Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10316/101974
Title: | Private Enforcement and Opt-out System Risks, Rewards and Legal Safeguards | Authors: | Ramos, Maria Elisabete | Keywords: | competition law; private enforcement; collective redress; opt-out system | Issue Date: | 2018 | Serial title, monograph or event: | Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies | Volume: | 11 | Issue: | 18 | Abstract: | The EU Antitrust Damages Actions Directive does not include provisions for
collective redress. Each EU member state is free to provide national regulation on
this matter. The Portuguese legal system provided regulation on actio popularis since
1995. The ‘rational apathy’ of individual consumers may lead to non-reparation of
damage and be of significant benefit for the company that is in breach of the law.
The opt-out models solve the crucial economic problem caused by a large number
of consumers or clients who have suffered a small loss because of competition law
infringements. Under those circumstances, it is rational to be apathetic, because it
can be foreseen that the cost of filing for compensatory damages will exceed the
recovery obtained from the defendant. Such rational apathy of the parties injured
by competition law infringements favours the wrongfully acting companies by not
extracting their illegal gains from them. By not requiring the active consent of each
of the claimants, the opt-out model is able to override rational apathy of consumers. La Directive 2014/104/UE du Parlement Européen et du Conseil du 26 Novembre 2014 relative à certaines règles régissant les actions en dommages et intérêts en droit national pour les infractions aux dispositions du droit de la concurrence des États membres et de l’Union européenne n’offre pas des normes sur l’action collective. Chaque État-membre est libre d’adopter ses normes sur ce sujet. L’ordre juridique portugais prévoit des normes sur l’actio popularis, depuis 1995. L’apathie rationnelle de chaque consommateur peut déclencher la non réparation des dommages causés par l’infraction des normes de concurrence. Cet effet signifie un bénéfice pour les entreprises qui violent le droit de la concurrence. Le system opt-out donne la solution pour le problème causé pour des nombreux consommateurs qui souffrent des modestes dommages causés par des violations du droit de la concurrence. En ces situations, il est rationnel ne pas réagir, parce que les couts sont supérieurs aux bénéfices. Cette apathie rationnelle favorise les entreprises qui violent le droit de la concurrence. Le system opt-out est capable de surmonter les effets de l’apathie rationnel. |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/10316/101974 | ISSN: | 16899024 25450115 |
DOI: | 10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2018.11.18.4 | Rights: | openAccess |
Appears in Collections: | FEUC- Artigos em Revistas Internacionais |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Private-enforcement-and-optout-system-risks-rewards-and-legal-safeguardsYearbook-of-Antitrust-and-Regulatory-Studies.pdf | 279.02 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Page view(s)
72
checked on Oct 16, 2024
Download(s)
45
checked on Oct 16, 2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Altmetric
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License