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**SECURITY IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
CHANGES**

**BRAZIL'S RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA FROM
1985 TO 2018**

**Thesis of the Doctoral Programme in International Relations -
International Politics and Conflict Resolution advised by Dr.
Maria Raquel Freire and presented to the Faculty of Economics of
the University of Coimbra.**

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requirement for the completion of the Doctoral Programme in International
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Resumo

O presente trabalho busca analisar como a Identidade de Segurança de um Estado se comporta no âmbito de parcerias estratégicas. Compreendendo os decisores de políticas públicas como portadores da Identidade de Segurança, os valores institucionais que formam a ideia do que é o Estado e o que forma a coletividade. Tais decisores de políticas públicas criam as suas percepções, que também podem acarretar erros de percepção, baseados em valores difusos na sociedade. Assim, nossa pergunta de pesquisa é colocada como “como os decisores de políticas públicas mudam as percepções de parcerias estratégicas construídas através da Identidade de Segurança?”. O estudo de caso das relações Brasil – Argentina permite-nos analisar como os valores e ideias sobre a Política Externa se alteram ou se mantêm ao longo dos anos. O período analisado (1985 a 2018) compreende a maior parte da atuação brasileira dentro do novo período de democratização, assim permitindo-nos observar as diferentes interpretações de valores e fazer conexões entre as várias administrações. Mesmo em governos com distintas ideologias e com o ambiente internacional diferenciado, os valores de Política Externa que compõem a Identidade de Segurança aparecem, muitas vezes, de forma similar. As relações com a Argentina mostram-se como um caso desafiador ao passar por várias mudanças neste período de 32 anos. De uma rivalidade entrincheirada a uma parceria estratégica incontornável, as relações Brasil – Argentina mostram a capacidade de reinterpretar a si mesmo e de reimaginar o Outro rapidamente. Utilizando análise de discursos, facilitada por programas de computador, foi possível perceber as ambições do Brasil para a relação com a Argentina ao longo dos anos, e as reações argentinas a esses intentos. Conclui-se que, apesar da perenidade de valores dentro da Identidade de Segurança brasileira, a interpretação dada por cada governo a esses valores foi distinta. A recepção argentina a tais mudanças na atuação brasileira foi de cautela e desconfiança, apesar da necessidade do país para melhor se integrar ao mundo, o que se buscou na parceria bilateral. A ilustração do estudo de caso mostra que percepções de Si e dos Outros carrega valores não apenas pessoais, baseados em aspectos psicológicos, como defendido pelas abordagens tradicionais de Análise de Política Externa. Também existem valores intersubjetivos, compartilhados entre a população, captados pelos decisores de políticas públicas, que impactam na atuação internacional do Estado.

Palavras-chave: Brasil, Identidade de Segurança, Política Externa, Argentina, parcerias estratégicas.

Abstract

The present work seeks to analyze how a State's Security Identity performs in the realm of strategic partnerships. Understanding policymakers as Security Identity bearers, institutional values form the State's ideas and are what distinguishes its collectivity. These policymakers create their perceptions, which can also create misperceptions based on diffuse society values. Therefore, our research question is "how do policymakers change strategic partnerships built through Security Identity?". The case study of Brazilian – Argentinian relations – with a stronger emphasis on the Brazilian case – allows us to analyze how Foreign Policy ideas and values are modified or maintained throughout the years. The analyzed period (1985 to 2018) comprehends most Brazilian acting under its new re-democratized period, therefore allowing us to observe different interpretations of values and connect these to various administrations. Even governments with different ideologies and in different international environments, will pursue Foreign Policy values that end up forming a Security Identity, appearing in this way many times along history. Relations with Argentina are a challenging case, as it went through many changes in these 32 years. From a deeply-rooted rivalry to an unavoidable strategic partnership, Brazil – Argentina relations show rapid reinterpretation capacity of the Self and the Other. Using discourse analysis facilitated by computer software, it was possible to perceive Brazil's ambitions in the relationship with Argentina through the years and the Argentinian reactions to these intents. We concluded that, although value perennity in the Brazilian Security Identity, each government's interpretation was distinct. The Argentinian reception to these changes in Brazilian actions was one of caution and distrust, although the country needed better world integration, sought through the bilateral partnership. The case study illustration shows that the Self and Other perception carries not only personal values, psychologic based, as defined by traditional Foreign Policy Analysis frameworks; there are also intersubjective values shared by the population, captured by policymakers, that impact the State's international acting.

Keywords: Brazil, Security Identity, Foreign Policy, Argentina, Strategic partnerships.

Abbreviations

ABACC: Argentinian-Brazilian Accountability and Control Agency

ABIN: Brazilian Intelligence Agency

CAMEX: Chamber of Foreign Trade

CAQDAS: Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software

CELAC: Community of Latin America and Caribbean States

END: National Defense Strategy

EU: European Union

FFAA: Armed Forces

FPA: Foreign Policy Analysis

FTAA: Free Trade Agreement of the Americas

G20: Group of Twenty

G7: Group of Seven

GATT: General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IGO: Intergovernmental Organization

IIRSA: Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure

IMF: International Monetary Fund

MDB: Brazilian Democratic Movement

MERCOSUL: Common Market of the South

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

OAS: Organization of the American States

PND: National Defense Policy

SCCC: Common System of Accountability and Control

UN: United Nations

UNASUL: Union of South-American Nations

UPP: Pacifying Police Units

USA: United States of America

WTO: World Trade Organization

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Introduction

Identity studies became common in International Relations for the past decades, nevertheless, in almost every IR theory (Wendt, 2014), identity performance by policymakers has not become a mainstream issue. Structural approaches often analyzed identities as environment-driven instead of actor-oriented ones. How identity affects Foreign Policy have not been addressed, especially in International Security Studies. And identity can be mobilized for Security ends by policymakers, in what has been called Security Identity. In this way, a closer analysis of Security Identity in foreign policy is pressing.

This work derives from our previous research on Security Identity (Vieira, 2014, 2015, 2016), but it revises our primary assumptions. First, the new connection with Foreign Policy Analysis will give us assets to understand the role of top-level politicians as identity holders and explore the limitations identity construction brings to perceptions about bilateral relations. Second, we will broaden our understanding of Security holder, not limiting this to the Armed Forces or core Security conceptions. Policymakers, especially top-level ones, create Security concerns in many realms. From our previous research, Economic Security is critical to adequately address the creation of a Significant Other (the othering process). Security Identity will also guide us to understand how a negative Other might inform a solid strategic relationship, in this study looking at the Brazil - Argentina case. A critical study case on perceptions change by inner and systemic shifts. So, we understand Security Identity as the Self and Other perceptions relating to State perpetuation, which can be economic, military, societal and environmental.

Our research question is “How do policymakers change the perceptions of strategic partners built through Security Identity?”. Using a diffuse take on process tracing, we will observe how Foreign Policy has enacted under different decision-makers in the deep-rooted values and institutions of Security Identity. We approach the relation between Security Identity and Foreign Policy based on the case study, using discourse analysis of top-level policymakers in Brazil and Argentina. This actor-based research shall clearly answer how identities change (or are maintained) through government transitions.

This research analyzes official discourse in official foreign policy and security-related documents, such as discourses in international organizations, bilateral meetings,

press conferences and interviews. It includes the analysis of 500 discourses and 20 documents among policies, laws and recommendations. To help us navigate this rich database of documents and complement our qualitative analysis of discourse, we used Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). CAQDAS helped us see new connections among discourses, such as Peace not only as a traditional security matter but also as economic affairs.

Brazil and Argentina shared tensions through History. Border problems, as much as economic rivalry, marked the relationship for many years. These countries actively avoided integration for many years in the 19th and 20th Centuries(Castro, 2010) due to distrust issues. After the military regimes, Brazil and Argentina part of the end of the Cold War, reverberating in bilateral integration due to constructing a more pacific world alongside the internal changes (ibidem).

Starting in the mid-1980s, with the Iguazu Declaration¹, rapprochement remained strong during the 1990s. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Minister of Economics from 1993 to 1994 and Brazilian president from 1994 to 2002, was one of those responsible for establishing MERCOSUL (Common Market of the South) with Argentina (and uniting Paraguay and Uruguay) in 1994, formalizing a new period in the bilateral history of Brazil and Argentina that started one decade before. Lula da Silva's administration, which followed Cardoso's presidency, improved regional arrangements but had a globalist view of Foreign Policy. This meant a focus on the international, not only in regional affairs. The bilateral relationship with Argentina was not a priority and was handled at the regional level. Later, during Dilma Rousseff's terms, the region was, once again, at the center of the priorities of Foreign Affairs (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015).

State visits between Brazil and Argentina's leaders increased under Lula da Silva, and the southern border became a primary concern – especially the Argentinian and Paraguayan. Michel Temer's administration, however, introduced several changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy. The focus was no longer on regional arrangements or traditional Security affairs but revisited the globalist view – not region-based, but focusing on relations with major powers. For the first time since the 1990s, the administration considered making international efforts in both security and economic affairs without the traditional regional partners. During his term, Brazilian values, such as development and public security,

¹ A treaty relating to new bridges building that have been considered the beginning of Southern Cone integration. Brazil and Argentina actively refrained from creating physical integration in the past (Castro, 2010).

remained the same. Our work intends to understand how one country can adjust its Foreign Policy while limited by its identity.

Work on Foreign Policy and Security Identity will make it possible for us to understand how politicians act when there are incentives to cooperate and how building a partnership can decline where incentives are thin. The deconstruction of relevant partnerships is an important topic to address, as we can debate how cooperation ceases. Our theoretical claims of policymakers working under their psychological constraints and cultural frameworks relate to precisely analyzing foreign policy. Also, we aim to understand how value changes can alter the perceptions of Others, replicated for different problems. The encounter of Foreign Policy Analysis and Constructivism is relevant for IR studies because it creates a multi-causal chain of events reflecting politicians' actions, from the structure and the cultural setting reinforcements. The present work explains how agents bear identities and what can be rapidly changed and considered a more deeply rooted matter on the values and institutions they created.

1. Security Identity under Foreign Policy Analysis

This chapter discusses Foreign Policy Analysis under the lenses of Constructivism. We understand that as social practice changes, both internally and internationally, identities also change. The meanings attached to an event are socially constructed by policymakers operating in the social world. Thus, socially constructed realities are the basis of a Constructivist approach to Foreign Policy – the conjugation of policymakers’ perceptions under a social world, understanding identities as both internally and internationally constructed. A fixed identity is the Foreign Policy goal (Morin & Paquin, 2018). It is common in the international environment that identity will reproduce itself. This chapter looks at both stability and change in Foreign Policy and Identity. The chapter takes as an assumption that top-level decisionmakers are the bearers of State Identity and Security Identity. First, we establish the relationship between identity and Foreign Policy. They are interconnected because identity impacts the National Interest, and National Interests define values and agendas in Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy outcomes, in their turn, will either change or reinforce a given identity.




Figure 1: connection between Identity and Foreign Policy

However, acting in foreign policy will imply that the actors will exercise the Security Identity in front of Others, especially, States, but also IGOs or other actors. After that, a decision is made, which might imply new Foreign Policy directions. This, too, might change or reinforce the identity.




Figure 2: Foreign Policy process

As the new Foreign Policy alignment might modify Identity because it requires new actions and novel tools to deal with a problem, the final sketch to our research is:




Figure 3: research framework diagram.

1.1 National Identity and Security Identity

National Identity has been widely researched, broadly relating to the sense of nation-building and belonging to a specific demographic (T. Berger, 1996; Lafer, 2004; Sen, 2008). A nation is conceived as a homogeneous group of people who feel like they belong because of political unity, especially in the State era (Hobsbawm, 2012). National Identity is the sense of abiding by their ideals and principles (ibidem). Although Hobsbawm's formulation of National Identity is rather simplistic, it gives us a substantial start on the National Identity debate as an idea born in intersubjective settings formed by people and used by the State. National Identity formation implies many security aspects, but also relates to emotional, social, economic and many other aspects of social living.

A State can accommodate more than one nation, and people can have more than one identity related to the State (one's city, federal state, region). The State is the guarantor

of the values and the way of life of the collectivities it represents (McSweeney, 1999). The 19th Century comprehensive democratic reforms, such as the access to education and public goods, and the creation of a permanent military, had proven that the State needed to reach the people to thrive (Hobsbawm, 2012). Realizing that not all people would support or serve the State, nationalism became the legitimacy driver in modern societies to foster collective work towards a given end (ibidem). Discourses call to the population “rationale” by remembering the heroic State’s past or how a decision was good for the people, legitimizing the importance of the State to the public (Campbell, 1992). The nation, within the State, was the standard way of living: people who spoke the same language, united by the same religion and same past (ibidem). The State, fabricating this feeling of togetherness, could achieve its goals and prevent mass revolutions (ibidem). This relationship shows us there is an intimate relationship between identity and security. Noticing the State is formed by the people who adhere to its collectiveness, it must guarantee those people are safe to perpetuate the way of living that grants the State survival. The people perpetuate the State and grant internal legitimacy to it (Wendt, 2014).

The State not only protects the identity. It is also its maker. As the collective of people builds the State, that collectivity needs to be protected by the State. Therefore, the State has an identity by itself, coming from the intersubjectivity of people (Wendt, 2014). As Wendt poses, policymakers create the State agency to ensure the political unity will be perpetuated (Wendt, 2014). People who make the state have diverse identities, which does not mean these personal identities will be part of the National Identity. People who work for the State are one of enactment of values and institutions before their terms. This might be divergent from people’s values and political ideas in their private lives (Thies, 2010). There are values relative to be part of a State agency that might not flourish as a private individual but central to State life.

It is common sense that identity refers to the collaborative practices among people – their traditions, language, world view, how society is organized, and other related affairs (Fearon, 1999). Identity can also mean selfhood, who they are, what they like, and adherence to specific groups (Fearon, 1999; Wendt, 2014). As both a category of practice and a category of analysis, the duality of identity is due to the connection between Social Sciences and the social world (Fearon, 1999). However, it is also proof of the overuse of the concept (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). There is a consensus among constructivists that, although plural in their selfhood, people share ideas and values related to the geographical, ethnic, and political place they were born in (Fearon, 1999). But there are plural places, heritages, and

political instances a person is a part of; the centrality of the State as an organizer of life in a world-scale level gives quintessential qualities (such as the triangle people – government territory as the basis of a State) on the social life in creating “who we are” (Wendt, 2014).

Although many social levels, from local to international, are crucial in forming a personal Self, the State has a central authority. It acts as the regulator of social life (T. B. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001). It agglomerates personal Selves. It creates the State Self, infused with values from these different collectivities. This notion has been challenged, as undivided sovereignty is not an immutable postulate of International Relations. Different nations, new sources of identity, and other factors contribute to the State shares social life organization with other actors (*ibidem*). Still, States are the most present actors in international life, making National Identity a relevant starting point for analysis.

Some theorists claim that National Identity is a self-image of policymakers whose formulations carry out the State’s emotional (nationalist) aspects (Neack, 2008). The view on National Identity as a label filled with stereotypical ideas is because values and culture in an Identity are reflections of society (Katzenstein, 1996). An exclusionary identity gives us a hint that identities can be related to hate – if my State is “good” because of X, this means other countries are not X (Neack, 2008). However, rarely will people, especially statespeople, have an exclusionary take on their values.

National identity does not mean “hate at first sight” (Sen, 2008: 6). Although many theorists believe that national identity will conflict with Significant Others because of their dissimilarities (Campbell, 1992; Huntington, 2011), we argue that national identity does not mean, *per se*, a violent stand towards other cultures. Political manipulation of a certain homogeneity to achieve political goals and exploit a rivalry might happen, though (Sen, 2007). Nevertheless, identities are not inherently bad or good, but translate the feeling of belonging to a culture (*ibidem*). Identities are not unique. One can adhere to different cultures and groups, not only State-related. One person carries many senses of belonging – national, religious, subnational, civilization, and others (*ibidem*). Sen’s concept of identity brings important light to how Security affairs are linked to Identity – political manipulation of the collective is vital to define States' security agendas. In using values widespread among society for Security purposes resides Security Identity.

Foreign Policy practice reveals more nuances and similarities than the pre-formulated imageries of Others. Identities are, therefore, not only multiple (Sen, 2007) but also an evolving perception of who we are (Self) and who the Others are (Wendt, 2014). Also, taking stereotypes as a valid starting point for Foreign Policy Analysis, as Neack

(1995) suggests, can craft a problematic view of the Others, and take researchers to reinforce prejudices on other people.

A private citizen might not have an opinion on Foreign Policy (Hudson, 2005), but will support the neutralization of threats, or alliances with States who share values. Dangers might “(...) involve pressure on the external boundaries; it might involve the violation of internal boundaries; it might be in the margins of the boundary; or danger might arise with contradictions from within” (Campbell, 1992: 92). These different sources of danger may resonate with different values on the population and demand different responses from leaders (Hudson, 1999). Though used by policymakers to achieve their political elite goals (Kassianova, 2001; Sen, 2008), values are not fabricated if they are not part of people’s culture. The political elite and top government officials pick the intersubjective values they can use for their gains (Jervis, 2017). As these values are present among ordinary citizens, individuals can often predict how their State would act in a given situation, understanding how the leaders often act and how politics are commonly conducted (Hudson, 1999). We will call this societal expectation towards Foreign Policy and the action of leaders “Foreign Policy Templates.”

Because of identity proximity to the State, some theorists see it as a source of order where power and National Interests are displayed (Morin & Paquin, 2018). Using identity interaction and reinforcement, the State creates and recreates the Self, being this the basis for the international world to function (Mattern, 2014). Mattern’s (2014) theory has limitations, as it gives a central role to identity without providing a framework on how identity acts and the intensity it has in different matters. It does not mean that national identity prevails over other types of identification or that national identity has more normative meaning than others (Sen, 2008). The State can better enforce given values and ideas through formal education, propaganda, and other cultural activities it can sponsor (ibidem). For States to perpetuate their existence, they must keep forging this cohesion to promote stability and legitimation (Wendt, 2014). Policymakers must perpetuate the State as it is (ibidem). In Sen’s (2008) words, a study of identity is a study on the “vulnerability of human beings to propaganda.” An omnipresent concept involving the totality of relationships in a State cannot act as an excellent analytic category (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000), as this would debate too many aspects of human life and have too many intervenient factors. Locating identity sources and their goals is central for any identity study, given the different forms the concept can acquire.

If the State has its identity besides the personal identities of the people who are part of it, it is plausible to think the State has a personified entity or a “Self” (Wendt, 2014). The roles in the government limit politicians’ plurality to some possible responses (Jervis, 1976). From these two approaches, State, as used in this work, unites identity, whose values and historical interpretations are the basis for the collective Self of policymakers, and the government, formed by the people who make it possible for the State to perpetuate its existence. Identity, therefore, is a more complex concept, and it may imply different thinking from the State (Wendt, 2014):

1. Corporate or personal – how the State sees itself, how it is formed, and how it perpetuates its existence;
2. Type – how the State is labeled by itself through certain characteristics;
3. Role – how the State acts in front of other States;
4. Collective – who is the State when the boundaries between itself and another actor get blurred to where they can no longer be understood separately.

The two first identities are pre-social, meaning they arise from the State before it relates to others. The last two can only exist in the interaction with Others. The external environment might interfere with the four types of identities, meaning corporate identities are not present in the contemporary world (such as a feud) and type identities (a State cannot claim others as its formal colony). Thus, corporate and type identities might be pre-social, but those will change via interaction (Wendt, 2014). As not all identities are possible within an international environment, there is a fundamental limitation on the four strains of identities States can have (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). Every social order has limited roles States can have, making the Self formed around a few possibilities of identity enactment (Grossman, 2005).

All four types of identities imply security concerns. However, the corporate component deals with the reflection of the State on itself, being this the most crucial kind of identity to locate the State’s central affairs. These are physical (differentiation from other units – sovereignty, population, area), ontological (predictability from the world affairs), recognition (a State must be seen as an equal agent regarding others), and development (as the aim to a better life standard) (Wendt, 1994). National Identity, although not based only on Security concerns, implies security. Although security is widespread between the four identities, it is not the *leitmotiv* of it – identities have other implications, not mobilized for security affairs. Security identity deals with the values mobilized in front of an Other and

the responses to a threat, coming from the State's values and the perceptions of the Other's identity.

Security is not only related to the core, military issues. Distributing Security in different aspects of the State's life helps us understand how different affairs become Security problems (Buzan et al., 1998). The main areas, military (related to sovereignty and government machinery), environmental (political and scientific issues from natural resources and climate change management), economic (power struggles and autonomy loss), societal (government stability and ideology), and political (threats to the social order coming from non-military threats) (ibidem). The sectorial approach of Security shows how not only military problems are needed to perpetuate the State. National Security seeks to avoid insecurity to the population, which is more nuanced than force explicitly by a State.

As National Security does not need to be violent or automatically reprehend those who are different (Sen, 2007), neither does Security Identity. Collective Self-esteem is a National Interest (Wendt, 2014). It represents the desire to be moral and correct, and reinforce a negative Other (Suzuki, 2007). Security has been defined as the absence of threats and the safety of those within State protection (McSweeney, 1999). The concept of State protection and the constitution of a threat can vary due to shared meanings of Identity in each society (Buzan & Hansen, 2013). What constitutes safety in Brazil or Israel is most likely to be dissonant from Northern Europe, as per the threats perceived and the emergencies identified by the people and policymakers. Security is a multifaceted subject related to the perpetuation of the State as a legitimate political unit protecting its people (Buzan et al., 1998). To deepen McSweeney's concept, perhaps security is a State behavior – a discursive practice highlighting the crucial affairs and the possible actions within the statespeople rationale (Buzan & Hansen, 2013).

Related to this broad understanding of the security concept is how identity is enacted. Performance and effects of identities have not been evident in many constructivists' work (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). Wendt's work is fundamental in identifying limitations to what identity is and how it is shaped, but there is still little understanding of how identities affect international life (ibidem). Identities are the basis of reflection for policymakers to create and evaluate a Foreign Policy based on State values and practices. However, as Hansen (2006) advances, one cannot assume a causal inference between Foreign Policy and Identity. As the international structure stimulates and condemns certain behaviors, the State enters the external world already affected by it.

Furthermore, its identity and preferences will change with socialization (Wendt, 2014). As Foreign Policy and Identity are co-constructed, the focus should not be on what is prior but on how these two instances feed each other. Discourses are the primary source to check the interplay between these two spheres, as those trying to give a fixed meaning to an affair, relationship, or enforce values (L. Hansen, 2006).

State values are not merely reflections of different identity formation institutions, such as mass media, the entertainment industry, or social media (Kassianova, 2001). The State has tools to create self-understandings and promote acceptable values and behaviors. Kassianova (2001) shows that (1) the political elite, whose discourses craft parties' programs and platforms, also works through lobbying, and (2) top government politicians, in making national strategy and budgetary decisions, are not only reflections of society. These government acts create their own debates, resulting in support for their policies. Kassianova's theory relates to Putnam's (1988) two-level game, although proposing different levels. Top politicians must agree between them to ratify an agreement (first level), and the political elite must be convinced this agreement will be favorable to their gains (second level).

There are theories affirming States have identities generated by the elites' internationally projected views on their aspirations. These are not born from interaction but the mindsets of policymakers (de Lima, 2005). Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996) affirm that National Identity is formed internally but suffers from external pressure and changes itself in relations with Others, maintaining a double movement between internal and external commitments. Lima makes the same conclusion as they of double movement between identity and external forces. In it, no identity remains intact when interacting with a partner or Significant Other. They also hold those social and legal elements that define the rules the State will base itself on and how to connect international demands and national interests (*ibidem*). Policymakers seeking internal legitimacy will base new identities on previous ones and are not straightforward towards new policies' dramatic changes (Morin & Paquin, 2018).

National identity has many interpretations, from anthropological ones, including nation, miscegenation, and religious beliefs, to psychological elements about belonging or not to a group and the distress, peer pressure, and joys (Sökefeld, 1999). History of wars, won and lost, and National heroes are also part of the vast field of National Identity (T. Berger, 1996). The operationalization of these elements to elevate a problem to Security status or how a government invokes this to call for war, or for a cease-fire, or new economic

programs during crises define the Security content of National Identity. When values, traditions, nationality, or otherness get to the center of political discourse to justify a Foreign Policy change, it is possible to access the most substantial part of the National Identity, called Security Identity. In recent Brazilian history, the country's otherness against the Venezuelan regime, under the slogan of "Brazil will not turn into a Venezuela," was vital for the Temer administration to reduce cooperation with Venezuela and deploy the military to the Venezuelan border (Prandi & Carneiro, 2018).

As security assumes a myriad of central issues to the perpetuation of the State, it must be related to the State's interest. Although interests vary from the State's needs in a certain period and the broader context where it acts (as these are social constructions), it is possible to broadly determine the extensive areas of importance for the State (Wendt, 2014). Deriving from George and Keohane, Wendt lists four main national interests: physical survival (of the State-society complex, not necessarily of specific people), autonomy (control over the resource allocation and freedom to choose the government), economic welfare (maintenance of the production means and State resources) and collective self-esteem (how the people feel about themselves, by respect or status) (ibidem). These interests need to be satisfied so the State can be a legitimate and equal actor internationally.

The term Security Identity is something that crafts rationality, like the acting of similar actors under similar circumstances, varies across the globe (Barnett, 1996). The actions taken are dissimilar, and the discourses to endorse them vary because of the audience and the culture they belong to (Buzan et al., 1998). In Januzzi's work (1991), Security Identity relates to the EU's alliance and the values the people shared, being instead of the consensus on the European commitments in Security (identification process) than an analytical tool (Januzzi, 1991). Building on Januzzi's work, Rato defends the idea of a European Security Identity as a sovereign opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s values. He sees a profound influence of the United States of America (USA) in NATO. The European strategies for Security and Defense carried those countries' main concerns and *modus operandi* to relate to American values more than European ones (Rato, 1995). Security Identity, in this interpretation, comes from the process of multilateral agreements. Security Identity conceptualization was not the focus of either Januzzi or Rato's work. They sought to understand collective European policies, not to craft a theory on Security values and behaviors (Januzzi, 1991; Rato, 1995). However, they connected how the State sees Security through its values, expectations, and culture – an essential pillar for our questionings.

Security Identity deals with the same actions that a State can make to ensure the safety of its population, being the part of National Identity less likely to change (Rieker, 2006). Rieker understands Security Identity as how a State deals with threats and how to change its values and actions. Her problematizations surround the limitations to perform one's identity when a stronger actor has its own Security Identity (like the European Union, in tension with National Identities) (Rieker, 2006). As per her research, different actors can stimulate their values and behaviors, not being confined by the State action (ibidem). Nonetheless, it is hard to compare the supranationality of values to other weaker organizations, such as the UNASUR (Union of South American Nations), the same weight in the internal affairs, as the Europeans Union has more tools to stimulate Collective Identities among its members. Security identity shows which Security policies are available to the State. It limits the Self, on the one hand, but on the other hand it opens to other behaviors, enforced by internal and external forces. Security makes people feel safe (ibidem), and how a State will ensure that safety will depend on the Self's values (Wendt, 2014) and acceptable behaviors (Jervis, 2017). Decision-makers translate people's expectations and structural constraints into possible actions to guarantee Security for their populations.

Our research differs from Januzzi, Rato, and Rieker's. Their work does not focus on policymakers' ability to enact identities. Neither is central to their analysis of how a Security Identity is formed. Although these authors understand Constructivism as the constant interaction with Others, they base their efforts on how much a State identifies itself with multilateral initiatives and these institutions' identities, not how the States Security Identity is formed. As per Wendt's (2014) observations, the State is an amorphous entity, and it only makes sense to think about it as the result of a collective effort. Interactions with society and Significant Others are fundamental for Security Identity changes. The top politicians of a country point, by intersubjective meanings with society, which values are important and how an administration puts them towards actions. The very definition of the Other and how to create threats on how politicians enacted the Security Identity from the political elites is part of the Security Identity.

Security Identity was conceptualized as the State interpretation of the Self, both in its internal capacity and towards Others, how these Others perceive the actor, and historical interpretations of both the State and Other, based on critical military events (Vieira, 2016). Our previous work debated how American cooperation on Colombian bases changed bilateral relations between Brazil and Colombia. Colombia did not focus on South American

relationships when it chose deeper USA involvement in its security affairs. Based on how its neighbors acted on bilateral cooperation, Colombian elites perceived their neighbors as supporters of their fight against guerilla groups. These new military bases raised awareness of more external presence in the subcontinent, and Colombia became a regional destabilizer. Although concerned about Self-consciousness, constructivist approaches have debated much more the structure of the system, or even the structure that creates the State, than actor-specific problems (Hudson, 2005). On the other hand, Foreign Policy Analysis specializes in actor-specific problems, but the traditional rational actor approach has in recent years opened to discuss values and personal interpretations of complex reality (Hudson, 2005; Jervis, 2017).

Another relevant input to Security identity is related to Wendt's four classes of identity. Corporate Identity depends on an International Order Change to happen – the same with Collective identities when formed. Security Identity resides, then, on the Type and Role Identities, and sometimes in the Collective Identities. Concerning Type Identity, Security Identity debates the State strength, its capabilities for dealing with problems, and its programs to solve a Security issue while respecting its values. Relating to Role identity, the perception of the Significant Others, how to deal with them, and the proper tools towards them are part of Security Identity. Security Identity relates to a small part of the National Identity, while it is an essential part.

Although relevant to our analysis due to actors' social constructions, Constructivism is somewhat limited in explaining how States act individually and how they are constructed in their singularities (Wendt, 2014). Foreign Policy Analysis framework based on single-State analysis and how specific policymakers craft State actions might add to the analysis framework. Using the assumptions of Constructivism that identities are confirmed and change due to interaction, we will analyze the State-specific theory of Foreign Policy Analysis of how policymakers form Security.

1.1.1 Changing values – the importance of discourse

As governments change (a new government or a change inside the administration), National Interest can change (what is threatening us? How to respond to this problem?). Democratic governments are chosen because of their views and how they aim to make their populations feel secure (Hudson, 1999). Authoritarian governments draw their legitimacy

from other sources, as they are not chosen per se. The government's Identity malleability depends on their underlying agendas and how the political elite will require them to work (Kassianova, 2001). Policymakers have their own goals, and economic ties to economic elites, interest groups, and lobby influence their decisions (Kassianova, 2001; Morin & Paquin, 2018). Bureaucratic processes involve negotiation with external actors and internal opposition that may change the results of a policy. National Interests are based on values evoked to deal with a problem, which makes interests very malleable (Weldes, 1996). As changeable as it can be, National Interest is often present in policymakers' discourses, which show us (1) Foreign Policy goals and (2) sources for legitimacy (ibidem). FPA debates the response government leaders, through their aspirations and interpretations of the State's Self, works to solve political problems (Morin & Paquin, 2018).

Although different governments will perceive National Interests differently, they do not reinvent the entire State Self when elected (Hudson, 2005). The government personifies values and actions inherited from decisions before their administration (Thies, 2010). The State has a somewhat fixed identity; the values, historical interpretations, and relationships with others usually have a longer life than a government (L. Hansen, 2006). The usual is to perpetuate the Self as it is. Governments often try to justify themselves based on identities and values perpetuated through time instead of convincing the population to adopt new ones (Jervis, 2017). However, the Self cannot be continuously reimagined, as the identity suffers changes when exposed to different stimuli (Wendt, 2014).

The international environment may force changes on States as an essential form of pressure. These changes might resignify Self and Others, or those might mean a new course of action to achieve Foreign Policy goals. This pressure can change States' Security Identity fast. Different threats, affairs, and agendas arise occasionally. How the State (re)acts reflect the government (policymakers) and its ideas (identity) towards security. The State not often discusses Identity and Security Affairs exclusively. However, Security should be read in a broad sense, meaning warfare and the constitution of the State's lives. States and decision-makers are worried about stability, and this has security implications.

Choosing a new policy will affect different areas of a given State's domestic and international life. By seeking consistency in its decision-making process, a State will look for "multiple, independent, reinforcing arguments" (Jervis, 2017, p. 134) to support an action. Many arguments are set to relate to the biggest audience possible. In other cases, the policymaker will relate to one or two core values in the belief system to assure it is the best for the nation, making the argument weaker (Jervis, 2017). After this, the leader will add to

the official discourse new values related to the new goals and aspirations the State is seeking with this new policy (ibidem). A language is a political act when it constructs an identity that relates to a population and marginalizes others – the dialogue with the elites considered relevant is the basis for changing values or actions (L. Hansen, 2006).

National Interest's reconstruction happens because new policies are approved to address security problems. From this, the State might gain new values or use its values in new ways. Change is not the rule of Foreign Policy, as most States seek stability in politics. When change occurs, it is a crucial moment for the State. The population might disagree with a given policy and contest it, which will require a more vigorous argument from the leaders or a change in Foreign Policy (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012). As opposition arises, they will counter all the arguments used to apply a policy, stacking the arguments as previously presented (Jervis, 2017). An opposer of a policy will try their best to counter all the supporting arguments used to support it (ibidem). At an extreme level, the identity towards a matter will be contested, not only a specific policy (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012). The difference between opposition to Foreign Policy actions to internal ones is normative. Foreign Policy is mostly value-based and has symbolic meanings. Opposition to internal policy changes, such as Public Health reforms, comes as an actual impact on people's lives. Like closing an embassy in a given country, a foreign policy change carries a symbolic meaning, although it will have little impact on the population's lives at most times.

As changes take place in the social world, they are not neutral or exempt from political goals. For structural or personal reasons from its policymakers, if the social life of the State changes, so too do their values and goals (Hudson, 2005). As a policy is less of a reflection of the State identity as a whole and more connected to specific values applied in specific contexts is more likely to be inconsistent in the long term (Jervis, 2017). If a policy is applied and the government did not foresee its sub-optimal results, the more likely it is that the State will have problems perpetuating it in those terms (ibidem). Wendt's theorization of social practice and shared ideas on the State and international reality as a daily construction of reality by the policymakers can be related to this (Wendt, 2014). Wendt affirms that the State only exists as a collective entity formed by deliberately attempting to perpetuate the Self (ibidem).

Governments trace the minimum acceptable results to consider a policy a success (Jervis, 2017). Private political interest will form the National Interest and, therefore, the minimum acceptable result for the established goals (Morin & Paquin, 2018). This thinking will be explicit in the leaders' discourses – their aims, the values evoked, and the importance

of action (*ibidem*). If a policy fails, new values arise, with or without a change of program (in the methods used for a given policy) or a change of goal (withdrawing from a policy or fulfilling its destiny) (C. Hermann, 1990). Shifts in discourses accompany changes in programs and goals. The changes in a government's objectives might trigger inner competition, as the rival groups may call up the discrepancy between the previous and new goals (Hudson, 2007). Different values and ideas can bring oxymoronic policies to coexist, giving the government a difficult task to reconnect its different actions. What limits the shapes an identity might assume?

Social structures are not very elastic. Social practice advances and values are praised or forgotten. Social actors cannot base their discursive actions on a value not reinforced by the social structure (Wendt, 2014). There is, often, a backlash when policymakers forget values. The people who carry those can feel the State is losing an essential part of the Self (Sen, 2007). However, the policymaker will choose which values will convince the population if a given policy is essential, and that a given value is a vital part of National Interest. If many people do not share those values or do not think it is part of the State's usual form of action, it will oppose it (Wendt, 2014). New values can be incorporated as the social practice changes internally, like if a primarily rural society becomes industrialized quickly. If an external force is pushing a change, such as the end of the Cold War imposed a rapid shift in East European countries' foreign policies (*ibidem*). Nevertheless, identities are steady, as a rule – States try not to counter people's values and perceptions of reality (L. Hansen, 2006).

Value changes are often slow to take place because these confront people's beliefs. Decision-makers may face opposition if the value is not explicitly part of their discourses and social practices to redefine the Self under society's values, especially in security affairs that are deeply rooted in the Self (Rieker, 2006). Sometimes, even if the government moves from a security matter, the population might not follow it, as they were socialized to fear a given Other (Sen, 2007). Although having good relations in their inter-government and inter-entrepreneurial realms, Brazil and Argentina still face rivalries and distrust among individual citizens. Rieker and Sen affirm a consensual idea of identity, behavior, and values among decision-makers; enmity patterns will remain the same. This consensus arises from party ideologies, perceptions of the State, and feasibility of actions; it is a social construct shared by the administration. However, empirical studies show that individuality matters, and the interpretation of identity and other social practices can affect the political decision-making

processes (Putnam, 1988). However, as the top-level politicians reach consensus, they re-emerge as they genuinely believed the behaviors policymakers did (Jervis, 2017).

States can change values and manipulate social perceptions, but there is no complete liberty on what States can rely on to achieve given goals, internally and externally. As society has its culture and States must perform inside their action templates, these will limit governments from just reinventing new values and shared ideas (Hudson, 1999). If this sparks retaliation from rival groups, then the former's performance can be reconsidered. When an issue is considered essential and demands actions, decision-makers create agendas and discourses (Waever, 1995). Discourses make values, ideas, and actions meet through the spoken word. A decision-maker will seek to ensure the National Interest and raise awareness on essential affairs (*ibidem*). More than that, a threat must be faced with actions and consequences, meaning States must have the tools to take some action (*ibidem*). Decision-makers will need to draw the desired consequences and the minimum acceptable results for the actions taken (Jervis, 2017). Policymakers must prepare for undesired consequences of their actions; nevertheless, their perceptions of those might vary according to their reading of identity and popular organization.

1.1.2 Top-level officials as culture bearers

If we consider the State as a “they” rather than an “it” – as a conjunction of top-level officials that determine the actions towards the discursive practice (Putnam, 1988), we can assess how the State identity and the “rationality” constructed under pressures from the international and the internal societies. Suppose we treat the State as the collective of people, also considering leaders, executive, legislative and civil society. In that case, we might not notice how decision-makers make the bridge between choosing from the inner and external circles of pressures they are facing (Putnam, 1988). The determinants of State behavior are the policymakers, not the State, as amorphous beings (Hudson, 2005). As Wendt (2014) affirmed, one person cannot personify the State. However, Wendt agrees that policymakers are an essential part of the State reproduction and have an essential task in keeping the imagination of the State alive. Hansen (2006) confirms that State officials must keep State life as a somewhat regular discursive practice, making social life predictable.

Identity performances are tested and bargained between political elites, bureaucracy, opposition, and audience, as well as by the Others (Grossman, 2005). They can be improved or abandoned as Foreign Policy and social life change. Leaders do not decide

on Foreign Policy alone. Decisions are made in situation rooms, debates, and strategy planning involving Ministries, advisors, and Department Heads. Although Security Identity, as the core of State perpetuation, is consensual (Kassianova, 2001), the consensus must be built among the politicians.

As Putnam (1988) affirms, once a treaty is signed internationally, it must go through the two inner levels to be put in place:

- The First level contains the politicians in the negotiations, trying to get a better agreement for their inner elites, both the ones who agree with their aspirations and those who oppose it. The first level is where the top-level officials perform the State Identity and must contain the values and interests they support;
- The second level includes the internal groups of pressure, such as the opposition, political elites, civil society group whose ideas might shock with the agreement achieved on the first level. Bargaining and negotiating with them is crucial for the State's political goals to perpetuate.

As we understand the two levels as important arenas for political negotiation, one might assume there is a "rational person" in the practice of foreign policy (Campbell, 1992). As rationality is constructed through this process between the top-level officers and the negotiation with a different group of pressure, based on the identity, one cannot assume that rationality is absent from the cultural context. As one cannot conceive the State without the people (Hudson, 2005; Putnam, 1988), and the people will represent their interests and are part of a socially constructed world (Wendt, 2014), it is impossible to conceive culture as an independent factor. Negotiators need to address the internal constraints to achieve a deal internationally, and those constraints base themselves on cultural assumptions. The international environment will not allow a treaty against their idea of proper international practice (the culture dominant in the status quo) (Wendt, 2014).

When a particular top-level official has a different idea of an identity, they usually act as they believe in the values enacted, given the importance of their jobs, stability, or nationalism (Alisson and Gapperin, apud. Grossman, 2005). Going individually against the State structure might also not blossom significant results. Changing an identity requires a certain level of consensus among the top-level officials and society (Biddle, 1986). Decisionmaking is a process that involves negotiation, even among top-level officials, as they have different ideas on how to interpret a move from other States (Putnam, 1988). Historical load, collective Self-images, and long-standing conflicts create an identity for the

State and the policymakers (Kassianova, 2001). Although identities are negotiated and rethought, some level of similarity among the decision-makers is needed, given they will share expectations on Foreign Policy goals, especially within an administration. Conformity is also essential to understand role enactment, both with the normalcy of international order and expectations, internal and external (ibidem).

Culture, especially political culture, can have diverse implications. It is related to constructing meaning (intersubjective ideas of what is essential), values preferences (what are the goals and course of actions States should take), and human strategy (how a State creates a set of responses and ways of living that will shape an individual) (Hudson, 2007). Through the political culture, policymakers will reinforce the in-group idea of Self and reassure their interests through a somewhat coherent discourse (ibidem). Political culture is the path where the discourse shapes identity. Through this process, the politicians' ideas of National Interest take place, appealing to the population, reinforcing the State legitimacy.

Culture will include history and what expects from the leader(s) in given situations (Hudson, 1999). In Foreign Policy Analysis, many important cultural aspects do not immediately reflect in action frameworks for the policymakers (Hudson, 2005). Meaning, one can analyze culture in Foreign Policy without an in-depth, ethnographic study, but limiting oneself to interpret how values and ideas reassure political ideas. Although focused on cultural limitations of the State, constructivists emphasize matters that will deal immediately or closely with Foreign Policy preferences (T. Berger, 1996; Wendt, 2014). Foreign Policy represents an important area where Self-hood happens, and defining how this is conducted an essential part of decision-making (Kassianova, 2001).

Political cultures are the beliefs and values that shape a society's orientation of public affairs (T. Berger, 1996). As Hudson (2005) argues, one need not understand the whole culture of a country to study Foreign Policy, but the most sensitive parts of it define Foreign Policy. Top-level officials' ideas and values are presented in society as they attempt to represent the nation's necessities (Hudson, 1999). These try-outs form the action templates used when the State is in front of Others (ibidem). Culture is an essential variable in leader cognition, bureaucratic processes, and conflict resolution (Hudson, 2005). Perceptions are culture-based, and culture also intervenes in the State craft (ibidem). Perceptions are both a reason foreign policy remains the same and why it changes, as it accommodates new and durable ideas of the Self (ibidem). However, culture can be ambiguous or even contradictory. Top-level politicians will choose from the vast cultural

possibilities, those who are more akin to their interests and beliefs (Hudson, 1999) and those more closely related to their personalities (Elkins & Simeon, 1979).

Values and political orientations in society will reflect the decision-makers (Snyder et al., 2002). Some of these values are learned simply by socialization. Therefore there is no great need to act to persuade the public (*ibidem*). Although Snyder et al. defines value articulation to legitimize a policy, we shall take a step further and argue that some decisions are reached because of the cultural context. The definitions of threat and interest are born from understanding the State from that given matter (Katzenstein, 1996). The State interpretations of reality are conditioned of Self and Other (Wendt, 2014). Culture is not a part of the process but the basics that make the political process possible. Culture dictates the perceptions towards international organizations and can show which values matter most in a community (Hudson, 2007).

Values will change the motivations and actions of decision-makers. Policymakers' calculations craft these values on the capabilities of the State and their roles, and sanctions and rewards from action from groups within the society will influence what action to be followed (Snyder et al., 2002). Values impact the process, but they create the decision-making processes (Doty, 1993). Without a social reason for seeing or perceiving something as a threat, decision-making will not happen. The same happens to calculations – responding to a threat, by which means, is also rooted in cultural expectations (L. Hansen, 2006). Top-level politicians will balance themselves between the needs they believe are shared by the entire society and the ones that will benefit groups of interest (Snyder et al., 2002). The objective reality is less of a matter than how the decision-makers interpret its demands and problems (Gustavsson, 1999).

Interpretation and the administration staff matter to FPA. How they deal with the population and how they construct the idea of the nation will determine their preferences and which values are reinforced under certain given circumstances (Snyder et al., 2002). In a crisis or policy window, a decision-maker with the most favorable personality will propose a course of action, bargain with the opposition, unite with colleagues with similar positions and strategically put their idea as a plausible solution (Gustavsson, 1999). Action is tied both by personality and the values and perceptions of the people conducting the situation. Statespeople are the link, through role enactment, between identity and decisions, being them that identity's culture bearers (Snyder et al., 2002). Through the political game made by the top-level officials, the leader can operate and personify the State.

Culture constructs inter-State communications, and it has a set of psychological constraints on which action to take and the expectations for the State (Hudson, 2007). Historical structures and ongoing roles reinforce statespeople scripts on a particular matter. A response to a problem becomes the natural way of things (we will conduct this problem the same way we did in a similar situation) (Banerjee, apud. Hudson, 2007). Thomas Kuhn's Normal Science explains that repetition usually works to aid National Interest. Significant changes in interpreting National Interest and Identity can often be related to a paradigmatic revolution (Kuhn, apud. Berger, 1996).

1.2 Foreign Policy Analysis and Constructivism

Wendt (2014) presents a theory where both agent and structure are equal parts of International Politics. However, he focuses on structural matters instead of how these affect the policymakers and the civil population. His analysis is rich to indicate how Identity comes to be and how structural processes change it. Wendt does not offer a view of how change happens inside the government (or when a new government is formed) or how the government absorbs the international environment's pressure. Nonetheless, the four types of Identity – corporate, type, role, and collective –, and how those reconfigure the policymakers' efforts to perpetuate the State through values, history, traditions, and others (Wendt, 2014). An unpopular measure, such as raising taxes, will be justified under the “patriotic spirit” to maintain the living standards. In Wendt's theory, policymakers intuitively connected values and shared ideas; it is not a thought decision on identity.

Hudson (2005) digresses from Wendt on an IR theory basis. States are people, as he exposed (Wendt, 2014). However, Wendt still looked to the State as an uncontested entity, especially from its officials. He would still believe the State Self to be a collective without dissonant voices from within (ibidem). Because of that, the State might look like a metaphysical entity: made by people, but where people have little agency to decide. Seeing the State as the collective of decision-makers gives us a more realistic and complex analysis (Hudson, 2005). As top-level politicians, the State also gives more depth to decision-making analysis (and, in our case, identity analysis) (ibidem).

Hudson deepens these findings in her 2007 book, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*. In this book, she does an extensive literature review of FPA. Cultural/societal inferences are considered one of the many factors to consider when detailing leaders' decision-making processes (Hudson, 2007). Nevertheless, culture cannot

be detached from the other factors she analyzes, such as psychological and opposition organizations. Culture is present in every aspect of social life, influencing the entire State and interstate systems (Wendt, 2014). Hudson provides an essential debate on culture and FPA, but she does not address the issue that all decisions are socially constructed, affecting the other dimensions (psychological and opposition). Hudson says there are moments where identity and culture have roles, but that rationality is still the basis of State action. Different societies have different forms to create governments and organize society. Actor-specific theories are necessary to understand the cultural roots that form society and leaders' mindsets. Although the framework can be universal, understanding the formation of the rationale in a State must be closely looked at, as Constructivism does not provide specific lenses for that.

Both FPA and Constructivism are interested in knowing how material and ideal forces relate to international life. The focus from both in the decision-makers and how these translate the ideas from society and the international is another essential contact point (Doty, 1993; Hudson, 2005; Snyder et al., 2002). There is a gap to be filled by both IR branches. While Constructivism understands the environment where States are forged and the structural constraints to an actor's decisions, but not the specificity of a given State decision-making process, FPA offers a broad framework that seeks to understand how policymakers get to the decision they must make, but rarely understand how these preferences emerge. Some scholars studied this link (Houghton, 2007; Hudson, 2005; Morin & Paquin, 2018) but it is still not a field sufficiently explored.

Foreign Policy Analysis makes a vital intersection between material and ideal forces in IR by calculating linkages between power and the role policymakers have on it (Hudson, 2005) and connects to the constructivist methodology, as we will explain further. To Hudson, State is not an actor *per se*, but rather an abstraction formed by politicians. Her view on State is close to Wendt's idea of agency, sharing the same conclusion that a State is a group of people who decide on the perpetuation of an entity. These people deal with a myriad of pressures in their office decisions. The international environment is one of them; foreign policy is one of the many areas that require their attention (Campbell, 1992). Personalities and the mindsets of the decision-makers are essential to Foreign Policy analysis (Hudson, 2005). Hudson's work matters the most to our analysis on the take that Foreign Policy is not as simple as implied by the realist's first works (such as Waltz [1959]), being distressed by internal, cultural, and external factors.

