INTERNATIONALISMS AND THE POLITICS AND POLICIES OF MISSION IN THE PORTUGUESE COLONIAL EMPIRE (1885-1930)

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ABSTRACT: This article addresses the politics and the policies of mission in the Portuguese colonial empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It explores the extent to which such policies were shaped by the international, transnational, and inter-imperial dynamics of political and religious internationalisms embraced by sectors of the Catholic and Protestant churches.

KEYWORDS: Colonialism, Imperialism, Internationalism, Missions, Portuguese colonial empire.

INTERNACIONALISMO Y POLÍTICAS Y POLÍTICAS DE MISIÓN EN EL IMPERIO COLONIAL PORTUGUÉS (1885-1930)

Este artículo aborda la política y las políticas de misión en el imperio colonial portugués a fines del siglo XIX y principios del XX. Explora en qué medida dichas políticas eran configuradas por las dinámicas internacionales, trasnacionales e interimperiales de las políticas y religiones abarcados por sectores de las Iglesias Católica y Protestante.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Colonialismo, imperialismo, internacionalismo, misiones, imperio colonial portugués.

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Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, the increasing importance of and interest in issues related to Africa, in political and economic but also in religious circles, entailed the emergence and development of particular international, transnational, and inter-imperial dynamics, which supported and promoted novel forms of imperialism and also distinct, but interrelated types of political and religious internationalisms. The emergence and consolidation of formal and informal «social, cultural, political and economic connections between individuals from different states, regions and locales» was an important phenomenon that generated new ideas, organisations, identities, and solidarities. As a consequence, multiple instances and processes of «imperial internationalism and internationalist imperialisms» emerged, namely after the Conferences of Berlin (1884-85) and of Brussels (1889-90). The interdependence between idioms, projects, networks, and institutions focused on the promotion of internationalist and imperialist agendas became recurrent and consequential. The internationalisation (and «trans-nationalisation») of imperial and colonial affairs —connected but distinct phenomena— became a fundamental element in the definition of the contemporary world. Interimperial competition became progressively submitted to forms of international regulation. The General Acts of Berlin and Brussels were founding moments of a novel normative context of imperial and colonial processes. Later, the League of Nations (LoN) and its specialized bodies, created in


the aftermath of the Paris Conference of Peace, also generated repertoires and mechanisms of supervision and potential intervention in imperial and colonial politics and policies.\(^6\)

Protestant and Catholic missionary revivalisms were an outcome of longer historical processes with distinct temporalities and dynamics, and were closely connected to the overall «political» and «economic» processes of internationalisation of African affairs in the long nineteenth-century, essentially since the 1870s. They promoted projects of evangelisation and conversion at a global scale that had clear imperial ramifications: they were connected with, but were not reducible to, political and economic projects of the empires. They were related, in varying degrees, with the inter-imperial —geopolitical and geo-religious— rivalries of the time.\(^7\) These revivalisms and the related global evangelizing vistas were also tied to other important international and transnational dynamics. They revealed crucial examples of modalities of religious internationalism, both Catholic and Protestant. The consolidation of a «cluster of voluntary transnational organisations and representations crystallizing around international issues» that focused on religious and ecclesiastical matters —the backbones of religious internationalism— had an important impact in national political and religious events and processes.\(^8\) The constitution of the «Black Internationals», an international and transnational network of «ultramontane Catholicism» that since the 1870s aimed to «coordinate international Catholic agitation in favour of the Pope and against secularisation», was one of the most informative examples. Another was provided by the role of transnational religious institutes and congregations that abounded during the century.\(^9\) In the Protestant world, multiple organisations and solidarities were involved in the international campaigns for abolitionism. Later on they were pivotal to the international impact of the denunciations of the Congo atrocities 2007, pp. 32-114. See also: Nuzzo, Luigi, Origini di una scienza. Diritto internazionale e colonialismo nel XIX secolo, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 2012.


and of the «slave cacao» scandal in São Tomé in the 1900s. The transatlantic and trans-imperial nature of these networks proved crucial to the enhancement of their scope and influence. The missionary World Conferences in New York (the 1900 Ecumenical Conference on Foreign Missions) — which was preceded by the Conference on Foreign Missions (1878) and the London Centenary Missionary Conference (1888) — and in Edinburgh (the 1910 World Missionary Conference), and the creation of the International Missionary Council in 1921, reinforced these tendencies and, to a certain extent, institutionalized the principles of international and interdenominational cooperation.

