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UNDERMINING FROM WITHIN

How even pro-European governments use the EU as a scapegoat, contributing to Euroscepticism

Master's thesis in International Relations: Peace studies, security and development, supervised by Professor Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro and co-supervised by Professor Olivier Costa, presented to the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra to the obtainment of the Master's degree

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We are part of Europe and it is in Europe that we all save ourselves or we all lose ourselves

-   Eduardo Lourenço

ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to understand to what extension does the way in which the pro-European Member States' governments portray the EU in their speeches may negatively influence the public opinion towards the latter and its institutions.

We acknowledged that pro-European governments regularly perform the nationalisation of successes and the Europeanisation of failure and sought to see its influence on the growth of Euroscepticism. To this purpose, we started by theoretically demonstrating that Euroscepticism is a social practice using an adaptation of Bourdieu's theory, and that EU Scapegoating by pro-European governments is also a practice, to then conclude that the two are mutually constituted. Moving on to the empirical demonstration, the case-study of Portugal was used to investigate the regularity and level of competence with which the practice of blaming the EU for unpopular policy decisions, and we empirically proved the existence of this practice. Finally, we expanded our scope and demonstrated that this practice is common to multiple other Member States, that it is recognised as such by the political actors, the media and academia, and thus that we are able to generalise and say that this is a European practice common to most, if not all, Member States.

Finally, we left room for further research concerning the practical effect that EU Scapegoating by pro-European governments may have in Euroscepticism, that we could only demonstrate in theory.

Keywords: pro-European governments, Euroscepticism, EU scapegoating, nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation of failures, practice, speech acts of justification

RESUMO

Esta tese procura compreender até que ponto a forma como os governos dos Estados-Membros pró-europeus retratam a UE nos seus discursos pode influenciar negativamente a opinião pública em relação a esta e às suas instituições.

Reconhecemos que os governos pró-europeus realizam regularmente a nacionalização dos sucessos e a europeização dos fracassos e procuraramos perceber a sua influência no crescimento do euroceticismo. Para este propósito, começámos por demonstrar teoricamente que o eurocepticismo é uma prática social, usando uma adaptação da teoria de Bourdieu, e que a instrumentalização da UE como bode expiatório pelos governos pró-europeus é também uma prática, para então concluir que as duas são mutuamente constituídos. Passando para a demonstração empírica, o estudo de caso de Portugal foi usado para investigar a regularidade e nível de competência com que a prática de culpar a UE por decisões políticas impopulares é realizada, e provámos empiricamente a existência desta prática. Por último, alargámos o nosso alcance e demonstrámos que esta prática é comum a vários outros Estados-Membros, que é reconhecida como tal pelos actores políticos, pelos meios de comunicação social e pelo mundo académico, pelo que podemos generalizar e dizer que se trata de uma prática europeia, comum à maioria, senão a todos, os Estados-Membros.

Por fim, deixamos espaço para pesquisa futura sobre o efeito prático que o uso de UE como bode espiatório por governos pró-europeus pode ter no euroceticismo, que só pudemos demonstrar em teoria.

Palavras-chave: governos pró-europeus, euroceticismo, uso da UE como bode espiatório, nacionalização de sucessos e europeização de fracassos, prática, atos de fala justificativos

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) is arguably the single most advanced project of intergovernmental and supranational governance in Human history, creating the largest period of peace ever lived in Europe and allowing for, at the moment, 28 Member States to cooperate and pool resources, economically and politically. Nevertheless, since the nineties (most authors argue the debate over the Maastricht Treaty as a turning point) and with the end of the "permissive consensus"[1], the EU has experienced a significant increase in citizen mistrust, scepticism and opposition, expressed through their responses in polls, the ever-decreasing turnout rates in European elections, and the rise of anti-European parties all over Europe. In the latest Standard Eurobarometer survey available, Spring 2018, it was concluded that only 42% of Europeans trust the EU (6% less than those who trust the United Nations, for example); only 40% have a positive image of the EU, whereas 37% have a neutral one, meaning they are not involved or do not care. Furthermore, 24% state that for them the EU means bureaucracy and 22% say that it means a waste of money; 53% agree that the word "Remote" describes well the European Union, whereas 50% of the respondents doomed the EU as inefficient. Also, on average, more citizens are satisfied with democracy in their countries than the EU, and 49% believe that their voice does not count in the EU. Finally, 30% of Europeans think that their country would be better outside the EU. All these numbers top up with the astonishing low turnout in the last European Parliament elections (2014), of only 43%, as well as the constant growth of anti-European parties in all Member States and in European elections.

Perhaps a reason for growing Euroscepticism, beyond the often-cited rise of populist parties, lies in the actions of pro-European parties themselves. Though obviously

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[1] Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970. The "permissive consensus" allowed the European community to grow as a result of a technocratic process conducted by political and economic elites, national and European (Faure, 2015). This period, from the creation of European communities until the end of the 1980s, was marked by the biggest advances in EU integration, but also by the lowest citizen involvement in policymaking.

supportive of the European Union project, on a daily basis, they do little to commend the EU when praise is deserved, rather condemning, even if implicitly, when responsibility is shared between the government and Brussels, particularly in the case of unpopular policy decisions, when they are in government.

It is clear that a significant part of European citizens does not feel involved in the EU, feeling distant, distrustful, sceptical, to the point of even opposing to the EU. To this, literature and political actors called "Euroscepticism", the beginning of the era of the "constraining dissensus"[2]. Defined in multiple different ways that we will explore later, it is now arguably one of the biggest threats to the European project. Several causes have been identified as important to this phenomenon, mainly: (1) the fear of losing national sovereignty and identity - identity and nationalistic factors; (2) fear of immigration and immigrants "stealing our jobs"; (3) the EU's alleged democratic deficit; (4) hostility towards the cultural and societal model of the EU - cultural factors; and (5) assessing the EU in an utilitarian way - cost-benefit analysis. For this thesis, we will be particularly focusing on the latter, the utilitarian dimension of Euroscepticism that, as Bârgăoanu, Radu and Varela pointed out, has been identified as the one that offers the most solid grounds to explain this phenomenon (Bârgoanu, Radu and Varela, 2015). This utilitarian hypothesis is simply the cost-benefit analysis of EU accession and membership, made consciously or unconsciously by individual EU citizens every day, and by the Member States as a whole when a referendum is made on a new treaty or a possibility to leave the Union. Even though we will analyse and recognise all causes, we will particularly focus on the utilitarian dimension of Euroscepticism, as it is through that dimension that the governments' EU scapegoating would be more effective. That is the reason why our definition of Euroscepticism will distance itself from what have been the mainstream conceptions: ideological, party-based opposition to the European project as a whole[3]. Even if a more precise definition will be elaborated in the first part of the thesis[4], we can already say that we will be looking into society-based Euroscepticism, beyond ideology and party affiliation, which does not necessarily translate into a hostile attitude, but rather

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[2] Hooghe and Marks, 2009, even though the expression was first used in 2008 by Fligstein. It describes the process by which EU polity gets increasingly politicised through elections and referendums (Hooghe and Marks, 2009), provoking a rise in contestation of EU politics and policy that we call Euroscepticism.

[3] "Euroscepticism can be understood as a discursive formation of arguments, which performed by political actors in rejecting the EU policies" (Ultan, Ornek, 2015)

[4] See part I chapter B.

a spectrum of attitudes towards the EU and the integration process, ranging from distrust, cynicism and opposition to mere detachment or distrust, alive in all European peoples, as well as all throughout the political spectrum. These citizens don't necessarily appear in Eurobarometers as the ones opposing the Union or saying they think it is a "bad thing", but they do have a certain level of discontentment and mistrust in "Brussels", thus affecting (if and) how they vote in national and European elections. Furthermore, these citizens are becoming more susceptible to Eurosceptic discourse coming from the extreme right and left, and their uneasiness may quickly evolve into full-blown opposition.

By definition, scepticism means doubting, and thus, the Eurosceptics are not the opposite versions of the pro-Europeans or the Euro-idealists, but also not convinced enough that the EU is all good, and that express those feelings in numerous different ways. Indeed, they do not completely oppose European integration, nor European institutions, instead, they either fail to understand all the politics and processes related to the Union, or they view them wi distance and with a distrustful eye, partly because of how their governments portray the EU.

The "European blame-game"/"EU scapegoating"/"nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation of failures" is the main phenomenon we are analysing here. Many different expressions are used to describe the behaviour, common to National politicians from EU Members States, consisting in instrumentalising the EU as a justification to their own unpopular policy decisions, while at the same time failing to mention it when policies are well-received by the citizens. While it is widely recognised that this is a common habit among politicians, this thesis will focus only on pro-European governments who, because of their access to the media and their authority, are contributors to the rise of Euroscepticism. By repeatedly and uncontestedly invoking the "EU", "Brussels", "Europe", or even specific Member States, these governments, formed fully or mainly by pro-European parties, can be perceived, as I argue, as an important contributor to diffusing distrust towards European institutions, its growth in the past decade and its vast consequences in European society, institutions and policy-making. The fact that these governments have greater access to the media and to thus to the average national household, combined with how these declarations are made without contestation from the opposition and together with constant nationalisation of successes, thus remaining lodged

in the everyday political life of the country, create the perfect environment for assimilation by citizens, hence dictating their blame on the EU for several situations affecting their living conditions, such as the economic and the immigration crisis. The choice to investigate pro-European governments was thus clear, for all the reasons above and for the fact that there is not a lot of literature on the matter, making it an original approach. It is important to state here that these discursive blame-games we will be analysing do not include being sometimes critical of the EU's actions, as everyone, pro-or-anti-European, is entitled to do. Rather, we will just be looking into how the EU is instrumentalised by pro-European governments, used as a scapegoat when they fear that their policy decisions will not be well-accepted by the public.

From these presuppositions, the research question to which this thesis intends to answer is the following:

> To what extent do pro-European Member States governments, in their everyday political discourse, portray the EU in a way that leads their citizens to become distrustful or even critical of the EU and its institutions?

This research question attempts to go beyond (and not against) the traditional, mainstream and widely accepted explanations to the rise and spread of Euroscepticism in the last decades. It is my understanding that the causes put forward by researchers and politicians are insufficient to explain the underlying wariness of a non-negligible chunk of the population towards the EU, which is why I make my own definition of "soft" Euroscepticism, as described above. Also, the influence exerted by the government on the population, through mainly uncontested everyday political discourses, is arguably way stronger than the one exerted by extremist, Eurosceptic parties that are constantly contested in the media and by other parties.

The objective of this investigation will therefore be to demonstrate that:

A) Euroscepticism is a practice, present in the society, academia, the media and within existing political circles;
B) Pro-European Member States governments have normalised the process of scapegoating the European Union, profiting from their privileged access to the

media and thus to their citizens' households, and that this behaviour is a practice which mutually-constitutes Euroscepticism;

C) These constant portrayals of the EU as "the one to blame" for all unpopular policy decisions (especially economic, financial, regulatory and migration policy) have a great impact in the citizen's opinions of the EU and its institutions;

D) The above-mentioned phenomena produce a process of disenfranchisement that makes citizens feel excluded from European politics, reproducing what they hear their governments say and further contribute to the distrust and criticism towards EU institutions;

Firstly, it is important that I establish, theoretically, that Euroscepticism can indeed be seen as a practice[5], in an adapted version of Bourdieu's practice theory, as something done regularly with different expressions, levels of consciousness and flair.

Second, through research and empirical studies (that will be described below), I will need to demonstrate that this phenomenon of scapegoating the EU constitutes a practice, and that it exists in the majority of Member States, that it goes uncontested by the opposition, and that it is recurrent not only when addressing the public but also when drafting legislation and at the parliament. It will also be important to show that this practice can, in theory, influence other practices in interconnecting social spaces, such as Euroscepticism.

Finally, we expect to be able to briefly establish an empirical relation between these two practices, and specifically how the nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation of failures by pro-European governments can be at least partly responsible for the rise in Euroscepticism.

There are, of course, several limitations to this study and what I intend to demonstrate, mainly concerning the establishment of a strict connection between the two practices and that they influence each other, for many reasons, the main being that this effect might be more potential (the potential that people that have a light distrust towards the European Union have to become convict anti-Europeans) than present. That is why

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[5] As defined in Part I Chapter A.

this dissertation's objective is mainly to demonstrate, through theoretical and empirical argumentation that, while it can be empirically proven that pro-European Member States' governments use the EU as a scapegoat to justify unpopular policy choices, and that this is a practice, this also affects public opinion towards the EU and thus the rise of widespread "soft" Euroscepticism. To overcome this difficulty, the argument for this connection will be mainly theoretical, as according to Bourdieu, two practices in related *fields* can influence each other. So, in this case, it would be theoretically possible for Euroscepticism and EU-scapegoating to be mutually constituted.

The "umbrella" theory I will be using in this study is, thus, Practice Theory, as I will try to demonstrate that the two phenomena are practices, but we will also be interpreting the political speeches using speech act theory[6]. I acknowledge, as its precursor J. L. Austin did in 1985, that all sort of linguistic communication involves linguistic actions. I will adapt this theory to my research to try to explain how scapegoating of the EU, as a speech act performed by pro-European Member States' governments, reflects on the strategic will to justify unpopular policy actions, making it a practice.

To achieve all the above, this work will be divided into two parts, a theoretical and an empirical one. The objective of the first part will be therefore to demonstrate that: (1) Euroscepticism is a practice, further elaboration on its origins, its causes, definitions and expressions; (2) speech acts of policy justification through EU scapegoating also represent a practice and (3) these two practices are mutually constituted. The second part will then serve to empirically demonstrate that blaming the EU for unpopular policy decisions is indeed a practice, and that it is performed by pro-European governments in several Member States. For this part we will use the case-study of Portugal, giving multiple examples of occasions where these speech acts were performed and evaluating their implicit meanings, and finally briefly looking for signs of their influence in the rise of Euroscepticism in the public. The case of Portugal is particularly relevant seeing that since the first democratic elections in 1976, all governments have been formed by pro-

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[6] "In contrast to theories that maintain that linguistic expressions have meaning in virtue of their contribution to the truth conditions of sentences where they occur, it explains linguistic meaning in terms of the use of words and sentences in the performance of speech acts. Some exponents claim that the meaning of a word is nothing but its contribution to the nature of the speech acts that can be performed by using it." (Enciclopaedia Britannica)

European parties, and yet we can observe an increase of negative views towards the EU, especially during the financial crisis.

PART 1: BIBLIOGRAPHY REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW EUROSCEPTICISM AND EU SCAPEGOATING REPRESENT MUTUALLY CONSTITUTED PRACTICES

In this chapter it will be argued that Euroscepticism has become a practice created and reproduced in society, media, politics, and academia, exploring the theoretical presuppositions of practice theory and its adaptation to other fields[7]. Then, a review of the literature on the concept of Euroscepticism will be presented, as well as its origins and its causes, further developing the conceptual framework for this study, while attempting to theoretically demonstrate how Euroscepticism has become a practice and what makes it so. Then, the theoretical framework for the scapegoating of the EU by pro-European governments will be laid out. An adaptation of the speech act theory will be used to lay the grounds for speech analysis and the methodology that will be presented in the next chapter. In this third part it will also be argued that these discourses are also a practice, in this case a political one. These two practices are thus mutually constituted and influential, since the fact that Euroscepticism exists is what allows for EU Scapegoating by pro-European governments (otherwise it would produce no effects on the public), and EU Scapegoating arguably allows for the growth and reproduction of Euroscepticism.

That said, I do not intend to argue that these adapted theories, or any others for that matter, can lay the foundations for a grand theory on EU scapegoating by pro-European governments. Thus, the theoretical framework here presented serves as a basis for interpretation and to the possible extent explanation of the phenomenon, as well as to lay theoretical grounds for my main arguments.

Finally, the utility of this chapter lies on the fact that, since it is empirically difficult to assess the impact of the scapegoating discourse delivered by pro-European governments on popular Euroscepticism, it is important to see how theoretical concepts already developed in the wider study of Sociology, Political Science, International Relations, Euroscepticism and speech/discourse can illuminate and interpret what we are

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[7]See definition below.

investigating. Specifically, how the practice of scapegoating can influence that of Euroscepticism.

1.1 THEORETICAL BASIS: PRACTICE THEORY AND ITS POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS FOR THIS STUDY

"Social theorists from Weber to Bourdieu have argued that most humans most of the time act in the world habitually, not reflectively."

- *Hopf, 2010:1*

Studying Euroscepticism with a lens of practice theory will imply that it has become a practice, since it is now recognised as so in the "Structure" (politics, academia, the media), and influences and is influenced by the agents (citizens), the *field, habitus,* and other practices. The goal henceforth is to introduce the main tenets of practice theory and show how the practices of Euroscepticism is constituted, how it influences the ways actors behave in certain *fields* and how it is influenced by other practices, particularly the nationalisation of success and Europeanisation of failure[8].

1.1.1. THE GENESIS OF SOCIAL PRACTICE THEORY

Social practice theory is a theory of social action put forward firstly by Bourdieu ("Outline of a Theory of Practice", 1972) and Giddens ("Central Problems in Social Theory", 1979 and "The Constitution of Society",1984), and since developed and adapted by a multitude of authors to a lot of different fields of study. Before the appearance of this new vision on social behaviour, the latter was explained through structuralism, on the one hand, and phenomenology and ethnomethodology on the other, that Bourdieu and other practice theorists strongly reject, making up a "third way" in social action theory. Practice theory is thus an aggregate of different studies and theorisations that are currently used, not only to interpret social action of individuals, but also being applied in History, Media Studies, Political Science, Psychology and International Relations, as well as other fields. It seeks to explain how people act the way they do in certain environments, the biggest advance regarding other theories being that social action is neither the exclusive product of independent individual rationality nor is it exclusively influenced by the structure, the society, "large-scale social institutions and realities which frame individual

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[8] Expression first used by José Manuel Durão Barroso in the State of the Union address 2013: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-684_en.htm

experience" (King, 2010:2). Instead, agents and the structure are mutually constructed, meaning social action is the product of the influence of individuals to the structure, which also affects the action of the agents. Bourdieu's logic of practice insists that "objects of knowledge are constructed, not passively recorded, and, (...) that the principle of this construction is the system of structured, structuring dispositions, the *habitus*, which is constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions." (Bourdieu, 1992: 52). The logic of practice thus implies that social reality should be primarily analysed by social scientists through social practices, a process of "internalization of externality and the externalization of internality" (Bourdieu, 1977:72). It is also postulating that agents decide how to act practically, i.e., combining a set of quasi-bodily dispositions and practical sense, the "feel" (*habitus*) for the "game" (*field)*. The proposition of this chapter is exactly that we analyse Euroscepticism as a social practice, through which several agents act, internalising the "game" (i.e., how other agents act, for instance their governments), and externalising their feel for it, through vote, discussion, conversations with peers, demonstrations, etc..

> Bourdieu admits the existence of objective structures in the social world that can direct or coerce agents' actions and representations. However, agents can transform or conserve such structures, or at least desire changes. It is a fact that such structures are socially constructed, agents incorporate the social structure and at the same time, produce, legitimize, and reproduce it. In this sense, Bourdieu rejects the dichotomy subjectivism/objectivism, since social relationships happen in a dialectical relationship. (Silvino, Z., Souza, D., 2018)

1.1.2. PRACTICE AND NORM, TWO INTERLINKED, YET DIFFERENT CONCEPTS

This logic of practice is related to the one of "norm" put forward by Foucault. In Foucault's conception of normalisation[9], it involved the construction of an idealized norm of conduct, for example, how people should dress at weddings, and then rewarding or punishing individuals for respectively conforming to or deviating from this ideal. It was, according to the theorist, the tactics applied to exercise the maximum social control, while using the least amount of force possible. His works were used to define the different types

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[9] See Foucault, M. (1975), *Surveiller et punir: la naissance de la prison,* Paris, Éditions Gallimard

of human behaviour that were considered "normal", that being desirable and accepted by society or a specific group. Being desirable, ideal, optimal was, in Foucault's account, a necessary condition for a behaviour to be considered normal[10], which is where the main difference lies in relation to Bourdieu and other practice theorists, as he identifies no such condition for a behaviour or a way of acting to become practice, apart from being constituted by several *habitus* in one or multiple *fields*, as a lot of different theorists have studied a myriad of different practices with a multitude of different characteristics[11].