Disagreements from Hudson come from the idea that purely psychological constraints are not enough for International Politics, as historical and sociological factors are at play to define security agendas. Otherness has multiple sources and different interest groups involved, making it harder to change perceptions towards them. That makes the problem of interpretative dispositions a necessity, moving a country towards an action (Doty, 1993). Doty also differs from Hudson by stating there is no fixed core of meaning where the minds of statespeople operate, but a complex transition of meanings where actions take place (ibidem) The world imposes given meanings to policymakers and creates and maintains reality; this translates as perceptions fostered by the statesperson. Despite that, there are no unlimited new ideas they can conceive, constrained by State identity (ibidem). Although relevant on how material problems affect identities, believes there can be new actions to the State's social life, despite internal and external pressures to act a certain way. Doty's analysis fails to explain why the same values and historical events are commonly evoked when dealing with different security problems by not addressing the identity constraints. Constructivism helps to deal with structural problems, but not the inner Self-construction. One of the core ideas of Foreign Policy analysts is that the National Interest is often subjectively constructed, fed by many sources of information that create decision-makers perceptions (Jervis, 2017; Kubálková, 2001). Our analysis contributes to these emerging studies on the intersection of identity-based and structural-based concerns. Neither is pure as a reflection of how leaders' mindsets read material problems.

We understand that, given new interests that may arise from internal sources (crisis, wars, new regional agreements), States will change their views on the international and position themselves differently (Morin & Paquin, 2018). Nevertheless, Security affairs are often different, as threats to the very State perpetuation depend on the decision-makers' consensus on threats and broader security problems (Rieker, 2006). If the leaders see a new security affair internationally or the bureaucratic elites' beliefs are at stake, they might reconsider their actions (Morin & Paquin, 2018). Different decision-makers with different ideologies, identities, and gains would react diversely in the same international environment (Hudson, 2005).

Although FPA theorists debated problems discussed by constructivists years later – such as agent-structure debates, the power of cultural forms in reality, among others, their approach was instead a positivist-like one – search for causal principles and a logical accumulation of facts did not explain construction of reality for the policymakers (Houghton, 2007). There is a direct cause for every policy for many theorists, given by national and

international constraints, in a somewhat direct linkage of causes and effects (Rose, 1998). The need to consider how culture and Foreign Policy Analysis interact, as Hudson first noticed it, implies a changed perspective (Hudson, 1999). Although Hudson (1999) and, years later, Hansen (2006) did not look for causal relationships between Foreign Policy and Identity, their interplay creates the discourses leaders will stand by.

Hudson explains that the need for the analysis of culture in Foreign Policy does not demand studying the entire culture of a given State, but only the “chunks” (Hudson, 1999, p. 768) of social interaction policymakers need to consider to be at a solution. There is a national role conception in which the State interprets the Self and seeks to act inside this framing (Hudson, 1999). National role conception changes by Others and is re-imagined inside the stimuli it receives (*ibidem*). To understand how role conceptions translate to action templates, she affirms that official discourses often provide maxims, repeatedly, on how the State sees itself (*ibidem*). Although Hudson’s theory relates, so far, with Wendt’s conceptualization, she drifts from him as she adds the concept of action templates.

Action templates are the possible responses to some given acts of external forces. Culture makes States more prone to respond in a certain way (Swidler, *apud*. Hudson, 1999). A State might so often deal with a matter with a rapid response to it. Action templates might also change with time. An actor who changes its identity might have to rethink its action templates as a former global superpower (Hudson, 1999). Although Hudson does not use the concept of identity, we shall base ourselves on identity as described by Wendt (2014), focusing on Security affairs, our focus for this research. Although attentive to structural matters, Wendt’s theory critically analyzes identity, from its organization to sources (Wendt, 2014).

A State rethinking its role in the international environment will reimagine many “chunks” of its culture, which might affect the actor’s identity and self-hood. Culture can be perceived in three arenas: formal institutions and security regimes, world political culture, and patterns of amity and enmity (Hudson, 2005). These layers are socially constructed and reproduced, making Identity a label branded by States and put on other States, which might help to cooperate or create tensions (T. Berger, 1996). Culture is the shared meanings that are constantly evolving, based on key historical events, connected to the possibilities drawn by the international life at the moment (Hudson, 2007). Culture is crucial for identity, and Identity is decisive for Foreign Policy, not always requiring a new group of politicians. The small-group dynamic of FPA theorists comes to complement the constructivist idea of the embodiment of identity. There is a reimagination of the Self that will define which behaviors

are must be enforced or altered. These people respond according to their mindsets (Jervis, 2017), but cognition is rooted in socialization and cultural learning. As Snyder (apud. Hudson, 2005) noticed, the policymakers are culture bearers, meaning they reflect the national roles they need to consider. As presented by Wendt, the identity will be interpreted by those picked to represent the State (Hudson, 1999; Wendt, 1994).

While Wendt focuses on the long-term values and structural constraints on the policymakers, Hudson believes that the continuum of social interaction crafts cultural values and dispositions towards a matter. Our goal is not to understand if culture comes before or after a given action or creates a new action template. It might not be possible to assess how a State began to act in a given way towards a particular affair. What can be assessed is how the State used values it had in its Self to create a somewhat consistent line of action towards another international actor. Value and posture towards another actor are also relevant for our study, as the enactment of identity shifts within it.

Changing values result from a new type of socialization. A State often follows an international norm because it was socialized to do it, but its actions might drift from those dictated by the international environment (Morin & Paquin, 2018). When the State finds itself in this contradiction, it will attempt to change values to support its behavior change (ibidem). As value changes happen slowly, it reflects on the speed of behavior changes. Change in Foreign Policy does not come only by a new government, but it is related to the following (C. Hermann, 1990):

1. Adjustment change – those related to the effort or scope of a given policy, involving the number of resources the State can mobilize for it (e.g., more funding for social programs);
2. Program change – related to methods and means, it deals with the quality of politics and how these can be perfected (new measures to make a social program more effective);
3. Goal/problem changes – when a problem is solved, or a country forfeit from an agenda (the country decides to end a social program because it lacks funding or because the problem was solved);
4. International orientation change – it is how the State relates to world affairs. It is the most drastic change. It involves changing the action templates for all the policies that need to be revised (a State invests more in regional integration or takes a Nationalist approach towards Foreign Policy).

Government change does not imply Foreign Policy Change. General notions of Identity remain the same. What changes within new governments is the efficiency of given policies or the evolution of State practice (C. Hermann, 1990). Foreign Policy is affected by internal politics in three main ways: as a policy becomes a matter of political struggle; changes in the elites' mindsets; revolutions or other likewise abrupt changes in inner political life (ibidem). Hermann's thinking is limited by how these changes will be interpreted and internalized by policymakers. Changes are not automatic; those need to be internalized by the political elites (Kassianova, 2001) and by society (internal and external) (Wendt, 2014). How the policymakers decide on reading a change can also vary, as it depends on the government's efforts, new discourses (with an update on the values), and budgetary/economic impacts (Jervis, 2017).

Perils can still be used politically after its solution, as the populations still react to past threats as historical interpretations will not be erased from people's minds (Campbell, 1992). Governments will often use an enormous amount of propaganda to make the public believe in a threat (Sen, 2008). After the conflict is over, people who lived inside that socialization will keep following those patterns unless similar resources and time is devoted to change those ideas (ibidem). As Campbell (1992) analyzed USA Security Policies, he noted the population would rapidly change their views on the country's biggest threats if there were a reinforced view on the new Security concerns of the State. He shows that, in 1985, 23% of the Americans believed Nuclear War to be the biggest threat to the USA, and only 1% agreed it was drugs; in 1989, 54% mentioned drugs as the biggest threat, against 1% polling for Nuclear War (Campbell, 1992, p. 199). New policies, media awareness, and the feeling of "winning" the Cold War were united to ensure a new agenda arose, as it can happen under a policy window. However, again, these policy windows are rare, and rethinking how the State deals with its Security Identity is very difficult and slow most of the time (Rieker, 2006).

Morin and Paquin (2018) highlight that Constructivism added the "how" questions to Foreign Policy instead of assuming a mechanical response. Leaders' preferences and personalities are essential to address Foreign Policy change, as the role enacted gains new scripts to enable their preferences as National Interests (Gustavsson, 1999). It also needs to consider how the preferences and values were shaped by decision-makers' personalities (ibidem), as values are reinforced or abandoned as social practice advances (C. Hermann, 1990). One must gather evidence showing how these steps were influenced by external or internal factors (Gustavsson, 1999). Finally, the momentum has to be favorable for a given

change – the *policy window*, as Gustavsson (1999) notes. Policy windows happen when both the international and the internal systems open for a change, big or small, easing the transition from a policy to another. Let us take Foreign Policy as practice, as it only exists as policymakers seek boundaries, approximation, and making due to their actions through discourses. Security does not happen in the void of policymakers' minds. Instead, it happens in the interaction with other cultures (Campbell, 1992).

Gustavsson's model, nonetheless, misses a Social Sciences issue. The leaders, values, and internal and international factors are not outside social practice. They are a constitutive part of it (Doty, 1993). States and top-level politicians are both subjects of Foreign Policy as they are objects (*ibidem*). This co-construction shows that action templates are constantly changing. New agendas, threats, crises blossom, and new action templates are crafted from the leaders' interpretation of the National Interest and how to protect it. Although co-constituted, States, leaders, and/or the international are the spark that starts a change in Foreign Policy. The cases must be analyzed in their specificity so one can assess where the change started. As reality is not a given but a construction, process-tracing of discourses to policies and actions must identify where the change began.

From the information decision-makers have combined with self-reflection, states build an image for others (Jervis, 1976). This image can be enforced on the population using propaganda or other cultural tools, such as education and media (Sen, 2008). As identities can be (although they are not always based on this) based on the differentiation from Others (Campbell, 1992), this reflection makes not only States' Identities (what makes us different from the Other?), but also counter-identities from policies adopted by others (this State sees us like this because they have these characteristics) (Wendt, 2014). Therefore, decision-making is based on values, perceptions of leaders and elites (how they enact National Interest), and the images of other actors (Jervis, 2017). It also deals with crossing information between these different actors (*ibidem*).

Jervis' work on the psychological constraints of the leaders in a State gives us a rich analysis of how policymakers embody identities. Cognitive interpretations will shape their participation in a given policy or political body, their attitudes, and their choices (Jervis, 2017). Decision-makers' cognitive processes often differ from the general population, given that international treaties do not matter for the civilians as much as they do for politicians (*ibidem*). Participating in Foreign Affairs means molding a country's identity and enacting it as expected for the more concerned citizens and the international audience (Morin &

Paquin, 2018). Perhaps even the very idea of ethics and morals differ from top-level officials and regular people (Weber, 2008).

Our analysis crosses these two concepts (identity and the imagery of others), which cannot easily be transmitted through the minds of policymakers. As politicians embody identities, and as identities need to translate National Interests determined by the leaders' interests, Jervis' theory is proven insufficient. Top-level politicians do not stop to analyze their identities as a conscious step (Wendt, 2014). They have their values in mind before any agenda (Hudson, 1999). Through Foreign Policy, Identity is crafted and reproduced (Morin & Paquin, 2018).

Identities matter in FPA because they connect with the statespeople and the values and narratives they relate to – their *perceptions*. Change in Foreign Policy often means a change in politicians' minds. Changes relate to three dimensions: degree of institutionalization of the policy (for how long, how many people were impacted, how common is it for the population to live with that?), degree of support (internal and external) (is the population in favor? Is there pressure from the international environment to change it?) and the degree of salience (significance) (is it closely related to the most critical values of the Self? Is it the biggest policy implemented by the administration?) (C. Hermann, 1990). Foreign Policy Analysis affirms that States can learn through failure, restructuring of means and ends, internal lobbying, external shocks, and problem-solving. Their leaders or the bureaucratic advocacy networks cannot lead those changes (ibidem). Recent works on Foreign Policy (Cason & Power, 2009; Hudson, 2005) claim that categorization of Foreign Policy might lose the complexity of reality. Building a change can be nourished by many forces and structure levels simultaneously. They disagree on the fact that change comes only from leaders or structures. These levels and forces can have a different weight in Foreign Policy formulation in distinct political moments. The exchange between them might be higher or lower depending on the objectives and interests involved; it may shift the balance of power from one internal actor to another (Cason & Power, 2009). FPA and Identity are the focus of the following section.

1.2.1 Foreign Policy Analysis and Identity

Identity not only shapes a country's actions in a critical moment but its character as well (Jepperson et al., 1996). Identity is conceived by Foreign Policy (especially role and collective identities), as Foreign Policy is the practice of differentiation. Foreign Policy is

one arena of speech acts that crafts the relevant problems for the State (Campbell, 1992). However, there is the argument that identity does not mean fear of Others by itself, although it can be manipulated for that use (Sen, 2008). Political elites can provoke fear or hate to make it easier for the population to accept a new policy, from economic austerity to war. However, these differentiations are often more present internally than externally (ibidem). Identities do not have a normative value by themselves – they can have positive and negative implications, depending on how the politicians direct it, sided by elites (Gustavsson, 1999).

Campbell is one of the first to address Identity as a performative constitution of the State. The discursive practice gives us notice of what is inside and outside. Repetitive processes make the performance of identity easier and naturalized (Butler, apud. Campbell, 1992), and that helps the State improve its narratives towards a matter and crafts better scripts for the leaders to follow (Hudson, 1999). Foreign Policy attempts to understand what constitutes the Self and how its boundaries are formed and reproduced by political performance (Campbell, 1992). Identity can be the “ultimate goal” (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 267) of Foreign Policy, as it keeps reaffirming the fundamental national values for the State’s peers. Identity and Foreign Policy are co-constructed worlds, so Foreign Policy crafts necessities and creates social cohesion internally (Campbell, 1992).

Foreign Policy relates to Identity in elevating matters to the Security level, but it is an indispensable guide to positively reinforcing core values towards partners. Differentiation is not always as substantial for all the different identities (Suzuki, 2007). There are also actors a State relates to because it shares concerns or values or who inspire the State as a model (ibidem). These connections might be as crucial for identity consolidation as those whom the State separates from the Self. However, limited identities create general action frameworks related to particular agendas of social life (Hudson, 1999). A State cannot have innumerable multiple identities because its values and knowledge of interpreting certain aspects of National Interest restrict this possibility. Second, Wendt’s identities (corporate, type, role, and collective) find the main domains of identity a State can find, being limited by the international context and system (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001).

This is an essential point of connection between Foreign Policy Analysis and Constructivism. While Constructivism sees limitations to infinite identities, as its main focus is on the structural constraints and not on the actor-specific problems, FPA affirms that, as policymakers perform identity, these people will have a somewhat stable mindset about those issues (Hudson, 1999). If there are innumerable identities, being all enacted to the State gains, then identities would not pose a problem, only rational actors manipulating reality,

detached from their populations. Nevertheless, decision-makers are both the performers and the readers of identity. This limitation shows us that if a value is not present in society, or people do not see it as part of “the nation,” they will not adopt it, as it can have consequences for the stability of the government and the country in general. A new law based on sharia would not get much acceptance in European society because the value of following the Koran is not present among its citizens. Foreign policy does not change fast because it derives from an adjustment, program, goal, and global transformation (C. Hermann, 1990).

1.2.2 Leaders’ based Foreign Policy Analysis

Historically, leaders’ based FPA has focused on the “great men” of their times and how their personalities changed political decisions with a robust strategy (M. G. Hermann & Hermann, 1989). This is due to it being a crucial moment for the State’s life, so the standard rules of politics are not applied. The more a subject is essential for the nation, the less it will be publicly discussed, and the more it will depend on fast action from the leaders (Buzan et al., 1998). Leaders can impact foreign policy with their personalities and decision power (the much they can go against other decision-makers and inner powers).

State leaders, such as Prime Ministers, Presidents, and Chairs, are chosen because they embrace the country’s values and how well they represent the National Interests (Hudson, 1999). Elected or not, leaders seek legitimacy, and they must represent State values to avoid a deposition. It is their job to pursue the perpetuation of the State. They reproduce State Identity through their discourses (Wendt, 2014) and reinforce the way of living most desired to achieve their goals (Gustavsson, 1999). Foreign Policy changes dissociate from government changes (C. Hermann, 1990). Though a leader cannot be considered the engine of Foreign Policy changes by themselves, depriving the analysis of the head of government can blur how foreign policy happens (Morin & Paquin, 2018). Suppose top-level officials hold more power in the decision-making process. If so, one must ask who put those people in there (M. G. Hermann & Preston, 1994). As the leader will, in most cases, choose their staff, then their perceptions will affect how foreign policy is conducted (*ibidem*). Leaders usually will not decide by themselves, as they will probably listen to their advisors and other interest groups (M. G. Hermann & Hermann, 1989; Morin & Paquin, 2018).

There can be moments where a leader is determinant for foreign policy, and this can happen in both authoritarian and democratic States (M. G. Hermann & Hermann, 1989).

In these cases, it relates to understanding how the leader's personality plays a part – how much the leader knows about foreign policy? How much opposition do they allow in their cabinets? How sensible to other opinions and advice are they? (ibidem). Some statespeople are known for their single-handed acts, even in democratic regimes – the reminder of Lincoln's single-handed policies is an interesting viewpoint on how this might happen under democracies as well (ibidem). Political preferences and personalities of leaders also have roles in Foreign Policy (Dyson, 2006). Extraordinary moments, such as crises and wars, require the leaders to work outside the pre-established protocol (Buzan et al., 1998). In these moments, the leader's personality has an important role (Dyson, 2006). Bureaucratic workers and advisors will represent different opinions and convince leaders of the different needs of their population in a way it represents their ideals and identities better.

Charles Hermann (1990) believed that only authoritarian leaders would single-handedly provoke foreign policy changes. The political power and energy needed to change their cabinets and the opposition pressure are too big for the leader to endure by themselves (ibidem). Margaret Herrmann (2003) affirms that ordinary moments require leaders with the right set of personality traits. This is decisive for changes, negotiations, or legal power, without jeopardizing democratic order. What often happens in democracies is that legislative and judiciary powers can limit implementing a new policy, going from budgetary decisions to veto or a potentially harmful action (Barilleaux & Andrew Iisu, 1999). In Brazil, specifically, presidential diplomacy became a critical tool for boosting National Interests internationally (Cason & Power, 2009). The Senate, nevertheless, needs to vote on any treaties for these to enter into force (ibidem).

The leader often verbalizes needs and expectations in the name of the State. As States, through their decision-makers, face a threat, it is often the leader who will address the population to advertise it as a real problem (Buzan & Hansen, 2013). If the leader succeeds to "sell" a subject as urgent to the public, the matter becomes more critical, and the break from the standard procedure is tolerable (Buzan et al., 1998). Not only leaders may claim something is a threat – bureaucracies, interest groups, and the legislative power can do it as well (Buzan & Hansen, 2013). As the leader debates an affair and its resolution, they threaten a policy agenda and call for attention for their concerns. Leaders will have moments when their personalities show, such as interviews, speeches, and other publicized leisure moments (M. Hermann, 2003). This hints at how they will act in important moments (ibidem). Hermann gives more attention to spontaneous interactions than to critical discourses (generally written by another person).

Nonetheless, her focus is on the psychological constraints of statespeople. Hansen (2006) affirms the official discourses are essential when analyzing Foreign Policy, as they show us where the leaders are heading and what type of decisions are being made. Hansen's model 1 of FPA analysis, based on the official discourses and the opposition, suggests that discourses often quoted or around a critical event have significant importance to understand Foreign Policy. Hermann (2003) also believes that leaders' statements and general ideas are an essential part of analyzing the role of leaders in Foreign Policy. Leaders' personalities will share the importance as the group of policymakers in power shapes National Interest side by side with them. However, in the early stages of the decision to join a party, a government, a given position will hold some information about the personal traits of somebody (Elkins & Simeon, 1979). Individual articulations of action templates often describe the capacity of molding the National Interest as part of somebody's identity, such as a charismatic leader (Hudson, 2005). Actions and values are both used to maximize the advantages of cultural preferences so that the government can reach its goals (Swidler, apud. Hudson, 1999).

Leaders' cognition is essential to understand how they will act; their personalities filter information fed through their mindsets and apply the most desired measure (Jervis, 2017). They have their formation, interest groups, and parties to craft how to act when facing a problem (ibidem). Nevertheless, fully addressing how they interpret a situation is extremely hard. First, because direct psychological work might be necessary to understand their motives truly – conscient and intuitively (M. Hermann, 2003) Second, because of the complexity of the crucial moments and all the pressures the leaders are suffering, it might be too difficult to properly analyze the extent a leader's Self played in a situation (Waltz, 1979, apud. Morin & Paquin, 2018). Therefore, discourses, press appearances, and the personality of leaders are essential to FPA. As the leaders do not rule just by themselves, it is crucial to understand how the top-level officials behave in these situations and create the solutions and discursive narrative within which the leaders operate, which is the focus of our next section.

1.2.3 New perceptions and new identities

Identities are somewhat stable (L. Hansen, 2006; Morin & Paquin, 2018). They are ongoing reflections of who the Self and the significant Others are (Wendt, 2014) and tend to

suffer few changes inside a stable *status quo*. Changes can occur without a significant change in the international social life (C. Hermann, 1990). However, through the values and everyday life, the rhetoric of stability tends to be the goal for most States (L. Hansen, 2006). Identity is the basis for National Interest, meaning Identity relates to the perpetuation of the State, showing the importance of State Security. To protect the State's social life, National Interest must secure National Identity, holding it to values which legitimate the Self (ibidem).

Identities take place in the social world to attend to its incentives and constraints (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1991). Identities can be labels that deal directly with immediate realities (Katzenstein, 1996), but they often live longer than the conjuncture they were created (Morin & Paquin, 2018; Sen, 2008). People are born and socialized, having some values, fears, and ways of life. They have difficulties simply leaving behind what they believed was right (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1991). Recreating a person's self-hood is hard. However, values and cognitions related to the National Identity take time, propaganda, and political effort (Sen, 2008). Recreating identities that the State will incorporate also takes time and effort from the State and its institutions (ibidem). It can go from the way elections are held to diplomatic efforts to convince new partners. New identities will be forged as successors of the old ones, still holding to the same or similar values, reinterpreting reality (Morin & Paquin, 2018). Hermann (1990) concludes that theories about inner Foreign Policy Changes agree that the ruling elite (their composition or beliefs) are the core of new policies. As Putnam (1988) states, political dialogue with elites is crucial for foreign policy change because they have views on how treaties are internalized not to hurt the National Interest. This means adjustments and changes in foreign policy might be detached from government changes, as interest groups might try to negotiate these with the government.

External crises are also an essential source of change in Foreign Policy. Governments will perceive changes in the international, such as a financial crisis, and know they will need to act differently from expected behaviors and rewards (C. Hermann, 1990). International social life rewards some values and initiatives differently, and it will be in the States' best interest to adapt to protect their Self (Wendt, 2014). It reinforces some identities and inhibits others – as one can agree that a State identifying itself as a Feud would not be adequate for 21st Century politics (ibidem). Crises can create new others and reinforce dormant differences between rivals, as the external world's discursive practice can accentuate dissimilarities.

Discourse and practice are a continuum on Security affairs. A threat is not an objective problem for the State. Policymakers construct threats as they understand an Other is problematic for survival (Waever, 1995). Through the speech act, States bring matters to the instance of security. These constructions are directed to an audience, and this audience will accept or deny a threat as such (ibidem). Waever, nevertheless, argues that studying Security does not relate to culture or politicians, but to “politics directly” (Waever, 1995). Our analysis understands Security is inserted in the cultural world, where an argument towards a threat can work for an audience, but it would possibly not be replicable to another (Katzenstein, 1996). Waever (1995) claims that there is no hidden motive behind securitizing a threat, such as propaganda. Hansen (2006) affirms that, although one cannot assume a causal relationship between them, there is a structural relationship. To her, discourse in Foreign Policy aims to create a link between identity and the proposed policy. Wendt (2014) says that culture makes a causal difference in the responses and discourses one State makes towards securitizing something. As the actors understand what an action entitles, such as moving troops to the border, there are shared ideas to the act (Wendt, 2014) – where is the border, how is our relationship with the other State, what a national army is. Culture as shared beliefs is very present in Waever’s theory, and the acceptance of discourse also deals with values and perceptions. Wendt (2014) affirms that the minds of policymakers are not created in a vacuum, but their ideas and interactions are embedded in the socialization processes they are involved with.

Discourses give meaning to social life, being Foreign Policy one of the many realms that dispute the State’s attention to create boundaries and protect its values (Campbell, 1992). Although securing identities is the final goal of Foreign Policy because these are co-constructed (Morin & Paquin, 2018), Foreign Policy is not the only realm that exercises identity (Campbell, 1992). Foreign policy can be seen as an external reaffirmation of the discursive practice (Campbell, 1992) and the most effective in portraying State values (Morin & Paquin, 2018). As States are verbal beings (L. Hansen, 2006), few policies are made by non-verbal communication. States pursue non-verbal discourses when they make war memorials, move troops, or raise surveillance at the borders, as practical examples (L. Hansen, 2006). Nevertheless, these practices are accompanied by a clear message. Discourses and non-verbal acts make a problem into a Security matter or a bureaucratic affair, as they relate to the Self or defy it on any level (Waever, 1995). As the State receives new stimuli from Others, new perceptions arise. These new perceptions can be related to an

enemy's openness to negotiate or a nationalist wave on the rise, making processes more difficult. These will require responses that might lead to new identities.

There is a mutual construction of perceptions and identities. New identities and perceptions will affect the conduct of Foreign Policy and will require adjustments on policies and acting from States. The sources of change are both internal (a policy being in debate, new attitudes, and beliefs from elites and political changes (C. Hermann, 1990)), and external (international crises and changes in the international social life (Wendt, 2014)). Competition increase (or decrease) is an essential external factor to change policies and exacerbate an Other (C. Hermann, 1990). From these different stimuli, the State re-evaluates itself and re-thinks its identity. Besides the structural limitations (legitimate political unity, values, perceptions of threats (Wendt, 2014)), new identities need internal factors to change. As we stated before, new identities derive from previous ones (Morin & Paquin, 2018). Crafting identities comes from cultural selection, as Wendt (2014) argues, with cultural selection constituting the basis for identity change.

As a policy window challenges an identity, cultural selection paves the way for the State to adjust to a new reality. Wendt (2014) points two ways for cultural selection: imitation and social learning. Imitation happens when a State seeks a model of success in the international environment (Wendt, 2014). A "positive other" (Suzuki, 2007) may be a wealthy State or one whose status the State pursues (Wendt, 2014). Imitation can be pursued by the perception of the Other or by cooperation in an important matter. Social learning reflects or repeals the ideas of the Self about the Other – both on the Self behavior and their Identity roles and values (ibidem). Even if the actors did not have any contact before the interaction, they carry perceptions about each other. Their responses to an action are conditioned to their first beliefs because they were socialized into a given order of preestablished ideas (Jervis, 2017). The actors either ignore discrepant information or re-evaluate it to fit their pre-established ideas (ibidem). As Self and Other establish a relationship, they shall repeat the act as it was in the first interaction, within their roles, until they agree that the structure of interaction is no longer viable (Wendt, 2014).

The structural interaction among two actors is based on the Self's expectations about the Other (Jervis, 2017), based on the type of values the society and the external environment endorse (Wendt, 2014). The expectations and predispositions bring to light some behaviors (the ones that confirm the Self's view), and obscure others (the ones that go against the expected view) (Jervis, 2017). As a common phenomenon, the actor will be readier to deal with it: the cues that something will happen to make an actor prepared to fit

the expected role for that situation (*ibidem*). Repeated interactions will sustain given roles and identities (Wendt, 2014).

Although the Self might take an egoist identity and dismiss the needs of the Other, especially if there is a power discrepancy or an enmity pattern (Wendt, 2014), the Other will take an egoistic identity as well and, by repeating this pattern, Self and Other will eventually change their perceptions and believe they are enemies (*ibidem*). This changes the structure; the relationship will be altered to accommodate new actions – more competitive or more aggressive (*ibidem*). When the structure is changed, subtypes of identity are reimagined. Personal Identity (what constitutes the Self – history, government type, principles of policy), Type Identity (those labels that define the Self, by the shared values, past, interpretation), and Role Identity (values and behaviors that exist concerning the Other) are adopted by both the Self and the Other (Wendt, 2014). Firstly, a new Role and Type Identities will be based on the Self and its formulations about Personal Identity. As Jervis (2017) affirms, a State will do what it sees as consistent for the formulations about itself (Personal identity, in Wendt's terms), but it will make efforts to have the Other rethink their perceptions about the discussed matter (Role Identity).

What drives the changes in front of new socialization structures is the “commitment to the image” (Jervis, 2017, p. 201). Jervis (2017), contrary to Hermann (1990), believes that the people who crafted a given identity (or, in his terms, image) are less eager to change it, as they devoted their time to policies and decisions related to it. Hermann (1990) points out that abrupt changes can force Statespeople to rethink their previous positions. Nevertheless, as the values and the relationship to the ruling elites are consolidated in some people, and there is an emotional attachment to their achievements, one will not be so open to innovate (Jervis, 2017). Then, one can conclude the rule is for people to carry on their policies as they were socialized, unless a dramatic change in the internal or external affairs takes to change, forcing the actors to rethink their previous roles. One typical example is how the collapse of the Soviet Union changed Security relations among its former States, who were no longer under the role of a satellite State of a superpower.

The most one State internalizes a given culture, the more it feels part of it, the most it will defend it (Wendt, 2014). Wendt points out that social structures do not change as States find it does not have importance anymore. Involvement is essential when changing identity, but how the policymakers deal with the new reality is crucial. Jervis (2017) argues that statespeople will often cope with discrepant information from their views by either internalizing them to their previous assumptions or ignoring them altogether. Changing

identities will need a further rethinking of the Self and the Other, requiring a new set of values and expectations to be dealt with by both State and society (Wendt, 2014).

1.3 Bilateral relations construction: values and perceptions

We must understand bilateral relations as a system. It is smaller than a regional system, but it includes norms, expected behaviors, and rewards as any more extensive relations system would have. It has fewer possibilities of free-riding, both participants usually seek commitments, and the rewards are often more precise than those with many actors.

The State Self is based on values and perceptions, alongside its place in the system and its capabilities – the corporate (what constitutes the State) and type (how the State labels its actions) identities (Wendt, 2014). Society creates its culture and values to differentiate itself from the Others – being this Wendt's role identity (*ibidem*). We shall assume that foreign affairs bring contrast between the cultures (Barnett, 1999; Campbell, 1992; Sen, 2007), but we disagree that this contrast will always be conflicting. Differentiation might relate to the Self role models, positive leaderships or ideals; assuming Others as consistently negative, obscures the capacity of friendship and cooperation between two States (Suzuki, 2007). Copying an inspiring Other behavior is an equally accepted form of identity change (Wendt, 2014).

Different orders create different types of Others. An order where little information exchange and violence are typical tends to create enmity patterns and, therefore, harmful Others (Wendt, 2014). A negotiated order opens the States to create cooperation systems, economic interdependence, and actors will abide more closely by the agreements (*ibidem*). Bilateral orders can be changed with the policy window, as the systemic or internal changes foster a change for the better or worse (Gustavsson, 1999). Systems can be multilateral or bilateral (Brecher et al., 1969). Changes in amity patterns of relations with one State can be part of systemic change, giving the complexity of a given relationship.

Identity is a relational construction related to National Interests, preservation, and the security interests of the Self (Wendt, 1992). A common understanding of security and violence often works on three aspects: competitive, individualistic, or cooperative (*ibidem*). In his later book, Wendt updates the three logics to Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian (Wendt, 2014). In a competitive/Hobbesian system, States will think about all the different actors as

negative Others and see enmity as a founding part of the international system (ibidem). Collective action is stern (Wendt, 1992). In the individualistic/Lockean system, the States compete against each other, but they recognize each other as a legitimate part of the system and accept rules and constraints (Wendt, 2014). Both these systems are based on self-help and egoistic National Interests (Wendt, 1992). The Kantian/cooperative system is where the enmity patterns are supplanted by amity, with disputes being solved without any threat of war or violent act, and the possibility of fighting together in case the security of one of them is in jeopardy (Wendt, 2014). The Other is always positive in this system, and cooperation is the rule, becoming a long-standing friendship among States (Wendt, 1992).

As perceptions are not only passive ideas of the Self-Other interaction, but also those change during the socialization process (Wendt, 2014). Values are rethought; roles are changed, and, therefore, structures of interaction will be recreated. Perceptions, from the beginning of socialization, or those crafted by observing the Other, interact with a third party will only be sustained if confirmed via interaction with the Self (ibidem). A State can act while interpreting its identity in a system but still act differently in another. Of course, Foreign Policy needs some coherence conforming with the identities (Hudson, 1999), but the same Self might enact some different roles. Brazil has a role identity in South America as a big economy; its economic weight is less relevant internationally. Still, the country values sovereignty and egalitarian relationships in both realms (Lafer, 2004).

Bilateral systems can change as any given Foreign Policy can (through adjustment, program, goal, or international orientation, as mentioned earlier (C. Hermann, 1990)), to a more or less secure one, as relations shift and historical reinterpretation changes the National Interest (T. Berger, 1996). Regions and the belonging to those are not natural but formed as the members decide to be a part of it and see the necessity of joint action (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). This joint action is usually related to security factors, especially border control and human security. While a country's economy can be either close or highly globalized, insecurity is often shared beyond borders (Buzan & Waeber, 2003).

Insecurity can lead to a subjugation of the Others, while the feeling of security can lead to an ethical stand to see the Other as an equal (Tsygankov, 2008). As rules and trust-building tools are reinforced, the system generates security for the actor to cooperate and improve multilateral agreements (Wendt, 2014). This positive learning shifts the view from the Other – it is a different entity but a source of learning and mutual benefits (Tsygankov, 2008). Amicable systems rely on ethical standards where trust and empowering put the

States to communicate as parts with the same importance and voice, relying on each other to improve the international order.

Wendt's key variables on collective identities might help us to understand how bilateral systems come to be. Contrary to Wendt's theory, we argue that bilateral systems do not have to imply a collective identity. Rather, States may not take the Other as a part of the Self but still create order between them. The key variables on system formation are (Wendt, 2014):

- Interdependence – when the action result for one of the members depends on the Others choices, both for amity or enmity patterns;
- Common destiny – when the survival or well-being of an actor depends on all the others in the group. Different from interdependence, it does not need any action from the parts or the self-interpretation of the system, but how third parties look at those units as one;
- Homogeneity – when actors are similar in their corporate and type identities, easing the system formation;
- Self-control – when states face the threat of being swollen by Others in the new system, as the Self has to give up some of its preferences. Trust-building is critical for Self-control.

One key factor for system formation is the threat posed by a third party. A powerful State can empower smaller ones to cooperate, giving the security they can provide (Wendt, 2014). External powers' presence may coopt the region to fear their neighbors and interact more with the external ones than those in the same geographic region (Buzan & Waever, 2003). Bandwagoning to the external power or resisting it by cooperation increase will depend on the Self values and National Role Expectations from it.

As policymakers enroll in action templates, they can rapidly understand how others will think and their expectations of a country in that position (Jervis, 1982). By doing this, they believe their intentions and actions are clear for the collectivity, which might not always be the truth (ibidem). Misperceptions can be related to value and credibility (Jervis, 2017):

- Misperception of value is considered harmful for one State but a reward to another. What is valuable or feared by Others is different due to corporate and type identities and the Self;

- Misperception of credibility: when a threat or a goodwill gesture feels truthful or a bluff. Whether others believe the proposal, the roles the State previously agreed and material capabilities;

States rarely try to understand action or stance from the Other's point of view, which gives statespeople cognitive dissonances from their enactment and how it will reach the Others (Jervis, 2017). As Others also have identities and expectations in a given social order, they have to be taken into account to create an order where both are considered to have the same value (Tsygankov, 2008). Taking these into consideration based on a misperception might reinforce biases. The State will read the Others' speech based not on what had been said but browsing for elements that reinforce existing bias (Jervis, 1988).

Statespeople often believe their own rationale. It is somewhat familiar for them to believe Others are more violent or irrational, to the point where hostility can be overestimated (Jervis, 1988). Policymakers are the moral agents of the State, making the decisions based on the values that constitute National Identity and, therefore, Security Identity (Suzuki, 2007). The rare occasions where States underestimate hostilities of Others is when trust-building transforms the order of a system where both actors participate (Tsygankov, 2008; Wendt, 2014).

States will change their identities to address their Others through natural selection and cultural selection (Wendt, 2014). Natural selection is considered marginal to the international environment today – as there is no conflict about which political unity is either good or bad and how to craft a State (Wendt, 2014, p. 392), cultural selection will be our focus. A country can change its Identity and perceptions towards the Other through imitation or social learning. Imitation changes a State's identity as, in front of a positive, inspiring Other, the State starts to mime its behavior (Wendt, 2014). Social learning relates to Identity changes or reinforcements due to the response of the Other to an act from the Self (*ibidem*). If the State has a misperception of the Other, it can recalculate and rethink its role and identity in the given system. As positive and negative reinforcement can come from the top-level officials, one must look if the self-examination can be seen as self-congratulations with no criticism (Suzuki, 2007).

Nevertheless, as the Others validate the change in the State (*ibidem*), this response generates clearer perceptions and highlights the positive values in an identity. As one can conclude from this, perceptions based on roles and identities can create a given reality (Jervis, 1988). Perceptions of the intentions and action frameworks from the Other will feed or reconstruct the roles and, therefore, the identities. Perceptions will be the cognitive ideas

leaders carry that will either reassure the corporate and type identities or the ones that will require identity and Foreign Policy adjustments. This will be analyzed under the use of common expressions of the leaders' discourses under CAQDAS software.

1.4 CAQDAS: critics and counter-critics

Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) has been under a crossfire in Social Sciences. Some advocate its use when dealing with a large quantity of data. Others argue about the lack of criticism towards such programs, arguing that quantification has little or no space in a non-positivist approach (Hansen, 2006). The main point is that these quantification tools isolate the terms from their context, which is always filled with ideological symbols, thus taking away the richness of the analysis (MacMillan, 2005). Although we agree with these readings, our take is that accounting for its limitations, this software can still help a qualitative researcher in a broader, interpretative form. Even though CAQDAS is not a method by itself, its use can enhance the scope of post-positivist analysis, assisting researchers in finding other not obvious correlations for the naked eye (Pollak et al., 2011).

CAQDAS works primarily through coding documents. Coding is the label given to a piece of data – a name, number, or any other type of information the researcher might find critical (Elliott, 2018). CAQDAS helps the researcher to automatize this. The researcher can make a keyword search through many documents, coding it automatically. Then, the researcher can add the codes to categories, which are a broad set of codes that share the same idea (Elliott, 2018). Coding helps us to locate commonly used expressions and keywords associated with values, like “democracy,” “freedom,” “nationalism.” Through this, we can understand how values are enacted and when those appear in discourses.

Atkinson et al. (1995) would alert on the perils of creating one unique methodology that could obscure other discourses and correlations, which would be the case of fixed coding software. To them, the word-coding process would limit the scope of interpretation, giving that one would only look into pre-established combinations of words (*ibidem*). Others argue that the simple fact of organizing data does not mean applying a methodology (Elliott, 2018; MacMillan & Koenig, 2004). Others will warn against the number of manuals and manual-

like publications, which can provide an acritical adoption of the programs (Graf, 2011; MacMillan & Koenig, 2004).

Coding is only the first step towards a qualitative method analysis. Coding is the starting point to know whether the first assumption was correct. It helps the researcher find new links between words filter the documents with little or no relevance for their analysis. Coding can reassure patterns or disclose new connections between categories (Pollak et al., 2011). For example, in Brazilian discourses, we realized the “Peace” coding of Brazilian discourses did not show peace as only a value, but also all the discourses with Peace Operations and terrorism attacks, which brought us two new codes, what became a more refined analysis. Our software of choice, MAXQDA, has a tool to determine proximity among codes, overlapping codes, and similarities between documents. Just as an illustration, using this software, we understood better the similarities between Temer and Collor de Mello’s discourses – both had a liberal ideology; nevertheless, sovereignty rhetoric was more present in Temer’s discourses than in Collor’s – a repetition similar to Sarney’s discourses. Temer and Sarney shared a similar interest in needing military support to sustain their administrations. Therefore, National Security was essential to appear in their discourses.

The software allows the user to work with many documents simultaneously (Elliott, 2018) through coding and lexical searches. Automatically coding, quantifying, and classifying documents also reduces the time-consuming process associated with documents’ selection (Pollak et al., 2011). From there, one can (as we did in this research) separate documents in themes, delete those without relevant coding, and trace patterns among them. It is vital to notice that coding is the beginning of qualitative research, not its end (Brown, 2002). CAQDAS served, to this work, to organize our extensive database and analyze whether coded sentences in different presidential periods would have similar patterns (adjectives, values, and others). This assists in better illustrating how values are perpetuated from different administrations under different ideologies.

The problem pointed by MacMillan (2005) on pre-programed codes that difficult freedom of interpretation is fixed the software we used – all types of searches and codings opened for any type of research. Elliot (2018) calls attention to another vital factor of qualitative research: counting codes and organizing data might be the beginning of quantitative data analysis, but it is not easy to apply such formal methods to qualitative analysis. Nonetheless, coding can help manual discourse analysis by searching the approximate pieces of information one needs and can help track ideology symbols and expand the number of discourses analyzed (Pollak et al., 2011).

Our approach to discourse analysis relies on an interpretative approach, with context-sensitive and flexible methods (Carcary, 2011). Understanding the correlations among words and the context and perceptions from authors must be the basis for a rich qualitative analysis work (ibidem). In the case of single-actor studies, as applied in this thesis, it is interesting to notice how certain words and phrases can give more support to post-positivist claims (Carcary, 2011; Graf, 2011). As Hudson (1999) claims, there are “chunks” of text to assess the State’s action templates. Action templates – the cultural expectations of how a leader is expected to act in Foreign Policy (Hudson, 1999: 770), require one to analyze the parts of social interaction the leaders use to make their decisions and interpret the Self (Hudson, 1999).

The first step towards constructivist discourse analysis is to find representations and how they are repeated or ignored, and their contexts (Neumann, 2002). CAQDAS can become auxiliary to this process. This discourse about an Other will be filled with values and perceptions of the Self (Wendt, 2014), which can also be traced. These discourses towards Others will pave the way for actions (Buzan et al., 1998; Neumann, 2002; Wendt, 2014). Followed by laws, treaties, or breaks, which can be accessed, discourses generate a given reality (L. Hansen, 2006; Wendt, 2014). Our work in this research is not to deny the basic assumptions of Constructivism, but instead to work with enormous sets of discourses and symbolism as provided in the extensive data gathered, without losing analytical qualitative depth.

CAQDAS can help the researcher find these speech acts and retrace those crucial moments of how the self’s identity impacted a decision. Values and preferences surrounding speech acts are easy to access, given that States, through their policymakers, are very verbal entities (L. Hansen, 2006). How one will assess these, either from manual coding or CAQDAS, is a personal preference from the researcher and their knowledge on the subject and tools (Rambaree, 2007).

However, counting words and coding is not considered the most efficient method of dealing with coding systems (Elliott, 2018; MacMillan & Koenig, 2004). Counting words does not help the researcher address the problems and changes within discursive practices or the shifting institutional forms. CAQDAS can help us find new patterns (Brown, 2002; Pollak et al., 2011) by creating the first categories of codes, organization of the documents, a thorough reading of those documents, and new coding sessions (de Paula et al., 2018). From there, we will determine similarities and differences between the texts, firstly using

CAQDAS and then by manual work. This helps us analyze many more documents in a shorter, allowing a more thorough reading of critical elements.

1.4.1 Using CAQDAS in discourse analysis: the path taken

CAQDAS was a valuable tool for our approach, given the temporality and the amount of data collected. In the 32 years of our sample, almost all Brazilian presidents' discourses are available online at the Presidency Library (Biblioteca da Presidência da República, [s.d.])². We selected the discourses whose titles were related to Argentina, Defense and Security, South America, and regional integration processes (MERCOSUL, UNASUL, and CELAC), and the discourses given by the presidents to new diplomats after graduating at the Rio Branco Institute (the diplomat formation institute). These discourses are directly related to the realms of Identity we seek to analyze. Those relate to regional, bilateral and national affairs surrounding Security Identity. From this first search, done manually, we reached a universe of 540 discourses. Through discourse categorization, our universe diminished to 493 discourses. The discourses left aside did not appear in any coding category, neither from CAQDAS or thorough reading. These included brief toasts in events, calling other politicians to speak, and small interventions with little significance in IGOs summits. All the discourses were read, and those with less than three codes were left aside from our analysis. Our research interests were only in the content of the discourses. Therefore codes in the document titles, context paragraphs, and greetings to politicians present in the meetings were discharged manually.

Our coding system bases itself on bibliographic research about Brazilian Security Identity and the 1996, 2005, and 2012 National Defense Policy, which lists the National Defense Objectives. These displayed essential tasks for the Armed Forces, but also the State. By doing it, many values came to light, evidencing where coding should focus to debate identity. These values are (*Política Nacional de Defesa*, 2012):

- 1- to grant sovereignty, national integrity, and patrimony;
- 2- to defend National and People's Interests, goods, and resources;
- 3- contribute to national cohesion and preservation;

² <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes>.

- 4- contribute to regional stability;
- 5- contribute to peace and security internationally;
- 6- project Brazil in the international scene;
- 7- keep the armed forces modern, integrated and balanced to operate together in national territory;
- 8- educate Brazilian society on the importance of Defense Affairs;
- 9- develop the National Defense Industry;
- 10- capacitate the Armed Forces;
- 11- develop defense logistic potential.

The document is similar to theoretical approaches in Brazilian Identity. Lafer's theory (2004) described four axes in the Brazilian Identity:

- 1- the country's size;
- 2- the importance of South America;
- 3- Concertation and defense of International Law;
- 4- Development and Nationalism.

Ricupero (2017) draws a similar design from Lafer. His work comes from a different approach, though, and it draws four axes:

- 1- A pacific State aligned with International Law;
- 2- Based on persuasion over military means in its diplomacy;
- 3- Based on the principles drawn by the Baron of Rio Branco (non-expansionism, trust in International Law, belief in the pacific resolution of conflicts, non-interventionism);
- 4- The insurer of economic diplomacy contributes to integral development (social, economic, political, and defense).

Ricupero – and Lafer, to some extent – debated the importance of quotidian values in the Brazilian Identity, including the diplomatic tradition for conflict solving, the mediator status, nationalism, and the State-guided economy. Based on these documents and typologies on the analysis of Brazilian foreign policy and the literature review exercise, we classified these dimensions in four main categories of analysis under Brazilian policymakers: South America, Identity, Security, and Argentina. These values were translated into sub-codes (a QDA software category), as followed:

- South America included the codes South America, IIRSA, CELAC, UNASUL, MERCOSUL, regional integration, regional stability, Latin-American, South American, and Latin America.
- Identity included the codes Identity, Amazon, Amazon, Brazilian people, Brazil, Democracy, Nation, Territory, Nationalism, Development, Stability, and Values.
- Argentina included the codes Argentina, Argentinian, Macri, Kirchner, Rodriguez, De La Rúa, Alfonsín, Menem and Casa Rosada (the presidential residence in Buenos Aires).
- Security included the codes Security, Defense, Terrorism, Terrorist, Military, Atomic, Non-proliferation, Nuclear, Navy, Air Force, Army, Sovereignty, National Interest, Defense, Border, Peace/pacific, National Defense Industry and Armed Forces.

These categories came from the previous literature review on Brazilian Identity and Brazilian Foreign Policy, displaying values and identity ramifications needed for Security Identity analysis. As prominent authors and official documents overlapped, we could conclude which values could become codes as parts of the overlapped literature. Once a State chooses to incorporate a value, it is difficult to abandon it. More commonly, values are re-interpreted or used with less frequency. Identities, especially Security Identities, are difficult to change (Rieker, 2006). Security-related ideas deal with the continuity of the State and the means to do so (*ibidem*), based on possible actions available to the State (Jervis, 2017). As the International environment seldom has complete changes (C. Hermann, 1990), the windows for profound transformation in Self-interpretation are scarce. Even in internally motivated revolutions, States still rely on, more or less, the foundational set of common-shared values to reinterpret the Self (Morin & Paquin, 2018). We understood intersection as the terms appearing in the same paragraph, but there are two significant limitations to the following data. One is the search grounded only in the encounter of two terms, without limitations of negation. If a discourse stated “development does not imply security”, as an example, it would still appear as an intersection.

2. Brazil Security Identity construction

The efforts in the International Relations realm to understand Brazil's Foreign Identity are not new. As others discussed this matter (Abdenur & Souza Neto, 2014; Lafer, 2004; Soares de Lima, 2005; Soares & Milani, 2016; Tibiletti, 2014), they focused on policy changes/minor alterations, while others highlighted the contrasts between governments. Our effort is based on analyzing the long-term paradigms (general ideas and practices under Foreign Policy [Cervo, 2003]), rather than governments alone, and how these related to deeply-rooted values of Brazilian Identity. We seek to understand better what seldom changes (the general Identity, exercised differently by the elites) and what changes often by way of different National Interest interpretations.

Identity construction does not happen only as a total reimagination of the Self. It is often common to re-accommodate previous values and Foreign Policy directions towards the new environment (internal and external), or perform smaller identity changes. Brazil's response to the post-Cold War and the re-democratization processes is an example, as it shows how structural demands with pressure for actor-level changes. Significantly, the change on Security Affairs is interesting. It comes from being a highly confidential sector of the government, during the military dictatorship years, to an open part of the democratic life, including the open discussion of important matters and democratic control of the Armed Forces.

