Hidden Processes of Reconciliation in Mozambique: The Entangled Histories of Truth-seeking Commissions held between 1975 and 1982

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Abstract

The southern Africa region has witnessed, over the last 50 years, several episodes of violent conflicts, and Mozambique is no exception. The dominant perspective of the Global North on transition to democracy insists on reinforcing a eurocentric version of modernity, symbolized by a linear transition towards a single legal system and nationhood. This dominant international model of justice reproduces violence in the form of epistemicide and privatization of violence. If courts cannot end civil wars, what are the alternatives? This article, which is focused upon Mozambique and based upon interviews and archival data, aims to explore the extent to which the multiple, almost invisible and silenced processes of national reconciliation can find expression within methodologies of national reconciliation processes. Specific emphasis is placed upon the analysis of initiatives (in the 1970s and 1980s) to deal with ‘traitors of the revolution’ in open organized meetings that produced little-known practices of national reconciliation. It is in such a context where the limits of the discourse about ‘universal jurisdiction’ and criminalization of perpetrators of violence are arguably best understood, and where alternatives can find their strongest manifestations and most radical expressions.

Résumé

Au cours des 50 dernières années, la région de l’Afrique australe a connu plusieurs épisodes de conflits violents, et le Mozambique ne fait pas exception. La perspective dominante du Nord global sur la transition vers la démocratie insiste sur le renforcement d’une version eurocentrique de la modernité, symbolisée par une transition linéaire vers un système juridique unique et l’identité nationale. Ce dominant modèle international de justice reproduit la violence sous forme d’epistemicide, et la privatisation de la violence. Si les tribunaux ne peuvent pas mettre fin aux guerres civiles, quelles sont les alternatives ? Le but de cet article,
Introduction

The history of many of the modern states that endured the violence of colonialism is crossed by many political conflicts of belonging and recognition, as well as by the moral and material implications of such conflicts. Mozambique is no exception. Over the last few years, a persistent demand has been made by various people and associations that acts of aggression committed in the near past in Mozambique must be recognized and acknowledged as historical wrongs, and that the aggressors offer an apology for the offences.

With independence in 1975 and in the context of single-party rule, FRELIMO, the leading political force in the country, constructed itself as the single source of authority in the production of law and in the dissemination of knowledge about the country’s past. This alliance between politics and history generated an official history narrative about the nationalist struggle, a narrative that became an instrument to legitimize the party’s hegemonic authority, rendering it unquestionable (Coelho 2014:21). At the core of this narrative lies FRELIMO’s victory over Portuguese colonialism, but by emphasizing the role of this nationalist movement, this strategy has promoted the silencing of other narratives about struggles for independence. These other narratives are the product of a complex interface between colonizers and colonized, concealing a variety of tensions and antagonisms that permeated (and still permeate) Mozambican society. Indeed, from the point of view of historiography, it is impossible to capture the diversity of perspectives about a single event; therefore, one has to be sensitive to the fact that during the processing of an historical event there is always something that escapes the record (Trouillot 1995:49). Therefore, any event is filled with constitutive absences, an integrative part of the construction process of the historical event itself. Ominously however, in these power games, is the reduction of huge pieces of history to silence, to invisibility.

The right to history emerged as a core claim in the emancipatory movements that blew over the continent, with Africans claiming the right to
decide about their own destiny (sovereignty) and to belong to themselves (autonomy). In Mozambique, 40 years after the declaration of independence, inquisitive questionings about the politics of history and memory are growing. They have been fueled by the recent publications of (auto)biographies and accounts of memory produced by the protagonists of contemporary Mozambican history, among which stand out former political prisoners, FRELIMO government officials, opposition leaders, among others. These memories give glimpses of mechanisms for coping with political violence, mechanisms that were put into place with independence, to deal with ‘comprometidos’ (collaborators), a sizeable group of people accused of having worked very closely with colonial institutions during the nationalist armed struggle that for over 10 years (1963-1974) opposed Mozambicans and Portuguese colonial forces.

Following the methodological proposal – the sociology of absences – advanced by Santos (2004a:3), aiming to make visible facts and actors that, although central to the understanding of the country’s recent past, have been actively produced as non-existent by dominant historical approaches, this paper examines three episodes of ‘truth-seeking commissions’ held in Mozambique in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Since the introduction of multiparty elections and the 1992 peace agreement aimed at bringing an end to the civil war, Mozambique is often described as a country that has been on a successful journey towards reconciliation and peace. However, recent episodes of violence show that many of the conflicts of the past are enmeshed in contemporary practices and structures. In order to solve them, several political activists and members of various political parties have called for truth commissions. Can these commissions solve the conflicts that continue to wreck Mozambique’s social tissue?

Over the last 50 years, the southern Africa region has witnessed several episodes of violent conflicts, showing that Mozambique, unfortunately, is no exception. Seeking a way out of these cycles of violence, Thabo Mbeki and Mahmood Mamdani averted in an article published in 2014 that ‘courts can’t end civil wars.’ Later on, an article by Mamdani (2015) accentuated that episodes of mass violence have to be dealt with as political processes. In Mamdani’s words, one has to move away from a narrow, but dominant, meaning of criminal justice: from one that individualizes the notion of justice in neoliberal fashion (2015:61, 67), towards political justice, involving groups, and aiming towards radical changes of the political landscape. Indeed, the dominant perspective of the Global North on transition to democracy insists in reinforcing a Eurocentric version of modernity (Santos and Avritzer 2007), symbolized by a linear transition towards a single legal system and nationhood (understood as an expression of universal jurisdiction). As several international
documents state, the goal is to restore the functions of the (modern) State, and promote the rule of law in accordance with international human rights norms. This is the case in Mozambique, where the project of national reconciliation (in the aftermath of national liberation and civil wars) rests upon a double articulation of ‘let’s change the page to let the past go’, together with the reinforcement of a western-centric form of regulation. This dominant international model of justice in dealing with past/present episodes of extreme violence, based upon the criminalization of the perpetrators, reproduces violence in the form of epistemicide and privatization of violence (Santos 1998:103). For Mbeki and Mamdani, to tackle the reasons that drive mass violence should be a political process ‘where all citizens – yesterday’s victims, perpetrators and bystanders – may face one another as today’s survivors’.

