Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10316/93851
Title: Idiossincrasias e contradições do projeto político republicano de Hannah Arendt
Authors: Uchôa, Marcela da Silva 
Orientador: Martins, António Manuel
Keywords: Republicanismo; Revolução; Totalitarismo; Desobediência civil; Instituições; Republicanism; Revolution; Totalitarianism; Civil disobedience; Institutions
Issue Date: 23-Dec-2020
Place of publication or event: Coimbra
Abstract: Se o pensamento de Hannah Arendt pudesse ser rotulado de alguma forma, ele poderia ser apenas “republicano” – não no sentido simplista e institucional do termo, mas no sentido da liberdade pública. Em diálogo com grandes teóricos do republicanismo, como Tocqueville, Jefferson, Maquiavel, Pettit, dentre outros, nos propusemos a identificar as marcas da herança tradicional republicana no seu pensamento. Essa afirmação não implica dizer que Arendt tenha tido um compromisso em seguir os preceitos da tradição republicana clássica, mas que, a partir do estudo dessas várias fontes, construiu o seu próprio caminho. A construção dessa linha republicana resgatou o ideal grego de espaço público e a herança romana da fundação, que a conduziram a buscar na história das revoluções um ideal político comprometido com a liberdade. As marcas da sua própria historicidade e os caminhos filosóficos que percorreu se entrelaçam e apontam para a busca de uma resposta que impeça que os horrores do autoritarismo encontrem espaço na falta de resposta política. Ao analisar as crises sociais que impulsionaram vários movimentos revolucionários, se preocupou com o que considerou como um esvaziamento da política. Do processo revolucionário nos Estados Unidos, viu na promulgação da Constituição um modelo que permitiria a real possibilidade da efetivação do republicanismo como espaço de liberdade. A Constituição organizada com vistas a diminuir a corrupção institucional evocava sua capacidade de gerir um processo de autorregulação dinâmica, que impediria que uma nova experiência totalitária pudesse vir a acontecer. Nesse percurso teórico, ela pensou a filosofia, as revoluções, o uso da violência, a desobediência civil, o direito, mas sobretudo pensou o seu tempo. Desse processo, encontramos não só as especificidades dos caminhos que percorreu, mas os resultados históricos daquilo que entendeu como caminho. Dos sistemas de conselhos federados como ideal à consciência dos desafios da tentativa de dar uma resposta institucional a tensões políticas, ficou a defesa da criação de instituições que garantissem o espaço de expressão da liberdade – ainda que o caminho político percorrido para chegar a essas respostas seja permeado por contradições individuais e políticas.
Hannah Arendt did not shy away from thinking and reflecting the world in a bold and risky way. It is with this political-philosophical premisse that this thesis proposes to think about the idiosyncrasies and contradictions of her own thinking. We start this research by trying to explain what motivates us to characterize Arendt’s thinking as “republican” – not in the simplistic and institutional sense of the term, but in the sense of what she understood as public freedom. In dialogue with the great theorists of republicanism, such as Tocqueville, Jefferson, Machiavelli, among others, we set out to identify the marks of the traditional republican heritage in her thinking. This statement does not imply that Arendt committed herself to follow the precepts of the classical republican tradition, rather that she studied these various sources to build her own path. The construction of this republican line was inspired by the Greek ideal of public space and the Roman heritage of foundation, which led her to seek in the history of revolutions a political ideal committed to freedom. In the American revolutionary process, she saw the promulgation of the Constitution as a model that would allow for a real possibility to put republicanism in practice as a space of freedom. As Arendt sees institutional innovations as guaranteeing the stability of the republic, she ends up endorsing legal arrangements aimed at preventing small producers from participating and having an active voice in the political domain. Arendt understood mass politics as a favorable space for the development and structuring of totalitarian regimes. For this reason, she defends the separation of what she calls the social question (which she associated with the grounds of the French revolution) from the political sphere (which she recognized in the American revolution). Hitler’s Nazi regime and Stalin’s communism were equalized as varieties of this single totalitarian system; a framework which excluded regimes such as Bonapartism and Mussolini’s fascism. But would the regimes led by Hitler and Stalin really be characterized as totalitarian regimes, or would they be bureaucratic degenerations? In order to answer this question, we understand both processes to be co-opted by countermovements. In other words, Nazism as a reaction to the post- World War I German revolution, and Stalinism is a countermovement in response to the Bolshevik revolution. In addition to the contradictions and dichotomies that permeate Arendt’s analysis of revolution and totalitarianism, we focus on the important influence that Rosa Luxemburg had on Arendt in the debate about the relationship between imperialism and colonialism. Following a reflection on the fallibility of the State’s action in the face of authoritarianism and the law itself, the debate around the relevance of civil disobedience as a form of claiming rights for the reestablishment of the democratic order, gains an important place in Arendt’s discourse, even while the discourse is permeated by important paradoxes when we confront it with other authors and activists who have addressed these issues. Confronted with the difficulty of separating the legal and political spheres, finally the sphere of law and justice is confronted, especially with regard to the debate around human rights. Discussions that, in the end, make clear the relevance of Hannah Arendt’s republican reflections and their implications for our time.
Description: Tese no âmbito do programa de doutoramento em Filosofia, apresentada à Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10316/93851
Rights: openAccess
Appears in Collections:FLUC Secção de Filosofia - Teses de Doutoramento
UC - Teses de Doutoramento

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
Idiossincrasias e contradições do projeto político republicano de Hannah Arendt.pdf3.72 MBAdobe PDFView/Open
Show full item record

Page view(s)

34
checked on Apr 9, 2021

Download(s)

9
checked on Apr 9, 2021

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.