Of course, many of these post-WWI religious internationalisms, strongly connected to the Protestant International Missionary Council and to the new Catholic missionary policy, intersected with and were related to imperial and colonial outlooks and projects. Despite the proclamation of a mission beyond national constraints, these religious internationalisms frequently aligned themselves with national projects. In distinct ways, many of these internationalisms were related to the need to devise a collective, cooperative, competitive, but regulated, missionary strategy at colonial and international levels. They aimed to participate in the processes of internationalisation of imperial and colonial affairs, namely via the intervention in international organisations and national polities, with a view to guarantee particular privileges and rewards in the growingly competitive missionary fields and in a context of enhanced political and economic inter-imperial and national rivalries. Finally, as a consequence, they also envisaged the formulation of particular colonial policies, the policies of mission, the set of state-sponsored political regulations and strategies that aimed to determine the goals and the limits of ecclesiastical and missionary activities in the colonial world, affecting state-church relations in metropolitan and colonial contexts alike. Therefore, to understand the politics and the policies of mission one must assess the constellation of international and transnational dynamics — of states, of international and transnational organisations (from the League of Nations to the Holy See, the International Missionary Council, and missionary societies), of imperial internationalisms and internationalist imperialisms — that contributed, again in varying degrees, to their definition.


This text aims to demonstrate the centrality of political and religious events that are fundamental to the understanding of the history of contemporary imperialism and internationalism —and also to the evaluation of the religious (ecclesiastical and missionary) dynamics that greatly impacted imperial and colonial by focusing on three historical observatories. This purpose entails important methodological and analytical interventions. The connection, cross-fertilisation, and integration of histories and historiographies —international, imperial, national, ecclesiastical, and missionary— is one of the most important. The intersection of scales of analysis —metropolitan, international, and colonial— is another. Perhaps, as prominently, the de-nationalisation of the study of political and ecclesiastical relations in imperial and colonial contexts is a methodological and analytical requisite. The analytical framework required to understand the relative importance of international and transnational dynamics in the formulation of the policies of mission by the Portuguese empire-state needs to take these three aspects into account. The same goes, more generally, for all the efforts to address the history of the so-called Portuguese «third colonial empire».

The first historical observatory refers to the beginning of the Portuguese republican regime, established in 1910, after the overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy. Republican political ideology, with an adversarial stand towards Catholic religious congregations, especially the Society of Jesus, had to face the norms of international law regarding missionary work, namely those that protected the role of missions and missionary activities in Africa since the Berlin Conference’s General Act. To explore this aspect, we address the process that led to the expulsion of the Jesuits from Mozambique and their replacement by the Verbites missionaries (Society of the Divine Word). This case reveals


15. For a recent collective analysis of the end of the Monarchy and the establishment of the republican regime in Portugal, see, among others: Teixeira, Nuno Severiano (coord.), História de Portugal Contemporâneo, vol. 3, A Crise do Liberalismo (1890-1930), Lisbon, Objectiva, Fundação MAPFRE, 2014.

the degree of intervention that missionary societies had in diplomatic spheres, political and religious alike. The consequences of this episode endured until the Great War and peace negotiations.

The second observatory relates to the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference (1919). Two significant aspects marked this period. On the one hand, the renewal of the normative guidelines associated with the protection of missionary activities and with the general principle of religious freedom, first with the Treaty of Versailles, then with the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. On the other, the emergence of new institutional arrangements, with supranational outlooks, designed to promote more effective evangelizing activities: in the Protestant world with the creation of the abovementioned International Missionary Council; in the Catholic one, with the new missionary policies concocted by popes Benedict XV and Pius XI, fostered by the *Maximum Illud* and *Rerum Ecclesiae* encyclical letters.

The third and last observatory is situated in the 1920s. It reveals the complex nature of the interaction and cooperation between missionary entities (Catholic and Protestant) and the Portuguese imperial authorities. It also shows the post-war international momentum’s crucial role in the evolution of this interaction. The post-war momentum was characterized by two seemingly contradictory tendencies: the enhancement of internationalist dynamics and the strengthening of national(ist) perspectives in colonial contexts. This meant that the Portuguese political authorities felt the need to modify their attitude towards the Catholic missionaries, mitigating antagonisms and reinvigorating the traditional suspicion over the action of the Protestant missionaries. In short, the formulation of a *policy of mission* was significantly affected by international dynamics. 17

I. Out with the Jesuits, enter the Verbites: the Republic’s ambiguities and the demands of International Law

When the republicans took power in Portugal, on 5th October 1910, one of their first political decisions was to renew the legislation that prohibited the presence of Catholic religious congregations in Portugal and in its colonial territories. Marquis of Pombal’s laws against the Jesuits (1759 and 1767) and the 1834 laws against Catholic religious orders and congregations. Despite the existence of this legislation, Portuguese monarchical governments had been more or less tolerant with the return and reestablishment of religious institutes since the mid-nineteenth century, especially those involved in education, charity and overseas missionary activities. 18 To many republicans, religious congregations had no place in the new society. But it was the presence of the Jesuits that was at the heart

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of the so-called Congreganist Question in Portugal. In general, most religious institutes were expelled from Portuguese metropolitan and colonial domains, with two significant exceptions: the Holy Ghost Fathers working in Angola and the Franciscans established in Mozambique. Both were allowed to stay in their missions, albeit with some restrictions.¹⁹