Nevertheless, the theory has obviously evolved ever since, with some authors arguing that what's normal is what is typical or average. Bear and Knobe's (2017) research suggests[12], for example, that

> as President Trump continues to do things that once would have been regarded as outlandish, these actions are not simply coming to be regarded as more typical; they are coming to be seen as more normal. As a result, they will come to be seen as less bad and hence less worthy of outrage. (Bear and Knobe 2017)

offering support to those who claim that, by being typical and/or recurring, actions and behaviours become more acceptable by society. Nevertheless, mainly evolving into a theory in psychology (more specifically social psychology), normalisation is still to this day used to explain the creation and maintenance of societal or group norms. As it could be seen, the development of normalisation theory is too much focussed (for the purpose of this research), on the one hand, on the formation of behaviours and social patterns of interpersonal relations and, on the other, the concept of what is ideal and desirable. This is the reason why, despite the two theories being interlinked and even complementary if one interprets them as so, I have opted by further developing how, apart from being normal in Bear and Knobe's conception, Euroscepticism and the scapegoating of the EU can also be studied under the logic of practice, arguing they both constitute practices. The relevance of this conceptual parenthesis in this section lies in the fact that, since we will

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[10] Foucault, M. (1977-78) Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977- 1978, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 57, in Taylor, D. (2009), Normativity and Normalization, Foucault Studies, No 7, pp. 45-63, September 2009

[11] See Rouse (2006:1), as the author gives examples of «the range and scope of activities taken by various theorists to constitute "practices"»

[12] Bear and Knobe (2016, 2017), for example, conducted a series of studies examining how people decide whether something is normal or not, presented in 2016 in the journal Cognition, reaching the conclusion that "when people think about what is normal, they combine their sense of what is typical with their sense of what is ideal. Normal, in other words, turns out to be a blend of statistical and moral notions." Bear, A. and Knobe, J. (2017) *Opinion | The Normalization Trap*, The New York Times, 20 January

be using the word "normal" in the development of the thesis, the concept needed to be defined not to be used in vain and void of meaning.

1.1.3. BOURDIEU'S PRACTICE THEORY: KEY CONCEPTS AND PREMISES

Going back to practice and Bourdieu's vision on it, when writing the first and arguably most prominent piece on practice theory "Outline of a Theory of Practice", his objective was to understand and explain why people act the way they do (Maggio, 2017). Two concepts are important to define before going into Bourdieu's theory: structure - a dynamic concept that is historically constructed by a multitude of agents (people), affects and is affected by them in their actions; and agency - "the ability of social actors to act independently of structures and rules" (Maggio, 2017: 12)[13].

Bourdieu put forward two new concepts (as he defined them) to make up the web of social interactions: *habitus* and *field*. *Habitus* is "the attitudes that actors internalize while being conditioned by past experiences, and re-enact in present everyday practices, though with a certain degree of freedom." (Maggio, 2017: 12);

> [...] a system of durable and transposable provisions which, integrating all past experiences, works at every moment as an array of perceptions, appreciations and actions - and makes it possible to perform infinitely different tasks, thanks to transfers analogical schemes [...] (Bourdieu 1983: 65, in Setton, 2002: 3).

In other words, it is a system of durable and to some extent stable predispositions, feelings, ways of thinking and doing that makes agents act the way they do in a given circumstance, acquired from our surrounding environment and life experiences almost inherent to the human being and, most of the times, unconscious and perhaps even irrational. *Habitus* "is the unconscious bodily and mental routines that allow us to act without thinking. The product of an apprenticeship, of a process of which we are no longer conscious, and which is expressed by a "natural" attitude of conducting ourselves

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[13] Although several other authors defined this concept before, Maggio's is one of the most recent definitions of Structure.

in a given environment" (Thiry-Cherques, 2006)[14]. Moreover, "Habitus is both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices" (Bourdieu, 1989:7), reinforcing the constructedness of social action and the social space. In a nutshell, *habitus* is the structure and structuring of our actions; "Their appeals to imitation, repetition and imprinting, training, and sanctions make the human body the crucial intermediary in the transmission, acquisition, and reproduction of social practices" (Rouse, 2006:14), they are the knowledge of the "rules of the game", or as Bourdieu often said "feel for the game", just like in sports[15], in a certain *field,* which leads us to the second concept.

Practice theorists divided the social sphere into smaller units where localised, non-universal practices can arise:

> Instead of treating cultural interaction as a matter of translation between whole cultural systems, practice theorists can recognize more localized practices of partial interpretation and exchange that can be somewhat isolated from other practices and meanings that function within each of the interacting fields of cultural practice. (Rouse, 2016:8)

The social sphere is thus divided in different *fields,* "the space where they (actors) compete for power and influence" (Maggio, 2017: 13). The "*field* is a system, or social subsystem inserted within a Social Structure, that is constructed from the sharing of experience and practices, with a series of beliefs, abilities and rules that follow in the logic of the field." (Haeming, 2018: 11). Each *field* "has its own set of positions and practices, as well as its struggles for position as people mobilize their capital to stake claims within a particular social domain" (Social Theory Rewired, 2016). The position each agent occupies in a specific *field,* as well as how much they influence its practices is defined by four different forms of capital: (1) economic capital - our economic power; (2) cultural capital - our knowledge, skills, information, etc., (3) the social capital - the set of social accesses, which includes our relationships and network of contacts; (4) symbolic capital - the set of rituals of social recognition, and which includes prestige, honour, and so on. Symbolic capital is a synthesis of the others (cultural, economic and social) (Thiry-Cherques, 2006). It is important to say that the same forms of capital may

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[14] Free translation by the author.

[15] Habitus, Social Theory Rewired (2016), Routhledge. Available at:
http://routledgesoc.com/category/profile-tags/habitus (Accessed: 24 May 2019)

be of more or less important in each *field*.[16] These powers influence the way the agents compete in a field, impose a vision on others, and reproduce unequal power relations - the more capital an agent has, the more he can influence other agents and the *field* (structure). Hierarchy inside the *field* legitimates and forms consensus between the agents in the *field*.

1.1.4. AN ATTEMPT AT A DEFINITION OF PRACTICE

> (Habitus x Capital) + Field = Practice (Bourdieu, 1984:101). Bourdieu's theory of practice ties all three core concepts together such that actors' dispositions (habitus) not only reflect their lived experiences but also depend on changing capital endowments and the boundaries of fields, including rules of the games. (Suminar, 2013: 4)

After defining Bourdieu's core theoretical concepts, the definition of practice, what constitutes a social practice, what is implied when the term is used, is still hard to reach. Bourdieu built up on its definition for most of his time, and others who followed, such as Guiddens, Ortner, Taylor, and a variety of others, have also made up their own definitions. After a summarised literature review, we will try to put forward our own definition, to be used in this thesis.

Bourdieu himself struggled with defining practices; "It is not easy to speak of practice other than negatively - especially those aspects of practice that are seemingly most mechanical, most opposed to the logic of thought and discourse." (Bourdieu, 1990:80). It was thus admittedly easy to find a clear definition of practice directly in Bourdieu's works, other than disperse premises of what practice isn't and how it is structuring for social theory, and how, for the author, practices are based in the dispositions existing in *habitus*, and depend on them.

Nevertheless, other sociologists and theorists from other fields of study have more recently interpreted Bourdieu's works, and/or attempted themselves at a definition, of which some will be presented in the following paragraphs.

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[16] I.e., if an agent is world-renowned neuroscientist, they can greatly influence the *field* of neuroscience, but may be void of power in the *field* of arts, for example.

Parkin suggests that for Bourdieu, practices are 'strategic improvisations – goals and interests pursued as strategies – against a background of doxa that ultimately limits them' (Parkin 1997: 376) putting into evidence that, contrary to *habitus* or doxa, practices are, or can be, conscious and strategic to a specific situation, objective or goal. This notion is clearly very important for this study since we will argue that the nationalisation of success and Europeanisation of failure is strategic, yet performed with regularity and varying degrees of consciousness and flair.

Schatzki, another prominent practice theorist, gave an extremely large definition, stating that practices are "open-ended spatial-temporal manifolds of actions" (Schatzki, 2005: 471).

Some authors related to other fields of study or less prominent in sociology or practice theory as a grand theory have actually been the ones able to better define what practices are and what are they consistent of, and they have also shed some light in Bourdieu's understanding. Chance, for instance, argues that

> For Bourdieu (1977, 1990), a practice is more than just a habit; it is a practical mastership incorporated in people's bodies that guides them to act without complete or explicit knowledge. What led them to these actions/practices is unconscious and irrational in the common sense but adequate under the given circumstances (Chance, 2015:15)

Reckwitz sees practice as routinised types of behaviour, consisting of several elements of bodily and mental activities (can include physical materials other than the body), shared competences, knowledge and skills, that are connected with each other (Bourdieu's *habitus*), it's existence is dependent on the presence and interconnectedness of these elements. For the author, "a practice represents a pattern which can be filled out by a multitude of single and often unique actions reproducing the practice" (Reckwitz, 2002: 250). In other words, a practice is an action, or set of actions that are routinely performed and connect the agents with their structure, implying a specific know-how, understanding of the *field (habitus)* and are meaningful to the individuals performing them, even if they are performed with little or no thought at times. Reckwitz sees individuals as almost mere "carriers of practices", not being able to completely freely select between practices, but are recruited to them according to background and history (Holtz, 2014), and of course each practice is suited to a different situation. And those who

do not freely choose between practices based on utility or similar individualistic concepts but are "recruited" to practices according to their background and history. Practices are continuous because they are reproduced by individuals, new agents are constantly engaging in the practice and practices are transformed by the actors, they are also interconnected with other practices, in a mutually constitutive relationship within wider structures (Røpke, 2009). Moreover, according to Silvino *et al.,* "social practices are structured and have the characteristic properties of the social position of those producing them" (Silvino, *et al.,* 2018).

Holtz draws on Shove and Pantzar (2005) and Røpke (2009) to define 3 broad elements of practices, "material, meaning and competence":

- Material "covers all physical aspects of the performance of a practice, including the human body" (Holtz, 2014);
- Meaning "refers to the issues which are considered to be relevant with respect to that material, i.e. understandings, beliefs and emotions" (idem);
- Competence "refers to skills and knowledge which are required to perform the practice".

Postil (2010), applying practice theory to media studies, defines it as "the embodied sets of activities that humans perform with varying degrees of regularity, competence and flair" (Postil, 2010:1). The author thus broadens the previous definitions meaning that even though practices are routinised sets of behaviours, they don't need to be quotidian, that they can be performed more or less consciously and with more or less skill and creativity.

Adler and Pouliot, on their end, give a broad yet precise definition of practice, claiming "Practices are competent performances (...), socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world." (Adler, Pouliot, 2011:4). In other words, according to the authors practices are activities/behaviours or sets of activities/behaviours that are patterned, can be recognised, reproduced and reacted upon by other actors, and can either simply perform, materialise, or even question the constructed structure, enabling "structures to be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structures" (Adler, Pouliot, 2011:5). Focussing on

practice is thus analysing "the patterned nature of deeds in socially organized contexts" (idem).

Finally, Shove and colleagues argued that "theories of practice have as yet untapped potential for understanding change" (Shove *et al.,* 2012:1). The authors thus recognise that practices can not only change (Bourdieu defined them as more-or-less stable), but also can provoke change, stating that the reproduction and/or transformation of practices has implications for the institutions associated with them. This notion is also particularly important for our quest, since we will argue that practices change, influence each other and affect the organisations and institutions, physical or societal, that are related to them. In this case, it will be argued that the practice of scapegoating of the EU affects national and EU-politics, and the practice of Euroscepticism, which in turn has deep implications for the EU's institutions and their functioning and legitimacy.

From the multiple definitions above we are now able to give a definition that, combining elements of previous authors, will serve as a conceptual basis for application in this thesis, that is: practices are patterned, socially meaningful performances[17], dependant on a specific set of *habitus*, carried-out with varying degrees of regularity, competence, consciousness and flair, that can be strategic, that evolve and change, and that have the ability to change the structure and to affect institutions connected to them. We also recognise the 3 broad elements of practices, "material, meaning and competence", as described above. Finally, it is important to specify that practices are only meaningful in their specific (one or multiple) socially organised contexts (*fields)*. For example, Euroscepticism has no meaning in the *field* of cooking, nor does teaching algebra starting in addition, then subtraction, then multiplication, and so on[18] (...) make sense in the field of national politics.

1.1.5. PRACTICE THEORY IN OTHER FIELDS OF STUDY

Just as Bourdieu, Giddens, another of the most prominent authors of practice theory, claims that structures make social action possible, but social action creates the structures. A second wave of practice theorists enlarged these basic concepts and

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[17] Performance is the process of doing something (Adler, Pouliot, 2011).

[18] A practice in the field of teaching mathematics in early ages.

theoretical features making practice theory the basis and the connection point between sociology and International Relations, through constructivism. Haeming, for example, argues that the theoretical principles of Bourdieu and Robert Cox can be combined, especially in the "use of categories that take into account the historical construction of society, and that both approaches share an ontology, explain a society of intersubjective relations in a historically constructed dynamic." (Haeming, 2018:4).

According to Haeming, several authors of International Relations (IR) revisited Bourdieu's concepts, such as Adler-Nissen (2013), Leander (2000), Leander (2011) and Bigo (2011).

Pouliot, for example, built upon Bourdieu to develop a theory of practice in security communities. He argues that "practices are the result of inarticulate know-how that makes what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical" (Pouliot, 2008:1). Together with Emanuel Adler, the two authors built upon poststructuralism in IRand proposed to look at international politics through the lens of practice theory, agreeing that practices have a discursive dimension but are not restricted to it, "explain how, on the ground, most political dynamics come to rest on the fixation of meanings – a hard work in which practices play a prominent role" (Adler, Pouliot, 2011:3)[19]. They apply the definition of practice to nuclear deterrence, financial trade and several other international policies, giving a broad yet clear definition of practices that was already laid out above.

As Rouse clearly points out, throughout the development of practice theory, or at this time practice theories, this logic has been applied to hundreds, if not thousands of different activities, varying in kind, scope, field, etc… one example would be Wulf *et al.*'s work "Socio-informatics", applying this theory to technology.

We can thus conclude that it seems just as pertinent to apply the logic of practice to European and national politics, specifically to our object of study: first, Euroscepticism, and then, the nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation of failures.

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[19] In International Relations, the "linguistic turn" that happened around the turn of the millennium was coupled with a "practice turn", making the two complimentary (Cf Neumann, 2002 *in* Adler, Pouliot, 2011).

Finally, we should state that the conceptual approach I am taking is Bourdieu's, as a basis, including more recent evolutions and adaptations to other fields of study such as Reckwitz's, Postill's, Røpke's, Puliot's, etc... But excluding those second-wave evolutions related to culture and history, that do not seem relevant in this case. I believe Bourdieu's original concepts, developed by more contemporary authors and broadened to other fields are easily adaptable and flexible, defining practices as, as explored above, more-or less competent, routinised behaviours or sets of behaviours that can happen in any field, with varying degrees of regularity and flair, and so best fit the sociological and political quest of this study.

The objective and relevance of this chapter was to present a basic theoretical framework from which we could then build upon in the next sections, namely arguing that both Euroscepticism and scapegoating of the EU by pro-European governments have become practices. This would mean that people, acting strategically, may behave in a certain way or perform certain discourses unconsciously, unintentionally, even irrationally, yet strategically. In the next two parts I will search for practice patterns in, first, Euroscepticism and, then, perlocutionary acts with the underlying intention of scapegoating the EU to justify unpopular policies, by pro-European Governments. By doing so, more than establish that these two are normalised practices in their individual and shared *fields*, it will also, to a certain extent, explain how they influence each other, contributing to the greater argument that these discourse practices have influenced the recent rise in Euroscepticism, as it is extremely hard to prove so empirically.

1.2 DECONSTRUCTING THE PRACTICE: THE ORIGINS OF EUROSCEPTICISM, ITS CAUSES AND EVOLUTION

Support for integration is crucial in the development of the European Union. The EU needs a basis of support to further evolve its policies and legitimate its actions as a regional and global actor. It can thus be said that "public attitudes (...) shape and constrain the process of European Integration" (Gabel, 1998:333).

Despite being first used by Margaret Thatcher and other British political leaders in the late-1980s and early-90s to describe a very specific British political phenomenon, particularly inside the Conservative party, Euroscepticism's meaning(s) have been extended not only in Britain but also internationally, in the media, politics and among academics to serve as a very broad and generic label covering different degrees and kinds of resistance or wariness towards the European project coming from within any Member State.

The concept of Euroscepticism, as well as its causes, origins and ways of expression are thus far from being consensual amidst the political and scholar fields. Because it takes so many shapes, expressions and comes from such different backgrounds and political ideologies, Euroscepticism is a hard concept to define and its definition should be adapted to each author or study.

In this sense, this part serves as a development of the concept of Euroscepticism in the way I see it to fit this dissertation, and what makes it a practice. To do so, I will first reflect on its origins (causes), then its expression and then its consequences, finally coming up with my own definition, which is *the feeling of discontent, criticism and/or distrust towards the EU, widespread across the population.*

After these considerations, and a voyage through the origins, definitions, causes and dimensions of Euroscepticism, they will allow us to conclude that is has become a practice, as it is, more than normal, accepted, reproduced and subject to change, it is structuring to interpersonal relations in certain *fields*. This means that, the more Euroscepticism becomes a widespread social and political practice, the more it grows, even if unconsciously, in the citizens' political minds, especially the ones sharing similar *habitus*.

1.2.1 ORIGINS: HOW DID THE PRACTICE START?

Up until the nineteen-eighties (20th Century), the European project experienced a "smooth sail", facing little to no opposition as integration relied on an almost totally compliant population. The elites supported integration and not a lot of importance was given to public opinion, as the general public showed hardly any interest or knowledge on what was going on in Brussels. This period was defined by Lindberg and Scheingold, in 1970, as the "permissive consensus". A period where, even though public opinion shaped the decision made by national elites in the European context, this input did not directly affect policymaking in the European Communities. This phase made it so that the European Communities are the result of a technocratic process led by national and European political and economic elites. Citizens are not associated with this regional integration project and did not (and to some extent still don't) show interest in participating. Thus, there is a tacit consent of the citizens who grant decision-making powers to the rulers. It can be said that, up until the 80s, the dominant practice was this "permissive consensus", letting the elite decide for the citizens with little-to-none questioning of their decisions and processes. But like all practices, this one was and is subject to change.

So, in the late-1980s and early-90s, in a larger and more integrated Europe, this tacit consent dissipated, opening the space for the emergence of opposition not only from national governments but also from the People. There seemed to be a gap between the European population and the European elite regarding the direction of the European project (Milner, 2000; Wessels: 2007 in Hansen, 2008). This was the moment of the rise of the concept of Euroscepticism, but especially to the fact that "Euroscepticism was a far more prevalent phenomenon than previously assumed" (Hansen, 2008). To this shift in public behaviour, Hooghe and Marks (2008) called "Constraining Dissensus", as the authors developed a Post-functionalist theory of European integration, as an evolution, more than an opposition, to the Neo-functionalist theory that based the "Permissive Consensus" of Lindberg and Scheingold. With this shift in paradigm in European politics came also a new practice: Euroscepticism. To know if it will become dominant in this *field*, or if it will stay one of many, common for people sharing the same *habitus*, we will have to wait for the next few years, if not decades, but we know from where it originated.

Usherwood (2004) argues that Margaret Thatcher's speech to the College of Europe in 1988 (where the word Euroscepticism was first used), the "no" vote from the Danish, in a referendum, to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Swedish rejection of the Euro were the most prominent and clear oppositions to the European project "as embodied in the European Union". In fact, it is widely agreed upon that these moments, but especially Denmark's first rejection of the Maastricht Treaty as well as France's short "yes" win in the referendum, showed that the increased visibility of Europe, as well as its impact in the citizens' daily activities, would have led to a polarisation of opinions with regard to integration: all the debates on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Amsterdam in 1997, Nice in 2003 and the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, contributed to politicising the European space and, at the same time, raising concerns about the integration process. It can be asserted that the more integrated the Union becomes, the more power is given to the citizens (Hobolt, 2012), and thus not only is there more space for public opinion in the EU decision-making but also its importance is rising as the major source of input legitimation of the Union. The *field* was thus changing, evolving, and so new practices needed to arise to consolidate the agents' *habitus* with these changes, in a way that would strategically benefit them and their position.

