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# NATO: UPHOLDING CIVILISATION, PROTECTING INDIVIDUALS

The unconscious dimension of International Security

Tese de doutoramento em Relações Internacionais – Política Internacional e Resolução de Conflitos, orientada por

Prof. Doutor José Manuel Pureza e Prof. Doutor André Barrinha, e apresentada à

Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra

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Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra para  
obtenção do grau de Doutor

Orientadores: Prof. Doutor José Manuel Pureza e Prof. Doutor André Barrinha

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## Resumo

Esta tese desenvolve uma análise crítica da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN), que se insere no campo dos estudos críticos sobre segurança. São dois os objetivos fundamentais a que se propõe: por um lado, inovar o debate conceptual sobre a história da organização; por outro, desconstruir os processos psicossociais inerentes aos significados predominantes e instituídos na segurança internacional contemporânea. Este trabalho é motivado por uma preocupação epistemológica essencial relativamente à forma como o conhecimento hegemónico tem moldado não só perceções e representações coletivas do mundo, como também tem influenciado o seu devir. Esta preocupação prende-se em particular com o impacto que formas inconscientes de conhecimento podem exercer sobre as leituras e práticas predominantes da segurança internacional contemporânea. A análise tem por objeto de estudo a OTAN, no seio da qual é investigada a dimensão inconsciente do conhecimento em relação à segurança internacional. Questiona-se em que medida processos inconscientes podem estar envolvidos na aparente naturalidade com que o objecto referente de segurança da OTAN – aquilo que pretende securizar – evoluiu. Especificamente, este estudo considera a relação entre a segurança da civilização e a segurança dos indivíduos, tal como têm sido conceptualizadas e postas em prática ao longo da evolução da OTAN. De que forma as prioridades da OTAN passaram de uma preocupação original para com a “civilização dos seus povos” em 1949, para a proteção dos indivíduos depois da Guerra Fria? Como é que estes dois referentes substancialmente diferentes foram coabitando no seio da Aliança? Quer enquanto conceito, quer enquanto narrativa, a civilização tem sido abordada de forma superficial pela literatura existente sobre a OTAN. Em consequência, esta tese sugere uma historicização e uma genealogia de ambos estes referentes de segurança da Aliança, com base numa análise discursiva crítica. Assim, é privilegiada uma abordagem de longa duração dos processos complexos que têm estado silenciosamente ancorados no inconsciente do mundo, e que vão para além da defesa e da segurança do imediato. Através de uma abordagem interdisciplinar que incorpora teorias e conceitos de áreas como a história, sociologia, psicologia social e psicanálise, são desenvolvidos dois argumentos interdependentes. Primeiramente, a conceptualização do “Sujeito Civilizado de Segurança” mostra que a civilização do Ocidente consiste num processo psicossocial que tem produzido de forma consistente sujeitos civilizados e seguros em redor do mundo. Este processo depende de uma

necessidade ontológica que os indivíduos têm de segurança, que advém de motivos psicanalíticos e simbólicos profundos, segurança sem a qual eles não podem formar-se e reproduzir-se enquanto sujeitos civilizados ao longo do espaço e do tempo. O inconsciente dos sujeitos civilizados do Ocidente tem sido o fio condutor dos significados e percepções intemporais de segurança que permitem que o Ocidente domine a segurança internacional. Este primeiro argumento fundamenta o segundo, nomeadamente, o Sujeito Civilizado de Segurança que está no cerne do Ocidente é o pilar que sustenta a implementação da Individualização da Segurança pela OTAN. A Individualização da Segurança afirmou-se como um processo transformativo da segurança internacional no pós-Guerra Fria, através do qual a civilização ocidental pôde preservar-se e prosseguir no campo da segurança internacional. Com efeito, as políticas de segurança centradas no indivíduo têm sido aplicadas enquanto parte de um processo civilizador de estados não ocidentais, porque têm procurado instigar mudanças específicas de comportamento e de pensamento securitário que visam gerar sujeitos civilizados e seguros fora da área original do Tratado do Atlântico Norte.

**Palavras-chave:** OTAN – Sujeito Civilizado de Segurança – civilização ocidental – Individualização da Segurança – inconsciente.

## **Abstract**

This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the North Atlantic Alliance Organisation (NATO) within the field of critical security studies, fundamentally aiming at two concurring goals: innovating the conceptual reflection on the history of the organisation; and deconstructing the psychosocial processes underlying the establishment of prevailing meanings in contemporary international security. It is motivated by a fundamental epistemological concern over how hegemonic forms of knowledge have shaped not only collective perceptions and representations of the world, but also how they have influenced their very becoming. This concern is related particularly to the impact unconscious forms of knowledge may have on the prevailing readings and practices of contemporary international security. The analysis focuses on NATO as an object of study, in which the unconscious dimension of knowledge is fundamentally questioned and searched for in relation to international security. It interrogates to what extent the seemingly natural evolution of NATO's referent object of security – what it aims at securing – may be framed by unconscious processes. This study specifically looks at the relation between the security of civilisation and the security of individuals, as they have been conceptualised and practiced throughout NATO's evolution. How did NATO's priorities evolve from a seminal concern toward the “civilisation of its people” in 1949, to the protection of individuals after the Cold War? How have these two substantially different referents cohabited throughout NATO's evolution? As both the concept and the narrative on civilisation have been superficially approached in current analyses of NATO, this dissertation suggests a historicisation and a genealogy of both referents of security of the Alliance, drawing on a critical discursive analysis. By doing this, it enhances the importance of a long duration approach of complex processes that have been silently anchored in the unconscious of the world, and that actually go beyond the defense and security of the immediate. Through an interdisciplinary approach that incorporates theories and concepts from areas such as history, sociology, social psychology and psychoanalysis, two interrelated arguments are developed. First, the conceptualisation of the “Civilised Subject of Security” shows that the civilisation of the West has consisted of a psychosocial process consistently producing civilised and secure subjects around the world. This process has relied on an ontological need individuals have for security, which draws on deep psychoanalytic and symbolic reasons, and without which they cannot be produced and

reproduced as civilised subjects across space and time. Thus, the unconscious of Western civilised subjects has been the thread holding the timeless meanings and perceptions of security that enables the West to dominate international security. This first claim sustains the second; namely, the Civilised Subject of Security at the core of the West is the basis supporting NATO's particular endorsement of the Individualisation of Security as a transformative process of post-Cold War international security, through which Western civilisation has been upheld and continued in the field of international security. Thus, individual-centred security policies have been enacted as part of the civilising process of non-Western states, because they have sought to instil specific transformations of behaviour and security rationales that aim at producing secure civilised subjects out of the original North-Atlantic area.

**Keywords:** NATO – Civilised Subject of Security – Western civilisation – Individualisation of Security – unconscious

## **List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

BH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEE	Central and East European
DoD	US Department of Defense
EU	European Union
IFOR	Implementation Force
IR	International Relations
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SG	Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA/ US	United States of America
USSR	Soviet Union
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War



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## INTRODUCTION

### *Context and Subject*

Les homes ont toujours eu l'impression, en vivant leur temps, d'en saisir le déroulement au jour le jour. [...] L'histoire a eu l'illusion, elle, de tout tirer des événements. Plus d'un de nos contemporains croirait volontiers que tout est venu des accords de Yalta ou de Potsdam [...]. L'histoire inconsciente se déroule au delà de ces lumières, de leurs flashes. [...] Chacun de nous a le sentiment, au delà de sa propre vie, d'une histoire de masse dont il reconnaît mieux, il est vrai, la puissance et les poussées que les lois ou la direction (Braudel, 1958 : 740).<sup>1</sup>

Humans are historical beings in many ways. We praise the history of our past as a species, which we learn at school through the history of events and individual figures. We may praise the very personal history of families and their generations, or even the history of the future we do not even realize we may be contributing to. We can also crave for fiction stories that make us reflect on, and idealise the world. There are indeed different complex layers composing the importance history conveys to us, and each one gives a critical and defining sense to the perception of who we are, where we come from, what we have done collectively as “Humanity”, and where we would like to get to, both as individuals and as a part of the world.

The above-quoted historian Fernand Braudel (1958) speaks of the “unconscious history” – *l'histoire inconsciente* – that is, the history that overcomes the duration of a single event in the most transcendent ways, and carries with it some imperceptible meanings that travel across time. This invisible and latent form of history suggests that we have an unconscious perception of who we are, and of what we are doing, independently of our specific temporal location. However, this unconsciousness mostly relates to the perspective of short duration, i.e., of “micro-time” (Braudel, 1958: 739), as short-term insights may veil our awareness in perceiving history more widely. This implies, on the contrary, that when we think of history in macro-time, or longer duration, the perception

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<sup>1</sup> Free translation of the author: “Men have always had the impression, while living their time, that they are seizing it as it progresses, one day after the other. [...] History has had the illusion of taking everything from events. Now, in our contemporaneity, many would gladly believe that everything came from the agreements of Yalta or Potsdam [...]. The unconscious history rolls beyond those lights, beyond those flashes. [...] Each one of us has the transcendent awareness of a mass history, whose force we recognise better than the laws or direction” (Braudel, 1958: 740).

we have of it is rather conscious. Or, as suggested by Reinhart Koselleck (2004) in *Futures Past: on the semantics of historical time*:

There certainly are also structures which are so enduring that they remain for contemporaries part of the unconscious or the unknown, or whose transformation is so slow that it escapes their awareness. In these cases, only social science or history as a science of the past can provide information that goes beyond the perceptible experience of given generations (Koselleck, 2004: 108).

The present research arises from a fundamental concern over how hegemonic forms of knowledge have shaped not only collective perceptions and representations of the world and its history in a way that dismisses the importance of this unconscious history, but also how they have influenced their very becoming. More specifically, this concern is related to the direct impact those forms of knowledge may have on the prevailing readings and practices of contemporary international security. The work undertaken in this research focuses on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as an object of study, in which the unconscious dimension of history is fundamentally questioned and searched for in relation to international security.

The pertinence of NATO to this endeavour draws upon the fact that alliances use to be temporary and last only as long there is a specific threat to combat (Wendt, 1994). Yet, that is not NATO's case, for it has evolved from an alliance into a community, and also from focusing on one specific *threat* to unspecific *risks* (Adler, 2008; Coker, 2002; Mozaffari, 2002: 30; NATO, 1991). In fact, it has managed to overcome its original compromise towards the safeguard of the *civilisation of its people* (NATO, 1949), up until the more contemporary point of committing to protecting *individuals* outside its original area of intervention (NATO, 2011). Therefore, this study interrogates to what extent the seemingly natural evolution of NATO's referent object of security – what it aims at securing – may be framed by unconscious processes.<sup>2</sup>

The overall objective is to understand in more depth the dynamics composing the still underexplored relationship within security studies, and more broadly within International Relations (IR), between the idea of civilisation and the place of individuality in it.<sup>3</sup> This will be done by making visible how the security of civilisation and the

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<sup>2</sup> The referent object of security consists of the designated object to be secured by a given security policy, deemed to be under threat. It may be either a global referent object, such as an economic regime or the environment, but also a specific community, state or region (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 12-13).

<sup>3</sup> This point will be further developed in the State of the Art section.

Individualisation of Security have been (interrelatedly) conceptualised and practiced throughout NATO's evolution. The goal of this conceptual and practical confrontation is to display an interdisciplinary interpretation – IR, political science, sociology, security studies, history, philosophy, psychology – of the actual importance of the individual to the becoming of human societies, as well as the importance of structural action upon this very becoming.

### The Research Puzzle

The starting conjectures of this research are inspired by assumptions both on the West and on NATO that interrelate important questions of history, power, identity and knowledge. One is David Gress' thick work *From Plato to NATO: the idea of the West and its opponents* (1998), according to which there has been a Grand Narrative of the West that is based on an "Allied scheme of history", explaining that when NATO was born, it cut off Eastern Europe from the West and ignored religion and any history that did not fit into the simple "Plato-to-NATO" scheme of constant improvement. Focusing on NATO's post-Cold War discourse, Andreas Behnke (2013) has assumed that NATO's persistence after the Cold War has depended on the Alliance's ability to discursively produce a geo-cultural space called the West. Another assumption of the same tone is found in Jacinta O'Hagan's conception (2002: 8) that NATO is the most prominent example of a formal alliance that uses and refers to the West as a "civilisational identity":

[a] **form of identity** which locates the immediate ethnic or national community within the context of a **broader, cultural community**, a transnational community, often **extensive in geographical and temporal scope**. A civilizational identity might be perceived as encompassing a multiplicity of languages, ethnicities, religious denominations, but **united by some elementary shared histories, traditions, values and beliefs**. These **influence the way people believe the world should be**, the goals that should be striven for and, perhaps more fundamentally, the things that are at stake. It may also **influence perceptions** of what is the **acceptable mode of conduct in the global arena**. Civilizational identity may be perceived as important in helping to form values, priorities, goals and norms. In this respect, a civilizational identity provides the opportunity for membership of a **normative community**, one that is **not necessarily fixed, but capable of change, evolution, diversity and even inconsistency!** Civilizational identities can be employed by states but do not constitute the totality of state identities. [...] Civilizational identities may be an aspect of national or state identity, but they locate the state or nation in a much **broader imagined community** (O'Hagan, 2002: 11-12; emphasis added).

These propositions have important implications. On the one hand, Gress points to the existence of a Grand Narrative in the West that is anterior to NATO, that comes from distant classical times, and that sustains certain forms of social relations based on “allied schemes” (Gress, 1998). When it comes to NATO’s formation, this allied rationale translates into essentially exclusionary practices, meaning that other non-Western histories and identities were left aside in order to convey a sense of evolutionary improvement focused exclusively on the West as a motor of positive change. As a consequence, the prevailing contemporary knowledge of the West would be influenced by a sense that social relations there follow a stable and linear improvement among essentially identical units, of which NATO is the ultimate contemporary example.

On the other hand, O’Hagan’s (2002) conception of a civilisational identity of the West, used and performed by NATO, involves a series of metaphysical elements that compose a sense of community and membership, transcending time and space. These may include multiple biological factors such as language or ethnicity. But on the international level, they unite into the same core of metaphysical bonds, to encompass shared representations of the world, values, beliefs, priorities, way of living, perceptions, symbols, modes of behaving and expectations. These ultimately compose the sense of security as defined by Peter Burgess (2011) – Burgess’ conception of security as a metaphysical system of values will be explored in more depth in Part 1.

However, these universalistic expressions of Western commonality are problematic, as they convey an evolutionary linearity among a set of seemingly immutable, yet complex, factors. Indeed, it has been argued by Nuno Severiano Teixeira and Daniel Marcos (2016: 9-10) that the history of the Atlantic area shows that the Atlantic is “[s]till a heterogeneous and divided region”, and that considering it otherwise would be “naïve”, despite its increasing interdependence across time. Is the history of the West *that* predictable and constant that NATO could arise as a natural by-product of the conscious will and beliefs of all the civilised identities of the West? To what extent are the representations of Selfhood and Otherness that consistent?

Heidrun Friese (2006: 298) has referred to three complex dimensions composing the notion of “cultural identity”: (1) the unchangeable structure of things, that which is seen to constitute the nature, or the essence, of things across time and historical transformations; (2) the relations human beings have with themselves and others, involving their intentions, actions, experiences, dreams and memories, although “‘selfhood’ might have been cast throughout history; (3) the historical references to shifting relations between human beings, to concepts of belonging, and a common and shared (symbolic) world, values and language, an inclusive ‘We’ differing from an exclusive ‘Them’.

Put in other words, the civilisational identity as defined by O’Hagan (2002) and the civilisational sense of history as conceived by Gress (1998) are cultural, as they display the same basic feature of a transcendent sense of naturalness across time, defining both Selfhood and Otherness around a core of metaphysical elements. Globally, these considerations on the West do not bring much tangibility to the matter. More importantly, they reinforce the need to question the presence of an unconscious dimension in the perception of the West as a civilisation. To what extent does this unconscious dimension of knowledge, with its latent and invisible meanings, influence the contemporary sense of international security as conveyed by NATO?

First, NATO is a political and military alliance, whose chief goals consist of the collective defence of its members. In the preamble NATO’s founding treaty, it is thus established that the Parties

[a]re determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (NATO, 1949).

In this statement, the referent object of the Alliance’s action – what is to be secured – is clearly collective, and united by a shared representation of history and civilisation. *Ab origine* and formally, NATO’s *raison d’être* does not seem to depend on a conceptual category such as the *individual*. “Individual liberty” is indeed mentioned, but it still appears as a valuing principle of a collective referent. “Civilisation” surges as the primordial referent of the defensive and protective mission that the new alliance was committing to (NATO, 1949). As in any other international organisation, NATO’s mission and identity from then on would depend on the strength of the concepts, ideas and norms used to formulate its existence. Throughout sixty years of existence, NATO has crossed two distinct ideological eras, each one with a different influence on the geopolitical



division of the world. It also had to respond and adapt to deep questioning periods from the international community (Barany and Rauchhause, 2011; Kay, 1998; Zorgbibe, 2002).

Again, NATO is a political and military organisation that primarily exists to promote the defence and security of the “civilisation of its people”. It is noteworthy that NATO was not proposing to safeguard the *existence* of its people, but rather their very *attributes*, which it identifies as “liberty”, a “common heritage”, and “civilisation”. If, to NATO, these very attributes precede the importance of the people’s very existence, then the existence of the people ultimately depends on the safeguard of those attributes. Therefore, if the people of the North Atlantic Treaty see themselves deprived of their liberty, and if their common heritage and civilisation are somehow destroyed, will they cease to exist? The physical integrity of a human collective may tragically subsist, even though it does not enjoy liberty. Transcontinental slavery is an example that marks the history of many Western countries between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Besides, can a human collective endure if its common heritage, or civilisation, disappears? As the extinction of ancient civilisations shows, individual elements may survive physically, but not the *idea*, the *identity* of the collective they belong to, with all its specific anthropological characteristics – social organisation, natural and food resources management, relational dynamics, etc. Extinguished ancient civilisations subsist today mainly in historical memory and material remains.

Therefore, one may assume that NATO’s primordial referent of security, that is, what was decisive for the organisation to emerge, and what it aims at defending and protecting, consists of the attributes it identifies as being vital. NATO’s referent of security consists of a metaphysical entity that overcomes all institutional models, boundaries, specific historical temporalities, because it refers to such a broad idea as civilisation. It refers in fact to a “civilisational identity” (O’Hagan, 2002). Although specific values such as democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are evoked, they do emerge in a position that is subordinated to that of civilisation as its foundation, as guiding norms for the execution of civilisational defence. Therefore, and in the light of the premise that security has become a metaphysical field (Burgess, 2011), characterising most of inter-institutional and interpersonal relations of the twentieth century, NATO constitutes an object of study of excellence. It is thus a product of the West, declaredly oriented at protecting the civilisation of the North-Atlantic people (NATO, 1949).

The concept of civilisation has no unanimous definition. Many authors from diverse fields such as history, sociology, cultural studies, or security studies, have attempted to defend their view of what civilisation means and entails by: (a) reconstituting the origins of civilisation as a term and idea, as well as its evolution through time (Elias, 1989; Braudel, 1989); (b) debating whether civilisation should be conceived in the singular or plural, i.e., whether we should think of one single civilisation as supreme and absolute condition or entity, or multiple interdependent civilisations that coexist (Arnason, 2003; Cox, 2002b; Delanty, 2006a; Eisenstadt, 2003); (c) exploring the civilisational evolution of different regions of the world, as well as the criteria required in order to be considered civilised – the prevailing “standard of civilisation” (Behnam, 2002; Bowden, 2002; Donnelly, 1998; Duara, 2001; Gong, 2002; Mozaffari, 2002).

However, Norbert Elias (1989; 1990) and Fernand Braudel (1989) provide two main approaches that are very influential in contemporary literature on civilisation. Together, they provide a preliminary idea of some of the deepest implications of working on the concept of civilisation. To Norbert Elias (1989; 1990), the West is self-conscious of its civilisation, in the sense that its elites have a sense of superiority developing since the eighteenth century – Elias’ theory of the civilising process will be explored in more detail in Part 1. That superiority seems to come from a Western society that is composed of politicised individuals, who possess structures of *civilité* and *politesse*, i.e., good manners that were progressively acquired and that act as antecedents of the very term “civilisation”. According to Elias, conceiving that a civilisation might *evolve* – i.e. conceiving a “civilising *process*” – depends on normative changes, for new priorities and forms of valuation need to overcome previous norms, and prevail over them.

The other influential work on civilisation is provided by Fernand Braudel’s broader conception of civilisation as simultaneously a geographical space, a society, an economy, and collective mentality (1989: 39-43). Braudel also introduces an important element in his conception, which is temporality. He argues that civilisations manifest both in short-term daily practices – as in a scientific discovery, a successful book, or going to the theatre – and in trends that remain longer in time, ending up by being interiorised as unconscious and irreplaceable values. To Braudel, current civilisations are the continuity of a certain past kept alive (1989: 39).

Civilisation is both a conscious and unconscious phenomenon, as it lies in complex ways between the self-conscious representation of a particular entity such as the West, and the unconscious knowledge, or interiorisation, of timeless values and perceptions. Hence, when NATO (1949) evoked the defence and permanence of a civilisation in its founding treaty, it was not only referring to the safeguard of a shared historical past, of a series of political achievements, of a mentality, a specific vision of the world, a cultural and identity bound, as it was also referring to a normative *acquis*. In turn, this *acquis* is the contemporary result of a gradual evolution of persons and ideas, from the past to the moment of NATO's emergence as an organisation. By doing this primordial and defining reference to civilisation, NATO correlated another fundamental idea, that is, security (Coker, 2002). NATO's relation to civilisation is thus simultaneously one of *representation*, in that it embodies the civilisation of one region of the world, and also a relation of *operationalisation*, as a tool *of* and *for* civilisational defence.

In this study, NATO's primordial relation to civilisation is confronted to the most decisive and influential normative trend in post-Cold War international security, which I term the "Individualisation of Security". The expression "Individualisation of Security" *per se* should not be interpreted as a naïve or simplistic apology of the individual; it is rather used to describe the political process of transformative discourses and practices using individualistic valuations of human societies in relation to the state. As it will be seen, the Individualisation of Security consists of the new visibility given by political actors to a referent object of security other than the state, i.e., the individual. Progressively, the Individualisation of Security has re-oriented security policies and their related discourses and rationales from the state to the individual. Furthermore, it also expresses a tangible security practice, from the moment it determines how security policies are directed, involving not only its referent object, as its subject of security as well (Booth, 2005; Walker, 1997).<sup>4</sup>

Conceptually, this trend emerging after the Cold War was associated to the notions of "human security", "humanitarianism", and "human development", because of the actions undertaken by international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). These entities gradually internalised in their discourses and

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<sup>4</sup> The "subject of security" is the actual and practical recipient of a given security policy, independently of its referent object.

policies the idea that protecting individual lives should come first, or before the state (Kaldor et al., 2004; UNDP, 1994). Those notions were indeed very well received and adopted in the codes of conduct of many international organisations, NGO's, and foreign policies of some states such as Canada, Norway and Japan – in particular human security (Ramel, 2003; Suhrke, 1999). Along this line, in 2001, the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was also formulated in the reports of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001), and endorsed as a doctrine at the UN World Summit in 2005 by UN member states. R2P has offered a more institutional expression to some unanimous yet non-binding premises articulated around the responsibility to protect the populations from top four inhumane crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This overall movement thus followed the norm “life cycle” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), as we may verify the emergence of the norm, its acceptance and internalisation.<sup>5</sup> Security was therefore *individualised* through a normative change in the way of thinking and practising security, by focusing on the argument in favour of protecting the individual in contexts of violence, repression, or persecution by a state.

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<sup>5</sup> Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998: 895-896) define the three stages of the norm “life cycle”. First is “norm emergence”, then “norm cascade”, and third internalisation.

Within NATO, the Individualisation of Security was put into practice since its military participation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) between 1992 and 1995, and opened a precedent for ulterior humanitarian interventions. This normative transformation was significant to the Alliance, and served the purpose of its institutional reinvention after the Cold War. With its intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NATO definitely reinforced the importance of individual security in its discourses, as well as human security and human rights. This represents a move from the idea of collective defence that prevailed in the strategic conception of NATO operations during the Cold War to global security (ICISS, 2001; Whitman, 2000). More recently, NATO's intervention in Libya was justified by a reiterated concern over deterring the attacks of Muammar Gadhafi's regime on civilians (NATO, 2011), legally drawing on the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) Resolutions 1970, 1973 and 2009. In this context, the numerous references to "the protection of civilians" showed and reaffirmed the Alliance's penchant towards humanitarian interventions, guided by ethical and moral purposes, and a specific mandate to that end (NATO, 2011).

More broadly, the Individualisation of Security suggests the rising of a cosmopolitan consciousness, in which the realisation of human interdependence, or interconnectedness, leads states to act in territories other than their own, in a sort of decentralising process of the original monopolistic state. In theory, a new norm does not necessarily imply that it is automatically opted, for it must compete with pre-existing norms, in a political process in which forms of power and coalitions intertwine (Jepperson et al., 1996). However, the life cycle of the Individualisation of Security indicates that there has been a transformation of behaviour in both individuals and international society, whereby humanitarian reasoning seems to have taken predominance in the decade following the end of the Cold War. Indeed, in the period between the end of the Cold War and the international military presence in Afghanistan after 9/11, the Individualisation of Security has produced a general discourse of discipline and normalisation, according to which a political-military conduct respective of individuals was progressively assumed to be natural for all states.

So, once again, the motivation of this research is to understand how two different referents of security – civilisation and the individual – relate in the evolution of an organisation that was created to uphold the security of Western states. How have these two substantially different referents cohabited throughout NATO's evolution? And to which extent does the Individualisation of Security inscribe and fit to NATO's civilisational character? In the remainder of this introductory part of the dissertation, the paths guiding the research will be drawn. This will include an outline of the state of the art on the subject, the theoretical stance in which the analysis is situated, the exposition of the argument, the methodological tools used, and a final display of the general structure of the dissertation.

### ***The State of the Art***

In general, post-Cold War literature on NATO has attempted to explain the dynamics of its organisational change as a result of the end of the Cold War. The main concern has been to find whether the Alliance will survive in the future, and whether it has been able to maintain its pertinence as an organisation (Gärtner, 2003; Kay, 1998; Sjørnsen, 2004; Van Ham, 2001; Wallander and Keohane, 1999). Those analyses have explained NATO's change in terms of adjusting its identity for survival (Braun, 2007; Sjørnsen, 2004; Williams, 2007); of conceptual, strategic and operational adaptation in order to update its functions (Adler, 2008; Barany and Rauchhause, 2011; Cornish, 2004; Gärtner, 2003; Rasmussen, 2001; Zorgbibe, 2002); of adapting its narrative as a way to manage the knowledge and image the world has of the Alliance (Behnke, 2000; 2008; 2013; Ciuta, 2002; Flockhart, 2012; Rasmussen, 2001; Williams, 2007); and finally of ideological adaptation and reaffirmation after the Cold War (Gheciu, 2005; Risse-Kappen, 1996; Stivachtis, 2010). To sum up, NATO's change has been observed in terms of the variations at the level of its identity; practice (security strategies, cultures and functions, and respective results); epistemology (through the narratives and discourses NATO discloses about itself); ideology (the principles, norms and visions of the world promoted by NATO).

Evidently, none of these levels is taken autonomously, in that each one has an interdependent influence on the other. Indeed, none of the aforementioned authors

approaches one of those levels without referring to one of the others. For instance, NATO's policy of identity projection – what it *is* – cannot be conceived without the practical dimension – what it *does* – in the sense its actions reveal its organisational identity. Similarly, a certain narrative used by NATO – the way it wishes to be interpreted or *known* – can hardly be understood out of its ideological context – through the *values* it endorses and defends for the world. This can be seen, for example, in the work of Alexandra Gheciu (2005: 63), who articulates NATO's changing discourses and practices with a changed environment, representations of Western values, and the definition of its new goals. Or in that of Trine Flockhart (2012: 78-79), who intertwines the analysis of past narratives, with that of practices and action patterns to demonstrate how NATO has transformed from an organisation characterised by a “practice of talking” to one of “practice of doing”.

Moreover, the use of “civilisation” in literature on NATO is quite limited. Civilisation has been related to NATO as: (a) the broader identitarian bound and cultural category upholding the union of its members, through a symbolic power (Van Ham, 2001; Williams, 2007); (b) the main referent object of its defence and security policies (Behnke, 2008; Coker, 2002; Williams, 2007); (c) a criterion of membership and organisational belonging, through the application of an ideological standard of civilisation in the context of its enlargement policy and new strategic concept, which basically consists of liberal democracy (Stivachtis, 2010). These representations of civilisation can be considered as “culturalist”, borrowing on Peter Jackson's terms in his critique of culture (2008). Obviously, concepts of culture can be found that are far from monolithic, such as in Clifford Geertz (1973) or David Campbell (1998), for example.<sup>6</sup> But Jackson's critique needs to be understood in the context of the “cultural turn” in IR, in which culture is used as an explanatory methodology that suffers nonetheless from either a lack of analytical rigour, or from a tendency to exaggerate the importance of cultural predispositions of collective and individual actors (Jackson, 2008: 155). Accordingly, the point regarding what I think is a “culturalist” view of civilisation is that it is plainly presented as something static, with no accounts of its evolution over time, mainly because it is conceptualised as being independent of its structural context (Jackson, 2008: 160).

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<sup>6</sup> While Geertz (1973: 5) sees culture as a system of symbols and meanings imposing order on the social order, Campbell (1998: 221) defines it as a relational site for the politics of identity, and should thus be thought of in terms of performance.

As a matter of fact, these analyses of NATO take civilisation as a clear-cut notion implying that it is a stable variable with no need of a deeper reflection. Although some studies on NATO have pointed to the Alliance's inherent Occidentalism and civilisational design (Behnke, 2000; 2008; Coker, 2002; Stivachtis, 2010; Whitman, 2000; Williams, 2007), they have been mainly referring to the ideological purposes of liberal democracy. Like "culture" in culturalism, the role and position of civilisation within NATO seems to be represented as a given, thus perpetuating monolithic and extendable causal relations, based on the production and reproduction of identities (Jackson, 2008: 161). This is to imply and perpetuate the idea that people and states have always been *civilised* both in time and manner. Put in other terms, this is to say that being civilised has always meant the same thing, involved the same normative attributes, regardless of the historical epoch. This limiting vision could be related to one particular tradition of twentieth century social thought, which consists in believing that our concepts not only alter over time, as they are also "[i]ncapable of providing us with anything more than a series of changing perspectives on the world [...]" (Skinner, 1999: 62). Conversely, that is why concepts gain a certain prominence (or unpopularity) at particular historical periods.

There have been effective practical transformations within NATO that still require explanation and comprehension (Ciuta, 2002). That is the case of the Individualisation of Security, which represents an important normative change that has significantly expanded NATO's field of action and circle of influence. However, this particular change has not been considered in most of the analyses on NATO's evolution. Mikkel Rasmussen's (2001) perspective of NATO as an agent of change, and as a modern and reflexive organisation that builds a Western consensus, is quite convincing, and would allow understanding the *how* and the *why* of almost any strategic, conceptual or practical change. Yet, this conception ends up being too loose, as it embraces almost everything NATO has decided to say and do after the Cold War. Likewise, Felix Ciuta (2002: 38) argues that NATO's evolution is sustained by a grand narrative on shaping European security, which functions as a "narrative shuttle" producing "accounts of linear evolutions" between events and their meaning.

