Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10316/92704
Title: Debt Governance - Alteração de paradigma e controlo do “terceiro poder”
Other Titles: Debt Governance - Paradigm shift and control of the “third power”
Authors: Dale, Eva Mendes Marinho
Orientador: Barbosa, Ana Mafalda Castanheira Neves Miranda
Keywords: interesse social; governo societário; stakeholders; credores; responsabilidade civil; corporate purpose; corporate governance; stakeholders; debtors; civil liability
Issue Date: 17-Dec-2020
Serial title, monograph or event: Debt Governance - Alteração de paradigma e controlo do “terceiro poder”
Place of publication or event: Coimbra
Abstract: O nosso percurso começa pela indagação de qual a configuração atual do interesse social, procurando descortinar os valores que devem orientar a sua atividade. Concluímos que estes não serão determinados apenas pelos sócios, mas por uma miríade de entidades que com a sociedade se relacionam, e procuramos estudar em que medida é que estes interesses “externos” deverão ser tidos em conta aquando da concreta configuração do interesse de determinada sociedade.De seguida, concluímos que algumas destas entidades “terceiras”, os stakeholders, serão dotadas de um acentuado poder em relação à sociedade, por uma combinação de fatores que vão desde a realidade prática à vinculação contratual. Este poder poderá ser de tal forma relevante que se convolam em membros da sociedade, de outsiders em insiders. Sendo esta uma realidade estranha ao paradigma atual do governo societário – ou seja, os mecanismos de hard law e de soft law não preveem formas de tutela, quer destes novos “participantes”, quer da sociedade em relação aos seus comportamentos – procuramos determinar como controlar este “terceiro poder”.Assim, o nosso objetivo principal é estudar os mecanismos de controlo existentes no nosso ordenamento jurídico, ajuizando da sua adequação a este conjunto de situações, focando-nos no instituto da responsabilidade civil e indagando, essencialmente, de que forma é que se poderá desvelar uma eventual ilicitude e procurando, em última instância, proteger a sociedade, com base na linha orientadora que é o interesse social.
Our approach begins with an enquiry into the current configuration of the corporate purpose, seeking to discover the values that should guide the activity of companies. We conclude that it will not be determined solely by the shareholders, but by a myriad range of entities that relate to the company, and we seek to study to what extent these “external” interests should be taken into account when concretely configuring the purpose of a given company.Next, we conclude that some of these “third parties”, the stakeholders, will be endowed with a significant power in relation to the firm, through a combination of factors ranging from practical reality to binding contractual power. This power may be so relevant that they converge in members of the company, from outsiders to insiders. Since this is a reality alien to the current paradigm of corporate governance – that is, neither hard law nor soft law mechanisms provide for means of protecting both these new “participants” and the company itself from their behaviour – we seek to determine how to control this “third power”.Thus, our main objective is to study the existing control mechanisms in our legal system, assessing their suitability for this set of situations, focusing on the institute of civil liability and asking, essentially, how a possible unlawfulness can be unveiled. Ultimately, we seek to protect the company, by means of the guiding line that is the corporate purpose.Our approach begins with an enquiry into the current configuration of the corporate purpose, seeking to discover the values that should guide the activity of companies. We conclude that it will not be determined solely by the shareholders, but by a myriad range of entities that relate to the company, and we seek to study to what extent these “external” interests should be taken into account when concretely configuring the purpose of a given company.Next, we conclude that some of these “third parties”, the stakeholders, will be endowed with a significant power in relation to the firm, through a combination of factors ranging from practical reality to binding contractual power. This power may be so relevant that they converge in members of the company, from outsiders to insiders. Since this is a reality alien to the current paradigm of corporate governance – that is, neither hard law nor soft law mechanisms provide for means of protecting both these new “participants” and the company itself from their behaviour – we seek to determine how to control this “third power”.Thus, our main objective is to study the existing control mechanisms in our legal system, assessing their suitability for this set of situations, focusing on the institute of civil liability and asking, essentially, how a possible unlawfulness can be unveiled. Ultimately, we seek to protect the company, by means of the guiding line that is the corporate purpose.
Description: Dissertação de Mestrado em Direito apresentada à Faculdade de Direito
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10316/92704
Rights: embargoedAccess
Appears in Collections:UC - Dissertações de Mestrado

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