According to Hooghe and Marks, resistance to the process of integration, if it has always existed, would have become institutionalized. The authors point out that "the decisive change is that the elite has had to make room for a more Eurosceptical public" (Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 9). The chart below clearly shows the point, between 1992 and 2002, where the public started to question the benefits of integrating the Union after a long period of rising support to integration. It is clear that, the more public debate became itself a practice in the EU, the more citizens felt concerned by European politics and, thus, more divergent opinions started to arise, originating a practice that was different than the dominant "permissive consensus".

Graphique 1 : Évolution de l'évaluation positive de l'appartenance à l'Union européenne, du soutien net et de l'index de soutien (1973-2002, UE8)

—■—SOUTIEN MOYEN (Bonne chose)   —▲—SOUTIEN NET (Bonne chose - mauvaise chose)   —□—SOUTIEN MOYEN (Index)

Données : Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File (1973-2002).
Notes : EC10, EC12, EU15 = élargissements de l'UE à 10, 12 et 15 États membres; SEA = Single European Act; SEM = Single European Market; TEU = Treaty on European Union; EURO = introduction de l'Euro.

Image 1: Evolution of the positive evaluation of EU membership, net support and the support index (1973-2002, EU-8). Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file (1973-2002)

Finally, it is worthy to state that if citizens attribute greater responsibility to the EU (through the transference of more competencies), then they are also more likely to have higher expectations of the quality of EU governance and the legitimacy of decisions taken by EU institutions, and therefore less satisfaction if their will and needs are not fulfilled. As Bourdieu claimed multiple times[20], practices are strategic connections made by the agents between their *habitus* and the *fields* in which they interact; attributing greater responsibility and expecting more from the EU means the actors (the citizens) look at the EU strategically, in a utilitarian way - which will be developed further - but it

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[20] See part A of this chapter.

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also means they will develop practices to accommodate their needs in the new political organisation. One of those, Euroscepticism, which we will now try to define.

1.2.2. DEFINITION

After going through the origins of this practice, we are elaborating on the ways there are to conceptualise it.

"Eurosceptics", "euro-critics", "euro-pessimists", "euro-phobia", etc… All these terms and more are used to describe a sentiment, a political attitude, an ideology, or a doctrine that, as seen before, has multiple origins, causes, dimensions are expressions. It goes from the extreme right to the extreme left, passing by the moderates and from the lower to the higher social status and income bracket[21]. Is it the rejection of the European project as a whole? Is it the fear of integration? Is it the simple inertia towards the EU? Is it scepticism, doubt, or lack of satisfaction? Is it a catchphrase that the media, the political elite and academia use as they please? Is it a practice? Or is it all or none of the above? As we will see here, it can be all of these of none of these, depending who is writing, speaking or thinking, depending on who and where is being studied, depending on the audience, on the time in history and the political agenda. Basically, it can be a variety of things, depending on the person analysing it and what they want to demonstrate.

Paul Taggart, one of the most prominent authors in the subject, has a broad definition of Euroscepticism, saying it "expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration." (idem, 1998:4). His definition already encompasses the existence of different levels, forms and intensities of Euroscepticism, allowing for an adaptation of the concept to the matter being studied.

According to Britannica, for example, Euroscepticism is an "European political doctrine that advocates disengagement from the European Union". Britannica's article on Euroscepticism also points out that this doctrine is advocated for especially by populist

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[21] Even though the causes of Euroscepticism vary according to several factors, and it is more common in the lower social classes, as will be discussed later.

parties that "generally support tighter immigration controls in addition to the dismantling or streamlining of the EU bureaucratic structure".

Flood (2002), argues that scepticism or doubt towards European integration can be directed towards one specific area (the Common Agricultural Policy for example) and not the whole project, whereas Harmsen (2005) rejects this proposition, defining it exclusively as the total opposition to the European Union and all its associated projects, tracing it back to the UK while arguing that it is much stronger there than anywhere in continental Europe.

For the purpose of this dissertation, my definition of Euroscepticism will be the feeling of discontent, criticism and/or distrust towards the EU, widespread by the population more than a party-based phenomenon. Based on this definition I will particularly look at how this feeling can be reproduced/reinforced, objectified and instrumentalised by political parties and individuals who have historically positioned themselves as pro-European, depending on their agenda.

1.2.3. DISCUSSIONS ON THE CAUSES OF EUROSCEPTICISM: WHY DID THIS PRACTICE EMERGE?

"A vast literature in political science has attempted to identify the main deterrents of public support for the European Union. This goes from economic benefits at the macro or micro level (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993 ; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996 ; Gabel and Palmer, 1995) to purely cultural fac Stilltors (McLaren, 2002; Diez Medrano, 2003) or contextual variables (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005 ; Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, 2000)." (Jacquier, 2012). In other words, the causes for the appearance and rise of Euroscepticism have been widely discussed, and the fact that no one cause has been so far identified as the main or even the only one means that they are multiple and different for each person, group, region or country. The sources of this feeling and political attitude are various and non-dissociable from each other. Regardless of its number, the factors that influence Euroscepticism can be divided into structural and short term/situational. In this section we will look at the most commonly accepted causes of Euroscepticism and relating some of them to what could be the *habitus* inherent to the practice we are studying.

Starting with structural factors, the first that comes to mind, as it is probably the most important one, is arguably the EU's alleged democratic deficit. Sara Hobolt, for example, identifies several phenomena around citizens' satisfaction the EU democracy. The author acknowledges that, being an elite-driven project from the start, the founders of the EU did not have democracy as a primary concern for the foundations of the institutions. On the other hand, the author also recognises that confidence in EU institutions matters more to citizens with a higher knowledge of its functioning.

The EU's alleged democratic deficit is therefore often pointed out as a cause of the rising Euroscepticism, as some powers are transferred from the national to the EU level without the establishment of the corresponding democratic controls (Hobolt, 2012). Examples of this are the European Parliament's lack of capacity to effectively control the EU's governing bodies and its inability to fully represent EU citizens. Nevertheless, after an empirical analysis, it appears to be a democratic surplus in the European Union (Hobolt, 2012), rather than a deficit (when comparing to the national level, on average), which would discredit the thesis that the EU's democratic deficit is one of the major causes of Euroscepticism. What is more relevant here though, more than the actual quantitative value of European democracy, is the feelings and perceptions of the citizens towards it, and on that point, the EU is clearly on the loss. Regarding the latter's relation with national institutions, Hobolt argues that there is a positive relationship between citizen satisfaction at national and EU level, as national institutions serve as a benchmark to evaluate the EU. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) says otherwise, arguing the worse the opinion of the national political system, the lower the opportunity cost of transferring sovereignty, in other words, people would be more inclined to transfer more decision-making powers to the Union if they perceived their national institutions as undemocratic or inefficient, thus the lower their perception of national institutions was, the higher it was for EU institutions, and vice-versa. Even though both arguments have empirical sources, Sanchez-Cuenca's analysis of the Eurobarometer seems more convincing. This alleged democratic deficit of the EU can be considered as one of the characteristics of the *field* that is contributing to the appearance of this practice. The fact that citizens have less confidence in distant and/or less democratic institutions is part of their sets of beliefs, as it is widely agreed in western societies that Democracy is the most efficient and beneficial system of government.

Another structural factor is, as presented by Alibert (2015), national specificities and culture, which can also be related to the EU's inability to foster a sense of European identity among all citizens. In fact, in a lot of Member States such as France and Italy, a sovereigntist conception and vision of the EU has historically been persistent, thus creating a barrier and to some extent an opposition to integration. Nationalism, based on the assumption that the EU takes power of decision from the Member States and concentrates it in a bureaucratic apparatus called "Brussels", fears the loss of national sovereignty and thus rejects any move towards integration that implies supra-nationalism, as opposed to intergovernmentalism. These national and cultural specificities can be easily related to *habitus*, as they are based on the agents' personal environment and past experiences and constitute a determinant for this practice. This would then mean that, in countries where the nationalist sentiment is historically more present, the tendency would be for Euroscepticism to dominate, which can be verified, for instance, in the results of the last European elections, where in both France and Italy, the parties who elected the most Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are far-right anti-European.

As to the EU's lack of ability to generate a sentiment of European identity, another much repeated cause of Euroscepticism, Alibert points out that the lack of transparency and accountability, the complexity and excessiveness of the bureaucratic system, the gap between EU-citizen's socio-cultural origin and their MEPs' makes it difficult to promote a common feeling of belonging, despite the efforts through multiple policies such as the Erasmus + program, DaVinci, the European Solidarity Corps, etc... Furthermore, the fact that the EU is to this point an "unidentified political object" (Delors, 1985), with constant changes in its borders, its treaties and its policy areas and without a common culture and language accentuates this difficulty. This blurriness in the EU's institutions and political system is also one of the characteristics of the *field* that fosters the development of the practice of Euroscepticism, as it instilled in every person's consciousness not to trust what they do not know.

The fact that people assess integration in terms of how it benefits them (utilitarian view) can also be seen as a cause of Euroscepticism. As Cécile Leconte points out in the specific case of France, part of the population thinks the EU in terms of economic and social gains, meaning that, if those people are not able to see, or are not shown, the direct

effect that the EU has on their lives, they will perceive it negatively[22]. This *habitus,* shared by most individuals, is absolutely crucial in the establishment of this practice, but it needs to be coupled with lack of education and information about the EU and its policies to lead to Euroscepticism, owing to the fact that the majority of citizens that view the EU as inutile or even prejudicial for their lives are not aware of the full extent of its policies, being more subject to the scapegoating made by their governments when, for example, their salaries are getting cut.

Social-economic backgrounds come next in the list of causes for the rise of Euroscepticism, as we enter the situational category. As Hobolt points out, the EU has an increasing impact on economic policies, and therefore economic outcomes are at least partly the result of EU policies, consequently, better economic conditions and higher transfers result in increased satisfaction with EU democracy, and by extension more support of European integration. Kuhn and colleagues were clear to point out the strict relation between the growing income inequality as a source of Euroscepticism (Kuhn *et al,* 2014), and Ritzen and colleagues write that Euroscepticism is also potentiated by negative financial expectations of the citizens. The *habitus* we identified earlier of seeing the EU from a utilitarian perspective is strictly related to this one, since the wage gaps who suffer the most from rising income inequality and negative financial outcomes are usually the ones who tend towards utilitarian Euroscepticism. Ritzer and colleagues go further as they discover empirically that this factor is way more expressive in Western Member States, which means that there is a *habitus* in Western citizens that makes them see the EU as an economic barrier instead of an opportunity, which the Eastern arguably do. Moreover, the economic and financial crisis that affected every Member State has had a very important toll in the citizen's approval of the EU, as can be seen in the following chart.

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[22] See Cécile Leconte, Understanding Euroscepticism, 2010

Favorable view of EU

100%

83
80
78

69

58
54

37

72 Poland

58 Italy
50 Germany
47 Spain
44 UK
38 France

27 Greece

0

2004   2006   2008   2010   2012   2014   2016

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10c.

"Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Image 2: Favourable view of the EU in Poland, Italy, Germany, Spain, UK, France and Greece, Spring 2016 Global attitudes survey, Pew Research Center

This chart clearly shows a decline in the favourable view of the EU in all the portrayed countries during the years of the financial crisis (2007-2013-14), and even though some have seen a slight rise after that, others are still in the very low and declining, further demonstrating that there is no one source of the Eurosceptic feeling. This change in the characteristics of the national and European economic and financial *fields* thus had an influence in the *field* of European politics "activating" the habitus explained above and contributing to the development and transmission of the practice of Euroscepticism.

The financial crisis, as well as the migrant crisis the EU faced in 2015 and the invasion of Crimea the year before made the people believe that the EU did not have the mechanisms to fight any of these threats and ensure their safety (Bulmer and Joseph, 2015), giving space for populisms of different kinds to arise and take space in the political stage. According to Leconte, despite being a consequence of a series of crisis lived in the EU from 2007 to 2015, the rise of populist parties across Europe was also a large contributor to the rise of Euroscepticism in the same period. Populist parties, both on the extreme right and left, feed their arguments on the lack of democracy, bureaucracy of elites, dangers of immigration, threat to national culture or to the nation itself, opposing

to the European project as it arguably stands in the way of national interests. This is yet another change in the *field* that had a great impact in the reproduction of the practice and its normalisation and growth, drastically changing the structure in terms of the balance of power, especially in the European Parliament and also in some national Parliaments where Eurosceptic parties have a growing expression.

Lack of education and/or information about the EU and its functioning is also one of the underlying causes of Euroscepticism, as many authors such as Hobolt point out, the more knowledgeable about the EU individuals are, the more their satisfaction with democracy in the EU depends on their evaluation of EU institutions and less on their evaluation of national institutions and national government performance (Hobolt, 2012), but also the more they are supportive of European integration, as Alibert implies in her paper on the root causes of Euroscepticism and how to address them (2015). "Overall, Eurosceptics of any type are less politically informed, less interested in politics, and less educated than the average citizen." (Weßels, 2007:43). This categorisation, if not the more important one as argues Weßels, is very important as less educated citizens will most probably share an ensemble of *habitus* that highly contribute to the development and reproduction of the practice.

Finally, coupled with the latter, misinformation in the media and in political discourse is also a recognised cause of Euroscepticism, and the one we will be further examining in this dissertation. In "How the EU really works" (2014), Costa and Brack clearly identify the shortcoming presence of the EU in national political discussion, the difficult access of EU officials to national media and the wrongful portray made by national political leaders. As will be demonstrated later in this dissertation, when the EU is mentioned in national political discourse, it is by a large majority for criticism.

It has become so normal and accepted to say that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit and that it justifies Eurosceptic views, as well as constantly searching for other causes in a lot of different fronts, that even this has become, itself, a practice, further making citizens more willingly accept and even share these views. Searching for causes of what would be, in principle, a phenomenon that hinders the EU and its legitimacy has given it reasons to exist, continue and be reproduced, also contributing to the logic of practicality. Specific causes related to agents such as social-economic and educational backgrounds,

national specificities and cultures are also consistent with the logic of practice; as Bourdieu argues, "agents who occupy similar or neighbouring positions are placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, and therefore, have every chance of having similar dispositions and interests, and thus of producing practices that are themselves similar." (Bourdieu, 1990:5); which can explain why the majority of popular Eurosceptics come from less favourable social-economic backgrounds, and why those sharing the same educational experiences, national culture, etc… can be driven to this similar practice. Nevertheless, this practice has some variations, as well as different ways of expression and a multitude of dimensions, which will be explored next.

1.2.4. VARIATIONS (TYPES), EXPRESSIONS AND DIMENSIONS OF THE PRACTICE OF EUROSCEPTICISM

As there are multiple origins, definitions and causes of Euroscepticism, there is also a panoply of dimensions and ways of expressing it, and those go way beyond the classical "hard" and "soft" Euroscepticism. Sofia Vasilopoulou, for example, clearly states that "opposition (to EU integration) has taken various forms and at times halted or delayed attempts to enhance European political unity" (Vasilopoulou, 2009: 1).

"In recent years, skepticism toward European institutions has transcended the support for small extremist parties starting to show manifest mass opposition (i.e. referenda, low voting turnout, etc.)." (Di Mauro, 2011:1). The author hereby refers to the different ways of expressing EU scepticism, those include, but are not restricted to: rise of anti-EU parties in national and European elections, low voter turnout in European elections, demonstrations in the streets, referenda such as Brexit's, answers to opinion polls, etc.. Other than these expressions, Euroscepticism also presents itself in a variety of types and dimensions:

Hard vs soft Euroscepticism

Even though these are concepts that are used and repeated constantly in Academia and politics, they emerged as a working theory on party-based Euroscepticism by Taggart

in 1998, further developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak in the following years. These terms were incorporated and criticised in various other works, but their pertinence remains to distinguish those that, in general, are anti-integration and oppose the very idea of European integration, and thus, the EU, and those that, even though not being, in principle, opposed to European integration, "are sceptical that the EU is the best form of integration", either because it is too inclusive (and opens doors to immigration, decreases State sovereignty, etc.), or because it is too exclusive (geographically or socially) (Taggart, 1998).

Party-based vs society-based euroscepticism

Party-based Euroscepticism refers to the attitudes of political parties showing opposition towards the EU as a principle and/or its current trajectory. As the concept of Euroscepticism itself, the definition of how European integration reflects upon and affects domestic party systems is also quite volatile and difficult to create a consensus around.

Taggart and Szczerbiak take Taggart's definition of "Hard" and "Soft" Euroscepticism and apply it to define party-based Euroscepticism as hard and soft. For them, party-based Hard Euroscepticism is

> where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2003:2)

and party-based Soft Euroscepticism is

> where there is not a principled opposition to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU trajectory (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2003:3).

Rovni (2004) goes further and conceptualises party-based Euroscepticism in terms of magnitude and motivations. According to the author, the magnitude is defined in "hard" and "soft" positions as per Taggart and Szczerbiak, but he sees it as a continuum, with multiple positions being possible between "hard" and "soft".

Furthermore, he also considers motivations, that can be strategic or ideological, "therefore focusing on the political party dynamics and incentives attached to their positions on European integration" (Rovni, 2004: 2).

Apart from being differentiated by being pro/anti-integration and pro/anti-trajectory, parties can also be separated in terms of base ideology. Whereas nationalists will, in principle, be more prone to resisting the dilution of national sovereignty, neoliberals will be more willing to pool it to achieve economic integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). The authors also exemplify this phenomenon (and the clash between the two), with the Gaullist Rassemblement Pour la République in the 1990s and the British Conservative Party after Maastricht. Nevertheless, as Taggart and Szczerbiak suggest, party attitudes tend to be more conjunctural-opportunistic and medium-term strategic to respond to certain situations, rather than intricate ideological ones.

Finally, Taggart (1998) argues that there is a high level of consensus within the major parties of each Member State, making it so that it is those parties who stand more to the periphery of the party system that present more Eurosceptic views and attitudes. They can be in the extreme left or the extreme right, as Meijers (2017) suggests. The author argues that, instead of being a linear phenomenon across the spectrum of populism, it diverges from the extreme-right to the extreme-left. The differences are in terms of the causes to oppose European integration: while the extreme-left finds its motivations in socio-economic arguments, the extreme-right's basis for opposition is sovereignty and nationalism.

Meijers also suggests that "Euroscepticism is not simply a strategic political tool used by fringe parties to bolster its anti-establishment profile" (Meijers, 2017), as both party-based and society-based (public) Euroscepticism have "clear ideological bases and are reactive to developments of European integration." (Meijers, 2017). He further agrees that the type of opposition towards the EU varies from right-wing voters to left-wing voters, as it does in the party system.

As mentioned before, popular views and support/opposition for the European project have changed since the signing of the Maastricht treaty. From an elite-driven project, the European Union gained competencies and influence on the lives of the people,

and so, feeling more concerned about European integration, opposition coming from the general public started to arise. This change in sentiment and attitude has, as we have seen before, many different causes, consequences and ways to be expressed, as we are analysing now. According to Capuzzi the constraining dissensus opened "a public debate on EU legitimacy and feasibility, the current structure of multilevel governance, and the fundamental political principles that have driven the unification" (Capuzzi, 2016: 2). The author argues that popular support for European integration is composed by two distinct dimensions, one of political and the other of instrumental support. Previous literature had identified differences in the origin, causes and expression of individual support for integration through cognitive skills, education, political values, partisanship, income, age, profession, cultural and national background, etc…, but Capuzzi's goal is to group Euroscepticism into the two dimensions listed above. He follows Lubbers and Scheepers's definitions and states that political Euroscepticism is "as an opposition to transferring policy competencies to the supranational level" and instrumental is "is an opposition to a country's membership in the EU based on a cost-benefit calculus" (Capuzzi, 2016: 4).

After his empirical research, Capuzzi created a model to classify public support for integration in the countries he analysed:

		Instrumental	
		Negative	Positive
Political	National	*Eurorejects*	*Europragmatists*
	Mixed	*Moderate Eurolosers*	*Moderate Eurogainers*
	European	*Eurorealists*	*Euroenthusiasts*

Finally, McLaren investigates Mass-Level Euroscepticism as to "whether it is driven by:(a) feelings about national institutions, (b) distrust of supranational institutions, (c) fears about the loss of national identity, and (d) personal interest-based utilitarianism" (McLaren, 2007: 1).