Following this line of argument, in this article I analyze a less frequently studied process of processes of ‘truth’ production and re-education in non-formal judicial instances: the ‘truth-seeking commissions’ held in Mozambique to deal politically with people considered to have ‘betrayed’ the nationalist struggles, by opting to side with the colonial Portuguese project. The study is based on archival research carried out both in Mozambique, Portugal, South Africa and USA archives, and by analysis of media. Another fundamental source of information were the interviews carried out with several people that in Mozambique were suspected of having betrayed the nationalist struggle; this large group would be part of several ‘truth-seeking commissions’ organized between 1975 and 1982. Mozambique, led by FRELIMO, in the aftermath of an episode of mass violence – colonialism and a ravaging colonial war -, had a choice: to ignore the fact that people were deprived of their dignity and that Mozambique, as a whole, had been the object of an aggressive war, or to address it, to radically challenge the roots of the violence. The ‘truth-seeking’ meetings/commissions of inquiry set in Mozambique were the form adopted locally to deal with the traumas of the recent colonial past.

This article exposes a denser and more intricate interpretation of the political history and social memories of a lesser known period of Mozambique – the end of colonialism and the first years of independence. This analysis requires a clearer and in-depth study of these conflicts, whose roots are to be found in colonial times. This article, ciliation’ and specific notion of ‘temporality’ associated with it, aims to contrast the single, global model of transition justice with the experiences Mozambique went through, as a means to explore the extent to which the multiple, almost invisible processes of local reconciliation can find an expression within methodologies of national reconciliation processes. Specific emphasis will be placed upon the analysis of FRELIMO party-state initiatives (in the 1970s and 1980s) to deal with
‘collaborators’ in open organized meetings, not to produce a victor’s justice, but to produce little-known practices of reconciliation towards a new political community – Mozambicans. It is in such a context where the limits of the discourse about ‘universal jurisdiction’ and criminalization of the perpetrators of violence are arguably best understood, and where alternatives can find their strongest manifestations and most radical expressions (such as the case of reinforcing experiences of protection and self-determination).

**Mozambique and the Crimes Against Humanity**

Colonialism is a crime against humanity. In Mozambique, as in many other countries, colonialism, while defying the right to self-determination, meant a larger process of subjugation that included the use of death, disappearance, torture, political exclusion, incarceration, and other forms of terror.

In situations of military, political and/or economic transition, the reassessment of the role of law in the transition process becomes a crucial site of a people’s or a nation’s negotiating the past, present and future. However, allusions to a tabula rasa or to judicial prosecution after traumatic collapses of societal order have turned, in many contexts, into ill-fated attempts to address the challenges of confronting the past when building the future. The law’s concern with nations that struggle with transition(s) expresses itself through hybrid concepts, the predominant being transitional or post-conflict justice, restorative justice, or reconciliation.

Transitional justice, a prominent element in the liberal peace-building projects, seeks to promote social and political integration and reconciliation, key elements to enhance the rule of law and to increase trust in state governmentality (Bell 2009). This normative model is mainly based on the figure of the modern nation-state paradigm, and on a monocultural hegemonic version of human rights, proclaiming reconciliation as a core condition for the survival of any modern state.

In contemporary societies, ravaged by conflicts, in order to bring about the process of acknowledgement and reconciliation, several formal mechanisms have been activated, including trials and truth commissions (Quinn 2009). However, as Mamdani defends (2015), truth commissions walk hand-in-hand with Nuremberg-style processes (courts), the distinction being that the truth commissions grant amnesty in exchange for the truth. However, in both cases, these institutions perform in similar ways, with the truth commissions producing a quasi-judicial proceeding.

Transitional justice, quite rapidly, transformed itself into an ‘official’ legal strategy to deal with the atrocities of the past, imposing its concepts and frames on debates on justice, rights and democratization in the aftermath of authoritarian regimes. This approach, institutionalized and normalized, has
been appropriated by a wide range of academics and policy makers, including the United Nations (UN) and well-known international NGOs (Teitel 2003:69). This paradigm sees transition justice as a set of tools with increasing legal embedment - prosecution and trials, truth commissions, institutional reforms and reparation programs, among others – part of a single model to be used by any society facing a legacy of atrocities. Yet, this global paradigm of transitional justice cannot deal with the diversity of unresolved and contested issues as various authors have pointed out (see, for example, Roth-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006).

In the words of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, this hegemonic perspective on justice stems from two central conceptions that structure modern western legal modernity: firstly, that the understanding of the world by far exceeds the western understanding of the world and, secondly, that the understanding of the world and the way it creates and legitimates social power has a lot to do with the concepts of time and temporality (Santos 2004b:159). The linear concept of time is at the core of modern justice. Societies understand power according to the dominant conceptions of time, as Koselleck (1990) underlines. By problematizing how modern historiography created the non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous, this author pinpoints the hierarchies that linear temporality has generated. Those who have the power to impose a certain teleological version of the world, define (or rather, aim at) their version of societal structuring and related normativity. The current model of transitional justice clearly shows the presence of such a hierarchical structure: the self-proclaimed democratic societies have the ‘right’ to impose their version of justice, thus defining as contemporary those that resort to global, modern legal institutions, part of modern-state structure.

Yet justice cannot be achieved without taking into consideration the specific political, economic and social context of each country and region. As Mamdani has highlighted (2015), violence is a constitutive part of contemporary national projects, developed upon the burden of building a collective political memory, supporting and supported by a national history. And any national project is full of silence, forgetfulness, absent actors and elapsed political processes.

In order to understand the cycles of violence that have marked Mozambique history over the last six decades, one has to understand not only the individuals whose bodily integrity was violated, but also the multiple episodes of war that occurred, including the colonial violence that marked the onset of Mozambique, as a colonial project. That is, one has to understand the position of the victims and the political context where the mass violence took place. Aiming to understand this complexity, in recent decades scholars of Mozambique have focused on the importance and uses of individual and collective memory to construct and interpret the past, to reconcile victims
and perpetrators, and to create a contemporary sense of a shared political or social identity through reflecting on past experiences.\(^7\)

The study of memory challenges positivist understandings of history and anthropology – scholarly projects informed by the search for objective historical truths and pristine cultural traditions. Memory is not a static entity, but a process, one in which preservation and change, if in differing degrees, are mutually implicated (Clifford 2004).

