Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: https://hdl.handle.net/10316/101413
Título: Works Council ‘Disaffection’ and Establishment Survivability
Autor: Addison, John T. 
Teixeira, Paulino 
Grunau, Philipp
Bellmann, Lutz
Data: 6-Jul-2022
Editora: Scottish Journal of Political Economy
Projeto: FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., Project UIDB/05037/2020 
Resumo: This paper investigates the association between a measure of works council heterogeneity and plant closings in Germany, 2006-2015. Two datasets are used to identify failed establishments, while institutional heterogeneity is captured by management perceptions of the role of the works council in managerial decision making and also by allowing for works council learning. The potential moderating role of sectoral collective bargaining is also examined. We report that works councils per se are not associated with plant closure. Rather, it is establishments with disaffected councils that display higher rates of closure. The latter result does not obtain where such establishments are covered by sectoral agreements; an outcome that is consistent with the literature on the mitigation of rent-seeking behavior, and one that also receives support from our finding that plants with dissonant councils are more likely than their consensual counterparts to transition into sectoral bargaining coverage. On the other hand, there is only limited evidence of works council learning.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10316/101413
ISSN: 1467-9485
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12330
Direitos: embargoedAccess
Aparece nas coleções:I&D CeBER - Artigos em Revistas Internacionais

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