Society-based, or mass Euroscepticism is, as every other EU-opposition related term, extremely hard to define as it is, as seen, varying in time, place, age, and a lot of other factors, but it is the main focus of our study, as it is extremely important for European integration, as Gabel pointed out, public attitudes "influence EU politics

through traditional channels of citizen politics such as lobbying, public protest, and elections. More generally, public attitudes provide the political foundation for integration" (Gabel, 1998:1). Some even consider that a certain level of doubt for European integration is positive and contributes to the development of the project.

But these are not the only types of Euroscepticism, WeBels, for example, identifies three different types of Eurosceptics, using the concept of political support to analyse Euroscepticism, taking into account questions of identity, attachment to the political community and approval of the regime, the author was able to establish that there are (1) critical Eurosceptics, accounting for 9% of the European population, that combine the lack of European identity with criticism towards the EU, and demand its improvement, (2) adamant Eurosceptics, accounting for 14% of Europeans, that "combine scepticism with no attachment to the European political community" (WeBels, 2007), and demand for an end in European integration, and (3) Eurosceptics with indifferent feelings about the community, accounting for 9% of European citizens.

Moreover, some authors even argue Euroscepticism can and should be studied as an ideology, as it has severe ideological implications (Flood and Soborski, 2018). They rule-out utilitarianism as costs and benefits of European integration can be accurately measured, but instead establish that the fact that the EU is a "hybrid, multi-level, unfinished construction" (Flood and Soborski, 2018) invites ideological appropriation, which has been, according to the authors, forgotten in the literature.

1.2.5. DEFINING THE OBJECT OF THIS STUDY

It was relevant to develop and build upon some of the different (already studied) types, dimensions and expressions of Euroscepticism, so that this research can also present their own. It is interesting to see how many different scholars have come up with so many different theories of Euroscepticism, be it party-based or society-based. It makes us believe that this phenomenon can be interpreted in a myriad of different ways, which is the objective of this section. For the purpose of this research, I will not elaborate much more on the types and dimensions of Euroscepticism, but it seems pertinent to point out that I will be further looking at how these discourses can society-based, "soft", "utilitarian" Euroscepticism. This particular kind of Euroscepticism, as I argue, can be

enhanced when lack of education and/or information about the EU is combined with recurrent scapegoating of the EU by the officials in power.

It is important to state, as a conclusion to this section, that I do not deny any of the origins, causes, expressions or academically recognised definition of Euroscepticism. I simply add to them and adapt them to my thesis as I stated is important in the beginning of this chapter. In addition, the fact that there is such an extensive debate on the definition of Euroscepticism is already an indicator that there is a logic of practicality in this political view, its debates, prerogatives and ways of expression. The fact that, in academia, in political circles in the media, etc... this term is scrutinised, repeated, studied, praised and feared suggests that it is accepted as a political view/feeling, that it can be considered a practice (to the extent of becoming normal), as it influences how other agents (media, politicians, scholars) speak and act about the European Union, as well as their electoral choices.

1.2.6. EUROSCEPTICISM AS PRACTICE

Social structures, in this case the European Union, the *field* in this particular study, is then supposed to be constructed by the different agents and be structured through a series of practices. This *field* was dominated by the elite (agents with the largest sum of capital), and so during the permissive consensus the dominant practice was to almost blindly support integration, without questioning or debating it too much. Then, with the changes within the *field* such as opening up to new agents of less social and symbolic capital, as well as the debate around European integration, other regards towards the Union started to appear and Euroscepticism being a strong aggregator of differing views (other than acceptance and support), grew in size and acceptance. Currently, it is considered an ideology, a legitimate political feeling. It is studied in academia and reflected in party systems, and largely portrayed in the media. It became a practice, constructed by agents of different capital and reflecting on their actions, and those of others in the same *field,* shared by those with a similar set of *habitus,* meaning the same background either in country of origin, culture, social status and/or education.

Going back to our definition of practice, analysing Euroscepticism with this lense means that it is a set of behaviours - the expressions, that are regular - patterned - which we have seen through the different types and ways of expression - socially meaningful - as they can easily be identified and reproduced by other agents in the *field* - depending on specific *habitus* - which we identified in its causes and origins - competent but sometimes unconscious, evolving and changing - as it started as a very specific phenomenon in the UK and spread to continental Europe adapting to the different countries' political systems -, and finally that it has the ability to change the structure and affect institutions connected to it - as Di Mauro clearly states "Disengagement and opposition toward Europe hurt the core of the whole European political system affecting legitimacy and democratic quality." (Di Mauro, 2011:1). It can also affect social structure in other *fields,* such as, in this case, national politics.

Drawing upon Holtz's "three broad elements of practices", we can identify:
- Material: opinion polls, elections, demonstrations, familial discussions, debates, etc..
- Meaning: the EU's alleged democratic deficit, the utilitarian view of European integration, the belief that membership is not as beneficial as non-membership, etc…
- Competence: this one is harder to identify because this sentiment comes from so many different agents, but we could identity at least some knowledge of politics and participation in the democratic system.

The elements we have identified in the previous sections of this chapter, as well as the examples we just gave are, I believe, a detailed overview of how Euroscepticism appeared, how it became a practice and what makes it so, how it is growingly reproduced by agents in several *fields* related to EU politics and how it is becoming more structuring of these *fields.*

In the next chapter, we will theorise the other practice we identified as relevant for this study: using the EU as a scapegoat to justify unpopular policy decisions[23]. We will both see how speech act theory can serve as a theoretical explanation to these performances as well as what makes them practices and how they influence, and are constituted by the first practice we identified here: Euroscepticism.

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[23] By pro-EU governments

1.3 THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE AND HOW THE SPEECH ACT THEORY CAN ALLOW FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF DISCOURSES OF EU SCAPEGOATING BY PRO-EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS

In this part, the goal is to set the foundations of a theoretical explanation to the phenomenon of EU scapegoating by pro-European governments, as of why and through which mechanism they do it, and what makes it a practice, in this case in the *field* of national politics. We will do a literature review on speech act theory of linguistics, how it was applied to International Relations and even sometimes related to practice theory, and finally see how it can be adapted to the case here studied. Since we recognise the hardship of empirically establishing a relationship between domestic political discourse and the rise in Eurosceptic views and votes, we will first do a demonstration on how, in theory, these two practices can be mutually constituted and constantly influenced.

A link between speech act theory and practice theory, which we will try to establish in this part, is not new. Even though in a different field of study, McKaughan already established that certain types of performative speech acts can influence scientific practices. The matter here is to find out if it can also influence political practice. Moreover, Reckwitz evidently defines discursive practices as "one type of practices among others", and states that these kinds of practices "embrace different forms in which the world is meaningfully constructed in language or in other sign-systems" (Reckwitz, 2002:254), and that they are more than chains of signs, they structure the *field* and give meaning to relations between agents and between them and the structure. "In discursive practices the participants ascribe, in a routinized way, certain meanings to certain objects (which thus become 'signs') to understand other objects, and above all, in order to do something." (idem:255). This last part of the author's statement "to do something", is the performative of the speech act that, we argue, can constitute a practice. Even though the author claims that discursive practices are not identical to speech acts, I believe from the previous justification that sometimes, the performative speech acts can constitute practices, such as in the case we will now start to theorise and deconstruct. Moreover, other authors recognise the possibility of discursive practices, such as Adler and Pouliot, who state that "the performativity of language should obviously be taken seriously". The authors also define discursive practices, ultimately relating them to speech acts and thus

giving us another reason to believe that performative utterances can indeed constitute practices: "Discursive practices, thus, are socially meaningful speech acts, according to which saying is doing (Searle, 1969)" (Adler, Pouliot, 2011:16).

Nicholas Onuf, pioneer constructivist, is one of the prominent figures of constructivism in International Relations, arguing that many elements of international relations are socially constructed, rather than being regulated by rational or irrational human nature or the nature of politics (the structure). According to his theory, the acts (deeds), which consist of speech acts or physical actions, create the world (Campos). A parallel can then be made with Bourdieu's concept of practice, which also structures the relations between agents and also the structure itself. After looking at a practice that has a lot of different ways of expression, physical and discursive, we will look at one that is exclusively discursive and made up of performative speech acts: the Scapegoating of the EU by pro-European governments.

Onuf's "deeds" are an adaptation of the speech act theory, which we will now revisit. Speech act theory was first put forward by J.L. Austin in the late 50s and further developed by John Searle in the following decades. A digest of 12 of Austin's conferences at Harvard University in 1955 was published posthumously in 1962 by the Oxford University Press, and contain the essence of his theory, it is called *"How to do things with words"*. After realising that mainstream philosophical theories focussed mainly on the meaning of sentences instead of its context and the occasion in which they were spoken, Austin developed what is arguably his main contribution, based on Wittgenstein's pragmatic philosophy (Haack, 1982), was that he argued that words, sentences, speeches, etc… could be more than simply statements, they could be and perform actions, that is, saying could be doing, if when we say something, we are actually also performing an action. The British philosopher of language defined speech acts as all actions performed by producing an utterance, or, in other words, utterances that have a performative function in language and communication. By being performative, speech acts can then constitute practices, if they fulfil the other requirements we previously identify. We will later analyse if they do.

He (Austin, 1962) presented two types of statements: constatives and performatives. Constative utterances describe or report a state of affairs and can be valued

as true or false, that is, they are reports, descriptions or affirmations that are established as true or false if they are, respectively, adequate or inadequate to the situation they are describing[24]. Austin shows that one of the biggest mistakes in traditional philosophy is to only rationalise using declarations, forgetting that, in current language, we use other kinds of statements (Rodrigues, 2012), so he introduces the concept of performative statements that, when said, perform actions[25]. These statements do not describe or report things, therefore, cannot be considered as true or false, but rather perform acts (ordering, condemning, forgiving, etc.). When a performative utterance is made, an action is being realized. To these performative utterances, Austin called "speech acts". It is necessary to emphasize that making performative statement is not, by itself, the guarantee of the accomplishment of the act. For that, it is necessary that the performative statement is realized within an adequate context. Austin called conditions of felicity the adequacy of the performative statement to the context in which it is realized[26]. A performative utterance is felicitous if certain criteria are met: the speaker must have authority to perform the act (and therefore to make the performative statement) and circumstances must be appropriate. For the purpose of this study, I argue that pro-European parties, since they have traditionally been elected to from government (particularly in the case study of Portugal), have gained enough widespread legitimacy and greater visibility, in a way that their statements are taken more seriously by all kinds of audience (Eurosceptic of not) and are thus more prone to constructing social reality and influence on other agents' practices. In terms of the logic of practice, one could say that governments of any kind, but especially pro-European, have greater social and symbolic capital[27], and thus their performances have more impact in the structure. After establishing the two types of utterances, Austin then divided the speech act into three types or layers of interpretation: locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act (Yule, 1996).

The locutionary act is the primary act of producing a meaningful expression (Wagiman, 2007), it is the utterance itself. It is the literal meaning of the utterance, that is, what that particular sequence of words means.

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[24] For example: *Portugal is a Member State of the European Union.*

[25] Austin uses the example of the *I do* (marriage acceptance).

[26] If a salesperson orders a client to take antibiotics, the sentence doesn't produce any effect, since the salesperson has no medical authority to prescribe medication. On the other hand, if a licensed doctor did so, the performative would be accomplished.

[27] As defined above.

The illocutionary act is, according to Yule (1996: 48) the underlying meaning of the utterance, the action performed via the meaning of the sentence. When a person emits this statement, they have some kind of function in mind. "It is also generally known as the illocutionary force of the utterance" (Yule, 1996:48). The illocutionary act is "performance of an act *in* saying something as opposed to performance of an act *of* saying something" (Austin, 1962: 99), that is, illocutionary is the act of the utterance, the act which is performed by saying the utterance. Illocutionary acts can be promises, offers, orders, requests, explanations, justifications etc. Austin later identified (and John Searle developed) five types of illocutionary acts, which are not particularly relevant to this study.

Finally, and because "saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons" (Austin, 1962: 101), a perlocutionary act is thus the effect of the utterance, direct or indirect, as desired and intended by the speaker or not. Perlocutionary acts operate *by* saying something. Moreover, "the perlocutionary consequences of illocutionary acts are non-conventional, not being completely under the speaker's control, but rather related to the specific circumstances in which the act is performed" (Berdini and Bianchi)[28]. Thus, the perlocutionary act is the effect of the utterance on the hearer, depending on specific circumstances, the hearer's reaction towards the speaker's statement. They include persuading, embarrassing, inspiring, intimidating, etc... For example, in the sentence "That food is really spicy", the locutionary part is the fact that the food is spicy, the illocutionary meaning is a warning to the hearer that the food is spicy, and the perlocutionary can thus either be encouraging the hearer to try the food, if they like spicy, or discouraging them from eating the food, if they don't like spicy. In a nutshell, according to Neill, the locutionary act is what we say, the illocutionary is what we mean when we say it and the perlocutionary is what we accomplish by saying it.

Going back to how Onuf utilised Speech Act theory to lay out his broad constructivism theory in International Relations, he argues that through these acts agents

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[28] Austin, John Langshaw | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (no date)

make the material world "a social reality for themselves as human beings" (Onuf, 1998:64), which is the same kind of effect that practices have, making us ever closer from relating the two. "Constructivism holds that people make society, and that society makes people. This is a continuous two-way process"(Onuf, 1998:59, *in* Campos, 2015:3), that is, applied to what we are here analysing, since "people make society" (through practices, some of which discursive), governments, having greater social capital, hold a particularly important role in the making of certain aspects of society (certain *fields*) such as defining widely accepted views on the EU, and since "society makes people" then it is possible to see how the practice of Euroscepticism grows, in this circle of co-influence between the individuals (agents of lesser capital), the government (agents of greater capital) and the society (the structure): the government, through certain practices, one of which scapegoating, instils in a certain number of individuals the view that the EU is to blame for a certain number of policies, then, by transmitting their views to their children, their peers, etc, create this sentiment within the society, and when society is contributing to the political growth of new individuals, it instils in them that feeling, and so it spreads to become the mainstream thought about the EU. By repeating this cycle for long enough, and again using Onuf's theory, these feeling towards the EU become the rule[29], a practice as we have seen before, telling people what to do and how to act, and, in this case, think, vote, etc... Onuf (1998) defines speech acts as "speaking in a way that causes one to act" (Idem:66). To the author, a speech act is generally formulated as follows: "(agent) affirms, promises, demands… to anyone who hears that a state of things exists (is true) or can be achieved" (idem). As so, speech acts will or won't be fulfilled depending on whether others respond to what they hear, and if the response was the one expected by the speaker, and, according to Onuf, it has no implications for future situations, that is, it only refers to the present.[30] However, as the author states, if a speaker repeats over time a particular performative statement, or, in other words, if it becomes a practice, people begin to think that that repetition has some meaning. "Repeatedly, the same old speech act becomes a convention, since everyone begins to believe that words alone, not those who have uttered them, are responsible for what happens." (Onuf, 1998: 66, *in* Campos, 2015:4). This may happen through a normalisation process, or simply a process of more-

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[29] According to Onuf, social rules are the way by which individuals and society are constituted continually and reciprocally. (Campos)

[30] In the case of this study, if for example a Prime Minister says that the 2008 crisis is the EU's fault, they are only referring to that specific crisis, not all future and past ones.

or-less conscious reproduction of practices. Onuf defines three types of speech acts[31], stating that rules can take the form of the three. The one that particularly interests us in this case is the assertive. In this form, rules inform the agents about the world, how things are and how they work, these are called rules of instruction (Onuf, 1998). Instructive rules constitute reality.

After this brief description of the original speech act theory by J.L. Austin, as well as its adaptation into International Relations' constructivist theory by Nicholas Onuf, I aim to adapt it to the phenomena I am describing, and then conclude on how it constitutes a discursive practice. When, for example, in February 2016, the Portuguese finance minister Mário Centeno (authority) said "The growth that we have at the moment was, we must say, downgraded from the draft budget plan and reacts to what is obviously the exigence of greater deficit reduction"[32], after the European Commission and the European Central Bank expressed their doubts about the socialist government's first budget (context), and while the mention to the EU is very subtle, he had the intention on pinning the downgrade of the expected growth on the EU's requirements, justifying it. In this case, we can say this was a speech act since this statement performed an action: the locutionary act would be the fact that the minister had to downgrade the expected growth as compared to the draft budget plan; the illocutionary act, what the minister meant is that the EU forced him to downgrade the expected growth because he hadn't taken into account the country's commitments with the European partners, thus justifying his position; and the perlocutionary would be the effect we could argue that the minister wanted to produce on his listeners/readers, that is, blaming the EU for having to review economic growth expectation, and making the citizens believe this was out of his control. Because the context in which this utterance was produced (presenting the budget to the parliament), as well as the authority of the person producing it (an apparently impartial member of the government), fulfilled the conditions of felicity of this performative utterance, it can be said that the effects that it intended to produce on the hearer were accomplished.

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[31] Assertive, directive and comissive. (Campos)
[32] *Governo culpa Bruxelas pelo enfraquecimento da economia* (2016)

Using the same example and looking at Hobart's definition of discursive practices: "practices of knowing, explaining, justifying and so on" and "practices of asserting, denying, questioning, deceiving and so forth" (Hobart 2005: 26, 31 *in* Postill, 2010:3), and assuming that these scapegoating utterances are mostly performed to justify unpopular policy decisions or outcomes[33], we can posit that these types of utterances, indeed, constitute a practice, which then facilitates the constitution and reproduction of the practice of Euroscepticism in its multiple forms and expressions, and vice-versa. This position will be further developed in the next sections.

In November 2018, the Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa decided to write a tweet "clarifying" (justifying) why macroeconomic predictions made by the European Commission (EC) were different than the ones made by the Portuguese finance ministry. The tweet (image 3) reads "About the European Commission's' economic predictions, released yesterday, it is worth it to compare the predictions made previous years with the final results."[34] The fact that the Prime Minister tweeted such thing (the title of the chart he presents is "Winter predictions: European Commission vs Reality"), is an illocutionary act (or expression of a discursive practice) of clarification, justifying, or one could even go to the extent of saying, challenge, contradict or even imprecate the European Commission and its ability to make macroeconomic predictions. By doing the contraposition of the "European Commission's predictions" and "reality", the Prime Minister is implying that the EC's predictions are false or inaccurate, creating the image that it should not be trusted to make rigorous macroeconomic forecasts, affecting the EU institutions image as a whole.

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[33] As we will try to establish in the empirical part of this thesis.

[34] Translated by the author

Image 3: screenshot of the tweet made on November 9 2018 by Portuguese Prime Minister, on the EC's economic predictions for 2019

It seems particularly adequate to refer to the scapegoating of the EU by pro-European Member States' Governments in the context of linguistics, and especially performativity, since according to constructivist theory of International Relations, and going back to how we started this sub-chapter, the linguistic construction of social reality results in discursive practices that constitute the identities and interests of agents in international (and one can specify, European) politics (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). In this case, it is possible to transpose this thesis to the internal sphere, arguing that these linguistic acts performed by governments, as part of the discursive practice of using the EU as a scapegoat to justify policy, contribute to the construction of the social reality, in this case, by instilling in the citizens the sentiment that all policy failures and unpopular policy decisions are the EU's fault, further making the practice of Euroscepticism more reproducible and structuring of the *field*. The debate in International Relations theory suffered, in the beginning of this century, what theorists call the "linguistic turn", that is, the growing concern with the relationship between language and reality, seeking to dispel the idea that language is merely a representation of material reality. Language is thus understood as creative, since some actions can only be realized through language (Campos). One of these actions, one could argue, in convincing, persuading someone of something. In the case of this study, it is useful to state that most citizens are not born (or reach adulthood, in most cases) with an opinion on the EU. Instead, this opinion is formed

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from their *habitus* and their interaction with other agents through their practices: what they hear at home, in school, in their communities and on the media, that is, it is constructed through social interactions, where people use language to express their views and try to convince one another that their opinion is the right one. Arguably, governments, through their common practices, also have an important role in forming their citizens opinions and views about the EU, including in making the practice of Euroscepticism more accepted and reproducible. They are thus agents in the construction of their social reality and of social practices in some of the *fields* they are most relevant in.