There is nonetheless an important core of literature within international political sociology that has expanded and brought critical substance to the topic, which is particularly indebted to French sociologists Norbert Elias and Pierre Bourdieu – as much



as this dissertation is, as a matter of fact. Andrew Linklater has drawn on Elias' work to highlight the relation between the rise of a modern society of states and the so-called civilising process. Linklater's international society approach, characteristic of the English School of IR, broadly presupposes that despite anarchy there is a society of states sharing common interests and values at the international level, which expanded from Europe to the rest of the world (Dunne, 1998; Linklater, 2007: 131, 137; Linklater and Suganami, 2006). Linklater thus argues that "[t]he development of international society needs to be seen as part of a much larger transformation of social and political life over approximately the last five centuries" (2011: 2). Linklater's contribution is important in countering the usual isolation of the international from larger patterns of the social and political life (2011: 4), for he too thinks that the role of the civilising process is underexplored: "The question – which to the best of my knowledge has not received much attention – is how far the development of international society was linked with the broader civilizing process" (2011: 12). Linklater therefore analyses specifically how the eighteenth-century European diplomacy, which was evolving within the royal courts circles, was already moving toward the development of an international society inserted into a broader process of civilisation to be spread beyond Europe to the rest of the world (Linklater, 2011: 13).

The work of Bourdieu has also been inspirational to other authors, who have used and applied different Bourdieuan concepts and notions – such as habitus, the field – to security studies and to NATO. These are generally approaches that deconstruct and explore the role of culture as a dimension of power, and that focus on processes of exclusion that are intrinsic to international society (Adler, 2008; Adler-Nissen, 2013; Gheciu, 2005, 2008; Pouliot, 2010; Williams, 2007).

Yet, the conception and role of civilisation have not been problematised enough in relation to security: what does civilisation consists of, and how is it related to conceptions of security? How does civilisation contribute to security? Have its meanings and representations evolved, or has it essentially remained the same through time? Important interpretive spaces remain to be filled. If literature portrays civilisation as a cultural and identity factor, as a membership criterion, and as a concept related to the very referent of security, it is obvious that analyses on NATO's transformation and change have dismissed another dimension of analysis, that is, the civilisational factor. The concept of civilisation has an important analytical potential for the understanding of NATO, namely in

genealogical terms. Indeed, it may bring more nuances to the relationship between the Alliance and the production of meanings for individuals. It may thereby lead to comprehend in more depth to what extent the organisation's metaphysical *raison d'être* has an impact upon individuals and their representations of their own security. However, the approach of the very concept of civilisation needs to be deconstructed and denaturalised in a more specific and comprehensive way, namely regarding what the Western civilisation entails and represents, its roots and dynamics, and the norms it uses in the course of its evolutionary process.

Research on NATO has suffered from the same fundamental problems that are common to IR in general. There has been an overall difficulty in the discipline to deal with the following elements simultaneously: history, the West, security, and culture. Questioning and eventually contradicting any of the common assumptions about those elements is a serious task that requires the capacity to survive to eventual crises – identity, social or scientific. However, given the predominance of that Western parcel, approaching those issues can surely be helpful for understanding the implications and consequences of its actions for the rest of the world. Therefore, this research is deeply grounded on the acknowledgement of two main problems: one is the difficulty within IR to address the question of time; the other has to do with IR's own cultural bias when dealing with the West and the question of civilisation.

### **IR and the problem of envisioning time**

According to John Hobson, contemporary IR is “historophobic”, in that it “[v]iew[s] historical analysis as superfluous or exogenous to the subject matter of the discipline” (2002: 5). To Hobson, IR scholars have mostly adopted an instrumentalist and exogenous view of history, in order to support and confirm theories of the present. Instead of that, Hobson suggests, we should employ a temporally relativist or constitutive reading of history, as a means to rethink theories and problematise the analysis of the present, thus reconfiguring the IR research agenda (*ibid*).

However, it has not always been like that. At the time of its emergence as an academic discipline, in 1919, IR comprised a body of knowledge, which included history

among other various disciplines, such as economics, sociology, law and moral philosophy (Hobden, 2002). But with the behaviourist revolution in the 1950's and 1960's, IR started privileging structure and space over time and context in analyses of world politics (Walker, 1989 cit. in Vaughan-Williams, 2005). This resulted in mainstream IR being reconstructed along asociological and ahistorical lines (Hobden, 2002).

To Richard Ashley (1989: 263), the consequence of not dealing with what he considers to be the “problem of history” – i.e., the impossibility of getting historical interpretation completely right – is that IR prefers to impose a representation that closes ambiguity and controls the proliferation of meaning, instead of projecting the uncertainty of historical meaning onto its object of study. Hence, the idea that time is regular, as meanings remain stationary independently of the time they represent.

More importantly, as a result of this aversion, insouciance or superficiality towards history, two “illusions” arise. On the one hand, the “reification illusion” consists in isolating the present from the past, making it appear as static, self-constituting, and autonomous; in other words, the present is represented as a reified entity, thereby obscuring its socio-temporal context (Hobson, 2002: 6). On the other hand, there is also a “naturalism illusion”, meaning that the present is naturalised on the basis that it emerged spontaneously in accordance with natural human imperatives, thereby obscuring the historical processes of social power, identity/social exclusion and norms that constitute the present (Hobson, 2002: 6). Clearly, both these illusions may be verified in the treatment of the object of this study. As suggested earlier, civilisation appears as a *reified* product in NATO literature, and normative evolutions such as the Individualisation of Security are *naturalised* without further questioning how and why they surged.

Furthermore, according to historian Fernand Braudel (1958), social duration is an aspect of history that is often ignored and misconceived by the social sciences in general. Therefore, Braudel (1958: 726) defends the importance and usefulness of history in terms of its underlying dialectic of time. To him, the ability to perceive the antagonism between the instantaneous moment and the slowness of long time passing by – the “plurality of time” – is essential to understanding social reality.<sup>7</sup> The problem of time is crucial for this

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<sup>7</sup> Free translation of the author. In the original: “[I]’importance, l’utilité de l’histoire, ou plutôt de la dialectique de la durée, telle qu’elle se dégage du métier, de l’observation répétée de l’historien; rien n’étant plus important, d’après nous, au centre de la réalité sociale, que cette opposition vive, intime, répétée indéfiniment, entre l’instant et le temps lent à s’écouler. Qu’il s’agisse du passé ou de l’actualité, une

research. It assumes that IR's approach of temporality and of the meanings associated to it has been rather rigid, which has too often limited our reflection of international phenomena to short duration terms. In turn, this shortness of sight has hidden the importance of unconscious meanings and their perpetuation in history, which is why phenomena ultimately have appeared in naturalised and unquestioned ways. Likewise, analyses on NATO have primarily focused on short and medium term changes, without referring to any longer-term pattern, such as the implications of civilisational defence. Therefore, it is a matter of reflecting on how a recent duration trend such as the Individualisation of Security fits into a longer-term objective – the civilisational heritage of the people in the NATO area.

This work precisely attempts to address this gap in the literature on NATO in two interrelated ways. One consists in embracing time through a “long duration” framework – *longue durée* (Braudel, 1958). Once again, to Braudel (1979 *apud* Cox, 2002b), different segments of social and human life have different tempos or timings. Economic change operates at a different pace from art, architecture, or law, for example. Even though these changes may be related to each other, they are not synchronous. Consequently, the history of how mentalities evolve moves at a different pace from the history of material life, even if they both interact (*ibid.*). Under Braudel, these different histories and tempos contain three levels of time: (1) the level of immediacy, that is, the simple duration of events – *l'histoire événementielle*; it has no explanation, for it needs to be framed within the spatial and temporal context in which it occurs. (2) Conjunctures – *conjonctures* – represent an intermediary temporality, such as a protracted economic cycle, a persisting configuration of social forces, such as Fordism, social democracy, a scientific paradigm. (3) Long duration – *longue durée* – is a historical structure created by collective human activity throughout a large period of time; examples are language, moral code, and state system (*ibid.*).

Consequently, it may be presumed that, within NATO, short-term changes such as the move towards out-of-area interventions (as in Afghanistan and Libya) have coexisted with medium term changes (such as the adoption of new strategic concepts), and with

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conscience nette de cette pluralité du temps social est indispensable à une méthodologie commune des sciences de l'homme” (Braudel, 1958: 726).

long-term patterns such as the civilisational defence of the North Atlantic.<sup>8</sup> Temporality thus helps to establish a relation between the two referent objects of security that are at the core of this investigation – civilisation and individuals. On the one hand, the Individualisation of Security represents a medium term normative change, as a conjunctural paradigm of international security defined by NATO’s different military interventions. On the other hand, the Individualisation of Security needs to be related to the Alliance’s long duration objectives such as the civilisation of its people. Ultimately, by considering these three levels of temporality when analysing NATO, it will be possible to highlight how its historical evolution as an organisation occurred along with the evolution of mentalities, and perceptions of the world. Taken together, these perspectives will help reconstituting a much more complete and comprehensive analysis of NATO’s referents of security.

### **IR’s cultural problem of dealing with the West and civilisation**

According to Jacinta O’Hagan (2002: 1), IR has provided “[l]ittle assistance in thinking conceptually about what or who the West is”, which she finds “intriguing” given its significance as a concept in international relations in general. How is it that IR does not address the West? To Gerard Delanty, the underlying problem could be that the idea of civilisation has been

[m]uch tainted with notions of cultural superiority, eurocentricism and even racism, discredited philosophies of history (such as those of Toynbee and Spengler) and more recently arguments for American leadership (for instance, Huntington, 1996) (Delanty, 2003: 15).

In this sense, the civilisational connotation of the West could have represented a cultural problem for IR, which could be an explanation for such discretion of the West within the discipline. Indeed, its existence is very often explicit in many critical approaches – in

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<sup>8</sup> See namely the adoption of the Strategic Concept at the 1991 Rome Summit that focused on a wide enemy and acknowledged the need for long-range institutional transformations (NATO, 1991). It also redefined and rebuilt NATO’s identity after the Cold War, in the sense of a “community of democratic security” (Stivachtis, 2010). In 2002, at the Prague Summit, a new Strategic Concept was adopted to include issues such as counterterrorism, nuclear, biological, and chemical defence (NATO, 2002).

particular post-colonialism.<sup>9</sup> However, to the English School, for instance, the notions of “global civility” or “civilizing processes in anarchical societies” have been rather important in relation to “social conventions, manners and habits, and related psychological traits and emotional dispositions that bring order to human affairs” (Linklater, 2007: 161, 163).

The most popular example of how the West represents an actual concern within IR is the post-Cold War discussion tossed by Francis Fukuyama (1989) and Samuel Huntington (1993). On the one hand, in Francis Fukuyama’s (1989) pronouncement of the “end of History”, the West is viewed as the provider of a universal model of human progress and development, and also of the rational state towards which the rest of humanity is evolving (O’Hagan, 2002: 1). During the Cold War, the idea that different civilisations could coexist had been obscured by the bipolar tension between East and West; but the West still preserved its universalistic notion of civilisation (Cox, 2002b: 3-4). On the other hand, Samuel Huntington’s view of a “clash of civilisations” preconizes an era in which world politics is dominated by “cultural” conflicts, namely “between nations and groups of different civilizations” (Huntington, 1993: 22). In this context, Huntington deems the West is to be challenged and joined by non-Western civilisations as “movers and shapers of history” motivated by a “growth of civilization-consciousness” (Huntington, 1993: 23, 26), among other geocultural, economic and military factors.

As a matter of fact, Mark B. Salter’s book *Barbarians & Civilization in International Relations* (2002) arises from a dissatisfaction with Huntington’s argument, and attempts to deconstruct the civilised/barbarian dichotomy, which he links to European imperialism and deems central to our understanding of international history and IR (Salter, 2002: 4). He thus finds that the dichotomy was as central during WWI, as it was in the interwar period, with the “frantic reassertion of the civilizing mission, embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations”, and during WWII as well with the barbarity of the Nazi rule and the West representing itself fighting for the preservation of civilisation (Salter, 2002: 160). Salter finally concludes that, although the barbarian/civilisation dichotomy largely faded away from the discipline until the end of the Cold War, post-Cold War IR theorising and thinkers show that it has come to actually divide the world into

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<sup>9</sup> For one of the most influential works in post-colonial studies, see: Said, Edward W. (2003 [1978]) *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.

other stereotypes of civilised and barbarian, which is the real result of Huntington's "clash" argument (Salter, 2002: 157).

Therefore, concerns with world order and civilisational issues have always been present at different historical moments in the life of the discipline. In the midst of WWII, Walter Lippmann (1941) had expressed his worries regarding Western civilisation:

[d]uring the past forty or fifty years those who are responsible for education have progressively removed from the curriculum of studies the Western culture which produced the modern democratic state; [...] deprived of their cultural tradition, the newly educated Western men no longer possess in the form and substance of their own minds and spirits, the ideas, the premises, the rationale, the logic, the method, the values or the deposited wisdom which are the genius of the development of Western civilization; [...] the prevailing education is destined, if it continues, to destroy Western civilization and is in fact destroying it [...] (Lippmann, 1941: 184-185).

Lippmann considered that the Western civilisation was on the verge of losing itself because its system of education had failed to inculcate the traditional Western values to the generation of the actors of WWII, which led to WWII (1941: 185). Clearly, Lippmann defends that the Western education must invest in its cultural tradition of morality and law; otherwise "alien and barbarous things" (1941: 186) shall replace civilisation.

If we look a little further back at WWI, for instance, the emergence of the embryonic version of a discipline of IR appears as a reaction to the plagues of war. The emergence of IR is thus embedded in a specific time, and in a specific space, that is, the creation of the Woodrow Wilson chair in 1919 at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom (Bell, 2009: 6; Wight, 2002: 27). Besides, as IR also reflects the society in which it is embedded, including its respective political and intellectual debates (Bell, 2006: 493), we see that it was decisively motivated by the debates of the time about the relation between capitalism and war, and about the most effective ways of dealing with totalitarian state aggression (Ashworth, 2002: 33). All of this clearly makes the discipline of IR the product of a Western endeavour in very practical and material terms.

Also by the time of WWI, the relation between nations and civilisation was transforming. Until then, the meaning of "civilisation" had been established as a universal and singular phenomenon around the world (Gong, 1984). As suggested by Prasenjit Duara's (2001), imperialist nations of the West used to invoke "civilisation" to justify their conquests in a civilising mission throughout the nineteenth century. Their conception of

“civilisation”, though, was based on Christian and Enlightenment values only, and dominated as the sole criterion for proclaiming a state’s sovereignty (Duara, 2001: 100). Duara further explains that WWI disenchanted the idea of a civilising mission, as “Writer after writer denounced the materialism and destructiveness of Western Civilization” (2001: 104). This was in sharp contrast with the idea that the technological progress coming from Europe could only cause wellbeing. Therefore, in many post-WWI movements, civilisation was seen as a correlation of imperialism and war, and as having provided a moral base to those problems (Duara, 2001: 105).

In this context, when IR first emerged, perceptions about the West were clearly an issue *à l’ordre du jour*, and it seems that its conceptual absence from scholarly literature results of a certain degree of cultural covertness. This can be interpreted in the light of what Michael C. Williams (1998) identifies as the problem of “liberal sensibility” that omits identity issues in security policies. However, this absence is only apparent, because

The progenitors of this liberal sensibility were all too conscious of the importance of strongly held values and identities. But they saw them as perhaps the primary source of violence and insecurity in the early modern era. What they sought to do in response was to confute these beliefs in theory, to *marginalize* them in practice, and to replace them with new forms of understanding and political action, and in so doing to transform fundamentally the politics of violence and the nature of security (Williams, 1998: 205).

This apparent superficiality of cultural stances in IR is sustained by John Hobson’s extensive book, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010* (2012). In it, he demonstrates that international theory, which was developed both inside and outside of the discipline of IR in the last twenty-five years, is for the most part a Eurocentric construct underpinned by various Eurocentric metanarratives since 1760. In fact, one of his central claims is that

[i]nternational theory does not so much explain international politics in an objective, positivist and universalist manner but seeks, rather, to parochially celebrate and defend or promote the West as the proactive subject of, and as the highest or ideal normative referent in, world politics (Hobson, 2012: 1).

Furthermore, Hobson refers that, after 1945, scientific racism disappeared from IR theory and manifest Eurocentrism took on a *subliminal* form during the era of decolonisation and Cold War – “subliminal” meaning that many aspects and properties of the manifest are hidden from immediate view (Hobson, 2012: 10). To sum up, the advent of the discipline of IR surges at a time of crisis, when questions of political and economic coexistence were



at the top of international concerns, denoting the interest and the will to provide a vision for the world, of how it should be. In the aftermath of WWI, the prevailing political and socio-economical models obviously seemed to matter, since they influenced and produced determined effects on the existence of Western societies in particular. From then on, although the universalist notion of Western civilisation apparently declined and became so unpopular that cultural issues were obliterated from the conscious realm of the politics of security, the West still needs to be considered as the main “ideal normative referent” (Hobson, 2012: 1) in world politics.

Michael C. Williams (2007) has demonstrated how, after the Cold War, there was a return of culture, in an appeal to the triumph of Western culture, of the universality of its liberal values, ideals and institutions. To Williams, cultural practices have been central in the transformations of the USA’s and EU’s security policies, as well as in NATO’s evolution. The cultural dimension of security revealed as a new strategy, a new basis for a new set of power relations:

By defining security in terms of forms of culture, itself a generative product of the habitus prevailing in Western security institutions, the field of security was transformed into one where cultural and symbolic forms of capital became vital – and one in which these forms of capital were dominantly possessed by Western states, societies, and security organizations (Williams, 2007: 40).

To Stefano Guzzini, the post-Cold War debate about the “West” is rather connected to the revival of geopolitical thought. As Guzzini argues, that revival should not be understood as a “normal” consequence of the end of the Cold War, but rather as “[a]n answer to, or an easy fix for, the sense of dis-orientation and foreign policy identity crises which followed 1989” (2015: 5). In Guzzini’s argument, not only are “re-identification” and politics of representation at the centre of the revitalisation of the “West”, as they have negatively contributed to increased militarism and to the re-securitisation of international politics, and ultimately, to a “[v]ision of an exclusionary Fortress West” (*ibid.*).

So, Lippmann's (1941) apprehensions during WWII that Western civilisation was failing in making its values endure, and the resurgence of the West in the 1990's, tell us that periods of war and political instability, or uncertainty, may have a determining effect on the reappearance of the fear that civilisation, or civilisational world order, might be under threat. However, the possibility of viewing time differently as a sequence of historical moments and evolutive trends was replaced by the predominance of cultural concerns or, at the other extreme, by cultural coerture and fortification. This is why references to Western civilisation in literature on NATO generally focus on the post-Cold War period only, which results in a static, stable and self-reproducing view of civilisation, conceptualised as being independent of any structural context, thus reinforcing culturalist representations. This can be seen, for example, in Peter Van Ham's assessment of "whether the cultural glue ostensibly keeping 'the West' together remains strong enough to endure post-Cold War transatlantic tensions" (2001: 394), which takes Huntington's concept of civilisation as a conceptual basis. Likewise, the possible outcomes of civilisation on NATO's security policies – just as the Individualisation of Security, for instance – have not been equated either.

### **Proposing a different view: embracing time more critically**

The suggestion of embracing time more critically has to do with adopting a view that is no longer focused on the immediacy of change, on recent institutional developments, but that rather espouses longer processes of change more focused on meaning and perception formation and their diffusion in time. This is a way of accompanying the evolution of ideas, and understanding how the temporal distance of original contexts may be eroded and dispersed through hegemonic knowledge, thus turning into an unconscious, accepted and naturalised knowledge. In order to justify such an approach, this dissertation will proceed by exposing the intellectual zeitgeist and the core theoretical corpus that support my view. After that, it will be possible to elaborate on the key argument of this research, that is, NATO's particular endorsement of the Individualisation of Security has acted as a transformative process of post-Cold War

international security, through which Western civilisation is actually upheld and continued in the field of international security.

### ***Theoretical prospects***

In accordance with the epistemological concerns and challenges exposed so far, and drawing on the suggestion of embracing time more critically in order to uncover the processes of knowledge establishment, this study is largely set within Critical Theory and other “alternative approaches”, to quote Richard Wyn Jones (2001: 3), like post-structuralism and postmodernism. Questioning the prevailing forms we have of perceiving and knowing both the concept of civilisation and the emergence of certain normative patterns such as the Individualisation of Security in international security, remits to one fundamental concern of Critical Theory, that is, the relationship between knowledge and values and, more broadly, between knowledge and society (Devetak, 1995). Put as such, this dissertation embraces Critical Theory as more than a conceptual toolkit; not only is it a philosophical and methodological positioning, as an essential social commitment towards the liberation of knowledge as well.

Originally, Critical Theory is derived from various strands of Western social, political and philosophical thought. The reference to the “Frankfurt School” is used interchangeably with “Critical theory” usually to refer to a group of thinkers from the *Institut für Sozialforschung* (Institute of Social Research) first established in Frankfurt in 1923, including Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and others more “loosely affiliated thinkers” like Walter Benjamin and Eric Fromm (Peoples, 2009: 8). The Frankfurt School is inspired by the thinking of Immanuel Kant, Georg Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud, in a synthesis of various traditions of modern theory, including German Idealism, Historical Materialism, Modernism and Psychoanalysis (Roach, 2008). Given the diversity of the intellectual background of those thinkers – philosophy, sociology, musicology, and psychoanalysis – this school has a “self-consciously inter-disciplinary nature” that provides its analysis of social change with a deeper understanding of society (Peoples, 2009: 8-9). Yet, it can be said that the common thread unifying them is basically a Marxian tradition of producing “an analysis of society that aims [...] to support a process of emancipatory social transformation” (Wyn Jones, 2001: 6). In very significant ways, the emergence of Critical Theory actually challenges the dominating social model in the West in the aftermath of WWI, which is quite revealing of an overall Western crisis at the time – social, ideological, intellectual, political.

The first enunciation of “Critical Theory” as such appeared in 1937 in an essay of Max Horkheimer, to describe his own research programme under the auspices of the Frankfurt School. In his critique of what he termed “Traditional Theory”, Horkheimer denounced scientific positivism and those forms of social science that tried to imitate the objectivity of the natural sciences. Thinking the theorist could somehow be detached from the social world was an illusion, so he deemed. In opposition to that, Horkheimer defined his theory as self-critical, in that it acknowledged its own function within society (Horkheimer, 2002; Müller-Doohm, 2006: 171). This is clearly inspired by Georg Friedrich Hegel’s (1977), who was the first concerned with bringing into visibility the internal contradictions, tensions, distortions – in Hegel’s term the “negative” – of the categories of mind constitutive of knowledge. Also, according to Adorno and Horkheimer (1997), scientific rationality evolves according to a latently totalitarian logic of domination, so it is bound up with ideological systems, which ultimately is an attempt at domesticating nature and enslaving humanity. This is central to conceive the potential for contribution of Critical Theory in this dissertation regarding the problems raised since the beginning of this introduction. In particular, it highlights how hegemonic knowledge shapes the perceptions and representations of the world in a way that makes certain ideas persist in detriment of others, which makes human mind to stagnate, and prevents it from progressing towards new meanings, and from achieving genuine social change.

Indeed, critical thinkers are particularly aware of the non-exempt relationship existing between knowledge and society, and invariably probed forms of hegemonic knowledge. That is why Critical Theory generally stands for the non-acceptance of the prevailing order, on the basis that the order we know is “[b]y no means natural, necessary or historically invariable” (Devetak, 2005a: 143). This awareness further implies that critical thinking also “[r]eflects the process of learning to do theory in the sense of becoming aware of one’s changing ties to (identity with) society” (Roach, 2008: xvi).

The complex relationship between knowledge claims, politics and power is specifically approached by postmodernism, whose definition is fairly disputed. Many authors considered as such do not even use the term – like Michel Foucault, for example – and sometimes prefer “post-structuralism” or “deconstruction” (Devetak, 2005b: 161). In the field of social philosophy, postmodernism expresses an “ex-Leftist exhaustion and disillusion”, having as a key figure the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, a disillusioned former militant of the far-left grouplet *Socialisme ou Barbarie* (Therborn, 2006: 186). It is interesting to note that both this reference to the opposition between socialism and barbarism, and Horkheimer’s concern with the abandonment of all culture and barbarism (Müller-Doohm, 2006: 172) basically posit the idea of civilisation as the value centrally at stake within Critical Theory, for they enounce barbarism as the negative side of Traditional Theory. In *The Postmodern condition: a report on knowledge* (1984), Lyotard focused on the status of science and technology, technocracy and the control of knowledge and information. In it, he highlighted the ethical dimension underlying the legitimation of knowledge, which should not be about denotative utterances, but rather about normative prescriptions:

[t]he only role positive knowledge can play is to inform the practical subject about the reality within which the execution of the prescription is to be inscribed. [...] It is one thing for an undertaking to be possible and another for it to be just. Knowledge is no longer the subject, but in the service of the subject: its only legitimacy (though it is formidable) is the fact that it allows morality to become reality (Lyotard, 1984: 36).

Postmodernism has strived to denaturalise the epistemological dispositions inherent to the *Modern* paradigms of political, economic and social organisation, including the prevailing identity formations that appear as normal, as social conventions or dogmas (Devetak, 2005b: 166). Indeed, as its name indicates, the *postmodern* school of thought essentially confronts the grand narratives of *Modernity*. The “project” of Modernity, as Jürgen Habermas (1983) calls it, emerged during the eighteenth century. It was an intellectual and secular effort undertaken by Enlightenment thinkers to develop human rationality, through objective science, universal morality and law, with the ultimate goal of liberating individuals from the irrationalities of religion, myths, superstition, and from the arbitrary use of power (Harvey, 1996: 12-13). As a concept, Modernity was first developed by Hegel, who used it in historical contexts to describe a precise epoch. Around 1800, the reference to the “modern times” – in English, and *temps modernes* in French – depicted the three centuries just preceding (Habermas, 1998: 5).

Postmodernism was never intended to be a social theory as such; it began as a movement within architecture and the arts, primarily literature, expressing a revolt against the rigid formalism of modernism, without being a rejection of, or a movement against, Modernity *per se* (Delanty, 2006b: 270-271). The postmodern critique towards Modernity often discloses its problematic relationship with time. Modernity essentially embraced the idea of progress in a way that obliterates the past, the old, the traditional, only to look into a reachable future where modern man, society, civilisation have only one direction, that is, forward (Therborn, 2006: 187). In the artistic field, for instance, a modern artist was considered to be someone with the capacity to extract the fleeting qualities of society and individuals, and freeze them in time to make them universal and eternal (Harvey, 1996: 20-21). Postmodernists perceive far more nuance and shadow, and see history as “[a] series of dominations replacing other dominations, and the knowledgeable subject as the site for the interplay between these dominations rather than the vehicle for their transcendence” (Smith, 1997: 334).

Postmodernism enhances the influence of temporality upon the fixation of meanings within society, because Modernity as a socio-historical construct erects seemingly timeless meanings, thus creating illusions of knowledge. This is precisely related to the epistemological illusions Hobson (2002) identifies in IR, as exposed above. Modernity thereby implies a form of exclusionary knowledge that leaves many social meanings and alternatives aside. In fact, at the time of Enlightenment, history was viewed as a uniform process that generates problems. Time became experienced as a pressure over the need to master the problems that arose, and the new modern world would be privileged over the old by the fact that “[i]t opens itself to the future, the epochal new beginning is rendered constant with each moment that gives birth to the new” (Habermas, 1998: 6). Therefore, Modernity narrates the past as a time reigned by ignorance, superstition, oppression, poverty, disease, stagnation, imitation, and depicts the project of an emancipating future, one that liberates from the misery of the past towards a rational, individualised, ever-growing, developed, creative and progressive society (Therborn, 2006: 187). In such a context, where the past is constantly revised, and the present redeemed by the potentialities of the future, time becomes naturalised in a predictable order of events and expectations, and the new problems arising are silenced by this pressure of time. The meaning of time is rarely debated, as we tend to take it for granted in our common-sense attributions, around which we organise our daily routines (Harvey, 1996: 201).

The critique of the treatment of time is a topic that Walter Benjamin persistently engaged with, namely through his critique of historicism, which he considered a way to tell history as a “sequence of events like the beads of a rosary” (Benjamin, 1973: 263). Benjamin rejected this Modern conception of time as linear progress, and urged for rethinking the idea that the future is the natural continuation of present and past. The past, according to Benjamin, can only be seized in an image occurring at a specific moment that is not to be repeatable. As a consequence, the present is only a transition, an interruptive force that seizes an image of the past. The past, which Benjamin calls “tradition”, is always in danger of being appropriated for political purposes. That is why Benjamin saw documents of culture as documents of *barbarism*, in that the victors endowed with the legitimacy to write history *determine what the past means* (Benjamin, 1973: 257; Ferris, 2008: 132-133). In turn, the future was seen to offer something other than the extension of the same forms of social and political life (Stephens, 2009: 79). Benjamin thus rejoined



Critical Theory by providing the future with a transformative potential, that is, with emancipation from temporality.

Benjamin allows transitioning to post-structuralism's contribution. Like postmodernism, post-structuralism is not anti-modern, nor against the project of Modernity or Enlightenment. Rather, it refuses to accept it as a pre-packaged set of ideas that can be applied linearly like a tradition, and does not take it as "temporal or spatial field of uniform content" with definite boundaries (Ashley, 1989: 260). Accordingly, the project of Modernity must develop a critical historical account of how we came to be what we are, a reflection of the self-formative processes (Devetak, 1995). Post-structuralism offers a more specific contribution in its formulation against the totalisation of knowledge and in the search for its deconstruction, by proposing methodological tools that address the epistemological challenges identified so far.

Richard Ashley's piece "Living on border lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and war" (1989) is central in conceiving the epistemological challenges inherent to Western culture. Ashley (1989: 261) exposes the influence of Logocentrism as the hegemonic system of expressions of duality, such as core/periphery, continuity/change, literal/figural, nature/culture, individual/collective, domestic/international, etc. He further explains that this logocentric tradition under Modernity tends to impose hierarchy, whereby one side of interpretation becomes sovereign for the participant, while the other is defined solely in relation to the former. Logocentric discourse thereby privileges one term only of the opposition (*ibid.*). While the privileged term is held as the source of truth and as a priority, the second is conceived as a deviation, complication, deterioration, accident (Ashley, 1989: 262). Ashley resorts to literary theory to claim that a "narrative structure is imposed upon history" (Ashley, 1989: 282), implying that

[a] narrative reasserts closure by imposing a central ordering principle whose categories and standards of interpretation are taken to express the essential and timeless truth integrating all of the historical times and places among which it discriminates. It constructs a story in which all time, all space, all difference, and all discontinuity are cast as part of a universal project in which the ordering principle is itself redeemed as necessarily, timelessly, and universally true (Ashley, 1989: 264).

This seemingly goes in Lyotard's sense (1984), who deemed there is a resurgence of narrative knowledge in the West as a way of solving the problem of legitimating the new authorities. From this, one may assume that the conceptual and theoretical limitations of IR in dealing with the West, which were identified above, are clearly the focus of many strands of Critical Theory. The exclusionary essence of Western mental structures and sense of time appears to have impacted upon the very creation of scientific knowledge itself. In this sense, IR would be the victim of Modernity too, hence the challenge of scientific emancipation.

That is why Michel Foucault (1995: 31) attempted to "write the history of the present". His intent was to ask how we have made the present seem like a normal or natural condition, and what has been forgotten or remembered in order to legitimise the present and its courses of action. Put in other terms, he focuses on how societies arrive at particular practices of inclusion and exclusion that not only allow forgetting or remembering, as they also differentiate the Self from Otherness. Hence the importance of a deeper reflection on the underlying spatial and temporal context of actors, ideas and concepts that might allow understanding how they have become an unconscious issue.