The eminently political character of the national project underway in Mozambique is perceived, firstly, in the artificiality of its territorial boundaries and secondly, in the selective use of the past for constructing the propagated vision of the Mozambican nation. The idea of the nation is founded upon the politicization of a particular narrative of the nationalist emancipatory project – one part of a complex past and current struggles -, thus hiding numerous ambiguities. This fact explains how memory and justice get imbricated in situations where history plays itself both the role of liberator or of subjugation. As a result, over recent times, with Mozambique confronting new episodes of violent violations of human dignity and rights, claims of transitional justice and truth commissions have appeared on the agenda, intimately associated to claims to ‘open up history’.\(^8\)

But can a subject of knowing become a knowing subject? Following this line of inquiry, two important points have to be addressed: whose voice is present in these depositions and testimonies? As a careful analysis of meetings reveal, most of the victims of these cycles of violence rarely participate in the discourse about them. As Sarah Lucia Hoagland analyzes, when someone speaks from the margins, about a less known or almost forgotten topic, he or she enters a frame of meaning within which the inquiry itself makes sense, and speak to an audience not normally used to hearing or acknowledging the sorts of things they want to say (Hoagland 2009:1).

To exorcise the cycles of violence (colonial exploitation, forced labor, liberation war, mass displacements, and civil war) demands responses both from policy makers as well as from the citizens, the people affected, victims and perpetrators. The answer to the violence that has martyred Mozambican society requires making these problems and debates audible and visible, as a way of finding collective political solutions. These challenges includes analyzing what marginalized testifiers are required to do to enter the field of meaning within which the testimony is to be given, as well as strategies we/they might use when giving testimony in light of the discourse within which we/they have to make sense (West 2003; Hoagland 2009). As mentioned above, transitional justice became a model to reconcile conflict-torn societies, and the tools used to examine violence and injustice have to be assessed. Yet, to fully understand the political and social implications of a conflict one has
to understand not only the substantive issues involved, but also the knowledge systems applied, the subjectivities is entails, since what gets counted (and how) depends on what can be categorized and evaluated as legitimated knowledge.

It is a prerogative of both courts and truth commissions, while searching for evidence about past abuses, to assemble and interpret information, because they are presumed to be the knowing (official) subjects, working in legitimate institutions and recreating the coloniality of knowledge. As will be addressed below, to be able to denounce the colonial repression against the political prisoners in colonial Mozambique represents resistance against a particular colonial relationship, a particular nationalist process.

In the ‘truth-seeking meetings’ set up in Mozambique, it became possible to decipher specific voices from the multiple utterances that form hegemonic discourse about the ‘victims of colonialism’. The people that gave testimony about colonial violence experienced in jail up to May-June 1974 express their experiences in a context where their voices were not used to being heard; many of them were not even fluent in Portuguese, so one has to consider how what they said was heard and/or used (S/a 1977). In this sense, their testimony adds up to the struggle for a new political community, of Mozambicans, in their diversity.

To insist on a monocultural structure to guarantee reconciliation becomes a form for silencing opposing interlocution. For Maria Lugones (2006:78), communicating requires intercultural translation, travelling between and across cultural universes, where the people that testify are seen not only as subjected but also as a subject. Multiple approaches to peace and reconciliation – core elements of transitional justice – have to be seen in the time and contexts where they took place, and not in opposition to ‘modern’ ones, the first illegal and the latter legitimate.

Encountering and understanding the conflicts and complementarities of memories and history is a process that claims to be democratized. Seeking to answer this challenge, Coelho defends that ‘history could be of great value to the democratic process’, as the past permanently waits to be revisited, discussed and ‘shared by all’ (2014:30-31). But, contrary to the ideologization of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, the motto in Mozambique seems to have been forgive and forget. Insisting in reclaim the past, as suggested by Frantz Fanon, ‘triggers a chance of fundamental importance’ (1963:210) for the subaltern other. Here, the silences of the otherness are not a synonym for the victimization of alterity, but of an increasingly active, and even radical presence of these ‘other’ historical actors - a condition for transforming the memories and narratives
they produce. This kind of knowledge, or better yet, inter-knowledge, rests upon recognizing the mutuality of differences and similarities, which allows relationships between and within societies to be reconstructed. In this context, to redress the past is a condition for reconciliation in the present.

Colonialism, War and Justice-making Transitions

The ‘truth-seeking meetings’ set up in Mozambique from 1975 to 1982 reflect a belief in the processes of uncovering evidence and enabling past actions to be brought into the open, to be discussed and those suspected of perpetrating actions of violence and betrayal to be recognized and publicly punished.10

The nationalist guerrilla was projected as the icon of the truly Mozambican citizen, the model of the ‘new man.’ This icon attempted to generate new political identities in the first years of independence. This project of the nation cast Mozambique as being made up of two main groups: those who had fought for independence and the others who made up the mass majority of Mozambican society. But this second group was not homogenous, as it entailed a perceptive differentiation between ‘first class citizens’, those who were considered full Mozambicans because they had identified fully with the nationalist struggle, and ‘second class citizens’, recognized by FRELIMO as having been allies and supporters of the Portuguese colonial presence (Meneses 2007, 2012, 2015). This differentiation, which entailed a strong hierarchy legally assumed, derived from the necessity to ‘limit the electoral capacity of the citizens who were committed to fascist colonialism’.11

To create a new political community for all the Mozambicans remained a central goal of FRELIMO. Shortly after independence, FRELIMO sought ways to overcome the separation created between those deemed to be ‘collaborators’ and the ‘Mozambicans.’ In 1977-78, the first signs of a political strategy seeking to deal with the ‘present memory’ of these colonial connections emerged. FRELIMO had decided not to opt for truth commissions as a form to deal with past wrongs, a key to building the nation. On the contrary, the multiple meetings and the integration processes for the ‘collaborators’ sought to elucidate, clarify, and offer knowledge about the complexity of the recent political history of Mozambique.

The ‘collaborators’ a significant and extremely heterogeneous group, lumped together all who did not ‘fit’ into the epic story that fabricated the ‘new man’, the icon the new Mozambique (Meneses 2007, 2015). They were those who had given in to temptation, having committed themselves to the colonial system. It included former members of the Portuguese political colonial police, the PIDE-DGS; members of ANP,12 commando units in the Portuguese army; the godmothers of African troops in the Portuguese army,
traditional authorities, politicians belonging to other political associations, members of the lower echelons of the Portuguese administrative apparatus, or still those who ‘were not with us’ (i.e. Frelimo). It also integrated former political prisoners upon which there was suspicion of betrayal. Finally, it included those who had been part of other nationalist projects, besides FRELIMO, or that had betrayed this movement. Seen as latent seeds of the colonial ideology, and people who the party state could not immediately trust, re-routing and re-educating memory became an important task during the early transition years.

One of the freedom fighters interviewed clearly stated, reflecting upon FRELIMO’s experience during the first years of independence: ‘if you can define the terms of the transition, it means you can win the transition and define the conditions of peace, and it means that the other side [Portuguese colonial administration] acknowledged that FRELIMO had won the war’. People may come to terms with, emotionally respond to, and actively remember and discuss the events of the past as a key element for rebuilding of the society. But power relations are always embedded in these encounters.