Before moving on to the next part, it is worthy to exclude any thoughts that may arise from reading this thesis regarding its theoretical proximity with the Copenhagen School of International Relations and its approach on security studies. Indeed, the main authors of this school (including Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan) did base their security and securitisation theories on speech acts, building a critical approach drawing on constructivism. Trying to move away between the debate on whether security threats are real or not, Copenhagen scholars focus on conceptualising security as a speech act, that is, on how certain issues can be constituted as a threat (Wæver, 1989). The idea of securitisation comes thus as the phenomena of extreme politisation in which political actors, through public speeches (performing speech acts), transform certain subjects into matters of national security (Buzan, Wæver, 1998:25) , then justifying the extraordinary means needed to deal with them, enabling themselves with more freedom of action. It could thus seem like I could be ultimately doing the same adaptation of speech act theory as these authors did, and thus arguing that this scapegoating of the EU is due to securitisation of the political sphere. Moreover, it could also be argued that this concept and theory could serve as the theoretical framework for this dissertation. Nevertheless, the political actors in the case study I am analysing (which can be read in the second part) rarely or never mention the EU being a threat to national security, thus excluding the relevance of security studies put forward by the Copenhagen School of International Relations to this specific study.

Analysing the logic of practicality in EU scapegoating performatives

Using the same nexus as when justifying our reasons to believe Euroscepticism has become a practice, we will now do the same exercise with the performatives of policy justification through EU-scapegoating by pro-European governments.

Political figures that make up national governments are arguably one of the agents in the EU *field* with the greatest capital (of all sorts, maybe excluding cultural which is not particularly relevant in this case), putting them in a position from which they can influence the behaviour, and thus the practices, as well as ways of thinking, of other agents, and even the structure. Being Euroscepticism now regarded as a normal practice, as argued before, the discourse governments have towards the EU is therefore able to reinforce and change perceptions of the citizens in regard to European integration, as well as how they act upon it - how they vote (or don't vote) etc. With the repetition of this discourse through time (regularity) and across the pro-European spectrum, with a certain level of competence, flair and using it strategically (in the logic of electioneering) it also becomes a practice in the *field* of domestic politics, which is closely related to that of the EU[35].

The fact that these discourses constitute a practice also means that they can be pronounced unconsciously or at least semi-consciously. As Pouliot states, "social action is not necessarily preceded by a premeditated design" (Pouliot, 2008: 5), and "hunches take precedence over rational calculations", meaning that members of government can pronounce these discourses without always reflecting on their consequences: "we respond to the world without rational reflection" (Hopf, 2010:2), even though in its essence, this practice is strategic.

Going back to our definition of practice, analysing EU scapegoating to justify policy with this lens means that it is a set of behaviours - the speech acts, that are regular[36] - patterned (follow the same structure) - which we have seen through some examples that were given and will continue to be given in the empirical chapter - socially meaningful -

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[35] Bourdieu established that *fields* are only relatively autonomous since all fields are embodied in the *social space*.

[36] We will try to establish its regularity in the empirical chapter.

as they can easily be identified and reproduced by other agents in the *field*[37]- depending on specific *habitus* - which in this case are electioneering and party/government survival[38]- competent but sometimes unconscious, evolving and changing - as the scapegoating is done through a multitude of means and with varying degrees of subtility -, and finally that it has the ability to change the structure and affect institutions connected to it - as it can also affect social structure and practices in other *fields,* such as, in this case, European politics and the practice of Euroscepticism.

Drawing upon Holtz's "three broad elements of practices", we can identify:
- Material: conventional and social media platforms, parliamentary debates, etc.
- Meaning: electioneering as central in representative democracy, justification through scapegoating as a means of avoiding popular discontent.
- Competence: argumentative skill, knowledge of the political system.

One of the main points that I would like to take from this theoretical analysis to the empirical part of my dissertation is whether there are positive illocutionary acts made by pro-European governments and with what frequency they are made. From a preliminary analysis, the working hypothesis is that the quantity and strength of negative or neutral illocutionary acts performed by pro-European governments highly surpasses that of the positive ones, nor only in frequency but also in social meaningfulness, as one could argue justification of policy through scapegoating constitutes a practice, whilst standing up for the EU doesn't since it isn't recurrent and strategic enough. Of course, a lot of other factors weigh-in what politicians say to the public, mainly party politics, which will be taken into account later in the empirical analysis.

In this subchapter it was argued that Austin's original Speech Act theory, as well as Onuf's adaptation, are a relevant starting point to elaborate a theoretical framework that can allow us to explain the phenomena of EU scapegoating by pro-European governments and that these speech acts, in being performative, strategic, recurrent,

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[37] Including members of government of other Member States, but also citizens through other practices such as Euroscepticism.

[38] It is instinctive of all governments to fight to survive in power.

socially meaningful and dependant on a set of *habitus* constitute a practice. Moreover, we said that this practice, because it is common to pro-European governments, holding great *capital* in the *field* of domestic and European politics, has the capacity of influencing other practices, particularly Euroscepticism, making it more accepted and reproducible. Which means it has become such an entrenched way of acting and speaking, implying that people come to speak of the European Union will do so in the same patterned fashion.

To summarise this first, theoretical part, the main point that I want to take to the empirical question is the following: two new practices have emerged that influence one another. First, Euroscepticism, as it became a normal and accepted view, studied by academics, exploited by politicians and portrayed in the media, reproduced by agents through a variety of means of expression and structuring the *fields* of European and national politics. And afterwards, strategically drawing from the first, policy justification through scapegoating the EU, that goes mostly uncontested and is constantly reproduced, and, as I argue, contributes, cyclically, to the enriching of the practice of Euroscepticism, while spreading it. As Bourdieu explained, social agents compete to maximise *capital* in each *field,* utilising individual strategies to do so. Transposing this to our argument, it is plausible to say that members of pro-European governments, to maximise their *capital* (influence in the political field - votes), utilise this scapegoating strategy, so much it becomes a practice. Since, in the view of Bourdieu, practices perpetuate the status quo of the structure, if Euroscepticism is normalised and it is highly present in a society, even if it's not practiced by the majority of agents, it will be perpetuated by the nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation of failures, against the will of the members of government who perform it, since they preach at the same time the fight against Euroscepticism.

Finally, I think it is also important to state that there is no "grand theory" of EU scapegoating by pro-European governments, other than the fact that, in a representative democracy, election results are the nexus, and thus, while in power, governments will go to the best of their extents to stay in power after the next elections.

In the next, empirical part, the goal henceforth will be to analyse to what extent these "justification through EU scapegoating" are regular, how they are viewed by experts and members of the governing parties themselves, and how they affect the *field*. It was

very important to establish this relation between both practices since it will be particularly difficult to empirically prove the extent of the influence the nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation of failures has on Euroscepticism.

PART 2: EMPIRICALLY PUTTING TO TEST OUR THEORETICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

"The attitude of National political leaders (...). Many are adept of the practice of doublespeak: often demanding reforms favourable to them or that seem necessary behind closed doors in Brussels but later appearing hostile to the action of the European Institutions when it comes to their implementation." - Costa, 2014:7

In the first part of this thesis we argued that Euroscepticism has become a social practice, influenced by many others. The one we are focusing on in this study is the scapegoating of the EU by pro-European governments to justify unpopular policy decisions and its outcomes, just as Costa argued in the quotation above, in what is, as far as I could investigate, the only mention to this phenomenon as a practice in literature. A theoretical argumentation was done to show that this constitutes a practice and that, in theory, it has the ability to influence others such as, in this case, Euroscepticism. It is thus now the time to move on to an empirical demonstration.

The main goal of this second part is therefore twofold: first, to empirically put to test our theoretical assumption that the Scapegoating of the EU has become a practice by demonstrating its regularity, and the acknowledgement of its existence by political figures and experts. This is our main goal as it will let us establish that it is actually a practice[39]. We will also try to understand the extent to which this practice is an object of reflection or, instead, a slip of the tongue, almost a habit which politicians conduct on a regular basis. Finally, we will briefly try to establish a connection between this practice and Euroscepticism, looking into how one can influence the other, especially how this blame game has in part provoked the growth of Euroscepticism in its many different expressions, which we will further elaborate in the final remarks of this thesis.

Rouse (2006) states that in order to analyse a phenomenon with attention to practice and the logic of practicality, it is important to assign constitutive roles to vocabulary and other linguistic forms or performances, which we have started to do when

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[39] The only aspects of practice that we can test for are regularity and level of competence, all others have been theoretically demonstrated.

introducing speech act theory as a framework to understand scapegoating of the EU by pro-European governments, and will continue to do in this chapter, through the analysis of illocutionary acts of justification in political discourse, literature analysis, interviews and a survey, to try to empirically establish a logic of practicality in these discourses, and see how it affects the practice of Euroscepticism.

I recognise the hardship of empirically establishing a relationship between domestic political discourse and the rise in Eurosceptic views and votes. As Flood (2002) recognises, even measuring Euroscepticism is far from being an exact science:

> With regard to public attitudes, the progress of research will undoubtedly make it possible to anatomise popular opinion on the EU with increasing refinement. At present, much of what is asserted concerning the nature and extent of EUscepticism among national publics is based, as my own analysis was, on a patchwork of aggregated responses to questions which admit multiple interpretations. More sophisticated analyses are, of course, carried out, despite frequent caveats concerning the problems posed by the limitations of the survey data. Still, the nature and dimensions of popular EUscepticism appear either spuriously clear or disquietingly elusive. Much the same is true of the significance of EU-scepticism as a factor contributing to voting choices. It is there, but it is not easy to evaluate. - Flood, 2002:19 (UACES)

I intend to adapt his last sentence to this work: "It is there, but it is not easy to evaluate". As we will see throughout this chapter, many political and academic personalities have recognised this phenomenon and the effects it has on the EU's image, nevertheless, it is hard to accurately statistically measure the exact influence it has.

To do so, the chapter will be divided into three parts: a first one laying out the methodological guidelines of this empirical analysis, the second presenting the selected case study - Portugal - through the analysis of political discourse made by members of the party(ies) in government throughout the past 11 years (late 2007- early 2019), and the final one showing that the phenomenon of policy justification through EU scapegoating is present in multiple EU Member States, as well as recognised in the media, academia, political circles and perceived by citizens.

2.1. GENERAL METHODOLOGY AND SPECIFIC METHODS TO CARRY-OUT THE EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION

In what concerns the methodology for this empirical study, we will be focussing on analysing the illocutionary acts of justification of unpopular policy decisions. An interpretative approach will be privileged, just as we did in the two examples we already gave in the first part of this thesis, and the case-study of Portugal will allow us to see a pattern of policy justification using EU Scapegoating, as well as a tendency to nationalise success, in a country whose governments have been pro-European since the first democratic elections in 1976. With an essentially qualitative approach, the collected data will be descriptive, in an inductive analysis highlighting the processes that culminate in the exposed argumentation. Nevertheless, quantitative data will also be used, even if shortly, to present data for Euroscepticism and the results of a survey. Accordingly, we will try to empirically establish that these illocutionary acts of justification are a practice through three methods: (1) first, using the case-study of Portugal, we will be analysing and interpreting political speeches from members of government or the parties in government in the period stated before, (2) looking into the presence of this issue in the debates between Portuguese candidates for the European Parliament elections of May 2019, (3), presenting a set of interviews we carried-out with politically relevant figures and experts, and, then, (4) we will be researching for literature and media coverage that supports the hypothesis that this is a widespread phenomenon common to pro-European Member States Governments, as well as (5) presenting the results of a survey we implemented with respondents from several EU countries, to assess citizens' opinions perception over this matter.

The first part will thus consist of the analysis of the case of Portugal through interpretation of political discourse, the presentation of our interviews and the presence of this issue in the debates preceding the European Parliament elections of May 2019. The choice for Portugal as the case-study can be justified in several ways. First, it is a country that, as the Standard Eurobarometer nº66 (Autumn 2006) pointed out, has "demonstrated very favourable attitudes towards the EU since joining in 1986, almost invariably above the EU average" (idem, Portugal Executive Summary: 2), so it is arguably a country that has been tendentially supportive of the EU and trustful towards its institutions. Nevertheless, the trend reversed in the years that followed, since from

58% of trust in the EU in Autumn 2006, Autumn 2007 and Spring 2008, the number drastically decreased to 50% in Autumn 2010, and continued to fall through Spring 2011 (44%), Autumn 2013 (25%) - lowest ever - to then go back up to 57% in Spring 2018, but quickly decreasing to 55% in the Autumn of the same year. In terms of positive image of the EU, we can go back to Autumn 2006 where, in the national report, it is said that Portugal had always had very positive views towards the EU (above EU average and always above 60%), but since the beginning of the 2000s and especially between 2005 and 2006, there had been a constant decline, reaching only 48% in 2006[40], then rising in Spring 2008 to 55%, further decreasing to 49% in Spring 2009, 40% in Spring 2010, 35% in Spring 2011, 22% in Spring 2013 in an all-time low, to then experience a growing trend starting in Spring 2014 (30%), 42% in Spring 2015, up to 56% in 2018. This overview on the Portuguese citizens' views towards the EU can be an indicator of two things: first, that Portugal is tendentially, thus "traditionally" a country where citizens in general support the EU and the Portuguese membership. Moreover, as said before, there has never been since the beginning of the Portuguese democracy a single anti-EU party elected for office, even though Eurosceptic parties have seen a rise in representation following recent elections. The second thing it tells us is that there was an enormous decline in the positive views of the Portuguese towards the EU during the economic and financial crisis, which confirms that this People assess the EU in a utilitarian way, as defined in the first part of this thesis.

This structural, traditional support for the EU, coupled with the economic conjuncture of the past ten years make Portugal a very good example of a country whose people, traditionally pro-European, became increasingly sceptic when policy was not efficient and the economic situation was extremely poor. The hypothesis here would be, going back to Costa's statement quoted in the beginning of this part, that the successive Portuguese governments have practiced "doublespeak", asking the EU for reforms and blaming it for their implementations when they weren't well received by the voters. This is what we will put to test through: (1) analysis of illocutionary acts of justification/clarification made by members of the government or the party(ies) in the government throughout those years (2007-2019), (2) looking into the presence of this

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[40] National report for Portugal in the Standard Eurobarometer n°66 - Autumn 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_pt_nat.pdf

issue in the debates between Portuguese candidates for the European Elections in May 2019, and (3) interviews to Members of Parliament and party leaders of the parties in government during those years and experts.

Another reason for choosing Portugal as the case-study for this thesis is a very practical/logistical one. I realised the access to Portuguese platforms (such as "Canal Parlamento", the channel with the recording of all debates held in the Portuguese Parliament), media, and political figures would be a lot higher than any other country since it is my current country of residence. My fluency in the language and understanding of the political and social conjuncture also make it easier to analyse in such a short period of time. Language skills are particularly important in this case since it will be easier for me to understand the subtleties of speech and the hidden meanings and intentions in speech acts. Thirdly, it was a way to profit from the internship I did in the Portuguese Parliament from October 2018 to January 2019, where I was able to collect data from plenary sessions and committee meetings and perform most of the interviews that will be presented here.

For the first section of this case-study, that is, the analysis of political speech acts of policy justification/clarification/explanation through EU scapegoating, we chose the period of 2007 through the present time (2019), the reason being the fluctuation in the support for the EU registered in Portugal in those years, and the fact that even though since 2014 it has experienced a growth, Eurosceptic parties still got an increase in their representation in the Portuguese Parliament in the 2015 election, and in the 2019 European election Portugal registered an all-time low voter turnout of just 31,4%, one of the lowest in Europe, showing disbelief in the importance of their voices for the European project. The research we conducted to find these speeches was based on keywords we entered the main informational media platforms, looking for debates and addresses related to the presentation of the budget or any other moment where austerity measures were applied, as we recognised that the Portuguese are more susceptible to react to these policies.

For this analysis will be collecting examples of illocutionary acts of justification made by members of government or parties in government in this period, following the structure of the examples we already gave in the theoretical explanation, while at the same

time reviewing speeches from when the situation was getting better, to investigate if the government also mentioned the EU in those, checking for the nationalisation of successes. We will try to avoid media interference as much as possible, as what we are trying to examine are political discourses and not how the media portrays them, which can easily be different. For that, we will try to use only directly quoted/live speeches and debates.

We are basing this analysis in the theoretical ground we presented in the first part, that utterances have no meaning in itself and that «'in saying something we do something' (Austin 1975: 94). There is an 'illocutionary force' to language. Furthermore, what we say may have an effect on other people; by saying something, we may not only act ourselves, but also force others to do so.» (Diez, 1999: 2). This implies that we will be looking at the meaning that the speakers wanted their discourses to have, as well as, briefly, what they wanted to provoke in the audience. As Schäffner pointed out "any political action is prepared, accompanied, controlled and influenced by language. We could easily add other verbs to this list, such as guided, explained, justified, evaluated, criticised, …" (Schäffner, 1996: 1), showcasing the structuring role of language for politics. She further states that the "study of language has recently become more central to" the study of politics. I intend to follow this trend and thus argue that language, in particular performative utterances (illocutionary acts as per Austin), is central to the analysis of political phenomenon such as Euroscepticism. While analysing the adjacent meaning, regularity and level of competence/consciousness of these illocutionary acts, we will also establish the reasoning behind these speech acts and its intentionality and, second, to what extent can they influence the *field* and the other practices present there.

This first part of the case-study will serve to assess the regularity of these illocutionary acts, its strategic nature and the degree of consciousness with which they are performed by different politicians in different moments, which will contribute to the empirical demonstration of the logic of practicality in these utterances.

Secondly, we will make a point on how this practice, and the issues it brings were brought up in the televised debates between Portuguese candidates for the 2019 European Parliament election. For that matter, we will be looking directly to the first of these debates, not to how the media portrayed them and analysed them, in order to keep the direct, intact words of the candidates. This will serve to evaluate to what extent these

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relevant political figures recognise the existence and importance of this issue and its effects, while some of them are members of the parties that do it. This part will be brief, yet important to understand how this practice is widely recognised by the member of the performing parties themselves, as well as the possible effects it has on the public opinion towards the EU.

Finally, we will be presenting the interviews we carried-out with relevant national political figures. For this, we chose members of the parties that were in government in the period 2007-2019 (PS, PSD and CDS-PP[41]), as well as the Head of the Representation of the European Commission in Portugal. The interviews to most of the party members will serve to analyse their views on certain EU policies and how they think they are more of less beneficial for the country, establishing the practicality of the Europeanisation of failures and to some extent its level of consciousness and implicity, and the others together with the interview with the representative of the European Commission, will serve to establish their views on this practice and how it affects public opinion towards the EU, shedding the light once more on the recognition of this practice by the political community, including members of the parties who perform it. Even though the choice for the parties was intentional, as justified above, the choice for their representatives was situational, reflecting what access I had to certain personalities, especially the internship I did in the parliamentary group of the PSD, giving me greater access to their Members of Parliament and thus justifying why most of the interviews I will present are from this party.

In terms of the organisation of the interviews, most were presential and recorded, while some were answered by email[42]. The questions asked to the party members were about some EU policies and the impact they had on the country, how they have or would have portrayed them to the citizens, as well as if they, or a Member of their party, has ever blamed the EU for any policy failures while their party was in government. It is also important to say that the interviewed were informed that this study was about "the politicians views towards the EU". In regard to the EC representative in Portugal, she was informed that the study was about "the Nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation

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[41] PS is the Socialist Party, PSD is the Social-Democratic Party and CDS-PP is the Party of the Democratic Social Centre - Popular Party
[42] See appendix 3

of failures by pro-European governments", and the questions were about this practice and the influence it had on public opinion towards the EU.

The second part will then consist of some examples of Europeanisation of failures by pro-European Governments in various Member States, followed by a short literature review on this phenomenon, as well as its acknowledgement from relevant figures in European politics, and finally the presentation of the results of a survey conducted to assess the citizens' perception practice and its effects. In this first part, we will be using some media platforms to get the examples of illocutionary acts of justification through EU scapegoating, but we will once more try to the biggest extent to minimise media influence by searching for articles with direct transcription or live videos of the speeches, in order to insure objectiveness and fairness in the interpretation and analysis. In what concerns the survey, the specific details of the questions asked, and the demographics of the respondents will be detailed in the respective section. This chapter will be important to establish that this phenomenon is recognised in the media, academia and political circles all over the EU, thus enlarging our scope.

I believe these methods to be adequate, logistically and scientifically, to establish an empirical demonstration of the practicality of the illocutionary acts of justification/explanation/clarification of policy through EU scapegoating, as well as a starting point for further research on its effects in public support of the EU. By mixing qualitative and quantitative methods I intend to make this empirical demonstration as broad as possible and as accurate as possible in such a difficult-to-measure practice.