The core of the discourses still carried similar ideas from the dictatorship years, like the rhetoric of sovereignty and the search for development. Democratic reforms in the military sector were slow, given the fear of a new coup, and negotiations often had to be carefully thought (Ricupero, 2017). The process of accommodating the military within the new politics relates to the stability rhetoric, a deeply-rooted value within Brazilian Identity (Spektor, 2014). The continuity of many aspects of the negotiated transitions is often standard in changing periods of Brazilian History. As people tend to be attached to the reality they are raised in (Sen, 2007), slower adaptations were also crucial for adapting to new times.

To fully address how these changes occurred, we must understand how Foreign Security Policy was formed and analyze changes and continuities within Brazilian Foreign

Policy and how policymakers managed Security affairs during the studied years. We shall take this chapter from the more abstract levels – the study of Brazilian Foreign Policy, to the more concrete ones, like discourses and construction of the Security apparatus in the New Republic. This period of Brazilian History includes the end of the military dictatorship to the present day (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015; Ricupero, 2017). It is characterized by the return to democracy with direct elections and the attempts to form a robust rule of law (Ricupero, 2017).

2.1 Brazilian Foreign Policy – paradigms, orientation

Brazil's Foreign Policy Identity has changed little throughout History (Lafer, 2004). Although Lafer briefly explained his interpretation of identity, his historiography of discourses works' is extremely rich. Lafer understands Identity as the interplay of internal and external, focused on the "who are we?" question, using History and culture of a country to answer it (Lafer, 2004). As previously discussed, values and interpretations of History are not neutral; they help the elites to pursue their goals and perceptions of what constitutes a Security Identity problem. Lafer is not focused on the theoretical aspects of identity but rather on how the Brazilian Foreign Policy Identity main pillars came to be. Lafer (2004) brings four central ideas to the constitution of Brazil's Foreign Policy Identity:

1. The continental scale of the Country – during the colonial period, Brazil expanded its borders through the efforts of both diplomats and pioneers who, through expeditions, extended the country's borders. Through this process, Brazil negotiated, mostly in a pacific way, its borders. Also, the country started to use the Armed Forces internally to annihilate any attempt of separatism;
2. The relations with South America – as borders' affairs were solved until the 19th Century, Brazil focused on other diplomatic matters, such as infrastructure integration and economy. Brazil reversed the negative view on the border-pushing issue by becoming a conflict mediator through the 20th Century. Although distanced from the continent more substantively

until the 1990s, the regional context had been more favorable to Brazil than other larger countries, such as China and Russia (p. 63);

3. The North-South relations – Brazil planned to have “preferential relations” with the USA through the 20th Century. The North-South axis was central for the country’s development because it was more profitable, from the political elite’s perspective, and more equal than European partners. With its European counterparts, Brazil sought to have a role as a peace-loving country with “general interests” in world affairs, reaffirming its role as a mediator;
4. The quest for development – development is the way to reduce international vulnerability. The North-South relationships would often leave Brazil with shorter deals and leave the country with few options. Development, then, was to improve the country’s economy and to insert itself internationally cautiously. It led to a nationalism focused on domestic conditions and with the State as the driver of the process.

From Lafer’s four main directions on Brazil’s International Identity, other values are clear. The diplomatic tradition, the mediator status, nationalism, and the State-guided economy are some of them. Often, Brazilian Foreign Policy is divided into different paradigms. These paradigms are the discourse practice of every day Foreign Policy. For our analysis, we will use the paradigm concept of Cervo, used to analyze Brazilian Foreign Policy. It is a comprehensive explanation of reality, without the rigidity of a theory in fixed variables, making it possible for the analyst to (1) examine the perception of the Self, (2) perceptions of National Interest, and (3) political elaboration from the inner and external circles (Cervo, 2003). Cervo’s concept focuses on Social Sciences, broadly, and in Brazilian Politics, specifically. As his reading of the paradigms becomes more present among other Brazilian Foreign Policy theorists, it is necessary to explicit the concept.

These paradigms are related closely to the praxis of Foreign Policy in Brazil. Firstly, they derive from the Diplomats Academy (the Itamaraty) highly institutionalized core (Passini Mariano, 2015). Second, these paradigmatic bases are present in the discourses from the elected political body, even those who do not share similar backgrounds (ibidem). The idea of general guides from Brazilian politics results from the importance of having a good international image and seeking socioeconomic development. Nevertheless, there is a debate on whether these paradigms or orientations are not just an adaptation towards Brazilian Foreign Policy development (Soares de Lima, 2005).

The first attempt to understand these paradigms is Cervo's work on Brazilian diplomatic history. The first paradigm, the liberal-conservative, took place between the 19th Century until 1930 and deals with the forced liberalism imposed on the peripheric capitalism against the closed but economically powerful Europe (Cervo, 2003). This required Brazilian top-level officials to become more specialized in negotiating deals and made it possible for the country to open markets in the system's core (ibidem). Brazil was a developing country, still ruled by the heirs of the Portuguese Empire, who were schooled in Europe. Therefore, the European values of free trade, comparative advantages, and tough diplomacy with its neighbors were very present in Brazil's institutions. It was at this moment where highly developed diplomatic education became a core part of Brazilian Identity.

Due to its diplomatic efforts to establish firm borders with its neighbors, Brazil considered itself "geopolitically satisfied" (Soares de Lima, 2005) and focused more on economic affairs, internally and externally. Both the outward orientation of Foreign Policy and the inheritance of European values made Brazil a peace-loving country aiming for commercial liberalism in Foreign Policy (Cervo, 2003). The country took part in many International Conferences, such as the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) and the League of Nations (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). In these cases, Brazil was the only representative of South America, promoting a European State among South American ones (ibidem). The 20th Century, though, would put some challenges in those assumptions.

The developmentist State represented modern Brazil in a changing world (1930 – 1989). The post First World War world opened new possibilities for the country, economically and politically (Cervo, 2003). Brazil was the first South American State to participate in the League of Nations, as it sent troops to the war supporting the Alliance. Thus, Brazilian elites started to portray themselves as part of the privileged world and sought to enter the developed world (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). Following this, the preferential relations with developed countries (especially the United States) became an essential part of Brazil's Foreign Policy. The North-South axis of Foreign Policy was reaffirmed as the main direction and recognized as a developed nation, the core of Brazilian Identity. State-owned enterprises and commercial treaties were also an essential part of these times – the "entrepreneur State" (Cervo, 2003).

Commercial deals, long-term strategies within International Governmental Organizations (both at the League of Nations/UN and the Organization of American States - OAS), and the pursuit of socioeconomic development came into the discussion (Cervo, 2003). Diplomatic affairs were considered a State policy, in the long run, rather than a

government issue, using career diplomats to deal with these problems. This approach created the misperception that Foreign Policy did not involve the government. It also made policymakers think that perceptions, as much as ideology and personal gains, were not at play in the international realm (Soares de Lima, 2005). Liberalism in Foreign Affairs did gain Brazil for the same ideology internally. There were two dictatorships during the 20th Century: the Vargas Era (1930 – 1945) and the military dictatorship (1964 – 1985). These periods highlighted sovereignty as a tool for dealing with political interference from great powers and the stability rhetoric for relations with partners (Cervo, 2003). Sovereignty and Nationalism expanded othering towards many States, especially more powerful ones, such as the United States. National independent development was at the basis of Security Identity – making international trade a threat more than an opportunity.

During the military dictatorship, the diplomatic sectors kept track of exiled persons in the neighboring countries because combating so-called communist agents was considered the main threat to Brazil's Security Identity (Penna Filho, 2009). This practice, used by the Centre of Foreign Information³ (present author translation), was current in the South American States, but it also had staff in Europe (*ibidem*). As Penna Filho's (2009) research shows, the diplomatic service related to domestic politics in Brazil would agree with top official perceptions of threats (communism, in this case). His work has a similar approach to De Lima's (2005) affirmation that it was a mistake to dissociate the diplomatic service from the elite's international perceptions.

The dictatorship also started the tradition of Security collaboration with South America. Although sovereignty was considered essential and regional integration was not part of the dictatorship agenda, cooperation in fighting similar threats, such as the surveillance upon those considered enemies of the regime, received impulse (Penna Filho, 2009). However, the sporadic collaboration did not change the distrust between Brazil and its neighbors (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). With the end of the Cold War and the following re-democratization period, regional integration and the fears of each other would be surpassed. The energy affairs with Argentina and Paraguay will influence this process, and it will be further discussed. At this moment, autonomy came to the center of Foreign Policy. There is a pendular movement, according to Soares de Lima (2005) in Brazilian Foreign Policy, that goes between credibility (the country needs to become more business-friendly and open to integration in the world economy) and autonomy (for political decisions and

³ Centro de Informações do Exterior, in the original.

freedom for external action). The late military dictatorship and the Sarney term would still be characterized by autonomy, while the Normal State period would focus on regaining the credibility lost by the debt crisis. Sarney's administration saw Brazil as a fragile state, and seeking more regional cooperation was needed to overcome it. The administration made efforts to create more partnerships, such as approximation with Latin and Saxon America and de-othering rivals to avoid more vulnerabilities in the future.

It is important to note that the developmentist State was still the ruling paradigm in Brazilian Foreign Policy when the re-democratization happened in 1985. Entangled with the "Normal State" paradigm during those five years, re-democratization changed how political elites perceived diplomacy. The world was already changing between 1985 and 1989. Most of South America transitioned to democratic regimes, and the neoliberal ideology blossomed (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). These last years of the developmentist State saw the last initiatives on public works, such as the Itaipu hydroelectric power plant (a binational project with Paraguay). However, hyperinflation was a severe problem that policymakers would address in the Normal State years that followed.

Re-democratization (1985) replenished sovereignty rhetoric with obedience to the armed forces' *status quo* and civil control of military forces. While the slow transition happened, diplomats led security affairs bilaterally and in OIGs (É. Winand & Saint-Pierre, 2010), what still happens. During the transition, a part of the dictatorship ideology was still present in the Armed Forces organization. The Congress or President did not define their budget, priorities, or goals (ibidem). This liberty made the three Forces grow apart, having their ideology and vision. Granting democratic control over the Forces would not only provide unification but ensure the same values and identity.

There were five Ministries of the Armed Forces in Brazil: Aerial Forces, Military, Navy, Military House, and Executive Bureau (Fuccille, 2006). The restructuring and civil control over the forces created a military identity crisis (Fuccille, 2006; Ricupero, 2017; É. Winand & Saint-Pierre, 2010). The rethinking of objectives and the lack of palpable threats were problematic to the Armed Forces. Security conceived in economic terms under liberal ideology, the use of Armed Forces was low. Security Identity focused on reestablishing an everyday economic life, and the prestige of the Armed Forces was low after re-democratization. This problem would be solved in the next decade.

The normal State (1990 – 2002) is a State which follows the international order prescriptions, especially the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the inter-American Development Bank principles. These prescriptions were to make privatizations,

finish the entrepreneur State's idea, stabilize exchange rates, open the markets, and adopt national legislation to receive foreign investments (Cervo, 2003). Neoliberalism and international insertion formed the basis for this model of the State (ibidem). Great strategies for making this insertion or discussing National Interests were abandoned, which would be reserved only for the most developed countries (ibidem). This paradigm not only had a strong "faith" (Cervo, 2003, p. 17) in the free market but also had a firm belief in pacific conflict resolution and liberalism as an orientation of Foreign Policy. The negotiations Brazil took part in, such as the World Trade Organization, the creation of MERCOSUL (Common Market of the South), and the attempts to discuss reform in the United Nations system, are proof of liberalism as a founding mechanism of Brazilian politics during these years (Ricupero, 2017). Although de-othering and liberalism were part of the Normal State paradigm, Plan Colombia brought another dimension to Security relations, affecting Brazil's role identity from a freedom-lover State to focusing on core security affairs.

Brazil passed this neoliberal moment towards a new developmentist called the Logistic State (2003 – 2016) (Cervo, 2003). The Normal State's frustration was flagrant, as it did not generate the richness it promised, and the social crisis within the country deepened (ibidem). The logistic State paradigm was grounded on a theoretical framework based on critical studies against neoliberalism. This paradigm did not intend to imitate developmentism, but to impulse the State to stay close to the world order and accept parts of liberalism, but not to follow the Normal path (ibidem). The new government strongly appealed to towards social causes and human rights; the region and other Global South countries became essential partners (Ricupero, 2017). Sovereignty came back to the presidential rhetoric, and to look critically towards economic and political powers were a mark of this period (Fuccille, 2006). United States presence got more substantial in the region, becoming a potential threat for South American States (Fuccille, 2014). The cooperation with Colombia against drug traffic made the American presence in the subcontinent noticeable, the loan of new military bases in South America, and the reactivation of the 4th Fleet (the US Navy branch responsible for surveilling South America during the Cold War) made it a political affair (ibidem). USA presence was a possible problem for Brazil's autonomy. Giving the left-wing ideology of the Brazilian government and the "pink wave" in South America (a name given to the majority of leftist governments during this period), regional integration became a source of strength to face external influences in the subcontinent (Cervo, 2003).

Paradigms, nonetheless, are just the general understanding of values and National Interest. As for Identity, we must analyze the direction of the government and its exercise by the political elites.

2.2 The thinking of Brazilian political elites during the New Republic

Brazilian elite's thinking changed drastically during the New Republic (1985 – 2018). Material conditions were handled differently, nationally and internationally, as well as the elected political elites changed. Brazil distrusted a profound relationship with Argentina in a de-othering movement to accommodate the Brazilian elites' demands better. In the first decade, one can see the fear of the military uprising and their accommodation o within the New Republic. After that, the business owners and international investors became the central force. In the last moment observed, the wealthy internal class became central.

Role Identity shifted, at first, from a National Security ideology, with closed borders and protections to the internal economy, with a controlling government, to an identity preoccupied with economic security and partnerships with the central world. Due to the internal re-democratization and structural changes after the Cold War, the Role Identity took different Others. Sovereignty ideals were replaced by integration and economic liberalization. Lastly, an ideology uniting those two previous arose. Sovereignty was important, but integration and market-opening policies, driven by the values of being a global player and a regional leader – opening would be done within Brazil's compliance, not at once.

In the following sections, we will analyze how the identity changes and continuities were made through New Republic's times, using bibliographic research and discourse analysis.

2.2.1 Discourses of a dying paradigm: developmentism under Sarney (1985 – 1990)

Tancredo Neves was elected Brazil's first democratic president, elected indirectly by the newly re-opened National Congress after 21 years of military dictatorship (Côrtes, 2010). Before he took office, he made an official visit through important partners to present Brazil's new government, ensuring this new moment would not mark the political problems. The elected president visited Italy, France, Portugal, Spain, the USA, Mexico, and Argentina to discuss Brazilian problems and possible partnerships (Ricupero, 2010). He sought support for the USA's financial crisis, which granted limited support – a decision that would taint the bilateral relationships for the following years (ibidem). Alfonsín, Argentinian president from 1983 to 1990 and leader of the first re-democratized State in South America, defined that a democratic Brazil would bring a continental political change (Ricupero, 2010: 217). Neves, nonetheless, died 45 days after the election, leaving his vice president in charge.

Sarney was an experienced politician who represented, *de facto*, the link with the previous order to the new (Côrtes, 2010). Nonetheless, he was supposed to be more a backstage person than the protagonist of re-democratization (Ricupero, 2017). After Neves' sudden death, Sarney came to office with little knowledge of previous regime negotiations and international partners (ibidem). Under Sarney, the new constitution was approved, with conservative and progressist society forces presented in the text, making the final document both lengthy and contradictory (Cardoso Jr., 2018). Sarney said that the new Constitution would make Brazil "ungovernable" (Sarney, apud. Ricupero, 2017).

In Sarney's first discourse at the General Assembly of the United Nations, he assured Brazil had crossed from authoritarianism through democracy. The country is ready to take a more active role in the organization (Sarney, 1985b). His discourse highlighted the maturing of Latin American institutions, such as democracy and the attempts to pacify the subcontinent, while calling for more presence (primarily financial) from developed States (ibidem). In the following year, discoursing for the new Army Generals, the president talked about the debt crisis as tension with powerful States and the need for integrated and modern Armed Forces to ensure sovereignty (Sarney, 1986c). As the developmentist State affirms, power disparities foster insecurities for the weaker States, seeking internal development before opening themselves to the world (Cervo, 2003). Developmentism was not amicable towards great powers because its ideology is rooted in the Third World Movement, against automatic alliances with any world powers during the Cold War (ibidem). The perpetuity of authoritarian reason in the democratic transition and the prolonged Foreign Policy silence during the military dictatorship caused Brazilian perception of the foreign world to be antagonistic. The Role Identity given to the powerful States relates to the imposition of

choosing sides from the two antagonistic worlds in the Cold War, where roles were highly institutionalized (Wendt, 2014).

The new Constitution was part of the democratic transition, but the effort was more significant than re-establishing constitutional order. The transition was a slow process that gave military elites control over amnesty laws and reparations (Ricuero, 2017). The transition was, as well, presented in Identity. Given the negotiated end of dictatorship, Brazil had to adapt its policies and Self-perceptions to an open society. This is noticeable in the Constitution, with the foundational National values listed in Article 1st. Sovereignty, Citizenship, human dignity, the social value of work, and political pluralism are the republic's core values (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, art 1^o). Article 4th emphasizes the International Relations Foundational values – national independence, the prevalence of Human Rights, self-determination, non-intervention, equality among States, pacific resolution of conflicts, repudiation of racism and terrorism, peace, defense, concession of political asylum and cooperation among peoples (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988). In its only paragraph, the same article states that Brazil will seek cooperation with Latin American nations in the economy, politics, and cultural efforts to build a Latin American Community of Nations (ibidem).

The doctrine of National Defense was still vital in the Constitutional text. Nationalism has been part of Brazilian identity, especially the type and role ones, to strengthen inner capabilities towards reducing the power disparities in the international environment (Lafer, 2004). Nationalism had versed, among the developmentists governments, in two ways. The first is to display the country's potentialities, and the other focuses on nationalism as a form to protect its vulnerable people and economy (ibidem). These two branches of nationalism can be perceived in the Constitution, as Article 1st shows the importance of the people and its importance, while Article 4th showcases the aversion of intervention in internal affairs. The role Nationalism would have in the following period of Brazil's identity would still be defined.

Antagonism to bigger powers was central in Sarney's Foreign Policy. In the 3rd United Nations Disarmament Session, the president called for peace among the superpowers, dangerous for the smaller States, and reiterated the importance for Brazil to have completed the uranium cycle towards development (Sarney, 1988b). On nuclear affairs, the president affirmed the importance of nuclear capacity in science and technology, which would be essential for State development (ibidem). In this speech, Sarney highlighted the cooperation with Argentina for the pacific use of nuclear capabilities, a dissonance from the historical

moment (ibidem). The Brazil – Argentinian partnership appears to dissuade fears of a nuclear run in the continent and display the defense partnership building. The bilateral approach began as the energetic crisis from the 1970s made the region invest in hydroelectric power. Competing for the resources of the Parana River, Brazil and Argentina came to terms to explore its capacity by the end of 1979 (Côrtes, 2010). Dealing with the importance of the energetic problem in the region, added to the need for State restructuration (from both economic and democratic matters), Brazil's elites felt the need for more considerable changes than the ones presented by Sarney.

Sarney administration's Security Identity based itself on a campaign of fighting Brazilian value misperceptions. Because Brazilian Security Identity relied on being an International Law believer (Ricupero, 2017), it seemed a misperception from the international environment for the country to be interpreted as hostile due to the years of Human Rights disregard by the military dictatorship. Democracy advanced, and the bipolar order crumbled, leaving Brazilian statespeople the unique chance to remodel Self-perceptions (Jervis, 2017). Changes in the international order may need other National changes in goals (C. Hermann, 1990), and Brazil's isolation was re-evaluated to serve its values better. Sarney started to aim for that change, but only the paradigmatic change which came with Collor de Mello made it possible for concrete that position.

Continuity happened concerning the Armed Forces. Sarney would often inflate the importance of the military for the past glories of the country and had said the exceptionalism is due to the country's transition towards democracy conducted with the military, not against them (Sarney, apud. Côrtes, 2010). In his speech for the memory of the Second World War, he affirmed, about the armed forces:

(...) Armed forces do not have one single defeating moment. They participated in Independence wars, National Unity wars, on campaigns outside the country and always returned victorious. Armed Forces and combatants were recruited among the people. Armed forces have, for the Country's History, a tradition of devotion and maintenance of order and institutions [translated by the present author].⁴

⁴ Original: Forças Armadas, que não têm um só momento de derrota. Participaram das guerras da Independência, das guerras da unidade nacional, das campanhas em que foram envolvidas fora deste País e sempre recolheram louros de vitórias. Forças Armadas e corpos combatentes recrutados no seio do povo. Forças Armadas que têm, ao longo da história do País, uma tradição de devoção e de manutenção da ordem e das instituições.

By stating the Army was not an enemy but a crucial partner in re-democratization, Sarney was very aware of the importance of giving the Army a prestigious place in his discourses. The new constitution, approved in 1988, gave limited direct political action to the military. They could only express their political views outside the military premises, and, in case they wanted to join a party or be elected, they should request to go to the military reserve force (Menezes, 2018). Soldiers should not express dangerous ideologies or disrupt the regime from the military dictatorship but expand it from military patents (ibidem). It is hard to change the values regarding Security Affairs and the military (Rieker, 2006). These speak more closely to the sense of Self a State has, and it bases the Security Identity (ibidem). Social constructions on military duty and enmity might surpass the period they were, in fact, threatening (Sen, 2007). This will be a delicate problem in the negotiated transition from Brazilian dictatorship – how to deal with the military and surpass (or not) the idea of their people as possible threats.

Brazil had another problem with the military identity crisis (the role of the military in a democratic society), which started to be resolved with the bilateral approximation to Argentina, which required a demonstration of trust. One of the most significant issues of distrust was the Nuclear Programs from both countries. Argentina had sook support for its Nuclear Program among non-aligned countries, such as Egypt (Castro, 2010). Brazil had Nuclear plants in cooperation with Germany, but the military junta had plans for making an atomic program from it (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). In 1985, a workgroup on Nuclear Policy was created to conform to both countries' policies (Antunes, 2016). After presidential visits to each other countries, in 1987, the presidents made a new declaration, the Iperó Declaration, where they affirmed that more cooperation on nuclear matters was needed (ibidem). The workgroup became a Commission to boost the pacific uses of nuclear power and ensure the programs would not crafting a nuclear weapon.

This decision benefited Brazil in its goal to defeat isolationism, as Lafer (2004) defines in the dimension of the continental scale of the country as a deeply-rooted basis of Brazilian International Identity. Brazil intended to be a mediator and a pacific country to gather sympathy from its neighbors. The re-democratization process showed the need to be more active in those efforts. As for Argentina, the Malvinas/Falklands War tainted the country's attempt to be seen as neutral in the international realm and damaged the relationships with two of its major partners – the United States and Great Brittan (Castro, 2010). Therefore, the change like the nuclear programs was necessary for both countries for

different reasons. This matter and economic integration will be fully addressed in the following decades, but it started during the beginning of the New Republic.

As the developmentist State policies halted due to the 1980s debt crisis, where almost all Latin American countries defaulted on public debts, it was almost impossible for the State to keep being the motor of the economy (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). Fiscal problems were addressed, but it got clearer that State capacities were limited by the lack of means (Russel & Tokatlian, 2003). This called for a new view on autonomy. No longer could the States understand their capabilities as a zero-sum game, but instead, they needed to embrace the multiple-sum idea from liberalist theories (ibidem). The new thinking based itself on the perception that, together, States could make a front to address their needs, such as the debt renegotiation and a better bargain in the international environment. Selected partners for the market opening were selected, making this a bilateral moment of Foreign Policy.

According to the government, economic integration was the only way to overcome the debt crisis and reinsert the countries in the international market (Ferres, 2004). Although, obstacles were many. The economies were very different; even though the crisis had a similar origin (the amount of spending of developmentists' governments and the hyperinflation caused by it), Brazil was one of the world's biggest economies, and Argentina was reestablishing herself after the Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982 (Castro, 2010). Brazil fostered its industry since the Liberal-Conservative State paradigm and worried that embracing neoliberal reforms would result in losing support from the industries. As well as calming the military in the transition towards democracy, Brazil feared the country would be too vulnerable if the economic elite fell into jeopardy.

Brazil and Argentina's relationship shift would be the brand for the New Republic Foreign Policy. As the president reiterated, ending the debt crisis required considerable adjustments, including the many different problems in the region (Sarney, 1985a). In the Iguazu Declaration, both States assembled what will become the basis for further integration. The Declaration goes, “[the States] equally agree on the urgent necessity that Latin America reinforces its negotiation power with the world, amplifying its autonomy of decision and avoiding the regional countries to keep vulnerable”⁵ (translated by the present author) (do Brasil, 1985: 2). This postulate reinforces the idea of autonomy not as a purely nationalist

⁵ Original: “concordaram, igualmente, quanto à urgente necessidade de que a América Latina reforce seu poder de negociação com o resto do mundo, ampliando sua autonomia de decisão e evitando que os países da região continuem vulneráveis (...)”.

trait but rather as a regional project to avoid external interferences. It is the traditional sense of Nationalism within Brazilian Identity – Nationalism as a form to reduce vulnerabilities in an unequal world (Lafer, 2004).

In the same document, the governments created a high-level mixt commission for bilateral economic integration formed by both the Foreign Affairs Ministers, government representatives, and entrepreneurs from both countries to help accelerate the opening of the relationships (do Brasil, 1985: 4). The commission had limited success, given tArgentina had already stepped into the Normal State and was following through with the neoliberal agenda. At the same time, Brazil was still attached to the developmentist agenda (Saraiva & Almeida, 1999). During the following years, many other treaties would be signed.

2.2.2 The Normal State – stability and protagonism

Developmentism had an essential role in Brazil's history. It made it possible for the country to gestate important economic sectors when those were too fragile to compete internationally (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). The 1980s debt crisis showed the limits of government intervention with unpayable debt and outdated industries. Timid neoliberal reforms took place. Integration bloomed in the 1990s, South America included. Which led to Fernando Collor de Mello's election, which promised to update Brazil's industries and bring back economic stability (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). His Foreign Policy platform was based on three main points:

- 1- update the country's agenda to the new international momentum;
- 2- Build a positive agenda with the United States;
- 3- Remove the Third World Country label from Brazil (Hirst & Pinheiro, 1995).

Security was primarily translated in economic and monetary terms (Hirst & Pinheiro, 1995). The debt crisis left severe problems in Brazil's economy, being hyperinflation the biggest one. The Normal State tried a new take on Security Identity by abiding by globalization rules and attempting the new development logic based on market freedom (Lafer, 2004). Opening markets and integrating to global trade chains, based on agreeing with the International Regulations and seeking meaningful partnerships, reinforced the values of development seeking and promoting International Law principles (ibidem). These principles became clearer during his first official State visit to Buenos Aires.

Collor centered his discourses around ethics, shared future, modernization, and democratization (Collor de Mello, 1990b, 1990a, 1990c). The president highlighted the democratic process as a regional victory against authoritarianism, where democracy met liberalization and integration (Collor de Mello, 1990c). Collor emphasized the new moment of the bilateral relationship as the process was facing fundamental changes instead of the instrumental and specific cooperation of the past years (*ibidem*). The optimistic view on the integration came to a halt in the same year. Without allies internally, the president's project could not continue.

The diplomatic service tried to keep itself apart from Collor's Foreign Policy due to the political crisis during his term that culminated in his resignation. Amid that, there was a growing wish for updating Brazil's economy towards competitiveness, granting Collor de Mello some support (G. S. P. e Casarões, 2012). Diplomats attempted to keep the internal problems of the country separated from Foreign Policy actions. However, the positive expectations of Brazil were reversed by the political problems internally (Hirst & Pinheiro, 1995). Although the government had support from the most competitive industries in Brazil, those more government-dependent sectors and the politicians coming from the military dictatorship did not approve the changes Collor proposed, and the newly re-integrated left (Sallum Jr, 2011).

The general lines of the Foreign Policy, such as the respect for International Law, were the basis for Collor's administration. Francisco Rezek, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated the importance of respecting international laws as a way to grant commercial opening and liberalizing reforms (G. S. P. e Casarões, 2012), thus reaffirming Brazil's Security Identity value of respect of International Law and Institutions (Lafer, 2004). After the dictatorship, promoting the State as a supporter of the status quo gained new importance, not only to have good relations with the USA but also with the developed world.

By 1992, Collor approved a ministerial reform to get more political support and bring more important political figures to his administration (Lafer, 2018). It brought a new posture for Brazilian elites. With many IR scholars in the cabinet, such as Celso Lafer, Brazilian political elites renewed their beliefs under the new idea of liberalization. Liberalism would mean to leave traditions and values, such as nationalism, but rather a nationalism based on competition and participation towards development (Sallum Jr, 2011).

Liberalism had found a space in Brazilian Identity. The difficulty in applying the Neoliberal agenda and the State reform resonates with the developmentist State and the elites. Developmentism would affirm that the State must support national enterprises until

those are ready to compete as equals with foreign companies (Cervo, 2003). The elites' shift happened due to hyperinflation and economic instability, and pressure for the market opening rose from important partners, such as the EU and the USA (Lafer, 2004). However, the Normal State Paradigm did not contemplate a big National Project (Cervo, 2003). The liberalization agenda believed the market would regulate the economic forces; to the State, the role was to promote the country and advance tax cuts and privatizations (ibidem). The diplomats were focused, then, on pacifying relationships with central powers. Controversial themes, such as the nuclear agenda, patents, and the debt problem (still not completely fixed), were for the diplomats to solve (Sallum Jr, 2011). Better relationships with central powers, especially the USA, were the government's main goal (Hirst & Pinheiro, 1995). That would be because of the possibility of a unipolar world after the Cold War and the aim to attract American investors to Brazil (Sallum Jr, 2011).

The nuclear dissuasion agenda gained importance due to Brazil's partnerships with the USA. Sarney administration made progress in this area, but the matter would come close to a solution under Collor. With advancements in liberalizing the economy, the nuclear program lost its funding – considered too high maintenance, both economically and politically (Sallum Jr, 2011). Nuclear dissuasion was not the core of the system, although both governments welcomed the label of peaceful and stable democracies; bilateral normalization should boost the economy (Ricupero, 2017). Nuclear deterrence was the first challenge overcome by Brazil and Argentina and granted economic openness and integration, as it paved the way for MERCOSUL.

Collor de Mello's discourse in the United Nations in 1991 called unacceptable any type of authoritarianism or economic closeness. He followed by saying the most significant threat for the world was the underdevelopment perils, where democracy should bring development to foster peace (Collor de Mello, 1991). New nuclear agreements with Argentina and Chile were highlighted as cooperation efforts towards regional development. In 1992, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Lafer, discoursed Brazil in the United Nations. His discourse defended a more peaceful world and affirmed that Brazil's destiny was peaceful and stable (Lafer, 1992), two crucial values for Brazilian Security Identity since Rio Branco Baron (Ricupero, 2017). Lafer emphasized, as well, that Brazilian Foreign Policy had two main axes at the moment: freedom and justice, both discussing the newly created peacekeeping concept (Lafer, 1992). According to Lafer's discourse, peacekeeping was close to Brazilian ideals and history and could be a dimension for Brazil's more active role internationally (ibidem). Participation in peace operations would become an essential

part of Brazil's Security Identity in the following decades. By the end of his discourse, he cited the importance of cooperation for development, reassuring the previous year signaling to South and Latin America. Democracy began to solidify in Brazil, and the international order was changing as well. Collor de Mello was the first elected leader in Brazil after 21 years of Constitutional exception, plus five years of Sarney's indirect election (Ricupero, 2017). In moments of abrupt change in many levels of the State life, new models of leadership that embody the changing society are welcomed (Hudson, 1999).

It has signed the Declaration of Common Nuclear Policy and the Common System of Accountability and Control among Brazil and Argentina (SCCC, in the original). A victory from the mixed commission established under Sarney and Alfonsín had some successes, granting its update in 1990 (Brazil & Argentina, 1990). The 1990 Declaration established, as well, that both governments would exchange information on nuclear materials and give to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on the matter. The IAEA would be part of the harmonization of terms according to the international system (ibidem).

In the following year, the countries signed a treaty abdicating the fabrication, fomentation, and authorization of atomic bombs, tests, and the holding of atomic weapons from third parties (Argentina & Brasil, 1991). The most important part of the treaty is establishing the Argentinian-Brazilian Accountability and Control Agency (ABACC), responsible for overseeing nuclear research, installations and ensuring the SCCC would be applied (ibidem). Following that, a four-parties agreement among Argentina, Brazil, IAEA, and ABACC where the countries, still outside the Non-proliferation Agreement, allowed IAEA to oversee the process and ensure the safeguards negotiated among them (Brasil et al., 1991). These treaties are still in effect and were an essential spiral towards regional economic integration.

Although the nuclear problem's solution was seen as a win for the government, corruption scandals and hyperinflation spiraled into a crisis internally, leading to Collor's impeachment (Sallum Jr, 2011). After him, his vice, Itamar Franco, took over for briefly. Franco's short-term was focused on the inflation problems and created the new currency, the Real. Monetary stability was the objective of his Minister of Economy, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, elected in the next election in 1994.

Security Identity is related deeply to comply with the status quo and establish good relationships with the developed world. Diplomatic efforts to open the country were central to advocate for a good business environment and to deepen the relationships with

neighboring countries. Values from the past paradigms, such as pacific conflict resolution and amicability towards traditional partners (Europe and North America), were necessary. South America gained new importance as a showcase of Brazil's leadership. The Brazilian embassy in Argentina gained notoriety, being graded A for the diplomatic service (top-level cooperation, on a scale from C to A). The Normal State paradigm was based on the notion to regain credibility with the international environment as the basis for Foreign Policy (Soares de Lima, 2005). As well, globalism and the assumption of autonomy by participating. Collor de Mello had to update Brazil's Foreign Policy and attract new investors to the country after the debt crisis (Hirst & Pinheiro, 1995). His term fostered regional integration and participation in many international instances to boost the country's economy. Although fighting corruption was one of his banners during elections, his administration fell because of an embezzlement scandal (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). During this period, his agenda continued within the other presidents, Itamar Franco (his vice, who took office briefly after Collor de Mello's impeachment) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

Cardoso had solved the hyper-inflation as Collor's Ministry of Economy, using a new currency. His foreign policy was focused on reestablishing Brazil's positive image globally. During his two terms, there was questioning on the need for Armed Forces, on the one hand, but overcoming the military identity crisis once for all, on the other (Fuccille, 2006). This overcoming is due to the Armed Forces' internal use in internal affairs, especially repressing organized crime (*ibidem*). The employment of violent repression towards social movements against the neoliberal agenda increased the importance of the military internally (*ibidem*). According to Brazil's limited (Fonseca, *apud*. Ricupero, 2017) capacity, foreign policy has branded sobriety and realism as goals. The most significant changes were the growing participation in international regimes and the abandonment of criticism of asymmetries in World Politics. Instead, the country would participate in negotiations and deal with power disparities by participating in these institutions (Ricupero, 2017). The tendency, already seen in Collor de Mello's administration, was now the platform to support International Governmental Organizations to seek protagonism. International Law compliance as a value permitted the State to advocate values still new to its internal politics, such as progressiveness and democracy, which was an affirmation of what path Brazil would follow internally – a choice made in other democratic periods of Brazilian History (Lafer, 2004).

This Foreign Policy period did not have an official name by the State, but was called “autonomy by participation” by scholars (Ricupero, 2017; Vigevani et al., 2003). He

followed Collor de Mello's path of renewing Brazil's international agenda and integrating the country among negotiations on many issues (Vigevani & de Oliveira, 2005). According to Vigevani and De Oliveira (2005, p. 3), Brazil had legitimacy in the world because of its diplomatic tradition and its Identity adequation during the 20th Century. Cardoso focused, as well, on "de-dramatize" Foreign Policy, by reducing tensions, critics, and disparities with great powers (Vigevani & de Oliveira, 2005), as expected from the Normal State (Cervo, 2003). By seeking economic stabilization, the administration intended to show investors that Brazil was more robust and more structurally capable than ever before (Ricupero, 2017). Development, a long-wished goal for Brazilian identity, could be achieved through the Normal State paradigm. National Interest did not change – there was still nationalism in protecting the Amazon Forest and patriotism towards Brazil's future (Lafer, 2004). Cardoso was elected as a symbol of stability, and his administration believed they could take the next step in Foreign Policy in negotiations greater than the South American region.

One of the most evident aspects of neoliberalism as part of State policy was the enlargement of the economic cooperation towards Argentina by creating the economic bloc of the MERCOSUL. They were adding Paraguay and Uruguay to form strong ties between the four countries to create a more robust economy. Adding these countries to the process was only possible because Brazil and Argentina solved the Nuclear secrecy problems, making possible approaches to build a more substantial region. MERCOSUL is a spillover from the liberalization started during Collor's term and the cooperation to ensure civilian control over strategic issues (Vargas, 1997). Cooperation and distension showed both countries they both had to gain with cooperation – Brazil became the most critical buyer of Argentinian goods, and Argentina bought almost 11% of Brazilian exports (MICT/SECEX/DTIC, apud. Vargas, 1997).

Argentina, in the 1990s, almost doubled imports from Brazil, while Brazil kept almost the same amount of Argentina imports. Due to the expansion of Brazilian companies in the Southern Cone, other MERCOSUL members started to call the integration process a "Brazildependency" (Vargas, 1997: 61). MERCOSUL, nevertheless, was seen as a way to integrate the economies in the global market (Caballo, apud. Vargas, 1997). As discussed priory, Brazil's size – geographical and economic, is a deeply-rooted part of its Security Identity and a source of conflict since the 19th Century (Lafer, 2004). Brazil needed to boost MERCOSUL as indispensable for the region. The Ouro Preto Protocol gave MERCOSUL a legal person status, and called governments to help protect the Customs Union and work for the bloc to become a Common Market (*Ouro Preto Protocol*, 1994). It aimed for the bare

minimum cohesion among the members to deal with economic conflicts among the partners (Passini Mariano, 2015). It also limited the bloc's tools to the will of the States, given that Brazil disagreed with any limitations to its autonomy (Passini Mariano, 2015; Russel & Tokatlian, 2003). This discourse from Brazilian authorities was received with animosity from its Argentinian counterparts, who suspended the MERCOSUL negotiations until Brazil re-evaluate its approach (É. C. A. Winand, 2015).

MERCOSUL was used by Brazilian authorities, though, as a tool for liberalization and fighting power disparities. As the United States tried to create the Americas' Free Trade Area, fears of US products flooding markets of opened countries made MERCOSUL a more suitable alternative (Passini Mariano, 2015). Nationalism as a form to protect Brazilian companies was, again, a government flag, and the protection of vulnerable economic activities was again crucial for Economic Security (Lafer, 2004). MERCOSUL, then, became a geopolitical weapon as well.

Regional relations were essential to Brazil because power relations were not central to negotiations, making it easier for Brazil to be a rule-maker (Lafer, 2004) and concrete the Constitutional value of integrating the subcontinent (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988). Based on idealist or Kantian ideology, Brazil was interested in making South America a peaceful zone because this could boost economic primacy for Brazilian goods (Lafer, 2004). In 1996's National Defense Policy, Brazil stated that democracy made South America one of the minor conflictive areas in the world, with pacific controversies solutions (*Política de Defesa Nacional*, 1996, 2.6). It also affirmed that Brazil aimed to integrate the continent to grant international credibility after more than 100 years from the last regional War (ibid., 2.9).

The government did not wholly follow the neoliberalism recipe of privatization and free-market (Cervo, 2003; Ricupero, 2017). Nationalism, a vital part of Brazil's Security Identity, focused on the internal environment was still strong in the country. The government often chose to follow a different path from the expected by the international finance system (Ricupero, 2017). Nevertheless, the country had started the path towards opening and stability, as proposed by the International Institutions, to keep up with the changes in world politics (Vigevani & de Oliveira, 2005). Neoliberal ideas reinforced the notion among some elites, especially some sectors of diplomacy, that the country lived in relative peace, as it did not see a war in the continent since the Paraguay War (1861 – 1870) and the Chaco War, which Brazil did not take part (1932 – 1935) (Mares, 2001). This thinking is the first National Defense Policy, where security, for Brazil, is a matter of human security, given the more

impoverished populations and economic security, alongside environmental issues. After disclosing the policy text as a fast-written document where the Armed Forces pointed their primary goals to finally overcome the identity crisis, without the proper research on how to characterize the region or security matters (J. P. S. Alsina Jr, 2003).

The 1996 National Defense Policy highlighted few real concerns. The following steps on the Defense Policy did not have its guidance. Instead, a strong voice from the administration's values. From these ideas, the most relevant was the signature of the Non-proliferation Treaty and the creation of civil stances for Security and Defense Affairs (the Ministry of Defense and Brazilian Intelligence Agency). The administration was interested in giving democratic control to the Armed Forces because the Air Force and the Navy had problems among them on the jurisdiction of carried-based aircraft and because the Air Force had made negotiations with USA based companies for purchasing new equipment without the presidential approval (J. P. S. Alsina Jr, 2003).

In 1997, Argentina was recognized as a NATO extra-regional partner (Zaverucha, 2005). Argentinian president Carlos Menem declared that any reform in the United Nations Security Council should have a rotation process, instead of Brazil's aspiration to become a permanent member (*ibidem*). With a more advanced democratic system over the Armed Forces, Argentina could be an alternative to Brazil's proposal for the UNSC (Zaverucha, 2005). Brazil then advanced rapidly to create a democratic defense system.

The creation of the Ministry of Defense was a turning point for the Security Identity. The Armed Forces got unified civilian control over their activities for the first time, equalizing the objectives and budgets of the force, taking over strategic planning to the political arena (Fuccille, 2006). An antecedent right before the creation of the Ministry is the beginning of the military cooperation between the USA and Colombia, starting with an operation in Putumayo, a border city with Ecuador (Youngers & Rosin, 2005). As the USA wanted to act on the Latin American drug problem, fears of the Colombian War becoming regional increased, including fleeing combatants and the army crossing borders (*ibidem*).

Cardoso's second term witnessed drastic changes, which would require inner modifications (C. Hermann, 1990), which appear in the discourses. In 1999, the Ministry of Defense created the main goal to unify and clarify the objectives and means for cohesive actions (Cardoso, 1999f). Strengthening the Armed Forces would, as well, be an economic opportunity for Brazil, as the military sector could do profitable projects that would impulse technological advances (*ibidem*). The president would argue the future need for a National Project, where the Armed Forces and National Development would meet for an integrated

approach of values and goals for the country (Cardoso, 1999c). The Normal State, per definition, would not aggregate this idea; it should be the market, not the government, the development guide (Cervo, 2003). The changes in the final years of the Normal State paradigm related to the power disparities and the globalization asymmetries.

National Interests, then, shifted from economic welfare to physical survival (the perpetuation of the State-society complex) and autonomy (the State resource allocation capability and government choosing freedom) (Wendt, 2014). Although these were always part of Brazilian Security Identity values, a more substantial USA presence in South America could jeopardize autonomy and national integration. Counterbalancing the American presence, IIRSA (Initiative for Infrastructure Integration of South American Region)⁶ [present author translation], was launched in the year 2000 (Ricupero, 2017). Regional integration was vital to Brazil; not fighting against any neighboring States was also considered central (Cardoso, 2001c).

Democratic values within the Armed Forces were part of the Ministry of Defense's rhetoric. The Minister affirmed he did not need to foster democratic values within the FFAA because the Armed Forces were essential for the democratic process (Cardoso, 2000a). It was still crucial to see the military not as the opponents of democracy but as part of the negotiated transition. By involving the Armed Forces with democratic values, democracy grew stronger. A State and its type of identity (what type of unity it is [Wendt, 2014]) must be reaffirmed daily, so the Self is perpetuated (*ibidem*). Especially after drastic changes, as those Brazil was going through. As part of the democratic transition, the Armed Forces became constituencies in the democratic order, meaning their compliance was crucial for the civilian Defense policy to thrive. Constituencies' endorsement and legitimacy are central for the State to make any change (C. Hermann, 1990).

The Ministry of Defense and the National Defense Policy materialized the Constitutional values of democratic control of the Armed Forces, reinforcing the presidential role in the process. This was a form, as well, to reaffirm the democratic State and to ensure the military was no longer in the front of the Defense affairs. The military took a step back in the conduction of the country's economic affairs, but the president would reinforce the same values as before – democracy, stability, the vital part of the Armed Forces (*Política de Defesa Nacional*, 1996).

⁶ Iniciativa para Integração de Infraestrutura Regional Sul-Americana.

The ministry helped refine Brazil's capacity to perceive threats. Although the Northern region was still the main vulnerability, the neighbor's affairs, not an unlikely international invasion of the Amazon forest, caught the attention (Castro, 2010). By uniting the forces under one ministry, the Cardoso administration made it possible for better unification and more substantial roles inside a democratic society. As the government was losing touch with the military, it needed to ensure democratic control over the Armed Forces adequately. Cardoso did not change the administration values nor dealt with a drastic rupture with the Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defense agglomerated those values under the Constitutional text over the military. They used those values to reassure the forces' capacities.

The Constitution chapter on the Armed Forces is the first to use Homeland to describe their duties. Those are: to protect the Homeland, grant constitutional powers, and, by those powers' necessity, apply Law and Order (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988: art. 142 caput). The president was named as the leader of the Armed Forces and got most of the control over it, with some prerogatives made by the National Congress, such as the number of Forces personnel (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, art. 48, III) and budgetary decisions (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, art. 51, IV). Although centralized and controlled by elected powers, the Armed Forces still had little control, being the president the only power above the Ministry, with little checks and balances over the Armed Forces actuation. The democratic control was more a harmonization policy of the values held and conflicts among forces than a real break from the liberties the Armed Forces had previously (Zaverucha, 2005).

The discussion over the Ministry of Defense re-lighted the need for new Intelligence Services. In the military dictatorship, the intelligence service focused on locating enemies of the regime and surveil politically exiled people (Marques, 2004). Collor extinguished the old intelligence service as part of his agenda updates, stating that no citizen would be considered an enemy under a democratic State. As the problems in the Northern border called for more attention, the Ministry of Defense addressed those threats incompletely without an intelligence service. The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) has, as its primary goal, to provide the Brazilian government with information to help better decisions in Defense and Foreign Policies (ibidem). The National Intelligence Policy limits the agency. The policy, though, has received critics, as it does not stipulate the limits for Intelligence actions (although there is an "ethics" chapter to it) or which are the limits and mandates where ABIN can be part (Zaverucha, 2008).

An important continuity, though, was that Armed Forces were still used internally in Brazil. In 1999, the president affirmed that the Armed Forces would assist in fighting drug traffic internally, although it would not have primacy in the matter (Cardoso, 1999c). The military aid for internal problems gained importance in the following year due to Plan Colombia (Cardoso, 2000b). For the same reason, border control – especially on the Northern border – became a concern (ibidem). Brazilian Constitution still granted Armed Forces the possibility to act under the assurance of Law and Order (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988 art. 142), internal use of the military was still a mark of strength against organized crime, an ongoing threat perception of the military in Brazil's History. As the intervention in Colombia escalated, fears of USA involvement around all of South America were real⁷. Initiatives to deal with the internal instability began, although their full institutionalization would happen only under the Logistic State. The 1999 law on the use of the military gave the possibility of using the Armed Forces to intervene in internal affairs, by the guarantee of Law and Order, as requested by the presidency (normas Gerais para a organização, o preparo e o emprego das Forças Armadas, 1999). The security discourse against drug traffic was the idea of State absence in many more impoverished neighborhoods and the “regain of territory” of the State (ibidem). By taking away drug traffic from the police force, Cardoso boosted the confidence in the military. As the population felt insecure about urban criminality, the fight against traffic was well received.

The Brazilian economy was somewhat stable and fighters in the Colombia civil war started to hide in the Amazon forest, going to other neighboring countries. The newly created Ministry of Defense had an essential role in protecting the Amazon forest, surpassing the identity crisis that characterized the beginning of the Normal State paradigm. Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government was able to deal with the Military identity crisis in three ways. First, he gave a new external threat for the military to strategize. Plan Colombia was a reinforcement for the need for the Armed Forces presence in the northern border. Second, with the Ministry of Defense and the Intelligence Agency, the new defense apparatus made it possible to conjugate the forces and create better strategies and policies. Third, drug trafficking inside Brazil started to be tackled by the Military Forces, giving them an internal threat and boosting the population's confidence in the military to fight parallel powers (Camargo et al., 2018).

⁷ Before the Colombia Plan, the USA had a project of an Andean Initiative against drug traffic.

