Long term incentives for executives : pay for performance

Abstract

Executive compensation in general, and Executive Variable Pay/Incentives in particular, have been subject to numerous discussions and analysis over the last decades. Especially after 2008-09 global financial crisis, Executives have been blamed for excessive risk-taking and “short-termism” in their decision making (i.e., pressure to produce short-term results) that led into extremely high Incentives payment (both short and long-term incentives) not connected with respective business results. In this project work I analysed how Executive Compensation, and more specifically, Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs), offered in a group of 10 listed companies have been evolving in the last five years towards the Pay for Performance principle, that is, alignment of LTIP payment and positive business results. LTIPs represent a significant portion of Executive Remuneration and as such the most scrutinized element in a company’s Proxy Statement (or Annual Report for companies not listed in the USA). As a result of this study, I am able to confirm that companies’ LTIPs design is increasing the focus on its alignment between Executives incentive payment and business results, specifically: over time, LTIPs’ structure present an higher weight of Performance Shares, one of LTIPs’ most prevalent metric is Total Shareholder Return (TSR) and Executives are paid mainly via variable pay which is dependent on business results.