'The unclaimed latifundium': the configuration of the Spanish fishing sector under Francoist autarky, 1939–1951

Santiago Gorostiza a,*, Miquel Ortega Cerdà b, c

a Centro de Estudios Sociales, Universidade de Coimbra, Colégio de S. Jerónimo Largo D. Dinis, Apartado 3087, 3000-995 Coimbra, Portugal
b Fundación ENT — MedReAct, Carrer de Sant Joan 39, Primer Piso, 08800 Vilanova i La Geltrú, Barcelona, Spain
c Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici 2, Carrer de Les Columnes, Campus de La UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Cerdanyola del Vallés, Spain

A R T I C L E  I N F O

Article history:
Received 27 February 2015
Received in revised form 23 December 2015
Accepted 29 December 2015

Keywords:
Fishing
Autarky
Self-sufficiency
Spain
Francoism
Fascism

A B S T R A C T

Autarkic ideology and economic policies were central features of the interwar period in Europe. Despite autarky’s connection to geographical concepts such as space, resources and population, its historical impact has been relatively little explored in the literature. In this article, we first present how the concept of ‘autarky’ conflates two etymological meanings: self-sufficiency and authoritarianism. We then explore this duality, using archival sources, by examining the social and economic policies applied to the fishing sector in Francoist Spain between 1939 and 1951. On the one hand, we examine the repression and transformation of the fishers’ social world. On the other, we study the impact of public policies on the marine fishing fleet, underlining the importance of the militaristic guidelines that shaped the reforms. We argue that these autarkic reforms have had long-term consequences that are still visible today. They represented a rupture for the associative environment of fishers and shaped the future characteristics of the fleet, as well as its pattern of geographical expansion.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Spain will go back to search for its glory and wealth by the sea routes

Fundamento de la Nueva España, 1937.1

In 1945, the Fascist-backed comic Flechas y Pelayos included a drawing of a cod fish with a brief inscription saying: ‘If fish had no enemies, cod alone would be enough to fill all the space in the seas’.2 Such popular (but also scientific) images of over-optimistic abundance are commonplace in a range of periods and places.3

However, in the Spain that emerged from Franco’s crushing victory in the Civil War (1936–1939), they achieved a special significance.

The post-Civil War period in Spain was plagued by hunger and deprivation. Diplomatic reports and travellers’ statements refer to undernourishment and deaths from starvation.4 Studies on historical nutrition and agrarian metabolism describe a decrease in Spanish agricultural production and meat consumption, and highlight the colossal disaster that these post-war years represented for the population.5 During these years of hunger, the Spanish minister José Luis Arrese allegedly told Franco that dolphin meat sandwiches and fish-flour bread were a feasible solution for starvation.6 Behind the minister’s odd statement there was a sense of uneasiness with the pervasive hunger that overwhelmed the country. But there was something else, something central to the economic approach of the period: the aspiration of using available national resources to the maximum extent in the name of

1 Fundamento de la Nueva España, 1937.
2 Flechas y Pelayos, 330 (1st April 1945) 13.
self-sufficiency. This was the main premise of the autarkic policies followed by Francoism since the Civil War. Under the circumstances of agricultural collapse and widespread hunger, fishing seemed to offer an inexhaustible source of food. In contrast to the agricultural crisis and the decreased availability of meat, evidence points to an increase of fish captures and consumption during the post-war years. In some regions, fish made up for the lack of land animal protein, contributing much-needed fat, fat-soluble vitamins and phosphorus to the daily diet of Spanish people. However, applying the idea of ‘national’ resources to fishing was problematic. In the 1940s, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) had not yet been established, meaning that the seas — outside the narrow perimeter of territorial waters — were unowned. Increasing fishing captures was mostly a matter of developing bigger and more powerful fleets that could expand all over the world if necessary. The open seas remained, in the words of a Francoist official, an ‘unclaimed latifundium’.

In what follows, we use archival sources and scholarship from the history of science and technology to explore the main characteristics and consequences of the autarkic fishing policies in Spain in the period 1939–1951. Following the approach of historians of science Tiago Saraiwa and Norton Wise, we understand the word autarky as the genesis of the ideas of self-sufficiency (autarky, from Greek autarkia) and self-rule (autarchia, from Greek autarchia). These authors have argued that the intimate relation between these two concepts is a characteristic feature of Fascist regimes. On this basis, we intertwine the study of import-substitution policies and other measures towards economic self-sufficiency (autarky) with a focus on the top-down, militaristic and socially repressive dimension of these policies (autarchy). We argue that Francoist autarkic policies for the fisheries sector had far-reaching social and environmental effects, and that an analysis of these policies may help explain some of the present characteristics of the Spanish fishing fleet, including its overcapacity in some segments or the low level of union activities in small-scale fisheries.

Our research is relevant to historical geography and environmental history for several reasons. First, discussions of historical conceptions of autarky reveal the relations of societies with their environments and the natural resources they consume. As David Harvey put it, and Erik Swnyedgouew exemplified with the Spanish case in his recent book on water, all political-economic projects are ecological projects, and vice-versa. The case of Spanish autarky and its relation to fisheries governance was no exception. Examining historical cases of national attempts at self-sufficiency in different areas of the economy and society can bring insights into the political configurations established and the geographical scales involved to achieve those goals. Moreover, while nowadays self-reliance and autonomy are usually associated with bottom-up environmental discourses from the left, several historical examples show how similar principles were applied by right-wing dictatorships in a top-down manner.

Second, the importance of feeding national populations in times of scarcity such as the Second World War is now receiving significant attention. The role of fishing, however, has been less researched than the equivalent roles of agriculture or livestock. By exploring the Spanish case, we aim to show the importance of fishing captures for feeding the population in periods of scarcity, in a way comparable to the work of Ole Sparenberg for Nazi Germany and William Tsutsui for Japan. Here the seas were still perceived as inexhaustible sources of food, and therefore conceived as spaces where it was possible to ‘reap without sowing’ or ‘harvest fruits without planting seeds’. Nazi discourses of the seas as the ‘last remaining colony’ resonate with Francoist visions of maritime routes as part of the lost Spanish Empire to be regained. Last but not least, Franco’s dictatorship and the case of the Portuguese Estado Novo under Salazar also show significant similarities.