Throughout his work, Michel Foucault's philosophical approach sought to deconstruct and denaturalise central concepts and visions of history that shape our knowledge of the world. In order to do that, Foucault questioned how a certain issue becomes a problem historically, i.e., how it was problematised in history (Neal, 2009: 167). One central method he advocates is the archaeological analysis, which insists on the historicisation of discourses, techniques, and practices in respect of their specific spatial and temporal circumstances (*ibid.*). To Foucault (2003: 269), the predominant historical-political discourse that Modernity deals with is a discourse that inverts the traditional values of intelligibility, and explains things in confuse, obscure, and disorganised ways. The interpretive tools used within this tradition have to do with the confusion and physical force of violence, passion, hate, revenge, and a series of circumstances that are articulated in terms of defeats and victories, confrontations among alliances, and rebellions (*ibid.*). On the contrary, Foucault views history as a set of declarations, documents, institutions, and notions that cumulate and interact. Therefore, he rejects that all might be reduced to one grand narrative supporting the states' and the West's sovereign presence as being at the centre of world history (Neal, 2009: 165). As such, the archaeological method privileges

decentralisation, and the historicisation of institutions together with their respective power relations:

Basically, I had been doing nothing except trying to retrace how a certain number of institutions, beginning to function on behalf of reason and normality, had brought their power to bear on groups of individuals, in terms of behaviors, ways of being, acting, or speaking that were constituted as abnormality, madness, illness, and so on. I had done nothing else, really, but a history of power (Foucault, 2000: 283).

Power relations are essential, for they surface around a given problem to include the web of individuals that constituted it as a problem, acted to solve it, used particular forms of language, and made concepts to emerge, as well as techniques, methods, and knowledge in order to answer that problem (Neal, 2009: 167). This is in part a “genealogical” exercise, in the sense that we need to focus on “a form of history that can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects” (Foucault, 2000: 118).

Genealogies are therefore not positivistic returns to a form of science that is more attentive or more accurate. Genealogies are, quite specifically, antisciences. [...] They are about the insurrection of knowledges. Not so much against the contents, methods, or concepts of a science; this is above all, primarily, an insurrection against the centralizing power-effects that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse organized in a society such as ours (Foucault, 2003: 9).

As this theoretical section has insisted so far, Critical Theory provides different perspectives that all concur to give visibility and deconstruct the enslaving domino effect of interrelated aspects of Western Modernity, namely, a rigid conception of temporality that encloses meanings within a stagnated knowledge, and ultimately naturalises unquestioned behaviour and identity, thereby excluding a whole world of epistemological and social possibilities.

In this context, Foucault provides very pertinent tools to inquire on NATO's civilisational identity and post-Cold War normative evolution around the Individualisation of Security and simultaneously rejoin the aforementioned precepts of Critical Theory. First, one may conceive the possibility that a modern narrative on Western civilisation, confined within a static linearity of time and progress, has influenced the conscious knowledge we have of NATO as the product of a normal evolution of a pre-existing civilisational identity. In the sense of what Foucault advises, the spatial and temporal context of NATO's emergence should be questioned in relation to how the past was appropriated, and through what kind of practices of domination and relations of power. Moreover, one may also assess to what extent NATO may benefit from the West's cumulated capital of domination in order to influence and control the field of international security. Therefore, NATO may draw on the West as a civilisational entity to adopt new norms without jeopardizing the representations we have of NATO, that is, questioning what it essentially does, how and why.

However, by uncovering what those practices of domination and power relations consist of, and how they have produced hegemonic knowledge, an essential unconscious dimension remains in the realm of what has been subjugated, i.e., of what has been dominated in order to naturalise the hegemonic content of knowledge. This phenomenon is in part illustrated by André Barrinha and Marcos Rosa (2013: 110), who show that security meanings in the context of NATO or the EU are appropriated by their members in such a way that they end up "translating a particular liberal understanding of security that is in many cases completely foreign" to their own security context. Put in other words, the naturalisation of knowledge implies that unconscious meanings have to be conveyed and seized through the narratives on Western civilisation.

### ***Developing the argument***

In the light of the theoretical questions and epistemological positioning presented so far, this research fundamentally aims at uncovering the unconscious knowledge underlying the fact that NATO originally offered to defend a precise civilisational identity, and has come to evolve into the protection of individuals in out-of-area countries. The goal is to understand the critical nuances underlying how two different referents of security – civilisation and the individual – relate in the evolution of an organisation that was created to uphold the security of Western states. How have these two substantially different referents cohabited throughout NATO's evolution? And to what extent does the Individualisation of Security inscribe and fit to NATO's civilisational character? This is relevant as it remits to questioning and measuring the actual significance of doing security for civilisation and/or individuals. The priority given to any referent object of security should indicate what the priority is for any given organised society, which ultimately has also a direct impact upon how states and people behave at, and relate with, each other.

Approaching the civilisational dimension of NATO's relation to the Individualisation of Security does not equate to a Eurocentric manoeuvre that might reaffirm the conception of a prevailing civilisation, and influence the construction of security's subjectivity. Assessing the importance of civilisation in the constitution of security is a reflexive exercise at the cultural, social and historical levels, which helps enhancing critically the processes, forms of power, actors and discourses of civilisation. This is supported by a simple philosophical conviction that only through profound self-comprehension may human mind transcend its own frailties.

There are a series of key narratives on Western civilisation that act interrelatedly under NATO's authority and present history, narratives about the West that sustain NATO's own narratives about values and security arrangements. Those narratives need to be deconstructed and denaturalised in order to unpack the closure and the subjugated knowledge they entail. Indeed, a critical perspective on this subject is likely to suggest that the idea of civilisation as defended by NATO in its original Charter is not necessarily to be held as a natural option to take for a regional alliance, or an international organisation of security. Likewise, the same organisation assuming that it has to protect the lives of individuals in out-of-area countries is not necessarily a given either, as its original compromise was towards the civilisation of its people. Did these two realities arise unconsciously? How do they fundamentally relate?

In order to establish that relationship between the two referents, short time lapse needs to be transcended, for it is not sufficiently comprehensive. As civilisation and its narrative are superficially approached in analyses on NATO, a long duration approach is needed to enhance the complex elements that have been silently anchored in the unconscious of the world. Because of the unseen meanings conveyed by the unconscious dimension of that knowledge, the concept of civilisation has nonetheless a strong analytical potential for the comprehension of NATO if it is approached in a deeper, more comprehensive, way. A focus on what Western civilisation entails and represents is required, along with a closer perspective on the historical roots, psychosocial dynamics, and norms used by Western civilisation in the course of its evolutive process. Despite its analytical decay, the notion of "standard of civilisation" is still a reality too (Gong, 2002; Stivachtis, 2010), as it also lies in the unconscious of the international realm.

Therefore, the argument of this dissertation is two-fold:

1. The civilisation of the West has consisted of a psychosocial process consistently producing civilised and secure subjects around the world. An interdisciplinary conceptualisation of a "civilised subject of security" highlights that the process of civilisation has relied on an ontological need individuals have for security that draws on deep psychoanalytic and symbolic reasons, without which they cannot be produced and reproduced as civilised subjects through space and time. This makes the process of civilisation to inherently seek and depend on security. In this

context, the process of civilisation is not to be understood as a rational and deliberate project of Westernisation of the world, but rather as a gradual movement of social adaptation and survival, involving particular dynamics of power that rely on a symbolic unconscious. Thus, the unconscious of Western civilised subjects has been the thread holding the timeless meanings and perceptions of security that enable them to advance across space and time.

2. The notion of a civilised subject of security developing from the West to the rest of the world supports the idea that there are unseen paths leading to the sense that the Individualisation of Security is the natural result of a linear evolution of international security, which makes it lie in an unconscious dimension of knowledge. The need to deconstruct those processes of valuation calls for a search for imposed meanings and controlled perceptions regarding the feeling of security of Western societies, in association to a sense of time and evolution. Therefore, the second interrelated claim is that NATO's particular endorsement of the Individualisation of Security has imposed and acted as a transformative process of post-Cold War international security, through which Western civilisation has been upheld and continued in the field of international security. Thus, individual-centred security policies have been enacted as part of the civilising process of non-Western states, because they have sought to instil specific transformations of behaviour and security rationales that aim at producing secure civilised subjects out of the original North-Atlantic area. The normative changes were internalised within the dominant patterns of military interventionism in a seemingly natural way. Ultimately, the Individualisation of Security serves an ongoing and open civilising process, in the continuity of a disciplining Western tradition.

Hopefully, substantiating this argument will contribute to the literature on NATO, Critical Security Studies and IR more broadly. It offers a historicisation of NATO as an institution of power and domination, consubstantiated by the dissection of its discourses on its referents of security from a long-duration perspective. Doing this on the basis of the “civilised subject of security”, which encompasses another historicising process that is anterior to NATO itself, the dissertation goes through a journey of meanings across time, space and different dimensions of consciousness. Expectantly, this will help transcending historiophobia and other illusions shaping knowledge within IR. Ultimately, so as to offer an actual critical contribution, I hope the result of this work will be the reflexion of an undominated, emancipated, scientific rationality. Well aware of my own social world and of my ties to it, the dissertation should nonetheless be able to disclose the peculiar character of international security and emancipate its comprehension from temporal closure and ideational rigidity.

### ***Methodology***

In accordance with the theoretical prospects and argument exposed above, the major methodological stance of this dissertation is provided by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Composed of multiple methods and techniques, CDA offers varying options for discourse, knowledge and power analysis. Indeed, it draws from a number of related areas (systemic linguistics, sociolinguistics, ethnography of communication, speech act analysis, narrative text grammar analysis, among others), and integrates different concepts from the Frankfurt School critical theory, post-structuralism, feminism, cultural studies, Bourdieuan sociology, and post-colonial theory (Luke, 2002: 98). Deeply inspired by Foucault’s discourse theory, CDA fundamentally deals with issues such as what knowledge consists of, how it is passed on, how its validity evolves, what function it has for the constitution of subjects and shaping of society, and its impact on the overall development of society (Jäger, 2001: 33). Throughout the dissertation, it will be evident that knowledge is perceived as a “flow of knowledge [...] throughout all time” creating “the conditions for the formulation of subjects and the structuring and shaping of societies” (Jäger, 2001: 34-35).



In this context, one of the major challenges of CDA is to make explicit the relations between discourse and knowledge (Van Dijk, 2003: 85). Discourses are a power factor because they are *agents* of knowledge, and are apt to *induce behaviour* and other discourses, and thus contribute to the structuring of the power relations in a society (Jäger, 2001: 37). The influence of discourse upon behaviour constitutes a critical point within CDA, hence the importance of language:

For (whether this sounds melodramatic or just obvious) language profoundly affects us – the ways we think, the ways we act, and the ways we are. As advertisers, propagandists, and spin-masters of all kinds know, we can be influenced subliminally – ‘mechanically and unconsciously’ – by constantly reiterated words and phrases, so that we come to act *unthinkingly* in ways that are required (Southgate, 2005: 144).

Empirically, CDA remits to structural relations of domination, discrimination, social inequality and control precisely conveyed by language, the latter being conceived as a social practice that is simultaneously socially constitutive and conditioned (Milliken, 1999; Nabers, 2007; Van Dijk, 1989; 1993; Wodak, 2001). But language is not simply to be considered under its oral or written expressions. The use of language and the choice of specific terms, to diffuse specific meanings is not innocent, and involves cognitive approaches that explore the relations between meaning and knowledge.

Teun Van Dijk explicitly relates power to the control of both action and cognition, by stating that, except in the case of physical force, power presupposes the control over cognitive conditions of actions, such as desires, wishes, plans, and beliefs. In other words, social power operates through the minds of people, by “managing the necessary information or opinions they need to plan and execute their actions” (Van Dijk, 1989: 20). “Mental control” or “mind management” is crucial to the exercise and maintenance of power (Van Dijk, 1989: 20), even if it is not always “bluntly manipulative”, and may result from “subtle, routine, everyday forms of text and talk that appear ‘natural’ and quite ‘acceptable’” (Van Dijk, 1993: 254). Moreover, this dominance through mind management involves the influence on knowledge, beliefs, understandings, plans, attitudes, ideologies, norms, and values, which is best searched for in discourse and symbolic control (Van Dijk, 1989: 23; 1993: 257).

In this sense, there are some complementary elements from political psychology that are consistent with both CDA and my inquiry over unconscious and silent processes that are helpful for the interpretation of discourses. As this research also searches for recurrent expressions in NATO's discourses that may indicate a deliberate attempt at influencing perceptions and induce behaviour and actions according to the particular designs of the Alliance, it is worth considering, for example, the role of *perceptions*, *beliefs*, *justifications* and *memory* regarding discourses on Western civilisation. These concepts can be used as conceptual tools in the discursive analysis of primary sources to enhance how meanings were allocated in relation to civilisation and security. *Perceptions* play an important role for the way the civilised habitus is expressed. They remit to the cognitive interpretations of the surrounding world and influence behaviour accordingly. Perceptions are about how a person

[w]ill see his environment or go about selecting the best route to reach his goals. When does a statesman think that others are aggressive? How is information that is discrepant from established beliefs handled? How do images change? How are images formed? Questions such as these that deal with the processes of perception cannot be answered in terms of the actors' interests (Jervis, 1976: 8).

Perceptions of the world and of other actors may surely diverge. It is always hard to determine which one is more accurate, also because perceptions depend on the information available to the actor (Jervis, 1976: 3, 7, 31). So as to complement and avoid misperceptions, Robert Jervis (1976: 31) proposes to observe how images of other actors are developed; what evidence political actors pay most attention to; what makes them perceive a threat? Hence, focusing on the actors' perceptions of Western civilisation and of the threats to Western civilisation may reveal how images of the civilised habitus are displayed, and to which aspects they give most importance to.

*Beliefs* express the critical role of emotion in rational or sensible thought. As cognition and affect cannot be separated according to the majority of psychologists, beliefs pervade every people's lives. They may convey commitment, faith, or urge others to do something (Jervis, 2006: 642-643). However, some beliefs will not be found in explicit expressions, for they may be illegitimate or infamous, and thus make the political actor not eager to reveal them, even though he may be perfectly aware of them (Jervis, 2006: 645). Therefore, a mismatch may exist between what the decision-makers said they believed, and the decisions or statements they actually took during war, which makes it very difficult to "determine what people really believe" (Jervis, 2006: 647). Besides, it is not relevant

whether a political actor really *believes* what he says when he mentions the historic importance of Western civilisation, for example. The fact he believes it or not does not explain the effects his appeal might have upon the world. “Beliefs themselves may, or may not, correspond to ‘reality’, but have no truth values unless discursively asserted” (Van Dijk, 2003: 85): what matters is what was actually said, that is, the words and content, regardless of why it was said. Personal beliefs and motivations do not influence the effect of what was said (Jackson, 2003: 235-236). In any case, beliefs appear as an important part of the civilised habitus, because they may reveal the level of commitment toward certain social meanings related to it. Given the emotional dimension of beliefs, the naturalised aspect of the habitus may be emphasised as well.

*Justification* as well is fundamental to legitimate an idea or some form of behaviour. People may seek justification for many different things, such as their own behaviour, feelings and thoughts, whether positive or negative – discrimination, aggressiveness, as well as their status or others’. “System-justification” refers to psychological processes that seek to preserve existing social arrangements independently of personal and group interest (Jost and Banaji, 2004: 391-392). At the state level,

When states justify their interventions, they are drawing on and articulating shared values and expectations held by other decision makers and other publics in other states. It is literally an attempt to connect one’s actions to standards of justice or, perhaps more generically, to standards of appropriate and acceptable behaviour. Thus through an examination of justifications we can begin to piece together what those internationally held standards are and how they may change over time (Finnemore, 1996: 159).

In turn, *stereotypes* are defined as “widespread beliefs about social groups”, which may characterise any system of separation of people into roles, classes, positions, or statuses (Jost and Banaji, 2004: 392-393). Therefore, stereotyping under system-justification implies the use of widespread beliefs that tend to differentiate social groups in a seemingly moral way for the sake of the system. This form of processing information usually occurs in an ideological environment (Jost and Banaji, 2004: 394). Interestingly, in the case of “ego-justification” of aggressive actors, stereotypes serve to justify their own behaviour by delegitimising their victims; the latter are denied a human status, as when soldiers refer to the enemy as “savages” or “satanic” (*ibid.*). In general, justification is important to shed light on the status of the civilised habitus, in the sense it may indicate how the civilised is legitimated for preservation, or conversely how the uncivilised is de-legitimated.

Finally, *memory* is an equally useful concept to the analysis of the civilised habitus. In it, the realms of language, beliefs and history interconnect and provide the habitus its continuation in time: “Our new memory is both very new and very old, for it marries hip new linguistic practices with some of the oldest senses of memory as a union of divine presence and material object” (Klein, 2000: 129). Memory may thus represent socially or culturally shared, general knowledge, through social representations of historical events such as the Holocaust, or 9/11. This is usually used for the understanding of all meanings of discourse and for the construction of mental models (Van Dijk, 2003: 93). Memory is also the *locus* where individual psychic processes of remembering interplay with the social systems of symbols, practices, stereotypes, and language that compose collective memory (Klein, 2000: 130, 133). The relationship between memory and habitus may thus offer a sense of what has been preserved or lost from the civilised habitus.

Throughout the dissertation, these conceptual tools will complement other different options within CDA. One approach, for example, consists in focusing on the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance, which Van Dijk (1993: 249-250) defines as the “exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality”. Within this reproductive process, different modes of discourse may be used: enactment, representation, legitimation, denial, mitigation or concealment of dominance (Van Dijk, 1993: 250). These may reveal in different ways how relations of power and domination underlie the construction and representation of the referent objects of security by the North-Atlantic elites.

Another analytical possibility is the “discourse-historical approach”, which Ruth Wodak’s (2001: 64) associates to the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory, by following a complex concept of social critique that embraces the interrelated importance of both cognitive and action dimensions: immanent critique aiming at discovering inconsistencies, contradictions, dilemmas; the socio-diagnostic critique concerned with demystifying manipulative or persuasive discursive practices; and the prognostic critique contributing to transforming and improving communication. Text analyses are never far from their social context and that is why CDA goes beyond the immediate, and presupposes “more general insights, sometimes indirect and long-term analyses of

fundamental causes, conditions and consequences of such issues” (Van Dijk, 1993: 253). CDA thereby requires “true multidisciplinary, and an account of intricate relationships between text, talk, social cognition, power, society and culture” (*ibid.*). The aforesaid approaches are all complementary options that do not represent the totality of the possibilities within CDA. They nonetheless offer sufficient analytic variety to usefully look into the discourses revolving around NATO and its representations of security.

It can be said this dissertation will fundamentally reflect the different precepts of CDA enounced so far. For instance, when conceptualising the Civilised Subject of Security in Part 1, a long-term interdisciplinary analysis will be privileged, so as to explore the intricate relationship between social cognition, identity, behaviour, society, power, and psychoanalysis. Besides, that conceptualisation will be duly contextualised with an historical and temporal perspective, to reflect the long-term, ever flowing, learning process inherent to knowledge. Hopefully, this will bring deeper substance to the subjectification of the Civilised Subject of Security. The choice over the long-term is also favoured when approaching the evolution of NATO’s civilisational referent of security (Part 2). That is why, whenever possible, literature and primary sources dating from the same period under analysis are used, together with intertextual elements, so that the contextual relation between society, cognition and knowledge is better enhanced, as well as the broader meanings of what is enounced textually (Nabers, 2007: 26).

Although Part 3 on the Individualisation of Security and the analysis of three empirical cases – NATO’s operations in Bosnia (1992-1995), Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2005) – reflects the shortest temporal period of the dissertation, it is nonetheless the ultimate object of analysis of the dissertation. Retracing the whole evolution of the IS until nowadays is not the purpose of the analysis. The analysis of the Individualisation of Security is indeed intended to be a counter-point to the analysis of civilisation as a referent object. In this sense, the three operations under analysis referred above – Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan – and the temporal period comprised by them constitute a fair basis for a genealogy of the Individualisation of Security.

Hence, each of the three missions represents a key transformative moment in the general evolution of the Alliance. First, in the early 1990's/end of the Cold War, with the case of Bosnia, NATO initiated its normative turn towards the individual for the first time. Then, in the late 1990's with Kosovo, the ethical and moral justifications of individual-centred interventions were consecrated within NATO. Finally, in the aftermath of 9/11 with the mission in Afghanistan, NATO operated its first mission outside the Alliance's traditional geographic area, as it occurred in another continent. Operationally, the strategy adopted in Afghanistan was totally different and the threat at stake was notoriously of an atypical kind. Yet, this is important precisely because NATO dealt with another threat in another continent, which requires to question whether that altered NATO's policy of the Individualisation of Security and civilisation, and how. The apparent diversification and dissimilitude between the three cases is important, so as to find commonalities regarding a transversal issue: who is the subject and who is the referent of security in each of these interventions? How are those differences processed by the discourses and practices? Although these topics are not meant to be comparative, they are still relevant to understanding how the individual referent of security actually evolved within the organisation, the kinds of discourses accompanying it, the means employed to put it into practice, among other things.

Regarding the actors and authors who give voice to the discourses analysed, the sources chosen reflect and enhance different genres and dimensions of power. The most employed are related to major power institutions with a degree of legitimacy for social control, and hierarchically high positioned within their irrespective institution: government, state agencies, the military, international organisations (Van Dijk, 1989: 27-29). Part 2 – which covers the 1939-1989 period – will give priority to the political elites featuring and more directly involved in the related events. Politicians are both shapers of public opinions and interests, and also “seismographs” that reflect and react to the atmospheric anticipation of changes in public opinion (Wodak, 2001: 64). Therefore, the main Presidents, Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries, governmental figures of NATO member states, constitute the basis of the analysis. For WWII, references are especially made to Winston Churchill, Ernest Bevin, Joseph Stalin, US Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman.

From the postwar period onwards, as NATO is the main focus of analysis, the discursive sources include NATO Secretary Generals' public speeches and statements; NATO official documents such as reports, policy documents, declarations issued after the NAC sessions; press conferences by the spokespersons, interviews with NATO commanders, and leaflets.<sup>10</sup> These are indeed different types of sources, as one may find either persuasive discourses aiming at influence future action; descriptions of future or possible events and actions, such as prediction plans, scenarios, and warnings (Van Dijk, 1989: 29); or even institutional texts, which also constitute formal dialogues fixed in writing or print that record the meeting or encounter and thus form the institutional or legal basis for any further action or decision making (Van Dijk, 1989: 41). Additionally, as it will be seen, those sources operate on different fields of action (Wodak, 2001: 68); some are about political procedures (regulations, guidelines); others are for political executive and administration (decisions, speeches, ministerial communiqués); and most importantly, there is also the purpose of forming public opinion and self-presentation (press conferences, press releases, inaugural and commemorative speeches, articles, reports, books by politicians, leaflets). Although many others authors and sources may be included, and although each may have a different degree of influence upon audiences at large, these hopefully provide sufficient diversity and representativity to the analysis of the different topics in their respective period.

In each of NATO's military operations under analysis – BH, Kosovo, and Afghanistan – the role and importance of the individual referent of security will be searched for in public speeches and policy statements. These will be assessed in terms of the justification advanced for the interventions, their formal mandate, their objectives, their normative principles, their self-declared results. This will be followed in each case by broader considerations on the civilised subject of security, by looking into expressions, formulations and depictions of civilisation and (un)civilised conduct, as well as symbolic references, constructions and representations of security in relation to space, time, or history. A *caveat* needs to be made; these *will not* be exhaustive interdisciplinary analyses of the very complex conflicts at stake that review the wide scope of factors and dimensions involved. Instead of focusing solely on the *conflicts*, the focus will be on very particular

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<sup>10</sup> It will be seen in Part 3, in the sections dedicated to Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, that leaflets constituted a recurrent and privileged asset of information and communication strategies in the context of NATO air-dominated operations.

aspects of the *missions* related to whether and how NATO has represented individual subjects of security and has related them to the civilising process.

### ***The Script***

Part 1 will start with the formulation of my conceptual understanding of what a “civilised subject of security” is. This conceptualisation grounds the argument, by portraying how civilisation is actually a psychosocial process composing the identity of individuals that is unconsciously rooted in the ideas of power and security. It successively introduces the key conceptual tools that allow this reflection to take form. First, (Chapter 1) Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of habitus fundamentally enables relating civilisation to primal processes of identity formation and social cognition. This will pave the way to understanding how the individual Self acquires and maintains the perception of his existence as a civilised subject in relation to society. Then, in Chapter 2, Norbert Elias’ theory of the civilising process brings greater focus on psychosocial progressions that connect individual to collective processes shaping this same perception of civilisation in close relation to the emergence of the state system. For society as a whole, the habitus underlying civilisation meant pacification, growing interdependence, state monopolisation and centralisation. After this, Chapter 3 introduces Michel Foucault’s assumptions on power to elevate civilisation to processes of self-discipline, and present the idea that only through power may a civilised subject be produced and reproduced, in a reciprocal relation of subjectification. Hence, the proposal that civilisation in the West should be seen as a complex process that is orchestrated by the production of civilised *ergo* secure subjects and societies. Chapter 4 will draw on psychoanalysis with authors such as Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, to frame the civilised subject within unconscious processes composing the ontological relation linking civilisation to security.

Chapter 5 will give Part 1 its final stance, by setting the civilised subject of security in time and space. Here, the conception of Modernity is presented as a hegemonic sociohistorical representation of the West, whereby a particular narrative of the origin of the Modern Western civilisation has circulated in time and space, and produced a civilised subject out of the original West through othering practices (Chapter 5, Section a). The



power relation between the figure of the civilised and the barbarian is specifically approached, to highlight how the civilised is produced through differentiation, without actually turning the Other into a similar civilised subject who is identical to the original Western Self. Then, I will focus on the standardisation of security, as a process of normalisation and stabilisation of Western civilisation through space and time, which reveals to be ontologically centred on a security rationale. Thus, security appears again as the key metaphysical value to be considered in the universalisation of Western civilisation, which ultimately illustrates how the production of civilised subjects is unconsciously related to security (Chapter 5, Section b).

Part 2 will then approach in detail how NATO relates to civilisation as a referent object of security. This will involve a genealogy of the use of civilisation as a concept throughout the life of the organisation, which will be supported by a discursive analysis. The objective of Part 2 is to highlight how NATO has always been driven by, and represented itself through, a mission of civilisational protection that breeds both upon the unconscious stance of the civilised subjects of security, and upon the long-term symbolic capital of the West as a civilisational entity (Chapter 6). As it will be seen in Chapter 7, NATO's civilisational referent of security has not been static, and has rather evolved through time, acquiring new conceptual and discursive shapes along the different international conjunctures.

Part 3 is about the specific relation between the Individualisation of Security and civilisation within NATO, and shows that the Individualisation of Security has been a tool used by NATO to produce civilised subjects of security. Chapter 8 will begin by presenting the broader transformations within NATO resulting from the end of the Cold War, and their implications for the civilised habitus of Western security. Chapter 9 will elaborate in more depth on the Individualisation of Security as the chief evolution in the field of international security. It will offer a conceptual, theoretical and practical analysis of the phenomenon, and articulate it with my notion of the civilised subject of security. Chapter 10 will then analyse each of the three missions proposed – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan – in the light of the Individualisation of Security as another stage of the process of civilisation of the West. This should indicate whether the individual is the mere conjunctural continuation of a civilising process conducted by the West, in which civilisation still continues to be the ultimate referent object of security to uphold. Finally,

Chapter 11 will recapitulate and offer a final reflection on the main findings of this dissertation.



## **PART 1 – Conceptualising the “Civilised Subject of Security”**

PART 1 offers a theoretical reflection that focuses on the terms and ideas that best depict what Western civilisation has encompassed and represented for the individuals of the twenty-first century, especially for the conceptions on their security, and also for broader conceptions on international security. Across the five chapters composing this first Part, a general understanding of the “civilised subject of security” will be formulated, drawing on different conceptual approaches inspired by the work of sociologists Pierre Bourdieu, Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault, and psychoanalysts Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung (chapter 1 to 4). A socio-historical approach will complement the conceptualisation by setting the evolution of the civilised subject of security across time and space (chapter 5). The notion of a civilised subject of security grounds the argument, as it embodies how civilisation has been a psychosocial process composing the identity of individuals that is unconsciously rooted in the ideas of power and security.

How far do reason, progress, or humanism represent the guiding principles of the West? Or would it be rather colonisation, domination, and universalism? The answer will probably depend on whether one believes that such entity as the “West” actually exists, and most importantly whether we consider ourselves as civilised Westerners or not. It is thus a matter of perception and identity, both at the individual level – ‘*am I civilised?*’ – and at the collective level – ‘*are we in danger as a civilisation?*’ – which is one of the most elemental implications usually held in civilisational discourses (Arnason, 2003: 51; Van Ham, 2001).

The concept of civilisation is not linear, and there is no actual consensus over formal definitions, or even over the elements it entails. Fernand Braudel (1989: 23-36) has outlined a civilisation from an inter-disciplinary perspective as being composed of a particular geography, an economy, a society, and a collective mentality, perpetuating itself on the long run. As Braudel put in quite straight terms, a civilisation is “[w]hat a group of men, throughout a tumultuous history, very often a tempestuous one, manages to protect and transmit from generation to generation, as its most valuable thing” (Braudel, 1989: 49).<sup>11</sup> To Mehdi Mozaffari, a “great” civilisation is “[t]he junction between a world vision

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<sup>11</sup> This is a free translation of the author; the original is in Portuguese.

and a historical formation”, i.e., between an ideological, religious, or cultural vision of the world, and a historical system, such as a coherent political, military and economic system (2002: 24-26). Besides one particular (great) Civilisation, civilisation is also a descriptive and normative concept (Bowden, 2010), an attribute. The term “civilisation” *per se* is a neologism that emerged in the eighteenth century in opposition to the idea of barbarity (Braudel, 1989: 17; Foucault, 2003: 195-196). Commonly, civilisation is assumed to have mainly expressed the self-consciousness of the West, as a feeling of superiority engendered by its elites, in a general sense of overcoming previous or primitive barbarian societies through the undisputable level of Western manners, technicality, and scientific knowledge (Elias, 1989: 59). It seems that Western society now conceives its civilisation as an accomplished status, a natural condition, a definite *acquis* to be transmitted to others, as it has been done since the Iberian Discoveries, and later the French Revolution through Napoleonic conquest and trans-continental colonisation (Dussel and Ibarra-Colado, 2006; Elias, 1989: 100). Drawing on the aforementioned authors (Braudel, 1989; Elias, 1989; O’Hagan, 2002; Mozaffari, 2002), a civilisation can thus be seen as a collective entity that is the result of a strong identity self-consciousness, (re)affirmed through space and time, which some degree of systematic organisation enables to continue and prolong during a sufficient period of time for it to be not only acknowledged and perceived as such, but also applied as a social model to others.

Contemporary literature has focused on several debates that actually reveal the cultural sensitivities underlying the notion of civilisation. Thus, it can be related to certain issues that are central to critical approaches such as post-structuralism and post-colonialism. There is a wide debate involving, for example, the fundamental diversity or homogeneity of “modernity” as a distinct civilisation (Behnam, 2002: 194-195; Eisenstadt, 2003); the fluidity and the interacting co-constitution amongst a “civilisational constellation” in reference to the Eurasian inter-civilisational cosmopolitanism (Delanty, 2006a); and most fundamentally over the use of singular “civilisation” or plural “civilisations”:

Civilization in the singular was an ideological projection of the capitalist world system and its expansionist dynamic; the plural version of the concept is therefore best understood as an empowering device designed to boost peripheral resistance to the systemic centre by contesting the cultural hegemony of the latter. If civilization (singular) can be equated with progress, enlightenment and universalism, civilizations (plural) are linked to the counter-values of identity, autonomy and diversity (Arnason, 2003: 7-8).