A Surveillance system for the Northern border was launched to improve sovereign control over the Amazon (Cardoso, 2002). The Colombian government offered the informatics system for cooperative use and development (ibidem), reassuring it was not a threat to Colombian affairs but countering guerrilla and drug traffic within the Amazon region. Modernization became present in Brazilian discourses in the year 2000. Not anymore as an economic goal, rather for Armed Forces re-equipage (Cardoso, 2000c). Due to economic stability, the government could focus on core security concerns, such as border surveillance (ibidem). Up to date, military equipment became a goal for Brazilian Security, as threats were no longer economic but military. These threats re-emerged the Brazilian Security Identity of South America as a peace zone, which the president would call a National Interest (Cardoso, 2001c).

The central Identity values, very close to Collor's, were the primacy of International Law and the seek for better relations with the developed world to reach development. The promotion of stability was important as well, as it highlighted the development path again. National Security ideology, important during the Sarney government, was abandoned as market opening rose. Integrity, discipline, and territorial integrity maintenance were the values highlighted in Cardoso's first speech to the Armed Forces on the 50th anniversary of World War II (Cardoso, 1995b). He compared the post-war period to Brazil's moment, a modernizing period of social justice, where being patriotic was also to take part in the new type of State (ibidem).

By the end of Cardoso's second term, regional integration had spill-over, on the one hand, but started to face more challenging problems on the other. After rejecting the USA proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA (ALCA, in the original), the regional responses blossomed (Vizentini, 2006). As MERCOSUL and the Andean Community advanced in their integration processes, the idea of becoming a unified institution also increased (ibidem). The first challenge to integration was the infrastructure fragility; as most countries had export-driven economies, the country-side roads were few to none (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). It resonated with 19th Century Foreign Policies of not integrating economies, fearing dependence from neighbors (ibidem). Physical integration was connected to security integration in the 20th Century, as the South American States shared the threat of drug trafficking (Nery, 2016). IIRSA was created to deal with those problems.

The last change made during Cardoso's administration was the repudiation of terrorism as a more present value in the Brazilian Security Identity. Abrogation of terrorism was already a constitutional value (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988,

art 4, VIII). The president expressed his solidarity towards the USA after the Oklahoma City terrorist attack⁸ (Cardoso, 1995b). After 9/11, though, the theme was elevated to the most relevant subject in Security affairs, and it became a growing part of every nation's repertoire (Buzan & Waever, 2009). While dealing with the contingency of the Colombian problems and the internal threats, the terrorist attacks from 2001 marked a profound change in the USA – Brazil relationships. Cardoso entered office following Collor de Mello's idea to improve the USA's bilateral relationship (Vigevani & de Oliveira, 2005). Although not conflict-free (given the FTAA negotiation and the military cooperation with Colombia), Brazil made efforts to be noticed as an essential ally to the USA. In his speech after the 9/11 attacks, the president highlighted the constitutional values of opposition to terrorism and sought a diplomatic solution (Cardoso, 2001b). The president also stated that the worst attacks Brazil could feel from the changes in the USA politics would be economic ones and reinforced that the economics staff of the government was ensuring monetary stability (ibidem). After his discourse at the United Nations General Assembly opening, postponed to November 10th, Cardoso said that Brazil would “borrow” (Cardoso, 2001a: 520) solidarity for the USA. The president linked drug traffic to terrorism in the same speech, using those related activities (Cardoso, 2001a: 521). He also debated the importance of globalization in front of terrorism, giving that different globalization, united to the concept of justice, would improve cooperation and foster peace (Cardoso, 2001d).

Celso Lafer, Minister of Foreign Affairs during 2001 – 2002, stated that much changed from his perspectives while entering the government and what came to be after the 09/11 attacks. His ideas for the position were to improve MERCOSUL, improve the Colombian problems' affairs, and boost the economy (Lafer, 2018). Like the other American States, Brazil went to OAS, where the terrorist attacks were considered an attack on all the American countries and requested a pacific solution for the crisis (ibidem). Nonetheless, the following Afghanistan War and Iraq War were a surprise, given Brazilian values, which requested the USA to follow the International Law to deal with those matters (ibidem).

Brazil was facing a crucial moment in its Security Identity. As the international changed, the Normal State agenda spoiled. Overlapping responses to USA military aid requests in the following years were proof that Brazil should realign its perceptions and exercise its values in the new world. Internally, Although a unified National project had been previously left aside from the Normal State, the changing relationship with the USA – South

⁸ Bombing executed by a former USA Army soldier, considered the worst act of homegrown terrorism in USA History. [source: FBI, in <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing>].

America made the government readjust their view (Cervo, 2003). The president affirmed “National Interest does not vanish” (Cardoso, 2000: 49) and affirmed that both the presidency and diplomats were working towards making Brazil more active in the international realm to enforce the National Interest – while affirming the country had no hegemonic interests (Cardoso, 2000b).

Even with updated defense mechanisms, the sudden shift in the International Order was unexpected, impacting Brazil's Foreign Policy. Cardoso Administration feared this world instability could cause another economic crisis (what happened to Argentina), which had just overcome hyperinflation. Brazil had to decide if it would still cooperate with the USA in the new military interventions in the Middle East, deflected from doing in the Gulf War (costing the deepening of the USA – Brazil relations). Brazil's Identity was centered on good relations with central powers and mediators of pacific conflict solutions (Lafer, 2004). All these fears increased as a left-wing government, led by Lula da Silva, came into power.

2.2.3 Rise and fall of Logistic State

Lula da Silva's election was followed with apprehension by international investors. Many feared he would create a socialist State, re-nationalize enterprises, or close the economy again. The instability before his inauguration was dealt with through discursive government action to calm partners. The government affirmed it would not perform the speculated changes. The core of the “active and haughty diplomacy” (Amorim, 2015) was to rescue some of the developmentist State's characteristics while keeping international presence and inserting the country in the international economy. In his speech to the National Congress, post-inauguration, the president stated that

(...) time has come to transform Brazil into the nation we always dreamt about: a sovereign nation, dignified, conscious of its importance in the international scenery and, at the same time, capable of sheltering, welcoming, and treating with justice all of your children (Da Silva, 2003: 2) [present author translation⁹].

⁹ Original: chegou a hora de transformar o Brasil naquela Nação com a qual a gente sempre sonhou: uma Nação soberana, digna, consciente da própria importância no cenário internacional e, ao mesmo tempo, capaz de abrigar, acolher e tratar com justiça todos os seus filhos.

On Foreign Policy, Lula da Silva affirmed he would negotiate lowering tariffs with wealthier States, promote Brazilian companies, and debate human rights violations during the dictatorship. The president said it was time for Brazil to have a National project and a natural development strategy (Da Silva, 2003: 2), distancing from the Normal State. National interests relied on autonomy and economic welfare, just like their predecessors. However, Lula da Silva aimed to improve Collective Self-STEM, as he said in the speech - make Brazil the country the people knew it could be. Collective Self-STEM relates to appreciation by Others or devaluing/annihilating them (Wendt, 2014). As Brazilian Identity always seeks for pacific conflict resolution, diplomacy became vital for the administration.

Normal State was rooted in acting accordingly to what the International Finance Institutions determined; National projects were an aspiration only for the developed, powerful countries (Cervo, 2003). To the Logistic State policymakers, the Normal State fate was subservient to foreign powers and ineffective for the national population's needs, undermining their Self-STEM (ibidem). The Workers Party's critique of the international establishment and the historic aversion towards the United States and International Finance Institutions were less scathing during the 2002 campaign elections (Almeida, 2003). The party changed course from the grassroots social movements to a more pragmatic view of the international (ibidem). Coalition with center and moderate left made discourses more palpable for a larger audience while still antagonizing the Normal agenda (ibidem). The Logistic State has open markets for Brazilian products still as a political goal but aimed to have more autonomy and reduce the disparities of the international environment (Cervo, 2003). For that, the country should invest in technology, innovation, and imitate advanced countries' behavior (ibidem). The State comes back as an entrepreneur in specific areas to boost international competitiveness (ibidem).

Logistic State had not to change Foreign Policy much.; It mixed the developmentist role of the State allied with Normal State cooperation project. Program change was supported by Brazilian Identity's values - seeking development and include Brazil in the developing nations' concert (Lafer, 2004). The values held, nonetheless, were closer to social justice and equality. It is a program change, as values and Foreign Policy action were similar, but methods and the form to achieve success with a given policy are different (C. Hermann, 1990). Identities are somewhat fixed in their values and core structure (L. Hansen, 2006).

The self-intituled “active and haughty diplomacy” (Amorim, 2015) was also conceptualized as “autonomy by diversification” by specialists (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007). The country focused more on cooperation with similar States at the development level globally, making unorthodox partnerships, such as the approximation to Lebanon and Iran (ibidem). Therefore, dependence on historical partners, such as the USA and European countries, would be reduced. Development was, again, recognized as emancipation from ties to the center of the international environment, not to be associated with it (Dantas, 1964, apud. Lafer, 2004). Changes were not made in the core of Brazilian identity. Only the emphasis of the partnerships was on other initiatives already drawn in the past (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007).

Critical theory and Marxist thinking were still part of leftist ideologies; relations with the USA were touched by this ideology (Cervo, 2003). In Cardoso’s second term, he already stated the problems of asymmetrical globalization and how much needed was a partnership update with the United States (Vigevani & de Oliveira, 2005). Lula da Silva's administration reinforced that idea and reflected it in Brazil’s Foreign Policy. Lula da Silva was the military's preferred candidate, the first time a left-wing candidate had such approval. He promised to double the budget for the Armed Forces (from 1 to 2%) (J. M. Battaglini, 2013) and to reinforce sovereign actions to reduce dependence on external forces operating in Brazil (Da Silva, 2003a). By doing, he re-ignited nationalism. He provided the means to protect the country in a hypothetical offense to it. The Foreign Policy Problem change (C. Hermann, 1990), presented by the cooperation between Colombia and the USA, and the global orientation change (ibidem), where the War on Terror replaced liberalism made necessary for a new strategy in Brazil. Returning to sovereignty rhetoric and financial aid to national companies, the Workers Party administration created a new coalition of forces, based on the inward nationalism and development, basis of Brazilian Security Identity.

Lula da Silva’s Foreign Policy had three main axes: one focused on economic development; the second, political action and resistance; and the third, based on social programs (Vizentini, 2006). It showed an up-to-date Foreign Policy approach, matured from the other Foreign Policy experiences, and synchronicity with the international moment (ibidem). It relayed on credibility from partners, an excellent image to diversify trade options while demanding a more prominent role internationally, a tendency from previous paradigms (Cervo, 2003). One update in the values seen through the first years of Lula da Silva’s government is that democracy was replaced by Social Justice (Da Silva, 2003a, 2004e, 2005a, 2006g). It still related to democratic capacities but now focused on their

improvements. It related both to appreciate the armed forces social work (Da Silva, 2003a) that will be later used on peace operations (Da Silva, 2004b) and the maturing stage of democracy after 15 years.

Argentina also started to appear differently in the discourses during Lula da Silva's administration. In 2004, the country was praised for coordinating the Haiti stabilization mission (Da Silva, 2004b). In 2006, though, it was the first time Argentina was mentioned as an equal for the South American peace, armed forces re-equipage, defense industry, and help to stabilize South America (Da Silva, 2006b). The bilateral cooperation would be, according to the president, the center for regional peace (*ibidem*). A coordinated protagonist role for both countries internationally was at the core of Brazilian Security Identity (*ibidem*).

Brazil had the momentum to update its National Defense Policy, considered idealist and did not count real problems in Brazil's Security (G. A. G. Oliveira, 2016). The new policy cited the world's vulnerability due to unipolarity and how natural resources matters for security (such as biodiversity, hydric and areas to be inserted in the productive system) (Política de Defesa Nacional, 2005). As Brazil has plenty of those, it became a vulnerability Brazil did not put any neighboring country as a threat, stating the region lives in relative peace (Política de Defesa Nacional, 2005: 3.2). Nevertheless, the importance of looking for single-countries conflicts is not becoming a regional threat (Política de Defesa Nacional, 2005: 3.4). The country started to use more of its military capacity internally, as the Law and Order Warranties (GLO, in the original) took place.

Lula employed the 1999 law on the use of Armed Forces to foster peace operations. In 2004, Brazil became the leader on the Haiti stabilization mission, which boosted the Armed Forces' morale. It also legitimized the increase of the increased budget for Defense. The rapid advance of Peace missions abroad made certain South American countries, especially Argentina, not see Brazil's arms purchases as a threat. In his speech to the troops, Lula da Silva reiterated Brazilian forces in Port-Au-Prince as "peace soldiers" and how the acceptance of Brazil's participation showed that the world saw the Brazilian Armed Forces as contributors to peace (Da Silva, 2004b). Although Armed Forces were used to deal with internal threats before democratic periods, the scope of the operations in 2009 was more prominent. Taking the military to favelas meant making the State present for the most vulnerable; one cannot deny its authoritarian figure (Carvalho & Silva, 2011). With the Pacifying Police Units (UPP, in the original), the government attended a middle-class demand (enforce the war on drugs) and attempted to give some civil rights to more impoverished populations (*ibidem*). However, these operations resulted the militia's power

growth and the hyper-militarization of quotidian life (Camargo et al., 2018). This became a more significant issue during Rousseff's terms.

Lula da Silva's second term would continue the policies from the previous one, but with more assertion in international affairs, not only regional. Regional affairs were modified due to UNASUL creation to be the agglomeration of bilateral strategic affairs. In da Silva's discourse in the first UNASUL meeting, the Security and Identity variables appear again. "Common Destiny" became more present in the discourses, together with democracy and peace (Da Silva, 2008b). The president began to propose a South American Security Identity based on self-determination, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (*ibidem*). Based on these principles, Brazil requested a meeting in Brasília to discuss a Defense Council.

As Brazil got support to start the South American Defense Council's initiative, another noticeable self-perception change occurred. In the 2008 discourses, the president called Brazil an example for the subcontinent due to peace, development, and agreement with its neighbors (Da Silva, 2008e). Lula da Silva's second term marks the idea that Brazil was fulfilling its destiny. The first term's doubts became pillars for triumphant discourses in the second (Ricupero, 2017). This created a misperception that would start a separation from South America in the following years. By overestimating the importance of Brazil's growth for the region, the administration saw itself as the center of South America's integration. It is often common for an actor to overestimate their influence when others behave as they desire (Jervis, 2017). Although Brazilian participation in South America rose since re-democratization, the other States also strengthened their ties and had a South American component in their Foreign Policies. Regional concertation was not a unified idea, rather than expressions of inner perceptions of autonomy and economic strength (Russel & Tokatlian, 2003).

In his 2009 Félix Houphouët-Boigny Peace award discourse, Lula da Silva affirmed the importance of Collective Peace. He enforced that Brazil was helping the Latin American States to achieve development; especially, through the peace mission in Haiti (Da Silva, 2009b). According to the president (*ibidem*), another critical issue was the de-nuclearization of Latin America, the only world region without nuclear weapons. This discourse reaffirmed the novelty of Brazil as the ignition for regional peace and the role as its insurer. Traditional Brazilian Security values, such as the defense of peace, stability, and development, were still present in the discourse, but Collective Security was discussed with National Security. Common Destiny was still an essential value through the last year of Lula da Silva's government. In 2010, at the UNASUL summit, the president called the region to enforce its

faith in regional integration to boost economic and security goals (Da Silva, 2010b). His discourse reaffirmed the importance of the new regional institutions, such as the South American Defense Council and the UNASUL, to reassure the common regional values: sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity, and non-intervention (Da Silva, 2010b).

The last more significant change during Lula da Silva's government would be the UNASUL (Union of South American Nations) creation. UNASUL has derived from IIRSA, and it was a connection between MERCOSUL and the Community of Andean Nations (CAN) to create an extensive integration process among South America. UNASUL did not focus on economic processes. Instead, the main idea of the institution was to foster political concertation through the region without any foreign powers (especially the USA). It was the realization of the Constitutional principle of creating a Latin American community of nations (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, art. 4). Brazil heading the project was also an Identity realization of the growing importance of the region without external interference, where Brazil could take the lead to improve pacific interactions among members to improve trading opportunities (Lafer, 2004). UNASUL based itself on top-level officials (presidents, ministers of economy, and ministers of defense, mainly) conversations to solve the region's problems through diplomatic means. It aimed to form a South American identity to bring the populations and the governments closer together (unasul, 2008). Collective Identities are where the separation between Self and Other gets blurred, and the units recognize the Other as part of themselves (Wendt, 2014). In this type of identity, policymakers can work together, and States get most closely of a Kantian Order (law-based peace) (ibidem). UNASUL intended to foster such identity in the entire continent by promoting regional concertation (unasul, 2008). Secondly, by uniformizing the Security and Defense apparatus by document sharing and harmonizing politics (ibidem).

UNASUL had an essential role in the defense congregation. First, using Southern Defense Council (CDS, in the original), an organ like the United Nations Security Council, where all the members would discuss the region's security affairs, mainly the emergency crises. Second, the organization would encourage the States to share their defense information and central documents. Brazil sought to create its first Defense White Book to be shared and review its Defense Strategy. UNASUL gained momentum due to the leftist ideologies of most of South America's governments, which claimed there was a necessity to end USA interferences in their politics.

Even with the significant step made with UNASUL, Brazil's leadership project was considered weak (Vilosio, 2010). Lula da Silva's ruling had Brazil focused on being

recognized as a global player, reducing focus from South America. Although Brazil made more deals with South American governments during Lula da Silva's terms, it was still less than the other countries' cooperation. As Brazil attempted to be a mediator in the Middle East, a peacemaker in Haiti, an essential partner to Europe and the USA, the regional partnerships were overshadowed. UNASUL and Brazil's National Development Bank were supposed to be banners of the country's presence. Nevertheless, they showed how far Brazil was from the region.

UNASUL became fully operational in Dilma Rousseff's administration (2010 – 2016). Being from the same party as Lula da Silva, many believed her administration would follow the previous policy guidelines. Nonetheless, Rousseff had a different power colligation than Lula da Silva and did not find it relevant for Brazil to keep its "haughty and active" diplomacy worldwide. She made South America her top priority. Primarily, Rousseff's terms represented attempts to get Argentina again close to Brazil. Brazil left aside its role as the South America agenda maker, relying on UNASUL to take the change to do it multilaterally (Saraiva, 2014). UNASUL had a bold institutional project, but Brazil's ambivalent position between deepening integration and autonomy from external power created a problem (Fuccille, 2018). Pending between deepening South American integration and maintain its autonomy, Brazil had a hard choice to make. As Brazilian Security Identity has these two axes, namely the South American relations and the quest for development (Lafer, 2004), and faced a tripping point on its Identity. UNASUL faced problems, as well. Brazil did not have financial means for its multilateralist project after the 2008 crisis. UNASUL received less funding than expected and the National Development Bank, a Brazilian institution that would make credit for South American governments, became more strict to sign new loans (Saraiva, 2014).

Internally, Brazil was divided as well. South American integration began to be questioned by many policymakers, especially by the opposition to the Workers Party. They called autonomy and nationalism truthful values in Brazil's Identity, and the other Latin American States had influenced the Workers Party administration. Specifically, the Cuban and Venezuelan leaders' proximity to the Workers Party was perceived as a vulnerability and a loss of sovereignty by the country.

There was another International Orientation Change (C. Hermann, 1990) happening, as well. After the 2008 financial crisis, developing markets were no longer an investment trend, and the demand for agroindustry products decayed (Saraiva, 2014). The president did not show as much importance as her predecessors (Cardoso and Da Silva) to

make presidential diplomacy (*ibidem*). Inner problems would dominate de agenda in the following years (*ibidem*). Rousseff's first term began with an inner and international belief that she would follow the Logistic State model drawn by da Silva without much novelty. In her first year as president, Rousseff would greet the Armed Forces for their constitutional reassurance of the democratic State (Rousseff, 2011b). She also saluted the importance of social work's armed forces, an essential tool towards development (*ibidem*). In a less triumphant tone than da Silva, Rousseff affirmed there were still much to be done in Defense affairs, such as reduce vulnerabilities, improve the arms industry, modernize technological apparatus, especially in the sea (due to the oil reserves found off-shore) as in the Amazon (Rousseff, 2011b). In the year, she highlighted the values of patriotism, abnegation, and loyalty from the Armed Forces (Rousseff, 2011f). Her diplomacy, shier than Lula's, and her more pragmatic approach to the military showed the previous president's adjustments.

The first concrete change in Brazil's Foreign Policy was when there was a soft coup in Paraguay in 2012. A congress meeting during night time voted for the deposition of Fernando Lugo in a dubious process (Galindo, 2018; Soler, 2004). Rousseff's initiative was to request Paraguay's MERCOSUL membership suspension until the country held new elections and requested the matter to be appreciated by UNASUL. Argentina supported Brazil's decisions and stood by them. Nevertheless, this marked a shift in Brazil's direction for South American policy: universalism was replaced with partner selection. It was not a return to Brazil's old tradition of regional distance but a shift from Lula da Silva's attempt to not antagonize the region. This first act also gave a clue of what would be Rousseff's Foreign Policy. From adjustment (the effort given to a particular policy) to program (means and methods utilized) changes (C. Hermann, 1990), her Foreign Policy dissociated from Lula da Silva in many ways. Such as closeness to allies, less diplomatic effort, and focus on internal problems would end the former diplomacy strategy. On the identity level, Rousseff sook to keep the continent's status quo and avoid regime changes that could cause instability, the main feature of the South American axis of Brazil's Security Identity (Lafer, 2004).

MERCOSUL, which was not a priority since the government Lula, got more fragile with the Paraguayan problem. Brazil focused its negotiations with Argentina, whose politics were reducing the imports for Brazilian goods, as a form to boost national enterprises. As Paraguay got suspended from MERCOSUL, Brazil moved with the vote for full Venezuela's total membership. The country did not have Paraguayan support to join the institution as a full member. However, other members believed it was empowering to have another strong

economy in MERCOSUL, as it would bring the third biggest economy to the organization, granting more force to it.

During Rousseff's first term, the National Defense documents got updated again. Although similar to the 2005 documents, the PND (National Defense Policy) and END (National Defense Strategy) had essential changes in 2012. The government reassured autonomy as the basis for development but added the importance of conjugating efforts with regional partners to achieve this goal (P. da R. Brasil, 2012: 3.2). It got clearer to see the values of development and the region's importance, despite the Paraguayan problem. The government was attempting to make amends on the problems faced by its Security Identity. The polarization expanded in the following years. Although Rousseff's administration formed a very similar cabinet compared to Lula da Silva's, the focus became more internal than external, which caused discontent among the government. Lula da Silva's ideas were handled differently, such as the more significant presence in Africa and a mediator outside South America (Saraiva & Gomes, 2016). Brazil made two important reorientations in Foreign Policy during the Logistic State era. First, it sought to be recognized as a mediator in International Conflicts, part of the "autonomy by diversification" approach (Vizentini, 2006). This was a value in the Brazilian Security Identity (Lafer, 2004) reinforced in the Rousseff administration. Secondly, the perception of the "pacific" South America was changing. It reactivated the national arms industry. The search for different partners, such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, was seen as a warning sign by its traditional partners, especially the USA.

Security, passed the identity crisis and its new mechanisms fully operating, will have two main ideas: to protect the country's sovereignty and create a space free of foreign intervention in South America (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007). Protecting the Amazon from foreign forces, who would try to internationalize the forest and strengthening UNASUL were government priorities that fostered military support (É. Winand & Saint-Pierre, 2010). Despite the increase in the funding for defense matters, the re-equipage was slow, once again justified by Brazil being a geopolitically satisfied nation (ibidem). The production of policies, strategies, and the white book of defense was made for the first time during the Logistic State paradigm to show Brazil's good intentions to its neighbors. The diplomatic effort slowed down during Rousseff's administration. Integration, although continued from the progressist spiral from the past decades, but it halted as South America did not support Brazil's leadership aspirations and, internally, losing autonomy (in both economy and Security) to regional institutions was not welcomed (Saraiva & Gomes, 2016). The

relationship with Argentina gained more focus, as the counterpart felt that Brazil had left their regional partners behind in their search for a more prominent international role (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015).

In 2013, after defense document updates, the president reaffirmed the traditional Brazilian Security values, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the Armed Forces social work (Rousseff, 2013). She recalled the importance of peace operations dating back to the post-crisis Suez Canal region until the leadership role in the Haiti peace mission (ibidem). In 2015, Rousseff would reaffirm the economic basis for Security affairs within the Brazilian economic and political crisis. However, her discourse would mark that Brazil's economy was not the same as before, given that the economy matured and the country had a more substantial structure for the conjuncture crisis moment (Rousseff, 2015b). Her defense of the democratic State would resemble Normal State presidents' discourse, due to the need to deepen democracy and improve its mechanisms (ibidem). The internal focus is a standard adjustment change in Foreign Policy. As a living and changing being, the State has many areas that require attention to survive (Campbell, 1992). In times of internal questioning, such as those during Rousseff's administration, government efforts must go to the most problematic areas. There was a legitimacy crisis with which the government needed to deal. The response was to reiterate stability rhetoric, a value somewhat abandoned during Lula da Silva's administration but essential for his predecessors. Ensured by diplomats, stability is the affirmation that Foreign Policy has little or no change in Brazil to grant legitimacy for the government and keep investors happy (Soares de Lima, 2005).

To deal with protests against her, the president delegated to her top-level officials to deal with South America; the diplomatic service lost its primacy (Saraiva & Gomes, 2016). Foreign Policy became, more and more, a matter of parties and ideologies similar to the government (ibidem). From the Paraguayan crisis to dealing with Venezuela's instability, it got more reactive than active, which would be a bigger problem to Temer's administration (Cornetet, 2014). Argentina was the only South American country to keep the same influx of official visits from the Brazilian president (Cornetet, 2014: 126). When elected for her second term, Rousseff reassured her Foreign Policy priorities as South America and its institutions (MERCOSUL and UNASUL). During Rousseff's administration, Argentinian presidents (Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez) were enthusiasts of a more proactive MERCOSUL to reduce economic uncertainty. Nonetheless, Rousseff's second term got more conflictive internally, and her focus was mainly internal for the following years.

During her second government, one initiative was the anti-terror law, a pressure made by the USA for years. The law, whose text was finished in 2015 and approved in 2016, sparked a fierce debate in Brazil. In its first draft, the government parties' mass movements said it could open for more criminalization of protesters and be used in xenophobic forms by the government. The final text included a paragraph explicating social movements seeking to protect constitutional rights, and social purposes were not included as terrorist organizations (LEI N° 13.260, DE 16 DE MARÇO DE 2016, 2016). To ensure the document had no goal to criminalize democratic practices, the president vetoed other doubtful parts of the law.

Rousseff's administration ended in a turmoil of corruption scandals and loss of support among Brazilian elites – including her vice-president. Although this work does not characterize Rousseff's impeachment process, it is crucial to sign two things. First, the errors in the process and the lack of straightforward prosecution on the crimes charged against Rousseff. Second, the excesses committed by the government during the entire New Republic. The Foreign Policy conundrum over regional integration as a form for the country to become a Venezuela puppet State (Chagas et al., 2019) dealt with two principal Security Identity ideals (sovereignty and nationalism), while the protests against Rousseff had a component of economic stability, another essential part of Security Identity, as it was deeply related to the development agenda (Lafer, 2004). Michel Temer, her vice-president, took promising office changes, such as a viable development and to take back the “future of the nation” (PMDB, 2015: 2).

Rousseff's term had many setbacks, such as the timid results of the economic interventions designed to counter the recession. After Lula da Silva's good economic moment due to China's demand for commodities and South America's demand for industrialized goods, Rousseff's administration suffered pressure to follow those good results. Not only those two partnerships were drained, but internally, the demand also lowered. Both the demand reduction, a product of the economic crisis, and the demand leak towards imports made the industry results too low for investors' expectations (ibidem). Immigration became a Security matter, with more Haitians coming to Brazil and the political and economic crisis in Venezuela worsening, driving more economic immigrants to Brazil (Cervo & Lessa, 2014). Rousseff's measures to deliver aid to both States were foreshadowed by the internal political crisis, based on corruption scandals, that lead to her deposition. After Rousseff's deposition, the vice president, Michel Temer, took office. There is a clear shift from Rousseff's to Temer's administrations, whilst Temer made concessions to the

opposition and made similar moves to the Normal State paradigm (Cardoso Jr., 2018) as the president pledged to boost privatizations and to reduce the State intervention (p.5) through ministerial reforms and pension reform (p. 7). Thus, this is very similar to the Normal State, although differences occur internationally, mainly due to conjuncture factors. The idea of othering changed – South American governments questioned the Temer administration, and the regional relationships were not a priority anymore (MDB, 2015).

2.2.4 Temer government – A new paradigm?

Temer was the vice-president in Rousseff's second term. His party, though, was part of the coalition that called for Rousseff's deposition. Temer began to articulate his cabinet before Rousseff's impeachment through the document *A Bridge to the Future* (*Uma ponte para o futuro*, in the original). In this document, the MDB – Brazilian Democratic Movement party (present author translation from *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*) highlighted problems in the Workers Party administrations and how Brazil needed to take a different path. The document does not focus on Foreign Policy, but one change was made from the previous aspirations. It affirmed that, if not in consonance with Brazilian goals, the country would seek new deals without MERCOSUL and South America, although it would be preferred to do it with them (MDB, 2015). It is more than a program change (weans and methods), but rather a goal change (C. Hermann, 1990). Integration was one option among others, not a destiny, as the former presidents affirmed.

Temer did not discuss Identity and Security as profusely as his antecessors. His 2016 United Nations General Assembly discourse would highlight global affairs, such as the North Korean nuclear tests, offering Brazil as a possible mediator, and the importance of diplomacy to solve conflicts. His regional experience with Argentina made de-nuclearization part of the constitution (Temer, 2016c). Regional integration and economic security were also considered important for Brazil and the integration with Europe and Africa (*ibidem*). Finally, the president would affirm the importance of the democratic use of the impeachment mechanism under the constitutional principles that ended Rousseff's term (Temer, 2016c). He declared that was only possible because of the strength of Brazilian institutions and that normalcy was re-established in Brazil (*ibidem*).

Continuing on the economic Security rhetoric, Temer stated Brazil should make a better environment for foreign investors (Temer, 2017b). He affirmed that economic stability

entangled itself in juridical security, and these opportunities were blossoming in Brazil (ibidem). Regional peace and the lack of internal conflicts would attract more investments to the country (ibidem). Temer professed similar values to the Normal State, such as the importance of external capital and economic liberalism. However, the administration's distance from essential international affairs would be close to Sarney's idea of generating distance from global political affairs. World leaders' distanced from the post-political crisis scenario in Brazil, as instability could have internal political effects and jeopardize investments.

There are still few published studies on the Temer administration. It is clear that the president sought to differentiate his administration from others. South America's mentions in his discourses decreased drastically (Vieira, 2016), but his politics became less connected to developmentism and more focused on economic pragmatism (Prates et al., 2019). When Temer ascended to the presidency, many Latin American countries, namely Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, notified Brazilian authorities over the fear of the democratic exception due to the troubled impeachment process. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Serra, used strong language against these suspicions. Considering these States as allies from the former government, he claimed they lacked knowledge in Brazilian politics (G. Casarões, 2016). The government reiterated *Ponte Para o Futuro's* values that commercial relations should prevail over political ones, and the USA and China would be the new government's priorities (G. Casarões, 2016; MDB, 2015).

As Hermann's (1990) theory shows, this changes the Foreign Policy program and Brazilian Security Identity. Those declarations shook the construction of pacific and positive relations with South America. The change of diplomatic direction to the North-South focus is a return to the most traditional foreign Policy ideas. It diminished South America's importance, which was central to seek equality in Foreign Policy, a value in the Brazilian Identity (Lafer, 2004). Brazil's Foreign Policy asymmetrical axis gains primacy, which observed Brazilian Identity in moments of orthodoxy where power disparities were more considerable (ibidem). More importance on the North-South relations within the Normal State. Nonetheless, the values guiding the Normal State of neoliberalism were different from Temer, focused more on the internal problems and the national capacity to deal with them. This tendency is inherited from the Rousseff administration and reaffirmed by the change of perception towards South America.

In his first discourse in the National Congress, Temer acknowledged it was the moment to unify Brazil and create a National Salvation government (Temer, 2016b). The

discourse affirmed inner nationalism and patriotism concerning Brazilian institutions, as the principles Lafer (2004) highlighted. As South American integration began to clash with nationalism – especially because of the population’s fears of Brazil inheriting a regime similar to the Venezuelan, internal aspirations were reinforced. This solved a value dispute in Brazil’s identity. The value with more support will be appraised and accompanied by others to give it more legitimacy (Jervis, 2017). Economic stability and development were essential parts of the discourse, both as unfulfilled promises of the Worker Party and as the path to be taken (Temer, 2016b).

Nonetheless, continuities are noted. Government acts changed, and identity was rethought, but the Temer administration was still held similar values to the previous ones. His first official visit was to Argentina, as it became common during the New Republic, where he discussed new agendas with president Macri. In the visit, Temer reassured the Brazilian government that it would work with Argentina and highlighted MERCOSUL's importance as a tool of South America’s integration (Temer, 2016d). The exclusion of UNASUL from Temer’s discourses is due to the attempt of not being caught in the same identity battle Rousseff was in, between integration and sovereignty.

Although without a precise theoretical classification of his government, South American relations were reclassified but not abandoned completely. Many of the Normal State ideas re-emerged. It was not a complete identity break, but a break of paradigm to one closer to the elite’s ideas for the National Interest of economic wellbeing (Wendt, 2014). As the crisis broke in Venezuela, many feared a left-wing government would “turn Brazil into a new Venezuela” (Chagas et al., 2019). Through massive protests against the Rousseff government, people requested a more orthodox government, which would solve the economic crisis quickly. When Argentina’s president, Mauricio Macri, visited Brazil in 2016. Temer affirmed:

Through the decades, Argentina and Brazil built their shared memory. Remembrances of our history are translated in words that are more than part of our discourse, and we incorporated it into our quotidian. In the Brazil – Argentina relationships, mister president. Expressions like: common destiny, strategic alliance, or economic integration find concrete manifestations. Those have a long lineage of whom we are guardians and evoke a vision of the future that is up to us to write precisely [present author translation] (Temer, 2016a)¹⁰.

¹⁰ Original: Ao longo das décadas, Argentina e Brasil construíram a sua própria memória comum. As recordações de nossa história traduzem-se em palavras que mais do que parte integrante do nosso discurso, nós

The partnership with Argentina was not erased from Brazil's identity. In the same speech, Temer affirmed that both countries should create common diplomacy and reinstitute MERCOSUL as the primary integration process in the region (Temer, 2016a). The most significant expression of reviving MERCOSUL and changing the ideological orientation of Foreign Policy was the return of Paraguay and the suspension of Venezuela of the organization.

Venezuela, the newest full member of MERCOSUL, had an economic decline, and president Nicolás Maduro did not have the same support as his predecessor, Hugo Chavez (J. A. Oliveira, 2018). The State used violent means against protesters, and South America started to have refuge and asylum requests from Venezuela (ibidem). Brazil was hesitant to act as a mediator in the Venezuelan crisis because of the pro-sovereignty foreign policy adopted by Temer. Venezuela made threats of halting imports from Brazil if overtly questioned (Chagas et al., 2019). Brazil's response was to take Venezuela's case to be discussed in MERCOSUL, alleging the State broke the bloc's democratic clause. The decision of membership suspension affirmed that Venezuela denied all attempts to establish an open dialogue with their representatives, making no improvements or guarantees to keep the country as a full member of MERCOSUL (MERCOSUL, 2017). It was a process similar to Paraguay's suspension after the soft coup in 2012 and granted more ideological cohesion to the bloc, where the presidents were pro-market and pro the MERCOSUL - EU treaty.

Brazil recognized the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela in the following year and created a commission to provide relief at the border, as irregular immigration spiked (J. A. Oliveira, 2018). This commission resulted in Operation Acolhida (welcoming – translated by the present author), responsible for organizing border control, sheltering and interiorization of the refugees and economic migrants (ibidem). Operation Controle (Control) Was created to prevent and punish crimes and irregular immigration (J. A. Oliveira, 2018). Temer administration had reinforced sovereignty rhetoric while reaffirming the protection of Human Rights, both crucial to the Brazilian Security Identity.

incorporamos no nosso cotidiano. Nas relações Brasil-Argentina, senhor presidente, expressões como: destino comum, aliança estratégica ou integração econômica, encontram manifestação concreta. Tem longa linhagem de que somos guardiões, evocam a visão de um futuro que agora nos cabe exatamente escrever.

2.3 Presidential Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Foreign Policy in the New Republic

Presidents have a critical part in republican societies. They embody the elected government and are the personification of the State as well (in purely presidential systems). Although they can act very little in the political realm on their own, presidents are an important personification of the administration. High-level officials would decide the following action to be taken and present it to the president, whom they make a spoken act about it. In New Republican Brazil, the president often was the liaison element among diverging Security Identities predispositions.

Leaders cannot change Foreign Policy by themselves, as it would involve negotiations and political capital one could hardly do alone (M. G. Hermann & Hermann, 1989). Nonetheless, Brazilian politics had defied theory during the New Republic. Presidents became the source of dialogue and a fast tool for create partnerships. As well, Brazil's constitution stipulates the president might legislate through decrees (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, art 84, VI). The presidential decrees accelerated internalization and avoided discussion in both Congress and the Senate. The leader's personality became more critical, as leader charisma was crucial to fostering Brazil's partnerships (Dyson, 2006).

In Sarney's administration, his officials' good relationships with Alfonsín administration were vital to developing a broader integration tendency. Attempts to normalize relationships with Argentina brought Brazil into democracy plenitude, reducing incertitude in the region (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). Sarney started, as well, to pluralize Foreign Policy. The top-level policymakers and the military had a prominent role, but company owners, social movements, indigenous populations, economic stability, and others were part of this amplification during the re-democratization – a tendency kept through the New Republic (Cason & Power, 2009).

Presidential diplomacy peeked in the Cardoso and Lula da Silva administrations. Both leaders had respect among their peers. Cardoso was a known intellectual in South America, and Lula da Silva had connections with many social movements in the region (Cason & Power, 2009). Cardoso and Lula da Silva were both heads of administrations with important foreign components. Cardoso's administration focused on inserting Brazil into the global economy (a Collor de Mello inheritance) and advertised the country as peaceful and

stable, especially after the intervention in Colombia (Vizentini, 2006). Lula da Silva's administration focused on social inequalities and the conjunct response to power disbalances in the international realm (ibidem). Hermann and Hermmann (1989) propose that leaders' personalities indicate how pluralist their cabinets are, Lula da Silva and Cardoso were the best candidates to operate leader-based diplomacy. They welcomed criticism and protests, would welcome their advisers' input and pluralized Foreign Policy – while still being well-versed in Foreign Policy for the ends they needed (Cason & Power, 2009).

Both governments gave more power to CAMEX (Chamber of Foreign Trade), an organization that connects the Ministries of (1) Industries, Foreign Trade and Services, (2) Foreign Affairs (3) Agriculture, (4) Agrarian Reform, and (5) planning, as well as the presidential chief of staff¹¹ (Cason & Power, 2009). CAMEX aims to increase Brazil's productivity and competitiveness by coordinating foreign trade policies (internal and external) (DECRETO N° 10.044, DE 4 DE OUTUBRO DE 2019, 2019). The organization pulverized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' monopoly and the Ministry of Defense, and the presidential diplomacy would do in the following years (Cason & Power, 2009).

Rousseff reduced presidential travel significantly. Compared to the first year of Lula da Silva's presidency, the reduction was 31% (Cornetet, 2014: 117). She made the most visits to Argentina (3 in her first term), followed by Venezuela, Paraguay, the USA, and Portugal (2 visits) (Cornetet, 2014: 119). It is not to say that presidential presence diminished; instead, it became more reactive than active (Cornetet, 2014). Rousseff focused mainly on the internal problems, both on security and politics, making less of presidential diplomacy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs regained its primacy, although the scope of its actions was limited.

Temer did even less travels in his first year – 9 in total (P. da R. Brasil, 2017), compared to 17 from Rousseff (P. da R. Brasil, 2011). The president's image got scarred, as the instability in Brazil made partners eerie to negotiate. The president gave more protagonism to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to give Brazil credibility again. His first Ministry of Foreign Affairs, José Serra, had a weak diplomatic background. The diplomatic service revived MERCOSUL and gave continuity to the European Union – MERCOSUL free trade agreement.

¹¹ CAMEX composition changed after the ministerial reform made by President Jair Bolsonaro.

2.4 Security Construction in the New Republic

Although much of the Security ideas made during the New Republic related to the military regime perceptions (such as the fears of Amazon forest internationalization), it is possible to observe many changes through the studied period. Development, international recognition as an International Law advocate, and nationalism in internal relations have not changed, being part of the core set of values of Brazilian Security Identity (Lafer, 2004). However, facing security problems evolved during the New Republic, both in the method and perception ways.

The 1988 Constitution, the first after twenty years of Constitutional exception (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015), has two crucial articles on facing Security affairs. The first is article 4, which states the International principles of Brazil. From those, only two deal directly with Security Affairs: peace defense (VI) and peaceful conflict resolution (VII) (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988). In article 144, on public security, there are two main threats presented: disruptions of political and social order with interstate, national or international repercussions (I), and international drug traffic (II) (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988).

President Cardoso felt the need for a Policy of National Defense given the problems within the Armed Forces (especially, the problem between Air Force and the Navy on Carried-based aircraft dominion) and the Air Force's direct contact with American enterprises on purchasing new aircraft (J. P. S. Alsina Jr, 2003). Cardoso administration, then, rushed to get a Policy of National Defense ready to contain the single-handed negotiations without the presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being contacted (ibidem). Policymakers were rushing an incomplete policy, although it was a landmark in democratizing Defense affairs after the military dictatorship.

The Policy of National Defense of 1996 adds to the constitution, affirming democratization and distance from the more significantly threatened regions made South America the most de-militarized region in the world (P. da R. Brasil, 1996: 2.6). The policy cites "armed bands" and drug trafficking as potential threats to Brazilian stability (P. da R. Brasil, 1996: 2.12). In strategic partnerships, the policy highlights cooperation with South American nations to maintain peaceful interactions (P. da R. Brasil, 1996: 5.1 G).

The policy brings seven National Defense objectives: (1) guarantee sovereignty; (2) guarantee the rule of law and democratic institutions; (3) preserve national unity; (4) protect

Brazilian people, goods and resources, in Brazil or outside; (5) to maintain Brazilian interests offshore; (6) Brazilian projection in decision processes internationally; and (7) contribute for international peace and security. Those general objectives were controversial, giving that assumed external intervention, although the policy would characterize Brazil's Defense profile as defensive (*Política de Defesa Nacional*, 1996).

The policy was innovative because it was a result of a committee with Armed Forces Officials, diplomats, and academics (J. P. S. Alsina Jr, 2003). Creating the Ministry of Defense, though, would request a complete review of the document, given the Armed Forces configuration and the regional security environment changed rapidly.

Plan Colombia and 9/11 terrorist attacks, followed by the USA pressure for Brazilian support in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, gave Security and Defense affairs a little more highlight (G. A. G. Oliveira, 2016). But the urgency overshadowed those matters to stabilize the Brazilian economy by the president (*ibidem*), and the negotiated transition made sense for the presidency to deal with military problems. However, the USA's cooperation with Colombia and the more significant presence of USA troops had a substantial impact on the president's discourses.

Cardoso changed his approach to Foreign Policy as the USA became more unilateral in its actions. Globalization was perceived as imbalanced – the USA had too much power to guide the process to their interests (Cardoso, 2000b). MERCOSUL received reinforcements as a strategic mechanism to deal with power disparities (*ibidem*). In the same speech, the president made it clear that the Armed Forces served on the border to ensure sovereignty (Cardoso, 2000b). This was interpreted as a transversal response to the changes in the Colombian conflict.

Perceptions on Security affairs created during Cardoso's terms suffered changes in Lula da Silva's administration. Although critics of the world order started to emerge after the Plan Colombia establishment, Lula da Silva potentialized those critics into the National Interest. Regional autonomy became part of the discourses, requiring a new National Defense Policy, approved in 2005. The new policy made critics of the international system and, especially, to the United States policies. The international realm characterization affirms unipolarity and military power imbalances could bring instabilities to the world (P. da R. Brasil, 2005: 2.3). Perceptions over South America did not have significant changes. However, it redacted South America's writings as a peaceful zone (changed to relatively peaceful). It did not mention the zone as the most de-militarized in the world (*Política de Defesa Nacional*, 2005).

The document brought the National Defense objectives, which were: (1) to guarantee sovereignty; (2) defense of the national interests and Brazilian resources in other countries; (3) preservation of the national unity; (4) promoting national stability; (5) contribute to maintaining peace and national security; and (6) project Brazil in international decision processes (*Política Nacional de Defesa*, 2012). Like the 1996 document, this was received as a revision instead of a change from its previous version. The most significant difference is the affirmation of the dissuatory, not defensive, character of Brazil's defense.

By the end of the same year, it was celebrated 20 years since the first Brazil – Argentina treaties. In the ceremony, celebrated in the Argentinian border town of Puerto Igrazú, both presidents and the former heads of State Sarney and Alfonsín. In president Lula da Silva's discourse, he thanked both former leaders for their innovative views in bilateral relations and reinforced Brazil – Argentina axis as the cornerstone for South American integration (Da Silva, 2005c). The president reinforced the importance of shared and open nuclear programs and how much the partnership had evolved since then, highlighting that no single-handed strategy was possible, only collective ones (*ibidem*). The president also affirmed the partnership with Argentina to be part of the permanent objectives of Brazil (*ibidem*). In his speech, President Néstor Kirchner reaffirmed the importance of bilateral relations in creating peace in South America and how much MERCOSUL was necessary for bilateral and regional relations (Kirchner, 2005b). The Argentinian leader critiqued Brazil, though, by saying that not only having interlinked economies should suffice for integration – to him, integration would be a common path towards development and a bolder partnership (*ibidem*).

The most significant change during Lula da Silva's administration was UNASUL and its South American Defense Council. Due to that fact, Brazil published a National Defense Strategy, publicized in 2008. The document reaffirmed the importance of National independence, and institutes the idea of integrating the Armed Forces, revive the National Defense industry and improving the strategic sectors to improve such independence (DECRETO Nº 6.703, DE 18 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2008. Aprova a Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, e dá outras providências, 2008). The most significant vulnerability discussed in the strategy is Amazon and how to protect it from foreign interests or external interventions (P. da R. Brasil, 2008: 1.13). The strategy is to have the three forces acting together to monitor and defend Amazon (*ibidem*) to counter this possibility.

Rousseff's government had a more pragmatic view of Security compared to Lula da Silva's and Cardoso's ideas of South American integration and universalism. In her

second year as president, the National Defense Policy and the National Defense Strategy went through revisions. Although alterations were minimal, it is essential to highlight that the new documents no longer affirmed there were problems derived from unipolarity; instead, the new Policy would affirm that those power discrepancies could bring conflicts (P. da R. Brasil, 2012: 3.3). In the National Defense objectives, the new document added to 2005 one. It maintained the objectives previously accorded, although the active verbs, such as “promote” and “defend,” were changed to “contribute,” diminishing the State's role on regional security and international peace and security. It added five other objectives, being them: (7) the maintenance of modern and professional Armed Forces; (8) to aware the population of the importance of Defense affairs; (9) develop the national defense industry; (10) to structure the Armed Forces with the confirmation of their strategic planning; and (11) to develop the defense logistic and mobilization capacity in the territory (*Política Nacional de Defesa*, 2012). It is a less proactive policy, although changes from the previous document were minimal.

The National Strategy was reviewed as well. More profound changes from the 2008 document were made. Integrating the forces was no longer a problem to solve, but how to monitor the Brazilian space (terrestrial and aerial) and adequately organize the forces (*Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*, 2012) was one. International Interests in the Amazon forest were listed as one of the biggest threats to Brazil's sovereignty, and surveillance of the Amazon is an integral part of the document (*ibidem*).

Temer brought changes to Brazil's security construction. Although the government did not review the National Defense documents or had an overt problem with South America, differences from the previous administrations emerged. Stating that Brazilian Foreign Policy was universal, rather than regional, the government sought new foreign investments in Brazil and highlighted the importance of MERCOSUL, not expanding much on UNASUL attributions and importance (Temer, 2017a). Integration with Argentina was seen more in the commercial-economic aspect than any other (*ibidem*).

From the remaining aspects of Security Identity, the sovereignty and stability rhetoric were the most present. Although changing accordingly to the paradigms they were related to – either from the closeness of developmentism, or the openness of Normal State, or the State intervention from the Logistic State, the idea of showing Brazil as a strong, stable State that would not accept impositions from others was a core value. Nevertheless, it coexisted with different ideologies and negotiations, especially the search for more foreign markets and integration that made the Normal and Logistic States more open. However,

regulating which sectors would be open and to whom. Integration was a significant value. Nevertheless, Sarney jeopardized it due to his nationalist take on Foreign Affairs and Temer, who saw integration as a complex subject for his potential supporters.