Marine historical research has called for more data and research on historical fisheries. With this in mind, our research is relevant to understanding how Spain became one of the world’s major fishing countries during the second half of the twentieth century. While the importance of Spanish fisheries can be traced to the ancient past, modern geographical expansion of the Spanish fishing fleet tends to be explained in relation to the policies adopted during the 1960s. We argue that some of its current characteristics can be better understood by looking at the evolution of Spanish fisheries policies during the period 1939–1951.

We have chosen our period of study as the years of major Fascist influence in Franco’s regime, and subsequent commitment to autarkic economic guidelines. Francoism was born as a result of a military coup and then three years of civil war when Franco received substantial support from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

---

9 Before the establishment of EEZs, each country claimed different ranges for unowned. Increasing fishing captures was mostly a matter of developing bigger and more powerful fleets that could expand all over the world if necessary. The open seas remained, in the words of a Francoist official, an ‘unclaimed latifundium’.
12 Throughout the article we use ‘autarky’ to refer to the dual concept. ‘Autarchy’ is used only when we explicitly intend to emphasise its socio-political and repressive dimension.
19 Immediately before our period of study, the major fishing countries of the world were Japan, USA, Korea, USSR and Norway. See D. Sahrahage and J. Lundbeck, A History of Fishing, Berlin, 1992, 167. For statistical data on the Spanish fish fleet and landings, see Carreras and Tafunell (Coords), Estadísticas Históricas de España, 352–356. For statistical information about the present-day fleet size, economic situation and captures, see the Spanish Ministry website: http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/estadistica/temas/estadisticas-pesquerias/pesca-maritima/default.aspx
20 P. Andrade, El proceso de expansion de las pesquerias españolas, Información Comercial Española 478 (1973) 83–94.
Different right-wing tendencies (Catholic, monarchic and Fascist) originally supported the coup. However, the first period of the dictatorship is usually regarded as the time when the Fascist sectors (usually identified with the state’s single-party, Falange Española) had more influence over national policies.21 The years 1939–1951 are also the period of maximum influence of Juan Antonio Suanzes (1891–1977), president of the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) from its establishment in 1941 and twice minister of industry and trade (1939–1941, 1945–1951).22 As a result of occupying both these positions, between 1945 and 1951 he centralised all the power to promote the autarkic policies which he fully endorsed.23 As we will see, both as a minister and as president of INI, Suanzes was a significant figure in developing fisheries policy. His ousting as a minister with the change in the Spanish government of 1951, together with the division of the Ministry of Industry and Trade into two different ministries, marks the end of our period of study. Coinciding with the resumption of diplomatic relations with the USA, this change opened the way to a first timid wave of liberalization measures that economic historians identify as an inflection point for the Spanish economy. During the early 1950s, several Spanish economic indicators finally reached pre-Civil War levels.24

Our research relies on several primary sources. First, we have examined the personal archives of Juan Antonio Suanzes at the INI archive. We have complemented this with a review of the press, especially Industrias Pesqueras, one of the main bi-weekly publications from the Spanish fisheries sector. We have also taken advantage of the digitisation of the Francoist newsreels, Noticiarios y Documentales (NoDo). Finally, we have used the recently digitised collections of Luis Carrero Blanco (1904–1973), navy officer and one of Franco’s closest advisors, located in the Navarra University General Archive.

The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews current theoretical approaches using the concept of autarky in the fields of history of science and Spanish contemporary history. We also discuss the evolving understandings of autarky during early Francoism and what it meant in practice. In the section that follows, we analyse how the autarchic-repressive period following the Spanish Civil War changed the organisation of the fishing sector. The next two sections then track the intimate connections between militarism, the reorganisation of the state administration responsible for fisheries and the policies designed to increase the size of the fleet. Along these lines, in the last substantive section, we assess the plans made for the geographical expansion of the fleet in the Spanish colonies and elsewhere, as well as the promotion of consumption measures. Finally, in the conclusion, we point out the long-lasting effect of the autarkic policies and underline the relevance of research on autarky for historical geography.

### Autarky/autarchy

**Current theoretical approaches to autarky**

While Geography as a discipline has engaged for a long time with the relation between society and nature and the interaction between humans and the environment, relatively little work has addressed the concept and historical applications of autarky.25 Despite this omission, autarky often appears in dictionaries of the discipline. In some cases, the concept is simply defined as ‘National economic isolation of a country achieved creating a self-sufficient independent economy’, and no distinction is made between ‘autarchy’ and ‘autarky’.26 Other dictionaries, however, explicitly point out the differences between the two words, defining autarchy as ‘absolute sovereignty, autocratic rule, despotism’, and autarky as ‘economic self-sufficiency’.27 Indeed, the history of science literature, and certain Spanish contemporary historians, have highlighted the duality of autarky/autarchy as a useful theoretical concept. On the one hand, Tiago Saraiva and Norton Wise claim that the fusion ‘in usage, spelling and meaning’ between self-sufficiency (autarky) and self-rule (autarchy) is fundamental for understanding Fascist regimes.28 While the notion of ‘autarchy’ focuses on political economy and the improvement and exploitation of the nation’s resources, the idea of ‘autarchy’ ensures that attention remains anchored to top-down authoritarian control. Likewise, in order to unfold his interpretation of the Francoist dictatorship, historian Michael Richards employs the same etymologic discussion of the dualism between autarky and autarchy.29 Richards relates the notion of ‘autarchy’ to social control and repression. In his interpretation, Francoist autarchy involved sealing Spain off from the outside world in order to treat the country ‘under conditions of quarantine’. Richards understands self-sufficiency ‘in the sense of a denial of any political, cultural or economic dialogue about the future’, and regards this as a fundamental part of the formation of the Francoist regime.30

Put together, Saraiva and Wise’s interpretation of ‘autarky’ as a defining feature of Fascism and Richards’ attention to the underlying social and repressive dimensions of self-sufficiency policies in Spain demonstrate the potential of this dual concept. If applied within historical geography, autarky/autarchy can intertwine both socio-political and economic/environmental concerns. Moreover, it can bring together the Spanish government’s management of national resources with the Fascist discourse of ruralism. As Marco Armiero and Wilko von Hardenberg have argued, the improvement of peasants and rural land coalesced with the idea of modernisation and improvement of the national territory in Fascist ruralist narratives.31 As we will see, this also applied to fishers and their fishing waters.