Portugal’s colonial project for Mozambique, in the footsteps of other colonial powers, resulted in the transformation of part of the south-eastern Africa into a settler’s colony. The presence of a significant community of settlers required the creation of an administrative and judicial structure to control the diverse population of their domains. Mozambique, as a project of a new country, had limited possibilities for inheriting anything from its colonial metropole, Portugal, besides the state, bureaucratic structure (Mondlane 1967:51). In terms of justice, the existing institutions at the time of independence had engaged mostly Portuguese, whose mental templates rested upon colonial references, and branding Portuguese legislation. State, official justice remained part of the colonial political landscape. The newly arriving power, made up of the liberating forces who had won the nationalist struggle, wanted to carry out a new form of justice. FRELIMO, assuming itself to represent ‘the people’, claimed a revolutionary, radically new form of justice for all the Mozambicans, beyond the narrow legal scheme inherited from the colonial times. In Machel’s words, ‘the judicial system has to be reorganized to make justice accessible and understandable to the common citizen [by breaking] the barrier erected between the people and justice’.

Because the new political leadership did not trust the inherited legal system, ‘traitors’ were forced to open up about their wrong-doing in these ‘truth-seeking meetings’ set up throughout the country, a key component of coming to terms with the past wrongs. Compelled by the government in power to attend these meetings, the collaborators felt loss, and experienced a lack of self-respect and helplessness. But, as the process of disclosure of suspicions
was opened up, and their ‘treason accusations’ publicly presented, remembering revealed its potential. As several of them have now argued, the initially unpleasant memories ‘transformed them into new citizens’, part of a stronger political community.

The Political Dimension of the ‘Truth Meetings’ – Creating the ‘New Citizen’?

In the late 1960s, with the progress of the liberation war in northern Mozambique, and with the emergence of liberated zones, FRELIMO faced a sharpening of internal contradictions – political, military and administrative – which resulted in the killing of several of its leaders, including its president, Eduardo Mondlane. Reflecting on internal differences gave rise to two different political projects (FRELIMO 1982:122), a radical division visible in the movement especially after the 2nd Congress of FRELIMO, which took place in 1968: hot debates on the strategies to continue the struggle, questions of ethnic identity, who was the enemy (attempts to identify the enemy as the ‘whites’), and attempts to limit women’s empowerment, were among some of the key issues (Ncomo 2003; Pachinuapa 2011).

To fight the various abuses that occurred during the war in the liberated areas, forms of ‘popular justice’ were performed by local political structures, in charge of mediating both civil and military cases (Moiane 1984:12-13). However, as Nalyambipano states, cases involving espionage and treason were dealt at a higher level (with popular participation in the hearings), and the punishment included re-education in special centres, public reprehension and even the death penalty (2013:80).

The escalation of the internal contradictions within FRELIMO in the late 1960s led Uria Simango, then Vice-President, to publish a pamphlet where, on the one hand, he criticized the radicalization of the revolutionary project and, on the other, openly exposed some of the conflicts that tainted the movement. This public position of Simango, a position that counted upon the support of an important wing inside FRELIMO, was interpreted by the other wing as if it were the voice of the enemy, serving the interests of the Portuguese colonialism and global imperialism. Simango was accused of treason by the opposing wing, comprising mostly of politicians and military leadership, and expelled from the front, late in 1969. To justify this exclusion of one of its top leaders, FRELIMO publicly accused Simango of opportunism, irresponsibility and corruption, signaling this behavior as a threat to the legitimacy and continuity of the struggle (FRELIMO 1977:140-142). By assuming this political stance, FRELIMO leadership identified itself as the vanguard of all Mozambicans, reassuring its compromise in defending
the interests of the underprivileged, in radical opposition against the ‘new explorers’, still present in the movement (Bragança 1980:xx).

These problems with leadership mirrored the conflicts that had emerged with and within the liberated areas. A net disagreement opposed those willing to maintain the exploratory economic system enforced by colonial administration, by africanizing it, and those who fought to radicalize the struggle, to free ‘the land and the people’. In the latter sense, the liberated zones were perceived as the laboratory of the future independent Mozambique, where the state ‘defends the interests of the exploited and oppressed classes of society’ (Machel 1978:144). These new, embryonic spaces of governance embodied the moral project of the nation, a society envisioned free of exploration, of racial discrimination, of tribalism, and of women’s oppression. That is, it was not enough to end the Portuguese colonial presence. As the political pronouncements underlined, the roots of the colonial, exploratory and discriminating system had to be removed, including the ‘removal’ of people who aligned with politic and economic projects that mimicked the methods and models of the enemy (Peixoto and Meneses 2013). On the external front the enemy came to be seen as imperialism, including the countries whose investments supported the extension of the presence of the colonial regime in Mozambique (Frelimo 1977). Internally, the struggle against those considered to have betrayed the ideals of the liberation war gained room.

Indeed, from the late 1960s up until the early 1970s, the Portuguese administration sought, through various political manoeuvres, to charm a significant (mostly urban) group of Mozambicans under the promise of more integrationist policies. One implication of this process was the consolidation of a small black bourgeoisie in the urban context, especially in Beira and Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). If several of these elements affirmed their nationalist position, they did not adhere to the revolutionary project of FRELIMO. In 1973, in Beira the first legal ‘autonomous’ political association (GUMO) emerged fighting, on the political front, for the autonomy of Mozambique. Abroad, other nationalist groups, such as COREMO (based in Zambia and Malawi), continued to operate, although with limited political impact, especially after 1972.

On the military side, the Portuguese psychosocial actions resulted in increasing defections from FRELIMO, since the end of war did not seem close. In parallel, the Portuguese army acted provocatively, providing resources to a growing number of ‘infiltrators’ inside movement (Machel 1977:107). In parallel, the contingent of black troops in the Portuguese colonial army was increasing (Coelho 2003). This process created a large number of well trained and equipped African troops fighting in defense of the colonial regime. It included the Grupos Especiais (GEs), the Grupos
Especiais de Paraquedistas (GEPs), the Commandos units, and Flechas, and the volunteers for civil defense (OPVs), totaling about 40,000 troops; in parallel less specialized militia forces were also active.

