Counter-Islamophobia Kit

Workstream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives – Portugal

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Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States.

CIK Project (Counter Islamophobia Kit)

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Working Paper 5 - Workstream 1: Dominant Islamophobic Narratives – Portugal

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About the CIK Project

The Countering Islamophobia through the Development of Best Practice in the use of Counter-Narratives in EU Member States (Counter Islamophobia Kit, CIK) project addresses the need for a deeper understanding and awareness of the range and operation of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred across the EU, and the extent to which these counter-narratives impact and engage with those hostile narratives. It is led by Professor Ian Law and a research team based at the Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK. This international project also includes research teams from the Islamic Human Rights Commission, based in London, and universities in Leeds, Athens, Liège, Budapest, Prague and Lisbon/Coimbra. This project runs from January 2017 - December 2018.

About the Paper

This paper is an output from the first workstream of the project which was concerned to describe and explain the discursive contents and forms that Muslim hatred takes in the eight states considered in the framework of this project: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and United Kingdom. This output comprises eight papers on conditions in individual member states and a comparative overview paper containing Key Messages. In addition this phase also includes assessment of various legal and policy interventions through which the European human rights law apparatus has attempted to conceptually analyse and legally address the multi-faceted phenomenon of Islamophobia. The second workstream examines the operation of identified counter-narratives in a selected range of discursive environments and their impact and influence on public opinion and specific audiences including media and local decision-makers. The third workstream will be producing a transferable EU toolkit of best practice in the use of counter-narratives to anti-Muslim hatred. Finally, the key messages, findings and toolkits will be disseminated to policy makers, professionals and practitioners both across the EU and to member/regional audiences using a range of mediums and activities.

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1. Introduction

The main aim of this working paper is to provide a map of knowledge production and dissemination on Islamophobia in Portugal, as well as of the public debates it has, or most often has rather not, generated in this context. The conceptualisation of Islamophobia deployed follows the work by S. Sayyid (2014a): ‘Islamophobia is a form of racialized governmentality. It is more than prejudice or ignorance; it is a series of interventions and classifications that affect the well-being of populations designated as Muslim.’ (p. 19) Sayyid points to the political, rather than merely religious, cultural or emotional dimensions of hostility towards Muslims. Following Brain Klug’s definition of anti-Semitism, Sayyid argues that ‘more than an expression of hatred or fear, Islamophobia needs to be understood as undermining of the ability of Muslims as Muslims, to project themselves into the future.’ (p, 14). Proposing ‘action-able knowledge’ (p. 12), Sayyid thus contends that to designate a phenomenon as Islamophobic is not merely an exercise in positivist science; rather ‘it enables the gathering of disparate elements into recognizable formations of cruelty and injustice, which is the first task of making demands for their rectification.’ (p. 22).

This report is divided in six sections: first, a summary of the literature produced in Portugal in the last two decades is presented. This focuses not so much on Islamophobia, which seems to lack academic relevance, but on the so-called presence of Muslims and Islam in Portugal. It should be noted though that such literature does acknowledge the existence of Islamophobia, which is most often not reported. Second, the report provides with estimates of the Muslim population in Portugal, situating its historical presence in Portugal, alongside a glimpse at its contemporary social and political significance. Third, the lack of available data on hate crime in Portugal – which would allow to make inferences as to how hatred has been manifested over time – is reflected upon. And, finally, following a performative approach to Islamophobia, the report analyses the range of expressions that Islamophobia seems to assume in: a) political discourse/policies; b) media content; c) experiences of discrimination in everyday life.

The main sources of data in the writing of this report include: academic literature and over 100 web entries related to Islamophobia produced in Portugal since 2000, official reports and newsletters, and digital resources and websites (e.g. CIL – the Islamic Community of Lisbon), also since the 2000s.

2. State of the art in research on Islamophobia in Portugal

2.1. A review of the literature on Islam and Muslims in Portugal

Most of the academic literature in Portugal focuses on either Muslims or Islam, not Islamophobia, and generally comes from the following disciplinary traditions: anthropology, sociology, history, political science and international relations. Commonly, when we mention Islam in Portugal, four strands of academic research are evoked. Firstly, and most expressive, is research on the ‘contemporary presence of Islam’ in Portugal via wider debates on immigration. Such literature,
mainly in the anthropological and sociological traditions, documents a diversity of migration trajectories, religious practice, gender equality issues, identity formation, social and cultural integration, and the everyday experiences of Muslims (e.g. Brandão, 2016; Santos, 2009; Faria, 2007; Mapril, 2005; Abranches, 2004, 2007a). Discrimination may be acknowledged, but there is no discussion of Islamophobia – even though the term may be deployed in passing. The question of gender is crucial in many of these writings (e.g. Abranches, 2004; Faria, 2007; Cunha, 2013) – and often seen as the real problem of discrimination affecting Muslims, as for instance in the works by Maria Abranches (2004, 2007a).

Secondly, studies focused on describing the situation of minoritised religions within the Portuguese context (e.g. Vilaça, 1999), and subsequently on a socio-demographic analysis of the Muslim population in Portugal. This is what Nina Clara Tiesler named as the New Islamic Presence (Tiesler, 2000; 2005), which would contrast with the historical presence of Muslims. Some studies in this strand are concerned with the (biased) representations of Islam and Muslims in specific spheres: media (e.g. Carvalho, 2008; Toldy, 2012; Ferreira, 2016); justice (e.g. Jerónimo 2016); and schooling (e.g. Santos, 2009).

Thirdly, there are also discussions about knowledge production, national identity and the historical presence of Islam in the Iberian Peninsula (8th to the so-called Reconquista in the 12th Century, and the expulsion of the Moors in the 15th century). Specially after the 1974 Revolution, Portugal witnessed the publication of major works which put forward a notion of an Islamic period in the Portuguese history (Vakil, 2003b, p. 448). Works on this field include: those by AbdoolKarim Vakil on a historical and political perspective on Islam and Islamophobia in the (post-)colonial context (e.g. Vakil 2003a, 2003b, 2004), and Cardeira da Silva’s (2005) meta-analysis of studies on Arabs and Muslims in Portugal.

Finally, there is a strand of discussions about security threats and terrorism in Europe, and, therefore, the argument goes, in Portugal. This is marked by the disciplinary traditions of Political Science and International Relations, focusing on Islamism, Jihad and Islamic fundamentalism (e.g Vegar, 2007; Raposo, 2009; Costa and Pinto, 2012). These studies construct the idea that Portugal is at threat precisely because of its history of Al Andalus – a territory which Jihadist wish to reclaim (Costa, 2016) – hence projecting in the national imagination Portugal as centre, part of Europe.