Finally, a clear connection can be made between policies aiming

21 Falange’s programme was influenced by Italian Fascism, featuring key elements such as the idea of empire, a totalitarian perspective on the state and the aim to have unions that included both workers and managers/owners. J.G. Pecharrromán, El Movimiento Nacional (1937–1977), Barcelona, 2013.
28 Saraiva and Wise, Autarky/autarchy, 424.
at self-sufficiency and militarism. Trying to reach self-sufficiency was a way to prepare for war, and the impossibility of achieving it was a justification for militarism and territorial expansion in order to gain access to more land and resources. This applies both to Mussolini’s war in Abyssinia and to Hitler’s justification for the drive towards the East. Referring to Spain and Portugal’s unequal exchanges with their colonies during this period, Gervase Clarence-Smith emphasizes the existence of a ‘conscious policy of imperial autarky’, meaning an intensification of the unequal economic relations with the colonies in order to fulfill metropolitan needs. This shows how the concept of autarky necessarily involves issues of scale.

Franco’s autarky in context

Spain is a privileged country that can meet its own needs. We have no need to import anything.

Francisco Franco, 1938, Palabras del Caudillo.

While economic historians acknowledge the trends of protectionism in Spanish contemporary history as part of the widespread economic nationalism of the 1930s, they have also underlined that the Francoist regime introduced a qualitative change in this trend by actively pursuing an autarkic political economy. To explain this change, some authors have consistently pointed to Franco’s ambition of imitating the autarkic military projects of his key allies during the Spanish Civil War: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Salazar’s Portugal. Others have also stressed the economic ideas of high Francoist officials like Suanzes or Franco himself, who were concerned with developing military power while ensuring political independence by diminishing external dependencies.

For years, however, this was not the predominant interpretation. In a similar vein to the historiography that regards the Francoist dictatorship simply as an authoritarian regime, the autarkic policy guidelines of the first decades were explained as a strategy that Francoism was mostly forced to choose, thus underplaying its ideological connection to Fascism. Self-sufficiency policies, from this point of view, were imposed by the circumstances of the Second World War and the later diplomatic ‘isolation’ of Spain once its former allies had been defeated. All in all, the interpretation of autarky as a reactive policy has not survived the slow opening of Spanish archives to enquiry. Consistent research on diplomatic and economic history has shown the inconsistencies of this analysis, and it is now usually accepted that autarkic policies were the choice of the Francoist regime. There is also a consensus on the negative impact of autarkic policies on the Spanish economic recovery after the Civil War, which took longer than in other European countries with higher war-related costs.

In practice, autarkic political economy aimed at reducing imports and increasing exports, with the overall objective of reducing the balance of payments and lessening economic dependency. The programme of ‘national improvement’ entailed an ambitious industrialisation plan aimed at substituting imports and providing jobs by using available resources to the maximum extent. It also involved pervasive state intervention in markets, carried out through a wide array of regulations, including price setting and rationing of basic goods, the establishment of input quotas for economic sectors and a tight control of imports and exports. The application of autarkic regulations by the Francoist state caused major economic dysfunctions, fueling speculation and a thriving parallel economy in the black market.

Yet, all these political and economic measures have also to be interpreted from a military standpoint. Following the examples of the autarkic military projects of the Axis countries, militarism became interwoven with autarky and it is essential to understand the Francoist obsession with national production and industrial development. More than as an end in itself, autarky was underpinned by high Francoist officials as a fundamental tool in a context of potential military conflict.

Autarky as a weapon

Undoubtedly the most important official in relation to the design and implementation of autarkic industrial policies was Suanzes, a former engineer in the Spanish navy. The crucial law regarding the reconstruction of the Spanish fishing fleet was prepared under his first mandate as minister of industry and trade. Suanzes was always a firm advocate of industrialisation policies, and held strong political views on the role of the economy, which he considered should be set ‘under the strict rule of politics, or better said, under the political aims of the State’. It is within this framework of subordination, where the political and the technical were given priority over the economic, that he developed autarkic policies even if they were not the most efficient in economic terms. It was production and industrial development that mattered, not comparative or opportunity costs.

Suanzes was the ideologue and the founding president of the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI), the main institution...
established by the Francoist state to carry out an autarkic project of industrialisation.46 INI’s original name sheds light on its unequivocal character: it was going to be called the Instituto Nacional de Autarquía (National Institute of Autarky). A last minute change at the Council of Ministers changed it to INI and put under the sole control of the head of the Spanish government.47 A few months later, after returning from a visit to Germany in June 1942, Suárez presented his views on autarky in a series of speeches given to high-ranking military officials, which are preserved in INI’s archive.48 In these select private meetings — when Spain still had volunteer troops side by side with the Wehrmacht on the Russian battlefront — Suárez associated autarky with the idea of national political independence and rejected the notion of purely economic isolation.49 However, despite his typically Francoist references to political independence, we cannot lose sight of the political alliances of the period. Suárez’s intimate knowledge of the Italian and German experiences of autarky, along with the support provided by those countries, is apparent and deeply influenced his personal views.50 INI, in fact, was partly inspired by the Italian Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale.51 The German connections were also obvious in INI’s most symbolic and expensive project, the creation of a national company to produce synthetic fuels.52 According to Suárez, as a political-economic objective autarky required action on four main fronts: a military force that could ensure political independence, an industrial base that could sustain the rear-guard in case of war, a raw materials policy that would ensure supplies, and sufficient internal and external communications to cover military needs and the transportation of raw materials. To realise all this, industrialisation was the essential step to be taken. In Suárez’s speeches autarky emerged not as an ideal state of self-sufficiency, but literally as a weapon, a necessary step for a higher capacity of production using national means. Industrial development was inextricably linked to the military, the central sector guaranteeing political independence. War, therefore, was central to his understanding of independence and autarky.53