The military coup d’état in Portugal in April 1974 paved the way for the negotiations that ended with a series of agreements with FRELIMO, that ended the colonial war and granted independence to Mozambique in 1975. However, the way to independence knew several less-known, but violent episodes. In the aftermath of the coup d’état various political groups were formed, besides GUMO, seeking to challenge the centrality of FRELIMO. But in the agreements signed in September 1974, between Portugal and front, this movement was recognized as ‘the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Mozambique’. All the politicians and activists integrating other political groups would soon be denounced as collaborators at the service of colonialism, accused of seeking to undermine the nationalist struggle. The broadening of the enemy’s definition included ‘puppet troops’ such as GE, GEP, Commandos, Flechas and OPVs, ‘increasingly involved in repressive actions to mask the foreign aggression and present it as a civil war between Mozambicans’ (Machel 1974:19). The label ‘collaborator’ was also applied to FRELIMO’s dissidents, some of who had formed or joined newly political organizations.

The failed attempted coup by radical white settlers on 7 September 1974 – on the same day the agreements were being signed in Lusaka - boosted FRELIMO’s suspicion about who were the truly supporters of the revolutionary project. Thus, demarcating the boundary between loyalty to FRELIMO’s political project and treason was a survival strategy applied from the onset of the transitional government in Mozambique (from mid-September 1975 on). The distinction between truly Mozambican and non-citizens became a curial tool in this operation. Those who would support FRELIMO’s political ideals for a new society were considered ‘true’ Mozambicans; the non-citizens were labelled collaborators. Addressing the transitional government during its inauguration, in September 1974, Machel stated: ‘The blood of our people was not shed only to free the land from foreign domination, but also to reconquer our Mozambican personality, to bring about the resurgence of our culture and to create a new mentality, a new society’.

FRELIMO’s concern regarding the potential intrusion of their ranks (and the new state) by former colonial collaborators remains central. During the first national committee meeting held six months before independence in northern Mozambique, it decided that membership of all the party and state structures should be revised in order to avoid the intrusion of former collaborators, FRELIMO detractors and counter-revolutionaries: the
extended list included former members of PIDE-DGS, members of the Portuguese fascist party ANPs, GEs, GEPs, Commandos, OPVs, also including members of ’puppet organizations and parties’, and people considered to be carrying out anti-social behavior (prostitutes, polygamists, etc.). The final report underscored that all people who would fell into these categories should not be allowed membership of FRELIMO.25 But because these ‘enemies’ had to live within Mozambique, side by side with true Mozambicans, they had to be purified from their colonial background and transformed into full citizens.

The first stages in dealing with collaborators included various strategies of ’naming and shaming’, including the denouncing of people who had supposedly work together with colonial institutions or had shown ‘incorrect’ social behavior. Many of them were sent to ’re-education centres’26 (Thomaz 2008, Meneses 2015), in remote areas of the country.

Other action was taken in relation to the group of white settlers that had acted against FRELIMO in the events of September 1974, as well as those who had deserted FRELIMO, who had opposed his proposed policy, both internally and externally. Finally, a third group included those who had challenged the FRELIMO on the military front, as COREMO’s members. Together, they were accused of betraying the cause of the people by the victorious FRELIMO. More than 300 people were arrested between October 1974 and March-April of 1975, and sent under arrest to Nachingwea, the main FRELIMO political and military camp in Tanzania. There they were subjected to a ’revolutionary and popular’ trial, chaired by President Machel, between March and May 1975. Following these trials, they were recognized as traitors, and sentenced to confinement in ’re-education’ centres inside Mozambique (Meneses 2015).

The combination of public trials with re-education was the continuation of the ’popular justice’ FRELIMO had implemented in the liberated areas. The goal was to rehabilitate people, and to create citizens, and not to destroy them. Samora Machel in a collective interview in March 1975 explained the importance of the popular trials in Nachingwea: ’We arrested them! We do not kill! They are political enemies! Our policy is for clemency. In Mozambique they will grow and learn from the peasants’.27 The assumption behind this line of reasoning was that yesterday’s traitors and their victims would have to live together, in a single country, through political re-education. The political goal behind the ’re-education centres’ was to transform the civil and political delinquents - thieves, assassins, military defectors, armed bandits, drug dealer, members of other political groups - into citizens: ’it creates in the delinquent the will and means for him to break up with his past. Gradually all disappear and in his place the worker emerges, the man, the citizen’.28
However, as several former detainees expressed, this experience revealed itself extremely traumatic. There was no judicial system at place, contrary to what later would be present with the TRC in South Africa (Mamdani 2015). The judiciary procedures depended on FRELIMO’s decisions; as a result, the length of detention was uncertain, with little possibility of appeal. In many centres political detainees were set side by side with criminals. Many reported that their arrest was unjustified, quite often following personal vendettas. In the re-educating centres, the fate of inmates depended on the military officers in charge, or at the highest level, on the will of FRELIMO’s leadership. As the centres were located in remote regions (mostly in the former liberated areas), there was almost no possibility of getting in touch with their families. Also, little ideological and political work was part of the re-education program. Malnourishment, bad weather and diseases were commonly named conditions that the detained endured.

A couple of years later, internal and external persistent allegations of abuse of human rights in these centres led FRELIMO to put aside the re-education program. Yet, if most of the centres were closed down by 1981, the former detainees could not leave the centres’ region and return back home. FRELIMO insisted in keeping the former detainees away, even though now their families were allowed to join them. This new option of re-education insisted in keeping potentially suspicious subjects away from heavily populated areas, while work was kept as a tool for re-educating people.

From Political Prisoners into Comrade Freedom Fighters?

In March 1978 FRELIMO leadership held a meeting with former political prisoners. The meeting was called to discuss suspicions of betrayal and collaboration of the political prisoners with PIDE-DGS, the Portuguese political police, in charge of the special penitentiaries (or jail sections) where political prisoners were kept in colonial times. This suspicion dramatically stained the political curriculum of many former political prisoners (Langa 2011:368-369). These meetings inaugurated a new cycle of sessions of ‘naming and shaming’ in the country, whose roots reflect a significant lack of confidence in ‘their own comrades’, as one of the participants in the meeting objected.

During the preparation for FRELIMO’s III Congress, held in 1977, many people who were ready to join FRELIMO’s ranks were identified as collaborators and not allowed to join the party; similar purges occurred in the state apparatus and in several public companies. With the transformation of FRELIMO into a political party, one witnesses a broader campaign aimed at identifying the ‘agents of the enemy that had infiltrated the structures of popular power’, as a form to reinforce the purity of the ranks inside the
party. Late in 1978, in the aftermath of the Congress, in a country increasingly confronted with the rise of political and military instability, the FRELIMO leadership issued a violent statement, proclaiming ‘the need for vigilance upon all elements that had collaborated with colonial-fascist organizations’. All collaborators – GEs, GEPs, Commandos, former PIDEs, etc. – had to publicly display their pictures and a short autobiography detailing how they had been trapped into collaborating with the colonial regime. Many of these collaborators were deprived of many rights. As many of the collaborators interviewed underlined, they could elect but not be elected, it was extremely hard to be promoted, etc.