2.2. Unravelling academic and political understandings of Islamophobia

It has been argued that the lack of studies on Islamophobia may be actually feeding a wider perception of its absence in Portugal (Rosário, Santos & Lima, 2011; Mapril, 2012; Dias & Dias, 2012). This does not mean that Islamophobia is absent: studies on Muslim populations in Portugal do refer to cases, namely: in education (e.g. Santos, 2009), in employment (e.g. Brandão, 2016), in the media.
Most of the works mentioned in the previous section do not define Islamophobia, and a few do not even mention the term. For instance, although Tiesler’s work (2000, 2005) engages in discussions closely related to Islamophobia, she does not elaborate on the term. It is also interesting to note that almost all the works cited in the section above rely on the authority of national and international political institutions, citing the United Nations (UN), the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, extinct in 2007 and replaced by the Fundamental Rights Agency), and the Runnymede Trust to provide legitimation for the term Islamophobia. For example, Jerónimo (2016) seems to take Islamophobia as the ‘crescent signs of hostility and the propagation of a biased image of Islam’ (p. 3) and the only time the term is used is when she cites the 2001 Durban conference, sponsored by the UN, taking place a few days before 9/11, which pointed at the ‘increasing Islamophobia in diverse parts of the World’ (p. 4). Abranches (2007b, p. 45) follows the definition in the 2006 report *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia*, produced by the EUMC, which distinguishes Islamophobia from racism while stressing that in Islamophobia, racism is extended to religion, and it is the belief system and values that are emphasised. Brandão (2016) also incorporates the conception of Islamophobia as the negative stereotypes, verbal attacks, physical aggressions and the destruction of property, which is proposed in the 2006 report. Carvalho’s (2008) study suggests the unfair treatment of Muslims by the press post-2001, without ever addressing the term Islamophobia. Yet, in her paper, she includes an interview with former High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities in Portugal, Rui Marques – who illustrates the pervasive understanding of Islamophobia as a matter of prejudice and stereotypes (p. 15).

In other understandings, Islamophobia is perceived as involving not only some form of negative bias and actions towards Muslims, but also unfavourable treatment by law and institutions. Brandão (2016, p. 33) follows the work of Liz Fekete, who draws on A. Sivanandan, and argues that Islamophobia is a ‘xeno-racism. Xeno because it is directed against foreigners making no distinction of colour and racism in the substance, as it contains all the forms of exclusion of old racism and the mechanisms that establish it are sometimes legal and institutional’ (p. 34). Although this is not clearly articulated, Brandão takes Islamophobia as the ensemble of political, media and common-sense discourses that legitimate discriminatory policies (providing as examples France or Belgium, with the prohibition of the Niqab or the Burqa, or in Switzerland with the prohibition of minarets). Mapril (2012) takes Islamophobia as ‘a set of discourses loaded with moral panics and simultaneously a global process for the racialization of the Muslim figure’ (p. 141).

It should also be mentioned that there seems to be a public perception that ‘there is no significant specific discrimination against Muslims because they are Muslims. Whatever discrimination or prejudice that may be said to exist against Muslims can be explained as racism’ (Sayyid, 2014a, p. 13).
Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique; hence, discrimination is often perceived as racial. Even so, in the Portuguese case, racism is politically denied and at most defined as occasional prejudice through ignorance; discrimination is hence considered as occasional, isolated events that do not typify Portuguese society.

Senior and parliamentary politicians have been silent on matters related to discrimination (racism or Islamophobia). The State has often promoted the idea that all religions are respected in Portugal, that this is a unique context characterised by inter-religious dialogue and where leaders of the Catholic Church, Islam and Judaism come together (e.g. ACM, 2017). This discourse was also often found in the press, and was equally professed by the leaders of different religious confessions.

3. Background: Muslim population in the country

In the 1950s and 1960s, the New State regime constructed a political rhetoric of a benevolent colonialism through the adoption of Lusotropicalism, formulated by Gilberto Freyre in the 1930s to explain the success of the Brazilian multiracial society and adopted in Portugal in the early 1950s as a way of deterring international pressure to decolonise (Castelo, 1998). According to Freyre (2003[1933]), Portuguese colonialism was exceptional as the Portuguese people would exhibit a particular aptitude to biological miscegenation and cultural interpenetration with the people from the tropics that would lead to the creation of harmoniously integrated multiracial societies. Freyre explained this aptitude through the miscegenated nature of the Portuguese themselves who had emerged out of a long contact with the Moors and the Jews. In the context of mounting international critiques to racism and colonialism, and the pressure both from the UN and liberation movements, such Lusotropicalist rhetoric took harbour in turning its colonies into ‘overseas provinces’ and in conceding Portuguese citizenship to the colonised – which was until then dependent on (the possibility of) assimilation –, helping to sustain the self-declared imaginary of Portugal as a multiracial, multicontinental and multi-religious nation. This narrative led the president of the then constituted Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL), Valy Mamede, in 1968 to make political claims in the name of the ‘two million Muslims in Portugal’ (Vakil, 2003b); in 1970, the magazine Panorama published by the Secretary of State of Information and Tourism also suggested that Portugal had about two million Muslims – which paved the way to legitimate an Islamic community in Portugal (Vakil, 2003a, pp. 10-11). With the achievement of the independencies by the former colonies, in 1975, this number dropped to a few thousand.

It is difficult to estimate the number of Muslims in contemporary Portugal. According to the last census, in 2011, there are 20,640 respondents who are Muslim in Portugal, corresponding to 0,2% of the overall population (totalling 8.989.849); this figure has increased significantly from what was registered 10 years before (in the 2001 Census: 12.014 self-declared Muslims). About two thirds of Muslims are residents in Greater Lisbon: there were 14,202 residents who self-declared Muslim in a

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2 This points to the intersectional nature of Islamophobia in Portugal, whereby religion and race interconnect.
3 Except in the recent proposal for the change in nationality law, towards a jus soli principle, by the Left Bloc.
universe of about 2.383.995 respondents. This would mean they represent 0.6% of the population in the Greater Lisbon metropolitan area, that is, 1 person in each 166 (INE, 2012; 2002). The census data does not collect information on ethnicity/race, and hence it is not possible to estimate the representation of Muslims in such groups. Additionally, the question of religious affiliation is not of compulsory completion and thus it provides an underestimation of the Muslim population (see Vilaça, 1999).