I recognise at the outset the difficulties that lie ahead, namely in what concerns finding a wide variety of these discourses without a database (that doesn't exist), as well as investigating examples of this practice in other countries where I do not dominate the language without media interference. Nevertheless, to the possible extent, we will try to avoid mediation and go directly to the source, or at least to articles where the speakers are directly quoted.

A second hardship faced related to the access to political figures and experts, which proved to be mostly out-of-reach for interviews, except for a few.

Moreover, it was also strenuous to find participants for the survey that was conducted to assess citizens' views on this matter. Because I had to use my personal contact network, a vast majority of the respondents are citizens with higher education (either holding Bachelor's or Master's degrees) and with an age range of 17 to 29, and the number of responses is low (59). Even though I undoubtedly recognise the lack of representativity of the general public present in the respondents of this survey, I believe it can shed a light on how more educated and young citizens are able to perceive these behaviours and criticise them, while recognising the nefarious effects they may have in the less educated and older part of the population's perception towards the EU.

A final difficulty that is clear, as evidenced in the introduction to this part, as it is not possible to accurately measure, or even say for sure what impact do these illocutionary acts that we are analysing on Euroscepticism, we can only base ourselves in the rise of anti-EU parties almost all over Europe, and the low turnout rates in the last European elections, that both show discontent towards the EU even when the Eurobarometer survey points to an increase of support[43].

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[43] Several elements can explain this discrepancy, such as the lack of knowledge towards the EU, but it does not mean that the Eurobarometer is not accurate in measuring citizens' views towards the EU, iti just implies that there are other forms of expressing Euroscepticism such as the vote for Eurosceptic parties and abstentionism in European Elections.

2.2. The case of Portugal: how using the EU to justify unpopular political decisions is the second most popular "sport" for members of government

"In Portugal, people carried effigies of their Prime Minister on strings and claimed
he was a 'puppet of the EU'" (Hobolt et al., 2014:3)

The first and favourite "sport" for members of government in Portugal is[44], of course, blaming the previous government for all the difficult decisions they have to make, especially when it comes to cutting public spending and raising taxes. The second is to turn to the EU and use it as a scapegoat for the same thing.

The difference is that members of the previous governments have broad access to national media platforms and can thus defend itself and deny responsibility in said political decisions. On the other hand, the European Union and its governors have clearly less access to national media than national governments and other national political parties, mostly not being able to explain the decision or deny responsibility, as we will see when we present the results of the survey, in the next chapter. In a nutshell, we have seen before and will continue to see in the next chapter how and why the EU makes for a perfect scapegoat. In the particular case of Portugal, Jalali (2012) claims that «In contexts like that of Portugal, characterized by a weak direct articulation of civil society and interest groups with Brussels, executives benefit even more disproportionately from this "European trump card"», the government sees "its position reinforced in the top-down relationship", conferring "upon it a crucial role as the interpreter of European decisions at the national level", and thus allowing "for blame-avoidance, as executives can use the European dimension as a pretext for measures they consider desirable, but which they fear may be unpopular."(Jalali, 2012: 78) (as Costa also stated).

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[44] As happens in most Member States, according to Hobolt *et al.* (2014).

To develop this argument, and see how Portugal is a great example of a country where this practice is very present, we will firstly look into some examples of when members of government and/or the parties in government performed this practice, as to establish the character of these utterances, prove its regularity and evaluate its level of competence/consciousness. Then, see how this question was addressed in the debates for the European elections in 2019, and we will finally present a set of interviews carried-out with Members of the parties in government from 2007 to 2019 and representative of the European Commission in Portugal, to reinforce the empirical proof that this practice exists and that it is recognised. It is important to state that, since the first democratic elections in 1975, Portugal has never had a Eurosceptic party in government.

2.2.1. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS OF JUSTIFICATION IN THE GOVERNMENT'S SPEECHES FROM 2007 TO 2019[45]

Before starting the listing and analysis of the examples, it is important to say that I will not evaluate the veracity of the utterances. The objective is to establish the regularity and consciousness of these illocutionary acts, contextualise them and examine their implicit meanings and potential consequences. Likewise, we recognise the almost omnipresence of the EU on its Member States' everyday life and are thus aware of its implication in national policy, "for good and bad". It is also relevant to note that the listing will be in chronological order.

Starting with the first government we will analyse, led be the Socialist Party PS, in late 2007, in the presentation of the Budget for 2008 by Prime-Minister José Sócrates to the National Parliament, one that was particularly marked, as the Prime-Minister himself said, by the drastic reduction in public spending to reduce the deficit, which generated opposition in the Parliament and among the public, he stated that "the reality is that excessive deficits and debts threaten communitarian funds (...) and thus threaten above all the living conditions and the future of the Portuguese"[46]. This statement even if

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[45] In this period there were three governments of the Socialist Party - PS (2005-2009, 2009-2011 and 2015-2019) and two of the coalition between the Social-Democrats and the Christian Democrats - PSD and CDS-PP (2011-2015 and 2015)

[46] Source: video of the debate recorded by ARTV available at http://videos.sapo.pt/43WQQ6GM11Ogh0eakZN2 Translation by the author.

subtle, implies that the measures taken by the government in this budget, that the Prime-Minister was predicting would face opposition, are to ensure that we get EU funds, so important to the daily lives of the Portuguese. It also more subtly implies that the EU only cares about the deficit numbers and the debt, withdrawing the funds if they are excessive. In this case, we can argue that it was strategic (because he had a script) but also quite mechanical since, in other occasions, Sócrates argued that the EU is good for Portugal. In the same debate, when defending the heavy reduction in current public spending (2%), the Prime-Minister argued that this is even " classified by the European Central Bank as an ambitious reduction"[47], implying the importance of the ECB's approval of these measures, but can also be interpreted as something done to "please" this institution.

What is also interesting to see in this same debate, is that in the Prime Minister's first intervention, when talking about the state of the country, he mentioned a lot of accomplishments that "the government"; "us"; "the Socialist Party", etc... had achieved in the past years, namely investment in schools, roads, companies and public services, as well as, according to him "the biggest deficit reduction the nation had ever seen". Throughout this first part of showing the good things before bad news came, Sócrates never mentioned the EU's support or co-funding of the projects he enounced, such as "Parque escolar" and "Programa novas oportunidades", two flagship programs of his government that accounted for high percentages of EU funding, and making for a good example of the nationalisation of successes.

Still regarding the budget for 2008, the government's report justifies the reduction in current revenues with the decrease in current transfers, "specifically stressing: (...) The decrease in current transfers from the European Union"[48] , pinning the reduction on public spending on the decrease in funds coming from the EU, without explaining the reason for the cut.

Moving to the end of 2010, when the budget for 2011 was being debated, one that the media and political actors classified as "one of the biggest reductions of public

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[47] Translation by the author.

[48] Ministério das Finanças e da Administração Pública, Orçamento do Estado para 2008 - Relatório, pp. 132
https://www.parlamento.pt/OrcamentoEstado/Documents/oe/2008/Relatorio_PropostaLei_MapasLei/relatorio_2008.pdf Translation by the author.

spending and tax raise in Portuguese history", the finance Minister Teixeira dos Santos gave an interview to the TV channel SIC, to explain the choices made in terms of cuts and tax raises. It was a moment where the other parties in Parliament were threatening to vote against the budget proposal, what would put into question the government's maintenance of power. The journalist asked, to this purpose: "if the budget proposal wasn't approved, will we have to knock on the door of the European funds?", to what the minister answered that Portugal wouldn't survive that scenario, and that "we wouldn't need to knock, they would contact us (...) demanding conditionalities, and we already experienced in the past conditionalities imposed in our economy (...), that implied heavy sacrifices by the Portuguese families (...)".[49]. This affirmation is quite clear in how the minister wanted to do two things: first, explain and justify why the budget is performing such high cuts in salaried and social programs and tax raises, and then guilt the other parties into approving the budget, inciting the fear for the "bureaucrats in Brussels" and in other international institutions to come and "impose" their conditionalities.

Still regarding the budget for 2011, specifically the government's predictions for the deficit, that were lower than the ones put forward by the European Commission, the Economy minister Vieira da Silva stated that "a year ago, in the autumn forecasts, the European Commission calculated for Portugal a growth for this year of 0.3% and now it has corrected it for 1.3%"[50], and that according to the government's predictions, no other austerity measures would be needed implying that, since the Commissions' predictions were wrong once, they can be wrong again, but also that this institution has usually a more negative prediction than the government, meaning it always sees Portugal with a negative regard. Moreover, according to this utterance, if the government followed the Commission's predictions, more austerity measures would be needed as advised by the EC, but now with the government's predictions, meaning the latter are more beneficial for the Portuguese.

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[49] Sic Notícias, Edição de 16-10-2010 (1ª parte): Orçamento do Estado, entrevista ao ministro das Finanças, https://sicnoticias.pt/programas/jornaldanoite/2010-10-16-Edicao-de-16-10-2010--1-parte--Orcamento-do-Estado-entrevista-ao-ministro-das-Financas# Translation by the author

[50] Expresso Economia "Vieira da Silva recusa novas medidas de austeridade", 29 november 2010, https://expresso.pt/economia/vieira-da-silva-recusa-novas-medidas-de-austeridade=f618349 Translation by the author

In March 2011, after the failure of the Portuguese Stability and Growth Programs number 1, 2 and 3 due to bad economic forecasts by the government and inadequacy of measures, a 4th one was proposed by the government, facing serious opposition from all parties in the Parliament. Although we could not retrieve videos or direct quotations from the government's speeches in the debate, reading the document we can find EU-based justifications, such as "the current situation is marked by a high degree of uncertainty and significant risks that may affect the evolution of the main macroeconomic variables. As potential risks we can refer to the following: (...) Changes in the monetary policy orientations of the European Central Bank (ECB)" (PEC 2011-2014, march 2011: 8), putting the blame on the ECB for the wrong predictions contained in the last 3 Programs, and, when justifying the additional austerity measures, it says "The adoption of these additional measures also allows for the reinforcement of the confidence of the European institutions" (idem: 11)[51], meaning if we impose more efforts to the Portuguese, it is because the EU would want us to, and will give us more funds which we need to finance our economy. If these justificatory affirmations are in the document presented to the Members of Parliament, I believe it is safe to assume that they were also spoken when explaining it to the Portuguese, even though we were not able to find any records.

Moving on to the next government, the coalition between PSD and CDS-PP, it is important to state that Portugal was, at the time, under external bailout from Troika, so the blame was mainly attributed to the IMF, even though Brussels was frequently invoked, as we will see. Nevertheless, in these years, the European institutions were used more by the opposition (including the pro-European PS) to accuse the government of being a puppet of "the bureaucrats in Brussels", rather than the government itself, since this argument was used by the opposition and thus, by using it, they would be contributing to their argument. Therefore, the analysis of this government will allow us to observe the unconsciousness of this practice.

The presentation of the budget for 2012, after the previous government's decision to call for external intervention by Troika at the end of its mandate, was arguably the first great challenge for the coalition to face not only in the Parliament but also regarding the

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[51] República Portuguesa, "Programa de Estabilidade e Crescimento 2011 -2014, Março de 2011", https://www.parlamento.pt/OrcamentoEstado/Documents/pec/21032011-PEC2011_2014.pdf .
Translation by the author.

Public Opinion. In fact, in a poll presented by Expresso, 81,1% of the respondents did not agree with the options for the Budget for 2012[52], meaning the government was facing serious opposition from the People. Predicting this scenario, in a speech to the Nation about the budget for 2012, the Prime-Minister Pedro Passos Coelho defended that the austerity measures applied in the past were not enough for the economy to recover, and that further and more (a lot more) restrictive measures were going to be imposed. One of the justifications used (among other external blame-game) was the following: "it is understandable that there is a temptation to abandon the path that we followed so far, but for that reason we need to be conscious of the terrible dangers that this option would materialise (...) the pressures to abandon the Eurozone would be immense", basically meaning that "if we don't perform much more austerity measures, the Eurogroup would kick us out regardless", feeding the people with the image of the EU that only cares about economic performances, and avoiding blame for the measures taken, when blaming the previous government wasn't enough. Further in this address he says "inside this budget there aren't only numbers, there is a rejection of the collapse of the country, there are the European ties of a country that wants to honour its commitments"[53]. This last utterance is once again a strategy for blame-avoidance, arguing that these measures are what will keep us united with the EU, and thus that the EU only "wants us in" if we are under heavy sacrifice.

Then, in 2012, when addressing the nation to announce new measures for 2013 in order to keep with the bailout program and the government plan of deficit reduction, the Prime-Minister defended the new measures (including the very unpopular raise in the private sector's workers' contribution to Social Security) with the following statement (among others): "after the recent public declarations from European leaders, it became clearer than ever that without this program, we won't have access to any European aid mechanism"[54]. Again, this implies that the European institutions, by the voice of their leaders, are the ones pushing for these new austerity measures, and not helping us if we

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[52] Expresso, "Portugueses contra o Orçamento do Estado", 28 october 2011, https://expresso.pt/actualidade/portugueses-contra-o-orcamento-do-estado=f683975#

[53] (Video) "Pedro Passos Coelho Sobre o Orçamento Geral do Estado de 2012", recorded by Sic Notícias, 13 october 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XTR8t672z4 Translation by the author.

[54] (Video) Sic Notícias, "Passos anunciou medidas para 2013 e diz que emergência financeira ainda não acabou - Discurso na íntegra", 7 september 2012, https://sicnoticias.pt/economia/2012-09-07-Passos-anunciou-medidas-para-2013-e-diz-que-emergencia-financeira-ainda-nao-acabou . Translation by the author.

don't implement them, once more avoiding the blame and responsibility over these tax raises and revenue cuts.

One final example from this government comes from the presentation of the State's budget for 2015. This was the first budget presented by this government without the interference of Troika, so the IMF was no longer to blame for the reforms. Nevertheless, most of the austerity measures were kept and the People showed unrest and carried-out demonstrations against the keeping of these measures after the end of the bailout. In a video released by the government on the 15th October 2014 following the presentation of this budget, we can hear the Finance Minister Maria Luís Albuquerque say "we accomplish the responsibilities assumed before Europe"[55], when justifying the heavy deficit reduction predicted (through the very unpopular cuts in public spending and tax raises). Again, this statement can be understood as the EU mandating the government to keep the harsh austerity and the government being helpless it that regard.

Nevertheless, in the last State of the Nation debate of this government, as well as during the campaign for the elections in October 2015, the government and the two parties that composed it praised themselves and the "efforts made by the Portuguese people" as the saviours of a ruined Nation that was then ready to grow again and end the austerity measures. As far as we could investigate, there was little-to-no mention of the EU as a contributor for this economic reboot, even though it was allegedly responsible for the austerity applied in the previous years. The self-appraisal from these two parties continued during the next government (PS), as it was stated multiple times by several Members of the parties that if it weren't for them, the Socialist Party would not have been able to give back so many privileges and increase public spending. From this example we can once more observe the nationalisation of successes that goes along with the Europeanisation of failures practiced in the previous years.

Proceeding to the next (and last) government we will investigate, again led by PS, we can start with an example of the nationalisation of successes. This government is

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[55] Historic Archives of the Portuguese Government's Website, "Presentation of the State's Budget for 2015", https://www.historico.portugal.gov.pt/pt/o-governo/arquivo-historico/governos-constitucionais/gc19/os-ministerios/mf/galeria/videos/20141015-mef-orcamento-de-estado-2015.aspx Translation by the author.

supported in parliament by the two parties/coalitions to its left, and so its program was a claim of the end of austerity, the increase in public spending as said before, and the re-establishment of social privileges and wages. While the previous government claimed that it was thanks to them that these new policies could be implemented, the government led by António Costa insisted that this was a new era of economic policies for Portugal as well as the UE, where austerity was going to end thanks to their new vision of democratic socialism, and that the lives of the Portuguese were going to be improved through this expansionist new policy, not because but "despite" the EU. This discourse was and still is to this day repeated by the Socialist Party in multiple occasions, representing once more the nationalisation of successes ("the new era of social benefits and public investment") and the Europeanisation of failures ("despite" - and the word "against" was even sometimes used - the EU's will).

In April 2016, Mário Centeno was called to the Parliamentary inquiry Committee on the resolution of the Banif bank shortly after the European Commission's VP Valdis Dombrovskis had clarified that the EU has no impositions in what concerns the Member States' Banking systems. When asked about the sale and the resolution as a whole, he stated that "I can't say that there haven't been strong impositions and a strong negotiation position from the DG-Competition in this process", further justifying some of the measures included as "(...) not suggested by the Portuguese government. It was something that, in the context of the negotiations, appeared on the table, very much at the last moment, proposed by the European Commission."[56] These are two ways of justifying the government's decisions on the resolution of the bank, first that the DG-Comp had a strong influence in the negotiations and the second that one of the most contested aspects (the refusal of a banking license) was proposed by the European Commission.

Still in 2016, there were heavy debates following the possibility of sanctions from the EU to Portugal regarding the excessive deficit observed in the previous year. In this moment, the spokesman of the Socialist Party (in government at the time), João Galamba, stated: "At this moment the Government patriotically fights in Europe in defence of the

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[56] Jornal de Negócios, "Centeno desmente Dombrovskis e diz que houve "forte imposição" de Bruxelas no Banif", 19 April 2016, https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/banca---financas/detalhe/centeno_desmente_dombrovskis_e_diz_que_houve_forte_imposicao_de_bruxelas_no_banif?ref=DET_relacionadas Translation by the author.

interests of the country"[57], implying, once again, that the EU is the monster who cares about nothing but the deficit and threatens sanctions, removing the responsibility of the excessive deficit from the government, as well as justifying further measures implemented by the government to re-balance the public accounts. Again, the mention to Europe is clear and direct, as well as the speaker's intention.

It is important to contextualise that the year of 2016 was the first year of the Socialist Party's government, and the moment where the Portuguese economy started to show progress. After a long campaign where the end of austerity was constantly promised, the Socialist party did not win the legislative elections held in October 2015, yet formed government with the parliamentary support of the two parties to its left, which is most probably one of the reasons for the constant need to justify policies that didn't quite contradict austerity, especially using the EU since the two other parties are expressly Eurosceptic.

During the speech António Costa delivered at the Socialist Party's 43rd anniversary celebration, the Prime-Minister stated "When we see some (...) in Europe saying that in Portugal we will not develop by raising the national minimum wage because we are condemned to live in a country with low wages and poverty, we have to say: No. We do not accept living in a country of poverty and low wages"[58]. While this is much more direct than other examples we gave, it is not quite a justification as much as it is a claim that "against everyone", especially those in Europe, our government is striving with higher minimum salaries and allegedly low poverty. The effect is thus the same: the creation of an image of the EU, far from the people, that is more concerned with financial outcomes rather than the lives of the citizens. It also creates a ground where further justifications using this image of the EU are better accepted and reproduced.

Moving to 2018, in the 3rd anniversary of the 21st government, António Costa organised an event where he and the government answers citizens' questions in the

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[57] Jornal Sábado, "Sanções: De quem é a culpa?", 5 July 2016, https://www.sabado.pt/portugal/politica/detalhe/sancoes-de-quem-e-a-culpa?ref=DET_relacionadas_politica Translation by the author.

[58] Rádio Renascença online, "Costa responde a Bruxelas: "Não aceitamos viver num país de pobreza e baixos salários"", 19 April 2016, https://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/52190/costa-responde-a-bruxelas-nao-aceitamos-viver-num-pais-de-pobreza-e-baixos-salarios Translation by the author.

University of Minho, on the 26th November. Asked about the long period of stagnation in Portugal's economic growth since 2000 (after a period of 40 years of steady growth of about 4,6%), the Prime-Minister referred that the three main reasons are "the emergence of China in the international markets, the EU's enlargement to the East and our accession to the Euro"[59], also pointing out the lack of EU regulations regarding banking activities that existed in the early 2000s. To contextualise it is important to say that not only the Socialist Party was in government from 1999 to 2002, and that António Costa was a minister in that government, but also that the government was Socialist for 11 of the 18 years gone by since 2000, which can point to why the Prime-Minister felt the need to justify the stagnation with external reasons. His allegations are nevertheless extremely clear and grave as they can easily contribute to the rise of negative views towards the EU.