Singular or plural, the potential of the concept of civilisation for generating ideological struggles is very clear as it is stated by Arnason: “ideological projection”, “empowering device”, “boost peripheral resistance”, “cultural hegemony”; these are all terms that put civilisation at the core of opposing forces for global dominance and control. In contemporaneity, a universalist conception of civilisation is commonly related to a particular ideology, as it enhances the singularity of capitalist self-projection, progress, Enlightenment, and Western universalism, for

[a] strong philosophical and historical tradition has made the existence of distinct and lasting civilizations one of the foundations in the understanding of human history. An equally strong philosophical and sociological tradition, going back to the Enlightenment, through Hegel, Marx and Weber, has made Western modernity and its attributes a universalism destined to spread everyone (Behnam, 2002: 194-195).

As it appears, the civilising process was initially associated to specific epistemologies as well. A philosophical and sociological tradition, in which the European civilisation – and its American affiliate – was seen as an active and dynamic agent (Cox, 2002b: 2) thus associated the civilising process to the positive idea of progress. However, to the East for instance, the West was an unknown and imaginary continent for a long time; and although Europe presented itself as synonymous with progress and power, as fighting oppression, in the search for liberty and scientific knowledge, this perception rapidly changed, and Europe would be associated to domination (Behnam, 2002: 178). As a consequence, the universalist view of civilisation has evolved as an object of critique for pluralist opinions that stress the possibilities of peripheral resistance, diversity, hybridism and cross-contamination in a clear attempt of countering the idea that the West is *the* Civilisation that works as an *ideology* to spread and conquer the world.

However, the influence of ideology is not a tangible element. Michael Freeden (2003: 1), who has worked on it as both a concept and a political phenomenon for several decades, states that ideologies act upon our lives “whether we are aware of it or not”. As he further explains:

After all, social groups operate on the basis of shared rituals, prejudices, stories, and histories – elements that ideologies incorporate. For most of us it is quite difficult to see ourselves from a different perspective and note the customs and habits that we internalize unthinkingly and uncritically (Freeden, 2003: 13).

Drawing on such perspective, this is to imply that even if civilisation works as an ideology, there are invisible meanings underlying it, which are not always consciously processed. In accordance with one of the theoretical postulations exposed in the above introduction – namely that *the normalisation of knowledge implies that unconscious meanings have to be conveyed through the narratives on Western civilisation* – I would suggest that civilisation cannot be plainly referred to as an ideology, but rather to what Weber calls an “unconscious ideology”, because it is an unconscious category of the Self: “[u]nconscious ideologies are the foundations of our ideological and political thinking that we place beyond debate. Unconscious ideologies, in other words, “go without saying” (Weber, 2010: 5). The notion of things that “go without saying” has been conceptualised by Pierre Bourdieu as ‘doxa’, which literally means ‘the silent experience of the world’, that which goes without saying. It is constituted by informal and unspoken structures that constraint on action because they operate at the level of the unconscious or semi-conscious (Jackson, 2009: 109). Bourdieu described it in opposition to opinion; while the opinion implies being aware of different viewpoints, the doxa implies that one is unaware that opposing viewpoints might even exist (Bourdieu, 1977: 167-78). This is all consistent with the epistemological problems raised by Critical Theory. Therefore, while civilisation as a concept belongs obviously to the realm of the conscious – for it can be enounced through language, and one may identify to it – its main signifying processes remain metaphysical and not entirely from the conscious realm. Civilisation should be approached as a cultural element, understood as “significant practices”, “sense-making” or “set of histories, beliefs and habits”, which requires focusing on how meanings are constructed (Weber, 2010: 4).

Besides, approaching civilisation as a cultural element involves considering “cultural patterns with primary internal reference”, a psychosocial notion used by Eric Trist to refer to unconscious internal objects that compose the basic social character of the individual, as they are regarded as a part of the individual by himself and others:

Beyond a certain point of perception their social configuration becomes lost. They appear merely as personal idiosyncrasies or as universal qualities. They act as an internal source of influence on the patterns at a more conscious level and reach into society through them (Trist, 1990: 542).

Beyond issues of definition and use, the concept of civilisation clearly raises philosophical and epistemological issues, as it presents complex linkages to society, culture, and identity. As a result, the general conception of a “Western civilisation” seems to be the symbiosis of one specific civilisation that has evolved *inter alia*, along with the current understanding of

a societal status in apotheosis. Taken together, these features thus form a civilised identity, that is, the identity of a Western civilisation. But how did the West manage to perpetuate as one particular Civilisation despite antagonising perceptions of domination? And how has the meaning of civilisation been produced and naturalised, until the civilised status of the West is now unequivocal as a natural *acquis*?

PART 1 addresses the need for a deeper understanding of the dynamics composing the idea of Western civilisation, namely one that addresses the questions of the unconscious dimensions composing it. It does so by focusing on the dynamics producing the civilised subject instead of civilisation as a whole. Its purpose is not so much to find a suitable definition able to surpass the aforementioned sensitivities, or to debate over which approach is the rightest one to be applied to the present case. In accordance with the archaeological methodology adopted, the exercise I propose here is to go deeper into the West as one particular Civilisation, and also into civilisation as a particular feature of the West. This is to assume that both Western civilisation as a social system, and civilisation as a concept, arose and developed concurrently. Hence, the conceptualisation of “the civilised subject of security” presented in this dissertation will allow observing how a civilised subject is produced out of his belonging to one collective entity, and of the normative attributes he embodies within that collective entity.

My theoretical proposal is structured in five chapters. The first will introduce Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as a fundamental conceptual premise. It shows that, according to the logic of habitus, Western civilisation may be first understood as an endogenous process of identity operating at the psychosocial level of individuals.

Chapter 2 will develop this concept in the light of Norbert Elias’ work *The Civilising Process*, in order to elaborate on the relation between a *civilised* identity and *civilised* social systems. It will show how a “civilised habitus” was formed in the West sustained by the interrelated evolution of a civilised Self and of a civilised society organised as a state.

Chapter 3 will add Foucault’s notion of power (Foucault, 2000; 2003) to the habitus rationale. The incorporation of power into the civilised habitus results in the conception of the “power of habitus”, so as to complement the existing readings of habitus. As it will be seen, power opens the possibility for a civilised habitus to evolve into being “civilising” as well. Its productive and relational effects not only allow relaying the



civilising process to other *foci* of agency, as they also allow civilisation as a social organism to be durable but not static, and therefore in continuous transformation.

Chapter 4 completes the framework by adding security to the conceptualisation of civilised subjects. Here, the ontological relation linking security to civilisation will be developed to reveal how the civilised subject of the West is necessarily a secure subject. Drawing on psychoanalytical insights, the centrality of unconscious processes and the interrelated role of symbols will be highlighted to connect security with the transcendence of time and space. Hopefully, this will allow understanding how the process of civilisation has played a continuous role in the provision of security to the civilised subject, and by extension, to the uncivilised Other.

Finally, Chapter 5 will illustrate the historical process of subjectification of the civilised in time and space, by enhancing the constitutive role of Modernity, its narratives, its symbolic capital, and its standardising effects. Here, it will be seen that, in order to be acknowledged outside the West, the process of civilisation throughout the European colonial period (from sixteenth to nineteenth century) essentially reproduced the civilised habitus as provider of security through domination practices of Otherness.

## **1. Bourdieu and the habitus – “how the subject socially knows”**

French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu introduces us to the first conceptual pillar of the framework elaborated here: the concept of “habitus”. This is the starting phase of a deeper reflection on the psychosocial processes composing civilisation. It will allow conceptualising the notion of a “civilised habitus”, so as to translate the possibility of civilisation as a predisposition of individuals to internalise and reproduce certain attitudes, in a way that is not entirely conscious. This does not mean that habitus is a natural tendency; it rather explains *how* social meanings may be *held as natural*.

Bourdieu’s work offers a valuable contribution to the critical enterprise of denaturalising cultural forms of knowledge, and their automatic assumptions about society by highlighting how unconscious processes may shape social meanings. The notions of habitus, along with the “field”, “symbolic power” and “symbolic violence”, are the cornerstones of Bourdieu’s critique of the cultural dynamics of domination.<sup>12</sup>

If I had to describe my work in two words [...] I would speak of ‘constructivist structuralism’ or ‘structuralist constructivism’ [...]. By **structuralism**, or structuralist, I mean that there exists in the social world, and not only in symbolic systems (language, myths etc.), **objective structures, independent of the consciousness or the will of agents, which are capable of orienting or constraining practices and representations**. By **constructivism** I mean that there is a **twofold social genesis**, on the one hand of the **schemes of perception, thought and action** which are constitutive of what I call **habitus**, and on the other hand of **social structures**, and particularly of what I call **fields** and of groups, notably those we ordinarily call social classes (Bourdieu, 1989: 14).

To Bourdieu, the fact that the familiar world tends to be taken for granted and conceived as natural appears to be a universal property of human experience. This is said to happen because of our habitus, i.e., our (pre)dispositions as agents (Bourdieu, 1989: 18). Etymologically, *habitus* is a Latin word signifying ‘way of being’, either physically, or regarding the disposition of spirit, character and feelings. Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, for instance, used the term in the context of Greek dramaturgy to emphasise an actor’s capacity to improvise (Burke, 2004: 56-57 cit. in Jackson, 2009: 107). Habitus, then, may be related to a general state of being that includes both inner features of the human mind, and exterior elements related to the visual appearance transmitted by the individual to others.

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<sup>12</sup> The notions of “symbolic power” and “symbolic violence” will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Bourdieu does not elaborate on a fixed definition of the concept of habitus, or of any other concept – such as field or capital – because he does “not like professorial definitions much” and rather defends the use of “open concepts” designed to be “put to work empirically”, as a way of rejecting positivism (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 95-96). Yet, some images may be taken together to compose a fair illustration of the concept. In Bourdieu’s own words, habitus “implies a ‘sense of one’s place’ but also a ‘sense of the place of others’” (Bourdieu, 1989: 19). This notion is to break with the notion of rational agent, and to provide instead a logic of practice to illustrate that there is a practical sense, a “sense of game” that underlies social action (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 120-121). Put in other words, the habitus implies that the sense of the Self is interrelated to the sense of Otherness, presupposing an inner comprehension that social action is interdependent of others, and cannot exist in isolation.

Such use of habitus remits to the human dispositions that are “[e]ssentially the product of the internalization of the structures” of our world (Bourdieu, 1989: 18). As explained by different authors who approach Bourdieu’s work, throughout one’s life, experience is learned, cognitive lessons are cumulated, both conscious and unconsciously through processes of inculcation, childhood experiences, training and learning, and social practices. This comprises everything from table manners to ways of holding one’s body – what Bourdieu terms the “bodily hexis” – constituting attitudes, inclinations, that are durable because they are embedded in the body and operate in a pre-conscious way, thus not subject to conscious reflection (Jackson, 2009: 106; Thompson, 1991: 13; Williams, 2007: 29). Put in Peter Jackson’s words (2009: 106), “categories of meaning” are internalised and, as a consequence, hierarchies, cultural practices and codes of conduct “that might otherwise seem arbitrary” are “misrecognized” by “both individuals and social institutions as being both natural and legitimate”. However, to Bourdieu, habitus does not *determine* action; it is instead a “durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisation” (Bourdieu, 1977: 56 cit. in Jackson, 2009: 107). In this sense, habitus would influence our action according to a certain logic of sensorial memory, which implies that although habitus conveys a sense of naturalness to social norms, it does not influence action in a direct conscious way.

In no way is habitus static, though, for it is in a continual state of evolution. As a product of history, habitus remains an “open system of dispositions that is constantly

subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structures” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 133). But habitus reveals itself only in reference to definite situations, in relation to certain structures, in order to produce given discourses and practices. Bourdieu says we should think of it as a “spring that needs a trigger” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 135). In this sense, habitus may be transformed and shaped by social interaction in order to (re)define the meanings conveyed by discourses and practices.

Andreas Pickel (2005) has suggested an interesting typology of habitus that follows a grading going from “simple and circumscribed” *habiti* to more “generalised and complex” ones. As such, the simplest *habiti* would consist of simple automatic behaviours such as facial expressions, and progress to acts of speaking, writing, problem solving; then to interpersonal interaction, economic, political, religious, domestic behaviour, freedom, obedience, or restraint. Finally, at the top of Pickel’s typology, the most complex kind of *habiti* are durable and generalised predispositions in a domain of life, or in all of life. Here, the author intends the “national habitus” as the single most important habitus in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries. To Pickel, the national habitus can be described as a meta-habitus that pervades most other social systems (*ibid.*).

Furthermore, the structures of habitus are simultaneously composed of dispositions that are acquired through the occupation of specific social and economic positions in specific *fields*. Bourdieu’s notion of field is thought in relational terms, as other thinkers do (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97) – like Norbert Elias or Michel Foucault as a matter of fact. A “field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions” that are related by domination, subordination, homology, etc. (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97). In short, it is the “locus of relations of force” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 103). As Williams (2007: 27-28) reads it, the habitus both structures and is structured by social fields, so action is constituted by the relationship between the habitus and the specific field in question – economy, international security, religion, literature or sports for example. Here, a “[s]ystem of schemes of perception and appreciation of practices, cognitive and evaluative structures” is apprehended “[t]hrough the lasting experience of a social position” (Bourdieu, 1989: 19). In other words, each field may entail one particular habitus. Moreover, the relation between field and habitus operates in two ways. First, it is a relation of *conditioning*, as it

is “the product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity of a field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 127). Then, it is a relation of *knowledge*, or cognitive construction: “Social reality exists [...] twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside agents” (*ibid.*). As synthesised by Francisco Vazquez Garcia (2002: 349), “habitus is history that turned into body; the field is history turned into thing, institution”.<sup>13</sup>

Through habitus, social agents perceive and classify the world in a seemingly orderly and routinised manner, by following a set of conscious and unconscious precepts that they continuously acquire throughout a life of social interaction, experience and learning. This continual process of interrelated inculcation and social learning gives habitus its legitimising and naturalising character, so that, “[t]hrough habitus, we have a world of common sense, a world that seems self-evident” (Bourdieu, 1989: 19). Bourdieusian notions rejoin Critical Theory, in that they dissect the apparent natural progression of social practices. Hence, the idea of habitus brings an incremental dynamics to processes of identity formation, through which one may conceive that social identity is a long-term cumulative and interactive phenomenon, and not the result of a singular, isolated, positivist evolution.

In terms of the “civilised subject of security”, it becomes possible to conceive that individuals coexist in a web of interdependent cognitive relations, as they learn from each other, internalise certain behavioural predispositions and cement them in the realm of the unconscious to the extent they do not necessarily make a conscious choice about those predispositions. Bourdieu thus helps denaturalising the idea that assumptions about behaviour, or meanings of identity, may be innate, because they are in fact rooted in complex processes of learning, inculcation, and socialisation. Moreover, as it was seen, the interrelation of a habitus with the field of international security also suggests that there is a relation of power that may be shaped to transform certain meanings through discourses and practices.

Ultimately, through habitus, a form of knowledge is unpacked that is pre-conscious, because it provides individuals with a sense of predictability and stability in their social relations. In turn, this form of knowledge helps understanding in more depth the silent dimension of the meanings conveyed by the narratives on Western civilisation.

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<sup>13</sup> Free translation of the author. In the original: “L’*habitus* est l’histoire faite corps; le *champ* est l’histoire faite chose, institution” (Garcia, 2002: 349).

In this sense, the next section will proceed by elaborating more specifically on a “civilised habitus”, which hopefully will allow further deconstructing the concept of civilisation.



## **2. Elias, the Civilising Process of the West, and the civilised habitus – “how the subject became civilised”**

The idea of conceiving civilisation as a habitus process was latently proposed by Norbert Elias in *The Civilising Process* (1989; 1990). However, while Bourdieu’s socio-cognitive habitus may be conceptualised in different social, temporal, and spatial contexts, Elias specifically locates the idea of civilisation as a *process* emerging in medieval France, in which the psychological changes of individuals are interconnected with social changes related to the formation of the modern state. As a matter of fact, Elias conceives *knowledge* itself as *a process*, as “the learning process of humankind, not the learning process of an individual person who supposedly acquires knowledge starting from scratch” (Elias, 1991: 113). This approach allows conceiving that a civilised habitus developed from the West as a complex historical and psychosocial process.

Elias’ work offers one of the most complete, interdisciplinary, dynamic and comprehensive understandings of the idea of civilisation in the West. In fact, his work has been profusely used in IR literature, in particular by the English School, regarding the role of civilising processes in the evolution of international society and the peaceful, or “self-restrained”, coexistence of its members (Adler, 2008; Ikeda, 2010; Linklater, 2004, 2007, 2011; Linklater and Suganami, 2006).

Elias’ endeavour was to approach long-term processes of historical change in human psychological structure in a very holistic manner, which made him call for the creation of a science that does not yet exist, namely historical psychology or historical social psychology. To Steve Smith (2001: 39), who provides an extensive re-reading of Elias’ work, understanding the civilising process in all its complex aspects was Elias’ key to cope with Modernity. That is why, throughout his work, Elias reflected a deep concern over the fundamental connections between our complex sense of identity and broader social processes, which he considered mutually influencing, in that social processes shape the identity of individuals and groups, as they are also influenced by the ways we act out that identity (Smith, 2001: ix).

In *The Civilising Process*, Norbert Elias exposes the Western civilisation as a long-term process of pacification within Europe since the early Middle Ages. His main argument is that the structure of man has become more civilised because his personality is



open and interdependent of other persons (Elias, 1989: 49). Elias' general vision on the civilising process is one that interconnects the development of human beings with that of societies, according to a cyclic relation of centralisation, competition, monopolistic mechanisms, pacification, increased specialisation of social functions, and complexifying chains of interdependence (Smith, 2001: 3).

Although Elias considers that one essential step of the civilising process occurs when there is *awareness* of civilisation – i.e. the conscience of one's behavioural, artistic or scientific superiority, which starts spreading to many other nations in the West. He does not think that civilisational change in the West is deliberate, or intentional (Elias, 1989: 100). It is not a rational and conscious process of individuals, because civilisation is not the result of human *ratio* or long-term planning (Elias, 1990: 187). However, civilisation occurs within a particular order, and not in chaos: first, physiological functions, impulses and affections are relocated to the private and intimate realm. Then, the interdependence between individuals makes a compulsive and *sui generis* order to emerge; an order that is stronger than individual reasoning. This order of interdependence actually determines the course of historic change, and lies at the very origin of the civilising process (Elias, 1990: 188).

Elias continuously observes historical facts and empirical material from the Absolutist period in Europe (sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries) to highlight the slow and gradual evolution of specific attitudes and social patterns (1989: 50, 106-107). He locates the *civilité* or *politesse* as it was used *ipsis verbis* by French society from 1530,<sup>14</sup> with the success of Erasmus' treaty *De civilitate morum puerilium* on the children's civility of usages (Elias, 1989: 103). Erasmus' treaty approached the man's public behaviour and focused on the boys' instruction, in the sense of inculcating them with the right way of behaving in society, by not spitting in public for example, and the polite ways to look at people, dress, gesture, set the table, eat, or clean their noses (Elias, 1989: 106-107). This clearly reinforced the need for a civilised habitus to be established, remitting to Bourdieu's bodily dispositions that co-constitute habitus. As Elias shows, these attitudes evolved in the sense of self-restraining natural impulses for the sake of social decorum. With new

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<sup>14</sup> At that time, in France, *politesse* or *civilité* had the same meaning that "civilisation" would later have. It expressed the self-conscience of Europe's superior stratum, as compared to other strata deemed more simple or primitive. At the same time, "civilisation" characterised the particular behaviour through which that superior stratum distinguished itself from the simple and primitive people (Elias, 1989: 90).

forms of conducting and organising human relations in a way that is more self-centred and respectful of the space of others, there is a growing obligation of self-control, which restructures the whole society (Elias, 1989: 129-130). In this context, the development of a habitus may be envisaged in the process of civilisation of the West, in that very “simple and circumscribed” human dispositions (Pickel, 2005) began to stabilise and were internalised into the unconscious of individuals, throughout a learning process that was first related to the bodily *hexis* mentioned earlier. Elias’ psychogenetic approach clearly illustrates how the process of civilisation was initially related to this notion of physical embedment of behaviours, which is consistent with Bourdieu’s view of habitus as both an open concept and process.

Besides the psychogenetic reconstitution, Elias also undertakes a sociogenetic approach that interconnects the civilising move of individuals with the development of a stable central state apparatus monopolising physical force within territorial limits (Elias, 1989: 52; 1990; Smith, 2001). In other words, alongside the civilisation of behaviour and restructuration of conscience, the civilising process of the West has also to do with the reinforcement of subjection, domination, centralisation and dependence underlying the formation of the state during Absolutism (Elias, 1990: 15). In fact, the Western process of pacification depicted by Elias required that civilised persons would have stable psychic systems of self-coercion. Then, in order to achieve that stability, monopolistic institutions of physical violence were needed. This revealed to be the only way of social modeling according to which the individual would be educated and habituated since his childhood to a constant contention, so he can act it automatically during his whole life (Elias, 1990: 191) – making it a habitus.

### **2.1. The changing field of security within the *Civilising Process***

In what was a crucial change of the field of security at the time, Elias explains how warrior aristocracy slowly underwent a process of transformation into court nobility from sixteenth-century France, as the nobility of long-generation knights and warriors was substituted with a class of paid officials. This newly emerged military class would devotedly serve and depend more on the central administrator, making the king’s rule

progressively independent of the individuals' will. This was a precondition for the pacification of a sovereign area from the centre (Elias, 1990: 17-19). More specifically, the monopoly of violence implied a more severe regulation of the threat man represents to man. Therefore, physical violence was confined to the monopoly of a remunerated army and became excluded from the lives of other people. The constant pressure that individuals used to feel upon their lives was no longer an issue, for their behaviour was attuned since childhood vis-à-vis the presence of a military organisation in charge of dealing with that threat. Moreover, the monopolistic organisation of violence did not deter individuals from violence through a direct threat; it rather exerted a psychological pressure that acted through the individual's capacity of reflection. This is how the individual wielded actual coercion on himself, based on the knowledge he had of the consequences of his actions (Elias, 1990: 194). This depicts the passage from a very hierarchical and decentralised medieval society, with its great and small warriors ruling the West, to the formulation of internally pacified societies, armed to secure themselves from the exterior, from their pairs (Elias, 1989: 52).

This sociogenetic approach enhances another structuring layer of the civilised habitus process. The evolution depicted by Elias in the field of the military in particular shows how the specific dispositions in terms of the functions of physical violence were acquired in narrow dependence of a central administrator, who monopolised the security and defence-related decisions in "exchange" for pacified societies. This vital social function of the administrator was internalised by civilised individuals, whose manners were evolving in the sense of self-restraint and pacification as well, and a collective habitus emerged and animated the action of state-related institutions and paid forces. Therefore, the acquisition of a civilised habitus occurred together with the routinisation of the central administrator's social functions. A civilised habitus thus made the central state functions to become common sense, which could mean that a civilised habitus could be actually at the origin of, or be prior to, the very national meta-habitus Pickel (2005) stands for.

Globally, Elias' work may be seen as both a postmodern and post-structuralist contribution that sows the seeds of the conceptualisation of a civilised subject of security. Indeed, it denaturalises Modernity and simultaneously deconstructs the process by which Westerners came to be what they are through a duly contextualised historicisation of

identity formation. With habitus as a ground concept, Elias allows relating civilisation to deep psychosocial processes of identity formation, namely to how the individual Self acquired the perception of its existence as a civilised subject in relation to an equally civilised society. Therefore, one may understand the mutually constitutive interaction between the sense of identity and broader social processes. Accordingly, the civilised habitus of civilised subjects is composed of a conscious civilised Self that is self-controlled and that has interdependently evolved amongst a centralised and pacified society in the West. The next section will introduce Foucault's insights on power to further develop the relational dynamic inherent to the civilised subjects and its wider consequences for knowledge.



### **3. Foucault and relational power – “how the civilised is inherently civilising”**

These two great ‘discoveries’ of the eighteenth century – the progress of societies and the geneses of individuals – were perhaps correlative with the new techniques of power [...]. A macro- and micro-physics of power made possible, not the invention of history [...], but the integration of a temporal, unitary, continuous, cumulative dimension in the exercise of controls and practice of dominations. ‘Evolutive’ historicity, as it was then constituted [...] is bound up with a mode of functioning of power (Foucault, 1995: 160-161).

Interestingly, in this quote, Michel Foucault recognised two fundamental processes seen above in Elias’ *Civilising Process* – the progress of societies and the geneses of individuals. This section will follow Foucault’s suggestion to inquire over power to better understand the “evolutive historicity” underlying the formation of a civilised subject of security. Indeed, apart from conceiving that a civilised habitus evolved in the West as a psychosocial process, the case for a “civilised subject” still needs to be elaborated within a conceptual framework that looks into how the process of civilisation coped not only with the formation of an identity in relation to a specific social system, but also with the standardisation of a status, following a logic of “contagion” across time and space.

Of course, the notion of power and the analytical potentialities underlying it are not exclusive to Foucault, nor to any other author. Stefano Guzzini (2013) has stood in fact for Bourdieu’s field analysis of relational capital when it comes to power, defending that Bourdieu provides the necessary tools allowing to combine the different features of power within a coherent social theory of power and domination. In this framework, Guzzini highlights, “[p]ower is only a means in the wider analysis of domination” (2013: 80) that is to be complemented by elements such as symbolic violence and the role of language in domination. To Guzzini, what makes the analysis of power *relational* and context-specific under Bourdieu is the dependence between the definition of capital and the field (*ibid.*). As a matter of fact, this relationship between capital and the field will be illustrated in chapter 5 in more specific and material terms. But for now, this chapter mostly highlights the notions of Foucault, in which the relational dimension is rather focused at the level of social interaction and consitution among individual subjects.

Through Foucauldian power, civilisation may be related not only to semi- or pre-conscious processes of cognitive internalisation (Bourdieu), and to the self-restraint and

the awareness of social interdependence (Elias), but also to further-reaching processes of disciplining, suggesting that only through power may a simultaneously *civilised and civilising* subject be produced. As a consequence, it will be possible to advance with the possibility that power makes the civilised to civilise, providing the civilised subject with a sense of agency.

As Norbert Elias puts it, the civilising process of the West happened under a strong social pressure, so even the inferior classes got used to contain their impulses and to discipline their conduct. Therefore, civilisational structures expanded within Western society, and the West as a whole – all socioeconomic groups included – tended to evolve into one only superior stratus and centre of a web of interdependence, from which civilisational structures spread across ever greater areas, whether populated or not (Elias, 1990: 202-203). In this context, a longer-term view is important, in that chains of action grew longer, in relation to the self-control of affections and behaviour (Elias, 1990: 205).

So, how can we go deeper and “longer” into the dynamics composing the process linking the internalisation of a civilised identity at the individual level on the one hand, to the exteriorisation of that identity into collective awareness and effort, on the other hand? The suggestion here is that the habitus process underlying the process of civilisation needs to be framed within dynamics of power, in order to embrace more specifically the phenomenology of this passage from identity to widespread, naturalised, knowledge:

Basically, I had been doing nothing except trying to retrace how a certain number of institutions, beginning to function on behalf of reason and normality, had brought their power to bear on groups of individuals, in terms of behaviors, ways of being, acting, or speaking that were constituted as abnormality, madness, illness, and so on. I had done nothing else, really, but a history of power (Foucault, 2000: 283).

In the sense conveyed by these words, a history of power under Foucault is related to how hegemonic meanings imposed as normality upon the behaviours and the habits of individuals. Drawing on both these notions and purposes, I hereby suggest that power is the relaying force allowing the civilised habitus of individuals to act as a civilising force that produces “civilised-*ergo*-civilising subjects”, which actually enables the civilisation to *proceed*, that is, to be both a transformative and durable *process*, in particular through hegemonic knowledge.

As described by Elias, besides its wide dissemination into society, a particularity of Western social processes is the adjustment of individual behaviour to something remote

in time and space (Elias, 1990: 201), and this deserves further reflection as it involves structures that go beyond the existence of a society in a closed space and time. Through Foucault's power rationale, this approach intends to question of how common knowledge on Western civilisation has been formed as a universalist ideology. As a matter of fact, the way this knowledge has been exercised, produced, and accumulated over centuries, but also institutionalised and made scientific is actually bound up with power mechanisms (Foucault, 2000: 291; 2003: 9) that deserve to be looked into. This is likely to demonstrate that the prevailing idea of a Western civilisation descends in fact from a *longue durée* process of power relations, characterised by discipline, normalisation and subjectification of knowledge, which has a central role in the perpetuation and reproduction of the civilised habitus as it emerged in the sixteenth century. The philosophical focus of such an approach is not on power *per se* – seen as an asset of supremacy, or absolute position – but rather on how its exercise “[i]s a way in which some act on others” (Foucault, 2000: 340). Definitely, to Foucault, power is not a fixed possession, but a flow of relations, established by a set of practices, for “[p]ower is never anything more than a relationship that can, and must, be studied only by looking at the interplay between the terms of that relationship” (Foucault, 2003: 168).

According to Michel Foucault, power is fundamentally “productive”, in the sense it produces meanings, and most essentially produces subjects. This power is not static, it has causes and effects, flows in human relations and alters the relations between individuals through the redefinition or perpetuation of intentions, meanings, objectives, privileges, and hierarchical positions. Therefore, power under Foucault cannot be *possessed*. It is in fact exercised, practiced, and relayed in all networks of society. Power transforms, as it produces subjects, i.e., individuals who are subject to the dominance of others. The circulation of power also makes certain meanings to move, in that it produces a certain kind of knowledge that appears as truth to the subject of power – it imposes a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 2000: 336-345). Moreover, power is intended very often to produce “discipline”, a phenomenon that the French philosopher estimates to be characteristic of Western history, whereby the individual “[h]as been caught in relations of power, as that creature who is to be trained, corrected, supervised, controlled” (Foucault, 2000: xvi).



Now, attending to the psychosocial dimension of the civilised habitus, for example, the previous section showed that one essential factor of the civilising process occurred at the behavioural level, with the self-restriction of human natural impulses, and the development of this carefulness toward the Other and toward the self-image of the individual when in public. Civilised individuals and communities would basically acquire, internalise and articulate the habitus of social decorum in terms of an unconscious self-control and restraint of violent impulses. This dimension of civilisation clearly conveys the elements of discipline and normalisation that are central in Foucault's conceptualisation of power. Hence, the process of civilisation implicitly shaped a "productive" power (Foucault, 2000), in the sense that a new signification for a new civilised subject is produced in order to discipline individuals. In other words, the psychogenetic process of civilisation ultimately tells us how a civilised subject behaves; how his body is controlled when he interacts with others; how, where and when his physiological functions are to be employed. The civilised individual thus detains a different form of knowledge of his Self, a new awareness, since he relates differently to his own body and to other members of society; he is self-disciplined and normalises his behaviour according to the codes of conduct of monopolistic and disciplining institutions. In *Discipline and Punish* (1995), Foucault illustrates the phenomenon in his analysis of the formation of disciplinary systems in the eighteenth-century Europe, whereby Western societies have exercised power on individuals through their national system of education and military formation, thus shaping their personality:

Exercise is that technique by which one imposes on the body tasks that are both repetitive and different, but always graduated. By bending behaviour towards a terminal state, exercise makes possible a perpetual characterization of the individual either in relation to this term, in relation to other individuals, or in relation to a type of itinerary. It thus assures, in the form of continuity and constraint, a growth, an observation, a qualification (Foucault, 1995: 161).