Various academic articles have provided tentative figures, but it is generally considered that a more accurate estimate may be provided by the organised Islamic community in Portugal (see Tiesler, 2000; Vakil, 2003b, p. 444). The Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL – Comunidade Islâmica de Lisboa), for instance, estimates that about 50,000 Muslims live in Portugal. According to the information that CIL makes available, the Muslim population has changed across time: it was mainly constituted by students and other elites during the 1950s and 1960s; families coming from Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau just after the 1974 Revolution; and later, immigrants from Northern Africa (mainly Morocco and Algeria), Pakistan, Bangladesh and the members of diverse embassies from Arab countries accredited in Portugal. A significant part of the Muslim population is constituted by Portuguese citizens.4 There is currently a diverse community of Muslims in Portugal: Sunni Islam, which is majoritarian in Portugal and composed of a variety of communities, religious practices and experiences; Shi’a Islam, formed both by Ismaili and Ithna Ashari; Ahmadia and the Baha Faith (Vakil, 2003b, p. 426).5

The main Muslim organisation in Portugal is the Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL), which was created as an administrative and not ecclesiastic organisation (Vakil, 2003b, p. 428). Its institutional and political history is revealing of the relationship of the Portuguese state and Islam, in terms of the negotiation of its official recognition, the legitimacy of the community spokesperson, the juridical recognition of its structures and the defence of member’s interests in the society at large: in this sense, CIL acts as a mediator between Muslims and the Portuguese state (Ibid, pp. 428-429).

The official recognition of Islam as a religious confession dates from the New State dictatorship, in 1968. The constitutional review of 1951 had declared Catholicism as the ‘religion of the Portuguese Nation’ — granted with special privileges —, yet it allowed the possibility of other religions to request legal recognition (Miranda, 1986, p. 122). In 1971, a Law on Religious Freedom was published, which foresaw equal treatment of all confessions, although based on their representation — Catholicism was then understood as the traditional religion of the country (Ibid., p. 123). Yet, it was with the 1974 Revolution that there was a shift in political discourse — fostering international solidarity and the opening to the Arab world — which came to shape negotiations with the Portuguese state on the basis of a cultural politics of identity and recognition, particularly with the Law on Religious Freedom which is pointed as a turning point in which Muslims come to be recognised as a religious minority and full-

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5 For a more detailed account of the different Islamic confessions in Portugal, see Vakil (2003b, pp. 426-446). According to Vakil, the Baha Faith became autonomous but emerged from Islam.
fledged citizens (Vakil, 2003b, p. 435). Since 1975, Mosques and other sites of several religious worship were built across the country, mostly in the Greater Lisbon metropolitan area\(^6\) and in the Algarve (see Tiesler, 2000; Vakil, 2003b).

Most Muslim students receive their religious education outside the formal school system. There is one single private school (Colégio Islâmico de Palmela) – where school education is integrated with a religious education, and most students receive such education in Saturday schools in their local mosque. It should be noted that Catholic education receives the support by the State, with a confessional school subject that is optional – the state pays for the teachers, who are considered civil servants (in virtue of the agreed in the 1940 and 2004 Concord with the Vatican). There is the possibility for other confessions to organise and provide students with religious education. Students must form a group of 10 pupils to demand a class, and only the Evangelical confession has its own classes – given the geographical dispersion of Muslim students, it has not been possible to organise such forms in the education system (previously, there were also a few forms dedicated to the Baha’i confession).

It is interesting to note the lack of political visibility of the Muslim population in Portugal – exception made when the news report terrorist attacks, the rise of the extreme right (recently, regarding Donald J. Trump, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders), or controversies around Islam, generally in other European countries. The Muslim population is estimated at the same size as the Roma/Gypsy population in Portugal; yet the latter is the object of a countless number of public policy interventions, and has been targeted by the State as requiring extensive knowledge production in view of contemporary ‘ignorance’ about these communities. This has not happened with the Muslim population, estimated as generally more privileged in terms of socioeconomic status. In what media visibility is concerned, previous research work has suggested that depictions are not generally problematic (e.g. Tiesler, 2000). Yet, the analysis carried out for this report confirms the reification of difference that was found in other works (e.g. Toldy, 2012; Ferreira, 2016). Some have looked at the characteristics of the Muslim population itself as explicative of this lack of media and political visibility – and this has certainly been the official approach in Portugal. Interviewed for another project\(^7\), a representative of the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI – Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e o Diálogo Intercultural) considered Muslims:

\begin{quote}
 a very responsible, very participatory immigrant population, who has also known to make a very important contribution to the Portuguese community and, therefore, from this point of view one has also been happy with immigrant citizens, in that they know how to live in this diversity. We have not obviously had, true... We have had a better job here because we have not had to address questions of religion, especially those related to Islamophobia, which we have seen specially in other European countries. We have a community of... a Jewish community, a Muslim
\end{quote}

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\(^6\) Construction work for the Mosque of Lisbon started in the late 1970s, and the Mosque opened in 1985; before it was concluded, a Mosque was opened in Laranjeiro in 1982 and another in Odivelas in 1983 (Tiesler, 2000).

\(^7\) ‘Race’ and Africa in Portugal: a study on history textbooks (2008-12), funded by the Foundation for Science and Technology (Portugal).
community, relatively well-integrated, with no big... without problems. (ACIDI representative, interviewed in 2010)

The key idea conveyed in politics seems to be that, in Portugal, we have ‘good Muslims’ (see Mamdani, 2004; Sayyid, 2014b) who are moderate people – ‘just like us’.

4. Background: the formation of anti-Muslim hatred in Portugal

The relation between Portugal and Islam goes back to the formation of the nation-state and the 12th century’s Reconquista. According to AbdoolKarim Vakil (2003a), such foundational relation continues to shape the Portuguese imaginary on Islam and Muslims in Portugal (p. 409).

In contemporary times, although with changing contours, official discourse has projected an idea of Portugal as an example of openness to religious plurality. Accordingly, the Portuguese State does not gather data on Islamophobia (and neither reliable data on racial discrimination); this would fundamentally contradict such rhetoric. Furthermore, most accounts that refer to Muslim hatred are mediated through the media or academic approaches that share a conceptually thin view of Islamophobia as prejudice and ignorance. Hence, it is difficult to ascertain how common is Islamophobia in everyday life and in institutional settings without carrying out empirical research.

Whilst it is not possible to provide a diachronic approach, there is some international data available that helps in mapping out contemporary Islamophobia conveyed by the European Islamophobia Report of 2016 (Kalny, 2017). The EIR reports on the results of a social survey carried out by Detlef Pollack at the University of Münster in several countries, including Portugal, published in 2010 in German only, whereby:

more than a third of those interviewed described their personal attitude towards Muslims as ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’; 57,9% associated Islam with the discrimination of women; 54,3% with fanaticism; 39,4% with propensity to violence; and 42,9% with narrow-mindedness. (p. 450)

The survey also included positive attributions, which were much lower:

Islam was associated with ‘peacefulness (19,8%), tolerance (17,6%), respect of human rights (17,1%) and solidarity (27,4 %). The approval of the construction of mosques and minarets in Portugal is significantly higher than in other European countries (73,5% and 53,4% respectively. While 39,4% consider other cultures and religions as a threat to their country, 81,1% also consider increasing cultural diversity as a form of societal enrichment; 89,2% consider that all religious affiliations in the country should have the same rights; 41,6% agree that girls should be allowed to wear a headscarf at school; and 36,5% consider that Islam fits well with the Western world. (Pollack, 2010, apud Kalny, 2017, p. 450)

The report further adds other data from another study, also published in German only:

Although this political effort is mainly visible in restricted circles and specialised publications (see ACM, 2017).
In 2011, nearly half of the population of Portugal considered that Muslim culture and European culture were not compatible (49.95), more than 25% considered that there were too many Muslims in Portugal, and 34.4% considered that Muslims demanded too much (Zick, Küpper and Hövermann, 2011, apud Kalny, 2017, p. 450).