3. Argentina reception of Brazil's projections

Argentina's identity and counter identities are more complex to define than Brazil's. The country has not achieved a consensual identity since the end of the military dictatorship in 1983. The transition was traumatizing, with no negotiations with the military (Antonelli, 2001). Argentina has no epistemic community, like Brazilian diplomats, whose values conduct Foreign Policy. Among the ideological, party-related rivalry, the very basis of Argentina's identity was in dispute. It impacted the foreign policy actions taken and the main two axes of motion. From these axes, one deals with the relationship with the United States and the other with the South America relations, where Brazil is a central part (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). Although Brazil and Argentina passed through similar governments during the past decades, Argentina had different positions relating to its neighbor due to this identity duality.

Our starting point for this chapter is to understand how the identity Brazil projected was perceived in Argentina. From the paradigms and their aspirations for the continent, we will draw how the Argentinians received Brazilian aspirations and how Argentinian elites treat Brazilian Identity. Argentina is a central Security actor in South America. Its relations to extra-regional actors make the State relevant for regional stability and its economic force. The Malvinas/Falklands War is relevant to the persistence of caution towards external actors for almost all South America. Argentina's closeness to NATO will also play a role in the distrust among neighboring countries. Being the second-largest economy in the subcontinent, followed by Brazil (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011), the rivalry against Brazil – and the partnership – was determinant for South America's Security relations (Buzan & Waeber, 2003).

3.1 The cognitive differences between what is projected and what is perceived

Projecting values and aspirations through leaders' discourses is only part of the Foreign Policy effort. Leaders can easily convert into discursive practice the values in their

society. A Significant Other will interpret those discourses according to their perceptions, which pass through their State identity formation. Argentina had perceived itself as the balancer of Brazil's leadership, and the relationship with the neighboring State is considered a competitive partnership (Wehner, 2015). Argentina's identity formation is different from their perception of Brazilian policies to what Brazil understands Argentina's role is. Brazil understands South America as a Lockean Order where, although Brazil is the biggest economy, all the others can take part (Lafer, 2004). On the other hand, Argentina sees itself as an equal economy with the same capabilities as Brazil to create a leadership project (Wehner, 2015).

Wendt (2014) poses four stages for interactions: (1) based on their identity; the Self acts, signaling the role it wants in the interaction; (2) based on their identity, the Other analyses the action taken from the Self. The Other can either accept new information given by the Self or not, showing the Other can either rethink their reality perceptions from the action or not – they learned from it. (3) Using its new definition towards a situation, the Other takes their action, basing on the role they want as well; (4) The Self interprets the actions from the Other, based on new and old learnings from that actor.

Policymakers learn not only by acquiring information. Often, decision-makers who get new information will ignore it to follow their original assumptions (Jervis, 2017). This happens for both identity consistency and personal biases. Learning is the process where policymakers interfere in information and make policy changes accordingly (C. Hermann, 1990). Differences must be so drastic to defy the previously established policies and require a new posture (Jervis, 2017). Thus, this leads to changes in action templates and the identity embodiment (Hudson, 2005). Action templates demonstrate the interpretation of Self and Other cultures (Hudson, 1999). New information adds to Other cultures, changing perceptions, calling for updates on the action templates (ibidem). As Wendt (2014) and Jervis (2017) point out, when faced with new information, the actor can either choose to add that to its understandings or ignore it.

Expectations rely on identities. Expectations "(...) represent standing estimates of what the world is like and, therefore, of what the person is likely to be confronted with" (Jervis, 2017: 145). It is close to identities as somewhat fixed meanings widespread among the population and embodied by policymakers (L. Hansen, 2006). Changing expectations would require a reasonable justification based on values presented within society (Jervis, 2017), or, if the change is too profound, a re-evaluation of identity altogether (C. Hermann, 1990).

As Hermann's (1990) four types of change, one can infer identity change. Adjustment (change in effort) and Program (methods) changes require little adaptation from the Self and Other. Goal (solving a problem or retreating) or International Orientation (how the Self relates to World Order) changes either an incredible amount of effort from policymakers or an Identity review. Learning from the Other, then, can provoke significant changes in the Self. Considering the Role Identity as how the Other interprets the Self, the learning effects can change a pre-established order altogether. Change is contextual, and not good or bad per se, but it is evaluated by the order it creates. It is not easy to address which specific action leads to a new order, but key learning moments can link new identities and new orders. New orders, either Kantian, Lockean, or Hobbesian, will depend on the acceptance of Role Identities derived from interaction (Wendt, 2014). Role identities will require acceptance of the enactment in an interaction so the Other can have relevant counter identities (*ibidem*).

The role of the Other is essential not only because it causes acceptance and creates a predictable order but also to establish differentiation degrees. Differentiation degrees are central to understand how policies can deter or interact with the Other and how threatening the Other is (L. Hansen, 2006). Except for the Kantian order, all others will see the counterpart as an Other, different from the Self (Wendt, 2014). The other in a Lockean order is closer than one in a Hobbesian order – rivalries can be diminished; trust can be built, and a somewhat stable order can be established in Lockean orders. The same is not possible in Hobbesian terms, however. Hansen (2006) means that the duality Self and Other is not always as extreme as some theorists may imply – she cites Campbell (1992) as an example of the inevitability of radical otherness. There are different levels of Lockean structures and rivalries that can be remediated. Understanding the degree of complementarity or rivalry/enmity towards an Other is a crucial part of action templates towards them.

3.2 Argentina Foreign Policy thought

In Argentina, foreign policy thought revolves around three main traditions: liberal, nationalist, and developmentist (Merke, 2008). The traditions are also called the idealist-realist, autonomist, and peripheral realist (Colacrai, 2019). Alternatively, they could be divided into different globalization cycles (Corigliano, 2007). The different branding of

Argentina's foreign policy periods varies, although there is some consensus among traditions. Authors seeking to debate distinct aspects of Foreign Policy will classify those moments to debate the minutia of their research problems; however, similarities arise. We will use Merke's denomination for this work due to the nomenclature similarities to Cervo (2003), although other denominations are equally valid.

The liberal tradition was conceived during the Argentinian State foundation. Low development levels made Argentina rely heavily on European imports and respect from International Law principles, especially those coming from Europe (Merke, 2008). From those principles, the Liberal tradition re-emerged in Argentinian politics during the 1990s under the neoliberal ideology. Argentina's political thought of world detachment and closeness defied the need for external investments (Corigliano, 2007). The State perceived itself as fragile, and the best way to surpass that was to seek preferential relations with the USA and EU in South America (ibidem). Under this tradition, the peripheric realist theory of International Relations declared that, to survive, a peripheric State must not seek autonomy or nationalism. Instead, it must reduce its costs and risks by making alliances and bandwagoning with stronger States (Colacrai, 2019). This need for alliances created a good momentum for Argentina for regional integration arrangements, which meant more alliances, and economic deregulation to attract more investments and reduce vulnerabilities (Merke, 2008).

The nationalist tradition appeared after independence and the first liberal wave. It has its core in identity creation and differentiation from Europe and other South American Countries (Merke, 2008). The State advocated for its people and their interests in the international realm, where the State is the only actor capable of bringing development – therefore, the State should act as a unity to bring those goals (Colacrai, 2019). At the beginning of the 20th Century, ideas of “authentic” and “unauthentic” Argentina took place. Authentic Argentina had its base in the countryfolk, its traditions, and way of living. Unauthentic Argentina still relied on European ideas and economy focused on imports, living in big cities in a European-like life (Merke, 2008). During this period, the substitution of imports model blossomed to generate internal industries to provide industrialized goods while Europe went through World Wars I and II (Corigliano, 2007). The nationalist tradition divides itself in two: the unanimist (create a national project with clear identity and values) and the decadentist (Argentina has distanced itself from the developed nations due to the lack of national projects) (Merke, 2008). Their ideas of “refund” the State, Kirchner, and

Fernandez put limits on economic liberties and seek South America as a priority are part of the nationalist tradition (Merke, 2008).

The developmentist tradition was created in the 1950s, after Perón's fall, debating deterioration on terms of trade, where the underdeveloped States would export less valuable goods that lost inherent value on a long-term basis. In contrast, the capitalist center exported manufactured goods with increasing market value to those impoverished countries (Merke, 2008). Although it shares some qualities with the nationalist tradition, the developmentist comes from evaluating the Self within the international system seeking to become a developed country, instead of the countryfolk nationalism advocated (ibidem). Autonomy meant creating a Self, not an object, for International Relations – to separate the State from others and reduce dependence (Colacrai, 2019). This tradition predicts more regional integration and new alliances, as the developed world is intrinsically unequal, and the State must create more and more equal partnerships (Corigliano, 2007). Developmentism was seen as a middle ground between liberalism and nationalism – it does not close the country to investments and cooperation, but it does not believe in a self-regulated market without State intervention (Merke, 2008).

3.3 Alfonsín and Brazilian politics

While Brazil focused on developmentism and, many times, isolationism, Argentina based itself on the globalist Foreign Policy thought (Jiménez, 2010). Globalism meant diversify their trade partners and focus on development as a form of autonomy (ibidem). This autonomy was based on a more negligible dependence from significant countries (USA and United Kingdom) and government-based infrastructure reforms (ibidem). This paradigm, present between 1940 and 1991, was more prone to Latin-American integration than Brazilian developmentism (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). Alfonsín's government (1983 – 1989) based itself on democracy as the center of the Argentinian problems. It was not the bad economy but the authoritarian regime that impeded better financial results (Merke, 2008).

The first re-democratization Argentinian president faced difficult times. Argentina was the first country in South America to be re-democratized, which caused distrust from its peers. Especially Brazil and Chile – Chile was noted in the president's inaugural speech by

stating that cooperation with the neighboring State was crucial to backing distrust (Alfonsín, 1983). As Brazil became democratic as well, differences were felt. Brazil negotiated its transition with the military elite, while Argentina retook democracy after the fall of legitimacy from the military dictatorship (Soares & Januário, 2018). The debt crisis, Human Rights abuses, and the loss of the Malvinas/Falklands war diffculted the maintenance of the authoritarian regime (ibidem). Its peers supported the country and renovated its faith in South American integration (Bernal-Meza, 1999).

The dictatorship junta decided to create a foreign threat to settle internal disputes – igniting the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War. Creating a significant Other highlights Security Identity crucial values to the population, diminishing inner conflicts (Campbell, 1992). Argentina hoped for a quick war against a protected British claimed territory; nonetheless, a British fleet rapidly dispatched and maintained British ruling in the territory, culminating in the Argentinian loss of the war (Alcañiz, 2013). During the War, Argentina called for the OAS' reciprocate assistance treaty, where aggression towards one member should be aggression to all American States (Bernal-Meza, 1999). Although few countries sent their troops in support, the war results changed Argentina's Self-perception. The war loss shook Argentina's place in regional integration and added more problems to the debt crisis. Internally, the dictatorship's popularity fell, and social problems increased, culminating at the end of the military ruling by 1983 (Rapoport, 2007). Argentinian democratic presidents sook to improve the Argentinian image globally and keep autonomy a cornerstone of Argentina's identity (Antonelli, 2001).

Alfonsín defined his priority in his inaugural speech: an honest government focused on its independence from outside intromission (Alfonsín, 1983). His discourse promised an open government, free of State violence and willing to collaborate with the new world being designed (ibidem). In 1988, he would affirm the importance of new development models, sustainable on a long-term basis, as the country stood up for its democracy and Human Rights respect (Alfonsín, 1988). Although Argentina sooks more cooperation with their peers, three conflict hypotheses persisted during Alfonsín government: cooperation with Brazil was fragile, border disputes with Chile could become a more significant issue, and the still-unsolved conflict with Great Britain (J. Battaglino, 2013).

Although debated whether Argentinian identity continuities and changes under Alfonsín (Delicia, 2010), it is sure that the traumatic end of dictatorship and social traumas caused by the Malvinas/Falklands War also by the abuses of the military junta, were emblematic (Antonelli, 2001). Trauma was more present in Argentina than Brazil's memory,

and international pressure over Argentina's dictatorship Human Rights crimes was heavier (ibidem). Thirty thousand people went missing during the Argentinian military dictatorship (Rapoport, 2007). Unsolved foreign political prisoners' disappearances called attention to the Human Rights violations worldwide (Antonelli, 2001). The riots, both protests, and guerrillas were repelled with disproportional use of force and created a social conflict between those pros and against the dictatorship (ibidem).

Another Alfonsín's government priority was to de-securitize Argentinian's daily life (Merke, 2008). His Foreign Policy agenda sook to reinstate Argentina's role in the regional and international realms – getting closer to the other new democracies and improving ties among Argentina and developed nations (Busso, 2014). Alfonsín affirmed that the Armed Forces stopped seeing themselves in authoritarian terms and would embrace the new Security Identity, where they are part of the democratic State and made by citizens equal to all others (Alfonsín, 1985). In the same speech, he affirmed that Argentinians could not be a part of the new world order if they made technical changes in their authoritarian behaviors – the democratic path needed the abandonment of the old ways (ibidem).

Argentinian participation in International forums in the 1980s was marked by the Malvinas/Falklands War (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). The parties did not sign a peace treaty; resuming negotiations became an important banner for Argentina's Foreign Policy because the State wanted to be recognized as a peacemaker (Delicia, 2010). Foreign affairs normalization showed resentment towards Brazil. Although the country supported Argentinian territorial claims, Brazil did not respond to Argentina's pledge for neighbor States Armed Forces reinforcements during the War (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). Nonetheless, Brazil supported Argentinian claims in the United Nations and the Organization of American States for mediation, creating proximity that started trust-building with Brazil, as the countries would side together in many UN and OAS summits (Malamud, 2011).

To avoid been seen as a pariah, Argentina became a promoter of democracy and peace in the region (Antonelli, 2001). As the first State to become re-democratized, in 1983, Argentina felt insecure close to dictatorships in Brazil (re-democratized in 1985) and Chile (re-democratized in 1990), their most extensive shared borders (ibidem). Alfonsín affirmed the past mistakes would guide what not to do so that Identity could be reframed (Alfonsín, 1985). Seeking regional normalization, especially with the rivalry with Brazil and border

problems with Chile¹², Alfonsín attempted to create a coherent identity for Argentina (Delicia, 2010). This coherence focused on democratic values and Human Rights, and the administration decided it was possible to promote such values internally but not externally (ibidem).

Alfonsín's administration happened during the debt crisis, as the Brazilian re-democratization. In late 1986, it became clear that merely the democratic transition would not alone lead to economic results (Busso, 2014). The president made a declaration in National Television affirming he would de-bureaucratize the State; he highlighted, as well, the South America market opening as a window of a new expansion for Argentinian firms (Alfonsín, 1986). One of the most significant changes to deal with the recession was reducing the military budget from 3.4 to 1.8% of GDP (J. Battaglino, 2013, p. 267). In the same discourse, he spoke on the Brazilian importance, commercially and as a union of wills, to avoid international discrimination and demand better economic practices from the major countries (Alfonsín, 1986).

The debt crisis called Argentina and Brazil to become a proposer of the Cartagena Consensus. The crisis solution advocated for development as the tool for debt elimination and pointed protectionism of central countries as the reason for the debt to expand so fast (Delicia, 2010). The USA rejected the project, and the Washington Consensus, which put the lack of good practices in the Latin American governments to blame for the crisis, was signed (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015). More critically, Argentina focused on USA relations after the Washington Consensus. European and Latin American countries' support did not grant the economic strength the State needed; USA alignment seemed the most profitable Foreign Policy option at the moment (Busso, 2014). Both South America and the USA were essential forces for Argentinian progress in the following years, although conservative sectors would prefer the USA market due to its stability.

The Washington Consensus was the key to the following IMF agreements. Argentina left behind the confrontation with Brazil to seek integration, and the economic ties among the two countries were re-established, with Brazil buying Argentinian corn and wheat (Delicia, 2010). Exports to the US, nonetheless, surpassed the amplification towards Brazil's market. This opened for the two main axes in Argentina's democratic Foreign Policy: the regional and Western axes. Alfonsín, like Sarney, was a transition between developmentism and neoliberalism. Unlike his peer, the Argentinian president found in the

¹² The Beagle Canal dispute started a conflict in 1978, solved in 1984, is an example of this (Bernal-Meza, 1999).

Argentinian developmentism strong resistances towards industrialization (Merke, 2008). Argentinian Armed Forces saw economic intervention as a form of communism and, contrary to Brazil, the State did not support the market under the authoritarian ruling (ibidem).

Alfonsín's democratic economic strategy reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote Argentinian business and investments internationally. It also opened the road to negotiate MERCOSUL. The emphasis in Latin America was economical, although Alfonsín received well the reopening of Brazilian markets for Argentinian goods. Argentina's autonomy centered itself in a stronger Latin America, regional integration, and a more stable, non-dependent region (and States) (Lorenzini, 2013). Alfonsín affirmed that the Cartagena Consensus opened a road for integration that would create real progress in South America, rather than treaties that had not been implemented in the past (Alfonsín, 1987). He cited the commercial approach towards Brazil and Uruguay to prove the new integration moment (ibidem).

Approaching Brazil was strategic to balance USA dependence. Brazil was a “fall back” plan to diversify the buying markets and not to be vulnerable to the fluctuation of the American market (A. C. Simonoff, 2013). The triangulation of Argentina – Brazil – the USA was the primary Alfonsín's Foreign Policy strategy to avoid further economic crises. For Argentinian purposes, sectorial economic agreements would not be enough; a necessity for deeper integration called for the triangulation strategy (Milanese, 2005). The nuclear agenda was not a cornerstone for the process, but as Brazil and Argentina had disagreements on other affairs, such as market opening, nuclear energy was a less sensible bilateral affair and a positive agenda to pursue (ibidem). In his last speech for the Congress, Alfonsín affirmed that approaching Brazil (and Uruguay) was one of the biggest successes of economic decentralization. It de-nationalized commercial influxes and reduced Buenos Aires' economic centralization to a more developed and egalitarian Argentina.

The most significant changes in Security Identity during Alfonsín administration were the shift from a Role Identity based on a solid country with firm objectives, making themselves conflictive to a Role Identity where democratic values fostered integration and cooperation. Argentina drifted from a State with problems with its neighbors to a peace-loving one – proved by reducing half of the military budget and the civil control over Armed Forces, together with the Nuclear Arms project's abandonment. Nonetheless, the country still needed to improve its economy and be an international player once again, President Menem's main goal for Argentina.

3.4 Menem and bilateral adjustments

Carlos Menem's administration (1989 – 1999) was the symbol of neoliberal ideology in Argentina. His discursive practice revealed a rupture with the past, seen as nationalist, conflictive, and isolationist (Merke, 2008). Neoliberalism, stability, and a pragmatic abide by international norms would relaunch Argentina's Foreign Policy as a pro-integration, peaceful, and distrusted State (ibidem). In his voting platform, Menem and his vice-president, Eduardo Duhalde, stated the need for a productive revolution in Argentina, where economic liberalization and export-based companies would boost economic recuperation and realign Argentina with its First World status (Menem & Duhalde, 1989).

Menem's Foreign Policy had agendas similar to Fernando Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso's, but neoliberal ideas were more vigorous in his administration than in his Brazilian peers (Cervo, 2003). He carried bolder privatization and faster market opening programs to bring foreign investments and create a new Security Identity for Argentina (Bernal-Meza, 2002a). His Foreign Policy Agenda broke with the developmentist thinking and the ultimate break on government ties with the market, based on privatizations, regional integration, market opening, economic deregulation, and approach to the United States (Merke, 2008).

Although he was the second president in the newly democratized Argentina, Argentinian democratic values were added to its Security Identity under his administration. As well, Menem encountered internal power disputes solved, contrasting social problems Alfonsín had to conciliate. From these, we highlight the de-securitization of daily life and the de-militarization of law enforcement. Getting back the trust and prestige from the international community and re-gaining normalcy in international life were values enforced by the United States for the Latin-American States and the liberal democratic government (Bernal-Meza, 2002a). Argentina needed investments. The Menem administration sought to integrate the North American values within Argentinian identity, which will impact the State Security Identity. The stability one surpassed democracy rhetoric. Therefore, with a concluded democratic transition, it was crucial to gain political and economic normalcy for Argentina's economic relaunch (Merke, 2008). Argentina was more internationally pressured to hold Human Rights values than Brazil because of the internationalization of the dictatorial Human Rights abuses (Antonelli, 2001). They embraced the neoliberal reforms more rapidly than their neighbor.

From these pressures, Argentina's ideal of normalization of international relations made it become a non-confrontational actor (Bernal-Meza, 2002a). Deepening from Alfonsín, the country embarked on the "Normal Agenda" (Cervo, 2003) not only by changing its economic ideology but also by letting go of any critical position perceived as aggressive against developed States (Bernal-Meza, 2002a). Menem's Foreign Policy focused on positive Argentinian images: any positive signal from a strategic partner was considered a win for National Agenda (Bernal-Meza, 2002: 77). These included the USA, Brazil, the United Kingdom, and others. Menem's administration saw sovereignty as different from its predecessors. State economic paternalism and nationalism were replaced by openness and freedom. Merke (2008) demonstrates the four signals marking new discursive changes:

1. States change and must re-think their economy and political moves in new forms, such as the internationalization of the economic activity. A nation is a legacy and a project constantly under construction;
2. The myth of territorial appropriations in South America is concerning. States were born believing their neighbors stole their rightful territory and constructed otherness. Territorialism and nationalism were the heart of the integration problems; therefore, Foreign Policy must be de-territorialized;
3. The new international order required States to concede sovereign to other agents, with many international agents working together for development and advancement – wars were no longer needed. The developed States were creating trust-building institutions rather than engaging in war with each other;
4. State intervention and the lack of internationalization of the Ministry of Economy made Argentina isolated from the world. The Ministry must be involved in international development strategies, seek investments, and business promotion as part of the Argentinian public policies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Security was mainly economic security for Argentina, like Brazil in the same period. Both States went through a deep crisis in 1980 and were struggling to reorganize both market and society after the Cold War and re-democratization. The ideology, neoliberalism, was as well concerned with economic problems rather than traditional security ones. As for Argentina, the attempt to re-engage in the International Order passed through the deny of confrontation, perceived in the discourse novelties presented by Merke

(2008). The normalization process – rule-abiding and international institutions following (Cervo, 2003) – was more needed by Argentina than Brazil. Normative tradition in Argentina was to comply with rules and assure others (Merke, 2008). The normative tradition distinguishes itself from the liberal tradition, carried by Menem, because it is based on the means, not at the end (ibidem). The normative tradition would accompany Argentina through the re-democratized period, although the liberal one would be shaken.

Firm believers made Menem's administration believe that globalization and liberalization were the only way to develop (Miranda, 2012). In his voting platform, Menem was emphatic that sovereignty and nationalism could not exist in the 21st Century, especially in a country devastated by poverty (Menem & Duhalde, 1989). Other States would see Argentina positively because commerce would blossom, and financial problems would demise (Miranda, 2012). In this scenario, Brazil's relations towards a Common Market were crucial to reaffirm Argentina's compromise with the new values in the new global order. The nuclear partnership was necessary to advance other economic ties, as the deterrence generated more space for trust-building. Both countries began to strategize together internationally, giving more presence and strength to Argentina's foreign affairs. Joint representation and aligned goals (especially in economic affairs) made Brazil and Argentina closer during the 1990s (Rapoport, 2007).

Regionally, MERCOSUL was a mark of the economy-lead Argentinian security identity principles. Focusing on economic freedom and the strategic partnership, MERCOSUL resonated well with Argentinian's pragmatism (Malamud, 2011). Then, it was a manifestation of globalization in the regional realm (Miranda, 2012). Its first years, 1991 to 1994, witnessed different paces in Brazilian and Argentinian economies. Market liberalization grew, but it was central for Argentina's Foreign Policy strategy and only marginal to Brazil (Carranza, 2003). Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs had highlighted the importance of regional integration – although this could only bring the needed results for Argentina's economy if the partners were all aligned for a market opening rather than only being free for the MERCOSUL members (Di Tella, 1991). Argentinians saw Brazil's reticence in opening its markets as an asymmetry in the MERCOSUL process, even an imperialist one (Malamud, 2005, p. 147). Minister Di Tella highlighted the importance of bilateral relations with Brazil, affirming the country's relevance was more than economic and political, especially in the nuclear realm (Di Tella, 1991).

The political importance of those agreements is shown in the automobilist sector. As an important industry, it sparked rivalries between the two countries (Carranza, 2003).

Brazil imposed quotas on Argentinian car imports in 1995 to foster its industry (Malamud, 2005). MERCOSUL was reviewed by then, activating the Brasília Protocol, a conflict resolution mechanism of the bloc. The Brasilia protocol deals only with commercial disputes and others coming from the MERCOSUL scope, and it is limited to inter-government affairs. Alongside presidential' goodwill, the automotive crisis was averted. As Malamud (2005) highlights, maintaining the status quo would be the outcome of any controversies among the MERCOSUL members. The ambition of creating a Common Market in 1995 had to be delayed due to the many crises within the two years. Specifically the Mexican, Russian and Asian crises, brought fragility to the Argentinian economy and changed the main economic goals for the Menem administration (Rapoport, 2007).

While Brazil saw MERCOSUL as a form of influence in global markets and a tool towards development and leadership, Argentina had a much more pragmatic approach (Malamud, 2011). MERCOSUL was, in the Menem administration, the microcosmos of a more significant project. The bigger project, globalization, was the key for Menem's Foreign Policy because Menem believed it was the best form to gain notoriety as a developed country (Miranda, 2012). In Europe and Asia, the region played a similar role to other countries to diversify Argentinian exports. It was one of many options, not a destiny like Brazilian decision-makers would affirm about themselves.

As FTAA advanced, Menem was enthusiastic about being part of a significant project with the USA, as it would open that country's market for Argentinian goods (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). Menem administration saw in the initiative a possibility to better integrate Argentina in global markets, but also his administration drafted an inter-American agenda to be discussed, including drug traffic, environmental problems, reduction in internal bureaucratic problems, the debt issue, solution to boost the private sector and the discrimination against Latin American products in Saxon America and Europe (Menem, 1991). This enthusiasm decreased as the presidential transition From the Bush Sr. to the Clinton administration, which had problems in the Congress approve the agreement.

MERCOSUL, on the other hand, opened markets for Argentina among its neighbors. Menem was confident regional integration could bring Argentina to become an important regional and global player (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). In his discourse in the United Nations General Assembly in 1994, Menem expressed how Latin America's new moment's landmark was the democratic order, Human Rights, Peace, integration, and innovation (Menem, 1994). Innovation was a new value-added to Argentina discourses by the Menem administration. They understood Argentina had a development halt due to the

military dictatorship and paternalizing presidents in the past. Therefore significant changes and innovative measures (called productive revolution), integration included, were needed to re-enter the path towards progress (Menem & Duhalde, 1989). In his second term, Menem would affirm that although the FTAA was crucial for economic leverage, MERCOSUL embedded a political strategy; “we have said in many opportunities, president Cardoso in Brasil and I, here in Argentina, that we are with the FTAA, but our priority is MERCOSUL”¹³ (Menem, 1997) [present author translation].

The nuclear consensus interested Argentina in two ways. The first was to discourage any Chilean aggressivity. Chile was still very distant from the region, and although the border problems were solved, there was little interest from the parties in creating a lasting alliance. Secondly, the Argentinian nuclear program was questioned. Argentina had plans for a medium-range missile, and the post-Cold War pacifist Foreign Policy could not coexist with that program. Menem’s discourses would emphasize the importance of pacific uses of atomic energy and Argentina entering the nuclear energy international regime (Menem, 1994), as per the normalization agenda of Menem’s government.

The advances made with Brazil were significant to build trust between both States and improve bilateral relations. Menem administration saw in the resolution of the nuclear debacle two victories. One, to close an expensive government project, which was against the ruling ideology. Two, a form to guarantee access to nuclear energy with IAEA approval without fully subscribe to the non-proliferation agreement (Quintanar & Romegialli, 2004). Argentina did sign the main treaty and took part in the revision committee, but Brazil would only be a part of the non-proliferation agreement by the year 1998 (ibidem). The signature by Argentina was motivated by the Menem administration’s Foreign Policy based on the approximation to the United States. If the country wanted to be seen as a partner instead of a threat, the idea of autonomous nuclear systems had to be repelled, impacting the Security Identity (Balbino, 2020).

The peace-loving State value was the second significant change in the core of the Security Identity – only sided by the prominence of economic affairs. After reducing the military budget under Alfonsín, Menem reduced military cabinets and the Ministry of Defense control under the State reform performed in 1990 (J. Battaglino, 2013). The military regained some autonomy, on the other hand. The president pardoned many of the

¹³ “Hemos dicho en muchas oportunidades, el Presidente Cardoso en Brasil y yo aquí, en Argentina, que estamos con el ALCA, pero que nuestra prioridad es el Mercosur.”

dictatorship's Human Rights abuses to calm the Armed Forces tensions (ibidem). The military new missions had connections with the responsibilities coming from the new international order. In his discourse during the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in 1994, Menem brought up the Argentinian contribution to peace forces, where more than four thousand soldiers were helping stabilize societies in the world (Menem, 1994). Argentina's Army identity crisis was finished through more flexible control over the forces and by giving them the mission of providing troops in international conflicts, such as the Gulf War and the humanitarian interventions in Haiti and Kosovo (Merke, 2008). This external threat perception not only helped diminish the Armed Forces' objectives in democratic times, but it was a vital advertisement of the new values for Argentina's Foreign Policy.

Argentina was seen as a champion for peace and nuclear deterrence by the Clinton administration in the United States, who would affirm that Argentina was an example for the world (Alcañiz, 2013). The approximation with Brazil achieved an essential goal for the country, but one primary objective of the Menem administration was fulfilled in 1992 when the country became an extra-regional NATO partner (ibidem). One of Menem's Foreign Policy goals was to change the international view on Argentina as a destabilizer, nationalist country to a pragmatic, open, and peaceful one (Merke, 2008). Joining NATO meant Argentina had reached such a position and was no longer seen as a problematic State by the central States (Alcañiz, 2013).

Approaching Brazil was not merely instrumental. Argentina could perceive the neighboring country's growing economy in the second half of the 1990 decade and saw MERCOSUL as a form to participate in Brazil's economic advancements (Malamud, 2013). Although both administrations (Menem and Cardoso) agreed to keep autonomous decision processes and were interested in keeping their sovereignty, they saw positive outcomes from the bilateral approximation. Menem saw the approximation to reduce asymmetries among countries and improve Argentina's international investments and gains (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011).

The increasing dependence on Brazil and Argentina's crisis would go through by the end of the decade making the asymmetry affair a bigger issue to Argentina in the second Menem administration (1995 – 1999) (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). Argentina became proactive in pro-Occident relations, supporting the USA pledges in the UN and sending troops to the Gulf War (Bernal-Meza, 1999). As Brazil opted not to take preferential relations with the USA during this time, it shook their bilateral relations with Argentina. Argentina

believed its preferential partner in South America was not committed to restoring international credibility (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011).

In its distance from the USA and focus on the region, Brazilian Foreign Policy was anachronic for the Argentinian standards (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). Opening the region's markets without a preferential relationship with the USA was considered problematic, as they were the main destiny for Brazilian and Argentinian exports (*ibidem*). Menem's credibility policy needed USA support and recognition to achieve its primary goals. Therefore, Brazil's relations would resonate with the USA's demands to the region, and Argentina would be frustrated when Brazil did not take the exact alignment (Bernal-Meza, 1999). The preferential relations status with the USA became central to Argentina, not only during Menem's administration but also to the subsequent administrations, as part of the Identity dimension of alignment with the status quo (Miranda, 2012). Argentina subscribed to the USA's globalist paradigm, and the region mirrored the foreign policy Argentina intended to display to the world (*ibidem*).

To Washington, the preferential relationship with Argentina was essential in South American normalization (A. C. Simonoff, 2013). Argentina was crucial for, in its diplomatic proximity, influence Brazil to expand MERCOSUL's scope and to negotiate positions in favor of the good relations with the USA (*ibidem*). Menem's administration believed Argentina was re-gaining its part in international life as the peripheric leader of alignment rather than the peripheric leader of the resistance (Merke, 2008). In Guido Di Tella's discourse in the United Nations General Assembly in 1996, integration was the theme of most of his declaration. He affirmed the importance of integration for economic purposes and as a trust-building mechanism to address political problems. The democratic clause is an essential commitment to stability because it was a new channel to mediate conflicts and stability, reflected in those countries' values and acts (Di Tella, 1996). Although the Menem administration's interest in integration was mainly economic, the political gains were undeniable; as the regional regime grew, the State was getting back to its role as part of the Western world.

Nonetheless, market opening policies, privatization for debt paying purposes, and financial globalization drove more speculative investments to Argentina and create deindustrialization. It was a response to market opening policies made after a significant crisis, impacting sectors with little or no Argentinian presence, leading to massive imports from developed countries and Brazil (Rapoport, 2008). The rapid opening process did not generate substantial infrastructural investments the country needed. The deficit rose during

the Menem administration because the country had to buy more products externally, giving the lack of incentives to produce them in Argentina and the facility to buy them externally (Lazzari & Rapoport, 2011). Especially, MERCOSUL made it easy for the Brazilian goods, from cars to oil, to enter Argentina, creating a neighbor's dependency (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011).

Due to this disparity among Argentina and Brazil's gain in the MERCOSUL, many commercial disputes started within the bloc. Argentina attempted to bar Brazilian imports in economic sectors considered crucial for Argentinian development, such as electronic appliances, cars, textiles, because Brazil's imports were the biggest threat to Argentinian survival during the 1990s (Rapoport, 2008). Adding to that, by 1998, the Brazilian currency (real) got devalued, and the Argentinian peso got more valued in front of the dollar, which made Brazil a better place for investments than Argentina (Lazzari & Rapoport, 2011). By the end of Menem's term, Argentina was facing a crisis again, and the strategic partnership with Brazil was not rendering expected results.

There are similarities from Menem Security Identity to Alfonsín, such as the value given to liberty and reduction of the Armed Forces role. Security integration continued central to Argentina, although economic security gained primacy. Integration, cooperation, and development had economic lenses – Argentina did not fully recover from the 1980s debt crisis, and economic wellbeing became the most important National Interest at the moment. Economic centrality derived from the value of liberty (especially economic liberty) and faith in globalization and integration, which brought core security values, such as the importance of peace for commerce and recognition as a “Normal” State by Others.

3.5 De la Rúa and Duhalde – Alianza and instability

Corruption scandals and internal crises marked the end of Menem's government, and the 1998 elections saw an administration shift. Menem's party lost the Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education elections who did not change Argentina's Foreign Policy majorly but had a different view of the region's strategic role (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). The party was born from different oppositions to Menem's government – from those in the radical left and the ones in the Jurisdicalista Party who were against the political reforms made by Menem's administration (Merke, 2008). Credibility, predictability, and preferential

relations with the USA were still guidelines for foreign action (Bernal-Meza, 2002a). Contrary to Menem's administration, though, the developmentist rhetoric and improvement of social measures using government influence went back to the discourses (Giavarini, 2000). However, De La Rúa intended to give MERCOSUL a more prominent role, as the post-Menem economy was fragile because of the abrupt changes in the economic forces (Doval, 2012). De La Rúa's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, defined the administration main Foreign Policy principles as (Giavarini, 2000):

1. Autonomous decisionmaking;
2. Friendship among nations;
3. Latin America solidarity;
4. Sovereignty defense;
5. No intervention in internal affairs of other States;
6. Support for democracy and Human Rights;
7. Support of International Law.

From Menem, the most notorious differences are points 1 and 3, highlighting Alianza's priority as South America. The opposition to Menem's government began to re-think identity values, as Argentina could not continue to bear First World rhetoric while being a Third World country that did not achieve development under austerity policies coming from international pressures (Merke, 2008). Nonetheless, identity performance was kept almost the same, with more adjustments than drastic changes from Menem (*ibidem*), displaying some Identity maturing. The short Alianza government was marked by difficult years for the Argentinian economy (Doval, 2012) and the dialogue with Alfonsín's and Menem's advisors under new identity principles. This cooperation was mainly economic because later, new governments had a duty to monetary stability (Rapoport, 2007).

Although short – from 1999 to 2001 – Alianza's term was a transition from previous attempts to deal with a changing world and the new paradigm implemented by Néstor Kirchner. In De La Rúa's inauguration speech, he stated the importance of re-founding Argentina on an ethical basis and rethought the neoliberal model as the social problems increased (De La Rúa, 1999). He would reaffirm the new Argentinian values, such as contribution to peacekeeping missions, the importance of democratic institutions, and regional integration, which he believed must address innovation and progress debates (*ibidem*). This re-foundational idea did not carry new values, rather a new exercise of the same values enforced in the democratic period.

The changes would focus on political and social problems, not only the economic ones. It was the first time during the re-democratization that Argentina put these problems in their foreign policy repertoire. Another change was MERCOSUL's more considerable economic force towards the United States – going from the “carnal relations” with North America to “optimal relations” with South America (Merke, 2008). Although the free-market policies were the basis of the neoliberal ideology, the debt was increasing due to the fixed exchange rates to keep the country’s currency away from hyperinflation, which resulted in the government buying and selling dollars to artificially stabilize the economy (Lazzari & Rapoport, 2011).

This interventionist policy made Alianza inherit an economic crisis from Menem’s administration, and the economic crisis resulted in a political crisis and discredit in politicians by the Argentinian population (Bernal-Meza, 2002b). The government saw this crisis as a call for sovereignty, first, against IMF’s recommendations to Argentina and, second, to the constant re-negotiations between Argentina and international creditors, where the State should abide by policy changes to have access to credit (Rapoport, 2007). One of the most criticized IMF recommendations was the abandonment of the Argentinian peso and the adoption of the dollar as the Argentinian currency (Lazzari & Rapoport, 2011), which would undermine the country’s economic sovereignty.

The crisis deepened with the default of external debt, a problem Argentina believed would no longer witness after the 1980s default. Exports, already low due to the deindustrialization carried during Menem’s administration, fell again due to the withdrawal of international investments (Lazzari & Rapoport, 2011). The crisis also affected imports, as the general population's acquisitive power also fell (*ibidem*). Dialogues with Alfonsín and Menem’s ministers were meant to debate how to overcome instability and maintain monetary politics (Rapoport, 2007).

MERCOSUL was vital for the intended changes. It acknowledged that Brazil's gains from integration were both economic and political (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). Economically, it desired to go further on production complementarity rather than competitiveness (*ibidem*). De La Rúa’s administration stated after the World Trade Center terrorist attacks the importance of regional integration to better counter shared threats, based on solidarity and cooperation among the Americas (Giavarini, 2001b). Minister Giavarini used his discourse in OAS to display solidarity with the United States and reinforce Argentina’s compromise to peace operations and regional integration, both bases for the Alianza government.

Cardoso, Alianza's contemporary, had a more critical view on globalization's processes in this scenario (Cervo, 2003), while Argentina sought cooperation among the Americas. Argentina had a more positive idea of Brazil's integration because of good integration results after the 1980s debt crisis (Doval, 2012). The development of the 2001 crisis was dubious to Argentinian policymakers: on the one hand, Brazil was very vocal on Argentinian needs; on the other, Brazil became a hub for foreign investments that fled from Argentinian markets (Rapoport, 2007). Minister Giavarini saw in MERCOSUL an instrument to deal with social problems and international negotiations (Giavarini, 2001a) – both needs in Argentina in social and economic crisis. De La Rúa intends to be closer to Brazil. However, he maintained foreign policy practice closer to Menem (USA alignment, IMF recommendations following) due to the new crisis and International Financial Institutions' expectations (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011).

As Brazil advanced in the South America Leadership project, Argentinians got more divided. Brazil started to drift away from MERCOSUL and give more attention to initiatives that involve the entire region (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011) – IIRSA and UNASUL, especially. The rapidly evolving MERCOSUL process started to decelerate in 1997 and halted by 1999 (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011: 294). On the Argentinian side, the internal economic problems occupied much of the political debate, making the MERCOSUL negotiations slower because of the change of focus (Doval, 2012). The crisis also made Argentina vote laws that went the other way from integration – in 2000, a law limiting the amount of sugar imported from Brazil shook bilateral relations; the neighboring country threatens to retaliate by halting imports from Argentina's sugary products (Malamud, 2015). After an unfriendly welcome for an IIRSA meeting, De La Rúa sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to mediate the problem with congresspeople from the more critical sugar cane producers provinces (ibidem). The problem was solved with a presidential veto to the law in favor of integration. Nevertheless, De La Rúa approved a decree that he would reverse after a consensus.

Distrust towards Brazil advanced because of Brazilian aspirations. Worsening the crisis, Argentinian leaders possessed classified Brazilian documents where the neighboring State affirm Argentina was an obstacle to Brazil's regional aspirations (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011: 295). However, because of the crisis, Argentina did not have the means to make a front to Brazilian assumptions (ibidem). Regional integration had been a high-level political agenda in both countries; De La Rúa preferred not to confront Brazilian counterparts because of the economic gains that MERCOSUL could achieve (Malamud, 2015). Regional stability

and the “peace-loving” identity Argentina was trying to create were not sustained as soon as the country needed more credibility (Bernal-Meza, 2002a). Argentina attempted to negotiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas to isolate Brazil in their critical approach towards the United States, which reaffirmed Argentina’s commitment to alignment with the American axis of their Foreign Policy (Aranda, 2004). Then, the Argentinian approach was to keep good relationships with Brazil while aware the neighbor country could turn the tides in the bilateral process.

The massive protests against the sovereignty loss and the shrinking economic opportunities would lead to the De La Rúa impeachment in December 2001, the first in the new wave of democratic governments in South America (Rapoport, 2007). After it, Eduardo Duhalde's indirect election by the National Congress formed a provisory government from January 2002 to 2003. He was a Buenos Aires representative, a more populated area, where the biggest protests against De La Rúa were held (Aranda, 2004). Duhalde was also Menem’s vice-president between 1989 to 1991, having close ties with his administration. His inauguration discourse affirmed his government's intentions not to deny his antecessors but to consider all the democratic period to create a national salvation government, not excluding any relevant public voice in his administration (Duhalde, 2002). His government was marked by a profound debate on Foreign Policy, as National Interest was re-evaluated. Under this review, some advisors would say that Brazil’s aspirations were dangerous to Argentina’s goals; others would say that the USA failed Argentina by not aiding them during the 2001 crisis (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). The debate focused on the lesser evil for Argentina’s economic wellbeing and economic survival rather than a positive debate among two robust options.

In his inauguration speech, the president affirmed the neoliberal agenda was not the only option for Argentina and sook to re-evaluate partnerships under this light (Duhalde, 2002). It was a break from the Menem administration, where Duhalde was the vice president. For Brazil, Argentina’s consumer market's disappearance devaluated the partnership (Bernal-Meza, 2002b). Limitations in foreign currency deposits and the break of contractual obligations between companies made Brazilian investors eerie of any approximation (Aranda, 2004). Duhalde called his government to advocate for State companies to regain investments from different partners (Duhalde, 2002).

Although Argentina started to recompose its economic ties, the exports changed drastically in the following years: industrial activity fell, and the meat and dairy markets became Argentina's most prominent economic activities (Rapoport, 2008). Intra-

MERCOSUL trade rose while out of South America trade did not get the same value (ibidem). The discredit in the USA was due to Argentina's request for a new agreement with the IMF for new credit lines (Aranda, 2004). For the USA, though, South American partnerships were losing importance in front of the Middle East wars; as well, the investments made by the American Government focused on these new military affairs, in contrast with the 1990s, where stabilizing South America was an important agenda (ibidem). It was apparent in Duhalde speech at the MERCOSUL summit, in 2004, the importance it had for Argentina since its creation "ten years ago, I would say, (...) there was the feeling that without a collective integration project, it would be difficult to participate in the world"¹⁴ (Duhalde, 2004) (present author translation). He brought the importance of the solution of controversies and the harmonization policies to interchange best practices in different realms (ibidem). It was the beginning of the following years of South America's turn of Argentinian politics.

The turn was a National Policy initiative. It suffered influences from the American denial of helping Argentina and Brazil being more vocal on its support towards their regional partner and criticizing globalization asymmetry. This made Argentina back away from preferential relationships with the US (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). Especially after 2003, Brazil sided with Argentina's negotiations with the IMF and called out the USA for closing a blind eye towards an allied State in the United Nations (ibidem). Although the Brazilian government was very vocal, the Argentinian environment was still not set for new investors – the 2000 default and the following economic setbacks made the country go low in the priorities of international investors (Aranda, 2004).

Brazil's policy reinforced the two distinct approaches towards the country. One saw Brazil as a partner with growing importance, especially under Lula da Silva's ruling; the other saw the neighboring State as a possible regional problem (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). When Duhalde's term was ending, he sent a communication to Cardoso's office (although he was no longer president) thanking him for supporting Argentina's pledges due to the 2001 crisis, for his "integrative vocation," and to take Argentina's ideas to amplify MERCOSUL's scope (Duhalde, 2003). The two fighting ideas over Brazil's partnership were dividing policymakers; Kirchner's election would crystalize Brazil's growing duality.

Although similar to Menem in perceiving the economy as the most extensive fragility in Argentina's State perpetuation, Alianza's government showed significant

¹⁴ "Yo diría, (...) era la sensación de que sin un proyecto regional colectivo, difícilmente podíamos participar en el mundo".

differences. The most noticeable was the politicization of the internal society due to its displeasure with government crisis management. The second was the more significant focus on South America and maintaining positive relationships with Brazil and other States. Nonetheless, as terrorism became a bigger threat, Argentina would embrace its peace-loving value within its Security Identity to promote State internationalization and closeness to Human Rights affairs, which distanced Argentina and Brazil post-September 11 positionings, adding to previous tensions between the States.

3.6 Kirchner and Fernandez – approximation and disillusion

The period of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez's terms presented comings and goings in Foreign Policy (Busso, 2014). Critics of the International system, these governments oscillated from the need for international partnerships to closing the economy to help internal production. The problematic Foreign Policy translates into strong values but changing actions based on those. Kirchner's changing policies to avoid a new default altered the government's actions, and Brazil's perceptions would be no different. Although the president himself had many critics of Brazil, his Ministers and Councilors would often advise for more cooperation (Busso, 2014). During his administration, the changing behavior pattern comes from the discordance between maintaining cooperation and demanding more from Brazil as a partner.

Néstor Kirchner, president from 2003 to 2007, was a critic of Menem's policies (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). He advocated for dialogue among State and market and focused on the Argentinian socioeconomic problems (ibidem). Like Lula da Silva, he repaved developmentism initiatives and stepped back from liberal policies (Aranda, 2004). Market opening, close relations with the USA, and small government were blamed for the 2001 crisis by the new administration (Soares & Milani, 2016). Another abrupt Identity change was to start in Argentina. The discourses against the previous establishment were marginal at the beginning of his administration, as almost 40% of the votes went to liberal suitable candidates, which gave Kirchner low pre-election popularity (Merke, 2008). It made the administration focus on improving popularity rates and gaining more support during its ruling.

At first, relationships with the USA were crucial for the government due to debt renegotiation in Argentina's foreign policy (Busso & Actis, 2018). Although US president George W Bush focused on Middle Eastern affairs, there was still important to keep good relationships with South America, as the Plan Colombia had just started. Negotiations were challenging, but significant advancements with State-owned and private companies happened (Busso & Actis, 2018). After Kirchner opposed FTAA, relations with the United States became more complex in a second moment because of Kirchner's indifference towards foreign affairs (ibidem). South America became the top Foreign Policy priority; the government sought to increase South American trade, it had slight inclinations for the international life, giving primacy to internal security affairs (A. Simonoff, 2008b).

In his inauguration discourse, Néstor Kirchner affirmed that his administration would not support automatic alliances; rather, it would seek mature relationships among equal counterparts (Kirchner, 2003 apud. Merke, 2008). It translated into better diplomatic efforts with partners while seeking more regional and international negotiations for Argentina's priorities which, according to Merke (2008), are:

1. Democracy affirmation;
2. Human Rights promotion;
3. Engagement with peace, disarmament, and security.
4. Priority for regional integration;
5. Attempt to retrieve the Malvinas/Falklands;
6. Efforts to protect the international community interest in Antarctica.

Two significant changes in Merke's appreciation can be noted: the region gains priority over developed countries, and the claims over the Malvinas/Falklands return to discourses. Kirchner represented a new paradigm for Argentina, abandoning old neoliberal politics. Based on a new understanding of developmentist policies in contrast with the neoliberalism problems, the new ideologies in Brazil and Argentina drove them towards similar Foreign Policy initiatives. These include the rejection of preferential relations with the USA, negotiations with the EU on agriculture subsidies, critics of the International realm's power disparities, and a watchful attitude towards American interventions in South America (Doval, 2012). However, although both governments had similar ideologies, they did not understand each other as previously thought (ibidem).

Kirchner changed the economic policy using price control, support for industrial development, and politics to revalue the Argentinian peso (Rapoport, 2007). The international market demand for more agricultural products boosted Argentina's exports

(ibidem). It resulted in new otherness happening in Argentina: the process of othering the Argentina of Menem (Merke, 2008). However, the president was a fierce critic of Argentina's turn to agribusiness while Brazil boosted its industrial potentialities, as this would unbalance regional development (Kirchner, 2005c). The change in means (the one in the instruments used in Foreign Policy) (C. Hermann, 1990) still pointed out for the National Interest of economic wellbeing, which was to develop the country (Wendt, 2014).

