Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10316/43197
Title: Claiming choice for institutional economics
Authors: Caldas, José Castro 
Costa, Ana Narciso 
Keywords: Conflict; Deliberation; Institutional change; Institutional economics; Pragmatism
Issue Date: 2011
Publisher: Association for Evolutionary Economics
Project: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/5876-PPCDTI/99630/PT 
metadata.degois.publication.title: Journal of Economic Issues
metadata.degois.publication.volume: 45
metadata.degois.publication.issue: 3
Abstract: Institutional economics is often presented by its critics as a tradition in political economy purporting a mechanistic, robot-like, view of the human agent. In this paper this portrayal of institutional economics is rejected and choice is reclaimed for institutionalism. In fact, institutional economics is not committed to an understanding of behavior as mere stimulus-response. Notwithstanding the fact that institutionalism places great emphasis on habit in human conduct, this does not mean that it excludes autonomy, volition or rationality.The paper addresses the notion of habit within the pragmatist-institutionalist tradition with the aim of clarifying this concept, disentangling it from current misconceptions. With the intention of contributing to the development of a theory of choice in institutionalism, it then deals with deliberation and choice in the pragmatist literature, namely in John Dewey's Human Action and Conduct. Finally, the implications of deliberation thus conceived, namely in respect to collective action and institutional change, are highlighted.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10316/43197
ISSN: 0021-3624
1946-326X
DOI: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450308
10.2753/JEI0021-3624450308
Rights: openAccess
Appears in Collections:I&D CES - Artigos em Revistas Internacionais

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