This new cycle of dealing with the betrayal shows some innovations. In order to overcome the separation created between the collaborators and the ‘Mozambican people’, the strategy adopted then by FRELIMO combined punishment (a public display of betrayal) with purification processes. For Coelho, the ‘purification’ happened by the presentation, in writing, of individual biographies containing a reference to the acts committed; it also had to include a demonstration of his/her remorse, key to free the person from potential blackmail regarding his/her problematic past (Coelho 2003:191). In fact, in this new context, people accused of collaboration, in most cases, were not threatened with arrest. But they had to publicly explain their stories and underwent, at their working and living places, supervision by the party and the state. As publicly stated, ‘only by knowing, controlling and closely watching the lives of these elements will be able to deliver them from the enemy and commitment to reintegrate them in society [sic]’.

In parallel, the purifying campaign of FRELIMO ranks knew other developments. Many middle to high rank party cadres had been political prisoners in colonial times, and shadows of betrayal of the ‘political cause of the people’ were mounting in 1978. As part of its restructuring ideological strategy, FRELIMO set up a series of meetings that year with former political prisoners in Maputo. Around 350 people participated in the meetings. In the first of the many meetings, opened by President Machel, he clarified the reason behind the gathering:

We all had children, we had wives, we had our parents, our mothers! But we opted out to dedicate our lives to the struggle […]. Making war is not the same as going to a banquet, do not you? […] These meetings, comrades, is to find out how many traitors are in FRELIMO! Military [from FRELIMO] gave themselves up with guns! Entered into agreements with the enemy! Yes, because of material problems. So it would be good that you help me […] we want to free everything!

Later, those present were invited to give their version of their experience as political prisoners. At the end of the meetings, that lasted for a while,
FRELIMO categorized the political prisoners into three groups: the heroes (those who had preferred death to betray the people’s cause); the vacillating (who had come to compromise minimally with the colonial administration in exchange for small privileges, but remained faithful to nationalist ideals); and the traitors (those who sold themselves to PIDE-DGS and denounced their comrades).42

In the aftermath of these meetings, a couple of elements were pronounced guilty of political treason by FRELIMO leadership and condemned – by a political party – to jail. Some others, for their incapacity to acknowledge their betrayal, were sent to re-education centres.43 The vast majority, however, was submitted, following FRELIMO’s decision, to a ‘purifying’ process of military and political training at Matalane centre (nearby Maputo), a process that lasted for a couple of months. This last group included well-known politicians and intellectuals, as the group of former political prisoners included names such as José Caveirinha and Rui Nogar, well-known poets; writers such as Albino Magaia and Luis Bernardo Honwana, and the world-known painter Malangatana Valente. It also included Cadmiel Muthemba, Moisés Massinga or Matias Mboa, still active politicians.44

According to the testimonies of some former political prisoners who lived through this experience, it came to be perceived as an ‘exam, not only in terms of capacity, but also to see to what extent one could trust them’.45 As asserted by the multiple political leaders of FRELIMO that participated in the training at Matalane, the goal was to clear out the ideological vices acquired in the long stay in prisons, and elevate the level of political ideology of the participants. In the words of some people interviewed, these meetings came to downsize the contributions of the former political prisoners to the liberation struggle.46 However, for most of them, this process of mental liberation contributed to clearing the suspicions about them, by clearing their pasts:

Ultimately, this was a form to redeem the prisoners, to stop thinking that the top leadership of the party was still suspicious of them. It was the way he [Machel] found of bringing people together. […] To know what people though, to see if, in fact, they had changed their mind, if they had not gone over to the enemy, was the goal of the meeting.47

In the words of Reinhart Koselleck (1990:103-104), the modern concept of history is marked by the reduction of plural stories into a single, hegemonic narrative. A central feature of modern history is the original violence it entails, resulting from the imposition of a monolithic analytical matrix, an analytical device that annihilates differences, and closes any possibility of dialogue. This one-dimensional reduction is, in itself, a methodological option and a historical fact.
By allowing 'the lion to tell also his side of the story', these meetings opened possibilities for dialogue with other (dominant) political narratives. Transforming a given feature, a given interpretation of a problem into a meta-narrative undermines the analytical process; this approach conveys the risk of turning one particular version of events – naturally partial – into the only possible historical chronicle, occupying the centerpiece of reason, the central theme of history. These meetings ought to turn potential enemies into adversaries or partners in the struggle for a new Mozambique, a new political community.

**Becoming Citizens: There are no More Collaborators, Just Mozambicans!**

The final episode of reconciliation with the colonial past took place in 1982, a couple of years after a large group of people had been ordered to publicly exhibit their pictures and confessions of collaboration with colonial institutions, as I briefly mentioned above. Meetings between top FRELIMO leadership and exposed collaborators took place throughout the country, in various locations, so that all the people involved could openly expose their own case, and apologize for it. The final meetings – one of which took place in Maputo, headed by President Samora Machel – were called to close the two-year process of self-criticism and public vigilance upon a large group of collaborators. This last group was extremely heterogeneous: it included the last ones that had not ‘fitted’ in the revolutionary project of Mozambican citizenship, those who, by siding with the colonial system, were considered traitors to the revolutionary project. Among the collaborators were former members of the colonial political police, of the ANP, well-trained troops who had served in the Portuguese army, the godmothers of war, traditional authorities, personnel in the lower echelons of the administrative apparatus, members of other political associations that had contested FRELIMO’s hegemony in the early years of transition and independence, among others.

In the interviews carried out for this article, people revealed how apprehensive they had been when they had received the call to attend the meetings. Many of them, aware of the outcomes of previous ‘truth-seeking meetings’, had said goodbye to their close relatives, sure that a formal conviction was waiting most of them, after an open session of popular justice. For those who had opted to stay in the country, this was a path that the party state led by FRELIMO had chosen to close their processes.