The perception of economic tools available was drastically changed under Kirchner. The president criticized the unequal access to Brazil's market as new laws to protect Argentinian companies were signed (Kirchner, 2005c). This means economic security was still important, although the National Interest of losing autonomy due to dependence on Brazilian goods was more present in Kirchner discourses.

The administration was vocal about "relaunch" MERCOSUL for the regional bloc deal with economic integration and social affairs (A. Simonoff, 2005). It clashed with the American project for the region, marking the distancing between Argentina and the USA (Busso & Actis, 2018). While Brazil relied on the UNASUL project, Argentina believed the MERCOSUL represented an essential change in regional matters, as the opening of markets and the path towards becoming a Common Market were essential for the country's international insertion. President Kirchner affirmed, in 2003, the importance MERCOSUL had for its members through the 1990s but admitted the bloc went through a trust crisis (among members and internationally) due to the Argentinian crisis and the lack of regional support (Kirchner, 2003a). Kirchner would reaffirm MERCOSUL's important political content through his administration: the importance of public policy to fight impoverishment (Kirchner, 2004a), societal integration in the project, and political concertation (Kirchner, 2005c). The little attention drawn from Brazil in this initiative was one reason the bilateral relations started to feel shaken.

Kirchner believed Argentina was "des-inserted" globally, and Foreign Policy should focus on reinsertion (Miranda, 2012). This des-insertion is a common value with other administrations and is constant in Argentinian Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy consisted of fewer but more consistent agendas, such as better international presence, Human Rights, South American relations, and strengthening national companies (Zelicovich, 2011). MERCOSUL was a strategic alliance where Argentina could assert its presence and create a platform for international presence (Zelicovich, 2011). It helped the country in bilateral relations and its relations with other multilateral institutions, such as the WTO and the EU, because it would help Argentina regain its socioeconomic status (Zelicovich, 2011).

MERCOSUL was used to boost Argentinian presence, as the country was fragile from the 2001 crisis – it became an essential tool for regional power for Argentina (Miranda, 2012).

This idea of regional, integrated South America security promoted, alongside the good economic results of both countries and the growing importance of the neighboring State, an approximation to Brazil (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). Leading the UNASUL initiative, Brazil believed that South America should not have preferential foreign partners and did not make additional efforts to maintain the bilateral relationship a priority – Argentina included (Doval, 2012). The bilateral arrangements became slower in Brazilian Foreign Policy's regional coverage, and the Brazilian South American project also engulfed MERCOSUL. During Brazil's president, Lula da Silva, first official visit to Argentina, Kirchner affirmed that it was time for Brazil and Argentina to let go of historical problems that created separations among both, which was difficult to integrate (Kirchner, 2003d). He called for a more profound bilateral relationship to create the spine of MERCOSUL, bringing the region to develop completely (ibidem).

Kirchner saw UNASUL with resentment at first. He perceived Brazil as an attempting hegemon in South America, putting itself first instead of fostering equal partnerships (Olmedo & Silva, 2018). As Brazil distanced from MERCOSUL, which was Argentina's preferred bet on integration processes, Brazil was also perceived to not aim for bilateral treaties and breaking protectionism (Rapoport, 2008). Brazil focused on creating regional political arrangements instead. Also, Brazil's aim towards being recognized as a global player made the country less proactive in South America (Olmedo & Silva, 2018). Kirchner reminded his peers in a MERCOSUL summit in 2004, the bloc's importance economically and as a political tool and a concertation instrument (Kirchner, 2004a). The tension about changing priorities was felt before the UNASUL establishment.

The associated members of MERCOSUL (Colombia, Peru, Bolívia, and Chile, especially, but those include Guyana and Suriname (MERCOSUL, [s.d.])) were priorities for the Argentinian Foreign Policy (Soares & Januário, 2018). Those countries needed goods manufactured by Brazil and Argentina; as Brazilian products mainly were going to other regions, Argentina saw an opportunity to fill the vacuum. Argentina found in MERCOSUL a platform for their companies and had an incredible economic moment (Zelicovich, 2011). By the end of his term, Kirchner would but the sociopolitical MERCOSUL agenda as a victory of his administration's Foreign Policy, explicating the deepening of democratic order and peaceful values as improvements for the region (Kirchner, 2007a).

In the middle of the 2000s, Argentina finally had the economic and political means to counterbalance Brazilian influence in the region (Doval, 2012). One pivotal moment to perceive how Argentina made MERCOSUL more critical for its regional politics was when Kirchner announced Argentina approved the regularization of all MERCOSUL immigrants (Kirchner, 2006c) - a project submitted to MERCOSUL but paralyzed due to Brazil's protests. Argentina had political intentions to become more influential in South America, while Brazil differed. As Brazil focused on its international partnerships, Argentina appeared as a viable option – cultural and linguistic proximity played a role in this approach (Soares & Januário, 2018). The excellent relationship at the political level kept the high degree of cooperation between Brazil and Argentina, although the economic relationship stagnated. Argentina supported Brazil in the opening dialogue with Cuba and was a key partner for the progress of UNASUL as Brazil opened for Argentinian inputs¹⁵ (Aranda, 2004). State visits and harmonization treaties were still a central part of both countries' international lives; Argentina's perception of Brazil shifted from a vital relationship to normalization of politics, shifting to a more ambivalent posture of the new initiatives (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011).

The proximity to Brazil experienced after 2006 responds to the good results in Brazil's economy. Politicians described Brazil as “inevitable.” Seeing Brazil in a leader role made Argentina associate itself with their neighbor's project (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). Also, Brazil's more significant voting rights in the IMF could be an asset for debt negotiations. In the period, the Argentinian economy grew almost 9% per year due to its new South American partnerships and exports to Brazil (Rapoport, 2007, p. 15). Brazil's influence could – and did – help the country to regain its credit score. Critics from the Kirchner government would say Brazil was doing everything correctly in its foreign policy, what Argentina was not – Brazil was occupying a place in the world that should be Argentina's as well (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011, p. 13).

Brazil had become an essential part of the world, while Kirchner's policies, inward-focused, were perceived by the opposition to reinforce Argentina's isolation – a problem he swore to tackle in his presidential campaign (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). Kirchner sought to diminish differences with the Argentinian neighbor by proposing economic complementarity with Brazil, rather than Brazil's unilateral development with South America resources (Kirchner, 2006b). To the president, more solidarity among both countries could make Argentina rapidly regain its role globally; instead, Brazil was a distant

¹⁵ UNASUL would be created in 2009, but its negotiations came years prior to it.

partner. “We [Argentina and Brazil] are partners for democracy; we are partners for peace, we must partners to gain our development”¹⁶ [present author translation] (Kirchner, 2006b, p. 4).

During Kirchner’s government, the idea of security began to shift. Economic security was important, but regional stability and Human Rights primacy became parts of Argentina’s Security agenda (A. Simonoff, 2009). President Kirchner signaled international security, peace, and International Law to value guiding Argentina through its democracy (Kirchner, 2004b). Participation in peacekeeping missions was important for credibility among financial institutions, as Argentina was renegotiating its debt with the IMF and balancing the negative to send troops to Iraq in the 2003 war (ibidem). The Human Rights policy also took away amnesty laws signed by Alfonsín and Menem, which made more military personnel suited for Human Rights crimes during the dictatorship years (Busso, 2014).

This impacted Foreign Policy as the military, who were never enthusiastic supporters of Kirchner’s administration, doubt the president's ideas for regional security; on the other hand, this crystalized Human Rights protection as a crucial axis for Argentina’s foreign policy Policy (A. Simonoff, 2009). The administration would give more power to the Ministry of Defense, give more civilian control over the forces, and re-open the trials for Human Rights abuse under the military dictatorship, creating more military problems but gaining more respect internationally (J. Battaglini, 2013). Kirchner sook to unify both Defense policy and Foreign Policy, affirming both were indissociable to keep the State secure (Kirchner, 2003b). The president ideology had a vital component of Perón’s ideas, who understood the military as a prominent part of governability; this changed Argentina’s democratic order dissociation from the Armed Forces, as they would become central to stablish social policies and protect Human Rights abroad (A. Simonoff, 2009). Although reluctant in the first moment, Armed Forces support to Kirchner grew during his government.

Traditional Security Affairs and Defense were back on the agenda because of Kirchner’s proximity to Perón’s military ideology. The former president believed the Southern Cone security problems should be faced collectively. Other factors influenced the comeback of Security affairs. Kirchner improved economic stability, and the neo-developmentist ideology believed Military-Industrial Complexes were essential to generate

¹⁶ “Somos socios para la democracia, somos socios para la paz, debemos ser socios para obtener nuestro desarrollo”.

work positions and avoid external influences (Soares & Januário, 2018). As the democratization of the military advanced, Argentina launched the planning of National Defense in 2007, which resulted in the directive of national defense policy by 2009, during Cristina Fernandez's administration.

In the core security policy, the new claim over the Malvinas/Falklands would also be different from the military dictatorship ones but more present than during neoliberal governments. The agenda never faded, but the normalization agenda kept the international claim minimal. Although Foreign Policy and Security Policy valued territorialization and focused on rebuilding sovereignty, the means employed to reintegrate the Malvinas/Falklands would be diplomatic, under the United Nations avail (Merke, 2008). During the 2005 opening of the United Nations General Assembly, Kircher affirmed that the Malvinas/Falklands problem was a special case of colonialism that would be settling between the parts, having the UN blessings to make mediation happen (Kirchner, 2005a). The Armed Forces were not, still, a priority for the Argentinian government – the investments made under Kirchner were more prominent than his predecessors, but mainly focused on paying the veterans coming from 1990s Foreign aid purchase of new equipment (Eissa & Ariella, 2018). It was a great part of it for an icebreaker vessel that needed repairs, a 10-year investment (ibidem). In his last addressing to the UN, Kirchner once more called for action on the Britain-Argentina territorial conflict, highlighting the 1982 incursion to regain the territory, in what he said a “back-turned military dictatorship to the Argentinian people, whom always sook pacific resolution for its legitimate sovereign request”¹⁷ [present author translation] (Kirchner, 2007b).

Argentina and Brazil increased their investments in Defense from 2003 to 2007. A debate began on whether South America was going through an arms race. The hypothesis was brought to attention by the United Nations by showing an increase of 34% of arms purchased in South America during 2003 and 2007 (Neto & Okado, 2013). The idea was further denied, first by Brazilian statespeople (ibidem). The Argentinian government supported the position, which affirmed that South America was not competing and walking towards war, but the military equipment purchase's objective was to reinforce regional autonomy (Alcañiz, 2013).

Multilateral security, overseen by international mechanisms, was the Argentinian take towards core security affairs (Miranda, 2012). Argentina attempted to make amends

¹⁷“(…) la dictadura militar a espaldas del pueblo Argentino, que siempre procuró una solución pacífica para su legítimo reclamo soberano”.

with the hostile reception to send troops to Iraq by stating their deployment would happen when an UN-managed multilateral peace force managed the conflict (A. Simonoff, 2009). Changing the focus towards South America was an ideological stand, but it resulted from US unilateralism (Balze, 2011). After September 11 terrorist attacks, the USA shift focus from economic cooperation, based on neoliberalism and diversification, to intricate security affairs, especially with the Middle East (ibidem). It changed their relations with South America because commercial negotiations stopped, requiring the States to work with their alternatives. Although USA was still an important market and a historical partner, Kirchner administration believed the US could not be a preferential partner, because this left Argentina in a subaltern position (A. Simonoff, 2009). The country was, nonetheless, open for negotiations among equals.

Argentina changed its Security Policy not only in ideological terms, such as peacekeeping operations presence and distancing from US affairs but also in its democratization. Kirchner named Nilda Garré as the Minister of Defense, a militant against dictatorship focused on bringing the former military junta to justice (Soares & Milani, 2016). She approved the new Regimentation on the Law on National Defense (2006) and approved ministerial coordination for the ministry budget (ibidem). Reducing the autonomy of the armed forces was an essential step for the maturing of the Argentinian democratic system by creating systemic checks and balances. The Armed Forces' duties became clearer than before – those would be used exclusively in case of an external threat, never in public security cases, abandoning the dictatorship's idea of National Security doctrine, with threats inside and outside borders (Soares & Januário, 2018).

As Kirchner sook popular approval, deepening democratic mechanisms were necessary for the government. This was sustained by regional cooperation. In Argentinian documents, the concept of regional security and a sphere of cooperation in South America started to appear (Miranda, 2012). The ideas of Security branded by the Argentinian Government, where Regional Security was part of National Security, confronted traditional Security concepts, being an innovation made by the Kirchner administration (Soares & Januário, 2018). Kirchner attempted to consensually build a pluralistic view on the tools to be used in Security and Defense institutions, accommodate the growing Brazilian influence, and put its agendas in discussion (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011).

Security Identity under Kirchner marks the critical look to the USA and Brazil, and the reluctant security cooperation with them. Argentina went back in some arrangements, such as deploying troops in the Middle East and de-territorialization of Security and Defense

(Menem's policies), impacting the country's participation in UNASUL. The administration worried about foreign intervention in the subcontinent, so Kirchner came around UNASUL and embraced multilateral security. This period presents the military's growing civilian control and the prosecution of Human Rights abuses under the military dictatorship, which reduced the military confidence in the president. Kirchner regained the Armed Forces' trust by re-equipping the personnel and investing in the forces.

3.6.1 Cristina Fernandez – adjustments and continuities

During Fernandez's government (2007 – 2015), the core beliefs from Kirchner's policies were maintained, such as the influence of Perón's thinking in the administration values, peaceful relations, and the regional agenda. The new president, married to Néstor Kirchner, played an active part as First Lady and was previously elected as Federal Deputy (1997 – 2001) and Senator (1995 – 1997, 2001 – 2005, and 2005 – 2007) the same party as Kirchner. Since her inauguration speech, she affirmed the importance of multilateral agreements against unilateral policies (Fernandez, apud. A. Simonoff, 2008a). Fernandez kept Washington's distance, although the fight against terrorism was still present in her discourses (*ibidem*). The fear of a new economic crisis drove Argentina to adopt a more closed economy, to focus on the internal market by restricting imports (Miguez, 2017b). Cooperation with global partners (such as China and Russia) gained importance in regional integration (Zelicovich, 2011).

Fernandez's administration's foreign policy made adjustments to changes in Kirchner's strategy; it had, nevertheless, the same core assumptions (Zelicovich, 2011). However, Fernandez found a very different Argentina from her predecessor. Instead of an unsolved crisis, she encountered a more developed country and was just entering a phase of stagnation (Torres, 2009). The main adjustments made from Kirchner's Foreign Policy were (Torres, 2009):

1. The need to improve relationships with USA and Europe;
2. Affirmation of the Argentinian regional role;
3. Re-evaluate the proximity to the Venezuelan government for improvements in the relationships with the US and Brazil.

The conception of Argentinian Identity is changed, defined as a Latin American State with global interests (Zelicovich, 2011), against Kirchner's limited interests approach.

Kirchner's strong regionalism was changed to accommodate the new growing markets, especially the Asian ones. This changed Brazil's role. Although regional security and political concertation were still a priority, economically, Argentina went differently (ibidem). The access to South American markets and Asia's negotiations were the new bet in Argentinian economic policy. President Fernandez highlighted sovereignty, production, and dignity as critical values for her administration, as the country fought a battle for economic stability (Fernandez, 2011a) again.

Argentina had regional influence through the 2000 decade. The bigger aspirations focused not only on Brazil's relations are shown in Fernandez's discourses in the Americas Summit. In this forum, she called attention to the Paraguayan problems and saluted its normalization (Fernandez, 2015a); she called for a more proactive Colombian action against drug traffic – focused on buyer States (ibidem). In UNASUR, president Fernandez vocally supported Evo Morales against a coup intent (Fernandez, 2013b). The call for action in the subcontinent was continuity from Kirchner's ideology of not accepting foreign intervention in South America. It was best if the region could contain its instability than require foreign assistance.

The good international moment for agricultural goods halted with the 2008 crisis, leading to Argentinian farmers' dissatisfaction. Soybeans still were an important export. The government elevated taxes for soybean exports to maintain internal social policies, which diminished soybean trade even more (Busso, 2016). This had two consequences for the government. First, it deteriorated the farmer's support for the Néstor Kirchner administration; second, it created an internal conflict in the government, as Cristina Fernandez, vice-president, publicly agreed with the farmers' requests (ibidem). The critical approach towards the international institutions, a pivotal point in Kirchner's foreign policy, did not get good receptivity in Fernandez's administration (Busso, 2016). Opposition from the media and political rivals claimed it was the moment for Argentina to seek normalization with these institutions to avoid more political crises (ibidem).

Critics of the government were substantial because of the slow response to the 2009 crisis. As Brazil's economic growth slowed (meaning it imported less) and commodities (Argentina's main export) lost their value, Argentina needed to adapt its foreign policy for the new international conjuncture (Miguez, 2017b). Argentina also suffered from the agriculture commodities lower prices, going from an 8,8% growth per year until 2007 (Rapoport, 2008), but the forecasts for 2008 were not optimistic. Fernandez's administration classified the Argentinian relationship with Brazil as a bilateral relationship with regional

implications due to the economic development and the political weight both States had in South America (Fernandez, 2011b). The positive relationship between the two countries would generate a positive integration among others, as it would create better institutions and trust for all members of MERCOSUL and UNASUL.

In 2008, Argentina signed a treaty with Brazil to create the Binational Committee for Atomic Energy (COBEN)¹⁸. This organization manages peaceful nuclear energy use (Balbino, 2020) alongside ABACC, which surveils atomic materials and publicizes its data. This was a big breakthrough for bilateral relations. COBEN took over nuclear capabilities, fostering trust. In Fernandez's visit to Brazil in 2008, she signed multiple deals: satellite cooperation, nanotechnology, a new hydroelectric plant in the Uruguay river, and new programs for the use of renewable energy (A. Simonoff, 2008b, p. 6). Her government had three labels for Brazil: 1- an indispensable partner; 2- the neighbor with the most significant international and regional importance; and 3- A leader who raised suspicions (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011, p. 13).

These perceptions, although conflicting, creating a more positive view of Brazil in Argentina's society, while the idea of Argentina doing everything wrong in the economy created more internal problems in the dialogue between businesspeople and the government. Fernandez affirmed that the past decade's data proved the State headed in the right direction –with nationalized industries and companies seeking regional complementarity (Fernandez, 2009a). The lack of economic complementarity was already seen as a weakness during Kirchner's administration and reinforced through Fernandez's years. President Fernandez commented on the need for production integration in Rousseff's first official visit to Argentina (Fernandez, 2011a).

Although the criticism towards the United States and Europe would bond Fernandez to Lula da Silva and Rousseff, business owners were discontent with the lack of new trade agreements with North America. During Lula da Silva's administration, president Fernandez supported the Brazilian sovereignty claim over the Amazon, opposing the European proposal of making it an International Law domain (Fernandez, 2008b). Her government sought positive relations with contemporary Brazilian presidents to reiterate the administration values – minor adaptations to accommodate Brazil followed.

Rousseff would attempt to make amends with Argentina by nominating the former Brazilian ambassador in Buenos Aires, Mauro Vieira, as her Minister of Foreign Affairs in

¹⁸ In the original: Comitê Binacional de Energia Atômica (Portuguese)/Comité Nacional de Energía Atómica (Spanish) [present author translation].

her second term. A specialist in Argentina meant to ameliorate the bilateral relations. This positively impacted the Argentinian government; however, the following Brazilian corruption scandals shook the bilateral ties and impacted Brazilian State-owned companies' investments in Argentina (Olmedo & Silva, 2018).

Fernandez had an excellent personal relationship with Rousseff. In the top-level political affairs, the two States were still very close, but economically, Brazil's decade-long distance created fears among Argentinian policymakers (Olmedo & Silva, 2018). The president also remembered the importance of Lula da Silva and Néstor Kirchner's friendship for South American politics, reinforcing a strategic alliance to flip their countries' 200 years of rivalry (Fernandez, 2010b). In Argentina, businesspeople would resent Brazil's companies' actions towards Argentina, but this also created praise. They affirmed that Brazil helped its most prominent companies internationalize, contrary to Argentina's business owners' problems. Brazilian companies were innovating while Argentinians stagnated, and Argentina's continuous economic policy changes created instability, while Brazil generated solid business rules (Russel & Tokatlian, 2011). During an event with businesspeople and Brazilian politicians, Fernandez affirmed that Brazil had an absolute path towards development. At the same time, Argentina endured deindustrialization and crises, which led to disappointed Argentinian business owners – what Kirchner and her government were trying to reverse (Fernandez, 2009c).

Through the Fernandez administration, Brazil and Argentina made meaningful bilateral progress, such as using their currencies for bilateral trade. President Fernandez saw this agreement as a cultural change as much as a financial one (Fernandez, 2008d). She affirmed Argentinians were used to relate their currency to the US dollar, while Brazil kept itself thinking in its currency, what she believed Argentinians would start to do (ibidem). Brazil also facilitated credit lines for Argentinian airlines to purchase new aircraft, which was seen as a goodwill gesture and seek to improve intra-MERCOSUL relationships (Fernandez, 2009c). Fernandez stood by the Brazilian side when president Rousseff had her phones hacked by the USA government, although she avoided being incisive against US authorities (Fernandez, 2013c). These actions took by the Argentinian government are small showcases of the still crucial Brazilian role in Argentinian politics, although Argentina's interests were getting more diverse. Argentina's distance from the world, an ambivalent value in its Security Identity, was reaffirmed under Fernandez, after Menem's denies it and the comings and goings under Kirchner.

Fernandez's administration criticized MERCOSUL due to its aid to Brazilian companies - stronger international competitors with increasing governmental funding. This weakened Argentinian competitors and kept Argentina behind due to the impossibility of negotiating the Pacific Alliance¹⁹ individually (A. Simonoff, 2008a). Nevertheless, Argentina's new take on Foreign Policy, focusing on a trade increase within South America, renewed the organization. Although Brazil was a champion in adding value to its production by getting more know-how, Fernandez affirmed that a strategy to be used by all MERCOSUL countries (Fernandez, 2008b). President Fernandez would continue Kirchner's agenda for more complementarity among MERCOSUL economies, in opposition to Brazil's lone growth. She affirmed that integrating other MERCOSUL members into this supply chain was a priority of her government (Fernandez, 2011c), as per the enlargement of Argentina's regional interests.

In Defense Affairs, Argentina approved the Directive of National Defense Policy in 2009, a result of the National Defense Planning Cycle, initiated in 2007 (Soares & Januário, 2018). The document highlighted the low possibility of conflict among the South American States, supported by integration, dialogue, concertation, and integration in the region (Argentina, 2009). It reaffirmed Argentina's position as a collaborative part of Collective Security Institutions, such as UNASUL's Defense Council and UN peace operations (*ibidem*). In 2010, Argentina published its first White Book, part of the Security trust-building dialogue with Chile (Soares & Januário, 2018). Both States agreed to share their White Books to amplify transparency in Defense issues, crystalizing the Beagle Canal dispute's end (*ibidem*). The Argentinian distrust towards UNASUL would be reassessed. The government understood UNASUL as another platform to discuss its project for Argentinian regional cooperation, making it another forum for Argentina's platform instead of a Brazilian instrument (Morasso, 2020).

Argentina began to create its regional partnerships as Brazil advanced in the South American project (Aranda, 2004). Kirchner administration did not play a leading role in the UNASUL creation nor its Defense Council (Soares & Januário, 2018). After Kirchner's administration, though, he was nominated UNASUL's General Secretary, and Argentina started to participate more of the organism. His election was a Brazilian move for Argentina to become more active in the organism. However, it did result in the organization mediating

¹⁹ The Pacific Alliance is a Free Trade agreement between the West Coast South American Countries and East Asian countries; membership was opened for other South American Countries, but the terms of MERCOSUL treat requires them to negotiate regional arrangements isolated.

regional conflicts, such as the problem with American bases in Colombia – a summit held in Argentina, where president Fernandez highlighted the importance of trust-building within South America through regional integration (Fernandez, 2009b).

UNASUL was essential for Fernandez's Foreign Policy as a platform to promote Argentina as a peaceful country with the capability to stabilize South America (Morasso, 2020). The peace-long country value was backing the discursive practice after Kirchner's critical approach of the International Order. An example of this was when Bolivia attempted a coup against President Evo Morales in 2008. Fernandez and the Chilean president, Michelle Bachelet, called for a Defense Council meeting to discuss the problems resulting from Bolivia's instability (ibidem). Although Human Rights were still an Argentinian Foreign Policy banner, internally, the problems with opposition started to shift the weight of this value. Outside UNASUL, Argentina worked with Venezuela for the peace treaty over the Colombian Civil War in 2008 – the ex-president Kirchner himself was part of the negotiation team (A. Simonoff, 2008b). Under UNASUL, as well, Argentina called an extraordinary organization meeting to support the coup attempt against President Rafael Correa, from Peru, in 2010, and Fernandez' government opposed itself to the soft coup against Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo in 2012 – a call made by president Rouseff (Morasso, 2020).

While Argentina got more active in peace operations and mediation, the military started to act inside Argentinian borders. Firstly, operations in the Paraguayan and Brazilian borders to restrain drug traffic; vigilance from the Armed Forces would be necessary to avoid all types of smuggling (people, drugs, and arms) (Sain, 2018). This would impact the Armed Forces, which contained internal problems, creating a militarization of everyday life (ibidem). Argentina had, since democratization, only use its troops externally, except for minor everyday duties. Fernandez understood drug traffic was a shared problem in South America, and Argentina's leadership could give the State some notoriety (Fernandez, 2013b). The impacts of this militarization would be more prominent in Macri's administration.

Fernandez's administration suffered critics on its distance from both the USA and Brazil. Argentina re-adopted import quotas to boost its national market, abandoning the promise to re-insert Argentina in the world (Miguez, 2017b). The policy, however, was designed to reduce dependence from both countries, as a result of closer approximation was timid (ibidem). Brazilian political instability and American unilateralism demanded

Argentinians to seek new opportunities. As criticism arose, the government began to lose credibility, losing the next elections to Mauricio Macri after another corruption scandal.

Her government suffered from economic stagnation – and was blamed for it by the unfulfilled promise of approximation with Europe and the USA. Again, the economy was a Security affair – especially a National Security problem. The president did not think Argentinian products could compete with International goods. The export-driven firms were invited, due to the international circumstances, to sell their products internally. Human Rights protection was maintained as the central part of the Security Identity, although it was focused more on South American problems, which brought Argentina closer to UNASUL. Although suspicious of Brazil's UNASUL project could be the beginning of a hegemony, Argentina became a sole supporter of regional answers for South American political problems. Criticism towards partners decreased, and more cooperation with Brazil happened.

3.7 Macri and the changes in Brazil

Mauricio Macri, president from 2015 to 2019, performed many changes in the Argentinian Foreign Policy. Those were not as abrupt as they were in other presidents' terms. His presidency had aspects from the neoliberal approach of the economy, which brought comparisons to Menem. Macri symbolized the political change in Argentina, given that both Menem, Kirchner, and Fernandez were close to the Judisticalista party (Frenkel, 2016). Since the electoral campaign, Macri criticized the previous administration for isolationism from the world and promised to re-insert the country in world affairs (Míguez, 2017). His cabinet had many businesspeople who gave his administration the nickname “the CEOs government” (ibidem).

He announced many innovations in Foreign Policy, such as the integration to the Pacific Alliance and bilateral Free Trade Agreements with the US, Canada, and Mexico – an effort that would go against MERCOSUL legislation (Arceo, 2016). During Rouseff's administration, this would bring tension. Under Temer, both States had the same inclination to change MERCOSUL's third-party agreements policy (Arceo, 2016). The Foreign Policy basis in Macri's administration was (Míguez, 2017):

1. Reinsert Argentina in International trade;

2. Solve the vulture funds debt;
3. Taking MERCOSUL back to its economic bloc roots;
4. Based on that, to advance the MERCOSUL – EU agreement;
5. Economic openness;
6. Open a door for new partnerships;
7. De-ideologize Foreign Policy.

Macri affirmed three main goals in his Foreign Policy: to unite Argentina using democratic ways, eliminate poverty and fight drug traffic (Macri, 2016). Foreign Policy was conceived in a radically different way. It was no longer a reflection on the good internal moment, rather an effort to leave the crisis and counter the economic and political isolation (Corigliano, 2018). Macri had a solid economic Foreign Policy strategy, aiming to reinsert Argentina in global trade chains, avoiding compromises due to regional blocs (Frenkel, 2016). His thought is based on the neoliberal idea of Alliance with more significant economies, like the neoliberal agenda. Different from Menem's government, the world now has various new economic powers. Under this idea, the USA was essential, but not determinant, for positive economic results (Corigliano, 2018).

These changes show a new understanding of Security Identity values. Those were very similar to Temer Foreign Policy, except the Argentina re-imagination of Self happened without a deep political crisis. The values held by both administrations had undoubtedly changed in Argentina. In Brazil, Macri found support for his perceptions on South America in the Temer organization, as the Brazilian counterpart equally sook to review MERCOSUL, rethink Venezuela and back away from UNASUL (Míguez, 2017). Both States had changed but were still together in their shared view of the region. To de-dramatize and de-ideologize Foreign Policy, the Macri administration sook for pragmatism – more deals with different partners, without a base on ideological similarities (Corigliano, 2018). Although the power disparities among Argentina and the North American partners raised suspicion from government opposition because it could worsen Argentina's vulnerability, free trade agreements became more common globally, and bilateral deals have been more prominent (Arceo, 2016).

Other central values held during Kirchner and Fernandez's policies suffered changes during the Macri administration. First, autonomy, debated that Macri did not seek autonomy as a central value in his foreign policy (Calderón, 2017). It related to autonomy to seek new partners and participate in International Governmental Organizations as a satisfied State (Vazquez, 2019). It was a criticism of the MERCOSUL policy of joint alliances among

all the countries. Especially with Venezuela's different position from Brazil and Argentina in their Foreign Policy. Macri criticized its antecessors for believing their market protections isolated Argentina instead of integrating it and bringing forth more partnerships (Macri, 2017c). It is a view similar to the Normal State paradigm, as the country would not oppose the more considerable international powers or try to evoke its agendas, but to be a cooperative part of the collectivity.

It is reflected in the Defense Policy, with the Armed Forces being closer to the government and surveilling borders and oceans (Calderón, 2017). During Kirchner and Fernandez administrations, the Armed Forces focused on either external peace operations or internal deployment for drug traffic. Macri reduced deployed troops. He requested Armed Forces to work in immigration irregularities and combat drug traffic in all the territory, not only in border control (ibidem). Macri affirmed that previous administrations' values were in dissonance from the people's values. He wanted his administration's Foreign to focus on predictability, openness, and trust from the Argentinian population (Macri, 2017c). For this, internal security issues were more relevant than attempts of regional presence.

Defense changed from collective defense (Jaimes & Miño, 2015) to national defense. In this ideology, the State must provide security instead of trusting multilateral institutions (Calderón, 2018). South America was not central to Macri's administration strategies. Inner manifestations of threats were at the heart of security issues (ibidem). In this sense, Macri's politics were like Menem's: it avoided the hypothesis of conflict, especially with anything related to the USA's interests (Aranda, 2004). President Macri also would use the Armed Forces to make border patrols, especially with Paraguay, to fight drug traffic to Argentina (Macri, 2016).

Even though security left its regional integration ideas, Macri's administration made Argentina more present in the global security agenda, named terrorism, drug traffic, and peace operations (Calderón, 2018), potentially related to the previous administrations. Unlike Menem, Kirchner, and Fernandez, though, his administration took a turn to politicize South America as a threat, especially Venezuela. President Macri affirmed Venezuela lived under an authoritarian regime, and MERCOSUL should immediately liberate political prisoners and re-establish democracy (Macri, 2018b). The change from the peace-loving State based on mediation and negotiation to a pro-interventionism State relates to the proximity to the USA took by the administration (Calderón, 2018), and its criticism towards Venezuela impacted the Macri administration's new identity. The anti-left feeling was part of the government rhetoric, similar to Brazil's changes in the period.

The new defense model would put the Armed Forces in charge of Defense affairs. It reduced the diplomatic staff role in Security arrangements and distanced Argentina from regional security, an ideological approach to threats (Calderón, 2017). The Macri administration would go back to buy arms from the US, and the US National Guard would be part of the Argentinian debates on public policy through its South Command (Míguez, 2017). The return to the arms trade was due to the Argentinian return to NATO meetings and negotiations (Calderón, 2018), a position conquered under Menem and left aside during the Kirchners' governments. After these deals, Argentina focused on preventing “new threats” in its territory (Anzelini, 2019). Although new laws or directions in defense policy had not yet, been drafted (ibidem), these were important to display agreement with USA Security Alliance. The US often encouraged its South American partners to protect their borders and be proactive against drug traffic and terrorism threats (Míguez, 2017). As for this, cooperation with Brazil got stronger under Temer, with greater border control from both sides and promises of technological development for both States to improve border security (Mastropierro, 2016).

Not only re-equip the armed forces was essential to the Northern partnerships, but Macri also intended to grant support from the Argentinian Armed Forces. The institution's prestige was low; many people would question the military's role and the need for an Army in Argentina (Calderón, 2018). From both de discredit and Macri's option for National Security over Regional Security agreements, the Armed Forces were deployed in internal affairs (Sain, 2018). In 2016, the government decreed an emergency State in Argentina due to traffic and smuggling. The northern amplified border operations gave the Army the mission to prevent crimes, defining their role as internal, finishing the idea of regional security as part of national security (ibidem).

Macri was also a signatory on the suspension of any UNASUL activity in the same meeting as Brazil in 2018. Denouncing the institution's highly ideological content, Argentina pledged to keep itself under pragmatic Foreign Policy. To *La Nación* newspaper, the Secretary of Strategic Affairs affirmed that UNASUL had forgotten South America, being away from its primary goal of physical integration (Dapelo, 2018). The government permanently left the institution in 2019.

Foreign Policy focused on trade translates to regional integration return as an economic tool rather than political concertation, a turn back to instrumentalist approach of South America like the Menem administration. Concerning Brazil, Macri's past evocation highlighted the history of understandings among the two countries and the importance of not

calling back past enmities (Macri, 2017b). The president reinforced MERCOSUL's importance (ibidem), although he would refrain from debating UNASUL. Internationally, the Macri administration made an effort to pay the public debt, and the IMF and the USA Treasury made public notes complimenting the State (Miguez, 2017a). Macri's politics towards the USA sought to break the cycle of approach – crises – rupture seen in previous governments by pursuing mature relationships with the country instead of the extremes of confrontation or alignment (Corigliano, 2018). The administration approach to International Organization resembled Menem's de-dramatization and de-ideologization; the preference for USA trade agreements and the alignment with the North-American partner also recall the 1990s administration.

The EU was also a government priority, changing the critical view of more powerful from Kirchner and Fernandez (Busso & Zelicovich, 2016). Argentina defined its identity as Occidental, not South American, and would prioritize those partners who could improve the economy through investments in production and development (ibidem). Macri went to Davos Economic Forum, in 2016, after 13 years of Argentinian absence in the summit (Míguez, 2017, p. 110). His presence opened talks with many States, such as the USA and France, to seek Argentina partnerships (Míguez, 2017).

Macri's success was also due to the isolation of Brazilian president Michel Temer in Davos due to the difficult political moment in Brazil. He would affirm the importance of Argentina and Brazil working together after his fruitful meetings in G20 and with the Pacific Alliance (Macri, 2017a). Although Argentina was more fragile economically after the Vulture Funds crisis, Brazil's isolation after the troublesome power transition from Rousseff to Temer would still give more momentum to Argentina's Foreign Policy initiatives. The administration approximation towards Japan, Germany, and other extra-regional partners showed the minor importance of the regional and the Kirchners' government project for leadership. Argentina focuses its strategy on becoming a global player as Brazil was before the 2016 political crisis. Critics called this a problem for Argentinian industrialization because international trade based itself on agricultural commodities, while Argentina exported manufactured products to South America – which could mean a setback instead of progress (Arceo, 2016). Nevertheless, the positive economic results and the new investments after Davos gave the government more approval, displayed as victories (Miguez, 2017a).

The government moved forward in the MERCOSUL – EU agreement, which has been under negotiation for over 20 years, but had suspicions from both Kirchner and Fernandez governments and Lula da Silva Rousseff governments (Miguez, 2017a). Macri,

united with Michel Temer, tried to get the agreement closed; what would happen by the end of his administration. He affirmed that both States should use the Pro Tempore MERCOSUL presidency to close the deal with Europe, given both administrations sought for the agreement to be done (Macri, 2017a). Although interested in the MERCOSUL – EU agreement, Macri believed that Brazil placed the biggest challenge to the region due to the political crisis it has been through (Mastropierro, 2016). Argentina was mainly interested in what the Brazilian economy's weight would bring to the inter-bloc agreement (Carmody, 2016, apud. Mastropierro, 2016). Brazil, and South America, would be a platform to break Argentina's isolation from world markets, not a political strategy for regional power (Frenkel, 2016). MERCOSUL flexibilization and an instrumental approach to the region were necessary for the Argentinian interest in the Pacific Alliance.

The Pacific Alliance, a Free Trade agreement among some of the West Coast Latin American States (Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico) (The Pacific Alliance, [s.d.]), became more alternative. As the organization is a Free Trade Agreement, there are few obligations within it. The focus on Asian Markets could be a positive compliment for Argentina, alongside a more flexible MERCOSUL. Macri's government invested in the Pacific Alliance, as the MERCOSUL was rethought (Busso & Zelicovich, 2016). The Pacific Alliance gained notoriety for Argentina and Brazil as it represented an economic bloc with little political ties that could open more international trade among the regions. On the other hand, it represented the abandonment of the previous integration arrangements – the Pacific Alliance based itself on very different values than UNASUL, such as freedom, individualist and economic focus, rather than the idea of political unity UNASUL carried (Arceo, 2016). These values' shift were concreted when Argentina, Brazil, and other States announced their forfeit from UNASUL in 2019.

As for the political crisis in Brazil, Macri was a sole supporter of the Temer administration, being the first to receive Temer's first Foreign Affairs Minister, José Serra. Macri's idea of pragmatism would focus on Brazil's economic ties rather than involving his administration in other State affairs. The president affirmed that he respected Brazil's legislative process (Corigliano, 2018). In his first visit to Brazil, Macri affirmed the importance of bilateral strategic partnership (on both the shared problems and innovative solutions), highlighting that frequent State visits would be the rule again (Macri, 2017b). Both countries shared the interest in flexibilization of the MERCOSUL and, perhaps, going back from a Customs Union to a Free Trade Agreement (Busso & Zelicovich, 2016). It

granted better development policies, especially that each country can choose its partner and celebrate its agreements without an organizational debate (Vazquez, 2019).

MERCOSUL flexibilization became a demand by Uruguay and Brazil and a core discussion among members on the next steps for the institution (Busso & Zelicovich, 2016). This flexibility allowed countries to make other bilateral agreements, participate in other regional processes, and negotiate in global institutions separately (ibidem). As the organization does not have supranational mechanisms, it depends on each member's government's approval to implement any agreement, depending on the interests generated by them (Mariano & Ribeiro, 2018).

The most considerable opposition to change MERCOSUL legislation ought to be Venezuela; as the country prepared to be the pro tempore president of the bloc in 2016, Macri requested for the democratic clause, used to suspend Paraguay from the bloc in 2012, to be used to remove Venezuela from the institution (Míguez, 2017). This move was a significant orientation change in Argentinian politics. Fernandez and Kirchner sook to integrate Venezuela into the continent by maintaining negotiations with its government and seeking energetic integration among South America, which could not be node Venezuela was estranged (A. Simonoff, 2008a).

Macri's Security Identity perceptions were mainly economic. Nonetheless, MERCOSUL was not seen as an essential tool; instead, it was an obstacle to achieving better bilateral deals and made it difficult for the Pacific Alliance's Argentinian entrance. The region was also not a strategic sphere for Argentina's interests but a security problem – primarily due to the Venezuelan crisis and drug and arms traffic. It serves to toughen Argentina's border control. Brazil's relationship had a good moment; both States had ideology changes and saw a form to rethink regional arrangements in their partnerships. Macri's relationship with Temer had ideological similarities, but there was little effort to increase integration; the bilateral relationship was a tool for the countries' liberty to make new partnerships.

3.8 Argentina's Security Construction

Argentina's relations with Brazil showed the importance the State gave to economic policy. To be internationally perceived as a peaceful State was necessary for the country to

be a part of the international realm. Normalizing bilateral relations with Brazil would give more economic opportunities, a more active international presence, making Argentina accomplish its goal to be a peace-loving State. Many program changes (those related to means to achieve a goal (C. Hermann, 1990)) through Argentina's Identity acting through the years. Argentina made few changes in its main Foreign Policy goals from its preferential relations with the economic North of the 1990s to the preference for South American ties in the 2000s to the conjugation of both under Macri (with significant changes).

The most notable difference is in prioritizing partnerships. While the Menem administration, like Macri's, privileged agreements with developed countries to achieve Argentina's Foreign Policy Goals, Macri differed from Menem due to his preference for agreements with China, which was not as relevant 1990s, privileging integration with South America's Pacific coast. Menem, in another way, saw MERCOSUL as part of a strategy for better relationships with Europe. On the other hand, Kirchner and Fernandez sought for more regional integration and South-South cooperation for Argentina's future. During Kirchner and Fernandez's terms, Brazil's relationship was marked by enthusiasm and fears of the neighbor country's accumulation of power, passing through a bilateral crisis and attempts to resolve it. Brazil lost its political primacy in Argentina's Foreign Policy, although it is still a relevant partner. Kirchner and Fernandez's governments focused on South America and the leading possibility for Argentina. MERCOSUL was a priority for all the governments, under different arguments – for its pacification possibility for Alfonsín; its economic prospects for Menem; its socio-political tool for Kirchner and Fernandez; and the chance it could conjugate with other integration initiatives.

The idea of being perceived as a peace-loving country had accompanied Argentina through its recent history. From Alfonsín's regional stabilization to Macri's engagement to USA defense strategies, Argentina kept the value but changed the relevant Other this value is projected. Alfonsín countered regional enmities and sought better relations with those States (Brazil, Chile, and England). Menem wanted this regional normalization to reflect Argentina's capacity to integrate the developed world, justifying the deployment to the Gulf War and joining NATO as an extra-regional partner. Kirchner sought internal peace by promoting social programs and tackling humanitarian issues; he related to Alfonsín's idea of regional normalization, as he advanced for Collective Security efforts (although outside UNASUL). Fernandez continued Kirchner's idea, but she also affirmed Argentina's capacity to mediate regional affairs and participate in regional peace operations, for which UNASUL would be crucial. Macri avoided UNASUL's limitations and related to Menem's idea of

alliances with stronger countries, especially the USA and China, the EU, and others. The Malvinas/Falklands War and the military dictatorship are still marking Argentina's Security Identity, and being seen and a peace-loving State was relevant for all analyzed presidents.

Economic stability was essential like it was to Brazil. Different from its neighboring country, Argentina faced many deep crises during the re-democratization period. The debt crisis was never fully surpassed. The abrupt changes in Argentina – within governments and under different administrations-due to the different perceptions of the country's values should reaffirm its Security Identity. From the Nationalists, Developmentists, and Liberal traditions, Argentina had conflictive paradigms on how to tackle its economic issues, which brought the State to interruptions in cooperation and programs. Lack of continuity changes Identity theories; Argentina had robust identity formulations with little convergence, bringing the State to internal identity conflicts yet to be solved.

The different approaches to Argentinian Identity and the values' enactment are the core of the country's Self. Contrary to Brazil, Argentina's presidents do not have to make broad coalitions to govern, diminishing dialogues among political parties. The diplomatic staff, without a solid epistemological community, and the military's division among developmentism and nationalism make the central Argentinian institutions polarized. The country lacks the means for a leadership project, and associated development has perils perceived by all Foreign Policy traditions. Brazil's unfulfilled promises left Argentina with few regional strategic possibilities to fully develop itself (Guimarães et al., 2020).

4. Analysis Leaders and Argentinian receptivity discourse

This chapter's objective is to understand how Brazilian discourses enacted the State's Security Identity values. This analysis has a quantitative element to it. Coding helps retrieve data from a large number of documents. However, our focus is qualitative and interpretative of the discourses where relevant keywords arise. This effort allows us to debate the context and the public in which discourses were made and understand values through different paradigms and historical moments.

4.1 Discourse analysis within Foreign Policy Analysis and Constructivism

It is possible to access the policymakers' interpretation of Security Identity through discourses. The speech act defines perceptions, values, and the daily making of international living of the State. Policymakers need to deal with the State's core values, which rely on the long-term values of Security Identity (Rieker, 2006). Not only stubbornness from leaders (Jervis, 2017) explains the resistance to change Security Identity and the very nature of security-related values. These connect to National Interests – physical survival, political autonomy, economic welfare, and collective self-esteem (Wendt, 2014). Security knowingly englobes more than military security (Buzan et al., 1998), and the four main National Interests embrace much of these sectors.

As part of the National Identity, Security Identity must read the four aspects of National Interest. However, not all the National Interests are represented on Security Identity – such as traditions, family formation, religion, although those can be tools. It is possible to replicate the four main National Interests in many cases, but each international actor will interpret how they work within their State. It is to say that Security Identity is the mobilization of National Identity for security and defense actions. While National Identity is full of potentialities, the leaders chose those values and historical events emblematic to their goals. Discourse analysis must relate to National Interests and Statespeople's perceptions of it. Although changeable (L. Hansen, 2006), values are not abandoned quickly

because of the regular daily politics and society's perpetuation (Sen, 2007). These somewhat fixed values are present in discursive acts and debated in the specialized bibliography.

Considering Buzan et al. (1998) sectorial approach of Security affairs, different matters became Security issues through Brazil's new democratic period. Societal and Political securitizations appeared as results of either economic or military affairs. Collor and Rouseff's impeachments were both results of economic crises (Ricupero, 2017). The societal reimagination of the Self after Rouseff's impeachment resulted from both an economic crisis and the politicization of South American relations as a sovereignty loss (Chagas et al., 2019). Environmental Security was only marginal to the Brazilian Security Identity. Although the Amazon is an essential part of the State Self-image, it is not taken as an Environmental issue but as a sovereignty problem (Lafer, 2004). The high militarization of Amazon affairs makes it more part of core military security affairs than a scientifically based environmental problem for Brazilian politics. As per the heavier presence of both military and economic security in Brazilian Security Identity, these two sectors must be analyzed independently; the other three (political, societal, and environmental) appear as punctual issues within the other two, which demanded more political actions.

Values are intervenient factors that influence Identity creation, which impacts National Interests. They are critical factors in both sustaining Identity perpetuation and give ideological substratum for interests. They are not external to the identity but a constituent part of it. Core identity values can play a more significant role in identity-building than a threat – as Hansen (2006: 36) exemplifies the reconstruction of NATO as a safeguard from liberal values rather than a union towards a concrete threat. Values are a fundamental part of identity, although mobilized differently according to policymakers' understanding and goals (Kassianova, 2001). Values help us understand what idea takes part in identity and how values limit identity and access its differentiations. These differences are noticeable through discourses.

Discourses mirror what top-level officers believe to be accurate and follow a given protocol (Charmaz, 2006). Shared perceptions of reality impact how policymakers see National Interest in collectively and individually Foreign Policy goals (Jervis, 2017). National Interest appears in Brazilian Foreign Policy discourses frequently. Those connect to the Permanent National Objectives or the diplomatic efforts made by diplomats and politicians to pass a positive State image internationally (Soares de Lima, 2005). Although

differences appear in discourses to distinct audiences, the coding process showed constant values in different incidents.

Foreign Policy has only marginal space in Brazilian politics. Diplomats conform to specific critical ideas for the State living in the International environment, which replicate presidents, vice-presidents, and minister's discourses. Development has been a Foreign Policy goal since independence (Cervo, 2003). Economic development, followed by industrial expansion and technological advancement, had been constructed as the core of Brazilian Foreign Policy to the point where it is considered a State policy, not a party initiative (Soares de Lima, 2005). The path towards development is viewed as a vulnerability in power disparities towards the world and the aspiration to create a robust South America (Cervo, 2003).

As a consequence of this under-development, Brazil perceived itself as a State with few power means, leading the State to advocate for International Law, just like the rest of South America (Ricupero, 2017). This respect for the International Law, made both by the country's material role and for the ideology of its diplomats, made peace a core value for Security Identity (ibidem). Itamaraty Diplomatic Course training's capability has aspects of a Total Institution, where like-minded individuals live a closed life and create their ethos (Farias, 2016). Although the conceptualization is not the most adequate, the Brazilian diplomatic ethos implies many similar ideologic aspects (ibidem), such as maintaining the status quo and abiding by International Law to achieve development. War was, since the independence, seen as a failure to abide by International Law, a price too high to pay for the country's international image (Lafer, 2004). Brazil's democratic transition in the 1980s reflected this abiding to international rules value. Democracy became an essential value in many areas of the country's International life because of the international pressure to embrace the liberal-democratic paradigm (Cervo, 2003).