The Society of Jesus started to erect new missions in the Upper Zambezi, in Mozambique, after 1881, with the support of Portuguese imperial authorities, despite all legal impediments and the heated political rhetoric associated with the Portuguese culture wars. The promotion of secularisation and the persistence of a widespread prejudice against the Jesuits, were not enough to impede new missionary projects and a relative acquiescence by the empire-state.²⁰ Constantly facing a lack of Portuguese missionary personnel to send to its Mozambican missions, the Society frequently employed missionaries from other Jesuit provinces. By the time of the Republic, most Jesuit missionaries working in Mozambique came from Germany and Austria-Hungary. When the missionaries received the order of eviction, they immediately looked for the support of the German consul in Mozambique. In no time, the complaints of the German-speaking missionaries reached Europe and progressively involved numerous authorities. The Holy See followed this issue with concern. This episode was another moment in the ongoing religious controversies that opposed Rome to the new regime. The implementation of a system of separation between Church and State was the most noteworthy. Berlin and Vienna, and also the Roman Curia, argued that Portugal should respect the international rules that governed missionary activities, specifically, the Berlin and Brussels General Acts. These international norms, signed by Portugal, guaranteed the protection of any Christian denomination and missionary society. Missionaries could not be expelled for reasons related to their denomination or to the fact that they were members of a religious congregation. But in Lisbon, the government proved intransigent in this matter and upheld its decision: the Society of Jesus should abandon all the Portuguese territories.²¹

Despite a German threat of sending a war vessel to the Zambezi River mouth, the Portuguese government did not stand down, and the German and Austro-Hungarian governments reformulated their arguments. The German and Austro-Hungarian governments argued that the interests of their citizens could not be jeopardized by a Portuguese


²⁰. For the idea of «culture wars» during the processes of secularisation in nineteenth-century Europe, see: Clark, Christopher, Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. For the Portuguese context, see: Neto, Vítor, O Estado, a Igreja, cit.

legal disposition, and since Jesuit missions had been supported by private financial aid, the nationalisation of the missions and their assets—privately funded—was unacceptable. Supported by the printed media and public opinion, this opposition increased when rumours that the Portuguese authorities were planning to take over the missions spread. The German and Austro-Hungarian governments conceded that the Jesuits could go, but that they should be replaced by missionaries with the same nationality, appointed by Berlin and Vienna. An agreement had to be reached.22

Law on the Separation of the Churches and the State was the cornerstone of the Portuguese republican religious policy and the bone of contention between the Holy See and the republican power. In April 1911, the day after this law was published, the Portuguese minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic’s Provisional Government, Bernardino Machado, issued a dispatch in which he gave German and Austro-Hungarian Jesuit missionaries a period of three months to leave Mozambique. This dispatch annulled the order of immediate expulsion issued at the end of 1910. Moreover, the minister also confirmed that missionaries with the same nationality would substitute the Jesuits.23

What Bernardino Machado failed to state clearly was that the Jesuits would very likely be replaced by missionaries from the regular clergy, who had been prevented from staying in or entering Portugal by the Law of 8th October 1910. The German and Austro-Hungarian governments, the Holy See, and, especially, the Propaganda Fide, were not considering sending secular priests to Mozambique. According to the guiding principle of Catholic missionary activity, religious congregations should be solely responsible for evangelizing activities. Moreover, Berlin and Vienna demanded that the Jesuits should stay until a new congregation was found. At the same time the dispatch was issued, the Propaganda Fide was looking for a religious institute that could replace the Jesuits. This search took longer than three months, postponing the exit of Jesuit missionaries, and forcing the government in Lisbon (and the authorities in Lourenço Marques) to ignore the deadline. This obviously impacted national politics. The delay caused numerous protests. Some politicians rejected the minister’s invocation of international conventions to protract the Jesuits’ eviction, arguing that diplomatic negotiations to speed up the process should be immediately opened. Several members of the Chamber of Deputies suggested that this deadlock should be used to solve the problem of religious missions, once and for all. It was time to effectively extinguish them overseas, whether they were foreign or national missions. In their place, lay missions should take on the responsibility of teaching and transmitting republican values, obviously emptied of any religious content. All religious missionaries should be removed from the colonial empire.24

However, the Provisional Government was not willing to start a diplomatic dispute whose consequences could go well beyond a mere religious rationale. The new regime was still waiting to be officially recognized by other powers. Moreover, the solution was not easy. If Catholic missions were the only ones expelled—as the most radical sects of the Portuguese republicanism wished—the colonial missionary field would be open to the expansion of Protestant missions, which were traditionally (and allegedly) identified with antinational connotations. On the other hand, if the decision was extended to all Christian missions, the government would inevitably face a wide set of claims and accusations by missionaries and their respective governments, including the reaction of the Holy See and of the Propaganda Fide. Such a flagrant violation of international agreements, notably the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels, entailed significant consequences: international complaints, diplomatic pressures, and possible interventions in the colonies by foreign governments aiming to protect their subjects and their assets, as the threat of a German military intervention in Mozambique to protect the Jesuits demonstrated. But they could also include the international marginalisation of the new Portuguese regime through withholding recognition. At the time of the debates about the expulsion of the Jesuits, the government of the United States of America was the only great power among those with missionary interests in the Portuguese colonies to have granted the Portuguese republic official recognition. Even though the British government had de facto recognized the Republic by November 1910, a de jure recognition was still to arrive in Lisbon. France, the great inspiration for the Portuguese republicans, would wait until after the approval of the new Constitution and the election of the first president, in August 1911. Germany and Austria-Hungary would only recognize the regime in September of that year. Similarly, to what happened in past occasions, namely during the signing of the General Act of Berlin and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891, the radicalised arguments against the Church and against religion were not considered sufficiently important to start a path of diplomatic conflict with powers that were patently willing to support their own missionaries (and subjects).25