Regarding specific areas of concern, the main findings of the *European Islamophobia Report*, very likely the most complete exercise in mapping Islamophobia in Portugal, are summarised and reproduced below:

**Employment**: A significant part of the Muslim community in Portugal is qualified and maintains a good socioeconomic status. The EIR did not found evidence of restrictions imposed on Muslims; yet, further studies need to be carried out;

**Education**: History curricula and textbooks construct an idea of Islam as an exteriority to ‘Portugueseness’ and ‘Europeanness’, and Portugal is implicitly defined as a nation of Catholic and White people (see Araújo and Maeso, 2012; 2015) (p. 453). It should also be mentioned that specific arrangements tend to be negotiated privately between schools and the families of Muslim pupils (e.g. for halal meals);

**Politics**: in Portugal, institutional representatives and senior politicians do not generally engage in hateful campaigns against Islam or Muslims – the only exception, not mentioned in the report, being the National Renewal Party (PNR – *Partido Nacional Renovador*). It is noted that in several occasions (e.g. the day the President of the Republic took office, on 9 March 2016) saw state and institutional representatives participating in interfaith ceremonies at the Mosque of Lisbon;

**Media and cyberspace hatred**: according to the EIR, stereotyping of Muslims abound in cyberspace and in the media. Regarding the latter, as developed in the next section, Islamophobic imaginaries are reproduced even when the media tries to counteract such stereotypes. Besides blogs which nature is to promote hatred towards Islam, commentary to news often evokes talk about the *Reconquista* and the Crusades, although most often this is not directly relevant – there does not seem to exist measures to prosecute and punish such activities (see CERD, 2016, p. 4);

**Justice system**: Although the Religious Freedom Act includes the right to observe religious holidays (at school or at work), Pollack’s (2010) study suggests that 19.4% of the population considers that the practice of Muslim faith has to be restricted significantly (Kalny, 2017, pp. 444-458).

5. **Categorical list of dominant narratives of Muslim hatred**

This section addresses the most common narratives of hatred towards Muslims in Portugal. Following Sayyid’s work, and the project’s approach, the expression ‘narrative of hatred’ is taken as
discriminatory discourse and actions that are specifically addressed toward people associated to Islamic religious belonging.

There are no public policies or programmes directed specifically at Muslim populations in Portugal.\(^9\) Political discourse on Islam is practically absent amongst senior and parliamentary politicians.\(^10\) Hate speech is openly promoted by the extreme-right PNR party (National Renovator Party), while the Trotskyist movement MAS (Socialist Alternative Movement) has published articles denouncing Islamophobia in Europe. Mainstream political parties (PS – Socialist Party, PSD – Social Democratic Party, CDS-PP – People’s Party) have been mostly silent. They seem to espouse the liberal idea of a plural and diverse Muslim population (Asad, 2003) and the absence of Islamophobia in Portuguese society – unless when promoted by the far right (Idem). More or less explicitly, this is attributed to the country’s supposed historical vocation for interculturality and non-discrimination (Castelo, 1998), as well as by arguing that those coming from the former colonies are ‘well integrated’. Representatives of the Islamic Community of Lisbon have helped sustain this narrative, often suggesting in the media that there is no Islamophobia in Portugal, particularly since 9/11.

As a result of such discursive denial of Islamophobia by institutional representatives in the Portuguese context, there was an underestimation and underreporting of Muslim hatred. Politically, this has helped to hinder the continuities of colonial racial governmentalities, whereby the Portuguese state is continuously placed as a *benefactor* and so-called *minorities*, precisely due to the assignment of this status, are expected to play the role of the *grateful* other – denunciations of Islamophobia would disrupt this depoliticising rationale. This also seems to have consequences in terms of knowledge production, insofar as research has not looked at Islamophobia in Portugal in a systematic fashion. Nonetheless, drawing data from the *European Islamophobia Report*, the analysis of online media outlets, the blogosphere and commentary in cyberspace, as well as on our previous research on history production and history teaching, it is possible to ascertain that at least five of the six performative clusters of activities described as Islamophobic in Sayyid’s (2014a) article take place in the Portuguese context:

   a) **Attacks on persons perceived to be Muslims**

This seems to be the most common form of Islamophobia in everyday life in Portugal, and it is most often expressed as verbal harassment, according to reports in the media. It does not seem to be denounced to authorities. Muslim representatives have often warned against generalisations of such verbal offenses. For instance, in 2007, the leader of the Islamic Community of Lisbon, Abdool Vakil, commented that Muslims may receive obscene words and verbal abuse in public places, but ‘one cannot generalise’ (2007-6b). In communication with the media, the Community has downplayed acts of Islamophobia, possibly as a strategy of containing hatred.

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\(^9\) Commonly referred legislation in this area is the Law of Religious Freedom (Law 16/2001, 22 June), which regulates the relation between the Portuguese State and the various religious confessions recognised in the country.

\(^10\) In the over 100 web entries analysed, there were three interventions by two politicians in the Left Bloc aiming at denouncing Islamophobia, and the only piece of news quoting politicians referred to Euro-deputies Ana Gomes (PS) and Nuno Melo (CDS-PP), following the live murder by Michael Adebolajo of soldier Lee Rigby in the UK, asked to comment on the European project.
b) Attacks on property considered to be linked to Muslims

There have been several instances in which the Mosque of Lisbon was vandalised, the most expressive being in 2015 just after the Paris Charlie Hebdo attacks, widely reported in the media. The date 1143 was sprayed in blue onto the main entrance door and on one of the Mosque’s walls. This date alludes to the founding of the Portucalense County (Condado Portucalense), which is commonly read as the ‘year of independence in Portugal’ from Castille and taught to children as a symbol of Portuguese-ness. According to police authorities, the 1143 symbolism is ‘generally evoked by neo-Nazi and xenophobic groups’ (Público, 9 Jan. 2015). It should be noted that such contemporary reading of the historical encounter between Portugal and Islam is not only an expression of Muslim hatred, but also casts doubt upon the self-proclaimed inter-cultural/religious relationships and approach stemming from colonial and post-colonial dynamics. Yet, media framing of such hatred as marginal actions committed by the extreme-right firmly contains its potential to disrupt the official rhetoric.

c) Acts of intimidation

There was also a bomb threat in the Mosque of Lisbon following 9/11 and the breaking of a window, according to Abdool Vakil (2007-6b). This was reported by the media at the time, but played down as a ‘fake call’.