Suárez’s private speeches make it clear that an ideological and political intention to follow an autarkic path existed. This choice involved much more than promoting the substitution of raw materials imports by increasingly exploiting Spanish natural resources and the colonial territories in Morocco and Guinea. As stated by high Francoist officials, autarky was intimately connected with the institutional mechanisms of social control.54 The search for self-sufficiency (autarky) was inextricably intertwined with the shaping of self-rule (autarchy). In the next section, by following Richards’ approach to autarky as social control we start exploring this blend by focusing on the repression unleashed by the dictatorship on fishers and their associations. The ‘autarkic weapon’, we will demonstrate, was to be used not only to face foreign foes, but also to defeat the enemy within.

**Autarchic reforms in the fishing sector: from positos to cofradías through structural repression**

The sea was central to the Fascist dream of the Falange, Francoism’s single party. Building an empire that was reminiscent of the glorious medieval past was a central objective for the new Spain engendered by the Civil War.55 In Franco’s words, Spaniards had a ‘marine duty’ to accomplish.56 However, in order to fit in with this dream fishers and their associations had to be radically transformed.

Immediately before the military coup, during the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1936), fishers were organised through positos and many other different workers’ and employers’ associations. Pósitos were organizations which were mostly constructed on the basis of local guild-type structures with medieval origins (cofradías).57 They were configured as local mixed associations where both crew members and vessel owners were represented within a restricted geographical area, and they played an important role in terms of social support for fishers, fisheries management, commercialization and financing.58 They were not only associations linked by professional interests, they were also community and local organizations linked through family relations.

However, during the first decades of the twentieth century, positos had not been able to adapt to changes in the fisheries management system. They had been excluded from many decisions in favour of the growing role of the state, while the introduction of new technologies, such as trawling and engines in fishing vessels, had created internal divisions of interests. As a result, their role and representation in the fishing sector was already limited by the 1930s.59 When facing the class struggles that characterised the years prior to the military coup of 1936, these limitations only deepened.60 In parallel to positos, many other types of associations defending class or sectoral interests emerged from the 1900s onwards. These included employers’ associations and workers’ organizations (unions, cooperatives and brotherhoods, among many

53 S. Corazón, M. Ortega Cerda / Journal of Historical Geography 52 (2016) 26–35


48 See Texto taquigráfico de la conferencia pronunciada por el presidente del INI Excmo. Sr. Don Juan Antonio Suárez Fernández en la Escuela Superior del Ejército sobre el tema Autarquía, part I (11th June 1942), part II (12th June 1942), part III (17th June 1942) and part IV (23rd June 1942), Suárez Collections, Archive of Instituto Nacional de Industria [hereafter INI]. For a parallel analysis of Suárez’s views on autarky, see E. Barrera and E. San Román, Juan Antonio Suárez, adalid de la industrialización, in: Gómez Mendoza (Ed.), De Mitos y Milagros, 35–52.49

49 Texto taquigráfico, part I, 12–15, Suárez Collections, INI Archive.

50 For Italy, see Texto taquigráfico, part II, 20; part III, 15, 17; part IV, 32. For Germany, see part I, 5; part II, 23, 31; part III, 17, 27, 33–34; part IV, 18, 32. A few weeks before the battle of Stalingrad, Suárez referred to the future victory of the Axis as the victory of ‘our ideals’, see Texto taquigráfico, part II, 20, Suárez Collections, INI Archive. On the technical support of Axis countries, see Catalán, La Economía Española, 230–231.

51 San Román, Exército e Industria, 143–152.


53 Texto taquigráfico, part I, 15, 17, Suárez Collections, INI Archive.

54 Vivas, Guerra, Dinero, Dictadura, 216–217; Catalán, La Economía Española, 71–72.

55 A. Cervera, Análisis Estratégico de las Cofradías de Pescadores en el Marco de la Economía Social, PhD dissertation, 2006, University of Cádiz.


The military coup unleashed a fierce repression in the regions controlled by Franco. Following other Fascist regimes, all political parties except Falange were prohibited. All unions were forbidden and workers and employers were legally forced to join the so-called ‘vertical unions’. These changes had important consequences for the fisheries sector, since they forbade all unions and workers’ associations and threatened the confiscation of their properties. Many of their union leaders were murdered without trial, or persecuted and jailed due to their political activities. The precise number of deaths is unknown, but included a few hundred fishers in Galicia, with the national total probably reaching thousands. Freedom of the press was also abolished. On the other hand, some of the employers’ associations were allowed to continue their activity until they were included in the vertical unions.

Overall, the establishment of the Francoist dictatorship represented a major rupture for pósitos and for the entire structural organization of the fishing industry. All members were first required to support Franco’s regime. If their fidelity was not clear, they had to be replaced. A few years later, the cofradía laws of 21st March 1942 meant the formal end of the pósitos institution. All were reformed as cofradías and some important changes were introduced both to their structure and social role. In terms of the former, they became highly religious. They were forced to adopt as protectors La Virgen del Carmen – who was the patron saint of the navy – and the local patron saint. Fishing was forbidden on these saints’ days, and fishers were forced to organise public celebration events. Each cofradía was linked to a parish, and the priest was member of the cofradía directorship. Even more importantly, following the Fascist government structures, cofradías became part of the vertical union and thus were transformed into ‘public corporations’. As such, they became formally part of the state and were forced to follow national political directives and eradicate any space for class struggle.