The appointment of a new religious congregation did not depend on the Portuguese authorisation. It was a decision emanating from a dialogue between German, Austro-Hungarian, and Papal diplomacies, with the fundamental intervention of the Propaganda Fide. Negotiations were long and difficult, because it was not easy to find an institute willing to accept the missionary work left by the Jesuits and, at the same time, meet one of the fundamental requisites determined by the Germanic imperial governments: its members must be Germanic subjects. The potential candidates were scarce. These circumstances also revealed the international dimensions of Catholic missionary action at that time. Having initially accepted the Propaganda Fide’s invitation to replace the Jesuits, the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI) ended up refusing the possibility, arguing that relations with the Portuguese authorities would impair their activity. But the true

reason was that the French authorities indicated that French missionaries should not be under any German protection and supervision. Finally, Pope Pius X selected the institute to replace the Jesuits, following a suggestion made by the Holy Ghost General Superior, Alexandre Le Roy; the Congregation of the Divine Word (the Verbite fathers), based in Steyl (Netherlands), but founded by German religious men in the years of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf.

In Mozambique, the replacement of the Jesuits by German missionaries was not welcomed. Some feared that the arrival of German missionaries from a congregation that was not established in Portugal and that had no Portuguese members, was the first move towards a territorial claim by Germany, in a moment in which the republican regime was not firmly consolidated. Shortly afterwards, rumours regarding a new Anglo-German agreement to divide the Portuguese colonial empire deepened the suspicions and the worries of the Portuguese colonial authorities, both political and religious. Nevertheless, the Verbites were allowed to replace the Jesuits in a prolonged process that would last until the eve of First World War. To a republican secular regime, which advocated an anti-congregationist policy, the acceptance of a Catholic religious institute was more than a strident contradiction of its ideological principles. In the context of a clear separation between the State and the Church, it also appeared to downplay a policy that all Portuguese governments, before, during, and after the Republic, constantly proclaimed: the policy of a nationalizing mission (missão nacionalizadora), that is, a missionary endeavour that aimed to nationalize, not merely evangelize, colonized societies.

Only the exchange of declarations of war between Portugal and Germany, in March 1916, enabled the Portuguese authorities to revert the demands imposed by the Germanic governments in 1911. In Mozambique, the General-Governor did not waste time to order the imprisonment of the Verbite missionaries. One of the superiors of the Verbites’ missions, Paul Schebesta, declared that such arrests were unjustified, for they responded only to the widespread «animosity» towards Germans, in the colony and in Portuguese public opinion. Portuguese arguments were of a military nature. Whatever their denominational affiliation, the missionaries were seen as representatives of particular national interests. Their arrest was justified as a preventive measure in a context of war.

The imprisonment of German missionaries in the Portuguese colonies was not a unique event during the global conflict. The association between missionary activity and...
nationalist interests and strategies was a common assumption in colonial contexts. Protestant attempts to develop an interdenominational and inter-national cooperation, namely after the London Missionary Conference of 1888 (the idea of *comity*), or the Romans’ inducement of a process of centralisation of the Catholic missionary activities (in Rome and at the Propaganda Fide), were not effective in neutralizing the connection between nationality and missionary action. A German missionary, whether Catholic or Protestant, was always seen as a German citizen. This was even more so in a context of war, where nationalist euphoria and glorification were widespread. Suspicions and accusations regarding foreign missionaries gained momentum, and the authorities easily justified their persecution. The pre-war imagination of a united and supranational evangelizing front formed by Protestants and Catholics was seriously confronted. Despite these circumstances, J. H. Oldham, one of the leading figures of contemporary Protestantism, and the secretary of the Continuation Committee - created in 1910 after the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference to promote Protestant interdenominational cooperation,31 tried to find a way to overcome the war’s disuniting effects. He appealed to his own government to adopt an effective policy of religious freedom that would allow everyone in British soil to freely practice their religion and to carry on with their missionary activities. Thereby, religious and missionary freedom should also be granted to German missionaries. But Oldham’s proposal was misunderstood or misrepresented as anti-patriotic. British public opinion and British colonial and imperial authorities refused any solution that could be interpreted as somehow favourable to the Germans.32

II. Post-war Internationalisms

After the 1918 Armistice and the beginning of peace negotiations, Oldham saw an opportunity to press his countrymen and open some space for the Allies to revise their stance towards German missionaries. At the Paris Peace Conference, he advocated the protection of the missionaries and their properties. He also argued for the possibility of their return to the missions in which they had worked before the war. His aim was not only to ensure religious freedom and to preserve principles of tolerance, but also to overcome national divisions.