Now, returning to Elias' civilising process, but on the sociogenetic side this time, the centralisation of physical violence allowed the monopolistic institutions asserting the mutual dependency between the state and the people, as a more competitive environment was set amongst a population of individuals keen to be remunerated. The concentration of social functions within the state actually required it to increasingly delegate competencies to the people (Elias, 1990: 96). As a consequence, there was a growing concurrence amongst the people, because more people needed to attune their behaviour to that of others

(Elias, 1990: 189-190). Here, what Elias highlights as the interdependence of men converging into the authority of central institutions may be thought in terms of power relations between civilised subjects. In fact, if we focus on civilisation at the individual level, it is interesting to reflect on how Foucault conceives the “individual” in relation to power. To Foucault, the individual is no

[i]nert matter to which power is applied, or which is struck by a power that subordinates or destroys individuals. In actual fact, one of the first effects of power is that it allows bodies, gestures, discourses, and desires to be identified and constituted as something individual. The individual is not, in other words, power’s opposite number; the individual is one of power’s first effects. The individual is in fact power-effect, and at the same time, and to the extent that he is a power-effect, the individual is a relay: power passes through the individuals it has constituted (Foucault, 2003: 29-30).

Therefore, under the action of power, a civilised individual is actually *civilising*, in the double sense that his individual process of civilisation is constantly on the move, and that he is also in a permanent inter-civilising relation with the Other. Put in other terms, through the individual, who is the first consequential materialisation of power, not only could the first psychological moves towards *civilité* emerge, as relations of interdependence could also intertwine and relay toward the centralisation and the pacification of society at the collective level. Therefore, the civilised individual who is member of a civilised society is also the consequence of power relations.

Introducing the idea of power as conceptualised by Michel Foucault to the civilised habitus offers an actual complement to the understanding of how a social-identitarian perspective of civilisation evolved into a normative and subjectifying concept. Power shows the inherent relational dimension of civilisation, whereby its process is in constant interaction with the Other, but also with time and space. Through Foucauldian tools, one may deepen a dimension that is latent in Bourdieu and Elias, namely the productive, disciplining and relational dimension of power in the conceptualisation of civilisation. Adding Foucauldian power to Elias’ civilising process is a way of reconstituting the formation of a Western Self by linking civilisation to wider structures of knowledge, whilst introducing the notion of a reproductive and spreading impetus of the Western civilisation, which will be developed in Chapter 5 on the subjectification of the civilised in time and space.



#### ***4. Security as metaphysics, ontology and unconscious – unpacking the “civilised subject of security”***

Chapter 4 will frame the civilised subject within the unconscious processes that compose the ontological relation linking civilisation to security. As it will be seen, security thus provides the conceptualisation of the civilised subject with a key time-space dimension that allows for the conceptual framework to take its final form. In fact, security is the ultimate value giving an ontological sense to the process of civilisation, for its deep and metaphysical bonding character in human societies. Put in other terms, a civilised subject of the West has been forcefully a secure subject.

The references concerning the conceptual articulation of civilisation with security are very few. Brett Bowden's (2010) work is one of the few exceptions in the literature. Bowden proposes three different ways to conceptualise what he terms ‘civilisational security’. One is the security of civilisations as inspired by Samuel Huntington’s conception of the “clash of Civilisations” (1993). This notion is thought in terms of stability and security of a given civilisation, as it is concerned with internal threats to the preservation of civilisational purity and identity, as well as with external threats such as the clash with other co-existing civilisations. The second conceptualisation consists of the *security that comes with* civilisation, i.e., the security provided and established *by* civilisation, such as the security of state sovereignty. Bowden illustrates this nexus historically, with the external interventions and conquests of those considered barbarians, or uncivilised, by the Spanish in South America, the English in Scotland and Ireland, the Europeans in Africa. In the twenty-first century, this kind of interventions still occurs in societies deemed less than civilised, and to non-sovereign members of the civilised international security.<sup>15</sup> Bowden’s third proposal of conceptualisation remits to the survival and viability of ‘Civilisation’, given the global concerns that potentially threaten the existence of the whole Humanity, and other species. These are threats to ways of living, to our capacity to continue living on the planet and explore it, such as the nuclear holocaust, or more currently viruses and climate change (Bowden, 2010: 10-11).

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<sup>15</sup> This point will be further discussed in Chapter 5, dedicated to the subjectification of the civilised in time and space.

Although Bowden's conceptual insights evidence the many possible understandings of the security-civilisation nexus, they do converge into the fundamental ideas of stability, durability, and survival, either physical, or metaphysical. Therefore, this nexus will be more deeply explored by proceeding in two parts. First, by elaborating on civilisation as metaphysical security, it will be suggested that the process of civilisation inherently seeks and depends on security, for the civilised Self cannot otherwise be produced and reproduced. This ontological relation, I claim secondly, can be better understood by approaching the dimension of the unconscious with the help of psychoanalytic literature. More specifically, by unpacking the metaphysical stance and the unconscious dimension of security, it will be possible to establish a relationship between the civilised habitus and security at the psychological level. This connects the individuals' ontological need for security and the civilised habitus as an unconscious provider of security. Ultimately, this conceptualisation will reveal not only how the security of the civilised Self is a necessary condition for the survival of civilisation, but also that a civilised Self is necessarily a secure one.

Fernand Braudel's work on civilisation (1989) contains both the material and ideational dimensions of civilisation that constitute a good starting point for thinking on the security-civilisation nexus. As it was seen earlier, Braudel proposes a wide conception of civilisation as an organism that includes a geographical area, a society, an economy, and a collective mentality, with the ability to continue and keep a certain past alive. As a geographical area, civilisation is linked to a localisable space, territory, climate, vegetation, animal species, to natural advantages and inconveniences that humanity manages to accommodate as basic conditions for their settling and development. In order to make that accommodation possible, a civilisation needs to dominate its own space, which implies both overcoming and conquering natural obstacles such as seas, deserts, mountains (Braudel, 1989: 23-29; 1993: 9 cit. in Arnason, 2003: 3). The physical dimension of civilisation has a natural relation to the idea of security, in that it is vital for any civilisation to endure, and at least to arise – i.e., the integrity of individuals is secured in a given place. In order to survive, individuals thus need to control basic natural factors of their lives, and ensure they can maintain those factors in stability.

Therefore, the essential physical condition of a civilisation's security precedes the very idea of civilisation. Individuals may appreciate physical security without forming a

civilisation, i.e., security comes before civilisation. Recalling Elias (1990), for instance, we may observe that the social solidification of the civilising process occurred decisively when physical security was guaranteed and monopolised by a central state. In turn, the existence of civilisation precedes the existence of the idea of the West as a sociocultural category and as a particular civilisation. Fernand Braudel broadly defines the Western civilisation as being composed of the American civilisation (USA and Latin America), Russia and Europe – the latter being composed of a series of smaller civilisations (Braudel, 1989: 26).

Simultaneously, security is also metaphysical, which Peter J. Burgess (2011) has defended through his view of security as a “system of values”. The author argues that security practices can only be achieved as a certain form of negotiating values. In other words, security always results of an *ethos* and an *episteme*, of a valuing choice in terms of a philosophy of life, culture, individual and collective anxieties and expectations, concerning what may be sacrificed in the name of what is to be preserved. Security thus implies an identification of what we like, what threatens what we like, presupposing that a campaign of normativity might be deployed, in order to define what actions are to be undertaken, how much suffering is needed to prevail, and what sacrifices are to avoid the threat (Burgess, 2011: 1-5).

If, as Burgess states, a threat to security is implicitly linked to what has value to us, then security is a system of values, for “[i]t is linked to the possibility that what we hold as valuable could disappear, be removed or destroyed” (Burgess, 2011: 13). On the other hand, in a system of values, the perception of a threat lies in the understanding of the dynamics linking human values to the surrounding environment:

A threat is not simply an unknown danger lying in wait [...]. Threat is not determined by others alone. It is co-determined by those who are under threat. It would be impossible to threaten us if we were not already projecting the catastrophe itself, and with it the dread fear, into the imminent future (Burgess, 2011: 14).

Clearly, apart from the obvious security of the material dimension of civilisation, the metaphysical aspect appears to make a major difference. As “ways of thinking”, civilisations embody a certain representation of the world, whereby a prevailing collective mentality animates and circulates through all the segments of society, and also dictates the mainstream attitudes, orients people’s options, fears, and beliefs throughout generations (Braudel, 1989: 35). Actually, this corresponds to what Michel Foucault calls *épistémè*,

that is, the overall framework of thinking characterising a certain epoch – the *épistémè* of a certain period brutally succeeds that of the previous period (Foucault, 1971). In this sense, a given civilisation may be framed within a particular *épistémè*. To Braudel, the collective mentality of a civilisation possibly constitutes the pillar supporting the remaining dimensions – geography, society, and economy – for it is the one that actually unifies a civilisation as a whole. For example, there can be a singular area where a society is sustained by a singular economy. However, if its members do not share the self-representation of that society, the civilisation ceases to exist as an idea.

As a consequence, there is a critical metaphysical element underlying the idea of civilisation that draws on a communion of values and attitudes, without which the continuity of a given civilisation is not possible (Braudel, 1989: 39). In other words, contrarily to the physical security of individual human beings, the physical dimension of civilisation is not an autonomous condition; if there is no collective mentality to unify the civilised subjects, physical space alone becomes obsolete. The permanence of civilisation, the continuity of its existence, vitally depends on the security of its metaphysical content. Consequently, the metaphysical dimension of security may be conceived as being indicative of the importance of values, of how these represent deliberated options taken for the safeguard of a given unit, and importantly, of how the normative framework surrounding the civilised Self is also co-determined by the perception and evaluation of the existence of an Other – either a person, or any outer factor. Drawing more specifically on psychoanalytical concepts, the next section discusses in more depth the possibility of connecting security and metaphysics.

#### **4.1. The ontological relation between civilisation and security: going deeper into the unconscious of security**

According to Richard Ned Lebow, the concept of “ontological security” was developed by R.D. Laing, but popularized by Anthony Giddens in his theory of structuration (1984). Lebow thus summarises its implications:

The largely **routinized nature of social intercourse** helps people **structure their identities** and enhance their **capacity for agency**, and accordingly becomes a powerful component of their security system. People suffer **acute**

**anxiety when these routines are disrupted** by novel or critical situations (Lebow, 2008: 25; emphasis added).

Jennifer Mitzen (2006) has applied ontological security to IR in an extrapolation of the individual level, and applied it to the state to explain the recurrence of conflict between certain states. According to Mitzen, states, like people, do not only seek physical security, but also ontological security. The premises of her argument are that agents are rational, but that uncertainty threatens their identity, which leads individuals to the need of ontological security. The routines are supported and enacted by the state's foreign policy, which provides the individual with the feeling of security, through a sense of certainty that avoids his perception of surrounding chaos. In this context, routinised relations – either cooperative, or conflictive – are maintained between states in order to maintain a sense of agency and identity. Accordingly, whether at the individual level, or at the state level, ontological security crucially depends on routines, on a sense of stable predictability, without which people suffer the anxiety of uncertainty. Put in other terms, it may be said that *feeling/perceiving* security depends on habitus as defined by Bourdieu.

At this stage of the reflection, psychoanalysis offers an important contribution not only for addressing the relationship between issues of anxiety, uncertainty, and security, as also to the conceptualisation of the unconscious and its role for identity and knowledge formation. Although much discussion can be withdrawn from psychoanalytic literature of authors like Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung or Ludwig Wittgenstein, the purpose here is not to enter into a debate on who developed the best psychoanalytic definitions. For the sake of this dissertation, the objective is rather to explore the conceptual possibilities offered by key authors from that field, and their application to this dissertation.

In general, though, it can be said that by inducing the subjects to recognise as theirs various motives that were hitherto unacknowledged and which they would have never accepted at the beginning, psychoanalysis provides us with criteria or reasons which allow us to say that “someone's behaviour was determined in a way that the subject was unaware of, by motives that were not conscious” (Bouveresse, 1995: 30). Also, meanings can be either elided from consciousness or repressed, as “[c]ertain elements are merely temporarily excluded from consciousness and can be retrieved by fairly simple procedures readily available to the subject himself; others are radically excluded from consciousness but nonetheless exercise a continuing influence on behaviour” (Bouveresse, 1995: 33).



Sigmund Freud provides this analysis with an insight on the deepest mechanisms underlying the ontological relation between security and civilisation. In his psychoanalytical approach of civilisation (1961), Freud highlights the instinctual human inclination toward aggressiveness as the main obstacle to the achievement of civilisation:

Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city (Freud, 1961: 105).

But while Bourdieu, Elias, and Foucault basically tell us that rational self-restraint of diverse bodily impulses is a stage of the disciplining process of civilisation at the behavioural level, Freud presents the evolution of civilisation as a *visceral* process that vitally *depends on* the struggle of aggressiveness/death instinct/destruction versus love/life. In other terms, the evolution of civilisation is “the struggle for life of the human species” (Freud, 1961: 104). In this sense, Bowden's third conceptualisation of the security-civilisation nexus as the survival of the human species would effectively be the one closest to the ontological relation between security and civilisation.

However, Freud is quite dubitative of the civilised status as an irreversible quality. As Nicholas Lewin (2009: 26) reads it, Freud deems it is an exaggeration to think that most of human beings have transformed in a civilised sense, because the instinctive drives of their primitive psyche still clash with the restraints of society. Hence, individual stability is hardly achievable on the long term, because society imposes restrictive moral standards on the individual who is compelled to act in the sense of precepts that are not the expression of his instincts. This does not necessarily mean that Freud contradicts Elias' view that civilisation as self-restraint allowed for pacification. What is rather implied is that pacification is only superficial, or can be reversed by decivilising practices at any time because of that human instinctual propensity to aggressiveness. Jean Elshtain (1989: 53) also suggests that, convinced that the civilisation of the West created over time a noncombatant civilian culture, Freud sees self-restraining individuals as sources of psychological instability and hence of conflict, so war is now to be seen as a decivilising activity producing neuroses. For example, in his first take on war, an essay entitled “Thoughts for the times on War and Death”, Freud shows his disillusionment and his horror of war, as he also states that we should have known better all along (Elshtain, 1989: 56). In this sense, it seems Freud sees war essentially as a failure of human nature.

Furthermore, under Freud, the dependence on other people is described as “fear of loss of love” (Freud, 1961: 107). Hence, the very threat of loss of love, together with social anxiety, originally motivates individuals to internalise aggression into their egos and super-egos. On a later stage, the super-ego grows more conscious as it develops a tormenting sense of guilt. This sense of guilt may be fed either by the fear of an external authority, either by the fear of the super-ego. The severity of the super-ego, the demands of the conscience, is a continuation of the severity inspired by external authority, to which it has succeeded and has in part replaced (Freud, 1961: 105-106). Also,

A threatened external unhappiness – loss of love and punishment on the part of the external authority – has been exchanged for a permanent internal unhappiness, for the tension of the sense of guilt (Freud, 1961: 107).

Here, the importance of security is paramount. As the existential tension of the sense of guilt needs to be contained, security reveals as a metaphysical value that ensures both internal and external happiness. Therefore, as civilisation inhibits the instincts, and represses the ego in a juxtaposed relationship with aggression (Roach, 2008: 101), security is thus the ontological death and life signifier that responds to the insecurity and threat posed by the possibility of loss of love.

So, attending to Freud, we understand in a much more nuanced way that individuals cannot be genuinely, irreversibly, civilised in the sense of an inner pacification, not only because self-restraint is contrary to their instinct, but also because they condition themselves to repress those impulses for the fear of loss of love and sense of guilt in face of society’s authority. In this context, the feeling of security is a guarantee against, but also a negation of the possibility of violence and death, and also social exclusion. These mechanisms that underlie the civilised habitus are what ontologically connects it to security.

But how has this fragile relationship between the civilised subject and his inner pacification been maintained? Within the unconscious dimension, there are still further elements to be explored that may help understanding the relationship between the pacified and secure civilised subject, one of which is central to this work, that is, his dependence on symbols.<sup>16</sup> Psychoanalyst Carl Jung greatly worked on the role of symbols, myths,

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<sup>16</sup> *En passant*, outside the field of psychoanalysis, even Elias has his own view of the importance of symbols. In *The Symbol Theory* (1991), he sees symbol formation as being bound up with human survival in the social developments composing the blind evolutionary process of the human condition. Without symbolic representation, says Elias (1991: 3), the language of a society is not known by its members. More

“archetypes” and their role in what he termed the “collective unconscious” (Jung, 1964; 2003). Those concepts are used interrelatedly and they are not easily understood. Lewin (2009: 161), who makes an extensive analysis of Jung’s work, deems he hardly systematised his definitions, in particular that of archetypes, and his writings even confuse the distinction between archetypes and symbolic image.

Yet, to Jung (1964: 20), a symbol is “a term, a name, or even a picture that may be familiar in daily life, yet that possesses specific connotations in addition to its conventional and obvious meaning”. Thus, a word or an image is symbolic when

[i]t implies **something more than its obvious and immediate meaning**. It has a **wider “unconscious”** aspect that is never precisely defined or fully explained. Nor can one hope to define or explain it. As the mind explores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie **beyond the grasp of reason** (Jung, 1964: 20-21; emphasis added).

According to this definition, symbolic meanings lie in the unconscious to the extent that their significance may involve hidden or silent meanings, which beyond immediate and spontaneous interpretation of the sense may be inferred, deduced, or even imagined: “Thus, part of the unconscious consists of a multitude of **temporarily obscured thoughts**, impressions, and images that, in spite of being lost, **continue to influence our conscious minds**” (Jung, 1964: 32; emphasis added). Jung explains that our perception of reality contains unconscious dimensions, because our senses react to real phenomena and translate them into our mind but, as every experience has a number of unknown factors, we cannot *know* the ultimate nature of objects and their matter. Likewise, there are certain events of which we may have not consciously taken note. Although they have happened, they have been “absorbed subliminally, without our conscious knowledge” (Jung, 1964: 23). We seem to have forgotten certain things, but they may not have ceased to exist; as the unconscious takes note of things we may not notice through our senses, they still influence our reactions to both events and people without our realizing it (Jung, 1964: 34).

Jung’s overall conception of the unconscious is extremely pertinent to this work, as it offers the closest notion of the “unconscious” that is to be used throughout this dissertation. The unconscious meanings conveyed both by the civilised habitus, and by the hegemonic knowledge on Western civilisation are thus defined by their apparent disappearance from conscious representations but nonetheless *permanence in subliminal*

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importantly, “The ability to control patterns of knowledge and speech in a society is usually a concomitant of the distribution of power chances in a society” (Elias, 1991: 6).

*forms*. In this context, Jung goes further when he goes beyond the individual unconscious and formulates the notion of a collective unconscious:

Gradually Jung came to see some of the types of problems he encountered as afflicting large numbers of people. He began to suspect that these common problems had causes set in the historic past, or so far back in evolutionary time that they had become in-born characteristics of mankind that he would call 'archetypes'. He developed a perspective of the psyche that had two sources. There were the individual life experiences that had filtered down into the personal unconscious and those factors that were common to humanity as a whole, which he called the 'collective unconscious' (Lewin, 2009: 102).

Through this reconstitution of Jung's intellectual process, we may conceive that the problems afflicting individual lives were common to so many people that they could be transposed collectively as problems with historic origins. This provides the individual unconscious with a social dimension, that is, there is a part of the individual's psyche that can be common to a whole generation, absorbed at an unconscious level (Lewin, 2009: 108).

Now, without proliferating the many different formulations of archetypes, it can be said that their role within the collective unconscious is to convey deep symbolic meanings through space and time. As put by Jung, archetypes create the myths, religions, and philosophies that influence and characterise whole nations and epochs of history (Jung, 1964: 79). They are meant to be deep truths about the nature of the human mind, the universal psychic images that arise from the deepest level of the unconscious (Lifton and Olson, 2004: 33). For example, the hero figure is an archetype that has existed since time immemorial; the universal hero myth refers to a powerful man or god-man who vanquishes evil and who liberates his people from destruction and death (Jung, 1964: 73, 79). As it will be seen throughout the following parts of this work, this archetype is very common and surges very often in political discourses. Interestingly, archetypes can be very influential in the political arena, mostly in relation to the rise of psychological disruption, which can take the form of abnormal over- or under-valuations, provoking misunderstandings, fanaticisms, myth-formation, fantastic rumors, suspicions and prejudices (Lewin, 2009: 198).

Furthermore, the importance of symbols is not only critical for the secure lives of the civilised subjects as it is also vital for the continuity of the civilising process. According to Robert Lifton and Eric Olson (2004: 39), societies and social institutions may help mastering death anxiety for those who believe in them, by generating shared images

of continuity beyond the life of each single person. This is achieved through a particular form of symbolism:

We can see the sense of symbolic immortality as reflecting man's relatedness to all that comes before him and all that follows him. [...] Without this unending sense of attachment to aims and principles beyond the self, the everyday formative process [...] cannot be sustained. When people believe in such cultural projects and expressions, they feel a sense of attachment to human flow, to both their biology and their history. They feel a *sense of immortality* which enables active, vital life to go on (Lifton and Olson, 2004: 34).

In this sense, immortality is a symbol that gives the Self a feeling of security through a sense of continuity that transcends his own physical life. Life is then attached to meanings that go beyond time and space. This is clearly consistent with the civilised habitus, and with Braudel's notion of unconscious history.

Now, what remains from all this for the civilised subject of security? First, drawing mainly on Braudel and Burgess, it was seen that the process of civilisation necessarily implies both material and ideational dimensions. Therefore, ontological security as the security of the Self (Mitzen, 2006) is slightly redundant, and cannot be plainly applied to civilisation, because it is not an added value, or an accomplishment, in civilisation. It is rather an immanent *sine qua non* condition. It was suggested that the existence of civilisation depends as much on the existence of civilised-ergo-civilising selves, as on the transformation of the uncivilised Other, because he/she ultimately represents a threat. In other words, the process of civilisation does not *need to seek for* ontological security to complement its physical security and thus maintain routinized relations with other entities – another co-existing civilisation, for example. Indeed, as long as the subjects remain civilised, maintain their civilised habitus, they do not have to pursue ontological security: a civilised subject is necessarily a secure subject, as the process of civilisation plays a continuous role in the provision of security to the civilised subject, and by extension, to the uncivilised Other.

After this, different psychoanalytic aspects of the individuals' relation to security were exposed. The ontological relationship between civilisation and security was thereby illustrated, and the rather complex, unconscious, connections between the civilised subjects and their security were explored. With Freud (1961), the binome of life versus death, the instinctual human inclination towards aggression, and sense of guilt illustrated that the pacification of self-restraining civilised individuals can be fragile. Here, the sense of security rather follows the logic of self-domination, in order to prevent greater evils.

However, this does not diminish the ontological role of security within civilised individuals; it rather contraries the idea of linearity in human behaviour, the idea that security could be innate, and opens the possibility for reverting the pacification of individuals through decivilising practices. Then, through Jung, it was possible to define the interrelated importance of symbols within the unconscious. In turn, this allowed conceiving that there is human demand for a sense of historical connection that goes beyond individual life, which can be managed through (archetypal) symbols.

Ultimately, civilisation *is*, ontologically, security. Therefore, civilised subjects are implicitly secure subjects. In more refined terms, the civilised habitus is an unconscious provider of security, but it is neither irreversible, immutable, nor exempt from fears and anxieties. On the contrary, as the civilised habitus depends on the domination of the Self and its unconscious unknowns, the civilised subject of security breeds upon the security that symbols may provide him.

The following Chapter concluding this first Part dedicated to the conceptualisation of the civilised subject of security will frame the civilised subject of security in wider processes of time and space. It will be seen how particular social practices of subjugation and processes of standardisation of security, or normalisation, have served to produce civilised subjects out of the original West, feeding upon symbolic narratives of power and differentiation.



## ***5. The modern secure Self of the West: subjectifying the civilised in time and space***

After having outlined the endogenous processes of civilisation in the last section, the conceptualisation of civilised subjects of security needs to be complemented by a reflection on how the civilised West evolved into a collective perception of a Western civilisation. In other words, how did the inter-civilising moves of individuals and states evolve into the centrality or centrism of a single civilisation in the international realm? And how is the uncivilised Other subjectified as a civilised subject? This approach will reveal the dynamics underlying early modern international relations, along with the dynamics of early modern international security. Following Linklater (2011), this is about linking the development of international society to broader civilising processes.

The task undertaken here is to approach Western civilisation *from the outside*, by focusing on exogenous processes of recognition in time and space, i.e., on how the conception of an intrinsically civilised and civilising West went global. This is in fact about the collective historic phenomenon in which power relations were decisive to produce civilised Others having the secure West as a model. Ultimately, this chapter aims at conceiving how Western norms were universalised, how the civilised was subjectified, transmitted, transposed to the Other, and how civilisation evolved from the “I in the West” to the “We of the West”.

There is one central claim leading the discussion: exploring the exogenesis of civilisation involves focusing on the exterior processes that universalised it, and on how the civilised-*ergo*-civilising habitus of the West was *acknowledged and reproduced*. From the perspective of *acknowledgement*, it is envisaged that, as a social object, Western civilisation only began to exist as such for those who belong to it and for others, only when it was distinguishable from other groups, that is, through knowledge and recognition – or put in Bourdieu’s terms, through *connaissance et reconnaissance* (1989: 23). Regarding *reproduction*, and in accordance with what was advanced in Chapter 3, one also needs to envision that there must be a driving force, which has made the process of civilisation to advance in a consistent progression throughout centuries and continents. Again, the Foucauldian notion of power may be seen as an invisible force, an energetic field coursing temporalities, circulating through space, between the multiple *foci* of political agency,



distributed and observable at the lowermost “extremities” of the social network. The power that underlies the process of civilisation may be understood as telling a story of how certain forms of relation may produce subjects, namely through domination (Foucault, 2000: 326; 2003: 46). So as to synthesise these starting assumptions, this chapter will discuss how the *production of civilised subjects outside Europe* is central to the *recognition* and globalisation of a Western civilisation, for it to be *understood* as such.

By looking back in history, this chapter will highlight how specific shared representations of history played a key role in conveying a civilised way of being, by continuously producing new civilised subjects across time and space. Hence, the role of history, and the social representations it conveys, will be enhanced for its influence in perpetuating and disseminating the universalist notion of Western civilisation. However, and in parallel with the premise of civilisation as an unconscious category of the Self, this is an “unconscious history” (Braudel, 1958) – meaning that humans of the past essentially ignored they were doing history, for they were confined to the micro-perspective of the time they were experiencing.

The first section will present the conception of Modernity as a hegemonic socio-historic representation of the West, whereby a particular narrative of the origin of the Modern Western civilisation has circulated in time and space, and produced a civilised subject through othering practices. The power relation between the figure of the civilised and the indigenous/barbarian will be approached specifically to highlight how the civilised is produced through differentiation, without actually turning the Other into a civilised subject who is identical to the Self. Then, the two following sections will discuss the notion of “standard of civilisation” as a process of normalisation and stabilisation of Western civilisation, which reveals to be ontologically rooted in a security rationale. It will be seen that security is effectively the key value to be considered in the universalisation of Western civilisation.

## 5.1. Modernity as civilised time: an othering history

[i]t is necessary to distinguish **modernity** from modernization. The second is within a non-Western society, imposed by visible and identifiable means, while the first **penetrates society** and **settles in invisibility** with an **unrecognizable introductory shock** (Behnam, 2002: 196; emphasis added).

The contemporary sense of a civilised status encloses an unequivocal historical awareness that a part of Western identity descends from past centuries. In other words, the present sense of a civilised identity in the West is determined by the appreciation of something that has travelled through time and that might be common among Westerners separated by time. Therefore, Western identity today comprises both a civilised habitus, and an unconscious dimension of history. As such, approaching the processes through which Western civilisation was actually known and recognised necessarily involves the sense of time conveyed by history, as a field of knowledge that narrates the facts, the sayings, the figures and the events from the past. James Liu and Denis Hilton (2005) precisely refer to the “shared representations of history” to highlight how the historical achievements of the past – or any other significant collective event – influence the political identity of the present – ethnical, national, or supranational:

History provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from and where we should be going. [...] A group’s representation of its history will condition its sense of what it was, is, can and should be, and is thus central to the construction of its identity, norms, and values. Representations of history help to define the social identity of peoples, especially in how they relate to other peoples and to current issues of international politics and internal diversity (Liu and Hilton, 2005: 1).

Historical representations, then, have a strong contribution in our sense of identity, as they seem to play an important role in human *habitus*, that is, in conditioning the interiorisation of semi-conscious social representations that influence our capacity for normalised improvisation and projection in social relations. The starting premise is that the prevailing perception of a Western civilisation has been determined by a “hegemonic representation of history” (Moscovici, 1988), prescribing that a certain time in a certain space precludes certain preponderant norms.<sup>17</sup> This hegemonic representation of history, Serge Moscovici says, was in turn enabled by a “narrative of the origin” made up of “collectively significant events” (*ibid.*).

Here, it is claimed that the hegemonic representation of the Western civilisation’s history is embodied in the notion of “Modernity”. Moreover, the narrative of the origin and

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<sup>17</sup> To Serge Moscovici (1988), social representations of history also contain descriptive elements that include persons and events, constituting the “narrative of the origin”. History provides the concrete reality – recognised people and events – as well as temporality; both are powerful instruments in constructing narratives about identity, with important consequences for action (Liu and Hilton, 2005: 3).

the collectively significant events sustaining Modernity can be traced to the Discoveries. The importance of the Discoveries for Modernity has become almost common-sensical. In his institutional analysis of modernity and its cultural and epistemological undertones, Anthony Giddens (1991: 19) considers the discovery of remote regions of the world by Westerners as the necessary basis for the development of “empty space”, which allowed for the representations of space without reference to a privileged locale, and for the substitutability of different spatial units. Concerned with “how it comes that social systems bind time and space”, Giddens deems the “time-space distantiation” to be the major factor for the dynamism – i.e. persistence – of modernity, on a much greater level than in the most developed agrarian civilisations (Giddens, 1991: 14). Also, in *Colonialism and Modernity* (2007), Paul Gillen and Devleena Ghosh hold the beginning of European colonialism around 1500 and the development of Modernity as the two greatest and concurring phenomena transforming decisively the world for the last five centuries. The authors establish a complex and multifaceted relationship between the rise to global dominance of people from Europe, and the coming of modernity, estimating that despite the contemporary waning of Western power, its

[c]olonial legacy is still very powerful: the colonial systems of language, capital, patronage, immigration, trade, education and cultural influence are still intact and even in some respects stronger, while many conflicts around the world, from the Caucasus to the Fiji, stem directly from the colonial period (Gillen and Ghosh, 2007: 5).

Likewise, in Ian Morris’ (2011) grand historical work questioning how Western social development came to dominate the world for the last centuries, the role of European navigation worldwide appears as crucial: “It was western-Europeans who began tying the world together with maritime trade, and western European social development soared upward, overtaking the older core in the eastern Mediterranean” (Morris, 2011: 32).

Hence, it will be seen that the narratives of the Discoveries originated shared representations of the West’s history that are critical for the modern conception of a Western civilisation. The claim here is that the contemporary conception of Modernity is the result of a process of subjectification, in which the original identity of the uncivilised Other was altered into a civilised one. Modernity thus acted as an othering process, by turning the Other’s Self into a civilised Self. Yet, the later is not identical to the original civilised Self, because the structural violence imposed upon him in the inculcation of a civilised habitus turns the process into an essential act of domination. In this context, the

newly dominated civilised subject is made secure by abdicating part of his original identity.

Generically, the role of a narrative may be thought as providing a solution to “[t]he problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific” (White, 1980: 5). So, this suggests that the form of narrating the Discoveries would be independent of the narrators’ cultural background, in that a “[n]arrative is a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted” (White, 1980: 6). However, this does not preclude that the accounts of the Discoveries would be exempt from normative or moral judgements. Hayden White even advances the possibility that the development of historical consciousness is in fact accompanied by the development of a narrative capability that is intimately related to the moralisation of reality:

If every fully realized story [...] is a kind of allegory, points to a moral, or endows events, whether real or imaginary, [...] then it seems possible to conclude that every historical narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to *moralize* the events of which it treats (White, 1980: 17-18).