In sum, and in disagreement with Francoist officials that emphasised continuities between pósitos and cofradías, the autarchic reforms that transformed these institutions began a long-lasting fracture in the trajectory and diversity of fishers’ organisations. By instituting cofradías as the only associations allowed, and by gluing them to national, municipal and religious structures, autarchic reforms cemented a geographical association between fishers, their fishing areas and the state. Therefore, in the same way that the Fascist discourse of ruralism blended peasants with land, autarchic reforms in the fishing sector merged fishers with coasts and in-shore fishing waters.

These connections between the Francoist discourses which romanticised peasant life and fishers’ life deserve attention. While discourses celebrating rural life have been identified as a characteristic feature of Fascist regimes — and have been studied in comparative perspective for Spain, Italy and Germany — the discourses and policies for fishers remain less well known. In this regard, however, the similarities between Salazar’s Estado Novo in Portugal and Francoist Spain have been underlined. During our period of study, the Instituto Social de la Marina (Navy Social Institute) was the institution in charge of social policies for fishers, under the control of the naval officer Díez de Rivera (Marquis of Valterra). As director of the institute, Díez de Rivera highlighted the religious character of Fascism. He regarded fishers as ignorant, simple people who had been misled by communists and anarchists before the war. To regain their minds, he believed that they had to be ‘attacked’ from the sentimental side. Accordingly, a central feature of the institute’s policies was the creation of casas del pescador (fishers’ homes), conceived as havens to keep temptations away and promote hygiene and education. Similar institutions had been created in Portugal under Salazar. In the Francoist newsreels of the 1940s we find other examples of these actions, such as public homages to old fishers, or events celebrating public housing being handed over in fishing villages.

Indeed, public housing became another symbol of Francoist social policy for fishers. In 1942, after two years collecting data, architects from Falange published a massive national plan for improving fishers’ housing that envisioned their villages as self-sufficient units. In the context of repression that we have presented, these planned towns exemplify the interwoven ideas of social control and economic self-sufficiency of the post-Civil War period. However, most of these housing projects, like other aspects of social policy, remained incomplete and would not receive resources until the 1950s and 1960s, when the original projects were significantly modified.

**Autarky and the military: the place of the fishing sector in the Francoist state**

Social purification and militarization were key parts of the autarkic transformation of the fishing sector in Spain. In the previous section we have seen how fishing associations were purged and workers persecuted. In the present section we address the transformation of the state administration of fisheries as a result of the autarkic project. As we will see, this process was supervised by military authorities who regarded the sector as strategic.

---


63 Pecharromán, *El Movimiento Nacional*.


65 Free unions in the fisheries sector remained banned until 1978. Still today, the cofradía status of ‘public corporations’ remains in the legislation. This represents an anomaly in comparison to other sectors, for example the agrarian sector equivalents — címaras agrarias — that lost this privileged situation a long time ago. See J. L. Alegret, Del corporativismo dirigista al pluralismo democrático: las cofradías de pescadores en Cataluña, *Revista ERES Serie Antropología* (1989) 161–172.


68 On the comparison with Italy and Germany, see G. Alares, Ruralism, fascism and regeneration. Italia y España en perspectiva comparada, *Ayer* 83 (2011) 127–147; D. Lanero, Sobre el encuadramiento de los campesinos y la agricultura en el tiempo de los fascismos: una comparación entre nazismo y franquismo, *Ayer* 83 (2011) 53–76.

69 P. Díez de Rivera, *La Riqueza Pesquera en España* (Madrid, 1940), 48–49.

70 P. Díez de Rivera, *La Riqueza Pesquera en España y las Cofradías de Pescadores* (Madrid, 1940), 31–53.


72 *Dirección General de Arquitectura, Plan Nacional de Mejoramiento de la Vivienda en los Poblados de Pescadores*, Madrid, 1942.
In order for the Francoist dictatorship to reorganise the state administration of fishing, it was first necessary to ensure the loyalty of civil servants by purging those who could not be trusted. However, in this case the process was supervised by the Ministry of Defence. Franco’s regime also created a fisheries service that belonged to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and was under Suanzes’ control. In 1939, a specific body to develop fisheries policies was created for the first time in the Spanish state administration. It was the Dirección General de Pesca Marítima (General Directorate of Marine Fisheries) (DGPM). Its dependent position within the Ministry of Industry and Trade was maintained during the entire period of study.74

Military presence was pervasive in the reorganised state administration. The DGPM was conceived as a civil-military body with responsibilities for fisheries management, fishing related industries and fisheries statistics. In fact, it was partly controlled by the Ministry of the Navy, which in agreement with the Ministry of Industry and Trade appointed the sub-secretary of fisheries. Only members of the navy could be elected for this position. Moreover, the Ministry of the Navy was directly in charge of many other marine administrative activities.75

This military-led repression, administrative purge and reorganisation demonstrate that fishing was not only regarded as a sector that could provide food in substitution for the agricultural sector. It also had strategic functions regarded as vital by the military, which meant that it needed to be kept under tight control. In the first place, the fishing and merchant fleet were conceived as a natural reserve for the navy in case of armed conflict. During the Civil War, fishing vessels had been useful as a support fleet, and Suanzes and other Francoist naval officers took note of it.76 As the Marquis of Valterra put it before the end of the war:

In reference to the armed fishing vessels, much can be learned from their current activities. In the future ... all new vessels should be authorised by the general staff of the Navy ... to ensure that they will be useful if needed at some point. Also fishermen ... should be trained to acquire the needed capacities.77