d) Acts which may occur in institutional settings, in which those perceived to be Muslims receive less favourable treatment than their peers in comparative positions

An example of this is the case, reported just in passing in a news report, that just after the Charlie Hebdo’ attack, a worker at a kindergarten wanted to expel all Muslims from school (2015-34). Also regarding education, particularly in curricula and textbooks, the President of CIL\(^\text{11}\) (2007-6b) alluded to the negative terminology deployed (e.g. ‘Saracens’), and the erasure of the eight centuries of ‘conviviality’ between Muslims and Christians in the Iberian Peninsula. Our own work (Araújo & Maeso, 2012; 2015), cited by Kalny (2017), also points to a teleological narrative that presents Portugal as Christian and, consequently, normalises the expulsion of Moors and Jews.

e) Incidents in which there is a sustained and systematic elaboration of comments in the public domain that disparage Muslims and/or Islam

This characterises much of online commentary to news reports in Portugal, despite many newspapers supposedly moderating the comments. This also takes place as hateful commentary to posts by Muslim people who have their own blogs (2009-11b). According to the EIR (Kalny, 2017, p. 456), the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has reported about ‘the limited information provided on measures taken [by the Portuguese State] to prosecute and punish such acts’. Social commentary in cyberspace seems to be the most prevalent form of Muslim hatred, and it is fully developed in the next section.

\(^{11}\) It seems that such critiques disappeared with time, although there were no changes in education.
f) State activities such as the ‘intensification of surveillance of Muslim populations using technology, agent provocateurs, and paid informers’.

It is difficult to access this kind of information. There is information in the media that anti-racist activists have been under surveillance. For instance, in 2009, ensuing the death of 14 year old Elson Sanches (aka Kuku, a black boy), at the hands of the police, and social mobilisation for the opening of an enquiry, the following news were published: ‘Police «concerned» with extremist movements in the periphery: minor shot down in Amadora by the Police for Public Security (PSP) mobilises radical groups in demonstration against the police’. The news report mentions that such ‘extremist, radical groups’ were under the surveillance of the Services of Information and Security (SIS, the ‘secret police’). However, no information on the specific surveillance of Muslims is provided to the broader public.

The remainder of this section draws mainly on online discourse on Islam and Muslims. A search in Google for the term ‘Islamophobia’ and ‘Muslims’ within the domain ‘.pt’ helped narrow down the results: the entries considered involved not only talk about Muslims (which produced too many results for a feasible analysis), but some sort of categorisation of such talk as Islamophobic (thus accounting for hate speech, its critique, and the accommodation of the critique). It also enabled to map the emergence of the concept in public discourse in Portugal. The initial online search was carried out in February 2017 and updated later on, in early April. It covered five year intervals, in the periods: 1990-1994; 1995-1999 (both with no entries that were actually published on those dates); 2000-2004; 2005-2009; 2010-2014; 2015-2017 (as of 31 March). The first three or four Google pages with results were screened for relevance. Over 100 entries were analysed, and consisted mainly of news outlets online, social commentary and personal blogs.

The master narrative found is that there is an intrinsic incompatibility of the West/Europe/Portugal and Islam. The former – even when not totally idealised (for instance, ‘still’ sexist, ‘still’ homophobic, ‘still’ religious) – is presented as always superior, because it is adaptable, guided by rational philosophical principles and thus tends to move towards civilizational progress. Hence, Islam is perceived as incompatible with the West/Europe/Portugal, in a set of ‘characteristics’ which would constitute the core of anti-Muslim narratives narratives:

1. Islam advocates violence, Muslims are prone to violence [VIOLENCE]

This is probably the most common hate discourse in cyberspace, both in common-sense discourse and within the more educated public. It is centred on terrorism and security-related events as demonstrative of the violent nature of Islam and of Muslims. Its defenders may draw on their own interpretations of the Koran to support their argument. Implicit is that Europe has overcome the use

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of violence with the Holocaust, taken as defining European identity and solidarities (Asad, 2003). Illustrative of this discourse are the following statements13:

- Muslims are malevolent people who infiltrate in Europe under the pretence of being persecuted in their countries in the Middle East, but they just truly want to bring terrorism here (2008-7);
- Muslims impose themselves in Europe through death and arson threats; they should be confined to concentration camps (2009-14 com);
- Muslims commit acts of violence, which not only do not cause indignation in their communities, as their their leaders remain silent and do not show condemnation of violent jihad (2014-26; 2017-73 com);
- If Muslims would be innocent, they would cooperate honestly with security forces (2014-26);
- We may have ‘hysterical Islamophobia’; yet, this is because of genuine security fears and the culprits are the Islamic terrorists who have attacked us in name of Islam (2016-53 com).

In academic discourse, this may be conveyed in subtler terms, or made particular to some Muslim populations. For example, Raposo, in an article on so-called radical Islamism in Europe, specified the differences between Wahhabism and Qutbism, arguing that the ‘problem’ rested in the latter (cf. Mamdani, 2004, pp. 45-62):

Qutbism presents an offensive Islam, which attempts to challenge the status quo of all nations. [...] Its influences are anti-colonialism, anti-Enlightenment and the anti-Western ideas which has gathered among Western ideologies, such as nationalist vitality, fascism/Nazism and communism. (Raposo, 2009, p. 5)

A few pages later, such distinctions are eroded: ‘Islamic communities [in Europe] encompass a security problem’ (p. 9).

2. Islam and Muslims are sexist in larger amounts than what one can see in the West [SEXISM]

This is a narrative very often deployed, mostly by men – who seem to be the majority – writing comments in news websites and blogs. Therein, the discursive statements that emerged as more significant are the following:

- Islam gives no possibility of choice to women, it mistreats women, it forces them to cover their heads: the hijab was designed to promote the segregation of Muslim women (2006-4);
- Although one is against Islamophobia, our allegiance to feminism trumps that (2008-8);
- Muslims segregate and humiliate women and I cannot allow that (2014-29 com);
- If you think the burqa is a good thing, then make your wife and daughters use it (2016-53 com).

13 For the sake of economy of space, the statements were summarised; whenever possible, the original semantics were kept.
The discourse that puts Muslim women in a submissive and inferior position to that of the hyper-sexist Muslim man is also prominent amongst intellectual women, including those that acknowledge that gender equality is not a reality in Portugal or in other Western societies. (e.g. academic Maria Filomena Mónica). In such cases, it is often accompanied by disclaimers: although until the restoring of democracy in 1974, women were not allowed to vote, encouraged to study, allowed wear trousers or to travel without the consent of the father or husband, we have progressed.