A final example we are going to give is from when, in July 2019, the newspaper "Público", in an interview about the Budget for 2019, asked the finance Minister Mário Centeno about the possible raise in the salaries of the public sector. His answer included "we need to consciously understand how to elaborate a budget without losing any of the characteristics that allowed Portugal to avoid sanctions and suspension of funds, and allowed for the exit of the Excessive Deficit Procedure" (EDP).[60] Even if the EU is not mentioned directly here, it is quite clear what the minister means, as the context implied that the sanctions and the suspensions of funds were from the EU, and the EDP is easily associated to the EU[61].

I believe it can be said that the examples here given and their analysis allowed for us to establish that this practice in the case of Portugal is recurring (even if we cannot accurately establish its frequency), that it is strategic, at least in its origin, through the examples but also the bibliography we quoted and will continue to quote in the next chapter, and that it is also sometimes unconscious, as we could see in the examples from

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[59] [Video] on the channel of "República Portuguesa", "Sessão de perguntas nos 3 anos de Governo, 26 de novembro de 2018", https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1876&v=TTUpwzDK7J8 Translation by the author.

[60] Público, "ENTREVISTA. Professores? "O OE é para todos os portugueses"", 23 July 2018, https://www.publico.pt/2018/07/23/economia/entrevista/o-oe-e-para-todos-os-portugueses-e-tem-de-ser-sustentavel-1838738 Translation by the author.

[61] The fact that most of the examples we have are from the most recent government (and there are many more that could be given) essentially relates to the fact that there is more information available (particularly direct transcriptions or live videos), in the archives of multiple media channels.

the PSD/CDS-PP's government. In the next two sections of this chapter we will see how this practice is recognised by political actors in Portugal, starting with how it was portrayed in the debates that preceded the European Elections in May 2019 and then proceeding to the presentation analysis of interviews we carried-out with prominent Portuguese political figures.

2.2.2. THE RECOGNITION OF THIS PRACTICE BY THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL CIRCLES

a) The Europeanisation of failures as talked about in the debates for the European Elections in 2019

In this section, it will be interesting to see how this practice was portrayed by the Portuguese candidates for the European Election in 2019, giving the example of the televised debate (in an open channel), on the 1st[62] of May, the first debate and the one where the candidates were asked about what they consider to be the reasons for the high abstentionism.

In this debate broadcasted by the independent TV channel SIC Notícias, on the first of May 2019, the question of scapegoating the EU to justify unpopular political decisions arose, and the candidates clearly recognised what was going on. When asked about the reasons for a participation rate of less than 34% in the last European elections (in Portugal), the Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and candidate António Marinho e Pinto, from ALDE, said "(...) What distances the people from European politics is this political subculture of the nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation of failures (...)", the others showed their agreement. Here, the MEP is very clear when saying that this is a political subculture, meaning it can be considered a practice.

Nuno Melo, MEP and candidate for EPP, also said "one of the reasons for the high abstentionism is the Europeanisation of a lot of the country's problems, when most of those problems are the result of decisions made by the governments", the journalist moderating the debate emphasised that "when all goes well, governments take credit, but

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[62] Broadcasted by Sic Notícias.

you know that it happens in all governments?", and Nuno Melo answered, giving examples on how most of the funds for public investment in Portugal come from the EU, and the government doesn't fully utilise them, people think it's the EU's fault. He also emphasised moments such as in health and agriculture, where the EU could have no fault in the problems faced in these sectors.

We are able to see not only that this practice is recognised by the candidates for the European Elections in 2019, but also that, as they claim, it has the effect of reducing citizen participation in these elections, that we identified as one of the expressions of Euroscepticism.

b) The recognition, but also engagement in this practice by prominent Portuguese political figures - interviews

In this section I will present a final tool for this empirical demonstration: the answers to six interviews carried-out with members of the three parties in government in the period we investigated earlier (2007-2019), some of which are Members of Parliament (MP), as well as one with the Head of the European Commission Representation in Portugal. Some interviews were done orally and recorded; others were answered by email. The respondents had knowledge that the interview was for a master's thesis about the politicians' views on the European Union, and all gave permission for their names to be mentioned, they are:

- Fernando Negrão, leader of the PSD bench
- Inês Domingos, MP, PSD
- Joana Barata Lopes, MP, PSD
- Sofia Colares Alves, Head of the European Commission Representation in Portugal
- José Limão, President of JP (Youth of the Popular Party - Oeiras and candidate for CDS-PP for the European Elections
- Eduardo Fernandes, President of JSD (Youth of the Social-Democratic) - Guimarães
- José Dias, President of JS (Youth of the Socialist Party) - Coimbra

In order to take the most out of these interviews, we will divide this section into two parts: first, we will present and interpret the answers to the questions meant to see if the respondents unconsciously[63] take part in this practice (excluding Ms. Colares Alves), and then we will evaluate if they recognise that the practice exists and its effects on public opinion towards the EU. It also matters to say that all interviews were conducted in Portuguese, and thus all translations are by the author. Finally, and even though we already stated in the beginning, the presentation of these interviews will be done in a way that goes towards our argument, which in practice means we will not transcribe all answers to all questions, using only what is interesting for the purpose of this empirical test.

Do the interviewees unconsciously engage in this practice?

To evaluate if these political actors engage in this practice, we posed questions related to the EU's action in certain domains, to see how they would react to them.

Question 1: What do you have to say about the excessive deficit procedure? Do you agree with the sanctions applied in case of default? Why?

Fernando Negrão: "Good accounting should be central to EU policies. It is important that the countries have the balanced accounts so that Europe as a whole is a geographical area of growth and innovation, which it is not today (...). This aspect is important but we have to be careful and to think of each of the European citizens, and this is a criticism that is made to the EU because it created an economic space, created a single currency, but the question that is always in suspense is " Is it not that you have forgotten the citizens?" As far as sanctions are concerned, I would say that Europe went too far in its will and imposed it in a way sometimes even a little violent and forgot that there were European citizens who were going to suffer from it, as we know happened". Here, we can see the practice already happening. To contextualise, Mr. Negrão was a Member of Parliament for PSD during the first government of this party in the period and a Minister during the second (very short), which can be a reason why he feels the need to justify the

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[63] It is important to see that, if they engage in this practice, it is unconscious, because they know their views on the EU are being analysed and they would have no reason to justify themselves to the public, as this is not a public intervention.

measures he claimed as "imposed", as they were very unpopular ones that cost his government to fall. This statement, if said in public, would contribute to the image that the decisions at EU-level are taken by "bureaucrats in Brussels" and are imposed to the countries. This, again, takes the blame from the government to an institution that the People are not so familiar with, thus not questioning these statements.

Inês Domingos: "The excessive deficit procedure exists for one reason: because there needs to be financial and economic coordination, and I agree with that (...). With regard to sanctions, great care must be taken to ensure that the policy is carried out in a coherent way, and I disagree with the way sanctions were applied in the case of Portugal, especially in 2015. They ended up not being implemented but there was a Commission proposal to that effect. I disagreed because I think it was necessary to look at the effort that had been made previously, so I think it was a wrong way of applying sanctions, or at least an attempt that did not materialize." Here again we can see that the MP did not agree with the proposal to apply sanctions to Portugal, as the new government (PS) accused the previous of being responsible for these sanctions. So, probably to avoid that responsibility, the MP would rather criticise the methods and coherence of the application of sanctions, putting the blame on the EU.

Joana Barata Lopes: This particular MP is known and admitted in this interview to be a European Federalist, and extremely pro-European. For that, this will serve as the "control answer", i.e., the one where the respondent understood the purpose of the interview, and thus acted in defence of Europe, not enrolling in this practice, and even denouncing it: "All clubs have rules. If clubs don't have rules, they can't originate rights. Where there are rights there are duties. And when people are members of a group that gives them rights, they have to be willing to fulfil the duties. And balanced accounts are important to belong to this club because it is also what is going to help us when that doesn't happen, either because of a catastrophe or wrongful management(...). The advantages, especially the money we receive every day from the EU is way superior to what we are "obliged" to do, as people say when they want to criticise it (the excessive deficit procedure). And in our case, it is exactly like this because we receive more that we contribute. (...). This mechanism has to be applied because if we want to be in a group with certain rights, we need to have rules that make those rights possible."

Question 2: What do you think about the Stability and Growth Pact? What impact does it have on Portugal? Positive or negative?

José Dias: "I see this in a positive way if it is applied cooperatively between institutions and not as a mere instrument for imposition." This answer is quite short, but we can already see there is an implicit meaning. It is important to say that the last Socialist government left office after the presentation of four different stability and growth plans for the same period, that were consistently inadequate for the situation in the country. This is thus, I believe, the reason for the use of the expression "instrument for imposition", to undermine the rightfulness of this pact and avoid the responsibility for the failure in its application in 2010-11.

Eduardo Fernandes: This is the "control answer" for this question, as the respondent is also a very convicted pro-European, and stated that "I think that the SGP should be more rigid in its corrective aspect with regard to public debt", and that "In relation to Portugal, I think it has a positive impact. Only because Portugal has left-wing governments supported by the extreme left that only seem to know how to govern in positive economic cycles. That is, when things get easier taxes and fees may decrease. It is important that in those times there are European mechanisms that can control the enthusiasm of such governments and have them have some economic and financial rules." The interviewee is clear in putting the responsibility in the Socialist government and in his support for this Pact as a means of control towards those governments.

Other respondents answered this question simultaneously with the previous one, which is why only two answers were considered.

Question 3: What do you identify as the causes for the crisis that started in 2008? Who was responsible?

José Monteiro Limão: "The ones to blame are internal and external, and so are the factors. (...) the EU was wrong from the start when it insisted, in its speech, that the US crisis would not affect Europe, which was clearly not true. The EU did not know how to apply the SGP effectively until the crisis. Moreover, the Banking Union not being

finalised was one of the main reasons that led to the chaos that occurred in the EU. When CDS voted against the Treaty of Maastricht did so essentially because, without the Banking Union finalised, we were not ready for that level of integration and, unfortunately, time gave us reason. Without a competent supervision of the activity of the banks, exaggerations were committed. But there were other culprits in Portugal. The PS, José Sócrates, (...)". The youth leader is clear in assigning part of the blame to the EU, even though not exclusively. He takes part in this practice by defending his party's choice in the vote for the Maastricht Treaty and his answer can also be justified by the fact that his party was in government with PSD when the very unpopular austerity measures had to be taken to solve the crisis, and so blaming the EU would to some extent justify these measures. Also, when asked if he had ever blamed the EU for his government's policies he said "No. But I know that the measures that were applied by PSD and CDS were part of a package negotiated by the PS with the EU. And that after it was finalized in 2014 with the exit of the Troika, many measures were negotiated. That is why I know that the EU has responsibility, but I have never used the EU as a scapegoat (...)". This can be seen somewhat as a "double answer", as in the one hand he says he doesn't blame the EU, but he knows the EU has responsibilities for what his party's government did.

José Dias: "The banking system was primarily responsible, although the EU also had an obligation to build stronger and more cohesive currency, enabling better integration of the various States." The youth leader's answer clearly avoids his party's government's responsibility in the crisis, blaming the banks and the EU, much like the previous respondent.

Question 4: When, on presentation of the state budget for 2016, the European Commission and the ECB threatened sanctions against Portugal for non-compliance with the budgetary rules, what did you think? Who was responsible? The government or the inadequacy of European rules? Do you consider these rules impositions? Why?

José Dias: "There is a need for greater flexibility in the rules and change the culture of suspicion and excessive competitiveness between institutions, leading to close cooperation (...)." Although not clearly saying that the EU was responsible, the youth leader implies that these lack flexibility and cooperation, from what we can understand that he was excusing his party's government by saying the EU was not flexible.

Do the interviewees recognise that this practice exists?

We already saw in the answer from MP Joana Barata Lopes that she recognised that people like to say we have obligations towards the EU. Here, we will continue to see if in other questions, and other respondents, in particular MPs as they are closer to the government, acknowledge this practice.

Question 1: The highschool Infanta D. Maria, in Coimbra, was rebuilt using community (EU) funds. If you had to present this project in your committee or in the plenary, would you refer the EU's participation?

It is important to say that, even though initially this question was to assess if the MPs would enter the practice from the other side as well (the nationalisation of failures), all of the respondents answered that they would, but also acknowledging that others wouldn't. The reason for this might be twofold: first, they are members of parliament and not mayors or regional governors, so they would probably not present this project at all, second, the question was quite direct in asking if they would mention the EU's participation, and thus they most probably understood that they should say yes, even if maybe that wouldn't be the case.

Inês Domingos: "I would certainly mention it, yes. I think it is very important because there is always that question of the politicians that, when there is something positive to talk about, never mention the EU, and then when something negative happens it is always the EU's fault. That is in fact something that happens because it is a way to do politics. (...)" The respondent clearly identifies the tendency of her colleagues to nationalise success and Europeanise failure, and recognises it is a practice when stating that "it is a way to do politics".

Fernando Negrão: "Of course I would yes, I think that in Portugal we talk too little about the EU, and the good things it gives us, and so that deficit needs to be filled, and the politicians have a responsibility to do that (...)". Here, the leader of the parliamentary group of PSD does not necessarily recognise blame attribution, but rather the nationalisation of success, which is also a part of our research.

Question 2: What do you have to say about the reduction in the direct transfers to Portugal through the cohesion policy, in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-27?

We will only present one answer to this question, from MP Joana Barata Lopes, because it is very clear and interesting that she went in that direction despite the question not being directly about it. She said "I believe it reveals very weak negotiation skills from the government (PS) (...) and it is a shame because it meant more funds to Portugal. And it is worrying because that makes for a news title that says "the EU gives less money to Portugal", and the government does not assume its responsibility, (...) and it is always like that, (...) it is like when we open a road no one calls the president of the EC, but if we're lacking money they'll say it's his fault (...) and that is the problem(...)". The MP was thus extremely clear in identifying the phenomenon we are describing here, without me asking her to.

Interview to the Head of the Representation of the European Commission in Portugal

Even though Mrs. Colares Alves did not answer all of the questions, she was still very assertive in her answers. To the questions "Is the expression "nationalization of successes and Europeanisation of failures" appropriate to describe the behavior of pro-European governments in the Member States vis-à-vis the European Union?" and "Is it possible to state that the pro-European governments of the Member States use the European Union as a scapegoat to justify unpopular policies?", the Representative answered together and said "The nationalisation of successes and the Europeanisation of failures is a behavior common to most governments and political forces. Obviously this behavior is more frequent in the case of unpopular policies. In the case of popular policies, national governments seek to present them as their own.", clearly recognising the

existence and the frequency of this practice. Finally, to the question "What could be the consequences of this behavior for society? Can they lead to an increase in Euroscepticism?", she answered "Obviously, this kind of behavior favors Euroscepticism.". In these answers, we can see the recognition by someone we may consider an expert, not only of the practice of nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation of failures, but also that it favours Euroscepticism, which we will further discuss in the conclusion of this dissertation.

As a conclusion to this chapter, I believe it is possible to say that we have established the existence of the practice of using the EU as a scapegoat to justify unpopular policy decisions in Portugal, by determining through various methods that it is a behaviour that is regular (recurrent), strategic, and with varying degrees of consciousness. We also saw that its existence is recognised by the political actors we interviewed, as well as experts.

In the next chapter we will try to enlarge our basis to other Member States, looking for examples and literature that can help us demonstrate that this practice is not exclusive to Portugal, and instead is shared by the governments of several Member States.

2.3. Justification through EU scapegoating: a widespread phenomenon recognised in the media, the society, academia and political circles

As stated before, this chapter will serve to establish the extension of this practice to several EU Member States and its recognition by relevant actors in the media, academia and politics, as well as civil society. The chapter will thus be divided into three parts: first, we will give some examples of moments where governments of different Member States have scapegoated the EU, and how they were covered by the media (1), then we will see if and how the phenomenon has been portrayed in academia and political circles, as to evaluate its recognition by these figures (2), and finally present the results of the survey we conducted from October 2018 to April 2019 (3).

2.3.1. A widespread practice present in multiple Member States, featuring media coverage

We will start this section with an example from Italy, whose former Prime-Minister Matteo Renzi, from the traditionally pro-European Democratic Party, started a very public fight with the European Commission personified in Jean-Claude Juncker. In January 2016, when asylum policy was being discussed[64], Renzi said that "Italy deserves respect" and, according to Reuters, "openly attacked Europe and Germany for policies that he sees as biased towards Berlin"[65]. In November the same year, it appears that the issue was not solved, and Renzi turned again to the EU during the campaign for the Italian referendum on constitutional reform, and in a time where the economic predictions for 2017 following the discussion of the Italian budget were not showing any improvements. On the 8th November, Renzi said that "The time of diktats is over" and that "Anything that serves to build schools comes before the bureaucrats of Brussels"[66], implying that the economic policies he had to implement were impositions from the EU, and that it is its fault that the social-economic situation of Italy is so rough. The Portuguese media

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[64] Italy was and still is one of the EU countries most affected by the influx of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa.

[65] Reuters, "Italy dispute with EU escalates as Renzi hits back", 15 January 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-italy-budget/italy-dispute-with-eu-escalates-as-renzi-hits-back-idUSKCN0UT13N

[66] Euractiv, "Italy row with Brussels escalates, Renzi lashes out at EU 'diktats'", 9 November 2016, https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/news/italy-row-with-brussels-escalates-renzi-lashes-at-eu-diktats/

platform "Observador" (currently with the pro-European centre-right), broke the news to the Portuguese People saying "Italy rejects impositions from Brussels"[67], showing the underlying meaning of the illocutionary acts performed by Renzi were well understood as statements blaming the EU's "impositions" for his policy unpopularity.

In June 2018, when the Aquarius ship full of asylum seekers was stranded at sea in the Mediterranean (between Italy and Malta) with 629 people on board, the French government led by Macron was heavily criticised by the left, ONGs and a lot of French citizens through social media for its inaction in this matter. After Italy and Malta refused to let the boat dock in their shores, there were a lot of accusations made by several EU governments regarding the "efficacy" of the EU's asylum policy. To justify the French government's decision not to welcome the ship and its passengers in its shore, the state secretary Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne stated to Sud Radio that "France had already taken more than its part" in this matter, "in the sense that we are engaged to welcome over three years 10,000 people eligible for asylum", further insisting on the "urgent need to put efficiency in this management of migration policy at European level"[6869]. These statements have two implicit meanings: the first two are, we can argue, meant to clarify that France has already done what the EU had "established" ("welcome over three years 10,000 people eligible for asylum"), according to the refugee quota negotiated between all Member States, and so there is no obligation to do more; and the third can be interpreted as another way to justify inaction, as there are no EU laws regulating it, and hence the EU is wrong as it lacks such regulations in its migration policy, blaming the EU for the dead-lock regarding this boat. In this case, the scapegoating of the EU was used to justify (to the left, ONGs, a part of the civil society and other countries) why the French government decided not to welcome these asylum seekers, but there are other occasions in which the same argument, in this case the obligation France has to shelter its designated quota, is used to justify the acceptance of the entrance of asylum seekers, as some french respondents of the survey identified The example of France under Macron is particularly

[67] Observador, "Itália rejeita imposições de Bruxelas em nova polémica com Juncker", 8 November 2016, https://observador.pt/2016/11/08/italia-rejeita-imposicoes-de-bruxelas-em-nova-polemica-com-juncker/
[68] Translations by the author.
[69] Huffington Post France, "Face aux migrants de l'Aquarius, Macron et sa politique d'asile se retrouvent au pied du mur", 12 June 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2018/06/12/face-aux-migrants-de-laquarius-macron-et-sa-politique-dasile-se-retrouvent-au-pied-du-mur_a_23456757/?utm_hp_ref=fr-emmanuel-macron

strong since his government and himself are arguably one of the most, if not the most, pro-European government France and the EU have ever seen, nevertheless, we can see that this practice is so deeply entrenched in political life that even this government performs it.