4.2 Defense and Security in Brazilian Identity

Our analysis has four steps. Firstly, from the previous universe of 537 discourses on Security affairs, economic affairs, regional integration, and bilateral relationship with Argentina, we selected those whose central theme was security (in its traditional sense),

resulting in a universe of 153 discourses between 1985 to 2018. From these discourses, we divided them, firstly, into Security spheres: Public Security (relating to Wendt’s Collective Self-Steem National Interest and Political Autonomy), National Security (Physical Survival), Regional Security (Economic Wellbeing), and International Security (all four National Interests). The third step comprehends the thematic classification of discourses, among greetings to the Armed Forces, Holiday discourses, Nuclear-related, Economy-related, Democracy, Amazon/environment, peace operations, terrorism, new policies, and drug traffic. The last step is related to identifying changing values through the years, such as how the use of “democracy” was linked, in the first decade, to the post-dictatorship and its fears, to the idea of creating better institutions and amplify participation, to reinforce the democratic maturity Brazil achieved in the decade of 2010. These changes are analyzed as Hermann (1990) and Hansen (2006) debate discourses and changes.

Our first classification, on Security Spheres, gave us the following:

Table 1: Security spheres prevalence in discourses per year

	national	international	regional	public security	total
2018	2	0	0	2	4
2017	3	0	0	0	3
2016	2	0	1	0	3
2015	1	0	0	0	1
2014	2	0	0	1	3
2013	2	0	0	0	2
2012	4	0	0	0	4
2011	8	1	0	0	9
2010	6	0	0	0	6
2008	4	0	2	0	6
2007	2	0	0	0	2
2006	4	0	0	0	4
2005	5	1	0	0	6
2004	6	1	1	0	8
2003	4	1	0	0	5
2002	6	0	1	0	7
2001	5	2	0	0	7

2000	0	0	0	0	0
1999	11	0	0	0	11
1998	5	0	0	0	5
1997	6	0	0	0	6
1996	11	0	0	0	11
1995	6	0	0	0	6
1994	3	0	0	0	3
1993	4	0	0	0	4
1992	1	0	0	0	1
1990	8	0	0	0	8
1989	6	0	0	0	6
1988	4	1	0	0	5
1987	1	0	0	0	1
1986	1	0	0	0	1
1985	4	0	0	0	4
Total	136	8	5	3	152

National Security primacy confirms the previous Security Identity conception of inwards nationalism (Lafer, 2004). Brazil focused its efforts on physical survival and political autonomy for the first century of its existence. Security affairs are not in everyday Brazilian politics; international threats are dismissed as foreign problems. This is a long Brazilian Foreign Policy tradition of conflict distancing, possibly tainting the country's name. Therefore, this makes it difficult to achieve autonomy, survival, and, by consequence, economic wellbeing. This tendency was the main characteristic of the Developmentist State paradigm (Cervo, 2003).

Although Normal and Logistic paradigms attended other security spheres more closely, those are still marginal compared to the weight National Security has on Brazilian discourses. There was a policy window during the 1990 and 2000 decades, as South America was economically weakened and receive less attention from central powers, more dedicated to the War on Terror. Political Autonomy has priority in National Interests due to the lesser overlay of American policies in the subcontinent (Buzan & Waeber, 2003). The salience of the National sphere on discourses relating to security shows the hierarchy from a strong Brazil first and, secondly, a strong South America. This salience became crucial that Temer's

platform would be robust on the return to the focus on solely national problematic, as the South American sphere was conflicting with the National Identity. Identity conflicts are solved by seeking what is primordial to the State, establishing a hierarchy among values (Wendt, 2014).

The most general hypothesis for Brazil (and South America) distancing from international tensions is the USA's power – it both calls attention and grant response from external threats (Mares, 2001). This theory affirms that the problem of South (and Latin) America is based on drug traffic, revolutions, and military coups, meaning internal security affairs trumps the major world problems (ibidem). Intra-regional and the USA relations gave South America a different type of Security need. The new democratic order increased predictability and cooperation, especially in the Southern Cone (Buzan & Waeber, 2003). As economy and stability are at the core of Brazilian Security Identity (Soares de Lima, 2005), protecting trade relations was at the core of Security. Economic ties are decisive for policymakers to engage in a particular behavior (Kassianova, 2001), and values and Self-perception fence Foreign Policy changes borders (Hudson, 1999). Regional cooperation met Brazilian needs for regional stability (Ricupero, 2017). It became a form of reducing regional security affairs and managing them efficiently instead of being another layer of preoccupations.

Another explanation, not detached to the first, bases Brazil's Self-centrism on Security concerns worldwide and regionally, to the State's lack of military capacity to be involved in those (Fuccille & Rezende, 2013). UNASUL, through its Defense Council, was to help Brazil mediate security affairs in the region (ibidem). Brazil's Foreign Policy is not conflictive because of the lack of means and because it defends the status quo (S. Alsina Jr & Paulo, 2009). As a contempt State, Brazil focuses more on the economy than military affairs, looking more for diplomatic solutions and mediator roles than breaking bilateral relations (ibidem). Although Brazil has high expenditure in military affairs [1.5% of a 1.8 billion dollars in 2019 (World Bank, 2019)], more than seventy percent of it goes to pensions from staff, retired personnel, widows, and military daughters' pensions (Portal da transparência, 2019). One last explanation for Brazil's National Security focus is its strong diplomatic capacity, a long-term tradition focusing more on negotiated solutions (Ricupero, 2017). Although Logistic State increased regional security presence through regional integration, the prominence was low.

Regional security is still marginal when compared to National. In 2008, we located four discourses – two debated solely national affairs (one in the Brazilian Army Day and

other in the new year's confraternization with generals), and two where we found both national and regional affairs (one debating the new Defense Strategy and other in the graduation of soldiers going to the peace operation in Haiti). That year marked the foundation of UNASUL. Integration as a political agenda was the theme of Brazilian discourses, not Security (to be discussed in the following sections). One explanation for that is the misperception of unity, where the government sees itself as more cohesive than it is in fact (Jervis, 2017). Although the Lula da Silva government saw regional integration as a Foreign Policy basis, the Armed Forces did not share the enthusiasm, especially due to the border protection measures made in the Northern region (Fuccille & Rezende, 2013). The Armed Forces believed the National Interest of Autonomy was in jeopardy, where the government would open itself to influence by leftists leaders such as Chavez/Maduro and Castro (Chagas et al., 2019). On the other hand, the government believed the National Interest in autonomy was reinforced, as regional integration made front to the USA (Vizentini, 2006).

In 1988 and 2011, discourses debating International Security were both in United Nations High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Affairs. The international served in the othering process for Brazil to maintain its nuclear program. While Security concerns were rising worldwide, Brazil made progress regionally to ensure the pacific use of atomic energy. The other moment Brazil had two discourses solely focused on International affairs were after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. President Cardoso both condemned the attacks and reiterated that, while Brazil would continue cooperating with the USA, the country would not go to war. It reflects both in the Brazilian status quo assurer role and the Self-perception of a weaker military power.

Brazilian policymakers know that Foreign Policy seldom grants votes. On the other hand, drug traffic affects many people living in bigger cities (Camargo et al., 2018). Substantial operations to contain drug shipments and politicians perceive Amazon forest protection as the core of Brazilian Security (Mares, 2001). During democracy, the use of Armed Forces to protect borders, the Amazon, and counter-drug traffic were amplified to solve the military identity crisis and gain legitimacy (Fuccille, 2006). Drug apprehensions at Brazilian borders, surveillance, and internal military operations are well-seeing by many citizens (Camargo et al., 2018). Other threats, such as terrorism and wars, are seen as too abstract (Mares, 2001). The central theme on security-centered discourses reaffirms this, as seen below.

total	5	43	4	24	7	4	10	3	62	163
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Less prevalent affairs as central themes of discourses, such as the Amazon (4 speeches), Peace Operations (7 discourses), terrorism (4), and drug traffic (10), will be discussed below. Other affairs, such as Democracy, Statebuilding, support for the Armed Forces, will be addressed more profoundly in the following section. Economy overlaps with core security matters. Nevertheless, its analysis will discuss in a separate section due to its dynamic for Security Identity.

Statebuilding, as the creation and maintenance of institutions, policies, and democratic rules, is the second most common theme in discourses. After 21 years of constitutional exception, society changed profoundly; institutions inherited from the military dictatorship were substituted for inclusive ones. One example of this was the Ministry of Defense. Although president Cardoso affirmed it was more about strategy and force unification than democratic control (Cardoso, 1999c). However, analysts demonstrate the importance of drifting power from the Armed Forces to the administration to step towards democratic stabilization (Fuccille, 2006). Available finances, administration capacity to create policies, and civilian management altered profoundly how the Armed Forces came to integrate society.

The four discourses where the Amazon was the central theme happened in 1989, 1999, 2001, and 2002. In 1989, president Sarney affirmed that the Northern border could become an unstable part of the subcontinent if the military were not doing patrols and exercises (Sarney, 1989d). Patriotism and renouncing from the army were essential parts of Brazil's security – values present in different affairs relating to the military. In his 1999 discourse, president Cardoso showed the importance of democracy for National Defense when launching ABIN (Cardoso, 1999d). While showcasing the new Intelligence tools, the president affirmed that the Amazon would be better cared for by the military (ibidem). Amazon's relevance for intelligence surveillance received praise in the 2001 discourse. The president affirmed the importance of Colombian border vigilance due to Plan Colombia (Cardoso, 2001c). He stated Brazil could not participate in the negotiation mission with guerillas because the country was too close to the matter due to border issues. Because of this, Brazil's role was to protect its border from guerrillas and foster democratic capacity in Colombia. The last discourse with Amazon as the central theme, in 2002, debated the System for Amazon Surveillance (Sistema de Vigilância Amazônica – translated by the present

author) and the better tools Brazil would have to make border control. All the discourses highlight the Armed Forces' importance to maintain sovereignty and the relevance of the Amazon to the State. The new tools launched by the government politicized the Northern border, while the Southern one was de-politized.

Peace Operations appeared in Brazilian discourses in 1995 and 2004, 2008, and 2010. In 1995, while greeting the military involved in the peace operations in the former Yugoslavia, President Cardoso affirmed the importance of military sacrifices (Cardoso, 1995c). He reaffirmed the importance of the military democratic values, remembering those who died fighting fascism and Nazism in World War II. He also affirmed that these principles (democracy and renounce) would take Brazil to be more present internationally to lead more peace operations. In his first speech on the theme, Lula da Silva affirmed that the international community had recognized Brazil's capacity to contribute to world peace (Da Silva, 2004a). Like Cardoso, he confirmed that democratic stability granted Brazil notoriety to lead peace operations. Lula also praised the Latin American union for the operation, where Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile also participated. His following discourses in 2004 affirmed that the preliminary steps to integrate South American armies had already happened (Da Silva, 2004c). In his visit to the troops in 2008, president Lula said the peace force in Haiti was crucial for a new Brazil – a more solidary and understanding one (Da Silva, 2008c). Solidarity was reinforced in the 2010 discourses. Haiti suffered an earthquake on the 12th of January 2010; the peacekeeping forces were entrusted with humanitarian relief, especially from Brazilian donations (Da Silva, 2010a). Peace operations maintained their importance of showcasing Brazil as a stable country with conditions to be considered a global player. Although MINUSTAH was deeply criticized due to Human Rights violations, the government kept the discourse of its importance for the National Project.

Terrorism, the theme of five discourses, was seen as a non-traditional threat, not connected with any country in particular since 2001 (Cardoso, 2001c). Solidarity with the victims of terrorist attacks and those on the brink of being radicalized by foreign interventions were central in that year (ibidem). His discourse in December 2001 affirmed the importance of solidarity and cooperation in the world - new opportunities for dialogue with the USA opened in International Forums (Cardoso, 2001f). In contrast, Lula da Silva's discourses, in 2003 and 2005, criticized un-coordinated cooperation for combating terrorism. Instead, many nations' diplomatic efforts and the use of tools, such as mediation and conciliation, and a clear charter on terrorism could promote dialogue and extinguish violent attacks (Da Silva, 2003b). In 2005, he added to terrorism combat the promotion of

development (Da Silva, 2005b) – a theme the active and haughty diplomacy had as a banner for its international relevance (Amorim, 2015). Although a new theme, as affirmed in all these discourses, terrorism showcased the agendas of the Brazilian government, such as development and international cooperation, not being a problem for Brazilian decision-makers per se, rather an issue where Brazilian Security Identity values were displayed.

Drug traffic will appear concerning Foreign Policy in three discourses. Many policies dealt with this problem, but Brazil avoided securitizing the affair – it was considered a public security problem, not a Foreign Policy one. However, the militarization of quotidian life increased through the New Republic (Camargo et al., 2018). The drug traffic problem would not be solved just with new regulations. The military capacity was brought to light in the Temer administration. The president affirmed that drug traffic has never reached volumes as high as they were in 2016 (Temer, 2016e), requiring a new approach. This approach would have more military at the borders and more border control, rather than the open circulation MERCOSUL sook to achieve (ibidem). In 2018, the president affirmed the perils of combating drug traffic in Brazil with open borders, where criminals would transit among countries freely, with minor consequences (Temer, 2018b). When he announced the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the president called for insecurity for the people and impunity for criminals, including free transit and drug traffic command centers inside detention centers (Temer, 2018a). The identity changes from previous governments to Temer are essential to notice. Borders and the region were politicized, cooperation now shared space with distrust and the tone towards the region got stronger. Temer's discourses found a new international structure, but also the values exercised were different. The following sections will debate how other values, such as democracy, development and statebuilding, were displayed differently through administrations.

4.2.1 Democracy and state-building

The second most present theme within Security, Democracy and state-building, has changed its manifestation along with the New Republic. During the Sarney administration, the discussion was mainly about the new institutions created and how the developmentist State paradigm was saturated. Collor de Mello focused on liberties and market opening institutions; Itamar Franco, after Collor de Mello's impeachment, debated the surpassing of

the economic and ethical crisis. Cardoso would affirm the solidification of Brazilian institutions and the democratic maturing process. Lula da Silva had less prominence in this area, as state-building and democracy changed for social justice and mass participation. The value came back to centrality in Rousseff's administration as the political crisis deepened – and it was the theme of one of Temer's discourses, as his administration resulted from a troublesome impeachment process.

Negotiated transition and avoidance in criticizing military dictatorship made the Armed Forces and their past Human Rights crimes a taboo among Brazilian administrators. The fears of the military retaking the State were always a shadow in Brazil's democracy. This idea of the Armed Forces not as the opponents of democracy, but as part of them related to negotiated transition. By involving the Armed Forces with democratic values, democracy grew stronger. Militaries were believed, in many discourses, to be the bastion to guard Brazilian Democracy. State and its type identity (what type of unity it sustains [Wendt, 2014]) are reaffirmed daily, so the Self is perpetuated (ibidem). This is especially true after drastic changes, as those Brazil was going through. As part of the democratic transition, the Armed Forces became constituencies in the democratic order, meaning their compliance was crucial for the civilian Defense policy to thrive. Constituencies' endorsement and legitimacy are central for the State to make any change (C. Hermann, 1990). Approximation with the Armed Forces was a constant during the New Republic; even the investigations over Human Rights abuses spared the military of any punishment and focused more on memory than reparations.

During the period, democracy's concept remained the same, pledging for the Armed Forces to reinforce its institutionalization. One relevant change among these discourses, though, is the nature of the State. State models changed within State paradigms (Cervo, 2003), but the Self-perception of its force and qualities also differed. Sarney's preoccupations with the future of the democratic State as approved by the Constituent Assembly saw it weakened; to him, Brazil had become impossible to govern (Ricupero, 2017). Even though the transition was successful, the political elite perceived hard times, as the debt crisis took State capacity, and recent democratic institutions could still suffer backlash (Sarney, 1988c).

Some of this fear was still present in Collor's administration, but his discourses brought the importance of liberty – a value to appear with democracy also in Cardoso and Rousseff's discourses. These three administrations all went through political crises, where democracy and stability were in jeopardy. To maintain the State's values (Wendt, 2014),

democracy became evoked more often in internal and foreign security-related discourses, as it was both a tool and an end for these policymakers.

During the Cardoso administration, these discourses related to the democratic reconstruction of State instruments, such as the Intelligence System and unification of forces under the Ministry of Defense, related to the years 1996 and 2000 state-building than democracy per se. As the Cardoso government institutionalized policies for the military, reinforce democracy defense among those groups was necessary for them to agree with the restructuration. The desire for institutionalization was noticeable in Collor de Mello's speeches, and the lack of institutionalization showed fears under Sarney. As institutionalization took place, democracy and state-building were no longer crucial as security themes. Lula da Silva's four speeches under this theme debated the need for more robust and better equipped Armed Forces to respond to the previous governments' shy investments in the area. Democracy debate returned under Rousseff because of the debate towards development. The development would require more sovereignty and, therefore, more strength from the Armed Forces (Rousseff, 2011f). During Rousseff's administration, the political crisis, which led to her impeachment, also took the president and her successor, Michel Temer, to reinforce their belief in democracy.

Political crisis changes focus from objective goals (strategies, planning, long-term directions) to subjective ones (desired outcomes, preferences, emotion-lead actions) (Wendt, 2014). Although dichotomies can erase a more complex reality, this differentiation helps us understand the democracy value discoursed during Rousseff's impeachment. The president would affirm Brazilian institutions were not at their best, but the work should strengthen it, rather than bury it (Rousseff, 2015b). Democracy gave room for other values, such as the centrality of peace in Brazil's Security Identity. Value perpetuity in security discourses is noticed when observing the value of peace.

4.2.2 Peace in Security discourses

In documents under the Security code, peace appears as a theme in 29 discourses.

Table 3: prevalence of the value "peace" in discourses per year

Year	number of discourses
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1988	1
1989	1
1990	5
1992	1
1993	2
1994	1
1996	4
1997	1
1999	1
2000	2
2001	1
2006	1
2010	2
2011	1
2012	2
2013	1
2014	1
2016	1

Peace had different implications through the years. In Sarney's discourses, peace relates to the national moment, where the democracy transition did not involve violence. Instead, it was negotiated with the previous regime. The fact that peace appears more in 1990 discourses than any year is due to the president's salutation of the first democratic elections, with no riots and results recognized by all the participants. In the Collor de Mello 1992 speech, democracy and state-building are confirmed as the basis for the State to reaffirm peace and strength institutions. Peace was not an isolated societal moment but a continuous national goal. This change relates both with the new State paradigm, as the Normal State bases itself on liberal democracy peace and institution compliance, while the developmentist State faced its inadequacies and criticism by its end (Cervo, 2003).

Cardoso, in 1996, aimed to use the value of peace as a reassurance of the non-conflictive ideology behind the National Defense Policy. He differed from other presidents' discourses because peace was neither a conjuncture nor a goal, but Security and Defense's base. Peace defined both Brazil's character and inter-South American relations. It was an intrinsic value Armies could reinforce. This rhetoric followed the criticism from the 1996 National Defense Policy. The policy was criticized due to its naivete. Formulated by

diplomats, the National Defense Policy had consonance with their ideology (J. P. S. Alsina Jr., 2003). Foreign Policy had non-violent means and the avoidance of conflict characteristics of the Normal State (Cervo, 2003), which reflected in the National Defense Policy and, therefore, in the presidential discourses of this year. Problematic affairs, such as drug traffic and transnational crimes, were not debated lengthily. The South American “Peace Ring” (*Política de Defesa Nacional*, 1996) served the regional integration goals of the Cardoso administration but reneged other Security issues the attention needed.

This formulation was unchanged until the year 2000. With the beginning of Plan Colombia, peace began to appear as a Brazilian value to project on others. It is a continuity from the first Cardoso years, but with an evident change from internal democracy to fostering liberal democracies in other places. Also debating Colombia and state-building, Cardoso affirmed peace was present in South America in the following year due to cooperation and political trust-building, not only by economic cooperation. Plan Colombia called attention to regional problems, but also Brazil started to have more stability to pursue its role as a global player. In this direction that Lula da Silva discourses (3 in total) debated state-building and peace. Brazil appears to be followed by others and helps develop other countries' capacities towards becoming peaceful societies.

Rousseff would affirm peace to be a Brazilian commitment, regionally and internationally. She adds to Cardoso's idea of peace as a primary value to a binding principle that guides Brazil's relationships. The main difference between Rousseff to Cardoso is that a commitment reduces the possible actions in a State, while a value might (or might not) be the base for action. Rousseff imprinted peace deeper in her discourses than her predecessors, reflecting in the 2012 National Defense Policy. This new document redacts other States' activities from the possible treats; the imperialist perception from other States was edited, changing from the 2005 version. The president took a more conciliatory tone in her speeches (G. A. G. Oliveira, 2016).

The projection of Brazil as a peace-loving country shows the disparities of internal and foreign policies. While the State considers its Foreign Policy peaceful due to the lack of wars in History (*Política de Defesa Nacional*, 1996), internal society is a violent one. The projection of a peaceful State grants Brazil the fulfillment of the International Law-abiding country and helps the State pursue its role as a global player (Lafer, 2004). However, being a peace-loving country did not suffice to participate in international forums – development accompanied these policies.

4.2.3 Development

Development also had prevalence in security discourses. The debate on development within Brazilian politics is lengthy because it is one of the permanent national objectives. The value prevalence was:

Table 4: prevalence of the value "development" in Brazilian discourses per year

Year	number of discourses
1988	1
1989	1
1990	1
1993	1
1996	3
1999	2
2000	2
2001	1
2002	4
2006	1
2011	1
2013	1
2016	1

In 1988, Sarney affirmed that strong Armed Forces were needed to achieve development, as the most developed nations were also the greater military powers. He justified his position by stating that Armed Forces kept working democratic institutions and avoid State disintegration. In his 1989 discourse, nonetheless, he affirmed the State could not develop itself under the developmentist paradigm, where the government provided for every need and solved every problem within society. These two speeches debated different aspects of Security, the importance of the Armed Forces, and the need for a renewed State model. Those are related, as many Brazilian institutions were rethought, and a holistic re-evaluation was necessary. It also shows Sarney's concerns about the democratic transition.

Collor, in 1990, would approach development in a more pragmatic form. Prosperity and social justice were needed for the country to restart its development process.

Development was the goal of his administration, reached with better policies for the most needed. Itamar Franco added that, in 1993, by saying the changing world would require autonomous acting from Brazil and National Unity. Franco's goals were bolder than Collor de Mello's, but it still related to his partner's views.

Cardoso, in 1996, debated development within security more deeply than any other president in our analysis. This year, the first intelligence training course happened, and the debate of new technologies started as part of development in both the top-level security decision-makers and in talks on higher education within the graduated from military courses. It added to Itamar Franco's steps towards development rather than denying the importance of his discourses. In 1999, the same year the Ministry of Defense was founded, Cardoso added to developing the importance of having military models that would foster development. The idea of the efficacy of the military in protecting National Interests as an inductor of development was reinforced as a change from the previous discourses as the Ministry of Defense would now establish partnerships and make international treaties in the Security area, therefore fostering technological development for the country.

In the following year, development formulations would change drastically. Plan Colombia created fears among the region about the regionalization of the Colombian civil war. The change can be perceived in discourses as the 2000's discourses started to add the pacific tendencies Brazil had for its development and the peace importance for becoming developed. The debate on a better military was abandoned because the State could engage with guerillas on the Northern border. The 2001 and 2002 discourses maintained the discourses on the importance of liberty and democracy for development; reaffirming these principles after the 9/11 terrorist attacks had a different context. As the International environment changed, policymakers adapted the Foreign Policy practice (C. Hermann, 1990). Development due to freedom and democratic institutions became essential for Brazil's support of the anti-terror fight because the State denied direct help in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (Doratioto & Vidigal, 2015), affirming Western values relevant to remain an ally to Western ideas.

Development appeared less in the security-related security discourses during Lula da Silva, who treated the affair as economic security. In his 2006 discourse, he highlighted the importance of the Armed Forces in supporting development policies, such as vaccination campaigns, road building, and State presence in general. This discourse happened after the peace operation beginning in Haiti. Therefore, state-building was held higher by the Brazilian government. The State was changing its role identity internationally, seeking to be

a global player in significant issues, bringing a program change in Brazilian action. As Hermann (1990) points out, a program change happens when the tools employed shift. Brazil had aimed to be a global player for an extended period of its history, represented in the predominance of the North-South relationship axis in its Foreign Policy action (Lafer, 2004). Statebuilding as an internal Army value was essential to reinforce the external goal of participation within UN stabilization missions, and it was the one praised in Lula da Silva's administrations.

Rousseff also affirmed the Army's importance for development in a similar form from Cardoso's affirmation of the Army as its inductor. She praised the importance of high technology in Army operations and the importance of an up-to-date arms industry to generate a spill-over effect in other industrial areas. The investment in the arms industry would help Brazil navigate through the post-2008 financial crisis, as it would open more work opportunities and demand innovation. When affirmed the importance of the Armed Forces in generating development, Cardoso was responding to a financial crisis and saw in State investments a way to make front to international vulnerabilities. Temer, in 2016, would reaffirm this critical relationship while rescuing Lula da Silva's importance of the Armed Forces in state-building and social work. In this aspect, he differed little from his antecessors, despite his party document of the needed changes in national and foreign policy.

4.2.4 Stability

Another value present in Security-related discourses is stability. Political and economic stability are deeply rooted values within Brazilian identity (Soares de Lima, 2005). Stability rhetoric is vital for Brazilian foreign policy due to its requirement for development (especially foreign investment and diplomatic accords) (ibidem). Coding this theme excluded false positives such as regional stability and economic stability, to debate stability only as a National Security value. Its prevalence was:

Table 5: prevalence of the value "stability" in Brazilian discourses per year

Years	number of discourses
1996	1
1999	1

2000	2
2002	2
2006	1
2010	1
2011	1
2012	1

In Sarney, Collor, and Franco’s discourses, stability did not appear because they dealt with a fragile transition process, where institutional stability was built. Sarney saw Brazil as a fragile State that could only attempt to pursue stability in a changing society (Ricupero, 2017). Collor debated stability in economic security discourses, especially monetary and market stability. Cardoso also followed that direction, but he would affirm, in his 1996 discourse, the importance of monetary stability to generate social stability. The result would create better military models. In 2000, a change coming from Plan Colombia impacted how stability appeared in his discourses. Social stability was threatened by drug traffic, and guerrillas fought on the Northern border, jeopardizing development in entire South America.

Lula da Silva would affirm that Brazil has conquered democratic stability internally and that it was time to bring this stability to others. Specifically, on the Haiti peace mission deployment. However, Lula da Silva intended to improve Brazil’s participation in other peace missions to bring stability. Rousseff added to Lula da Silva’s discursive construction, confirming that making Brazilian neighbors stable would maintain stability within Brazilian society. As the region becomes stabler than before, fewer vulnerabilities will threaten any State in the region. Her affirmation does not dissonate with Cardoso’s fears of regional instability. It mirrors the same idea but dialogues with a different regional scenario. Nonetheless, Rousseff would make positive reaffirmations on the regional political integration and reaffirm the positive results in Haiti’s peace force when the operation was internationally criticized. As the National Interest of collective self-esteem was attacked, as part of the country’s international image was rooted in the peacekeeping enthusiast role, the government would protect that label for maintaining the country’s pronunciation of being a capable global player.

4.2.5 Argentina within Security matters

For discussing Argentina within Security matters, another sample is required. Firstly, all the discourses citing Argentina and its presidents were separated and divided between those relating to Security and Economy (present in subsection 4.3.5). From 534 documents, we used 111 debating Argentinian and regional affairs. We excluded from this part of the analysis those documents with general addressing to Argentinian authorities or the country's name cited, but no relevant matter is discussed, e. g., a discourse where the Brazilian representative salutes all MERCOSUL members. From these 111 discourses, we analyzed 49 where debating security matters. Within these, we seek to understand which themes were more present. From the 49 documents, nine fell under the two themes, and the other 39 fell under one.

Democracy and integration were the most present values within the Security discourses, followed by stability. Integration debated building friendship between the two countries and the common destiny of stability and democracy needed for it. The first discourse debating Argentinian-related Security affairs was Sarney's 1986 discourse on the United Nations General Assembly opening, where he stated the Argentinian claim over the Malvinas/Falklands as legitimate. It was an essential step towards integration, as Brazil did not send troops to support the war, a practical matter to Argentina. In the following year, Sarney affirmed in the Argentinian congress the need to “integrate not to hand over” (present author translation)²⁰ (Sarney, 1986a). This slogan would accompany many discourses through the New Republic. Integration was strength against wealthier countries; much of a sovereign measure took regionally opposed to the North-South economic axis (Lafer, 2004).

Freedom and democracy began to appear in Sarney's discourses towards Argentina as the shared values that would help “our people rediscover their most profound identity” (present author translation)²¹ (Sarney, 1986a). The end of the Developmentist State took a Western Identity label (Cervo, 2003), where freedom, democracy, and free-market gained particular attention in identity formation (Ricupero, 2017). The Western label was useful to a cultural selection towards richer countries. Opposed to natural selection (where a State assimilates another), cultural selection occurs when a country sees a significant Other as an example to be followed (Wendt, 2014), which happened to re-democratized South American

²⁰ “Integrar para não entregar”.

²¹ “nossos povos redescobrem a sua identidade mais profunda”.

countries. The policy opportunity window opened for this identity change as the Cold War came to an end and re-democratization pushed South America to Western-like type identities (the ones related to shared traits among society (Wendt, 2014)).

A new bilateral system was born because, after the debt crisis, the idea of Common Destiny (the need for joint action) and Interdependence (the fact that a change in one State will impact all others) drew the plans for better cooperation (Wendt, 2014). This is confirmed when Itamar Franco used the same idea of profound identity in his first official visit to Argentina (Franco, 1993b). Cardoso would affirm the moment for more cooperation had finally arrived – for him, other administrations had not tried to make those efforts due to the political costs it would imply (Cardoso, 1999e). Cardoso observed the past to debate the newly found shared values of both States and the shared values among Brazilian and Argentina enterprises (ibidem). It marks a change where the economic and political opening made actual results, implying more companies making business and international ventures together.

The process observed in Brazil – Argentina relationship during re-democratization shows an active pursue to de-other the neighboring countries and look forward to a possible collective identity in the future – where the Self and Other barriers no longer exist (Wendt, 2014). In 1989, Sarney affirmed that the bilateral relation was built on the experience of dialogue and creating consensus (Sarney, 1989c). The creation of consensus became a beacon for Brazilian politics – it helped the country develop within Western values (Lafer, 2004) and aided the promotion of Brazil as a conflict mediator (Saraiva, 2010). When the leftist governments of Lula da Silva and Néstor Kirchner started, the values changed for more socially-driven ones, still in touch with the Western values, such as solidarity, justice, and development (Da Silva, 2003c). Under these values, MERCOSUL would be re-founded (ibidem), as the Argentinian president Kirchner had suggested before.

In 2004, Lula da Silva affirmed the good Brazil – Argentina relationship to be the basis for South American integration (Da Silva, 2004d). To Brazil, there was homogeneity (when the type and personal identities coincide (Wendt, 2014)) among the two States, which meant that expansion of these shared ideas was in order for Brazil. Although the bilateral approximation spill-over to the Southern Cone was evident in the past administrations (Passini Mariano, 2015), it was the first time a Brazilian president stated the relationship as the spinal cord for integration. In this discourse, Lula put Kirchner's presidential election in the more significant movement of left-wing movements in Latin America, which he believed facilitated the integration process (Da Silva, 2004d). In 2005 and 2006, Lula's discourses

aimed to get Argentina involved in the UNASUL project. Therefore, the importance of Brazil and Argentina as shared leaders of the integration process was necessary for the Brazilian integration process (Nery, 2016). In 2008, Lula affirmed:

Argentina and Brazil's Strategic alliance is vital for us to reach our national goals, which only make sense if understood as part of a South American integration project [present author translation]²² (Da Silva, 2008a).

Lula began a diversion process with Argentina by putting multilateral integration as the basis for the bilateral agenda. This policy window created a change in values, boosted by the global change in the 2008 European crisis. Brazil, empowered by multilateralism and union among all South America, changed its perceptions of Argentina as the most crucial partnership in the region. These values crafted new interpretations and decision-making processes in Brazil (Doty, 1993), where the whole region was equally important. Argentinian leaders felt jeopardized by the Brazilian regional project, beginning to take steps towards an independent leadership project (Malamud, 2013). Brazilian policymakers felt victorious because Argentina agreed with the broad regional integration idea, part of Brazil's agenda. Although the regional aspect of the relationship was still part of the agenda in the following years, the 2009 financial crisis re-ignited the bilateral aspect of Argentina – Brazil relationships. Lula affirmed the strategic alliance's importance to make front to International Finance Institutions (Da Silva, 2009a). He highlighted the importance of strategic thinking of alliances instead of a rivalry to address others (*ibidem*). It shows a changing Lockean order, where rivalries and cooperation dispute the agendas moving towards a Kantian order, where collective identities and peaceful-only interactions occur (Wendt, 2014).

Rousseff kept the importance of the regional sphere, but she brought the bilateral sphere back. Joint forces to face the financial crisis and make both countries more assertive in international summits (especially G20) were the main aspects of the renewed bilateral relationship (Rousseff, 2011d). In the last discourse on the bilateral relationship, Rousseff thanked Cristina Fernandez for her support of the regional agenda (Rousseff, 2015a). Although Rousseff's discourses highlighted the personal friendship between her and Fernandez, important peace-related values appear – the idea of shared vision and future was

²² Original in Portuguese: “A aliança estratégica entre a Argentina e o Brasil é imprescindível para que alcancemos nossos objetivos nacionais, que só fazem sentido se forem tomados como parte de um projeto amplo de integração sul-americana.”

a constant. The conjoint efforts for unified international agendas could signalize the de-othering which the States worked together on from the 1980s.

Temer administration, although akin to president Macri, did not have Argentina as part of the strategic partners presented in their government plan (MDB, 2015). His biggest regional security concern was the Venezuelan social and political crisis (Temer, 2017c), although he did not offer Brazil a mediator, which had been Brazil's historical role in the region (Lafer, 2004). Temer represented a new flex on Brazilian values, where freedom and a smaller State (Temer, 2017c) would be the center of the Security Identity. Although these are centers of Brazilian Security Identity, especially under the Normal State (Cervo, 2003), his focus was internal, as seen in border protection and organized crime repression (Temer, 2016e). Temer administration had an inclination for neoliberalism ideology, but political integration and regional strategic partnerships did not play a big part in it; financial results were the government's main goal (MDB, 2015).

This represented a drastic program change in Foreign Policy – goals are either achieved or taken away from the political program (C. Hermann, 1990). It impacted the de-othering process been made with Argentina and the positive relationships with the region. His first Foreign Relations minister, Jose Serra, made public announcements criticizing the countries that questioned Rousseff's impeachment (MRE, 2016). It contradicts the Normal State paradigm, based on rule-following and de-dramatization of Foreign Policy (Cervo, 2003).

Under Macri, Argentina went through a neoliberal agenda comeback, seeking more international investments with no preference for Brazilian partnerships. Instead, the focus is on the bigger economies and North-South relations. Bilateral agreements were still important, but the turmoil of Brazilian politics since the deposition of Rousseff made the Macri administration less interested in joining forces with his neighbor State. The bilateral system faced difficulties, as Homogeneity, one of the bases of creating a system, faded, affecting the other pillars, especially Self-Control (threats are dealt together) and Common Destiny (one actor can only survive with the others, as seen by themselves and Others). Both countries' decay of the system would be marked leaving UNASUL together without any enforcement on MERCOSUL or other institutions.

4.2.6 Brazil in Argentinian discourses on Security

From our 210 discourses sample from Argentinian leaders, we identified 86 discourses relating to Security affairs. The smallest samples are from the shorter presidencies – Duhalde and De La Rúa; these had fewer internationally active presidents. From those selected discourses, 38 also debated Brazil-related affairs.

Alfonsín's perceptions of bilateral integration with Brazil were less optimistic than Sarney's. The president affirmed that integration with Brazil and Latin America was long due (Alfonsín, 1987) but was suspicious. While Sarney announced bilateral deals as a novelty from great diplomatic efforts (Sarney, 1989a), Alfonsín affirmed the rivalry among the two countries was proof of past provincialism, far from the Western identity Argentina soaked in the democratic order (Alfonsín, 1987). Sarney's "Integrate to not hand over" (Sarney, 1986a) idea would find a peer in Alfonsín's discourses. The Argentinian president believed integration would empower the market and the fight to keep a sovereign economy (Alfonsín, 1986). Autonomy as a National Interest and recovering economic well-being were integration motors for Alfonsín. Creating a working regional system would improve the internal market and the debt crisis (Alfonsín, 1984). With a more trustworthy environment, regional normalization was necessary for economic stability (Alfonsín, 1987). Peace and normalcy were a standard part of Argentinian discourses (Alfonsín, 1983, 1987, 1989), but it was more reinforced internally, as part of the new democratic order than externally, in the context of avoiding conflict with their neighbors.

The conflict hypothesis was due to the Malvinas/Falklands debacle. Although Alfonsín and Menem took sovereignty over the islands through diplomatic means, the conflict hypothesis was still present. Menem's Foreign Affairs minister affirmed, "Argentina will keep fighting for full sovereignty of the austral islands through dialogue and recognizing international norms (...) for the first time, the United Kingdom recognized a sovereignty dispute"²³ (Di Tella, 1991) [translated by the present author]. The minister said, "realistic means" (Di Tella, 1991) were used in this debacle. Nevertheless, the discourse towards Argentina's neighbors was one of integration and freedom (Menem, 1997). The administration affirmed that the region was vital for Argentina to re-integrate the international supply chains (*ibidem*).

First affirmed by Alfonsín, stable peace was an essential part of Argentina's foreign policy (Di Tella, 1996). However, Menem's administration affirmed the importance of it

²³ "Argentina sigue bregando por la plena recuperación de la soberanía de las islas australes a través del diálogo dentro del reconocimiento de las normas internacionales (...) por vez primera Reino Unido reconoce explícitamente la existencia de una disputa de soberanía".

regionally, not only internally. Menem would also affirm the importance of Argentina, a peace-loving State, to counter the 1994 terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires. Guido di Tella added to the prosecution of Human Rights abuses the importance of de-nuclearize South America and Brazil's efforts to it because it would prevent more violent attacks (ibidem). At the time, stability was a marginal part of Brazil's discourses and debated in economic and monetary terms (Cardoso, 1996). In 2000, with the beginning of Plan Colombia, Cardoso reinforced the importance of peace (Cardoso, 2000b); still, peace was linked to Brazil's seek for development rather than a factor for inner stability. Argentina did not debate development as Brazil – the Menem administration focused on overcoming the debt crisis and making a more efficient government (Menem, 1994). Liberalization and more external investments were more focused on Argentina, while Brazil granted economic stability early on the 1990s.

Under Kirchner, peace and development would appear together, like Lula da Silva's discourses. The president affirmed that poverty and inequality fostered conflicts, which increases instability (Kirchner, 2005a). Kirchner praised Brazil's cooperation for affordable HIV/AIDS medication (ibidem) at the UN. It marks an Argentinian discourse change as the first one under bilateral security debating human security instead of economic or nuclear. The social agenda was more present under these presidents, accelerating bilateral agreements. The critics made towards Brazil became more evident through Kirchner's term.

In 2003, the president alerted his Brazilian counterpart of the importance of taking all MERCOSUL's identities into account to make regional integration work, highlighting the importance of bilateral relations to reach that homogeneity (Kirchner, 2003d). In the following year, Lula stated that both countries had the same identity (precisely, the same Personal and Type identities) (Da Silva, 2004d). President Kirchner affirmed that more agreements were needed for Argentina to fulfill its Common Destiny with Brazil (Kirchner, 2006a). Brazil's next Foreign Policy move was to integrate Argentina in its bigger project, as president Lula believed the Common Destiny referred by Kirchner should englobe the entire subcontinent (Da Silva, 2008a).

Although diplomatic problems arose from Brazil and Argentina's distention (Busso & Actis, 2018), Fernandez's administration was more amicable with Lula da Silva and Rousseff. Fernandez highlighted the importance of a regional defense strategy (Fernandez, 2008c). Most important, Argentina's defense priorities changed to “food, energy, low-populated regions with high food, potable water, and energy production” [present author

translation]²⁴ (Fernandez, 2008c). President Fernandez seeks more cooperation with Brazil, affirming the importance of building more routes among the countries (because the lack of bridges was a historical symbol of Brazil and Argentina's political distance) (Fernandez, 2008a). Her discourse also debated Common Destiny among the two countries in fight poverty and underdevelopment (ibidem). She also commented with journalists how Latin American governments have always supported the Malvinas/Falklands sovereignty claim (Fernandez, 2008e), a change from her predecessors in remembering Brazil did not send troops to support the war.

She would reaffirm that Brazil and Argentina had 1- Common Destiny, 2- Homogeneity, and 3- Interdependence in a discourse in the Council of the Americas, in New York. “Today we must not only see Argentina or Brazil alone but Argentina and Brazil and Brazil and Argentina as a strong complementarity, not only economical but also political” [present author translation]²⁵ (Fernandez, 2010a). For the first time, an Argentina leader affirmed, under security claims, that Brazil and Argentina had the essential components in a system. Previously, Argentinian presidents affirmed that bilateral relations were moving towards forming a system.

The ideas of regional security began to change under Fernandez, with a stricter tackle of drug traffic and organized crime, but those would be the basis of Macri's election. The president affirmed Latin America as the most significant peaceful zone globally, as per its absence of wars (Macri, 2017c). This condition made Argentina eligible for being a leader, as its capability for energetic and alimentary security made the country a cornerstone for the 21st Century threats (ibidem). The work against drug traffic would be essential for it, creating a safe environment for people and trade (Macri, 2018a). Under the changes in the world and the region, the president affirmed that it needed to deal with poverty and work on bilateral agreements for better relationships (Macri, 2017a). He admitted, in 2017, a distance from Brazil he intended to review. According to president Macri, there is a rivalry between Brazil and Argentina that could be overcome with more interdependence (Macri, 2017a).

Social affairs did not vanish in Macri's discourses. However, admitting rivalry with Brazil and positioning Argentina as a possible leader for the region are significant changes from the past, adding the militarization of drug-related problems. Macri's Foreign Policy

²⁴ “alimentos, energía, regiones escasamente pobladas altamente productivas en materia de generación de alimentos, de agua potable de energía”.

²⁵ “hoy no solamente tiene que verse a la Argentina o a Brasil como Brasil solo, sino Argentina y Brasil y Brasil y Argentina como una fuerte complementación, que no solamente es de carácter económico, sino también de política”.

was diverse, and the vacuum Brazil's political crisis left in the region created a policy window for Argentina. Strengthening MERCOSUL and closeness to the Pacific Alliance are showcases of the new agendas Macri proposed. Moreover, the Macri administration had more focus on economic growth than his antecessors – not only in social development problems but in attracting more investments and making Argentina a better place to conduct business. Brazil's difficult position granted Argentina a more privileged place in these new partnerships.

Argentina's protagonism in South America, while Brazil's shrunk, impacted Brazilian Security Identity deeply. Macri admits there is still rivalry among the countries shows a setback on the strategic partnership constructed in the past thirty years. This partnership has been relevant for Brazil's rhetoric of stability and regional peace relevant for the Brazilian focus on economic affairs. Also, losing primacy in the regional integration process, both by defying other countries and its new Foreign Policy focus towards North-South relations, reduces Brazil's outlook as a consensus promoter and a relevant regional actor. It was essential to show Brazil's peace-oriented Foreign Policy, which was an argument for increasing its participation in international forums.

4.2.7 Schematic – relations among policies and discourses through the years

Below, we present a systematization of significant events of the analyzed 35 years. Although the complexity of Brazil-Argentina relations is not exhausted in this diagram, we seek to understand how some critical moments in Brazilian and Argentinian history connected themselves. Publication of essential defense documents and new cooperation treaties helps us understand the links made during this chapter's analysis.




Figure 4: main Traditional Security events in the New Republic

4.3 Economy and Brazilian Security Identity

Most of the Security affairs faced by Brazilian administrations are part of economic security. Economic security is related to the capacity of providing a safe and predictable economic space for people and companies (Buzan et al., 1998). Maintenance of the State's goods and territory, and production and accumulation are part of economic well-being as a National Interest (Wendt, 2014). Economic Wellbeing was responsible for Brazil and

Argentina's perception of Common Destiny, central to building an international working system (ibidem). Economic security needs to be analyzed separately due to the centrality of Brazil's perpetuation. Economic security also meant physical survival and autonomy, impacting collective self-esteem. Therefore, economic security debates all National Interests and has played a crucial role in Brazil politics. The classification of Spheres on economic-related discourses made a section of 135 discourses, divided as follows:

Table 6: main themes in Economy-related discourses per year

	bilateral	national	regional	international	total
2017	0	2	1	1	4
2015	0	1	2	0	3
2014	0	1	1	0	2
2013	0	1	0	1	2
2012	1	2	3	1	7
2011	1	0	2	2	5
2010	1	1	2	2	6
2009	1	1	1	3	6
2008	2	1	1	3	7
2007	0	1	2	0	3
2006	0	3	3	1	7
2005	1	3	2	2	8
2004	0	2	0	2	4
2003	2	0	2	1	5
2002	0	3	1	2	6
2001	0	1	2	2	5
2000	0	2	3	1	6
1999	0	4	2	3	9
1998	0	3	0	0	3
1997	0	3	2	0	5
1996	0	4	0	0	4
1995	0	1	1	0	2
1994	0	2	2	0	4
1993	0	1	2	0	3
1991	0	1	0	0	1

1990	0	2	0	0	2
1989	0	1	1	0	2
1988	1	2	0	0	3
1987	0	2	0	0	2
1986	1	1	3	0	5
1985	0	1	3	0	4
total	11	53	44	27	135

The data shows the changing nature of Brazil's Foreign Economic Policy. During Sarney's administration, "autonomy by distancing" was skeptical of the advantages of economic ties to the USA, although conscious of the central importance of that country (Passini Mariano, 2015). The 1980s debt crisis unveiled the vulnerability and drove the government to strengthen South American ties, especially Argentina (ibidem). Like universalism and democracy, avoidance of vulnerabilities was the most significant value to improve USA relations. The frustration with the USA's unhelpful attitude towards the crisis made the regional ties more important (Ricupero, 2017), which the salience of regional-sphere discourses can observe from 1985 to 1990. A threat posed by a third party, especially a powerful third party, helps States develop their systems to counter it (Wendt, 2014). USA presence in South America diminished after the Cold War, making it possible to craft other arrangements (Buzan & Waeber, 2003).

Economy-related discourses show a more internationalized Brazil than traditional Security affairs. Crises were frequent, the USA's influence was needed to solve it, and debates on economic integration flourished (Mares, 2001). Economic regionalism led by high-level officials gained more importance than market-led integration (Passini Mariano, 2015). MERCOSUL challenged traditional integration theories because government arrangements preceded market interdependence (ibidem). The debt crisis had central importance in this new conception of integration, especially in Brazil and Argentina (Vargas, 1997). Latin American economies faced a significant problem of unpayable debt and decided to create collective solutions for the problem (ibidem). The regional economy played a particular part in the countries' agenda in the 1980 and 1990 decades. Coordination in large groups was hardly accomplished, due to unilateral agreements made with financial institutions that diffculted an integrated response (Ricupero, 2017).

Bilateral and regional concertation lead to the creation of MERCOSUL. Brazil and Argentina cooperation responded to the crisis by attempting collective demands. This will foster regional and bilateral economic debates through Latin America. Firstly, the international sphere coincides with Cardoso's criticism of globalization asymmetries and the confrontation with the power centers, especially the United States (Ricupero, 2017). During the Logistic State paradigm, between 2003 and 2016, the international sphere debated updating international financial institutions and the wealthy countries responsible for the 2008 crisis. Cultural selection made Brazil and Argentina look for more developed countries and their attempts to make better policies, which led them to be inspired by the European Union initiative, which influenced MERCOSUL's first years.

The national sphere kept similar rhetoric through the analyzed period. Through paradigms, monetary stability, social programs, government investments, and innovations maintained importance regardless of the tools for such goals or value enactment. Brazilian Security Identity has relied on the path towards development and shaped its alliances and negotiations for that purpose (Lafer, 2004). Diplomats and politicians debated economic affairs and engaged in economic activity consistently (Passini Mariano, 2015), making it the most scripted part of the Brazilian Security Identity. The more a State gains from a particular behavior, based on its values and reality interpretation, the less likely it is to change the action in that area. Identity becomes solidified from more action in a given realm (Hudson, 2005). The interests encountered in the bibliography, and extensive reading of the selected discourses are:

- The central importance of development (Lafer, 2004);
- From the development rhetoric, the idea of innovation and progress (Espellet & Guerra, 1970);
- Economic stability or stabilization (Cervo, 2003);
- Tangent to stability, crisis management, and strategies towards crisis;
- Criticism and request for reform of financial institutions (GATT, WTO, IMF, G7);
- The importance of North-South relationships (Passini Mariano, 2015);
- Economic integration within South America, or the Americas, or with other partners.