The policing of Muslims for gender equality has increased since 9/11 (Razack, 2004). The favourite issues invoked in discourses as symbolising the embedded nature of gender inequality in Islam are the veil/hijab/burqa and female genital mutilation (FGM). Other related issues are so-called ‘forced marriages’ and the lack of education opportunities for women. The most infamous public discourse was by Cardinal Patriarch D. Policarpo in 13 January 2009. Talking at a public event, the Cardinal stated: ‘Caution with love. Think twice before marrying a Muslim, think very carefully, you stumble into a pile of problems that not even Allah knows where they end up’ (Expresso, 14 January 2009). He added that: ‘If I am aware that the first time a European young woman of Christian upbringing goes into their country she is subjected to the regime of Muslim women, then go figure!’ He also stated he knew of ‘dramatic cases’, which were not specified, and that it is ‘very hard to dialogue with our Muslim brothers’. Toldy (2012), for instance, analysing representations of this discourse in the printed press saw this as embodying what Razack (2004) called the logics of the triangle ‘imperilled Muslim woman’, the ‘dangerous Muslim man’ and the ‘civilised European’ (Toldy, 2012, p. 52).

3. Islam does not rely on democracy and the rule of law, but on the rule of God and is prone to autocracy [THEOCRATIC]

This narrative is permeated by the implicit idea of a so-called ‘Islamic civilization’ which is incompatible with Western/European liberal democracy (see Mamdani, 2004; Sayyid, 2014b). Within this narrative, those who challenge such binary opposition are perceived as passive subjects who fall prey to political correctness, based on multiculturalism and cultural relativism which they endorse and impose, coming from the Left and displaying vermin anti-Americanism. This is neatly summarised by sociologist Maria Filomena Mónica in her chronicle ‘The Sentiments of a Western Woman’, published just after the 9/11:

One of the most serious problems of our time is the plague of the Politically Correct, which core, cultural relativism, forbids us to assert that a civilization is, or is not, superior. We moved

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15 Lately, clitoridectomy is located as an African, rather than Islamic, cultural practice.
17 A more recent ‘event’ sparking debate on gender inequality in regards to Islam was that related to the ‘Night which changed Germany’, that is, of sexual violence incidents involving Muslim men in New Year’s Eve of 2015/16 in Koln (see Ferreira, 2016, for an analysis of representations in the press). This also generated some social commentary, along the same lines, however more explicitly: Muslims men cannot control their ‘sexual impulses’ in the face of liberated, semi-naked Western women (in Observador).
from the European arrogance of the 19th century to the relativistic hypocrisy of the 20th century. [...] 

And yet, it does not seem difficult to defend the superiority of Western civilization. No one can deny that it was a pioneer in the separation of politics and religion, a decisive factor in the creation of modern States, as no one can dispute the fact that it was it that allowed, within itself, the development of modern science. Finally, it was it, and it alone, which established within itself mechanisms capable of controlling tyranny. It seems that, for the adepts of cultural relativism, things like the system of guarantees of the individual before the State, democracy and the separation of powers count little. (Oct. 26, 2001, *apud* Mónica, 2002, p.164)

The path to civilizational progress traced by Europe is seen as the template to which all civilizations must submit (Wallerstein, 1997; Venn & Featherstone, 2006); crucial to such ‘progress’ has been the separation of powers between the Church and the State (see Sayyid’s discussion of secularism, 2014b, pp. 31-44). Placing progress within a linear narrative, the West is interpreted as an achiever and provider of democracy, and the ‘Islamic world’ as the forever-failing student who resists ‘evolution’. This argument is deployed not only to pinpoint the ‘insufficiencies’ of Islamic societies, but also to protect the West from critique: ‘they cannot teach us [democracy, tolerance, etc.]’:

- Muslims have their own laws and costumes, which include paedophilia (2008-7; 2014-29);
- We must stand against the Sharia, even if imposed with pacific methods (2014-26);
- Muslims are ruled by a theocracy, and refuse to evolve (2014-29 com);
- The Muslim theocratic perversion which promises to devour Christians, Jews, infidels, black, and white, women without veil or the music that torment them, that is their programme. They reduced the Koran to the sword and take the vacant spots where Europe became absent. (2015-44).

It can also be detected in discourses that portray Islam as antithetical to both democracy and liberalism, as would be illustrated by territories such as Saudi Arabia or the peripheries of Europe cities, where – it is argued – Muslim ‘communities assume themselves as a state within the state’ (Raposo, 2009, p. 10). As argued by AbdoolKarim Vakil (2004):

> The simplistic imputation of Islamic theocracy, blurring the very diversity of historical trajectories, compromises and solutions regarding the relation State-Church in the West, and blind to the expressions of public religiosity of non-Western contexts in which a vast majority of the populations of the world live, not only ignores the debates about the meanings ‘Islamic’ and the historical reality of the relation between politics and religion [...] as the very proposals for an ‘Islamic secularism’ (p. 19)

Any analysis of how such territories have been constituted is dismissed, by suggesting that autocracy and dictatorship are inscribed in Islam and in Muslim populations, and that societies ruled by Muslims have an *overwhelming* presence of religion.
4. Muslims are intolerant [INTOLERANCE]

Tolerance is also conceived as a key tenet of European/Western civilisation and identity, alongside respect for diversity and freedom of thought (Mamdani, 2004). European tolerance is conceived as pre-existing all sorts of Muslim action and discourse. For instance, historian Rui Ramos wrote on his chronicle in the liberal online newspaper Observador: ‘It will not be possible to keep the current standards of freedom, tolerance and pluralism in a society shaken by the regular killings of citizens’ (2016, 50-b, emphasis added). Accordingly, the assumption is that, we, Europeans had been tolerant until event X [9/11, March 2004, 7/5, Charlie Hebdo, ....] took place, but now ‘enough is enough’:

- Islam uses primitive violence against Israel and the West, and we have been too tolerant; but we either stop playing the fool or we will be blown up (2014-29 com);
- We are entitled to forbid, as they want to impose on us: forbidding Christmas, taking crosses out of state schools, dictating female costume (2017-72).

As tolerance goes hand in hand with a liberal democratic society, the common perception is that Muslims would hate ‘us’ not for what we have, but for what we are – ontologically speaking. In this discourse we can note how, as Vakil (2004) argued, ‘The same orientalism that essentializes Islam grounds the ontologization of the West.’ (p. 18).