In the Catholic side, the leading figure in the defence of the interests of German Catholic missionaries at the Paris Conference was Bonaventura Cerretti, secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, and Benedict XV’s unofficial representative.33 Like Oldham, papal diplomacy sought Allied sympathy towards the German missionaries. The Holy See’s secretary of State Pietro Gasparri explained to the British legation that those missionaries should be seen, «not as enemies, but as collaborators in the work of civilisation».34 The Roman Curia argued that the goods and properties of the German Catholic missions that were confiscated during the war belonged to the Propaganda Fide, the entity that coordinated Catholic missionary activity. Therefore, if the Holy See owned those goods and properties, Pontifical authorities should be responsible for redistributing them among other Catholic missionary societies. In Paris, the leaders of the so-called Great Powers —Wilson, Lloyd George and Clémenceau— challenged this thesis, while the Italian prime minister, Orlando, considered that the goods of the Holy See were property of the Italian State and, therefore, if the goods returned to the Propaganda Fide they should be re-directed to the Italian State. However, Cerretti’s persistence eventually paid off. The Allies signed a declaration that determined that the German missions and their respective properties would go to missionaries that came from the same religious denominations that operated before the conflict. Portugal also signed this declaration.35

The most significant result of the Catholic and Protestant pressures was the insertion of Article 438 in the Treaty of Versailles. The goods and properties of German missions were excluded from those confiscated by the Allied powers and remained in their congregations.36

To Oldham, the terms of this article were an important victory for the spirit of missionary cooperation proclaimed in Edinburgh. Furthermore, it also reinforced the idea that the missionary movement was essentially a process of evangelisation and civilisation, divorced from nationalistic assumptions and drives. The latter had caused many problems to the missionary movement during the war, and the new article supposedly corrected this misconception. The defence of the principle of missionary freedom was essential to Oldham and to other Protestant representatives. The same happened at the

33. The Holy See was not allowed to send an official representation to the meeting.
Holy See. For this reason, it was fundamental to reassert the pre-war international norms and agreements that guaranteed legal protection to Protestant and Catholic missions. German missionaries had already protested what they considered a violation of Article 6 of the Berlin General Act, but with the German defeat, the treaties signed by Germany were at risk of being nullified.

The text of the Covenant of the League of Nations, specifically one of the paragraphs of Article 22, determined that the power responsible for the administration of territories in Central Africa should «guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals». This principle, and its formulation, corresponded to the wishes of some Catholic and Protestant actors. The full and free exercise of evangelizing activities by missionaries of all denominations was legally enabled. This was already inscribed in, and guaranteed by, the Berlin and Brussels Acts. The Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, signed on 10th September 1919, revised both these documents. The novel agreement expanded the activities protected by these earlier Acts: the freedom of commerce and the condemnation and combat of slavery and slave trade. On missionary matters, Article 11 of the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye reinstated the norm already inscribed in Article 6 of the Berlin Act, but the new writing included a new and significant addendum, the transcription of part of the Covenant of the League of Nations’ Article 22. Indeed, Article 11 assured that freedom of conscience and religion must be protected and respected. The only exceptions to this were the maintenance of the public order and the enforcement of national constitutional laws. This exception created the perfect conditions for states, and empire-states, to oppose missionary activities. It was the Portuguese delegation at the Peace Conference that suggested this addendum, which was accepted «after much effort». To the government in Lisbon, the Portuguese delegates could assume that the «safeguard of the Portuguese interests» was, therefore, ensured.37

The head of the Portuguese representation, Afonso Costa, the main instigator of the Law on the Separation, stated that this addendum to was one of the «many advantages» obtained by Portugal during the negotiations. With this paragraph, the constitutional principles that forbade the entry and establishment of religious congregations would prevail over any complaints by the missionaries. The legality of such opposition could not be questioned, even considering the prescriptions of international law. In contrast to what happened with prescriptions issued in Berlin and their collision with the Portuguese constitutional texts (first the 1826 Constitutional Charter and, then, the 1911 Republican Constitution), the Convention of 1919 provided some legal support to Portugal’s efforts to control missionary activity.38

These changes in the legal framework of international regulation of missionary activity created other difficulties. If the Berlin General Act determined that missionary activities could not be hampered by reasons related to the nationality of the missionaries or their religious denomination, the Convention of 1919 guaranteed protection and assistance to «religious, scientific, or charitable institutions» that were «created and organized by the nationals of the other Signatory Powers and of States, Members of the League of Nations». This created an obvious problem, as the Holy See pointed out, years later, because it excluded a significant number of missionaries. Only the citizens from member states of the League of Nations were under this protection clause. As Gasparri said to the French ambassador to the Holy See, it was desirable that Berlin’s norms were reintroduced, «in all its extension and universality».\(^{39}\)