White’s argument is actually reinforced by Enrique Dussel’s “myth of Modernity” (1993), which unveils the narrative of the origins and de-mystifies the natural progress usually associated to Modernity, by conceptualising Western civilisation in terms of conquest, hegemony, subjectifying knowledge, and moral mission. Dussel explains that the concept of modernity was born in 1492, when the Discoveries initiated a process of suppression or non-acknowledgement of the non-European.

Before the European “discoveries”, Europe had been the periphery of a more powerful and advanced Islamic world (Dussel, 1993: 67). To Dussel, the perception of what Modernity entails is an issue of self-perception that inevitably leads to the idea of a civilising mission. He namely argues that Modernity is a European phenomenon, arising from a dialectical relation with a non-European and peripheral otherness, from the moment Europe affirmed itself as the “centre” of world history (1993: 65; 1995). Through discovery and conquest, Europe also constituted its modern subjectivity, i.e., a modern ego that represents both the centre and the end of history (Dussel, 1993: 74). However, just like progress, Modernity only makes sense in the present of historiographical discourse, and may only be viewed by modern historians (Madureira, 1993: 109). This is to say that the

term “Modernity” has a retroactive meaning. So, how did we get from the Discoveries, as a collectively significant event, to Modernity as a mystified and hegemonic representation of history?

According to Mohammed Bamyeh (1993), who compares the European and Arab logics of discovery, the European line of the Discoveries – initiated by Marco Polo and later established by Columbus, Amerigo Vespucci, Vasco da Gama, Fernão de Magalhães and other discoverers – constituted a major breakthrough in the *modus operandi* and *vivendi* of the act of discovering and relating to the unknown Other. Until then, an ancient form of trade governed by seasonal cycles was practiced on a smaller scale through routes of communication, in ports and other sites protected by a multiculturalist ethics. The fundamental difference instigated by the European discoveries lies in the role played by the central political authorities of Europe, which organised huge expeditions supported by a massive state apparatus and armies able to proceed to a forced wealth transfer, in order to ultimately centralise them and profit from them (Bamyeh, 1993: 96-97). In other words, the European innovation of the sixteenth century basically consisted of the idea of “total political and cultural control” (Abu-Lughod, 1989 *apud* Bamyeh, 1993: 90). Still, the value of narrativity cannot be dismissed in understanding the relation between the mystification of Modernity and the way historical facts actually occurred, as it actually helps contextualising the idea of total control.

For instance, in the Portuguese *Treaty of the Discoveries*, dating from 1555, the Discoveries were seen as the very history of Portugal, and the discoverers as chapters of a unique narrative that would become the synonym of the vision the empire had of itself (Bamyeh, 1993: 97). In this sense, the narratives of the Discoveries not only constituted the history of the country, as they also determined the collective identity, or self-perception, of the Empire. In 1500, the letter of Pero Vaz de Caminha to his king Manuel I of Portugal – who financed a vast expedition to explore westward routes to India – first reports the details of the discovery of modern Brazil (Ley, 1947). The letter illustrates very well how the dependence of the expedition toward the central authority actually shaped the intent, social disposition, and attitudes of the Westerners/colonisers regarding the Other/natives. Caminha’s letter is an ethnographic account of the Tupinambás and the first impressions they caused as a different people, in a narrative that is very similar to the way a biologist would describe a newfound animal species. The scribe Caminha does it in order to offer

the king Manuel I a detailed report of the territory, and more particularly to determine whether the existing conditions were propitious to explore the mineral resources – gold and silver – and basically settle a colony (Caminha, 1963).

Caminha's description of the natives' overall aspect and behaviour refers to "dark, brown and naked" but "good" bodies, "good well-made faces and noses", "good men", "ingenuous" and "innocent people" with a "fine simplicity" (Pero Vaz de Caminha cit. in Ley, 1947). Thomas Bonnici (2000) has done a very thorough analysis of Caminha's letter, with an interpretation of the colonial encounter as one dominated by gaze, in which speech is fundamentally absent, and processes of identification, objectification and submission are enacted. For instance, Caminha's frequent reference to the natives' nakedness not only points to a cultural difference the Europeans insist on and are convinced of, and marks the absence of learning, as it also highlights the natives' subalternity and powerlessness (Bonnici, 2000: 53), that is, their suitability to be dominated, controlled, and disciplined. This can also be viewed as a feature of a Western concern regarding the physical disposition of the Other, in a projection of its civilised habitus.

Another expressive episode of Caminha's letter is his portrayal of the Tupimambás' coming onboard of the Portuguese ship:

They entered. However, they made no gesture of courtesy or sign of a wish to speak to the admiral or anyone else. For all that, one of them gazed at the admiral's collar and began to point towards the land and then at the collar as if he wished to tell us that there was gold in the country. And he also looked at a silver candlestick and pointed at the land in the same way, and at the candlestick, as if there was silver there, too. [...]

One of them saw the white beads of a rosary. He made a sign to be given them and was very pleased with them, and put them round his neck. Then he took them off and put them round his arm, pointing to the land, and again at the beads and at the captain's collar, as if he meant they would give gold for them.

We took it in this sense, because we preferred to. If, however, he was trying to tell us that he would take the beads and the collar as well, we did not choose to understand him, because we were not going to give it to him. Then he returned the beads to the man who had given them to him (Pero Vaz de Caminha cit. in Ley, 1947).

Many different observations can be made from this passage, which is surely only representative of many others that could be found in the historical archives of countries such as Spain, Italy, France or Great Britain. But in the interest of the analysis, two demand to be particularly discussed. One is Caminha's indication that the natives did not have the *courtesy* of greeting anyone on the ship, as if the naturally expectable behaviour would be for the natives to show good manners and a civilised attitude on such occasion.

There is an inherent assumption that *civilité* would have to apply in that situation, *however* the visitors did not do so, which emphasises that the Tupinambás did not act according to the same social habitus, to the same civilised pattern of Westerners. Only did they communicate by body gestures, in reference to the gold and silver of the admiral's jewellery, as if the indigenous were willing to tell them they had gold and silver on their land too. This was obviously Caminha's own careful interpretation.

This leads to a second point, that is, Caminha's contradictory account. Initially, he describes a situation where the natives seemed to be explaining that they too had gold and silver on their land. But then, he refers to another version of the same attitude, when he shows suspicion that the natives wanted to be given the beads of a rosary. Here, the Portuguese *preferred* to take another sense of the gestures, and *did not chose to understand* because they had already decided that they would not give any valuable item to the Tupinambás anyway, apart from simple trifles. In this context, the symbolic meaning of the rosary needs to be enhanced, as European colonialism, mostly the Catholic Portuguese and Spanish, was also motivated and justified by religion. The obligation Christianity placed on its followers to evangelise was perpetuated by the Discoveries in a worldwide missionary campaign: "The first European colonists perceived the worlds they encountered and attacked through lenses shaped by the noisy polemics of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation" (Gillen and Ghosh, 2007: 93).

So, was Caminha's testimony voluntarily biased in order to please the expectations of the monarchical and spiritual authorities? Did Caminha's narrative have to follow a predetermined script, i.e., the self-perception the Empire had for itself? In any case, this episode is an illustration – among many others possible dating from the same epoch – of how the process of civilisation may be apprehended in situational terms. Here, the sense of being civilised was reinforced by a situation in which the civilised individual has an encounter with difference, which he deems uncivilised. This validates Elias' prospect (1989: 100) that there is awareness of civilisation – in the case of the encounter between the Portuguese and the Tupinambás, the conscience of one's behavioural superiority – but not intent or deliberation right away.

Mohammed Bamyeh (1993: 100-101) helps shedding some light into these questions, by stating that the Discoveries served an instrumental purpose in the context of a power struggle. This in turn requires to question who is the public of the discoverer and his

narrative; what will be the utility of the discovery in the cultural system of the discoverer's homeland; how will that cultural system interpret the discovery; and which aspects will the cultural system observe, ignore and emphasise? In this context, Caminha's testimony could have served the very purpose of power. For example, when the natives go on board, other aspects such as the displacement of the natives from their natural environment, their refusal to eat and drink, but also other episodes of the Letter such as the celebration of a mass by the explorers, their covering of the natives' bodies, or their order to lay the arrows and bows down (Caminha, 1963) reveal a dominant group imposing a specific knowledge, a discipline and values upon the Tupinambás as a dominated party.

This subverts the Other's identity, by uprooting his subjectivity, alienating him from his culture by suppression and substitution by European (and supposedly correct) mores (Bonnici, 2000: 54-56). Clearly, the purpose that is to be served by Caminha's narrative for his cultural and political system obeys a rationale that is self-centered in the interests, objectives, and perceptions of the discoverer. The emphasis put on the physical and behavioral differences between the discoverer and the Other throughout the different episodes of Caminha's report accentuate the discoverer's civilisational superiority in terms of natural impulses, good manners, *habiti*. These differential aspects are precisely those to be interpreted and observed by the homeland, because there is no other way made available to the public of knowing the Other.

Past this kind of original and moralising narrative regarding the first colonial encounters, which nonetheless sets the tone for the essential asymmetry existing in the original power relations of the Discoveries, ulterior narratives would proceed with a more invasive character (Bonnici, 2000: 55).<sup>18</sup> Thus, according to Dussel, as the modern European civilisation saw itself as the most developed and superior, it felt morally compelled to develop more primitive, barbarian, and underdeveloped civilisations. When the civilised Europeans encountered resistance or opposition to their approach – meaning, to Modernity – they resorted to violence in order to remove all obstacles to modernisation. Given the innocent, emancipating and redemptive character of civilisation, the sacrifices and suffering imposed on the subjects of modernisation – the guilty barbarians, as Dussel refers – were deemed necessary and inevitable (Dussel, 1993: 74; 1995; Dussel and Ibarra-Colado, 2006: 496-497).

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<sup>18</sup> Thomas Bonnici (2000) refers, for example, to Montaigne's essay "Of the Cannibals".



Seemingly, for Immanuel Wallerstein as well, the conquerors argued that their superiority was due to their innate qualities and performance. Their attitude toward the sub-humans (*Untermensch*) involved different approaches, from the negation of their basic humanity, to affirming the need to save their souls. In any case, the arguments used were always associated to a feeling of moral superiority (Wallerstein, 1993: 42-43). As such, the West fundamentally acquired an unbalanced way of knowing and recognising the Other, whilst the Other forcefully knew and recognised the West in the light of the very meanings the discoverers imposed upon them.

In the centuries that followed, many arguments ensued in the West in favour of colonisation that obeyed to the same dynamics of subjugation and domination, within a rationale of Modernity-as-modernisation. Those arguments encompassed, for example, Lockian justifications for occupying land on the basis of natural law, or Kantian claims on the necessity of republicanism for perpetual and global peace (Gillen and Ghosh, 2007: 94-95). But the most influential is related to “social Darwinism”, drawing on Charles Darwin’s *Origin of Species* (1859), which detailed that biological species had evolved from earlier forms by a process of selection favouring the characteristics of individuals who best survived and reproduced. This theory had a powerful impact on ideas of progress, whereby only the strong and fit could survive. The West was analogous to nature, on the side of progress. Herbert Spencer adopted that vision to defend some classes and races were fitter than others. From this perception that the white were fitter, the right to colonise and dominate was seen as natural. This slogan penetrated the “consciousness of Westerners of all political persuasions” for several decades (Gillen and Ghosh, 2007: 96-97).

Now, regarding the figure of the “barbarian”, the power relation that fundamentally connects him to civilisation is worth discussing as well. In fact, Michel Foucault himself explored the subject, drawing on the juridical thinking of the eighteenth-century French historian Henri de Boulainvilliers, and on the anthropology of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries as well. Foucault namely highlights how the barbarian may only be defined and understood in relation to a civilisation, outside which he exists and lives:

Unlike the savage, the barbarian does not emerge from some natural backdrop to which he belongs. He appears only when civilization already exists, and only when he is in conflict with it. He does not make his entrance into history by founding a society, but by penetrating a civilization, setting it ablaze and destroying it (Foucault, 2003: 195).

In fact, the historical-political discourse introduced by Boulainvilliers created the barbarian as an antithesis of the juridical figure of the savage, who is a man who trades rights and goods, and integrates civilised society by constituting a social corpus that is simultaneously an economic corpus, and thus ceases to be savage (Foucault, 2003: 194-195). On the contrary, the barbarian does not integrate the civilised society; he lives out of it, resists and fights civilisation. There is a pre-existing historical relation between the barbarian and a civilisation's history that he rejects. The barbarian does not trade, he follows the logic of domination; he takes and occupies, instead of creating or working to create his property (Foucault, 2003: 195-196).

Clearly, the praxis of imposition and subjugation upon the barbarians referred by Enrique Dussel, which is latently recommended in Caminha's letter, but also the fact that either the Ottomans, the Chinese, Europeans or Americans were confronted both to hostile forces and "uncivilised barbarians" (Donnelly, 1998: 5) suggest the possibility that the constitution and establishment of a civilised Self is also related to a "system of differentiation" (Foucault, 2000: 344). In this sense, a fundamental schism was established between the civilised Self and the uncivilised Other through the exercise of power. Under Bourdieu as well, processes of "differentiation" have the effect of regulating conflict and reproducing structures of social domination (Jackson, 2009). Effectively, and more intensively since the sixteenth century, the expansion of Western civilisation into Modernity revealed as a phenomenon in which the European culture became central, and whereby the corresponding ideology and globalisation arose from a process of asymmetrical exchange – economic, political or cultural (Dussel and Ibarra-Colado, 2006).

As an overall consequence of this historic subjectification, verticality implies that using the term "civilisation" today is more than a simple description of a process or status attained; the idea thus contains an inherent value or normative quality (Bowden, 2010: 7).

[w]hen we are talking about the progress, failures, greatness and weakness of civilization we do have a value judgement in mind. We have the idea that the civilization we are talking about – ours – is itself something great and beautiful; something too which is nobler, more comfortable and better, both morally and materially speaking, than any outside it – savagery, barbarity or semi-civilization. Finally, we are confident that such civilization, in which we participate, which we propagate, benefit from and popularize, bestows on us all a certain value, prestige, and dignity. For it is a collective asset enjoyed by all civilized societies. It is also an individual privilege which each of us proudly boasts that he possesses (Febvre, 1973: 220 cit. in Bowden, 2010: 8).

This perception of civilisation suggested by Brett Bowden exclusively emphasises the positive self-perception of a civilisational identity. In other words, when defining a civilised Self and determining that the Other is not civilised, the normative dimension of civilisation not only conveys exclusionary practices of the identity of Others, as it also dominates it. Besides, the notion of “uncivilised” is only meaningful from the perspective of the one who considers himself as “civilised”. Behind this subjectification of the civilised is undoubtedly a relation of power, in that a new meaning is attributed to the very essence and identity of another individual. This power relation is definitely one of hierarchy, according to the judging element underlying the conception of a “more civilised and modern” versus the “less civilised and modern” (Gong, 2002: 93).

Remarkably, this kind of power relations seems to be the key principle conducting the social organisation and dissemination of civilisation, as this is based on societies with hierarchical relations and deep gap between groups. To Fernand Braudel (1989: 30), for instance, speaking about civilisation or society is to refer to two inseparable notions depicting the same reality, namely, one that is steered by transformative tensions, social conflicts, and political struggles as part of their social dynamics, to allow their constant evolution, as opposed to primitive cultures. For, on the contrary, these primitive cultures descend from equalitarian societies, whose group relations are regulated and repetitive, thereby implying some stagnation that may be a risk for the civilisation’s survival and continuity (*ibid.*). This is to say that advanced and ever-evolving societies are necessarily those who manage to go ahead of their core social asymmetry and conflict.

The aim of this section was to show how the historical representations of the process of civilisation may influence the current perception of civilisation in the West. The European Discoveries were held as a collectively significant event because of their innovation in relating to the unknown Other, and because of their civilising role. The focus on the narratives of the Discoveries was important to highlight how the way the act of discovering was narrated not only influenced the mutual subjectification of the Modern Self and the uncivilised Other, but also the subsequent wave of colonialism. The narrative of discovery obeyed the logic of differentiation, subjectification, domination, and cultural suppression – in other words, othering processes. Then, that narrative paved the way for a more aggressive wave of conquest, based on physical violence, motivated by the perception of overall superiority. This particular relational dynamic of conquest is what

characterises the inherent “civilised-*ergo*-civilising habitus of the West”, but transposed onto spaces outside Europe, thus making the arbitrariness of the subjugation to be understood as natural and inevitable. As a result, total European control – political and cultural – was possible.

These subjectification processes are an important part of the Western civilisation, for they contributed to implement more durably a “civilised-*ergo*-civilising habitus” outside the West properly said. Actually, those processes characterise the way the civilisation of the West got to be known and recognised. In present times, the historical awareness of those processes of civilisation is only semi-conscious, as many less positive aspects of the civilising process remain aside. But ultimately these are the shared historical processes and representations that are now part of the civilised habitus, that is, the modern Western Self.

## **5.2. The “classical standard of civilisation”: formulating the original architecture of international security**

After having discussed how the process of civilisation produced civilised subjects through othering practices as it expanded spatially at the time of the Discoveries, this section focuses more specifically on the importance of *standardisation* as a practical process that is endemic of civilisation, and that strongly contributes to its dissemination and evolution as well.

It will be shown that the standardisation of civilisation first came through international law in order to protect Westerners overseas during the nineteenth century, and that this was actually enabled by the symbolic power and capital previously accumulated by the West during the Discoveries. Besides, it is argued that, more ontologically than law, security was the natural rule, the guiding metaphysical value underlying the process of normalisation, or standardisation of civilisation. In other terms, security is the norm that made it natural for civilisation to become an international standard. More specifically, the “classical standard of civilisation” will be explored in the light of the civilisation’s fusional relation with security, so as to show how that standard was a juridical safeguard for dislocated Westerners in the East during the nineteenth century. This standard actually

formulated the original architecture of a system of international security.

Each civilization possesses its own standard. [...] Put simply, the standard of each civilization represents the identity card and the DNA of the same civilization. Furthermore, the standard of civilization is the criterion determining who is “uncivilized” and who is “civilized”. “Uncivilized” in one civilization could be considered “civilized” in another, and vice versa.

There is a direct correspondence between the real power of a civilization and the extension of its standard. When one civilization becomes stronger than another, its standard will prevail as the dominant standard. The dominant standard is often imposed on others (e.g. “capitulation”, “unequal treaties”), but it can also be “interiorized” and voluntarily accepted (conversion to a religion, adherence to democracy, etc.) (Mozaffari, 2002: 27).

As Mehdi Mozaffari puts it in the aforementioned excerpt, the standard of a civilisation is able to reveal its very essence, its power, as well as the core elements that make it function as a living organism and prevail over other existing organisms. Norbert Elias himself mentions the importance of a “standard” for the empowerment of the men from the West, so they could impose a change in human relations throughout the world. In fact, Elias says, Western men dominated those regions through institutions and behavioural control, when they founded a barrier between them and the groups they colonised – whom they considered to be inferior. Also, as they extended their forms of society, they also spread their standard, in other words, their behaviour and institutions (Elias, 1990: 206).

The notion of “standard of civilisation” cannot be taken as a singular and linear expression of a phenomenon remained unchanged. As with the evolution of international society, standards have also evolved into different shapes, ruled by different norms – this will be further discussed in the following section. So as to understand the implications of this evolution, Gerrit Gong (2002) defines three helpful aspects that are inherent to any standard of civilisation. First, according to Gong, those who fulfil the requirements of a standard of civilisation in a given society belong to the *civilised* members of that society, while those who do not are left aside as uncivilised individuals. Secondly, the standards of civilisation are applicable to states, individual societies, state systems, or international societies of states. Finally, the standards of civilisation derive from the acknowledgement that interactions between members occur at both the transactional and the normative levels. Now, regarding “norms”, Gong says: “It is the aggregation of these normative values regarding international behaviour which reflect and shape, by whatever name, international standards of civilisation today” (Gong, 2002: 79). In short, a standard of civilisation

defines the terms of acceptance and belonging in a community of both civilised members and those still to be civilised.

There is a clear relation between the standardisation of civilisation and both Foucault's "normalisation", and Bourdieu's "internalisation" – when speaking about habitus specifically. In fact, in the light of a civilised habitus moved by relations of power and by an ontological need for security – as conceptualised in Part 1 on the civilised subject of security – standardisation appears as a necessary element to make discipline effective, for it implies that the civilised behaviour and the awareness of a civilised status are stabilised and secured in a controllable and regular manner. Without this normalisation, the new dynamics and relations of power could not constitute stages of a continuous progress, through centralisation and self-restraint, expanding over the centuries to build up the self- and hetero-consciousness of an undisputable Western civilisation. As a result, discipline is *normalised*; it becomes natural and goes without saying. But how, specifically, did the standardisation of Western civilisation come into play? Which values, or norms, did that process particularly convey?

The notion of "standard of civilisation" was first developed by Georg Schwarzenberger in the field of international law. Originally, it operated during nineteenth-century European colonialism as a legal mechanism aimed at establishing whether non-European states could ascend to the status of "civilised", in order to be recognised by international law (Bowden, 2002: 2). Positive international law did not explicitly include any civilisational test for membership in international society. However, as the Ottoman Empire was dragged into Europe's balance of power, as China and Japan had to face an increasingly assertive and powerful Occident, and Africa was becoming an arena for the rivalries between the great European powers, a "classic" standard of civilisation emerged (Donnelly, 1998: 3-4).

The test whether a State was civilised and, thus, entitled to full recognition as an international personality was, as a rule, merely whether its government was sufficiently stable to undertake binding commitments under international law and whether it was able and willing to protect adequately the *life, liberty and property of foreigners* (Schwarzenberger, 1955: 220 cit. in Bowden, 2002; emphasis by Bowden).

It appears the West managed to exert such an influence overseas that it was able to establish this classic standard of civilisation in a seemingly natural and pacific manner. However, a particular form of violence may be considered in the conception of this

process, one that is indeed distinct from the direct form of violence exercised in the context of colonisation during the Discoveries, in which physical subjugation was part of the civilisation of barbarians. In this context, the “symbolic”, which is central in Bourdieu’s work,<sup>19</sup> plays a key role in sustaining that subjugation through violence and power:

Objective relations of power tend to reproduce themselves in relations of symbolic power. In the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for the monopoly over legitimate naming, agents put into action the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles and which may be juridically guaranteed (Bourdieu, 1989: 21).

In his reading of Bourdieu, Guzzini (2013: 81) stresses that the capital encloses processes of cognition and recognition for the agents, in which a form of connivance between the dominating and the dominated is implied. Alienated from conscious consent, agents react following their habitus, which results in obedience, or “doxic subordination”, that is,

[a] subordination which is neither the result of coercion, nor of conscious consent, let alone a social contract. Instead, the domination is based, as he writes, on a mis(re)cognition (*méconnaissance*) of that symbolic violence which works by not being recognised as such (Guzzini, 2013: 82).

I therefore suggest that the standardisation of civilisation, as a process aiming at securing the civilised habitus of the West *outside* the West, depends importantly on symbolic forms of violence. Hence, symbolic violence allows for a more structural and unconscious entrenchment of the civilised habitus into periods of time of *longue durée* and widespread spaces, than rough physical force. Whereas direct violence enables immediate subjugation, symbolic violence follows the logic of long-term pacification, interdependence and discipline of the subjects, and therefore, suits the logic of standardisation into the unconscious.

As a consequence, the symbolic power of the West in achieving the standardisation of its civilisation overseas through international treaties rests on the possession of the social position or authority acquired previously, during the Discoveries, when direct and symbolic violence subjected and subjectified the non-civilised into

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<sup>19</sup> “Symbolic violence”, namely, refers to the imposition of social meanings and representations of reality. It legitimises structures of domination, by representing them as natural, so that social actors internalise them into a habitus, and therefore take them as natural and legitimate (Jackson, 2009: 110-111). In turn, “Symbolic capital is a credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition” (Bourdieu, 1989: 23).

“civilised-*ergo*-Westerners”. The apparent naturalness of the civilised habitus was decisively provided by the force of that symbolic capital.

What is striking under the classical standard of civilisation is how it actually came to implicitly architect a system of international security ruled by specific (legal) norms, in which the international sense of security was primarily destined to protect the integrity of Westerners overseas, whilst civilising other regions of the world. For instance, during the nineteenth century, Western powers came to establish special rights for the European, white and catholic minorities overseas (Donnelly, 1998: 10), in international treaties explicitly referring to the term ‘civilisation’ as the will and aptitude of a state in protecting the life, propriety, liberties and rights – especially those of foreigners (Duara, 2001: 100). Among other things, this endowed Europeans settling in countries with no other European legal rule present the liberty to commit acts of violence and injustice upon indigenous populations, which could only be controlled by annexation of the territory concerned (Gillen and Ghosh, 2007: 96).

Progressively, Gerritt Gong argues, five criteria came to dominate the core of any state’s standard of civilisation until at least WWI: (1) to guarantee basic rights such as life, dignity, propriety, freedom of travel, trading and religion, in particular those of the foreigners’; (2) to possess an efficient political bureaucracy, and be able to organise its self-defence; (3) to adhere to international law, including the laws of war, and to maintain an internal juridical system (publishing laws that guarantee justice for all in its jurisdiction, for both natives and foreign citizens); (4) to preserve diplomatic relations and be open to communication and exchange; (5) to abide to the common norms and practices of the civilised international society – slavery and polygamy were thus considered uncivilised and unacceptable (Gong, 2002: 80). So, implicitly, to be a civilised and sovereign member of international society was not only a matter of the states’ political and legal obligations, as it was also a moral issue that equated their civilised behaviour to the values of Christianity and Enlightenment (Donnelly, 1998: 5; Duara, 2001: 100).

In this context, the classical standard of civilisation basically set the tone for the dominant conceptions of international security, by giving rise to particular conceptions of the Western state model as a secure political subject across space (Devetak, 2005b: 176). Clearly, the civilised habitus developing since the sixteenth century continued revealing the psychogenetic and sociogenetic aspects mentioned earlier, but in a transformed way.



The civilised subject of security of the West evolved in both time and space, from the late-medieval kingdoms of Europe to the community of state-empires of the newly globalised world, thus adapting to new forms of socio-political organisation, and simultaneously spreading to uncivilised regions of the world. The difference, now, lied in the kind of accumulated power and symbolic capital interacting between the parts, and also on the recipient of civilising moves, namely, the state as a collective regulator and provider of secure behaviours.

### **5.3. Evolving standards of civilisation**

By approaching the evolution of the standards of civilisation, this section introduces the preliminary notion that standards, despite the different forms they may assume, fundamentally serve the security of the West. It is only a preliminary approach, since the notion of standard of civilisation will be used again in the following chapters in relation to NATO, which constitutes the primary focus of my analysis.

It will be shown that evolving standards of civilisation resemble a historical process of securitisation of the West that builds on the strength of its “symbolic power” (Bourdieu, 1989). This enables the civilising force of the West to be secured and to evolve durably without saying. It will be seen that, as different standards of civilisation came out with the growing interdependence among states and societies within the international scene, these have continuously worked as forms of power, and simultaneously legitimated certain knowledge and discourses about the world, thereby disciplining non-Western states. Moreover, all standards arising after the classical standard of civilisation mentioned earlier would perpetuate and serve the security of “something” from the West. Ultimately, this section reinforces the idea that security is vitally and ontologically related to the process of civilisation.

After the initial conception of the classical standard of civilisation, many other standards have manifested throughout contemporary world history. Each standard has come to involve different norms and institutional shapes, and different authors have attempted to defend their own perspective on which standard of civilisation has come to prevail during particular periods of time. Notably, these standards are the expression of the life of different *fields*.

Recalling on the Bourdieusian definitions presented in Chapter 3, the field is a social world in which there is constant differentiation and struggle for power between actors who compete for various forms of material and symbolic power resources (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97; Jackson, 2009: 108). Moreover, it was said that the mutually structuring relation between the field and the habitus is constitutive of action, as they both exemplify a continual process of reinstatement and transformation. A particular habitus is revealed and becomes active only in its relation to a particular field. As such, the same habitus can lead to different practices and manifestations depending on the state of the field (Williams, 2007: 27-28). In short, the field is the specific arena in which actors compete over different forms of power, and that is essential for a particular habitus to develop. As such, one may envisage that the habitus of “civilised-*ergo*-civilising” subjects needs to evolve in specific fields of social action.

Human rights appear as one of the most critical fields of the twentieth century, in which social action and social habiti have been importantly determined by standards of civilisation. Hence, contrarily to constraining or prohibiting norms applying to states under international law,

Standards of civilization are more subtle. States, wishing to render credible their self-descriptions of being civilized, must adhere to internationally recognized standards of civilization – as well as to their own principles of civilization. The society of states sets standards of civilization, although individual states interpret such standards within their own national and cultural identity. According to constructivism, in such mutually constitutive relationships, states, systems of states, and international societies each create and shape the norms by which they understand their own behavior and identity (Gong, 2002: 81).

As a matter of fact, self-determination had come as a priority for the redesign of Europe after WWI, namely in US President Woodrow Wilson politics (Franck, 1992: 53). And after WWII, self-determination became the prevailing norm at the international level, which eventually led to decolonisation. Therefore, the classical standard of civilisation definitely lost its prominence, and state sovereignty replaced it as the minimal common denominator for a civilisational status at the international level (Donnelly, 1998: 14). Concurrently, humanitarianism was already developing since the mid-nineteenth century, closely associated with the work of the International Committee for the Red Cross, which later promoted the essential formulation of humanitarian law through the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Barnett, 2005: 727). The emergence of international humanitarian law and its more thorough development and implementation after WWII strongly

contributed to reappraise the classical standard of civilisation. The presence of the Nazi regime within the confines of Western civilisation had proved that a barbarian Other could coexist “at home”, so human rights represented a new standard that was more inclusive and based on human commonalities (Donnelly, 1998: 14). As such, many international organisations have established international standards of non-discrimination and human rights that are deemed more universal than the classical standard of civilisation. This is the case of the UN, OMT, GATT, and especially of regional regimes such as the EU and the Organisation of American States, considered more progressive (Gong, 2002: 82-84). However, the human rights regime appeals to a progressive liberal understanding of civilisation, which implies that the state is the main tool to make its citizens’ rights effective (Donnelly, 1998: 14).

Along this line of thinking, democracy appears as another central standard of civilisation, and some authors defend that it should be the ultimate standard of civilisation ruling in state governments, especially in the light of their attachment to international society. Thomas Franck (1992), for instance, argues that the right of any state to be represented in international organisms, benefit from development, trade, and security programs must depend on its democratic validation. This is to say that democracy should be the standard of civilisation that grants a state its integration in international society. In relation to the international monitoring of elections in sovereign states, for example, Franck nonetheless sustains the need to “uncouple” it from a “long history of unilateral enforcement of a tainted, colonialist “civilizing” mission” (Franck, 1992: 84). To David Fidler (2001: 148) as well, “Whether a government is democratic is now a pressing issue, and the test of democratic legitimacy is more far reaching than what the old standard of civilisation required”. But it is now a matter of imposing a “liberal, globalized civilization on the world” (Fidler, 2001: 139). In his sense, states, international organisations, and nongovernmental organisations are using contemporary international law as part of “a liberal project of political, economic, and legal homogenization seeking to foster a certain kind of human solidarity within Westphalian civilization” (Fidler, 2001: 149). To Brett Bowden (2002: 11), one of the most significant indicators that human rights and democracy are gradually becoming normative texts and practices is their ever-common appearance in the negotiations of intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN. Bowden even mentions the AGNU Resolution 52/513 of 21 October 1997 entitled

*“Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies”* as an example of how this text naturally takes democracy as a standard, although “democracy” *per se* is completely either absent from the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In his very enlightening analysis of how regional organisations such as NATO and the Council of Europe have socialised the post-Soviet space, Yannis Stivachtis (2010) refers that, although the historical standard of civilisation has declined, the standards of civilised behaviour remain. In this sense, a state’s socialisation outside of the group it belongs to requires its acceptance of and compliance to the norms and practices that international society considers as civilised. Stivachtis analyses the evolution of the standard of civilisation and its relation to the contemporary evolution of the idea of democracy and to the policy of democratic conditionality. He observes how NATO and the Council of Europe have sought to civilise the socialist countries and the Soviet republics, by socialising them through Western values and norms related to liberal democracy. According to this logic, the enlargement process of these organisations is very similar to the mere continuation of old practices that were previously condemned internationally. Put in other terms, new concepts are used to describe old practices that continue the same (Stivachtis, 2010: 7). After the political failure of the original standard of civilisation, democracy was associated to “civilisation”, having progress, development and modernisation as inherent features (Stivachtis, 2010: 12).