5. Muslims as unassimilable [ASSIMILATION]

The underlying assumption is that, in the West, there is political, economical and social freedom – understood as individual liberties. Islam would represent the negation of what seems to be the highest pillar of ‘European civilization’ (see Mamdani, 2004). Such freedom serving the individual is what makes the West what it is: freedom of individual choice, which can be seen in the most everyday decisions (e.g. the possibility of alcohol consumption), to that of who one can vote in or marry, as well as other checklists for Western lifestyle. Malala Yousafzai becomes thus an iconic figure for the West insofar as she symbolises the triumph of the individual over such (evil) system. These narratives continuously demark difference between ‘Western/European civilization’ and ‘Islamic civilization’ – Muslims can only be assimilated if they let go of what many seem to consider their ‘essence’, which they do not want to do (hence, they are unassimilable) (Asad, 2003, p. 169; Sayyid, 2004). As academic historian Rui Ramos states in Observador, in a chronicle entitled ‘This Europe may end up in Nice’: ‘Europe nowadays welcomes large communities of immigrants in uncontrolled growth, and where too many people reject Western values. Some feel inspired or were even organised to attack the society that welcomed them’ (2016, 50-b). In social commentary, the following statements seem common:

- One should support moderate Muslims (2009-10);
- They come to Europe and should adjust to our ways. I don’t agree with covered faces, or with public funding for Mosques where Muslims are promoting hatred. If a Western woman would
go to an Islamic country she would have to adapt to the religious norms of that country, but they come here and do as they please. (2017-64, com);

- Muslims are not integrating into Europe, but rather integrating Europe in their world (2017-68).

So the logic goes, Islam should be Europeanised before Europe becomes Islamicised. As argued by Talal Asad, assimilation is hence perceived as ‘necessary and desirable’ (2003):

The idea that people’s historical experience is inessential to them, that it can be shed at will, makes it possible to argue more strongly for the Enlightenment’s claim to universality: Muslims, as members of the abstract category ‘humans’, can be assimilated or (as some recent theorists have put it) ‘translated’ into a global (‘European’) civilization once they have divested themselves of what many of them regard (mistakenly) as essential to themselves. The belief that human beings can be separated from their histories and traditions makes it possible to urge a Europeanization of the Islamic world. (pp. 169-170)

Yet, according to Raposo, although the Europeanisation of Islam is desirable, it is impossible due to the lack of ‘will to integrate’:

Within Europe, the question turns around the following: will we have ‘Islam en France’ or a ‘Islam de France’, that is, will we have Muslims living in France as if they were in Morocco or Egypt, or Muslims who continue being Muslims in their faith but who adapt to French ways of thinking? Now, at the moment, the balance hangs towards the first hypothesis. [...] within Europe, Islam is incapable of change. It is within Europe that we find the more close-minded Islam. What is happening with European policies for integration? (2009, p. 17)

6. Islam is a proselyte religion, which aims to ‘invade our territory’ and take over ‘our way of life’ [PROSELYTISATION]

This is very similar to the previous narrative, but it is a discourse that is most often espoused by the extreme right – which often centres more on the mere presence of the other, rather than the lifestyle or religion. It is a discourse that is not very elaborate, drawing on a supposed consensus on the incompatibility between Islam and Europe that seems so strong that requires no explanation. It is also often expressed in the news reports, where there is no need to explain why in particular ‘Europeans’ are against the simple presence of ‘Muslims’ (e.g. Most Europeans against the immigration of Muslims18):

- The minarets make visible the presence of Muslims in their cities and that is a cause of concern (2009-12);
- ‘Islamic state threatens Portugal and Spain and swears to recover the Iberian Peninsula’ (2016-47b);
- Muslims are still upset about the Crusades, and want to take over Europe (2016-53 com)

• A great part of the Western media is not covering the ongoing Islamic cultural invasion (2017-68 com).

This discourse seeks legitimation of Islamophobia through the construction of nativist claims and has been deployed by the PNR in its webpage. It considers that the presence of Muslims is indicative of an ‘invasion’ of ‘our’ legitimate territory and borders, and the semantics deployed reflect that: ‘To re-conquest that which is ours!’; ‘Against the Islamisation of Europe’ by ‘hordes of barbarians’ who ‘do not wish or share our values’. Islam is seen as hiding its ‘true nature’ and the ‘threat it represents’, which would be emerging without disguise in contemporary times: ‘the eggs hatched’: ‘savage beheadings’, ‘the destruction of the civilizational values of Europe’ and the ‘genocide of its peoples who do not submit to Islamic law’. This is a discourse that is spread mainly through websites and social media, as well as in meetings and demonstrations. For instance, in September 2015, five members of the PNR dressed in burqas and distributed propaganda on the ‘Muslim invasion’.19 The title of an online news outlet (zap.aeiou.pt) ‘Islamic state threatens Portugal and Spain and swears to recover the Iberian Peninsula’ (2016-47b) was the only of this kind that emerged in the search. It concerned a video by the Islamic State which expressed the intention of ‘taking Al-Andalus back’. Unlike Christians, to whom they are implicitly compared, Muslims are perceived as wanting to convert people, both religiously and into ‘their way of life’20. Quoting the Slovenian historian of the Crusades Tomaž Mastnak, Mamdani (2004) argues:

  Only with the Crusades did Christendom define a universal enemy and declare a ‘state of permanent war, against the heathen’. No longer just another earthly enemy, the Crusades demonized the Muslim as evil incarnate, ‘the personification of the very religion of the Antichrist’. This is why the point of the Crusades was not to convert Muslims but to exterminate them: ‘The Muslims, the infidels, did not have freedom of choice; they could not choose between conversion and death because they were seen as inconvertible.’ (pp. 25-26)

7. Islam does not allow freedom of speech [NO FREEDOM OF SPEECH]

Western civilization takes freedom of speech as crucial, Islam does not allow it. This argument is very often deployed in social media commentary and reached its peak during the Danish cartoons affair in 200621 and the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack. With these two events, prominent intellectuals aligned themselves against those who made a critique of political debates on both events within a critical stance towards Europe/West – illustrating the impossibility of freedom of speech when the position is reversed. Perhaps the clearest example of the expression of this narrative is the large number of Facebook personal accounts that continue to show publicly a profile picture with the flag of France, or the countless pictures circulating in social media, in which rather than featuring the weaponry deployed in attacks, taken as symbolising Islam, images of pens and pencils are used to symbolise the way of the West. For example:

19 https://sol.sapo.pt/Mobile/Noticia/414315 (accessed 20 April)
20 Some news report analysed do attempt to show conversions of traditionally non-Muslim people as freely chosen.
21 For a discussion of freedom of speech in Portugal regarding the controversy around the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons, see Araújo and colleagues (2009).
Hence, the reverse of *freedom of expression* taken as a symbol of modern societies is violence. Mahmood Mamdani (2004) argued that discussions of political violence regarding so-called pre-modern societies are generated through culture talk, and ‘attribute political violence to the absence of modernity’ (p. 4). Culture/modernity is ‘the diving line between those in favour of a peaceful, civic existence and those inclined to terror’ (p. 18).