The renewal of the Holy See’s missionary strategy was already underway before the end of the war. In 1917, the Propaganda Fide was engaged in the elaboration of a pontifical document about missionary activity in China. This country was being torn apart by nationalist conflicts and there was a noticeable shortage of missionaries, particularly since the German missionaries that were there before the war did not return after its end. The new prefect of the Propaganda, Willem Van Rossum, the first Dutch cardinal since the sixteenth century, led this process of missionary re-engagement. As the leading figure in the re-elaboration of the papal missionary strategy, he was regarded as the «second founder of the Propaganda».\(^{40}\) Shortly after the ratification of the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Pope Benedict XV issued the encyclical letter \textit{Maximum Illud}, the «Letter of the Contemporary Missions», on 30\(^{th}\) November 1919. The document intended to reinforce the supra-nationality of Catholic missionary action: before being Portuguese, French or German, a missionary was above all a Catholic. His main concern should be the conversion of the «heathen». This assertion was, in a sense, opposed to the nationalizing aims that imperial powers promoted in their own missionary endeavours overseas. In an attempt to protect the interests of the Catholic missions —in a way similar to the one being pursued by the Protestant—, Rome insisted in the spiritual character of missionary work and challenged the nationalizing elements usually promoted by the policies of mission fostered by colonial authorities. Benedict XV reminded missionaries that their

\(^{39}\) Gasparri to Jean Doulcet (French ambassador to the Holy See), 17\(^{th}\) May 1926; Archive of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs (ACAES), Stati Ecclesiastici, Anno 1926-1929, Pos. 380 P.O., Fasc. 262, fls. 69-69v.

«duty» was not «the extension of a human realm but of Christ’s». If the populations being evangelized realized that a missionary was more interested in their «earthly» homeland, the «heathen» would regard all his work with suspicion. Catholicism was not «the national religion of a foreign people» and its universal character should always be underlined. From 1922 onwards, Benedict XV’s successor, Pius XI, continued the way paved by his predecessor in missionary matters. Van Rossum’s continuity as head of the Propaganda Fide was revealing, as was the fact that the fundamental encyclical letter of the new pope (and one of the most important of the twentieth century), *Rerum Ecclesiae*, issued in 28th February 1926, reinstated several principles inscribed in the *Maximum Illud*.41

The revitalisation of the missionary strategy in the Protestant field was also underway before the end of the war, under a similar guiding principle: the centrality of supra-nationality in relation to missionary activities. In 1920, Oldham wrote: «for the Christian, nationality is not the ultimate loyalty. His highest allegiance is to the Christian fellowship».

In that same year, a decade after the missionary meeting in Edinburgh, the Swiss town of Crans welcomed a new international missionary conference, attended by members of British, American Dutch, Belgian, French, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Swiss, and South-African missionary societies and German members of the Continuation Committee. The participants decided to create an International Missionary Committee. In the following autumn, at a meeting in Lake Mohonk (United States), they founded the International Missionary Council (IMC).42 The new organisation was supported by two fundamental pillars. First, that missionary policy should only be determined by the missionary societies, boards, and churches that they represented. Second, that the Council would not approve any decision on ecclesiastical or doctrinal matters if there was any disagreement between its members. The first principle aimed to secure that the elaboration of missionary instruments was the sole responsibility of religious entities, free in principle from any external intrusion, namely by political powers. The objective of the second guideline was to overcome possible theological divergences among different denominations, highlighting the importance of forms of interdenominational cooperation in the conversion of the gentile and in the expansion of the Christian realm. Thus, the International Missionary Council sought to become the coordinating hub of an organized and cooperative strategy in the field of Protestant missions.43


42. The replacement of the term «committee» by «council» aimed to ensure that this body would not have an executive role.


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III. Portuguese empire and missions: the need for cooperation

Given the new international context, the missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, were willing to redefine their relationship with Portuguese authorities. In Angola, the Holy Ghost Fathers considered the post-war moment as the proper time to solve longstanding jurisdictional quarrels with the empire-state, the defender of Padroado’s prerogatives. In a Mémoire sent to the Propaganda Fide, the Superior General of the Congregation of the Holy Ghost concluded that the Law on the Separation had put an end to the Padroado regime, while the Treaty of Versailles and the Convention of 1919 had renewed the principles of missionary freedom in Africa, covering missionaries from all nations and denominations. Therefore, the Portuguese authorities could not block their free establishment, action, and circulation. Le Roy optimistically hoped that republican secularism and the legal obligations derived from international agreements would minimize the objections of the Portuguese government to his proposals, particularly those related to the choice of the ecclesiastical hierarchy by the Propaganda Fide instead of the Portuguese authorities, and the complete subordination of Catholic missions to the Propaganda Fide’s religious jurisdictional authority. Achille Locatelli, Apostolic Nuncio in Lisbon, stated that the ideas in the Mémoire were «great», but also assumed that they were «unrealistic» and would probably create «difficulties» to the Catholic missionaries that the Holy See should committedly avoid. Acknowledging the changes in the Portuguese politics and policies of mission, and warned by several missionaries, Locatelli was convinced that even a proclaimed lay and secular political regime such as the Republic would never accept losing the rights of the Padroado, namely the selection of the ecclesiastical higher-authorities that could operate within the colonial empire. Le Roy’s ideas were indeed «unrealistic». Van Rossum, the mastermind behind the new supranational Catholic missionary policy, was warned of the risks posed by Le Roy’s Mémoire and decided that his requests should be abandoned. Past lessons could not be clearer: despite the existence of international conventions guaranteeing missionary freedom, the Portuguese authorities never hesitated in creating numerous obstacles to missions. The preservation of the Catholic missions’ status quo in the Portuguese colonies was preferable. Furthermore, the exception entailed by the last paragraph of Article 11 of the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye now gave the Portuguese state the authority to legally obstruct any action considered contrary to constitutional law or public security.44