As briefly expressed above, the ‘purification’ started by the presentation of written, individual biographies of collaboration, demonstration of remorse. This was a humiliating exposition: their now ‘inconvenient’ past was exposed
to the public. Many of them occupied middle and upper level positions in the
government, and were to be scrutinized by their subordinates and employees.49

In May 1982, one of the main meetings was held in Maputo. This meeting,
known as the ‘Meeting with the collaborators’, fully restituted the civil and
political rights that had been denied to these collaborators. Indeed, at the
closing ceremony, President Machel proclaimed ‘there are no more
collaborators, there are only Mozambicans’.50

This stage of ‘naming and shaming’ was replete with violent psychological
episodes. The meeting was attended by a large public. The collaborators
were called to come up front and openly speak out their ‘crimes’. Samora
Machel was harsh in confronting them. Recognition of the wrongdoing,
confrontation of their pasts, was the key to become fully Mozambicans,
part of the long process that Machel defined as ‘mental decolonization’.51
But the collective therapy played an important role in reinforcing support
and setting the stage for the gruesome testimonies, replete with violence.
Many of them, confronted with their murky past, confessed their fears of
being killed by the people they had denounced and to be arrested or killed:
‘What would the people of Manjazaze do to you?’, interrogated Samora
Machel one of the former PIDE members. And he recognized publicly: ‘If
had gone back to Manjacaze, they would had kill me’ [sic].52

These episodes, broadcasted by the then experimental television of
Mozambique, revealed an exercise of citizenship, where people meet to
understand each other. However, the negotiations of full citizenship depended
upon the willingness of the ‘collaborators’, to open up about their past and
to recognize that their past behavior was far from the ideal Mozambique
citizen that FRELIMO had defined. At the end of their depositions, most of
them, including commandos involved in war massacres, begged for
forgiveness, in highly moving and convincing ways, from the ‘People of
Mozambique’.

In fact, just a couple of them refused to acknowledge their ‘betrayal’ and
their past of collaboration and were sent to jail.53

The meetings with the collaborators were performed redoing the route
of memory, clarifying and making known their historical backgrounds.
Samora Machel, speaking initially in the first day of the meeting, reinforced the role of history:

Just reviewing the past will be possible to know the present. Just knowing the present will be possible to make the prospect of the future. These are three key elements in society: past, present and future. Pages are marked by history. [...] You were part of the colonial structure. Your tasks and actions were complementary, competing for the same goal. Which one? Prevent the independence of Mozambique. [...] We decided to expose your pictures in the windows. We asked for your biographies. We did it to expose your collaboration, so that every citizen could identify you. We did it so that people could exercise vigilance over you!

It was an act of justice! ... Revolutionary justice. In other countries would have been dragged to the courts. In other countries where revolution had triumphs, you had been shot. [...] But we also did it to prevent that had a double life, to allow you to break free. By publicly exposing your collaboration with organizations and repressive forces of colonialism, we have destroyed the secret that bounded you to the enemy. You were a reservoir for the enemy to blackmail you anytime. [...] The liberation is right here - narration of the sufferings. [...] Today, we are in an independent Mozambique, you are now citizens of an independent and sovereign country, respected by the international community! We liberated our country so that Mozambicans could always control and decide their fates!"55

Accentuating that the past lives with us, Samora Machel, at the end after all the sessions, saluted the people that had had the courage to trust each other and that had dare to expose themselves to the ‘People’. They were no longer second-class citizens or enemies. They had become part of the political community, of a new present. Indeed, the final question posed to all of them was – ‘compatriots or collaborators?’55 And the almost unanimous cry became – compatriots. As the large band crossing the room announced by them, ‘with the liberation of Mozambique the collaborators has also won a country, a motherland’.

In the ‘era of the witness’ (Wieviorka 2006) that we live in, debates over the adoption of official silence in countries that have known war-torn conflicts have oscillated between two perspectives: pragmatic arguments for, and moral condemnation of this type of strategy. The arguments in favor of state silence have been justified on the grounds that instituting formal mechanisms to achieve accountability for past violence can potentially imperil the fragile peace in deeply divided societies. However, longitudinal analyzes of the dynamics behind official silence demonstrates that silence is neither complete nor does it result in the political death of memory (Ricoeur 2006). The example
of Mozambique and the debates over history and memory highlighted the right to political memory, the urge to deal with ‘the ghosts of the past’. Indeed, what these meetings reveals were moments of high intensity discussion on the conditions of a new political community, turning enemies into citizens.

**Conclusion**

Nation-state building is a violent process in nature. The identification and persecution of the collaborators in Mozambique and the violence that characterized these processes is an integral part of independent Mozambique history. The study of the reconciliation processes promoted by FRELIMO between 1975 and 1982 is in line with Mamdani’s claim (2012:7) for more including and deep historical research that contributes towards a broader theorization of African experiences in conflict resolution processes.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Truth Commissions (TC) reproduce a model for criminal justice that, by proxy, reproduces the experiences of war courts set up at the end of World War II. However, other models have been in use in Africa to deal with conflict situations, as the case of the truth commissions in Mozambique illustrates. As several situations analyzed show, in truth commissions the goal was to broaden trust and to create conditions for people to regain their dignity, as fully trusted citizens. But these conditions are hard to achieved, as the case of Mozambique demonstrates. In order to understand the contexts and times of transition, to grasp the complexity of tasks of building a nation, it is important to unveil and study the multiple layers in which politics of state-building and governmentality are put in practice across different periods.

The constructions of social groups of ‘enemies’ – both internal and external – was the approach used by FRELIMO to deal with the collaborators, an integral part of the larger politics and ethics of nation building. The collaborators personified the figure of the traitor/enemy necessary for the edification of the new nation-state, and FRELIMO used them to define the boundaries of national belonging and citizenship in a period fraught with suspicious loyalties and allegiances to the new regime. Tobias Kelly and Sharika Thiranagama maintain that

> accusations of treason have historically played a central role in the attempt to maintain social order and political authority. To make accusations of treason is to make a claim to power, to try to police the boundaries of permissible politics, and to exert authority in the face of constantly shifting affiliations (2009:3).

The three stages of truth seeking analyzed here show how FRELIMO, through ‘naming and shaming’ the ‘close allies’ of colonialism struggled to
re)construct the wrecked social tissue of the ‘new’ Mozambique. The social
engineering applied in different moments to deal with those then perceived
as ‘close enemies’, and the challenges met to ‘decolonize their mentalities’ reflect delicate social processes that contributed to restoring the dignity of
the former ‘collaborators’ as full Mozambicans.