Archival sources support the connection between the fishing fleet and war in the reasoning of high military officials. In the first stages of the Second World War, one of Franco’s closest advisors, Luis Carrero Blanco, warned that in case of an open conflict with Great Britain fishing would be restricted. He not only highlighted the importance of fish as a foodstuff for Spain, but also underlined the connection of fishing with naval power. In case of war, one of Carrero’s suggestions was to arm fishing boats and transform the long-distance fishing fleet into anti-submarine vessels.78

In the second place, from the autarkic perspective the fishing fleet became part of the merchant fleet and therefore had to be ready to take charge of the transportation of raw materials. This subordination materialised in 1942 with the incorporation of the DGPM into the Subsecretaría de la Marina Mercante (Office of the Merchant Navy). Since Francoist military analysts saw Spain primarily as a peninsula with most of the threats coming by land from the Pyrenees, ensuring enough national merchant fleet capacity to transport raw materials by sea was considered a military priority.79 Moreover, from Suanzes’ point of view, this could be done by developing the national shipbuilding industry — a sector where INI also got involved — thus improving the capabilities of the Spanish navy.80 As we will see in the following section the expansive merchant marine policy based on these notions shaped the future of the Spanish fishing fleet.

Increasing national fishing capacity: the autarkic development of the Spanish fishing fleet

God placed us facing the seas and thus assigned us a marine duty .... [W]e accomplish it both when our merchant fleet ... sails the world and when our fishers, in the hardest of winters, face the raging seas to bring us the cherished fruit of its bosom.

Francisco Franco, 1947, Textos de Doctrina Política.81

On 2nd June 1939, the Francoist government published the Naval Credit Act, and later the same year the Protection and Reconstruction of the National Fleet Act. Both laws became the most important elements of public intervention in relation to the reconstruction of the merchant and fishing fleets and supported a significant expansion of Spanish fishing activities.82 The Naval Credit Act, later expanded and renewed, provided ample and cheap credit for ship renewal or the construction of new vessels, with loans up to sixty percent of the investment with very low interest rates (two percent) and repayment periods of up to twenty years. The law was embedded in the autarkic perspective in both discursive and practical terms. It stated the need to reconstruct both merchant and fishing fleets, underlined that they had to become auxiliary navy vessels, and thus conditioned projects to the navy’s approval. Autarkic economic justification was also present in the claim to use national vessels to transport raw materials in and out of Spain. Links with Fascist discourses regarding the imperial destiny of Spain were explicit in the law’s preface. Finally, it enacted that ships had to be built or modernised at national shipyards and that their crews had to be Spanish.83

By the end of 1939 the Second World War had started and fish

73 Aplicación normas depuración de funcionarios, letter signed by Pascual Díez de Rivera, 4th April 1939, Suanzes Collections, INI Archive.
75 Galindo, Giráldez and Varela, El sector pesquero. La administración pesquería, 365.
77 Hechos y consideraciones sobre la Ley de Crédito Naval, 25th August 1950, 1–2. Suanzes Collections, INI Archive.
78 Our translation, Díez de Rivera, La Riqueza Pesquera, 35.
79 See Consideraciones sobre un plan de operaciones marítimas en caso de intervención de España en la guerra, 11th November 1940, 5–6, B. Luis Carrero Blanco Collections, Archivo General de la Universidad de Navarra. Díez de Rivera, who had insisted in the military importance of fishing, also highlighted the relevance of fishing captures to make up for the lack of agricultural products. Consejo Técnico de Pesca. Session of 19th May 1945, 3. INI Archive.
80 Galindo, Giráldez and Varela, El sector pesquero. La administración pesquería, 365.
81 L. Carrero Blanco, España y el Mar, Madrid, 1941. For Suanzes, the issue of the merchant fleet ‘had to be addressed from “a military point of view”, Texto taquigráfico, part IV, 25–26. Suanzes Collections, INI Archive.
82 Hechos y consideraciones, 4, Suanzes Collections, INI Archive. One of the most important companies established by INI was Elcano, a national shipping company. See Valdálo, Programas navales y desarrollo económico, and J.M. Valdálo, La Empresa Nacional ‘Elcano’ de la Marina Mercante y la Actuación del INI en el Sector Naval durante la presidencia de J.A. Suanzes, Documento de trabajo 9802, Fundación Empresa Pública, Madrid, 1998.
83 Franco, Textos de Doctrina Política, 600.
85 See preface, articles 8 and 10, in Ley instituyendo un sistema de Crédito Naval, Boletín Oficial del Estado 158, 7th June 1939, 3107–3110. On the importance of naval credit for the fishing fleet, see Sinde, Expansión y modernización, 58–59, 64. On the use of naval credit for the merchant fleet, see Valdálo, La empresa nacional ‘Elcano’, 18–22.
prices were soaring. During the 1940s the combination of growing fish consumption, state controlled prices and the availability of credit boosted the fishing fleet. As a result, during the second part of the decade the fishing fleet recovered from the war and overcame the problems caused by the scarcity of certain materials (especially steel) and limited technological know-how (in relation to diesel engines, for example). Consequently, during the 1940s around 80,000 Gross Registered Tons were built, almost tripling the construction of the previous decade. In terms of beneficiaries of the Naval Credit Act it was the Spanish long-distance cod industry that benefited the most, once the Celtic Sea – the region of the Atlantic Ocean off the south coast of Ireland – and the Grand Banks of Newfoundland were reopened to Spanish fishing vessels after the Second World War. Cod fishing companies successfully captured the act’s resources to build Spain’s biggest fishing fleets. Indeed, this is not surprising if we take into consideration the Francoist authorities’ interest in substituting cod imports as part of their autarkic policies together with the navy’s desire to develop a long-distance merchant fleet for potential military purposes. In contrast, coastal and inshore fleets were ignored. 