More recently, as the 09/11 events were characterised as attacks on civilisation perpetrated by barbarians, war against terrorism was put as a war between the civilised and the uncivilised:

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom (Bush, 2001).

Here, the standard is presented as a choice. Members of international society may or may not rally to the civilisational fight against those who violate freedom, progress, pluralism, and tolerance. Therefore, in this specific case, a civilised member of international society should be the one that stands by the US-led war on terrorism. And this is yet another step further into a fresh, or resurrected, civilisational standard for the twenty-first century (Bowden, 2002: 14). But this question will be analysed in more depth in the section

dedicated to NATO's involvement in Afghanistan, further in the dissertation (Chapter 10.c).

Seemingly, standards of civilisation in contemporaneity depend on particular normative and even linguistic options primarily adopted by states and international organisations. Standards have thus assumed different denominations, but generally have been the expression of ideas, behaviours, and habits developed within and by the West. However, the adherence to international norms such as human rights and democracy does not automatically imply that a given state effectively complies with them. As suggested in the previous section on Modernity as civilised time (Chapter 5. a), the acquisition of the civilised status does not mean that there is an actual identity change, because only a faction of the world is dictating the universality of the norm. There is no actual negotiation of values, and these only become an arena for power struggle. Like individuals, states may not really transform their identity and behaviour, just because a determined standard of civilisation is prevailing in international society:

The whole globe was recognized as civilized. 'Civilization', however, lost all substantive meaning. The Idi Amins, the Macias Nguemas, the Mobutus, the Maos, the Sukharnos and the Pinochets of the world were accepted as, to use Westlake's language, 'civilised, though with other civilisations than ours' (Donnelly, 1998: 13).

Standards of civilisation may be as ontologically biased, as the exercise of classifying civilised members of international society is subjective. For example, Diamond (2002: 9-10 cit. in Bowden, 2002: 15) considers that only thirty countries in the world are effectively civilised for being stable, advanced industrial and liberal democracies. Besides, twenty-four of the thirty countries are in Western Europe, and include the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel and Japan. This means that the vast majority of the countries of the world remains outside the fully civilised realm (*ibid.*).

Furthermore, in a world that is divided according to the levels of material well-being, Mehdi Mozaffari connects standards of civilisation to security as follows:

In a world with multiple and different world-economies, in Braudelian terminology, the standard of civilization as well as the world order became consequently regional. [...]  
In a world with two concurrent and dominating world-economies, security issues determine the quality of relations between international politics, ethics, and law. This was the case during the Cold War. In this type of situation, the logic of consequences based on security will prevail. It should be noted that economy alone is not enough to fully explain the rivalry between the West and the East. This was equally a struggle or a clash between two competing civilizations (Mozaffari, 2002: 47-48).

The major implication underlying this statement is that the regionality of world order has been determined by the fact that security issues have been predominantly ruled by the West, in a struggle over civilisational power. Therefore, the notion that standards of civilisation ruling the cohabitation of states is not as *démodé* as it could seem. Although the criteria may vary, they still point to the fact that particular West-originated norms are guiding the standards according to which states of the entire world should behave not only at other states, but also at their citizens. Moreover, despite the belief that contemporary civilisation should not be monopolised, and rather washed of any notion of hierarchy if the co-existence of peoples is to be successful (Linklater, 2011: 17), the existence of institutions such as the G's groups – G7, G8, G20, G77 – may prove the opposite tendency. Hence, the greater number of states involved in the denomination of the group, the least inferior is the state akin to feel by belonging to the group.

To conclude, this section showed that the standardisation of civilisation is an important dimension of the process of civilisation in that it has been decisive to its dissemination and to the subjectification of the uncivilised Others as civilised outside the West. First, the classical standard of civilisation established an extra-territorial legitimacy for the West to impose its norms in overseas nations, and regulate their behaviour as social providers of certain rights. Then, over time, the standards of civilisation evolved and were continued in different fields such as international law. However, the sense of security is the one prevailing in the many contemporary standards of civilisation, namely the security of norms, values, and social models spread by and/or from the West.

Throughout Part 1, a general conceptualisation of the civilised subject of security was developed. It began by framing it conceptually within three major influences – Bourdieu, Elias, and Foucault. First, Bourdieusian notions of habitus and field provided a socio-cognitive approach of perceptions and their entrenchment in pre-conscious knowledge to enhance how the subject relates to both his Self and the social world. Then, drawing on Elias' *Civilising Process* (1989; 1990), it was possible to develop the notion of a civilised habitus duly contextualised from both a historical and psychosocial stance. It was seen that the subjects of the West progressively acquired a civilised habitus, which is mutually constituted by a sense of a self-restrained identity and a social position within increasingly centralised and pacified societies. After this, the relational perspective of

Foucault, centred on relations of power, allowed suggesting that civilised subjects inevitably produce and reproduce their civilised habitus, hence their underlying *civilising* character. Chapter 4 was the ultimate step in the conceptualisation of the civilised subject of security, which established an ontological relation between the process of civilisation and security as a metaphysical value. Here, the contribution of psychoanalysis – through Freud and Jung – enhanced the unconscious, complex, symbolic, connections between the civilised subjects and their sense of security. This conflicts with the idea of linearity in human behaviour and that security could be innate, as the reversion of the civilised habitus through decivilising practices actually appeared as a possibility. Within the unconscious dimension of security, the importance of symbols was also exposed to highlight the sense of historical connection that goes beyond individual life, which provides the civilised habitus with that time-space transcendence.

After this, Chapter 5 offered a more empirical illustration of the processes of subjectification through which the civilised subject of security expanded both in time and space. Here, Modernity was analysed for its temporal and narrative dimensions, but also for its geo-mental role in the acknowledgement of Western civilisation outside the West. In this context, the Discoveries and European colonialism more broadly played a major role as narratives of the civilised Modernity, but also as a geopolitical process of civilizational standardisation. Through this expansionist move, characterised by important forms of symbolic power and structural violence, newly civilised subjects were constructed through domination, in the light of Western norms and values. The dissertation will now proceed by focusing on its object of analysis, NATO.

## PART 2 – NATO’s civilisational referent of security

A full account of the formation of NATO should therefore include an exploration of the history of “Western civilization”, and an explanation of how it came to be present in the postwar period in a form in which it was available to be tapped by advocates of a relatively permanent alliance between the United States, Canada, and several Western European countries (Jackson, 2003: 240).

After having outlined the conceptualisation of the civilised subject of security and having explored the initial dynamics of his expansion outside the West, Part 2 will show that NATO’s original referent object of security is fundamentally civilisational. In other words, as suggested by Jackson in the abovementioned quote, after having addressed the issue of Western civilisation, it is now a matter of looking into “[h]ow it came to be present in the postwar period” (2003: 240). Understanding NATO’s formation and identity involves the critical question of what it surged to defend, that is, ultimately, its referent object of security. The claim here is that WWII was fundamentally a breaking point for the civilised habitus, which required the correction, redefinition and redirection of the habitus process for the continuation of civilised subjects of security in the West after WWII. In this sense, NATO emerged and developed as an organisation of civilisational defence in the light of the serious decivilising threats raised by WWII.

Traditionally, “States ally to increase their security against potential adversaries” (Weber, 1992: 675). As it was stated earlier, *ab origine* and formally, NATO is an alliance aiming at collective defence, establishing a military binding between its members: “the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (NATO, 1949: art. 3). There are also other notions in NATO’s formative treaty, which consist of particular concepts, terms, and ideas that are strongly expressed and reiterated to compose the Alliance’s identity. The most complete expression of those notions may be found in the preamble of the Washington Treaty, in which it is stated that the Parties

[a]re determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and **civilisation of their peoples**, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to **promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area**. They are resolved to unite their efforts for **collective defence** and for the **preservation of peace and security** (NATO, 1949; emphasis added).



This passage is of great importance, because it conveys much more than the military commitment against potential adversaries. On the one hand, it specifies the values that were to be *safeguarded* by the parties' willpower: "freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples". It also defined the principles upon which those values were founded as being "democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law". The Treaty is ambitious; in addition to the ideals, it aims at a particular political regime, stability, well-being, collective defence, peace and security. An alliance with such an embracing commitment, and encompassing an area such as the North Atlantic, is rather unprecedented.

The overall comprehensiveness of objectives and norms may be the cause for the lack of consensus over *why* NATO took shape as an alliance. To David Haglund (2004: 226-228), there is the question of whether NATO was born to respond to a traditional Realist-type threat to security, or whether it could have emerged even in the absence of a Soviet threat. The author addresses the question by looking into NATO's "deep origins", namely the decade preceding the emergence of the CW, from early 1938 to 1948, as NATO's "true gestation period", during which it would have needed to take shape as a democratic alliance (Haglund, 2004: 226-227). After dissenting over whether NATO was formed because of shared values, and/or because of a Soviet threat, he finally concludes that NATO's origins are not so deep after all, for the trio of founding nations – UK, France and USA – did not represent the institutional expression of a shared identity in the years that preceded the alliance's formation (Haglund, 2004: 227-230; 245). According to this perspective, the alliance's formation was mostly opportunistic. If this is accurate, how are we to interpret the treaty's reference to a "common heritage" of the North Atlantic peoples?

As to *how* NATO took shape as an alliance, Patrick Jackson (2003), for instance, has approached the conditions of NATO's formation under a *relational* dimension. According to Jackson, a relational account of NATO's formation indicates that state representatives involved in the formation of the alliance often claimed to be speaking and acting *on behalf* of "the West". This is to say that NATO was proposing to defend a precise community. However, to Jackson, the West acted mostly as a "rhetorical commonplace". As a consequence, if the West is the relevant actor for the process, and not the states which submit to the "larger civilizational whole", then the "arguments deploying

this commonplace are instrumental in legitimating the Alliance” (Jackson, 2003: 224). The author considers Western civilisation as a rhetorical device used in the discursive work of NATO’s formative years, expressed by an occidentalist language and commonplaces such as the defence of liberty, anti-communism, heliotropism, and American exceptionalism (Jackson, 2003: 242-243). Ultimately, “an alliance *within* Western Civilization seemed to be simply an acknowledgement of connections that already existed, and therefore less of a radical departure than it might have seemed” (Jackson, 2003: 245). From this perspective, if NATO did not represent a “radical departure”, then what was it continuing?

Part 2 will therefore extend the *why* and the *how* questions of NATO’s origins, by focusing on *to whom*, that is, the “civilisation of the North Atlantic peoples” as NATO’s original referent object of security. As sceptical as both Haglund’s and Jackson’s views on NATO’s origins may seem, and as clear as NATO’s designs may be expressed in the Washington Treaty, there is still need for further reflection on the possibility of disruption or continuity within the broader civilising process of the West.

Part 2 is composed of two chapters. Chapter 6 will start by contextualising NATO’s adoption of a civilisational referent of security in relation to the state of the civilised habitus, namely in the 1939-1949 period. This assessment will be made by discussing (a) the apparent resurgence of barbarian behaviour in the West; (b) the prevailing representations of uncivilised Otherness by the West; (c) the civilising role of the “spiritual argument” in Western postwar discourses; (d) the rearrangement of power and security dispositions among the civilised of the West. Then, Chapter 7 will look into NATO’s evolution from its emergence in 1949 to the end of the Cold War, and show how the Alliance developed and adapted the civilisational referent of security.



## **6. NATO's deep origins (1939-1949): was the civilised habitus broken?**

In the line of Haglund (2004), inquiring over the “deep origins” of NATO’s referent object of security should consider a period prior to 1949, and even to 1945. Of course, the main negotiating, discursive, political, and diplomatic exchanges between the major actors and powers involved in NATO’s formation took place more intensively between the end of WWII and 1949, as many lives, infrastructures, nations, identities and ideas had to be reviewed, reconstructed, reinvented or restored. However, all this occurred only as a direct consequence of WWII, and therefore the 1939-1945 period is equally determining for so many psychosocial, geopolitical, philosophic purposes, among others. So, in relation to the 1939-1949 period, to which extent did civilisation need to be upheld through a Western organisation of defence and security? In other words, was there a perception that the civilised habitus and respective subject of security were on the verge of being lost?

This chapter thus proposes to deconstruct the role of “civilisation” in the formation of the Alliance, by highlighting the antecedents leading to the need to safeguard the civilisation of the North-Atlantic people. It will be shown how WWII greatly destabilised the civilised habitus, and how, although it suffered a major breakdown, it did not collapse. For that, each of the upcoming sections will focus on the most significant manifestations and expressions of the civilised habitus by the major political actors involved in the process: (a) aggressiveness, as the lack of self-restraint, and the correlated use of the notion of “barbarism” to design the antinomy of civilisation; (b) the figure of the uncivilised through the Soviet Union; (c) the role of spirituality as a tool for discipline and self-restraint; (d) the rearrangement of postwar security and power through reinforced interdependence. Together, these different approaches will show how the civilised habitus was reformulated, redefined and reasserted.

However, some cautions need to be made. The first regards the use of statements made by individual actors concerning Western civilisation. Even if those statements are used for methodological purposes, that does not necessarily imply that individual human beings are the only actors in any social situation (Jackson, 2003: 238). Furthermore, the facts, events and speeches that occurred during the period under study have a historical, cultural, economic, political and diplomatic background that may be traced to previous

historical periods. That is why some references will be made to facts whose origins obviously belong to previous periods of time, while others – mostly anterior to WWI – may be lacking. All those episodes may also be interpreted from a multiplicity of angles: political, ideological, economic, psychosocial. Each one of these dimensions may be approached from many different perspectives, and still seem insufficient or incomplete. This is to say the exercise proposed in this chapter is not to be a *total* one, but rather an attentive reflection motivated by an inter-disciplinary concern with the conceptual history of “civilisation” within NATO.

As Norbert Elias did in the *Civilising Process* (1989; 1990), manifestations and marks of the civilised habitus are better searched in the forms of discourse that prevail at the period of time under study. In accordance with the theoretical and methodological stances adopted in this dissertation – as announced in the introduction – the influence of discourse and its respective language in spreading and disseminating social meanings and normative contents has proved to be critical. It is in fact a premise of cultural psychology that nothing just “is”, for realities are the product of the way things are represented, implemented, and reacted to in various taxonomic and/or narrative contexts (Shweder, 1990: 3-4). This is important for what regards the power of discourse in producing a reality, in which the need for upholding Western civilisation appears as vital.

### **6.1. World War II: barbarism unleashed**

This section approaches barbarism as an indicator of threat to the civilised habitus. As it will be seen, there are two interrelated aspects underlying barbarous behaviour and the breakdown of civilisation in WWII. One is related to human nature and the apparent resurgence of aggressiveness in individual behaviour, in particular in the West, suggesting a retrocession in terms of self-restraint. As mentioned earlier in Part 1, Chapter 4, Freud (1961) was quite skeptical of humans’ real propensity to non-violence, and deemed it an illusion. To him, the natural instinct to aggression was only temporarily and superficially repressed. Freud’s psychology of aggression in his article “Why war?” (1932 cit. in Lewin, 2009: 25) also focused on the interactions between the individual and the crowd, the potential for social instability caused by the repression of instincts, the

emotions involved with aggression and death, the psychology of hate, the suggestibility of crowds and their need for leaders. Amidst WWII, Freud (1940: 185 cit. In Lewin, 2009: 26) even considered we should include the influence of civilisation as a determinant for neurosis, as the task to remain civilised is harder than for the barbarian to remain healthy. Another aspect of barbarism has to do with decivilising practices at the state level, indicating both a reversal of pacification and a perversion of the state's monopoly of the use of force. This is consistent with the idea of historian Herbert Butterfield (1950: 143-144) that the scale of atrocities happening in the modern world rather derives from modern technique and organisation, and not from any change in human nature. Taken together, both the individual and state dimensions of barbarism seem to contradict Elias' sense that civilised societies were pacified and had instinctually renounced to violence.

From 1939, the world was ravaged by a world war for the second time in less than thirty years. Memory of WWI was still vivid. It had left a traumatic effect, because a big-scale war had never been expected, and had even been deemed incoherent (Lasswell, 1948: 878; McNeill, 1982: 307). The "diplomatic culture" had been ruling, and people believed that any war would be civilised and spare civilian life (Elshtain, 1989: 57). WWI had also disenchanting the idea of a civilising mission of the West for all humanity. The materialism and destructiveness brought by the West were associated to imperialism and war (Duara, 2001: 104-105). When WWI ended, a strong reaction against bloodsheds set in, and most of the survivors assumed that war had been "an atavistic aberration from the norms of civilized life" (McNeill, 1982: 308). In the two decades following WWI, the widespread belief that excessive violence had been eliminated made European societies ill-prepared for the rise of Fascism and the possibility of genocide (Linklater, 2007: 165). To anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski – one of the most influential of the twentieth century and founder of "social anthropology" – the West was aware of its fragility, and self-confidence regarding its cohesion as a civilised entity was undoubtedly shaken. In 1936, he thus accounted for the state of Western civilisation :

Our present civilization is undoubtedly passing through a very severe, perhaps a critical, stage of **maladjustment**. **The abuse of legal and administrative power; the inability to create lasting conditions of peace;** the recrudescence of **aggressive militarism** and magical trickery; the torpor of true religion and the assumption of a religious garb by doctrines of racial or national superiority or the gospel of Marx [...] (Malinowski, 1936: 449; emphasis added).

It seems that both as a consequence of WWI and of the increasingly unstable environment of the 1930's, war, militarism, the failure of peace, and the maximisation of power were all transforming many aspects of Western civilisation, including its self-perception and beliefs. Even after WWII, the multifaceted political scientist Harold Lasswell, who lived throughout both world wars and was much influenced by Freud in his work on communication and propaganda, considered in 1948 that many were still pessimistic about the universal possibility of political cooperation, for war had become a “skeleton” that was no longer “kept in the closet” (Lasswell, 1948: 878).

Now, the psychosocial and historical conditions under which the rise of Nazism occurred is well depicted by Norbert Elias in *Studies on the Germans* (1997), in which he outlines the conditions underlying the rise of Nazism in Germany. He thereby traces the numerous ways in which the features of the German habitus, social structure and behaviour combined to produce the rise of Hitler, to find that it was likely that Nazism could happen in Germany, and not in Britain or France. Elias shows that, after the successive defeats against invaders in the previous centuries (such as Louis XIV and Napoleon), the Germans' self-image was fragmented, and also aware of its relative weakness and low status in the rank-hierarchy of European states. This led to a nostalgic longing for a strong, heroic, leader, which reinforces the “onyric character of the German self-image”, and to idealising the greatness of the past and the creation of a new Reich (Elias, 1997: 283-285). Here the role of the unconscious in the self-image is evident; as Germans lacked the feeling of security, their national habitus was unstable and the subsequent anxiety can be seen as the motivation for the search for an ontological, symbolic, relation with the state.

It is interesting that in 1934, well before WWII, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had already represented an eventual threat to the West that he perceived to come from a new totalitarian regime. This was how he portrayed the German people and the Nazi government, led and imposed by Adolf Hitler in 1933:

**This mighty people, the most powerful and most dangerous in the Western world, have reverted to the conditions of the Middle Ages** with all the modern facilities and aggravations. We are confronted with **the monstrosity of the Totalitarian State**. All are to think alike. No one is to disagree. [...] Every link with the past, even with the most glorious traditions, has been severed. A despotism has been erected **only less frightful than the Russian nightmare**. Its aims are different, its forms are opposite, but its methods are the same (Churchill, 1934 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 193; emphasis added).

This excerpt shows the evident association of different realms: the *collective identity* of a

powerful and dangerous people of the West, whose *behaviour* seems to have retroceded to the time of the Middle Ages, to now form a monstrous totalitarian state that threatens the Western world. The retrocession to “the conditions of the Middle Ages” is a clear reference to the memory of a historical past, in which manners and self-constraint of interpersonal violence were less entrenched. To Churchill, the situation was a clear rupture with the past, as despotism took the place of “glorious traditions”. Identity, history and politics intertwined to form the most Dantesque scenario possible for Western modernity. It is noteworthy that the only thing deemed worse than Nazi Germany by Churchill at the time was the “Russian nightmare”.

However, “civilisation” was not explicit yet. Later, less than a month before the outbreak of WWII, German pressure on Poland intensified and “civilisation” would be definitely at stake. Churchill expressed his view on the possibility of a war with Germany as one versus the civilised world:

It is not because we have any doubts how **a struggle between Nazi Germany and the civilised world** would ultimately end, that we pray tonight and every night for peace. But whether it be peace or war; peace with its broadening and brightening prosperity, now within our reach; or **war with its measureless carnage and destruction, we must strive to frame some system of human relations in the future, which will bring to an end this prolonged hideous uncertainty**, which will let the working and creative forces of the world get on with their job, and which will no longer leave the whole of life of mankind dependent upon the virtues, the caprice, or **the wickedness of a Single man** (Winston Churchill, 1939 in Gilbert, 2012: 223; emphasis added).

Churchill’s words revealed a strong belief in the superiority of the civilised world if war was to occur. The enemy of “the whole of life of mankind” in the eventuality of war was a single wicked man, whose virtues and caprice defined the possibility of “carnage and destruction”. Churchill also indicated the need for a “system of human relations in the future” that would be able to contain the threat inherent to the instability of autocratic regimes. This might have been an appeal to some kind of international organism that would be proactive in keeping democracy, peace and security.

On 30 September 1940, WWII was running. On the occasion of the second anniversary of the Munich Agreements, Churchill broadcasted to the people of Czechoslovakia, who had been living under the harsh severity of the Nazi rule since the German occupation of Prague in March 1939:

In this hour of **your martyrdom** I send you this message: The battle which we in Britain are fighting today **is not only our battle**. It is also your battle, and, indeed, **the battle of all nations who prefer liberty to a soulless serfdom**. It is



**the struggle of civilized nations** for the right to live their own life in the manner of their own choosing. It represents man's instinctive defiance of tyranny and of an impersonal universe (Winston Churchill, 1940 in Gilbert, 2012: 271; emphasis added).

Again, the battle was explicitly referred to as a collective battle of the civilised nations against the uncivilised. But here, the battle was also a metaphysical one, as the civilised victims were represented as martyrs being dominated by the uncivilised and “soulless” tyrants of Nazi Germany.

Recalling on a secret meeting of the Anglo-French War Council held in Paris on 31 May 1940, Churchill would later write:

If Germany defeated either ally or both, she would give no mercy; we should be **reduced to the status of vassals and slaves forever**. It would be better far that the **civilisation of Western Europe with all its achievements should come to a tragic but splendid end** than that the two great democracies should linger on, stripped of all that made life worth living.

Mr. Attlee then said that he entirely agreed with my view. 'The British people **now realise the danger with which they are faced**, and know that in the event of a German victory everything they have built up will be destroyed. The **Germans kill not only men, but ideas. Our people are resolved as never before in their history**' (Winston Churchill, 1940 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 246).

These words reveal Churchill's conviction that the civilisation of Western Europe would be lost to servitude and ideological oblivion if Germans were to defeat Great Britain or France. To Churchill, a “tragic but splendid end” was preferable to such decay. It would have been a physical submission to the “status of vassals and slaves”, and a loss of ideas and values as well. And this was a horrendous scenario for Churchill and Clement Attlee.<sup>20</sup> According to Churchill, the level of resolution of the British people was seemingly unprecedented in “their history”, which suggests that Germany might have represented the greatest threat to civilisation ever.

However, in the beginning of WWII, Nazi Germany was not the only uncivilised enemy. In 1940, after the Soviet Union invaded Finland, Churchill would state:

We cannot tell what the fate of Finland may be, but **no more mournful spectacle could be presented to what is left to civilised mankind** than that this splendid Northern race should be at last worn down and reduced to servitude worse than death by the **dull brutish force of overwhelming numbers**.

If the light of freedom which still burns so brightly in the frozen North should be finally quenched, it might well herald **a return to the Dark Ages, when every vestige of human progress during two thousand years would be engulfed** (Winston Churchill, 1940 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 235-236; emphasis added).

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<sup>20</sup> Clement Attlee succeeded Winston Churchill as Britain's Prime Minister (1945-1951).

Here, Soviet Russia is represented as a “dull brutish force” that crushes the remaining civilised mankind with the “mournful spectacle” of the invasion of Finland. The uncivilised Russia was depicted to unleash violence and lead the world back to the time of “the Dark Ages”. This reference remits to ages of barbarism prior to Christianity, in a complete reversion of the idea of progress conveyed by Modernity.

The aforementioned words of Churchill are a selection of the most striking and unequivocal conceptions of Western civilisation. Not only did they express the attributes and beliefs regarding Western civilisation, as they also portrayed the perceptions held on the uncivilised character of Germany and Russia. They were also grave and solemn words, in that the unprecedented character of war was said to represent a serious rupture with the historical past of the West. Churchill stressed how *ideas* were threatened and even equated the possibility of a “tragic but splendid end” for Western civilisation in very material terms.

Another perspective of the subject is well elaborated by philosopher Hannah Arendt. As a Jewish exile – she left Germany in 1933 to France where she worked for the immigration of Jewish refugee children into Palestine – her most influential and famous works include *Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of Evil* (2006 [1963]), and *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1966), in which she profoundly reflects on the issue of Nazism and the Holocaust, in terms that articulate the often-conflictive relationship between the individual and the collective dimensions of public life. In *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Arendt noted that even though the “law in civilised countries” assumes that the voice of conscience should tell individuals not to kill, Hitler’s commands demanded precisely the opposite. Nazism rather defied the “normal desires and inclinations of most people” (Arendt, 2006: 150). Adolf Eichmann’s defence, Arendt retells, was that he had carried out “acts of state”. Eichmann said he had never wished “the murder of human beings”, and that he had acted alienated from his personal feelings and beliefs out of pure “obedience”, a “virtue” that had been abused by the Nazis (Arendt, 2006: 247-248). Totalitarianism rather dictated that everything out of normality could be permitted and made possible, essentially because it suspends law and makes human beings superfluous (Arendt, 1966). According to Eichmann’s arguments, who was an actor of barbarism under Nazi rule, the normality of civilised people is to refrain from impulses of violence and aggressiveness, while barbarous acts are an exception dictated by the state. In this sense,

Hitler altered that normality by establishing a regime of total control over people's behaviour, either acting individually, or collectively. Totalitarianism made barbarism possible, sustained by the individuals' habits of discipline and interdependence toward the same monopolistic state. Nazism ultimately proved that peaceful relations respective of different Others can be altered, and that civilised behaviour can be reversed under the action of a particular political regime.

In his study on the Germans, Elias also approaches the Eichmann case, stating that the main problem with mass murder achieved in the name of the nation, does not reside in the act of killing *per se*, but rather in its incompatibility with the highest standards characterising the most developed societies of our times. People of the twentieth century, Elias says, tend to see their time as if their standards of civilisation and rationality were well beyond the barbarism of old times and the least developed societies of today. Despite all the doubts about believing in progress, the image those persons have of themselves remains impregnated with that belief (Elias, 1997: 270). As war violated Western civilisation, and destroyed the old meanings of world order, the "classical" standards of civilisation – basic human rights, state capability to self-defence, international law, open diplomacy, civilised behaviour according to Christian and Enlightenment values (Donnelly, 1998; Duara, 2001; Gong, 2002) – had proved to be fragile. In terms of beliefs as well, Nazism had destroyed the faith in the civilised condition. The path of European social and political development of the previous five centuries was broken by Nazi de-civilising processes (Arendt, 1966; Bauman, 1989; Elias, 1997). Civilised states were not immune to barbarism. As individuals, participants in the Holocaust were not active participants of public acts of cruelty. Instead of direct aggression, they were seemingly required to play more passive roles in the bureaucratic processes of industrialised killings (Linklater, 2007: 165-166).

Although the mechanisation and massification of death developed in Nazi concentration camps could have had less direct effects for human psyche, WWII brought to Westerners the self-awareness that barbarism was possible in their society in two important ways. One was that their socio-political context could lead them to make things they would normally not do; the other is that they, as individuals, could also go back to barbarous behaviour, abandon themselves to impulses of violence, and lose their sense of empathy. The high level of organisation and industrialisation with which death was

brought upon the victims of Nazism represented a threat to the interpersonal and interdependent ties developed among civilised members of Western societies.

It can be said that WWII led to a fundamental insecurity regarding the Westerners' own civilised Self and inherent habitus. Not only did Westerners live in a world of physical insecurity and destruction, as their most profound convictions about who they were also shaken. Insecurity regarding Western capacity to self-control arose, because Nazism had proved to be able to de-civilise individuals. Man was insecure about himself, his humanity, his nature, and about his instrumental role in barbarous acts. But Man was also insecure about the state's monopoly of physical force. Through the mechanisation and massification of selective violence, Nazism proved to the world that the reversion of civilised individuals was tragically possible. It was not that human nature had changed, but rather that civilised subjects could be de-civilised by the state. As a consequence, self-images, representations, beliefs and justifications on Western civilisation were affected. After that, to whom would Westerners attune their behaviour to, in order to feel *civilised-ergo-secure* again? While Section d) on security and power will return to this question later, the next one will address the role played by the civilisational factor in the process of changing justifications and perceptions regarding Russia, as another concurring ground for NATO's emergence.

## **6.2. The never civilised Soviet Union?**

This section will discuss the prevailing notion according to which the Soviet Union became an enemy of Western civilisation at the end of WWII. It will focus on some of the discursive manoeuvres about the Soviet Union by Western actors, to enhance the evolution of Western perceptions, representations and justifications regarding its wartime ally. This will reveal two interrelated things; first, the Western perception of a Soviet threat was no novelty brought by postwar circumstances, but rather a renewal of past perceptions regarding who was uncivilised. Then, the use of decivilising discourses by the West to represent the Soviet Union as barbarian once WWII ended critically contributed to shaping NATO's justification for a civilisational referent of security. It will be seen that the change of perceptions was sustained by new justifications, which created new representations and

beliefs. By focusing on the civilisational element of Western discourses on the Soviet Union, it will be revealed how it actually worked as a tool that re-defined the conception of a civilised behaviour in the international realm.

The issue of how the Soviet Union's role evolved throughout the war may be seen from other standpoints, of course. Geoffrey Roberts (2005), for instance, has analysed the Soviet foreign policy before and after WWII to show how Stalin's thinking, rhetoric, and policy evolved during the war and its immediate aftermath. To Roberts, there were continuities fraught with ambiguities in Stalin's policies, as he wanted to cooperate with the USA and Britain, whilst distrusting his wartime allies. Stalin wanted security, but his fears were rooted in his ideological presuppositions as well as his country's historical experience (Roberts, 2005: 43). But essentially, the shift from "tripartism to a more limited and traditional concept of peaceful coexistence was informed by **perceptions** of Western ideological animosity" (Roberts, 2005: 53; emphasis added). Regarding the changing position of the Soviet Union after WWII within the Western alliance, David Holloway has suggested that the use of the atomic bomb by the USA made Stalin both restrained and constrained, and also less cooperative (2005: 72). Although Stalin believed that the atomic bomb constituted a powerful new factor in international politics, he saw no immediate danger of war after Hiroshima. To Stalin, Holloway argues, atomic diplomacy seemed a greater threat, meant to inspire fear to those with weak nerves. Against this background, the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan were seen as attempts to put pressure on Russia and to weaken its influence in Europe (Holloway, 2005: 73). Regardless of the many other issues that might have influenced policy changes, either on the Soviet side, as on the Anglo-Saxon side of the wartime alliance,<sup>21</sup> the role played by perceptions was indeed central.