The use of open meetings to publicly expose the past activities (now no
longer considered acceptable) of those accused of betrayal, contributed to
generate a broader sense of belonging and offered, with all the violence
associated with it, a moment for the aggressors to offer an apology for their
past actions, strengthening FRELIMO’s authority and legitimacy. This top-
down process of reconciliation, although it met multiple resistances, opened
up the possibility for Mozambicans, in their diversity, to negotiate their way
through contradictory ethical and political demands. Indeed, the collaborators
and those that confronted them (from FRELIMO political leadership to the
common citizen) came to know more about the colonial political processes
in Mozambique, fostering a coming-to-terms with the past through various
mechanisms including remembering, forgiveness, trust, civic engagement
and social cohesion. It should be underlined that the truth-seeking processes
were not determined by Mozambique’s political elite’s rush for spoils and
political power; rather, what these processes transmit is the urgency to
create and control Mozambican society and to mold the citizens according
to particular (temporal and geopolitically speaking) aesthetics and moral
ideals (Peterson 2012:284). As such, the state-building project had to manage
multiple positions, allegiances and betrayals, as fundamental components of
the new nation.

By dissecting the past memories of violence, the processes analyzed in
this article illustrate how memory is a crucial part of dealing with past violence
a way of claiming the (re)construction of the official historic narrative. By
openly exposing the reasons that led to betrayal, the truth meetings set up
internally in Mozambique produced other versions of history. In these ‘other
histories’, memory acted as an instrument for social transformations, re-
connecting and reconciling people, reconstructing trust after long episodes
of violence and helping to heal traumatic events (for both victims and
perpetrators).

A relational world is all about a heterogeneous history, combining, in a
dialogical way, located, active and specific events and actors. Knowing,
seeing, witnessing, attesting and speaking always flows from a particular
body, located in a particular time and space, both literally and relationally.

As has been argued elsewhere (Meneses 2011, 2015; Peixoto and Meneses
2013), what is required is a narrative made of interconnected histories,
locally and regionally articulated, challenging conventional wisdom. This theoretical and methodological shift answers to a growing concern to recover silenced histories from various locations, where African experience is theorized both from within its own experiences and in relation to other realities. After all, at the core of modern nations acts of extreme violence can always be found – a fact that is reflected in war memorials, lists of historical monuments, and street names. But the persistent silence about the African contribution to human rights and academic discussions about citizenship evidences the heritage of a broader conflict that disrupted utterly the rights of Africans – the violent colonial encounter – a conflict that remains to be addressed in all its complexity.

Notes
1. This article results from broader research projects. I am thankful to the financial support of the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT / MEC) Portugal (with national funds and co-funded by FEDER through the Programa Operacional Competitividade e Inovação COMPETE 2020) whose fellowship PTDC / CVI-ANT / 6100/2014 - POCI-01-0145-FEDER-016859 funded part of the research. It also benefited from a European research project funded by ERC and coordinated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement n. [269807]). I am very thankful to all the interviewees who willingly embarked on this project. Needless to say, my gratitude extends to all the institutions (archives and libraries) that granted access to their collections and contributed to the production of this article, especially the Historical Archives of Mozambique. My acknowledgement to the colleagues who listened and commented an initial version of this paper, presented at the CODESRIA 2015 General Assembly.
2. FRELIMO was the main nationalist movement in Mozambique, gaining access to power on independence. It transformed itself into a political party in 1977, (Frelimo party) remaining a dominant political force.
5. In independent Mozambique, judicial punishment had, as I will address further on, three main goals: to educate, to deter, and also to repress. Sentences became much harsher in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, as FRELIMO was severely strained successively and in combination from Rhodesian attacks, South African destabilization and the MNR-Renamo rebellion (Machava 2011).
6. I try to avoid labelling them ‘truth commissions’, although these different moments represent, in fact, truth commissions. And in various moments, as I will address further on, Samora Machel, president of Mozambique, present in multiple meetings, would emphasize that their goal was ‘to find the truth’
about the reasons for violence and betrayal. Also, as several of the interviewees emphasized, their presence in these meetings was crucial, as it allowed them to ‘explain their side of the story, their truth’.


9. This concept is used to refer to a process of translating the diversity of the world - other cultures, other knowledges, other ways of being, onto a monocultural reality, presuming commensurability through Western rationality.


11. Interview with a member of the then Mozambique council of ministers. During the 1977 elections for people’s assemblies a clear distinction existed, separating those that were involved ‘in the colonial structures of the oppressor’ and the ‘Mozambican people’. The former were banned from political participation: they could vote but not be voted for (Meneses 2012, 2015).

12. PIDE-DGS: the repressive police during the dictatorship. Acção Nacional Popular: the single political party that ruled Portugal throughout the period of the dictatorship (until April 1974).

13. Interview with an elected deputy of the first mono-party national assembly of Mozambique.


15. Interviews carried out in Mozambique with former collaborators, between 2011–2013 and 2015.

16. With episodes of strong verbal violence by FRELIMO leadership, as the tapes consulted reveal.

17. Reference to the final speech of Samora Machel during the meeting with collaborators in 1982. Mozambique National Archives - Fund SM0006.


19. On this topic, see Ncomo 2003 and Meneses 2015.

20. United Group of Mozambique.

21. Mozambique Revolutionary Committee

22. The transition government was headed by a Portuguese High Commissioner and had Joaquim Chissano, a top FRELIMO leader, as prime minister.

26. See, for example, ‘Denunciados e expulsos quatro infiltrados no Ministério do Trabalho’, *Notícias*, 8 January 1978.
29. Interviews carried out in Maputo in 2012 and 2016.
30. Interviews carried out in Maputo in 2012 and 2013.
31. Interview carried out in Maputo, in March 2014, with a former member of this process.
34. Interview carried out in Maputo in 2012.
35. During this Congress FRELIMO was transformed into a political party of Marxist-Leninist orientation.
36. Interview with a former political commissar, carried out in Maputo in 2013.
37. Caused by MNR-RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance), a movement formed and funded in neighboring countries, militarily challenging the socialist project of FRELIMO.
39. Ibid.
41. See also Machava (2011), ‘We don’t want to be called anymore ex-pps: notes on the purification of other collaborators in Mozambique’. Paper presented in 2011 in Lisbon.
43. Interviews carried out in Maputo in 2012 and 2014.
44. Several of the former political prisoners who were accused of treason and then submitted to re-education processes, explained during the interviews that they underwent a difficult period of political marginalization after independence (see also Laban 1998 and Mateus 2006).
45. Malangatana’s testimony, in Mateus 2006:643.
46. Interviews carried out in Maputo in 2012.
47. Chivite’s testimony, in Mateus 2006:625.
49. Interviews carried out in Pemba and Maputo in 2012.
52. ‘Cruz de Cristo servia a tortura de homens’, Noticias, 12 May 1982.
53. Interview carried out in Maputo in 2012.
57. ‘Descolonização Mental é o Nosso Problema’, Samora Machel’s initial speech at the meeting with the ‘comprometidos’ held in Maputo. Noticias, 11 May 1982.

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