In an article for Politico, "How Merkel Broke the EU", Matthew Karnitschnig wrote that to justify her extremely unpopular migrant policy since the beginning of the European refugee crisis in 2015, the German Chancellor recurrently argued that it was not a matter of the German refugee policy, "but the very survival of the EU". She especially used this discourse during the campaign for the Bavarian elections in 2018, when her governing partner was at risk of losing the region. According to the author, these statements guilt the Bavarian people into voting to keep the majority, because «No one, not even the Bavarians, wants to be blamed for "destroying Europe."». Moreover, back in 2015, when Merkel's government accepted an influx of thousands of refugees stranded in a train station in Hungary, the Chancellor defended her decision as a matter of "European solidarity", stating she expected other European countries to "do their part", hoping for better acceptance from the German public. The author argues that because, when the other countries refused to take in some refugees, Merkel proposed an EU-wide quota system, the opposition she faced from the public (including demonstrations and riots) in Germany spread to other countries, forcing other governments to close their borders and other Peoples to question the EU's asylum policy, arguing that is one of the reasons why she "broke the EU"[70]. This latter also provoked the decline in the EU's reputation in Germany and the rise of animosity for other European countries that "didn't do their part." To conclude on this example, it is important to state that I do not believe Merkel's intention was to provoke an anti-EU feeling, but to justify what she believed was a righteous migration policy, heavily criticised by the German people. The Chancellor meant that it is the sense of European solidarity that led her to accept those refugees, and following the same sentiment, other countries should do the same. Even though they didn't, the German people were already dissatisfied with her and the EU's policy before.

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[70] Karnitschnig, M. (2018), "How Merkel broke the EU", Politico, 28 April, 2018
https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-broke-the-eu-migration-crisis-refugees/

Taking into consideration these examples, we can admit that this practice is common to several EU Member States, even though a generalisation can't be done to all of them since we haven't analysed them all. To find these examples we privileged countries that were traditionally supportive of EU integration, with pro-European governments (at the time of the examples), thus excluding for example the United Kingdom and Denmark, as well as some Central and Eastern European countries where this practice is obvious and recurrent, but the contexts are very specific in terms of support for the EU. We also meant to have examples from founding countries, from the North and the South, reflecting different kinds of policy. To this purpose, I believe the showcase of France, Germany and Italy (in addition to Portugal) were a relevant sample that can allow us to take conclusions on how this practice is performed even by those who defend the Union the most, arguing for the unconscious character of this practice made evident by Merkel and the French government, and its strategic character made evident by Renzi's declarations. Another important conclusion to take is the kind of policies which the EU is regularly used to justify: economic/financial/fiscal and asylum/migration/refugee-related policies. The growth of the EU's competencies in both these areas, especially the economic stability mechanisms, the Dublin and the free-circulation regulations, allow members of government to use it as a scapegoat to justify relatable policies, as argued by some authors we will analyse in the next section, where we will examine how this practice is looked at by academia and political circles.

2.3.2. A PRACTICE WHICH EXISTENCE IS RECOGNISED IN ACADEMIA AND POLITICS

As early as 2001, when the Polish accession was being negotiated, Szczerbiak already predicted the "danger that Polish governments may attempt to shift the blame for many unpopular decisions on to Brussels by claiming these were forced upon it by having to conform to the requirements of EU membership" (Szczerbiak, 2001: 110). Since the government at the time, and until 2005, was of the Democratic Left Alliance, a pro-European government, the author's warning is an early sign of what was going to happen next, since he argues that these kinds of behaviour may contribute to the rise in scepticism towards EU membership amongst the Polish Public: "Any further attempts by the Polish government to blame the difficulties associated with economic and social reform on the EU is bound to lead to a further erosion of support for Polish membership" (idem). What

we observe now, in 2019, is a far-right anti-EU party in government. We can argue that the blame attribution warned by Szczerbiak in 2001 had a least a partial influence in this outcome.

Then, in an interview to Spiegel in 2011, Werner Hoyer, a senior German Foreign Ministry official, was asked about the reasons for the crescent bad reputation of the EU. He answered that "The political class likes to use the European Union as a scapegoat for everything that goes wrong. Failures are blamed on the EU, while national governments like to claim successes for themselves."[71], recognising the phenomenon that we are studying. He further stated that "Europe makes a good scapegoat", as we will argue, because of its restricted access to mainstream media. This interview marks one of the first attempts at describing the phenomenon that was later called "Nationalisation of successes and Europeanisation of failures" by the President of the European Commission Durão Barroso in the State of the Union address in 2013. In fact, as far as I could investigate, it was the first time this expression was used, when Barroso said that "in some areas, Europe still lacks the power to do what is asked of it. A fact that is all too easily forgotten by those, and there are many out there, who always like to nationalise success and Europeanise failure". In the same speech he acknowledged that the EU is often blamed for the economic recession (as we saw in António Costa's answer to citizens' questions in 2018), and that "Some people will say that Europe is forcing governments to cut spending", reinforcing the idea that the EU is often used as a scapegoat when it comes to justifying economic policy[72].

The Head of Social Media and Visual Communication for the European Commission, Dana Manescu, tweeted in 2014 that "nationalising success, Europeanising failure" is an eternal problem, and that "changing this is on" Durão Barroso's Wishlist for the future of the EU. A citizen then commented that the problem is that "national politicians are not challenged on their 2-sided agenda on Europe", arguing for what we have already talked about in this thesis which is the lack of opposition to these statements of EU scapegoating. Even though these actors don't specifically identify governments as

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[71] Spiegel online "A Danger of Backsliding; 'Politicians Like to Use the EU as a Scapegoat'", 11 July 2011, https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/a-danger-of-backsliding-politicians-like-to-use-the-eu-as-a-scapegoat-a-773585.html

[72] State of the Union Address, 11 September 2013 by the President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-684_en.htm

the performers of the practice of nationalising successes and Europeanising failures, it is, I believe, easy to see that other agents (other parties) would have no interest in nationalising successes if they are not the ones contributing to them, as it would only vouch   for the ruling   party's re-

election.

Image 4: Dana Manescu's tweet on the 4th of March 2014, as quoted above

Jean-Claude Juncker and his Commission also joined the movement, showing the practice was still occurring during his mandate. In the European Commission's recommendations for the strategic agenda 2019-2024, it was made clear that it is "time to

move past the tendency to nationalise success and Europeanise failure and instead better explain jointly our common decisions and policies"[73].

Professor Enrico Colombatto also recognised that "The EU and the euro remain ideal candidates for as long as scapegoats are needed to take the blame.", in a report for "United Europe" in 2014, noting that politicians are using the EU to justify "national ills", and that it has an impact on the citizens' image of Europe. Even though he doesn't mention (pro-European) governments specifically, he explains why the EU and the euro are used as scapegoats, thus explaining the conditions of the *field* for this practice to be effective.

Allison-Reumann and Murray were very clear in their claim that "Scapegoating the EU for political gain is a popular game played by many national leaders" (idem, 2017), following Costa's statement quoted in the beginning of this chapter and further vouching for the idea that this constitutes a practice. A similar argument was made by Professor Andrea Renda in an article for TRIGGER (Trends In Global Governance and Europe's Role), as he stated that "national politicians, also experiencing growing distrust among their population, often exploit their proximity to the voters and the Union's imperfect multi-level governance to Europeanise all failures and nationalise all successes." (Renda, 2019), describing both the practice and why it is possible given the characteristics of the *field* (the particularity of supranational and intergovernmental European governance).

Finally, Hobolt *et al.* (2017) specifically studied how blame in attributed in the EU, including by national governments. The authors argue that, in multilevel governments such as the EU, "governments also have the opportunity to point the finger at other levels of government". They created a table to explain different ways of blame-attribution:

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[73] European Commission - Press release "Strength in unity: Commission makes recommendations for the EU's next strategic agenda 2019-2024" Brussels, 30 April 2019, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2309_en.htm

Table 7.1. Blame-avoiding and credit-claiming strategies of national governments in the EU

	Strategy	Approach	EU example
Blame-avoiding	*Find a scapegoat*	Deflect blame by blaming others	Blame EU institutions or other member state governments
	Redefine the issue	Distance oneself from the problem	Present the issue as an EU problem rather than a domestic issue
	Circle the wagons	Diffuse blame by spreading it among as many policymakers as possible.	Spread the responsibility among EU nations and institutions
Credit-claiming	*I did it my way*	Take sole credit for positive outcomes	Take credit for positive EU-level decisions or outcomes
	We made it happen	Claim association with positive outcomes of collective responsibility	Highlight association with positive EU-level decisions or outcomes

Image 5: Blame-avoiding and credit-claiming strategies of national governments in the EU (Hobolt, *et al.:* 2014: 103)

The authors are clear in saying that national governments, even if in a very subtle way, spread the blame of certain decisions and policy outcomes across the EU institutions and other Member States, giving the examples of when, in June 2012, the Irish Prime-Minister stated: "All the hard work we have done to make our way back to a secure position could be undone, through no fault of our own, through the reckless behaviour of others.", as well as Merkel's constant use of the "we" when presenting economic and financial strategies and policies, both at national and EU level. They argue that this "we" narrative might be seen as sharing credit, but that, given the circumstances (Eurozone crisis), "it is also sharing future responsibility for problems" (Hobolt, et al.: 2017: 104). They give a particularly elucidating example of how Merkel justified to the German People the aid to other European economies, in a speech in 2012:

> We have to act more united and have to say: We feel that we have an obligation towards this Europe. And this is precisely what we have done. We have done so by showing solidarity with Greece, with Ireland and also with Portugal. But we can only do so if everybody is willing to do their homework. (Hobolt, *et al.:* 2017: 114)

Although the authors and political actors here quoted do not specifically speak about pro-European governments, it is important to note that up until the most recent

elections in some Member States, national governments were mainly pro-European, with very few exceptions.

After this short overview of how this practice if portrayed by academia and the political class (even though it was not deemed a practice by any of these authors, I believe this is an original contribution of this thesis), we are able to establish that there is indeed recognition of this tendency of National governments to Nationalise success and Europeanise failure, that this is constant, strategic and that it negatively impacts the public opinion towards the EU. Next, we will evaluate how the class of higher educated youth perceives this practice through the presentation of a public survey.

### 2.3.3. A PRACTICE PERCEIVED BY THE CITIZENS

Before moving on to presenting the results of the survey, I believe it is important to state that in a conference at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, in April 2019, I asked the assistance to raise their arms if they had ever heard the discourses here described, and everyone raised their arms with no exception. Another question asked was if they thought these speeches could influence the recent rise in Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic parties, to which, once more, everyone raised their hands assertively. Even though this is a small basis of inquiry, it is noticeable that Portuguese university students are aware of this practice and the consequences it might have in public opinion towards the EU.

Moving on to the results of the public survey, we first need to establish the demography of the respondents: there were 59 responses from people (gender wasn't identified) aged 17 to 29, 80.9% have hold a bachelor's degree or higher, 19.1% have completed high school. The great majority of respondents were from Portugal and France (33,9% each), others were from the UK, Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Belgium, Latvia, Spain and The Netherlands. From these only the respondents from the UK and Italy (and one respondent from Portugal, who most probably did not understand the question since the government in Portugal is clearly pro-European) stated their governments were not mainly made up of pro-European parties, which is why we eliminated the answers from those respondents in the analysis of the remaining questions, since we are only considering pro-European governments. We were then left with 51

responses, and those are the ones we will be analysing. It is also important to say that the respondents were made aware of the objective of the survey and the main argument of the thesis. We will move on to presenting and interpreting the answers to some of the questions we consider most important to establish the most informed citizens' perception of the practice of EU scapegoating to justify policy decisions:

## Which do you see/hear/read the most in daily media?
51 responses

To the question "Which do you see/hear/read the most in daily media?", a vast majority of 90,2% said it's their National Government, confirming it has more access to the citizens' "homes" than the EU and its institutions. If this is the proportion in most informed citizens, the one among the least informed ones (the majority of the population) will probably be higher.

Have you ever listened to your government blame Europe for the economic crisis/migrant crisis/underemployment/poverty /others?
51 responses

To the question "Have you ever listened to your government blame Europe for the economic crisis, migrant crisis, underemployment, poverty or others?", a majority of 56,9% answered "yes", showing that most of these respondents perceive these speeches. It also enlarges our basis since we have respondents from countries where we didn't quote examples in the before last section, such as Belgium, Spain, Latvia and The Netherlands.

Then, for the following questions, we eliminated the answers from those who said "no"[74], since these were "if yes" questions, and we got the following results:

- When asked if they could describe occasions where that happened or remember any of the expressions used by the members of government, some of the answers were:
  - «"The rules from the EU oblige us to take this economic policy"»
  - «"A culpa da crise é de Bruxelas"» (Brussels is to blame for the crisis)
  - "It's more about how some things "can't be changed because Europe decided it", like pesticides or taxes"
  - "Everytime there's a cutback, Europe is often pointed, more precisely Germany"
  - "EU needs to take action. EU is forcing us to do…"
  - "We have 2 or 3 parties that just want to blame everything in the EU, especially immigration, but the governing party has blamed the EU partly for the economic crisis of 2008."
  - "Migrant crisis"
  - «"Eurocrats in Brussels, Bruxelles thieves"»
- When asked if they think these discourses are recurring, the amount of positive and negative responses was equal (37,9%), but a large amount (24,1%) answered they didn't know. These answers can probably be justified by the fact that the youth is less prone to follow daily news, and thus would not so easily recognise patterns in these speeches.

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[74] With this elimination we ended up with 29 responses and lost representation from Bulgaria and Finland (1 and 2 respondents, respectively). Nevertheless, this does not seem representative enough to conclude that his practice doesn't exist in these countries, but we can't say they exist either.

Do you think these claims are harmful for the public opinion (of your country) about the EU?

29 responses

- YES
- NO

10.3%

89.7%

Finally, to the question "Do you think these claims are harmful for the public opinion (of your country) about the EU", a staggering majority of 89,7% answered yes, showing these citizens, of multiple different countries, are aware of the implications these discourses have to the public image of the EU.

To conclude this chapter, I believe we have demonstrated that this practice is not confined to Portugal, despite it being a good and representative example for the reasons explained above. Instead, this phenomenon is widespread and present in multiple other Member States. We also observed that his practice is more common in two policy fields: economic/financial and migration policy, depending on what the People in each country fear the most. Finally, we saw that it is portrayed in the media, recognised by the academia and political circles[75] and perceived by the most informed young citizens as something that is harmful to the public support towards the EU and its institutions, driving us to the conclusion of this thesis, where we will briefly make arguments to demonstrate how it would be possible for pro-European governments to be partly responsible for the rise of Euroscepticism in the population, and therefore the growing representation of Eurosceptic parties and the decline in participation in European elections.

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[75] Including the ones performing the practice.

CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The objective of this thesis was, on the one hand, that Euroscepticism and speech acts of justification through EU scapegoating are practices, and on the other to demonstrate that they can be mutually constituted, thus affecting one another. More specifically, the intention was to investigate to what extent the way in which pro-European governments portray the EU can influence public opinion towards European integration.

Through a theoretical and empirical demonstration, using Portugal as a case study, this thesis has demonstrated this argument in multiple ways, using not only theoretical framework but also by providing and exploring several examples. It has presented interviews and how these practices and their influence on each other are recognised by relevant academics and political figures.

In the case of Portugal and in general, we were able to determine that the Europeanisation of failures and the nationalisation of successes is indeed a practice, and that it is shared by pro-European governments, since it is performed regularly with varying degrees of competence/consciousness and flair, and it is, in essence, strategic. We also saw it is widely recognised as a common, patterned behaviour that might have a negative effect on public opinion towards the EU, even though this is as far as we could go in terms of the empirical demonstration of its influence, leaving room for further research in the matter. For that potential research, as well as the policy implications it might have in terms of preventing these speeches from being reproduced and from producing such a nefarious effect in European politics, we will now shed some light on how these speech acts can be partly responsible for the rise in Euroscepticism when performed by pro-European governments.

Can EU scapegoating by pro-European governments affect citizens' opinions on the EU?

We saw that, theoretically, it would be possible for practices in the same or interconnected *fields* to influence each other, and even mutually constitute, but we also recognised the empirical hardship of strictly establishing such relation. Nevertheless, we presented data, examples and literature that strongly suggested that EU scapegoating is, indeed, a practice, and thus I recognise that we were successful in proving the logic of practicality in both (Euroscepticism and EU-scapegoating, specifically by pro-European governments). We also saw that, in recent years, as the economic and the refugee crisis reached Europe, Euroscepticism experienced a sometimes-exponential growth, both in the EU average and in Portugal, the case-study we analysed. We also remarked that, during those same years, coincidentally or not (I argue not), members of government of several Member State have used the EU as a scapegoat to justify policy decisions, especially those related to economic/fiscal/financial and migration policy. After stating, as early as in the introduction to this thesis, that we recognise the utilitarian dimensions of Euroscepticism as one of the most important ones, it is possible to establish an inductive reasoning and state that, since the citizens see the EU in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, and the pro-European governments, having great influence in the formation of the citizens' opinions towards the EU, use it as a scapegoat to justify policies related to what seems to bother them the most (economy and migration), their actions can negatively impact the citizens' views on the EU.

I thus believe that it is pertinent at this point to present some data and literature that would again point to the fact that the rise of Euroscepticism and its consequences are at least partly of the responsibility of pro-European governments, since they have the practice (shared, of course, by anti-European governments, but that is evident) of "nationalising success and Europeanising failure", and they often go uncontested, as some experts we quoted suggested. Kumlin (2009), establishes a relation between the public opinion of the EU and the attitudes of the elite, arguing that, since the average citizen is often "uninterested and uninformed about European integration(...) they need help by more informed agents".

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People follow ready-made cues as to how their interests are affected, as interpreted by political elite actors such as trusted parties, politicians, interest organizations, and experts. (...) EU interests are articulated and politicized which explains how 'EU citizens form these utilitarian appraisals without a sophisticated understanding of the economics and politics of European integration' (Gabel, 1998: 12) (Kumlin, 2009:3)

It is clear Kumlin sees the relation between the speeches of the political elite, in which the government is obviously included and arguably the most influential actor, and the vision the citizens have about the EU. He concludes that citizens see the EU in a utilitarian way because the elites cue them that way, explaining why support for integration would decrease in times of economic crisis. Moreover, statistical data suggests that there is a large majority of citizens that disapprove the EU's handling of the economy and of the refugee crisis, as the images that follow suggest:


Image 6: "Europeans generally disapprove of the EU's handling of the economy".
Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Pew Research Center

Overwhelming majorities unhappy with EU's handling of refugees

Do you ___ of the way the European Union is dealing with the refugee issue?

	Disapprove	Approve
Greece	94%	5%
Sweden	88	10
Italy	77	17
Spain	75	21
Hungary	72	24
Poland	71	19
UK	70	22
France	70	26
Germany	67	26
Netherlands	63	31

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50b.

"Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Image 7: "Overwhelming majorities unhappy with the EU's handling of refugees". Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Pew Research Center

With this data and the information collected throughout this thesis, I believe we have a good starting point for further research on how EU scapegoating by pro-European Governments (that this thesis proved was a practice) can have an influence in the rise in Euroscepticism in the population and, consequently, the growth of anti-European parties.

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Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Pew Research Center

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Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Pew Research Center

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF EUROBAROMETERS USED

Standard Eurobarometer nº 66 - Autumn 2006

Standard Eurobarometer nº 66 - Autumn 2006, Portugal - Executive Summary

Standard Eurobarometer nº 66 - Autumn 2006, Portugal - National Report

Standard Eurobarometer nº 68 - Autumn 2007

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Standard Eurobarometer nº 80 - Autumn 2013

Standard Eurobarometer nº 81 - Spring 2014

Standard Eurobarometer nº 83 - Spring 2015

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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF VIDEOS OF SPEECHES AND NEWS REPORTS

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APPENDIX 3: GUIDELINES FOR THE INTERVIEWS

Ethical statement: The interviews were performed in person with a recorder or via email. All respondents gave their signed consent to the recording of the interview and were aware that their answers were going to be featured in this thesis. All respondents were aware of the research topic of this study and all authorised that their names were mentioned in this thesis.

Questions:

What do you have to say about the excessive deficit procedure? Do you agree with the sanctions applied in case of default? Why?

What do you think about the Stability and Growth Pact? What impact does it have on Portugal? Positive or negative?

What do you identify as the causes for the crisis that started in 2008? Who was responsible?

When, on presentation of the state budget for 2016, the European Commission and the ECB threatened sanctions against Portugal for non-compliance with the budgetary rules, what did you think? Who was responsible? The government or the inadequacy of European rules? Do you consider these rules impositions? Why?

The highschool Infanta D. Maria, in Coimbra, was rebuilt using community (EU) funds. If you had to present this project in your committee or in the plenary, would you refer the EU's participation?

What do you have to say about the reduction in the direct transfers to Portugal through the cohesion policy, in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-27?