From these interest/themes, we gathered the following data:

	Stability/ stabilization	social	integration	development	crisis	progress/ innovation	North- South relations	total
2017	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	6
2015	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	4
2014	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	3
2013	0	2	1	0	0	2	1	6
2012	0	3	2	1	2	1	1	10
2011	0	1	1	0	2	4	1	9
2010	0	2	2	2	1	2	0	9
2009	0	0	2	1	4	0	2	9
2008	3	1	2	2	4	0	0	12
2007	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3
2006	1	2	1	4	0	0	1	9
2005	0	2	2	5	0	0	0	9
2004	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	4
2003	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	6
2002	1	1	1	0	2	2	4	11
2001	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	6
2000	3	0	2	0	0	1	0	6
1999	3	0	1	3	2	4	1	15
1998	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	5
1997	1	0	0	2	0	3	0	7
1996	1	3	0	0	0	2	0	6
1995	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
1994	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	5
1993	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3
1991	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
1990	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	4
1989	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	3
1988	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	4
1987	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	3
1986	0	1	2	0	3	1	0	7
1985	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	5
total	23	24	30	34	30	30	16	192

These themes are discussed under Brazil's Security Identity in the following sections: development, Stability, North-South relationships, and crisis. Discourses under the codes “Social” and “innovation” appear transversally in the other topics’ analysis.

4.3.1 Development

Development is a crucial debate for Brazilian Security, both in economic and in traditional realms. It is a National Interest, a goal and pivotal in Type and Role identities. The prevalence of the Development value in presidential discourses is represented by the following table:

Table 7: prevalence of the value "development" in Brazilian discourses per year

	Development
2015	1
2014	1
2012	1
2010	2
2009	1
2008	2
2007	1
2006	4
2005	5
2004	1
1999	3
1997	2
1995	1
1994	2
1993	1
1990	2
1989	1
1988	2
1985	1
total	34

The first five years of analysis show development as a distant possibility for Brazil. In the two discourses solely based on National Economic issues, he affirmed the State could not make investments due to the international loans' heavy stipends (Sarney, 1989b); he also referred to the path towards making development possible as a “fight” (Sarney, 1988a). Sarney understood State fragility as a peril requiring much government action. The other discourses, two in the regional and one dealing with the bilateral sphere, called for the union to counter the crisis. It highlighted the international institutions' impositions and science innovations required to change the productive matrix for a more rentable one. Although not as rewarding as expected (Passini Mariano, 2015), the call for organized action in the economic realm impacted the Brazil – Argentina approximation. Sarney affirmed the importance of the changing bilateral relationship and the construction of common destiny with Argentina would increase trade to begin a response to the debt crisis (Sarney, 1989a).

Common destiny and the development as a long path were important values that began to be implied under Sarney’s administration, although the tone was defeatist. The president would talk about the State's incapacity to lead development – the debt crisis and the condition imposed by international institutions. Brazil’s identity value of law-abiding and satisfied with the status quo (Lafer, 2004) was central for the country not to take a more critical stance when confronted with financial institutions' conditionalities.

As Collor de Mello’s policies showed results and more investments happened, the National Interest moved to economic wellbeing, and development was presented as a real possibility sooner. Collor implemented a program change (when goals and means are modified), as economic policies and approaches to the international realm were rethought, and a goal change (when an agenda is updated, created, or dropped) in Foreign Policy. The debt crisis was no longer a problem, and the government forfeited from it as an agenda. National economic stability was a more significant issue. The government reaffirmed that autonomy is non-negotiable, differently from the Sarney administration – the national institutional fragility was partially solved. President Collor de Mello affirmed, in 1990:

The treatment my government has given to the external debt affair is the clearest proof we are not intended to follow a path we did not make. Critics might say my government to this day did not deal with the foreign debt. In a certain sense, they are right – the contacts made have an exploratory character, preliminary. For the first time, concretely, Brazil implemented economic homebrew before getting to the table with foreign creditors and international finance organisms. There is not any inclination from our attitude to confrontation. We are entirely open to dialogue and negotiation of mutually acceptable formulas. However, we make a point of acting according to our priorities, our criteria, sustained by a government that is a

legitimate expression of the popular will (Collor de Mello, 1990d) [present author translation]²⁶.

Autonomy is the National Interest where governments freely debate resource allocation and respond to internal demands (Wendt, 2014). From his pro-liberty and pro-market campaign, Collor de Mello represented the beginning of more freedom to entrepreneurs, investors, and families (Sallum Jr, 2011). He was elected because he represented the moment for Brazil's economy and State-society complex, the beginning of a new moment in Brazilian History after the dictatorship.

Freedom is a basic value of the new government, represented a great identity change towards democracy. Governments must make good use of society's identity values to be elected; only those who better incorporate those values can be elected (Hudson, 1999). The need for freedom, economic freedom included, was a signal of Brazil's next political moment. Collor de Mello's government made a significant change towards development, making it more foreseeable through new policies and more optimistic discourses towards its future. The international change (the one which changes how States relate to world affairs) - the end of the Cold War – also required a re-adaptation of the identity. As the democratization and the return to constitutional order, internal factors also influenced the country towards a total re-adaptation of its identity. As Hermann (1990) affirms, International Orientation changes require adaptation for all the subjects and affairs a country is meddled in, not only the adaptation of one problem. Since colonial times, development has been central for Brazilian Security Identity (Lafer, 2004), but now it requires a new State role. The Normal State paradigm granted that it was possible to achieve development with a different government, who would step back from being an economic force, and from the international institutions, who would have to negotiate with the government, showing a program change actively

²⁶ “O tratamento que o meu governo tem dado à questão da dívida externa é a prova mais clara de que não estamos dispostos a trilhar caminhos que não traçamos. Os críticos poderão dizer que o meu governo até hoje não tratou da questão da dívida externa. Em certo sentido eles estão certos — os contatos mantidos tiveram caráter exploratório, preliminar. Pela primeira vez, concretamente, o Brasil cuidou de implementar uma receita própria de saneamento econômico antes de sentar-se à mesa com os credores externos e com os organismos financeiros internacionais. Não há em nossa atitude qualquer inclinação para a confrontação. Estamos inteiramente abertos ao diálogo e à negociação de fórmulas mutuamente aceitáveis. Fazemos questão, porém, de agir segundo as nossas prioridades, os nossos critérios, sustentados por um governo que é expressão legítima da vontade popular.”

Cardoso's first administration believed in liberal order was positive for development. New investments and market opening were the core of the new path towards development, with a national response to the inflationary problem (Cervo, 2003). The recommendations from International Institutions were well received, as the government agreed with the recipe of minor State power and more market freedom – the Normal State core (ibidem). Cardoso rethought Economic Wellbeing because he understood it as primarily international; development would happen when the country opened itself and had more national companies in other countries.

During his second term, development was discussed less due to numerous financial problems around the world. Problems with the USA unilateralism and difficulties Brazilian companies to internationalize came back. Although the problem of North-South disparities was very present since Sarney's years, as development was getting harder to achieve, Cardoso also disapproved of the global power differences. Development vanished from his discourses, giving space to critics of the world order. It was a moment where the intra-MERCOSUL trade blossomed, based on the "open regionalism" value. Economic wellbeing was, still, the most prominent National Interest. Cardoso's second administration appeared farther than in the first, where liberalism and globalization were believed to put the country on the road towards development. Program changes were in place in the foreign policy – where tools and investments got rethought for the same objectives (C. Hermann, 1990). Thus enters the Logistic State.

Lula da Silva's first discourses aimed to criticize the former administration for the dire economic results which halted development internally. The good economic results of his government, such as reducing external vulnerability, better salaries, and more competitive industries, made a path for development and let the country pay its debt with the IMF ahead of schedule (Da Silva, 2006a). Externally, the president would ask developed countries to open their economies for Brazilian and South American products to re-enter their paths towards development. In 2005, he would reaffirm the importance for South American development to have infrastructure programs, trade increases, shared social problems, and solutions to achieve sustainable development capacity. As the country regains its economic surplus, South America became responsible for Brazil's greatest exports, which granted funds for more extensive investments in energy and social programs (Da Silva, 2006c). Under Lula da Silva, development meant social programs and better regional alliances, rather than North-South alliances that could benefit fewer people.

Economic stability granted Brazil another identity change, starting to collective self-esteem. This National Interest is about the group status and the negative or positive views about its performance (Wendt, 2014). From Sarney to Collor's impeachment to Cardoso's second term economic halt, Brazil saw development as an unfulfilled promise. As Lula da Silva's administration had positive economic results and based itself on social programs, Collective Self-esteem got to be part of the repertoire of the National Interests.

In the last years of Lula da Silva's administration, the president debated development in a different sense. He showcased the importance of Brazil's social policies to face the 2008 crisis to justify its low vulnerability. Although confident in Brazil's resilience, he requested the USA and other developed countries take responsibility for the crisis. The reduction in imports would affect Brazil's good results, potentially a bigger problem; new partnerships with Asian and African countries were observed as the gateway to maintain Brazil's road towards development.

The crisis started to have more effects on Brazil during Rousseff's administration. In 2012, she affirmed the importance of making Brazil more competitive and attractive for investors while keeping its social agenda (Rousseff, 2012b). While her antecessors, especially Cardoso, worried about speculation (Cardoso, 1999c), monetary stability, and the lowering investments, Brazil's economy has changed much in the almost two decades among their administrations. Rousseff reduced protections on short-term investments and external funding on science and technology to boost the economy (Rousseff, 2012b). Her two discourses on development, in 2014 and 2015, were embedded in the political crisis that led to her impeachment. In these discourses, the president would reaffirm the good results of her economic agenda in attracting investments and improving Lula da Silva's social investments. This reaffirmation reflects Hudson's (1999) approach towards leaders. Development is a core value of Brazil's Security Identity, and it legitimized the government policies, which were under attack.

Temer's discourses on development would represent a drastic change from Rousseff. His government affirmed that the Worker's Party's economic politics were paternalistic and reckless, leading Brazil towards a profound crisis (MDB, 2015). He would advocate for a smaller State similar to the Normal State but in a different environment. The Normal State followed the recommendations made by international institutions after a persistent crisis (Cervo, 2003); the Temer administration chooses limited State participation on economic affairs in a sovereign path. The moment Temer ascended to power, State-led

social investment got criticized, being called “communist” by some society sectors (Chagas et al., 2019).

Temer’s government-aligned State investments reduction, a somewhat unpopular measure, with Self-esteem improvement and better financial results. His discourses on development highlight the importance of investment reductions and investment caps on sectors like education, public health, and public pensions (Temer, 2017d). Development should focus on economic growth and better accommodation for enterprises. Nonetheless, Temer’s discourses debated budgetary cuts rather than development, although development was the backbone of his discourses. His economic reforms had little effect on economic results, as Brazil kept economically stagnated (World Bank, 2019). Temer had one of the main goals of regaining social stability and started a new period of wealth in Brazil.

4.3.2 Stability and stabilization

Because of the lack of economic and military means, Brazilian policymakers made the option for development and stability the fastest way to gain power (Soares de Lima, 2005). These values should boost the country’s international image, leading to two main identity processes. One used the rhetoric of national stability to attract more investments and made more diplomatic deals (ibidem). As the seeker of multilateral arrangements, this socializes the costs of transactions and reduces uncertainties in the multilateral arena (ibidem). The prevalence of stability and stabilization as a value in Brazilian economy-related discourses is:

Table 8: prevalence of the value "stability and stabilization" in Brazilian discourses per year

	Stability and stabilization
2015	1
2008	3
2007	1
2006	1
2004	1
2003	2

2002	1
2001	1
2000	3
1999	3
1998	2
1997	1
1996	1
1994	1
1993	1
total	23

The transitional character of Sarney's government made stability absent of his discourses. He debated more often the changing nature of politics in his time than the possibilities of stability. The first discourse on this theme, made by Itamar Franco, called for national unity towards common goals – monetary stability, economic growth, political openness (Franco, 1993a). These goals would be present in many other economy-based stability discourses through the New Republic. In 1994, he affirmed the economy was stable and democracy as blooming – reaffirmed in Cardoso's 1996 discourse. Cardoso drafted the Monetary Stabilization plans as the Minister of Economy during Itamar Franco's administration, and he reaffirmed stability as the top economic result of his administration. Stabilization was central for better economic planning, affecting both the National Interest of Economic Wellbeing and Collective self-esteem; making this part of the discourse would attract more legitimacy for the government, especially after Collor de Mello's impeachment.

Economic growth, better salaries, and high employment rates were necessary for economic success and improving democracy and participation mechanisms (Cardoso, 1997). The Type identity, related to the regime chosen and State forms (Wendt, 2014), explains the importance of seeking stability. As changes take much effort from policymakers (C. Hermann, 1990), States tend to reaffirm their actions with strong argumentation (Jervis, 2017). Cardoso defended the gains economic stability brought, including the strength given to democracy, as identity gains would make the country conquer the developed State status, therefore, boosting National Interests (especially collective self-stem and economic wellbeing).

Economic wellbeing expands to social spending and social programs in Cardoso's second term as a form of social stability to maintain democracy (Cardoso, 1998b).

Addressing social exclusion and highlighting the enrichment of the population enforced stability because it denied the possibility of rioting and left-wing backlash. Changes in stability will appear only in 2003, under Lula da Silva. Stabilization made the region more attractive to foreign investors and added predictability to the region, empowering governments to make better policies, especially in social investments (Da Silva, 2006e). Considering national stability achieved, the expansion towards regional stability is debated in Lula da Silva's discourses on Brazil's duty towards the region as its biggest economy. However, it is also the realization of South America approximation, in other times made difficult due to internal problems (Lafer, 2004), and the realization of the constitutional idea of regional integration expressed in the Brazilian Constitution (Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, art 4, § un).

Under the national sphere, Lula da Silva reiterated the same values as Itamar Franco and Cardoso: regain economic growth, monetary and democratic stability. This rhetoric was well established within Brazil's Foreign Policy. It encountered the post-dictatorship values the population aspired leaders to hold. However, regional stability was the most significant novelty during Lula da Silva's government; but only two discourses fell into this category, displaying the region's still marginal importance when confronted with internal problems. He congratulated South American governments for their independence towards the IMF and other financial institutions, highlighting that it was only possible because the policymakers acted for it to happen (Da Silva, 2007).

Rousseff's only discourse under stability and stabilization focused on regaining economic independence and stability. Her arguments debated the importance of keeping South America competitive and stable under the 2010 decade economic stagnation (Rousseff, 2015c). She reiterated that the continental solid economic bases were the key to regain stability (ibidem). Rousseff believed regional strength was provisional for stability (for Brazil and South America). A unified region would have more bargain power internationally to regain investment levels and voting rights in international financial institutions. She debated an essential part of Brazil's economic life, but only after years neglecting it – a personality trait of hers, who did not like diplomatic life and Foreign Policy excursions (Passini Mariano, 2015). Many people, however, did not believe her capacity to fulfill that promise – Rousseff was no longer somebody who could encapsulate society's values as president.

Temer, although with no discourse falling under this categorization, would be reluctant to give a central role to South American relations – his government plan sated

Europe, Asia, and North America as the basis for economic wellbeing (MDB, 2015). Seeking reforms in the pension system, welfare benefits, and tax reduction, Temer believed the primary reason for Brazil's instability was a loss of competitiveness (Temer, 2016e). A smaller State with open markets would easily attract investments (Temer, 2017d). Political instability tainted his government and halted foreign investments in Brazil (Prates et al., 2019).

4.3.3 North-South Relationships

North-South relationships often appear in Brazilian discourses. The USA's presence in South America has marked most of the sub-continent economy because they rely on the Northern neighbor big market and acquisitive power (Buzan & Waever, 2003). Economic power disparities also appear in the Brazilian desire to become part of the developed world and the difficulties it encountered (Lafer, 2004). North-South relationships are not a value per se, but they represent much of the role identity taken in the international environment – the part of identity-related to Others and the Self-position in a group (Wendt, 2014). The prevalence of North-South relationships in economic discourses are categorized as:

Table 9: prevalence of North-South relationships in Brazilian discourses per year

	North-South relations
2013	1
2012	1
2011	1
2009	2
2006	1
2002	4
2001	1
1999	1
1995	1
1989	1
1987	1

1985	1
total	16

Sarney's administration saw North-South relationships critically. It was essential to solve the debt crisis by responsabilizing developed States for the finance system disbalances, such as dollar inflation, speculation, and imports barriers (Sarney, 1985b). While the country was re-democratized and re-integrated into the international environment, tariffs and quotas from developed countries delayed the development process. The less critical approach towards North-South relationships showed in the absence of Collor's discourses on the matter, and only one in Cardoso's first term reflects the Normal State de-dramatization of Foreign relations. Making front to the system core would disrupt re-entering the international environment in an un-problematic way.

The 1995 discourse shows this position. Cardoso showcased shared values with the US, such as the democratic order and market freedom (Cardoso, 1995a). The same discourse appealed to the US authorities to help Brazil improve its external expression, as the country got more international responsibilities (ibidem). The evolving international practice of cultural selection is perceived in this discourse (Wendt, 2014). The USA had values Brazil was aspiring. Imitation of those behaviors, such as economic liberty, was needed to update Brazil's Foreign Policy and improve bilateral relationships. In the following discourses, the president called for more market opening from developed countries. The agricultural subsidies negotiations on WTO got paralyzed, and this was one of the most crucial export goods from Brazil. Cardoso's final years show how discontent he was with the cultural selection made towards the USA; liberalism did not result in economic gains, and the US did not show itself as open as it required South America to be (Ricupero, 2017). The same argument of needed openness was present in Lula da Silva's 2006 discourse – the importance of the WTO court rulings pro Brazil and the importance of the continuity of negotiations on agricultural subsidies (Da Silva, 2006d).

Cardoso's second term and Lula da Silva first take part in perception among their governments on power disparities in the path towards development. It takes place in a unilateral moment of the USA Foreign Policy, leading to a more critical claim of the free market. In this claim, the global South would open their markets and the North to achieve development. The policy window opening made from the US closeness opened Brazil's path

towards autonomous responses to regional problems. It solidified the Common Destiny, creating room for the Autonomy National Interest, bonding Brazil and Argentina more.

In 2009, Lula da Silva's discourses debated the responsibility of the financial crisis and its end. He criticized wealthy nations and their lack of fiscal prudence (Da Silva, 2009d) and highlighted Brazilian economic policies - from tax reductions, enlargement of social policies to the ampliation of trade partners, and ways to counter the 2008 crisis (Da Silva, 2009c). Although the president believed some economic recession would happen in Brazil, he was confident his government made the right choices to avoid a prolonged recession (ibidem). Although discrepant information from the administration's expectations came, Lula da Silva's government carried the idea of achieved development and wealth. As the rate of this discrepant information was low until the 2010 elections, the government kept its values set with no significant Foreign Policy change.

In her 2011 and 2012 discourses, Rousseff debated the loss of US supremacy in the world. She argued the G7 could no longer coordinate the response to world crises, and a task G20 could perform better (Rousseff, 2011c). She called the USA to reintegrate world politics into a multipower structure (Rousseff, 2012a). A program change was in place - the president's more inquisitive tone towards the USA showed how the Northern partner had less prominence in her Foreign Policy, which was more focused on South-South cooperation. Her argument in both discourses was the importance of the USA to negotiate new regional treaties, where Latin and North American countries would be treated as equal parts.

The president affirmed that the North-South hierarchy did not attend to the Latin American needs; it could also damage the USA economy. Her approximation with the USA differs from other presidents; however, the American economy was hit by the crisis and had more open negotiations with its partners. Her discourse is closer to Cardoso's from 1995, where the main idea to stabilize the country was to bring the USA closer as a partner, not a threat. It accompanied the 2012 revision of the Defense documents, which redacted the great world powers as menaces for Brazil's security (*Política Nacional de Defesa*, 2012). The US has a vital role in Brazilian politics, even though the top-level politicians often take their preferences and demands as an interventionist, which is why Brazil's nationalism often seeks to protect itself from American economic intervention (Lafer, 2004).

4.3.4 Crisis

A crisis is a constant fear in capitalist economies; it breaks the development process. Crises were analyzed nationally, concerning Argentina, and internationally in the studied period. Although not a value, crisis is a main concern of Brazilian Security Identity, as it jeopardizes the State's capabilities. The discourses regarding crises are vital because they relate to a real menace in economic security. A crisis can jeopardize a country's economic well-being and autonomy (as seen in the external interference during the debt crisis), and the very physical survival of a country (as the loss of means to protect the country). On the other hand, crises can open a policy window for innovative practices and systems. They are a very present discourse theme in the analyzed period, as demonstrated below.

Table 10: prevalence of the value "crisis" in Brazilian discourses per year

	crisis
2017	1
2015	1
2012	2
2011	2
2010	1
2009	4
2008	4
2002	2
2001	1
1999	2
1991	1
1990	1
1989	1
1988	1
1987	2
1986	3
1985	1
total	30

Sarney discourses debated the Brazilian diplomacy strength on not accepting vertical deals from international institutions. They highlighted the importance of the major

capitalist countries to act on their responsibilities on the debt crisis (e.g., their closed markets and protectionism from Third World Countries imports). He debated low investment rates in Latin America, affirmed the region did not get developed during the 1980s, and showed regression in their economic data (Sarney, 1989e). The president's criticism of the Northern nations also discusses the failing Brazilian State - paying the external creditors made new investments impossible, turning regional integration necessary to overcome the crisis (Sarney, 1987). Criticism towards the USA did not vanish during the military dictatorship, which praised sovereignty and saw the odds of losing territory to the USA as a possibility – especially in the Amazonia region (Lafer, 2004). Sarney's criticism, shared by his Latin American peers during the debt crisis, was substituted by a fierce will to re-establish a positive relationship with North America by his successors. Normalization of relationships and increased US trade, without preferred regional relationships, based the bilateral agenda for the following years (Cervo, 2003).

Collor's discourses affirmed that the crisis could end with Brazil's internal reorganization under neoliberalism. He argued that the country would not take IMF agreements to increase Brazil's vulnerability (Collor de Mello, 1990e). With the reforms made by the president, the country would become wealthier and would only then made new agreements with creditors (*ibidem*). The absence of "crisis" themed discourses in the following year was due to Cardoso's rhetoric change, more focused on the development and the recently gained stability. As the president must incorporate the values held by society (Hudson, 1999), crisis vanished from government speech, which began to focus on development and progress rather than jeopardizing economic well-being. Cardoso's administration gave the ideological substrate for the Normal State to properly establish itself, including the better economic results (from tax and pension reforms and the privatization campaign) and increase of international trade (Lafer, 2004).

Cardoso's discourse on crises debated the many that happened through the decade, such as the 1994 Mexican crisis, the 1997 Asian crisis, and the 1998 Russian crisis, as complex cases for the recently gained Brazilian monetary stability. Brazil's positive results were applauded even with some economic losses because of the previous unstable and vulnerable political scenario (Cardoso, 1999b). At this moment, the crises happening worldwide are reflected in Cardoso's discourses as positive results from Brazil – especially how the country did not re-enter a crisis, like others. In the same year, he announced to the American press and its investors that Brazil was stable and ready to enter a new phase of economic expansion (Cardoso, 1999a). The following discourses in 2001 and 2002

reaffirmed the Brazilian economy's resilience and called for more investors. The quick debate on the Argentinian crisis, more as a mirror to Brazilian exceptionalism than a debate on how to help the neighboring country (Cardoso, 2001e), was a mark of the nationalism still present in Brazil Security. In this discourse, Cardoso highlighted how Brazil had substantial economic gains while the neighboring country entered a crisis, which raised concerns on the future of regional integration on Argentinian elites (Bernal-Meza, 2002b).

The crisis only got back to Brazilian discourses in 2008, when it became a more common part of Lula da Silva and Rousseff's regime. During Lula da Silva's administration, the crisis was perceived as a foreign problem that would not affect Brazil. A discourse changed during Rousseff's years. While Lula da Silva argued South America was strengthening its integration and, therefore, would not feel the crisis as strong as other places (Da Silva, 2008e), he made a clear distinction from Cardoso's distancing from Argentina. As the bilateral system got solidified, Common Destiny became more present in his discourses. The bilateral system developed to the point where, from Lula da Silva's discourses, interdependence was finally taking place, cementing the last bloc from Wendt's (2014) theorization on systems.

Da Silva adopted a critical discourse towards the USA and Europe, who were seen as responsible for the crisis – like Sarney's comment on the closeness of major economies in the 1980s. Lula guaranteed the best form to counter the crisis was through integration and unified political action (*ibidem*). In the following year, he ratified the necessary form to counter the crisis was through social policies that would stimulate the economy and a unified presence of the countries under development, from the Asian, African, and Latin American counterparts (Da Silva, 2009d).

Rousseff focused on the crisis core – the developed countries – and their need to be held accountable for their wrong-doing. In her 2011 discourse in the United Nations, she affirmed Brazil was doing well, but there was economic growth without cooperation with International Institutions (Rousseff, 2011e). She reaffirmed Brazil's positive data as an argument for reforming those institutions, where countries in which the crisis had little impact could help those in need (*ibidem*). Brazil's desire to be a more active voice in the international system is a long-term value of the country's capability (Lafer, 2004) highlighted under the Worker's Party ruling as part of better commercial negotiations a project for leadership (Almeida, 2003). In the same year, the president reiterated the call for more international cooperation and the importance of deepening trade within MERCOSUL to face the global problem (Rousseff, 2011g). Rousseff's 2015 discourse would reinforce

Brazil's economic results amid the crisis, but how those efforts, such as tax reduction, credit amplification, and welfare, were getting to their limits, as stagnation persisted (Rousseff, 2015b). Her recipe was still for the wealthier countries to open their markets and increase cooperation through reformed financial institutions (*ibidem*).

Temer vouched against those ideas. For him, establishing a budget cap was the most relevant measure to diminish the public deficit (Temer, 2017b), especially in welfare benefits and pension reforms (*ibidem*). Temer's Foreign Policy went through a deep identity re-imagination. Not only a significant program change was in place, but a global change as well. Donald Trump's administration was more unilateral than his predecessor, Barack Obama. This international change, mixed with the internal program change, re-imagined Brazil's identity. Temer would focus on Brazil's deep political crisis, leaving South America, integration, and partnerships outside his discourses.

According to his discourse, economic indexes showed positive results of these measures bringing new trade deals. He highlighted his visits to Argentina, Spain, China, and the USA as results of Brazil's newly re-found stability (Temer, 2017b). It is noticeable that the absence of regional integration on Temer's discourse relied on the sovereign response to the crisis, similar to Collor de Mello's, who commented that his focus was to gain stability internally and negotiate with financial institutions (Collor de Mello, 1990e). The difference was that Collor believed the region was essential to counter any crisis, while this prism is absent from Temer's discourses. Temer's administration dealt with a political rupture where regional problems became highly contested (Chagas et al., 2019) – a matter with little importance during Collor's administration.

Temer shows a tendency for a less proactive presence in the region. Venezuela, as well, became treated as a regional crisis – what the Temer administration would affirm to be a legacy from left-wing governments (MDB, 2015). This distinction of regional integration and the demonization of left-wing (Chagas et al., 2019) reflects society's new values, which are noticeable, the dissatisfaction with the Workers Party policies (*ibidem*). To use the Venezuela crisis and the internal crisis to support an identity change, Temer redefined corporate, type, and role identities (the one relating the State to its Others). Although Temer only has one discourse debating crisis as a central theme, the rhetoric of leaving the previous administration's way of performing politics behind. His rhetoric would call for bringing Brazil back to its path (Temer, 2017d). Nonetheless, his Foreign Policy follows different programs from his antecessors.

4.3.5 Argentina in Economy-related discourses

The main subject of economic discourses on Brazil – Argentina relations is integration, reaching 45 of the 61 discourses under this label. It is crucial to analyze how economic discourses are more international but debate bilateral relationships less – more discourses debate either MERCOSUL or other international summits, with less prevalence of separated partners. Nonetheless, MERCOSUL unfolds bilateral agreements among the two countries and an essential part of the bilateral system drafted by both States. This makes the regional integration initiative central for our analysis.

In the Sarney administration, the central values related to Argentina relations were trust-building and freedom (Sarney, 1986b). Much is due to structural changes in the region and the world – re-democratization, the end of the Cold War, debt crisis. These values, although stimulated by different structural manners, embedded themselves in the Brazilian political culture. Due to cultural selection, Brazil felt that under Sarney, that alignment with the USA was undeniable (Ricupero, 2017); the values seen in that State ought to be mimic in the region. As policymakers seek for Western identities and values, the making of everyday politics changed. The bearing of changing values and practicing those in the bilateral relations opened Brazil to the Normal State. This imitation of the values held by central countries which enabled the independent bilateral project later branded as a form of autonomy in Foreign Policy. The debt crisis created the first important step towards creating a bilateral system – the perception of Common Destiny, reinforced by democratization and the pursuit of Western identities.

In the Normal State, Collor de Mello was the first to affirm Argentina as a strategic partner with a shared destiny with Brazil (Collor de Mello, 1990c). His words to the Argentinian congress affirmed the frank communication and absolute trust started a new era in the bilateral relationship (*ibidem*). It starts to better follow under the system classification by Wendt because the corporal (democracies seeking to belong to the Western World) and type (population going through marketing opening policies and more social freedom looking for new economic opportunities) identities started to blend among those two countries, creating the Homogeneity aspect Wendt (2014) highlights for system creation. This discourse does not comment on structural affairs that influenced the new moment in their relationship; instead, it highlights optimistic scenarios built by both countries. These scenarios were put in practice under Cardoso, who celebrated deals in the energy sector with

Argentina, which he considered the first significant change in the region – Brazil embraced cooperation in strategic sectors as Argentina was de-othered (Cardoso, 1998a).

Economic de-othering was shown in 2001 when Argentina went through a financial crisis. President Cardoso ensured Brazil would discuss the matter internationally (Cardoso, 2001a) and sought to amplify MERCOSUL politically, as previously proposed by Argentina (Cardoso, 2001g). It benefited Argentina, as it would help debt negotiations, and Brazil, which would support its agendas in these forums. The de-othering under Cardoso gave two other pillars for system creation. Both countries no longer feared conflict among each other (Self-control), and the actions carried by an actor influence policy in another (interdependence).

Lula da Silva would act on those ideas by saying Argentina – Brazil relationship was the basis for a more balanced region, given the more advanced state of their economies (Da Silva, 2003c). To him, both countries' weight was crucial to pacify the continent and help other countries in the region develop (ibidem). In 2005, he saluted the Argentinian president in his successful attempt to amplify MERCOSUL's scope (Da Silva, 2006f). However, Lula's perception of Brazil's Role identity was different from Cardoso's. In his inauguration speech, he affirmed that he would take Brazil to be a sovereign example for South America (Da Silva, 2003a). His perceptions towards Argentina were of MERCOSUL amplification (Da Silva, 2006b) because the administration looked for a more prominent role of Brazil in the region, creating a homogeneous Regional Security Complex (Fuccille & Rezende, 2013). Argentina began to lose primacy.

Lula da Silva affirms sovereignty as a shared value with Argentina. The importance of using their own money for commercial transactions and the energetic systems integration were seen as a form to reduce external threats (Da Silva, 2008d). De-othering deepens as the Brazilian Security Identity dimension of inwards nationalism (Lafer, 2004) began to include Argentina – their industries, natural resources, and the trust shared by both presidents (Da Silva, 2008d). It is a form of Self-control needed in international systems, which reinforced the region's importance on the Brazilian side, creating a Collective Identity. A few years later, he would affirm that Argentinian growth and development were part of Brazil's National Objectives (Da Silva, 2009e). An increase in Argentinian exports and South America free of instabilities would be essential to counter the impending crisis, in his opinion (ibidem). Rousseff would follow the idea of sovereign joint leadership within South America – the central values she believed the bilateral relationship could uphold (Rousseff, 2011a).

Temer adjusted the discourses when it came to values and economic security. First, he affirmed the core values were the democratic control of institutions, freedom of the press, and individual guarantees (Temer, 2017c). His interest in highlight democracy, internal and external, was due to the troubled impeachment of Rousseff and the subsequent diplomatic isolation of Brazil until the political scenery was re-stabilized (Prates et al., 2019). In the same discourse, Temer highlighted the importance of economic harmonization affairs in MERCOSUL, such as law harmonization and avoidance of double taxation (Temer, 2017c). In his government plan, the administration made clear MERCOSUL should be de-ideologized and focus on the economy rather than hard-to-reach political concertation (MDB, 2015). The economic primacy gave to the bilateral affairs with Argentina began a bilateral system's redefinition. Focus on the economy only would reduce the ideas of Common Destiny because the government affirmed it could make decisions without MERCOSUL partners (MDB, 2015), and the States began to drift apart in the homogeneity. Argentina was stable, while Brazil went through a political crisis. It differentiates from both the previous political and economic crises because Argentina did not seek to help the neighbor country; in other crises, both would overcome any instability signal collaboratively.

This pragmatism changed the course of regional integration from the greater de-othering happening in the past years towards a narrower view of integration, similar to Collor de Mello's approach to the Normal State – a norm following de-bureaucratized State focusing on economic gains (Cervo, 2003). Contrary to Collor's agenda, though, the Temer administration showed low interest in other integration areas, such as the energy sector and the conjoint representation in international forums for better results (Sallum Jr, 2011). The denial of the Logistic State agenda reduced Temer's administration's focus on internal reforms, whom he intended to be the most prominent brand of his administration (Temer, 2017b). The lack of interest in external partners in investing in Brazil through the complicated Rousseff impeachment process made it harder for Temer's administration to take a prominent role in international politics (Exame, 2016).

4.3.6 Brazil in Argentinian Economy-related discourses

The economy has been the center of security discussion in Argentina. From 210 documents analyzed, 80 debated economic issues. From these, 73 discussed Brazilian or South American problems. It is a hint at the centrality of regional affairs for Argentinian

problems. Nonetheless, our quantitative analysis does not suffice for inferences on the affirmations made about both Brazil and the region. The discursive analysis showed Argentina's perception of a relationship not as deep as Brazil projected. Argentina did not find the support and strength of Brazil in many crises and other problems the country went through. While Brazil affirmed a deep connection with Argentina, its counterpart showed less enthusiasm in bilateral economic cooperation.

In Alfonsín discourses, integration with Brazil appeared as an enthusiastic opportunity for new partnerships and more investments through bilateral normalization and requesting better investments internationally to counter the debt crisis (Alfonsín, 1986). He highlighted the importance of openness and international cooperation with Brazil and the United States (Alfonsín, 1984) even before Brazil's re-democratization, displaying the importance of the strategic partnership to counter the crisis.

In his address to the National Congress in 1987, Alfonsín commented on the importance of national integration as a change from the distrust caused by the Argentinian dictatorship (Alfonsín, 1987). He affirmed that the crisis Argentina was going through was not only economic but also ethical and political. His 1987 addressing had high hopes for Latin American integration – The Cartagena Consensus and integration with Brazil were Alfonsín's most significant innovations to counter the economic crisis (Alfonsín, 1987). He was enthusiastic about Argentina, leaving its distrust behind and embracing new Foreign Policy ideas. These value changes displayed the program change (the one relating to accomplishing a goal or abandoning a policy (C. Hermann, 1990)) after the dictatorship. This program change is due to the end of internal surveillance and the positive outcomes from regional cooperation. Argentina's discourses start to hold, from 1983, values like union, change, and openness to address the crisis and the population.

Nonetheless, his address in 1989 had similarities to Sarney's less optimistic ones. Alfonsín admitted that his administration did not solve the debt crisis. Although bilateral cooperation and debt negotiation had a positive impact in the following years, he admitted international power disparities were the most significant problem faced by his administration (Alfonsín, 1989). Distrust from other countries, especially the more developed ones, was similar between the Argentinian and Brazilian governments that drove them into a system formation. The standard Destiny pillar for a system developed was based, especially in the lack of means to face major countries' economies. This idea would change under Menem.

President Menem was enthusiastic about integration, but his proposal was an open integration model, an idea Cardoso agreed. It did not limit the bloc's preferential scope to

the region, but partnerships to be sought both as a bloc and an individual State. Under the “productive revolution” platform, where all the country’s potentialities were released under decentralization and de-bureaucratization, the government would award productive efforts and increase production (Menem & Duhalde, 1989). Through productive revolution, a more unified Argentina could achieve development (ibidem). Argentina had a historical disposition to be a world protagonist, a goal possible to achieve with integration and development (Menem, 1989).

Di Tella, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, affirmed that integration was central for Argentina’s progress, as the bilateral arrangements with wealthy nations could no longer suffice the changing Argentinian economic activity (Di Tella, 1991). Integration would contribute to better deals and lead to a peaceful region, with no fights for deals with powerful nations, neither would they be tied down for regional integration – individuality for different States with different needs was still needed (ibidem). MERCOSUL’s goal was to empower its members’ economies to be more internationally competitive (ibidem). The organization had an essential role in bringing Brazil and Argentina together as partners rather than rivals – the minister affirmed that FTAA would be crucial for the countries to cooperate better and have more access to North American markets (ibidem). Collor de Mello did not debate North-South relations. However, he agreed with Menem’s government on the importance of de-bureaucratization and liberalization, creating a united effort among the two countries, which would begin a path towards interdependence, even if it was a government-reliant one. In 1994, the president affirmed in the United Nations the rapid change from an authoritarian and economically closed Latin America to an open region that attracted international investments (Menem, 1994).

Menem saw in FTAA a possibility to diminish its tariff conflicts with the USA for his country and other Latin American product barriers (Menem, 1994). From Cardoso’s election and his preference for the MERCOSUL to fight power disparities, Menem affirmed the FTAA was necessary for the regional economy but that MERCOSUL was the State’s priority (ibidem). In the De la Rúa administration, the balance between MERCOSUL and FTAA would be an essential part of Brazil’s negotiations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs affirmed that a common position among Southern Cone members would make the bloc stronger in front of FTAA’s perils (Giavarini, 2001a). MERCOSUL should be a platform for the minister to enter more agreements, not being resumed to its geographical circumstances (ibidem). He affirmed MERCOSUL was the platform where nations

strengthened their relations to reach better agreements – and the proposition of FTAA was vital for it (*ibidem*).

Kirchner changed the idea of what constitutes MERCOSUL. He affirmed that the institution was an economic integration symbol and created the opportunity for regional democratic integration and pacification (Kirchner, 2003e). The organization was a forum for economic strengthening, but more than that – it was a place for better politics for the society (Kirchner, 2003e). He affirmed the importance of integration, although this would have to happen simultaneously with State restructuring – a MERCOSUL that forced States to open their borders for others would become a peril for regional stability and become a tool for inequality (Kirchner, 2003c). The more critical tone for world disparities and Brazil's disparities would confirm the rivalry among both States in economic affairs was still a problem in the bilateral relationship.

Contrary to the traditional security discourses, where the Common Destiny only became clear under Fernandez, the shared interest appeared for the first time in the economy in 2005. This year, Kirchner affirmed MERCOSUL was no longer a commercial agreement but rather a place for political concertation for uniting forces to counter more significant economies (Kirchner, 2005c). He affirmed that unilateral treaties to improve only one State was counterproductive for the region – instead, the joint development under democracy and social justice were the appropriate policies for improving the region (*ibidem*). His discourse also commented on the inter-ministerial meetings with both States' Ministries of Foreign Affairs to improve the bilateral approximation and create a better agenda, considerably improving the relations among both countries in the following year.

Kirchner got closer to his Brazilian counterpart after the signing of the Buenos Aires Consensus (2003). This document was a commitment to developing better bilateral policies for more employment conditions and social policies. Although not a treaty, it showed the Brazilian intention to cooperate with Argentina instead of imposing its will. This initiative solved the Self-control issues Argentina had with its bilateral relationships, at least for the moment, confirming both countries under the Self-control prerequisite to form a system (Wendt, 2014). Argentina accepted it would remain autonomous while cooperating with Brazil. Kirchner affirmed, in 2006, that the document showed the world the social vocation of the bilateral relationship under the definition of politics and ideology for the region (Kirchner, 2006b). This breakthrough would mark Fernandez's administrations.

One meaningful discourse that shows how Argentina saw a consolidated system with Brazil was Fernandez's discourse in the 2008 MERCOSUL summit. She did not

mention improving politics to increase integration as her predecessors. Instead, her discourse tackled how every president could represent a united sub-region in meetings with the European Union, the IMF, and the WTO (Fernandez, 2008b). She explained how MERCOSUL members should unite forces and improve their economic policies to counter the incoming crisis (ibidem). This discourse changes Argentinian perceptions on Brazil and MERCOSUL drastically, as she was no longer debating how to integrate the economies, instead proposing solutions in front of a crisis, moving integration to a more consolidated moment. In 2011, her discourse during an official visit to Brazil showed enthusiasm with debates on the economic crisis with president Rousseff, especially how to counter the oncoming financial crisis (Fernandez, 2011b). President Fernandez was sure that, as long as the governments protected the “real” economy (made by entrepreneurs, customers, and industries), the financial crisis would be countered (ibidem). In the same year, the presidents promised to improve productive integration for unified supply chains in the region under a new MERCOSUL mechanism (Fernandez et al., 2011). It consolidates the bilateral system as interdependence increased under this treaty.

Fernandez criticized Brazil’s halt in integration in the following years. Even with the renewed agendas, Brazil was not as active as it was under Lula da Silva. She called Rousseff to act because “Brazil is missed: it makes not only more but better integration” [translated by the present author]²⁷ (Fernandez, 2013a). The distancing between the countries is noted during the transmission of the pro tempore MERCOSUL presidency – Fernandez debated the importance of the approximation between the USA and Cuba under Pope Francis mediation, with no more significant propositions for the institution or debate on the bilateral relations with Brazil (Fernandez, 2014). This summit happened right after Rousseff’s reelection, a moment when usually presidents reaffirm their bilateral commitments. In her last year as president, her discourse in the MERCOSUL summit did not debate bilateral relations with Brazil; president Fernandez made a brief thanks to president Rousseff for her friendship and debated more the opportunities with Bolivia and Venezuela (Fernandez, 2015b), therefore marking the distancing among Argentina and Brazil in the past years.

The distancing was felt under Macri too. During his official visit to Michel Temer in 2017, the Argentinian president called attention to increase productive integration and to the need to rebuild the bilateral relationship (Macri, 2017b). Later that day, the presidents signed a joint declaration, affirming the need to re-initiate the semestral official visits among

²⁷ “Brasil hace falta, no solo más, como mejor integración”.

the countries, what happened until 2014, and strengthening MERCOSUL to improve trading between the two countries (Macri, 2017a). The declaration called for agendas among the countries for regional integration (MERCOSUL and Pacific Alliance) and internationally (European Union and China) (ibidem). Later that year, Macri affirmed that Argentina was going through an identity change, from a closed country to an open one, with more international presence and dialogue. It affirmed a change in the type identity because the State redefined its core characteristics, and a role identity change, as new relevant Others were rising, as Brazil lost its primacy in Argentinian politics. It included the reforms in MERCOSUL, as the institution sought better integration with the Alliance for the Pacific by harmonizing its treaties with their regulations (ibidem).

4.3.7 Schematic – Policies and othering in economic security affairs

With no intention of being an exhaustive effort, this schematic intends to display the main actions and reactions on the economic realm among Brazil and Argentina. The economic aspects of the relationship show us the consensus-building attempts, and the weight of the values showed above. The values that guided Brazil's Security Identity in the Economy form the basis of the Identity and the relations with Argentina. Development, stability, the economic North role, and the countries' crises formed the now changed partnership. The de-othering among Brazil and Argentina was stronger in the economy, mainly because of regional integration initiatives and due to the centrality of economic security for both countries' perpetuation. Brazil's perceptions of Argentina in its regional initiative impacted the bilateral relation – Argentina's discourses show the State perceived Brazil as distant from their relations.

The coincidence in values due to structural constraints shows more convergence in bilateral agreements. Although tensions were noted, the goals of Economic Foreign Policy were close, making consensus more likely. Contrary to core Security affairs, economic affairs were represented by periods of relative stability in bilateral arrangements. The importance of the crisis and its avoidance, stability, and development marked the basis for MERCOSUL's creation and changes through the analyzed period. The schematic below intends to illustrate relevant moments, not an exhaustive exercise of historical construction.




Figure 5: main Economic Security events in the New Republic

Final Remarks

This thesis analyzed how policymakers change strategic partner perceptions through the values held in Security Identity. The work made in Brazil – Argentina relations show us that those value discrepancies and (mis)perceptions lead States to act not in linear forms. Foreign Policy templates can be well enacted, such as Brazil and Argentina's economic templates, but structural and internal conditions depend on many factors. Although governments take action to improve the relationship and construct trust, Security Identity conditions change slowly.

The exercise of National Interests and shared values can help governments create a bilateral system. However, when values such as nationalism and industry protection are central to the Security Identity, trust-building tools will face setbacks. Governments' wills balanced between increasing cooperation and the fears of losing autonomy. Brazil and Argentina made progress through the analyzed period in strategic affairs, from nuclear capacities integration and economic integration; nonetheless, the collective identity construction suffered halts when the political and economic elites felt their best interests were not attended.

Although culture is an intersubjective societal practice, policymakers are the bearers of it, both internally and internationally. Culture resonates from the othering process but from the internal shared ideas of what makes the country. Therefore, culture creates not only the Self but its perceptions and misperceptions. Perceptions are not only the results of individuals thinking about a problem. These individuals are part of a society, and they perceive problems as a part of this plurality. External relations will contain these ideas and values. Othering, either positive or negative, may change values and perceptions.

Periods with highly integrative governments, such as Alfonsín and Sarney, Lula da Silva and Kirchner, and Fernandez and Rousseff, were counter-balanced by different forces. Menem and Cardoso feared MERCOSUL would limit their international presence when they sought to amplify partnerships. Temer and Macri were distressed by regional instability and sought legitimation in the anti-left and anti-integration feelings, not putting South America in their priorities. Although exercised in various forms, the same values, such as democracy, stability, development, and normalization, appeared among these governments.

As part of National Identity, Security Identity relates to the mobilization of speech acts that will face threats and State perpetuation issues. It consists of somewhat fixed values. Most of these evolve, such as the democracy stabilization making room for state-building practices, but valuing democracy was still an essential part of Security Identity. Regional integration suffered many changes in the analyzed period. Even when governments understood this value required reassessment, they reinforced the importance Brazil – Argentina relations had for economic, social, and traditional security affairs. Both States hold the partnership central to their Foreign Policy. When sovereignty is more appraised by governments, still bilateral relations were relevant. With open policy windows for military integration and nuclear affairs normalization, the governments made essential steps to create a working system for their collective identity.

Economic affairs were slower to integrate. From MERCOSUL's failed attempt to become a Common Market in less than a decade and the FTAA criticism of Lula da Silva's regional strategy to Temer reduction of MERCOSUL, Argentina saw many potentialities under-explored. Misperceptions of unity happened more often under pro-integration governments than in globalists or nationalist ones. Argentina received Brazil's slower integration pace with discontent when their counterpart made more promises than when governments openly sought more partnerships. Due to its centrality for bilateral relations, economic integration is where Brazil's Identity expression creates more dissatisfaction in Argentinian counterparts.

The latest identity conflict on South America integration shows a troublesome path for multilateral organizations. South American integration is seen as a leftist banner instead of a Brazilian Security Identity value. As Workers Party administrations did not address the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and kept integration efforts, fears of losing self-control and igniting a similar situation in the country took back the inwards nationalism rhetoric, praised by both the Temer and Bolsonaro administrations.

In its broader sense, the conservatism re-thinking of Brazilian Security Identity and National Identity resulted from different movements that did not feel contemplated by previous administrations. This change happened among the population; bureaucratic staff, diplomats, and the army are active parts of the ongoing identity change. More research is required to understand how this conflict among State institutions and government officials creates new identity ideals focused on identity breaks, and dissonant values are needed. This separation is a challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis – the theory affirms the importance of

keeping the constant values. However, there are still few studies on contestation coming from top-level officials.

The use of CAQDAS helped us achieve our research goals. It allowed us to study and categorize large amounts of documents. The sizeable historical period of this investigation brought challenges to accurate data interpretations. The use of software helped filter relevant information and showed important relations among administrations that seemed to have little connection. Ideology and different security affairs can make differences more apparent. But, as values appear in similar forms through various administrations, it shows perennial identity templates. These templates are conducted mainly in Security Identity, where threats to State perpetuation can generate trauma or fear for many generations. Security Identity changes slower than other aspects of identity, and the value perpetuation among different administrations shows this rigidity.

One example of it is the bilateral construction of Brazilian-Argentinian relations. The mutual efforts to build a strategic partnership brought policymakers to affirm this friendship is deeply rooted in both States' identities. The deterioration of this amity under the Bolsonaro administration will require further research efforts. The re-imagination of Brazilian identity under the new president is a challenge for Foreign Policy and Constructivist analyses and fertile terrain for value examination for different publics.

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