The Holy See had always sought ways to cooperate with the republican regime in missionary matters. In 1913, when Decree n.º 233 extended the principles of the Law on the Separation to the colonies, the instructions that came from Rome were not the same of those sent when the Law was published in 1911. Instead of a public condemnation of

the Decree, the Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, instructed missionaries to meet the terms of the Decree. Colonial realities required a different, more cautious approach. Jeopardizing the Catholic missionary presence in the Portuguese colonies could signify opening the door to Protestant expansion, and in a context of strong interdenominational competition for «native» souls, Rome seemed willing to cooperate with a political regime whose religious policies she frequently condemned. Similarly, for Portuguese governments, the presence of Catholic missionaries in the colonies was not entirely negative, as long as they worked in a nationalizing framework, promoting the «civilisation» of the «native» communities and obstructing the advance of Protestant interests. The latter were often seen as an external foreign intrusion and, therefore, a threat to Portuguese colonial rule. This explains why several Catholic missionaries supported Portuguese missionary legislation. Some were even active collaborators in its formulation. Months after the publication of the Maximum Illud, Benedict XV congratulated the Portuguese government for the approval of a new missionary decree, which recognized the central role of the Catholic missionaries, de jure and de facto, even as it promoted missions as instruments of nationalisation. This public political and legal recognition was fundamental to the Holy See and to the Portuguese government. Years later, papal circles would also praise the publication of the Statute of Missions in 1926 by the Minister of the Colonies João Belo. The fact that the statute focused on the role played by national missions and, therefore, contradicted the supranational and universal character declared to be the cornerstone of the Holy See’s missionary strategy, did not provoke criticism. The Portuguese imperial politics and policies of mission were seen as moving towards the recognition of the centrality of Catholic missions.45

To the Protestants, this centrality revived old fears, which had prevailed during the Monarchy. Many had hoped that the Republic would remove them for good, but the new legal framework frustrated those expectations, even as imperial and international challenges forced the republican governments to rethink the potential role of Catholic missions in their colonial project. The relations between Protestant missionaries and the Portuguese authorities constantly underwent moments of crisis and mutual recrimination, but they also entailed the advocacy and practice of cooperation. From the 1920s on, several reports of the International Missionary Council about the activity of the missions —their everyday life and their interaction with the Portuguese authorities— suggested the need for a conciliatory relationship, while keeping the missionaries aware of the juridical conditions that framed their action. In a report presented at a meeting in Oxford, in 1923, Abbe L. Warnshuis, the secretary of the IMC, stated that Portuguese legislation represented a «serious infringement» to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by international treaties. Nevertheless, in his general overview, he regarded the relations between missions and the General-Government of Angola as «satisfactory». The local government «promised all protection and moral and financial support» to Protestant missions. Mo-

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Moreover, Warnshuis believed that with patience, and «by demonstrating the loyal purpose of the missions to observe the laws and regulations of the government», it would be possible to change some of the legal dispositions of Portuguese policies, especially those related to the use of indigenous languages for teaching. In sum, it was important to work in conformity with the indications of colonial officials, for good relations with the authorities were fundamental to guarantee the normal activity of missionary work, despite the Portuguese violation of international conventions and their principles.

Warnshuis underlined the need for a cooperative relationship between missionaries and the Portuguese authorities, expressing an argument supported by others members of the IMC. In his report, Warnshuis used a speech given at the 1910 Edinburgh Conference by Swiss missionary Arthur Grandjean (from the Mission Suisse, established in Mozambique), to refute some of the missionaries’ claims against Portuguese legal measures. For instance, Warnshuis defended the «justness of the government demands» regarding the compulsory use of the Portuguese language in all missionary schools. But, despite Warnshuis’ arguments and warnings at the Oxford meeting, the IMC adopted a resolution declaring that the «free circulation» of the Bible in native languages and the «free use» of these in worship were «inseparable from the exercise of religious freedom». Accordingly, all missionaries should «respectfully» advocate this point when engaging colonial authorities. Although this was a «general statement» related to missions everywhere, it had a particular relevance in the Portuguese colonial empire, given the nationalizing efforts guiding the country’s politics and policies of mission.46