Overcapacity soon created overfishing problems off the Spanish coasts. These were only partially addressed by limiting some trawling activities in the coastal waters and promoting new fishing areas. The broader environmental problems of overcapacity and overfishing, however, were never really taken into consideration. Suanzes’ retrospective analysis of the impact of the Naval Credit Act, conserved at INI’s archive, sheds light on the approach to this issue. Francoist officials did not analyse the impact of fleet growth on the fisheries sector itself, but they framed fishing vessels as part of the much bigger framework of the merchant fleet. More interestingly, Suanzes’ testimony shows that the analysis underlying the law was based on the carrying capacity of the merchant fleet, without any mention of fishing capacity. He also made it clear that the objectives and resources of the law were defined to increase naval construction as far as possible, in order to achieve the maximum amount of raw material transportation by the national fleet. The overcapacity of the fishing fleet, therefore, can be seen as ‘collateral damage’ from the enlargement of the merchant fleet. After the losses suffered during the Spanish Civil War, the fishing industry had called for vessel reconstruction with the support of the state. The construction push, however, caused fears that fish prices would fall due to overproduction, as had occurred in the early 1930s. Spanish fishing vessels might sail farther and increase captures, but what was to be done with all the fish? Thus, industry periodicals reacted by demanding the promotion of fish consumption, as did some Francoist officials.

Eat more, fish further!

The option to increase fishing capacity was only viable in an autarkic model if it was linked to growing national fish consumption, rising prices and/or an increase in exports. From an ecological perspective, an increase in fish availability had to be achieved too. In the short term this could only be accomplished by two means: better management of the current resources or an expansion of the fleet into new fishing areas. The latter, as we have seen, coincided with the ideological features of Falange and the importance they assigned to the sea.

The Francoist state administration tried to develop several strategies with different levels of success. Regarding internal consumption, there was a constant call by the industry and relevant fisheries officials to promote fish consumption, as had been done in Nazi Germany. Eating more fish was presented as a way of supporting fishers and ‘contributing to the fatherland’. At the same time, in order to increase profits by using previously discarded parts of the catch, new fish products were researched, such as fish sausages. Nevertheless, we have not found proof of any commercialization of these products, apart from an exchange of letters between Suanzes and one producer, as late as 1951. A relevant policy that was developed by INI was the creation in 1949 of a national network of refrigerators to improve distribution. In the end, in a context of lack of meat and relatively cheaper prices of fish, consumption increased significantly during our period of study, growing from 13.9 kg/person/year in 1929–1934 to 17.72 in 1939–1948.

Prices were fixed for pelagic species, which ensured very good revenues for the industrial sector in years with high captures. In 1941, new food policies imposed controls on canned fisheries production. This regulation required producers to sell sixty percent of the production at lower prices for the internal market, while the other forty percent could be exported at an extremely high price. These exports were limited to the Axis nations as part of Francoist political alliances. This intervention severely limited the profit margins for each produced tonne. Consequently, in order to maintain economic returns, these policies provided incentives for the expansion of the fishing fleet into new areas, particularly when sardine captures decreased in 1941–1942.

86 On fish consumption, see Piqueró and López, El consumo de pescado en España, 5–6.
89 Suanzes specifically referred to cod and the military role of the merchant fleet in his 1942 speeches about autarky. On cod, see Texo taquigrafo, part II, 5, 8–9; on the merchant fleet, see Texo taquigrafo, part IV, 25–26. Suanzes Collections, INI Archive. The Spanish substitution of cod imports significantly affected traditional exporters to Spain, like Iceland. See A. Yraola, La repercusion de la Guerra Civil Española en los países nórdicos con especial referencia a Islandia, 1936–39, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea 16 (1994) 131–149.
90 Sinde, Díezeg and Guernonde, Spain’s fisheries sector, 367. On the eve of the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish fishing sector was composed of steamers (almost 50% of Gross Registered Tons), sailing (30%) and motor vessels (20%). This last sector would expand significantly during the 1940s and 1950s. The main Spanish fishing ports were in Galicia and the Basque country, and their main fishing zones were coastal areas, Bay of Biscay, Africa and the Canary Islands. See Amorim and López, The fisheries of the Iberian Peninsula, 273.
91 Hechos y consideraciones, 4–5, 8–10, 24, Suanzes Collections, INI Archive.
92 See, for instance, La flota y la economía pesquera: recuperación, reconstrucción y control, Industrias Pesqueras 268 (1938) 8–9. On the losses suffered during the war, see Díez de Rivera, La Riqueza Pesquera, 34.
93 El desequilibrio entre la producción y el consumo, Industrias Pesqueras 308 (1940) 3. See also Lledó, La Pesca Nacional, 104.
95 Díez de Rivera, La Riqueza Pesquera, 27, 45, 52. Sparenberg, Perception and use, 98–101.
96 Díez de Rivera, La Riqueza Pesquera, 54.
97 La salchicha de pescado, alimento del porvenir, Industrias Pesqueras 353 (1942) 13; Los desperdicios de los grandes peces. Su tratamiento, previa clasificación. Industrias Pesqueras 359 (1942) 29.
98 Letter of Javier Sensat to Juan Antonio Suanzes (1st December 1951) and reply (7th December 1951), Suanzes Collections, INI Archive.
100 Piqueró and López, El consumo de pescado en España, 6.
In line with autarkic perspectives, the geographical expansion of the fleet was also promoted. Since the Second World War had temporarily closed off the Spanish fleet’s traditional access to European waters and the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, the state administration and the industry were forced to explore other territories. They even attempted, with little success, to promote substitute species, like corvina (Johnius regius) from African waters, for non-available ones, like cod. Similar strategies of species substitution were also tested in Nazi Germany as part of the autarkic project. At the time, Africa and African waters were seen as a ‘European extension’ in the Axis view of a future European autarkic economy. In line with this view, Francoist officials regarded Spanish colonies (Morocco and Guinea) as complements to the autarkic efforts.