8. Islam is bigotry and thus it is intolerant towards homosexuals [HOMOPHOBIC]

Very closely related to the narrative on sexism, this one relies perhaps more heavily on ideas of Islam as being anti-progress – whereby support for (liberal) LGBT groups is seen as a form of progressive politics. In Portugal, a traditionally very conservative country, we have seen a shift in the last 10 years towards increased support for LGBT rights (such as marriage and adoption). This is functioning in the wider imaginary as symbolising the country’s *being* Europe/West. Binary constructions of Islam/West are thus reinforced by policing Islam on this matter. This came up especially regarding the Orlando nightclub killings, in 2015:

It was Islamic fundamentalism the voice that places in the mouth of [Omar] Mateen the words of destruction and on his hands its instruments, American or not, gay or not, Muslim or not – we are what they make of us and what we do with of they made of us. (2015-38)

9. Muslims use public funding to promote Islamic fundamentalism\[23 [FUNDAMENTALISM]

This position accuses Muslims of using public resources for their own communities while professing self-segregation, fundamentalism and hatred. Common statements within this discourse are:

- Muslims have schools that promote fundamentalism, radicalisation and political violence (2006-4);
- Madrassas and mosques serve to teach violence and fundamentalism (2014-26).

More recently, the debate has re-emerged surrounding the construction of a new Mosque in Lisbon, in Mouraria. A petition was launched denouncing ‘the public spending of a constitutionally laic state’, the ‘collision with the type of buildings in the area’, and especially ‘the construction of the said temple will be contributing manifestly to social alarm, given the situation of expansionism of Islamic extremism that is lived in the Middle East and the North of Africa and that threatens Portugal’ (2016-49b). The title of the news report is ‘Petition tries to stop the construction of a Mosque in Mouraria, but it is charged of Islamophobia’. Interestingly, in the corpus of the news, published in Público, it is not specified who considered it Islamophobic.

10. Islam does not allow modern science within it, as Western civilization does (hence, Muslims are not led by rational decision-making) [IRRATIONAL]

This is a statement deployed as self-explanatory and is never fully developed, but is linked to perceptions of the lack of autonomy of the Muslim subject from religious authority and, hence, as prey to irrational forces. As Mamdani (2004) argued in relation to the mid-19th century debates, French intellectuals, such as Ernest Renan, conceived of Islam as ‘hostile to science’ and hence considered that science and philosophy ‘had only entered the Islamic world from non-Arab sources.’ Along the same lines, Talal Asad (2003) speaks about how Islamic civilization’ must be denied of its links to the properties defining Western/European identity. One of the ways in which this is achieved is by denying Islam an essence of its own, for instance, by representing Islam as ‘a carrier civilization that helped to bring important elements into Europe from outside, material and intellectual elements that were only contingently connected to Islam’ (p. 169). While this is not often developed in online media, in common conversations people may acknowledge knowledge coming from Islamic civilizations, yet they tend not to perceive it as being properly Islamic or ruling Muslim life, from mundane decisions to international politics.

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23 Fundamentalism was created in 1920s US Protestant circles (Mamdani, 2004).
24 The question of the relation between science and Islam also points to the debate on the challenges posed by colonialism to Islamic reformers in the mid-19th century (see Mamdani, 2004, pp. 45-47).
In sum, these ten narratives described above illustrate: a) how in Europe, but not of Europe, Muslims become an ‘intrusive presence’ that disrupts a narrative of Europe which draws on homogenous space and linear time (Asad, 2003, p. 167). Accordingly, the construction of a binary opposition between the West/Europe/Portugal and Islam seems a way to settle this tension; b) implicitly, we can find a second binary construction with the splitting of the good Muslim (aka the moderate Muslim) and the bad Muslim: assignment to such categories is, according to Mamdani (2004), bestowed on political, not religious, grounds: ‘good Muslims are modern, secular, and Westernized, but bad Muslims are doctrinal, antimodern, and virulent’ (p. 24). Yet, the two categories are nevertheless fundamentally intertwined, and ethnicity marked: the Muslim will never be fully European (Sayyid, 2004).

6. Concluding remarks
The political invisibilisation of Islamophobia in Portugal has produced an absence of knowledge regarding political discourse and everyday experiences. Regarding the former, specific political initiatives targeting specifically the Muslim population, or political discourse on Muslim populations were not found – exception made to the extreme-right wing PNR and a couple of chronicles by members of the Left Bloc and MAS denouncing Islamophobia. This informed the methodological strategy of studying Muslim hatred through the analysis of media content. Regarding politics, the analysis suggests that, in the news concerning Muslims, Islam and Islamophobia (the latter always related to other European countries), senior and parliamentary politicians were not featured. In public events and publications, state and institutional representatives convey an idea of Portugal as a tolerant and plural society. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that representatives of the Islamic community have also downplayed discriminatory situations affecting this population.

This state of affairs is supported by the practical absence of research focusing specifically on the everyday experiences of Islamophobia in Portugal. Most studies to date focus on Muslim minorities and their immigration trajectories. There is a critical strand of research focusing on Islam and national identity, as well as about conceptual understandings of Islamophobia, which nevertheless remains marginal in Portuguese academia.25 The publication of a few international reports, most in German, and their presentation in the European Islamophobia Report (Kalny, 2017) has enabled to map negative social attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, and especially to highlight a series of situations and events of Islamophobic nature in the Portuguese context. Yet more research needs to be done, specifically to understand how Islamophobia is operating in institutional settings.

The cyberspace is where one can more easily find expressions of Islamophobia. To unravel narratives of hatred in a more systematic fashion, this report drew mainly on media content published in the last 20 years (over 100 entries were analysed). The main narratives of Muslim hatred deployed in the media are:

25 See the works by by AbdoolKarim Vakil, based at King’s College London, cited in this paper.
1. Islam advocates violence, Muslims are prone to violence [VIOLENCE]

2. Islam and Muslims are sexist in larger amounts than what one can see in the West [SEXISM]

3. Islam does not rely on democracy and the rule of law, but on the rule of God and is prone to autocracy [THEOCRATIC]

4. Muslims are intolerant [INTOLERANCE]

5. Muslims as unassimilable [ASSIMILATION]

6. Islam is a proselyte religion, which aims to ‘invade our territory’ and take over ‘our way of life’ [PROSELYTISM]

7. Islam does not allow freedom of speech [NO FREEDOM OF SPEECH]

8. Islam is bigotry and thus intolerant towards homosexuals [HOMOPHOBIC]

9. Muslims use public funding to promote Islamic fundamentalism [FUNDAMENTALISM]

10. Islam does not allow modern science within it, as Western civilization does (hence, Muslims are not led by rational decision-making) [IRRATIONAL]

These narratives are pervaded by a us/them binary opposition; and yet, with more or less flexibility, these narratives seem to allow for the Muslim – situated in the externality of the idea of Europe – to cross that same boundary and be granted the position of the good/moderate Muslim, ‘if only they would’ sacrifice their Muslim-ness, assimilate into the values of ‘Western/European civilization’, and especially refrain from denouncing Islamophobia.

7. References


26 Fundamentalism emerged in 1920s US Protestant circles (Mamdani, 2004).