The debates about the need to find a modus vivendi between Portuguese authorities and Protestant missionaries also emerged during the Conference on Christian Missions at Le Zoute-sur-mer (Belgium, September 1926), which followed the one held in High Leigh, in 1924, and was prepared by Oldham himself. This new conference took place amid the uproar caused by the so-called Ross Report, which denounced the widespread use of forced labour practices in Angola and Mozambique at the LoN. Most of the information that American sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross used in this report came from Protestant missionaries, and several members of the IMC had facilitated the author’s trip to both Portuguese colonies. Although this deepened Portuguese suspicion and hostility against Protestant missionaries, it also reinforced the need for a cooperative relationship between both parts. These debates, problems and connections cannot be understood in a simple way. At the beginning of 1926, even before the conference in Belgium, Henri Anet, director of the Bureau des Missions Protestantes du Congo Belge, came to Lisbon to soothe the Portuguese authorities and minimize the negative effects that the Ross Report could produce in the dynamics of missionary competition, namely regarding the expected impact on Protestant missionary endeavours at the colonies.47

46. A. L. Warnhuis, The relations of Missions and Governments in Belgian, French and Portuguese Colonies; Torre do Tombo National Archives (ANTT), Companhia de Moçambique [Company of Mozambique], n." de orden 2164, n." 316-AF26, 3-31.
47. For all these issues, see: Jerónimo, Miguel Bandeira, The ‘civilising mission’ of Portuguese colonialism... cit.
Henri Anet carefully detailed the myriad ways in which Protestant missionaries were willing to cooperate with the Portuguese empire-state, and in his report, he emphasized the proposals’ positive reception from important Portuguese colonial figures. Ernest W. Riggs, a leading member of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, argued that Anet’s visit to Portugal was a success: Anet had left an excellent «impression» in the country, apparently tempering the Portuguese animosity towards Protestant missionaries after their involvement in the recent denunciation of Portuguese colonialism’s modus operandi. The proximity between Anet and Alberto de Oliveira, the Portuguese minister in Brussels, who was invited to attend the Le Zoute Conference, certainly helped. During the Conference, after a suggestion made by Anet, the Portuguese diplomat was allowed to publicise the Portuguese government’s commitment to suppress abuses and to facilitate missionary action, namely in educational matters. Nevertheless, this commitment would be in accordance with Portuguese imperial interests and goals. Portuguese authorities followed the debates addressed in this conference and in similar venues and events, for their discussions on racial issues, missionary strategies and educational topics allowed the authorities to anticipate future complaints in international fora or external pressures over their colonial policies.48

Conclusion

Since the mid-nineteenth century, Christian missionary movements promoted supranationality as a crucial element for their activities. They argued that the creation of new Christian believers was far more important than the shaping of new imperial citizens. The principles of religious and missionary freedom, guaranteed by the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels, were partly the result of these evangelizing perspectives. In varying degrees, they affected the relations between states and churches in metropolitan and colonial contexts. The widespread influence of Protestant missionary societies, and even of the Holy See, in metropolitan public opinion enabled them to get some leverage in those relations.

The emergence and consolidation of a supranational discourse fostered the development of a religious modality of internationalism. In the Protestant field, this process reached a peak at the 1910 Edinburgh World Missionary Conference. In Catholic circles, it occurred via the process of centralisation of missionary activity in the hands of the Propaganda Fide, which started with Gregory XVI back in the 1830s, and culminated with the missionary policy of Benedict XV and Pius XI in the 1920s. Both Protestants and Catholics had to counteract national(ist) projects, devising possible ways to continue their evangelizing work within a global context marked by the renewal of international pers-
pectives and imperial (and national) strategies. Multiple, and contingent, *modi vivendi* needed to be established. This was particularly clear in the case of the Portuguese colonial empire.

As we have shown, the *internationalisms* that assumed an important place in the post-war moment, both an *internationalism of nations* (represented by the League of Nations) as well as an *internationalism of religions* or *religious internationalism* (represented by the renewal of Catholic and Protestant missionary movements), intersected profoundly with the colonial dynamics of the Portuguese empire-state. They effectively conditioned imperial and colonial politics and policies, including those related to ecclesiastical and missionary aspects. The Portuguese empire-state and its authorities had to balance external legal, political, and religious rationales and logics with internal imperial and nationalizing projects. Therefore, understanding the politics and policies of the Portuguese colonial empire requires the adequate study of these intersections. The three cases or observatories provided in this text demonstrate how and why international and transnational dynamics were crucial in the politics and policies of mission in the Portuguese colonial empire, as well as why scholars need to incorporate political and ecclesiastical dimensions and explore their interrelation, which operates in distinct scales: colonial, metropolitan, international. The traditional metropolitan or colonial single-way focus is not sufficient. Wider processes, diverse political and ecclesiastical genealogies, and specific histories and historiographies need to be mobilized and articulated in a common framework. Their relevance and, we argue, their centrality, needs to be acknowledged.

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