The defeat of the Axis powers did not substantially change Spanish views regarding colonial fisheries. Archival data shows how in 1945 the Instituto Social de la Marina and the Dirección General de Marruecos y Colonias (General Directorate of Morocco and Colonies) requested INI to establish a public company to exploit the African-Canarian fisheries. The records from INI meetings discussing this proposal show how the Francoist government declined all permits for fishing activities by other nations and reinforced its own research on fishing opportunities in this area. Two years later, Industrias Pesqueras Africanas, S.A. (African Fishing Industries, S.A. [IPASA]) was founded. Among its objectives were typical colonialist aims such as spreading so-called ‘civilizing activity’ in Spanish colonies. In Franco’s speech at a visit to IPASA in 1950 he reminded factory workers that Spain was a colonizing country and emphasised its historical fishing rights in the region.

After the Second World War, the need to increase captures was rendered more acute by the increased fishing capacity that political reforms had produced. During the years 1945–1947, the Bay of Biscay and the recovered stocks of the Celtic Sea were the main target of the growing Spanish fleet. After two strong years of overfishing, the Celtic Sea stock collapsed and the Spanish fleet reacted by moving to the less exploited resources of Newfoundland, where cod was relatively abundant. However, unlike the optimistic comic’s representation of cod abundance presented at the beginning of this article, the seas were not entirely filled, nor were their fruits inexhaustible. Ironically, precisely when the Francoist state started dismantling autarkic regulations after the 1950s, the Spanish long-range cod fleet was eventually able to substitute out cod imports. However, in the long term, this expansion also contributed to severe ecological damage.

Conclusions

In the present paper we have explored the reforms of the Spanish fishing sector during the first years of the Francoist dictatorship by focusing on the notion of autarchy/autarky. Following the history of science literature, we defined autarky as a dual concept merging self-rule with self-sufficiency. On this basis we have followed the thread of repression and militarization within autarkic social forms, the reorganisation of state administration and the plans to expand the fishing fleet in order to reach self-sufficiency in fish consumption. In the fishing sector, autarkic reforms aimed at increasing fish captures to make up for decreasing agrarian and meat supplies. However, the military purposes of expansion were interwoven with economic aims. In our analysis, autarky emerges as much more than a policy of import substitution: it was a political-economic project necessarily involving social repression. It was, in Suanzes’ words, ‘a weapon’.

The social and industrial transformation fostered by the more Fascist-influenced years of the Francoist dictatorship shaped many features of the fishing sector for the subsequent decades. The fishing and merchant sectors were especially controlled by the military because they were regarded as strategic. Nowadays, the consequences of the autarkic reforms are still palpable. On one hand, the long-term impact of repression – four decades without fishing unions – and the continued privileged legal status of cofradias contribute to explain the low level of union activities in the small-scale fisheries. This situation is different in the case of industrial fisheries and the processing industry where cofradias did not play such an important role and unions have recovered from Franco’s repression. In small-scale fisheries unions have only recently started to reemerge along with new fishers’ associations that defend sectoral interests and not only territorial ones, bringing together, for example, fishers who still use artisanal methods.

Regarding the capacity of the Spanish fishing fleet for fulfilling national consumption and promoting exports – that is, the self-sufficiency element of autarky – it is important to note that a clear subjugation of fishing policies to naval construction policies took place for the first time during this period. The expansion of the merchant fleet, firmly supported by the military, led to an uncontrolled expansion of fishing capacity. A similar trend was repeated after 1961 with the creation of the Fleet Protection and Renewal Act, which provided credit without proper environmental and economic assessments, and thus launched the third expansion of the Spanish fleet that ended with important fishing overcapacity problems that still remain today in some parts of the fleet.

However, as we have argued in this paper, the basis for this had been set in 1939.

Together with these two long-term consequences of autarkic policies, the pervasive presence of the military and its intimate relationship with the ideology of the regime emerges as a central point of our research. Firstly, because it shaped the technical characteristics of the fishing fleet’s enlargement, subordinating it to the needs of the navy. And secondly, because autarkic fishing policies reflected the ideology of a Spanish Fascism that dreamt of a new imperial Spain and thus celebrated geographical expansion, despite the apparent contradiction with the autarkic ideals. Therefore, it is

103 Sparenberg, Perception and use, 94–96.
104 See, for instance, Suanzes, ‘La pesca en España’.
107 Consejo Técnico de Pesca. Session of 19th May 1945. INI Archive.
108 Barceló, La intervención del estado, 136–139.
110 Sinde, Diéguez and Gueimonde, Spain’s fisheries sector, 364. The failed attempts to find substitutes for cod in Africa and the previous knowledge about Newfoundland’s fisheries are among the reasons for this reaction. See Amorim and López, The fisheries of the Iberian Peninsula, 257.
111 Texto taquiográfico, part I, 15, 17. Suanzes Collections, INI Archive.
not strange that the expansion of the fishing fleet first paid attention to the waters of North Africa, near the Spanish colonies, and later turned to Newfoundland. In the fishing sector, Spanish autarky turned into an expansive ecological project, increasing the fleet and sailing to reap the ‘unclaimed latifundium’ of the open seas.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Daniel Banoub, Ignasi Puig, Irmak Ertör, Melissa García-Lamarca, David Saurí and Marco Armiero for their comments on earlier versions of the manuscript. We are also grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for providing extensive and constructive comments. Research for this paper benefited from EC funding under the Marie Curie Actions — Initial Training Networks — FP7 — PEOPLE — 2011; Contract no. 289374 — “ENTITLE”.

Santiago Gorostiza is a PhD candidate trained both as an Environmental Scientist and as a Historian. He investigates socioenvironmental conflicts during the Spanish Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship. His research interests include urban geography, the environmental history of war and the role of historical research in political ecology.

Miquel Ortega has a PhD in Environmental Sciences. He co-founded and is a member of Serveis de Suport a la Gestió and Fundació ENT. He is also a researcher in the Environmental Science and Technology Institute of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His main areas of interest are fisheries policies, political ecology and environmental justice.