First, the fact Churchill spoke of a "Russian nightmare" in 1934 needs to be contextualised. Communism was no novelty; it was the political regime of the Soviet Union since the Bolshevik revolutions of 1917, and it had been vividly scorned by the West since the very beginning:

The anti-communist propaganda campaign began even earlier than the military intervention. Before the year 1918 was over, expressions in the vein of "**Red Peril**", "**the Bolshevik assault on civilization**", and "menace to world by Reds

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<sup>21</sup> See for instance the postwar negotiations on Germany (Roberts, 2005: 44), and others that will be further discussed in Section d).

is seen" had become commonplace in the pages of the *New York Times*.

During February and March 1919, a US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee held hearings before which many "Bolshevik horror stories" were presented. The character of some of the testimony can be gauged by the headline in the usually sedate *Times* of 12 February 1919:

**DESCRIBE HORRORS UNDER RED RULE. R.E. SIMONS AND W.W. WELSH TELL SENATORS OF BRUTALITIES OF BOLSHEVIKI— STRIP WOMEN IN STREETS—PEOPLE OF EVERY CLASS EXCEPT THE SCUM SUBJECTED TO VIOLENCE BY MOBS.**

Historian Frederick Lewis Schuman has written: "The net result of these hearings ... was to picture Soviet Russia as a kind of bedlam inhabited by **abject slaves** completely at the mercy of an organization of **homicidal maniacs** whose purpose was to **destroy all traces of civilization and carry the nation back to barbarism**" (Blum, 2004: 7; emphasis added).

And so, it seems Communist Russia had been uncivilised since its inception. In other words, civilisation had always been at stake with Bolshevism. Media of the late 1910's depicted a generalised behaviour of brutality, violence, homicidal manias, and slavery as something common to "every class". There was no self-control, order or discipline; the most basic impulses were being released in the streets. The picture could not be worse in content, and clearer in its message: Communist Russia was barbarous and a threat to civilisation.

From 1939 to 1941, a Nazi-Soviet pact ruled, during which Eastern European territories had been distributed between the two regimes. But in December 1941, an Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance was concluded by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Stalin. Besides the wartime alliance between the two countries, the agreement secretly settled a preliminary postwar order, according to which the Soviet Union's Eastern interests and territories would be recognised, including her right to Soviet military bases in Finland and Romania (Roberts, 2005: 45).

The establishment of an Anglo-Soviet alliance against Nazi Germany drastically altered the perceptions about the Soviet Union. For the remaining years of WWII, the Soviet Union was indeed an ally of the West:

Today our country is in a far better position than it was 23 years ago. Today it is many times richer in industry, food and raw materials. **Today we have allies** who jointly with us **form a united front against the German invaders. Today we enjoy the sympathy and support of all the peoples of Europe** fallen under the yoke of Fascist tyranny.

[...]

**The enslaved peoples of Europe under the yoke of the German invaders are looking to you as their liberators.** A great mission of liberation has fallen to your lot. [...] **The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just war** (Stalin, 1941; emphasis added).

In this speech, Joseph Stalin spoke to the Russian people and portrayed a country invigorated by its economy, and most importantly by the enjoyment of international support and alliance. At this time, Russia was another victim of Nazi Germany, like many others. It was threatened by Nazi troops and in actual physical danger of invasion. However, the country's resources were sufficient to allow it to be in a "good position". Above all, for the first time since her establishment, Soviet Russia had allies, with whom it formed "a united front against the German invaders". Stalin's confidence in Russia's superior status in comparison with WWI could indicate that Russia was better accepted by the Western allies, now morality was on their side: Russia could play a liberating role in a "just" war.

This confidence was supported publicly by Stalin's pairs on the Western front. American President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1942) opportunely saluted the "superb Russian army" for its joint effort with the British against the Nazis, and paid tribute to both the "fighting men of Russia" and to the "fighting leaders" of the allies – Joseph Stalin among others like Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek (Roosevelt, 1943). British Premier's position on Soviet Russia was more mitigated, though. Churchill acknowledged the negative perception he had had of the Bolshevik state, as he was aware that this perception had only been appeased by the appearance of Hitler:

I pondered on my mission to this **sullen, sinister Bolshevik State** I had once tried so hard to strangle at its birth, and which, **until Hitler appeared, I had regarded as the mortal foe of civilised freedom.** [...] **We had always hated their wicked regime,** and, till the German flail beat upon them, **they would have watched us being swept out of existence with indifference and gleefully divided with Hitler our Empire in the East** (Winston Churchill, 1942 in Gilbert, 2012: 317; emphasis added).

However, Churchill also admired the Soviet leader on a more personal plane:

I was deeply impressed with this remarkable statement. It showed the **Russian Dictator's swift and complete mastery** of a problem hitherto novel to him. **Very few people alive** could have comprehended in so few minutes the reasons which we had all so long been wrestling with for months. **He saw it all in a flash** (Winston Churchill, 1942 in Gilbert, 2012: 321; emphasis added).

This report portrayed Stalin as an intelligent and astute leader, who was able to cease the complexity of a problem like very few. However, despite this kind of personal or professional admiration and the acknowledgement of the implacable effectiveness of the Russian army (Roosevelt, 1942), Stalin was still seen as the "Russian Dictator". This

suggests that Russia was indeed accepted as part of a broader war effort, but she was never perceived to *be like* the West. Therefore, antagonistic perceptions coming from the West were only on a temporary interlude, during which military cooperation occurred between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. That interlude did not imply that both parts attuned their behaviour and mutual perceptions, though. Actually, the representation of Russia by Churchill was mainly one of enmity and lack of trust. His statements prior to WWII had already showed that. As it will be seen next, ulterior developments of the relationship between Russia and the West would reinforce this idea.

As war had ended, George Kennan's "long telegram" of 26 February 1946 from Moscow to US Secretary of State George Marshall is held as one of the West's first conceptual justifications for the change of mood regarding the wartime ally (Gilbert, 2009: 18).<sup>22</sup> Besides the extensive and meticulous explanation on the challenges posed by the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology, the telegram is also rich in details that confirm the Western perception of the Soviet Union's latent connection to a civilised habitus. Here are some selected excerpts of Kennan's long telegram:

At bottom of **Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity**. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with **economically advanced west, fear of more competent more powerful, more highly organized societies** in that area. [...] for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively **archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable** to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries (Kennan, 1946: part 2; emphasis added).

**Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic**. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. **Impervious to logic of reason**, and it is **highly sensitive to logic of force** (Kennan, 1946: part 5; emphasis added).

We must study [the movement] with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same **determination not to be emotionally provoked** or unseated by it, **with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual** (Kennan, 1946: part 5).

**World communism is like malignant parasite** which feeds only on diseased tissue. [...] to solve internal problems of our own society, to **improve self confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit** of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow [...] (Kennan, 1946: part 5; emphasis added).

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<sup>22</sup> At the time, diplomat George Kennan was deputy head of mission in Moscow.



Taken together, the perspectives transcribed above not only compose a clear picture of how the Soviet Union was fundamentally perceived by Kennan, as they also epitomise how future representations of that country would be made by the USA. Therefore, it is worth deconstructing Kennan's most striking statements. First, Russia was deemed to possess a "sense of insecurity" that was so deeply entrenched at the level of instinct and tradition that it could be considered a habitus actually. The Russian habitus of insecurity would have pervaded from a historical past when the peaceful agricultural population strove to survive to their geospatial exposition to barbarous nomads. This long lasting and long evolving insecurity would thus be at the basis of a "neurotic view of world affairs" in contemporaneity. Then, according to Kennan, faced to materially developed and complex interdependent societies of the civilised West, only irrational fear arose from the Soviet regime, led by elites aware of their archaism, fragility and weak "psychological foundation". Hence, the lack of psychological assets underlying the reference to "impervious to the logic of reason" and the comparison of Russia to "an unruly and unreasonable individual" are counterpoised to her sensibility to the "logic of force". On the opposite side of the civilised spectrum, Kennan's words were simultaneously the self-representation of a self-contained entity resisting to emotional provocation, determined to behave in an objective and rational way, as a "doctor" would do. The civilised Self suggested by Kennan would therefore reinforce the basic traits of the civilising process: discipline, morality and community spirit, which is equivalent self-restraint of aggressiveness, interdependent social relations and symbolic power. Whilst contrasting with a civilised Self, all the demeaning representations of the Soviet Union essentially enhanced the uncivilised portrait of the latter.

The influence of Russian Communism in third countries was associated to uncivilised behaviour as well. The Soviet Union was not respecting postwar dispositions accorded in Yalta and Potsdam.<sup>23</sup> Countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Romania were under growing influence of Communism:

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<sup>23</sup> In Yalta, the three allies (USSR, Britain and USA) discussed the future of Germany, the borders of Poland and the spheres of influence in Europe. On Germany, the Three agreed on a division into four zones, occupied and administered by the USA, Britain, France and the Soviet Union Five months later in Potsdam, the Three did not reach any consensus on a peace treaty for Germany. Only vague understandings were issued about German reparations and the peace treaty. The Potsdam accords were then disavowed by the Western powers and the Soviet Union in 1946-47 (Jackson, 2009: 49).

**A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows** what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or **what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies.** I have a **strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin.** [...] We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the **removal of all possibility of German aggression.** From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic **an iron curtain** has descended across the Continent. [...] The **Russian-dominated** Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and **mass expulsions of millions** of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to **preeminence and power** far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain **totalitarian control.** Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is **no true democracy** (Winston Churchill, 1946 cit. in Gilbert, 2012: 370-371; emphasis added).

This excerpt of Churchill's speech at Fulton, USA, is one of his most famous and influential. It is in fact popularly known as the "Iron Curtain" speech. In it, Churchill not only diffused uncertainty, obscurity, and insecurity regarding the designs and behaviour of the Soviet Union, as he also established a strong parallelism with what the Nazi regime had done in the past. Similar to what German Nazism had inflicted during the Holocaust, a "Russian-dominated" government was acting in a "wrongful" and "grievous" way, through "mass expulsions of millions". As with 1930's Germany, a threat of "totalitarian control" was being perceived by Churchill and transmitted to his audience. All these parallelisms to past events constitute a memory recall of a situation "undreamed-of", to which the world was certainly not willing to return to.

In a decisive address to the House of Commons, nearly one year before the NATO treaty would be signed, Ernest Bevin (1948b) stated that the Soviet Union "revealed a proactive policy of getting Communist control over Eastern Europe, and also in the West".<sup>24</sup> This provided enough fundamentals for a renewed stereotype regarding the Soviet Union:

One has only to look at the map to see how since the war, **Soviet Russia has expanded and now stretches** from the middle of Europe to the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. Yet all the evidence is that **she is not satisfied with this tremendous expansion.** In Trieste we have difficulties (Bevin, 1948b; emphasis added).

Soviet ambition was advancing and invading. Soviet Russia was "not satisfied", and it was personified as an eager and thirsty entity. She would keep on seeking "satisfaction", according to a human logic of fulfilling natural impulses. In Trieste, so close to the centre

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<sup>24</sup> Ernest Bevin was the British Foreign Secretary between 1945 and 1951.

of Western Europe, the West had “difficulties”, and it seemed insecure about its capacity to stop a relentless Russia. Bevin also acknowledged that “International agreement” was an “experiment” that failed, and that “has only been a source of friction and bother” (*ibid.*).

Bevin’s general spirit when he spoke of the Soviet Union to the House of Commons suggested that there was no further effort to be made; the situation was presented as unchangeable and almost untouchable. It is not hard to imagine that at the time there was no actual way or will to engage in a new conflict, especially not with a gigantic Russia. The fact is that Bevin preferred a solution involving the “right use of power and organization”, and to “proceed swiftly” (*ibid.*). It is nonetheless interesting how Bevin recognised that individual Soviet representatives were “grand people to get on with” when “free to discuss on their merits”. This suggests that Soviet individuals could be rational when acting individually, but guided by irritation when it came to their political instructions: “The military governors left to themselves could have settled far more than they did in Germany on the basis of Potsdam, if they had been permitted to do so” (*ibid.*).

Furthermore, when mentioning the six weeks spent in Moscow for the Conference of 1947, Bevin described an environment in which time was lost and negotiations ineffective, due to the nervous outbreaks of the members of the meeting:

But, the Moscow Conference last spring was certainly very revealing. We were there over six weeks. [...] **any rational meeting, where there was a will to do business could have done in a week everything we did in that six weeks.** It was I must confess, **very wearying, and even difficult to keep one’s temper at times.** Calm judgment in the conditions under which we had to work was very difficult (Bevin, 1948b; emphasis added).

This reinforced the idea that the Soviet system de-civilised individuals because of the irrationality, lack of calmness, and negotiation barriers it inculcated to its members. Bevin’s testimony stereotyped a country where self-containment of bad manners and instincts, good temper, and calmness did not occur.

Likewise, Bevin’s account of the West-Soviet relationship in November 1947 was very revealing. In Moscow, he depicted the insufferable mood of the Soviets and referred to “The flood of abuse against ourselves and the world by M. Vyshinskiin New York”,<sup>25</sup> but also that

Every day when there was a proposal discussed and an effort made to reach a practical conclusion we had to **waste a whole day listening to abuse of the**

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<sup>25</sup> Andrei Vishinski was a Soviet diplomat, assigned as a permanent representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations from 1945 to 1954.

**Western Powers.** [...] I ask each one here to try to imagine what it is like to sit there hour after hour and to have **thrown at one almost every invective of which one can think and not answer back.** I felt very often like the boy who was asked what he would do if he were hit on the one cheek by his school teacher. He said he would turn the other. His school teacher said “That is a good boy, Tommy, but supposing you were hit on the other cheek, what then?” The boy replied, “Then heaven help him.” I must confess that I felt very much like the schoolboy, and **we had to suppress our feelings** (Bevin, 1948b; emphasis added).

The suppression of feelings by Bevin and other Westerners clearly remitted to the self-containment of impulses, which the Soviet Union was not doing. Russians behave like bullies, without the discipline inherent to the good manners of the civilised. After displaying the behavioural superiority of the West by not “answering back” to “almost every invective”, Bevin was obviously tempted, but he felt like a schoolboy. He was provoked but able to avoid violence and direct response through self-containment. The reference to matters of self-control, natural impulses, and bad manners is a clear manifestation of how the civilised habitus still pervaded the diplomatic and political arenas of post-WWII.

To sum up, barbarism had proved possible in the West under the action of Nazism. When exercised by a state, it had totalitarianism as a synonym. Russia had been a temporary ally, but was never considered civilised by the West. Before the war, she had been deemed a nightmarish tale of brutality for more than twenty years. At the end of the war, as Russia was on the victors’ side, her international role and influence came out strengthened. However, her regime and leader remained unchanged. That is why Russian actions in many European states after the war were perceived as the marks of uncivilised behaviour again. To the West, Russia was displaying a spirit of continuity in relation to its pre-war behaviour. While Russian officials were characterised as uncivilised, Communism was represented as an ideology that de-civilised individuals at the collective level.

In conclusion, from the perspective of the uncivilised, Russia did not break the habitus but rather reinforced and specified it. The redefinition of a civilised habitus for secure Western subjects thus involved the redefinition of *who* and *how* the uncivilised was. Here, the uncivilised was personified by Soviet Communism. Its uncivilised character was not new though. It had only undergone a period of interlude, during which it was an ally of the West against Nazism. Uncivilised behaviour was perceived again after war, when Communism expanded across Eastern Europe. Despite an initial phase of harmonised objectives within the Anglo-Soviet Alliance, despite the military successes achieved

together, despite Stalin's discourse of liberation and justness, uniformity had never been in question. Both sides were aware of their dissimilitude. The secret agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union of 1941 had already designed how and where postwar areas of influences would be shaped for Stalin's regime. Therefore, the West did not perceive the Soviet Union as civilised during wartime, as it rather returned to enhance its de-civilised character after, through renewed justifications and stereotypes, in order to reinforce the social meanings of what it meant to be civilised and not.

The following section will focus on the spiritual dimension of postwar civilisational discourse, as a particular unconscious element that provided further meanings to *how* civilisation was to be conceived.

### **6.3. A “spiritual union”: a tool for self-restraint?**

The definition and perception of civilisation were considerably damaged by WWII, but not completely destroyed. This section will address the very recurrent reference to the “spiritual” during and after WWII, as a complementing value of the civilisational factor for NATO, operating at the unconscious level. Although the revival of spirituality was seemingly linked to the resurgence of Christian faith, it was actually more deeply related to the psychosocial effects of war. Hence, the reassurance of the Western civilised habitus through the spiritual factor was an important dimension of postwar discourses. In this context, and in conformity with the unconscious relation between the civilised habitus and security defended in this dissertation (see Part 1, Chapter 4), it will be seen that apart from material reconstruction, the “spiritual” restoration appeared as a vital requisite for postwar security.

Recalling on Carl Jung's central contribution on this subject, it is the role of religious symbols to give meaning to the life of man (Jung, 1964: 89). But “cultural symbols” may be used as well to express “eternal truths”, still used in many religions. These have gone through many transformations, in a long process of “more or less conscious development, and have thus become collective images accepted by civilized societies” (Jung, 1964: 93). These cultural symbols may evoke deep emotional responses in some individuals, and this psychic change makes them function in much the same way

as prejudices for instance: “They are important constituents of our mental make-up and vital forces in the building up of human society; and they cannot be eradicated without serious loss” (Jung, 1964: 93).

What were the meanings underlying the conceptual and symbolic association of Christianity to Western civilisation? This section will illustrate how the issue of spirituality surged in relation to the broken civilised habitus, as a central discursive aspect of NATO’s deep origins. Evidence will suggest that wartime de-civilising moves were attributed to the loss of spiritual values. Then, this void would be compensated by a stimulation of beliefs in order to serve the justifications and stereotypes about the uncivilised of the epoch. At the same time, the religious character of postwar discourses had the power to re-inculcate the need for individuals to discipline their behaviour and attune it according to the moral authority of the state.

War and the massive scope for destruction brought by technological innovations had a strong impact on Western self-representations. In terms of beliefs, it can be said that faith had been lost on many different fronts. The Christian and Enlightenment values on which the nineteenth-century conception of Western civilisation was based (Duara, 2001: 100) lost credibility in the West. Martin Conway (2006) has made an extensive review of the state of Christian confessional beliefs at the time, and asserted these had suffered a major loss of influence since WWI. In 1939, any account of the influence of Christian churches in Europe would have been pessimistic, mostly due to the increasing number of authoritarian regimes. Christian churches, political parties and values had little influence, and had receded considerably over the twenty-five years since WWI (Conway, 2006: 151). War had given rise to a “militantly atheist communism”, which was by the 1930’s a durable and important influence in European politics. Forms of right-wing politics were also emerging that were separate or even hostile to Christian ideas. Therefore, the actual dominant trend in 1939 pointed toward the “marginalization of Christian values in public and political life” (Conway, 2006: 152).

However, the reference to a “spiritual union” surged very often in postwar discourses, in close association with Western civilisation. It was in fact an important part of NATO’s formative narrative. Spirituality, in particular that related to Christian tradition, had been present in Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s wartime discourses (Churchill, 1940 in Gilbert, 2012; Kirby, 2000: 389). Christian language and symbolism

had played an important role in discourses of political leaders, and continued to do so in the postwar context. In particular, the ideological critiques to Communism were very often sustained by spiritual arguments, on the ground that Bolshevism had been campaigning against the Russian Orthodox Church since 1917 – in line with Lenin’s belief that religion was a product of social oppression and economic exploitation (Shaw, 2002: 6). In 1946, Churchill blatantly implanted Christianity into the issue as follows:

Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the **Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization** (Churchill, 1946, emphasis added).

The civilisation of the West that had been so often mentioned during wartime was now referred to as “Christian civilisation”. And communism was its opposite. Likewise, the British press frequently denounced Communists as blasphemous murderers, along with their spiritual and sexual depravation (Shaw, 2002: 7). In the USA as well, Washington and the CIA developed a peculiar “missionary mentality”, which later made the “godless Communism” a major theme of CW discourse (*ibid.*). President Truman’s administration amplified the Soviet threat, in order to secure public and Congressional support from both parties. In this process, the narrative or discursive key elements were presented in terms of “[a] crusade to save western civilization and Christianity from an atheistic Soviet Union” (Kirby, 2000: 388). After the war ended, beliefs and perceptions were rapidly transforming. The Soviet Union had been an ally of the West with the purpose of defeating Nazi Germany. This means their representation as uncivilised underwent a brief period of interlude, during which their behaviour was considered sufficiently civilised to be integrated in the struggle against barbarism. The reversal of that temporary situation required clearly a new justification after the war, which the spiritual narrative was able to do by appealing to people’s beliefs.

Furthermore, the conception of a spiritual union was an important part of the justification-system used by the British Foreign Office to establish bonds with the American side of the Atlantic after the war. Moralistic language and religious imagery were used to attune the political objectives and identity with that of Truman’s administration. Dianne Kirby (2000) has analysed the role of Christianity in the Anglo-American Cold War alliance. Kirby explained in detail how the British Foreign Office built an “education campaign” after the war to prepare the audiences for the dissolution of the wartime alliance

with the Soviets. The goal was to divulge a basic and sober doctrine that would not outrage the public opinion and political supporters, but would at the same time support the anti-Sovietism of the USA (Kirby, 2000: 395-396). The spiritual conception of Europe based on Christianity, introduced by Churchill years earlier, provided an ideological rationale for the British Church leaders to support the cause, and help ease the doubts regarding the socialist government in power (Kirby, 2000: 388): socialism was not synonym with atheism. This spiritualising move in Britain was thus emulating US President Roosevelt's construction of a "theology of war" in the struggle against German Nazism, and represented "an opportunity to resurrect the wartime alliance during which Hitler's possible conquest of Europe had unrelentingly been portrayed as a threat to Christian civilization" (*ibid.*). His successor Harry Truman also used many Bible references to appeal to the messianic convictions of the American people, whilst demonising the "godless" Soviet Union during the Cold War (Kirby, 2000: 389). However, according to Kirby, the USA was not as able as Britain to draw the distinction between socialism and communism. Therefore, the British Labour government gradually changed its discourse and presented the Soviet issue in terms of personal liberty and democratic process, backed by an open commitment to Christian values and ideals (Kirby, 2000: 400).

Bevin formulated the idea of a "spiritual union" in softer terms, by refocusing on "Western" civilisation:

It is not enough to reinforce the physical barriers which still guard our **Western civilisation. We must also organise and consolidate the ethical and spiritual forces inherent in this Western civilisation** of which we are the **chief protagonists**. This in my view can only be done by creating some form of union in Western Europe, whether of a formal or informal character, backed by the Americas and the Dominions (Bevin, 1948a; emphasis added).

The sovereignty of the Eastern European nations is handicapped. What of the West?. Neither we, the United States nor France is going to approach Western Europe on that basis. It is not in keeping with **the spirit of Western civilisation**, and if we are to have an organism in the West **it must be a spiritual union** (Bevin, 1948b; emphasis added).

Bevin referred to the need for a spiritual union as another vital dimension to revitalise Western civilisation. Reinforcing the "physical barriers" was not sufficient. The power of ideas, values and norms would have to come chiefly in reinventing the behaviour of states after the war. Western states that "thought" alike were to unite. However, what was initially defended as the need for a "spiritual union" ended up as a call for the spirit of democracy. As exposed above, Bevin's reference to a spiritual union was in fact very



political in its designs, as he associated to it ideas such as the compulsion of Western protagonism; the suggestion of a geo-political alliance “backed by the Americas and the Dominions”; the “sovereignty” of Eastern Europe; the upcoming creation of an “organism”. In fact, this political position was echoed by many Christian activists in the West, who “believed that the fight to protect theological freedom in the East would in turn help to revitalize democracy’s own moral and spiritual values” (Shaw, 2002: 7). Therefore, the discursive association of religion with “liberty”, “democracy”, and “Western civilisation” became popular in Western culture, in sharp contrast with the “atheism, barbarism, and totalitarianism” of Communism (*ibid.*).

Apart from the discursive importance of religious references, by the late 1940’s, religion had actually regained a central position in West European political life. According to Conway (2006: 153-154; 158), not only were Christian values influential in shaping the Cold War spirit, as Christian churches and affiliated institutions were also important interlocutors in the increasingly complex interaction between state and society: “The panoply of established, semi-established or simply privileged churches gave European civic culture a durably Christian veneer and **marginalised the power and even the visibility of Europe’s other faiths**” (Conway, 2006: 177; emphasis added).

The issue of “marginalisation” is important here, for it suggests that power inevitably concentrated in the particular realm of Christian meanings, representations and beliefs. That is why historian Herbert Butterfield was so sceptical about modern men’s spirituality in his *Christianity and History* (1950: 118), in which spirituality is said to basically lock people in a “world of partial visions”. Butterfield further defended:

So, a **religion** [...] comes to us as a thing with **geographical location**, with a place in the **historical scheme of things**, and with many of its **truths condensed** so to speak **into historical events**. [...]

An **historical religion** by the terms of its very existence implies a certain conception of God, a certain view of the universe, a **certain doctrine about human life** and a **certain idea concerning the course of things in time**. By its fundamental assumptions it insists upon a God who stretches out His arms to **human beings presumed to be groping in grave distress and blind bewilderment** (Butterfield, 1950: 120; emphasis added).

Butterfield’s insights suggest that an historical religion is geographically related to a specific location, and also that it has attributed certain meanings to certain historical events. In doing so, an historical religion also conveys a “certain doctrine about human life” and a perspective on the very “course of things in time”. Put in other terms, it defines

*how* and *when* life progresses. Further in Butterfield's line of reasoning, one may find how this overall rationale influences political discourses:

**Glib prophets** tell us that we had better be good, or they blithely take it for granted that we will be good – and at worst they will threaten us with the **atomic bomb in case we are not good** or refuse to do what they want [...]. **In time of war the spectacle of sin and evil** seems to be envisaged in a highly-coloured form; and if I look at history it is now the French, now the Russians, now the Germans, who have at the convenient moment, become for Englishmen **the seat of all the sin** that there is in the world (Butterfield, 1950: 122; emphasis added).

Here, the “glib prophets” are clearly the political actors, who have in their hands the power to play on their monopoly of force and their moral authority upon the world, including that of threatening people “with the atomic bomb”. As war displays a “spectacle of sin and evil”, the basic meanings of good and bad are ascribed to certain actors and the cause they defend, either the Anglo-Saxons, the French, the Russians or the Germans. Behaviour is inherently conditioned by the possibility of massive destruction.

This is consistent with the discursive effects of “civilisation”, as shown in previous sections. The major difference lies at the level of language. Fundamental meanings, representations, and beliefs concur to the same elements. Therefore, the role of spirituality in postwar discourses on civilisation served to reinforce the perceptions on barbarism, but at the more profound and emotional level of beliefs. As a consequence, two possibilities may be inferred. First, the language of religion managed to express symbolic meanings in a more primary and effective way, so that different countries – with different interests, objectives, traditions or ideologies – could rally in the same fundamental cause: to restore and perpetuate the civilised habitus. On the other hand, it was a powerful moral tool for reasserting the role of the state in disciplining both individuals and other states of the international society.

After having analysed the state of the civilised habitus at the level of self-control and violence under Nazism (a); of defining the uncivilised through the Soviet Union (b); and of spirituality as a tool for disciplining the civilised (c), the next section (d) will assess how changes in the realms of security and power influenced the evolution of the civilised habitus in the West.

#### **6.4. Rearranging security, repositioning power: the process of rebuilding interdependence among the civilised**

This final section of Part 2 will focus on how basic meanings of survival and security were redefined and reorganised in order to re-secure the civilised habitus of the West. Again, the argument is not that Western civilisation had been lost. Rather, meanings and relations of civilisation were reinvented or strengthened in some areas in order for the civilising process to continue consistently with the basic assumptions and values it had been conveying for centuries. It will be shown that while Europeans felt insecure, the USA felt powerful and invigorated in her newly found role as a provider of international security. Not only did the USA provide material security through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, as she also defined the ideological premises necessary for security to be attained. This was essentially a matter of redefining the terms and implications of *who was to be a secure member of Western civilisation if it was to survive*. As a consequence of the general security rearrangement, power and material means concentrated in the West, and interdependence grew stronger among the civilised members of the West.

Until WWII, international security had been institutionally defined by the League of Nations. The League had emerged as a consequence of WWI to prevent another world conflict from happening again. But it had failed redundantly in providing the world with security or peace. In the 1930's for instance, Ethiopia had been invaded and hit by Mussolini's air campaign of gas mustard before the partiality and passivity of the League, and despite Ethiopian appeals to arbitrage and conciliation (Sélassié, 1936). De Gaulle (1941) spoke of the League's "platonian charter" and failure in achieving real, practical and organised security. US President Roosevelt (1943) acknowledged the failure of the League's idealism and the consequent inexistence of a "decent" and "durable" peace between the two world wars. Alas the League of Nations' ineffectiveness culminated in a second world war.

Against this background, the perception of an institutional capacity to provide international security as a collective good to be enjoyed by the whole community was very hesitating. Managing to maintain the security of interdependent units was the key challenge. Therefore, the task of retrieving international security was not only material, as it also depended on the redefinition of psychosocial factors related to confidence and commitment. It was a matter of reaffirming both material and symbolic power under new

conditions. The spiritual dimension analysed in the previous section was one way of achieving that at the emotional and metaphysical level.

The idea of “compression of space” illustrates the new mental configuration in which power was to be reorganised. In geospatial terms, WWII was a “new kind of war”, involving “every continent, every island, every sea, every air-lane in the world” as “endless battlefields” (Roosevelt, 1942). When war ended, the fact that only two of the greatest powers remained – USA and USSR – changed perceptions in profound ways. According to historian Arnold Toynbee (1954), the geospatial configuration of the world metamorphosed after WWII, in that the *Oikoumenê* – ‘Mankind’s habitat’ – expanded into the “shape of a great helm pulled down over the face of the globe from the North Pole to the southern edge of the Southern Temperate Zone” (Toynbee, 1954: 483). Hence, the two surviving great powers were now in the position of “simultaneously encircling and being encircled by one another” (Toynbee, 1954: 484). Between the two, a series of smaller war-torn European states remained on one side, and a vast ocean on the other.

Materially, the USA was in possession of the war’s most decisive weapon and had used it over Hiroshima, Japan, to end the war: the atomic bomb. Its destructiveness was unprecedented; it had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T., and “more than thousand times the blast power of the British ‘Grand Slam’, which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare” (Truman, 1945). In William McNeill’s words, “with the discovery of atomic explosives, human destructive power reached a new, suicidal level, surpassing previous limits to all but unimaginable degree” (1982: 360). Additionally, the issue of monopoly over the atomic bomb was obviously at stake, and provided the USA with the most “significant diplomatic advantage in postwar diplomacy” (Sherwin, 2005: 64). This is to say that the bomb concentrated in itself, and in its sole American possessor, the most radical power of a global death and life signifier. Furthermore, it represented a revolution for scientific knowledge and cooperation in all its magnitude, for Western civilisation had the knowledge of how to destroy humanity.

The geo-mental shrinking of the world, combined with the material concentration of the ultimate power over life and death, is revealing of how much the postwar strategic-political plane cannot be surveyed without the psychological one – both material and “spiritual” forces were at play (Toynbee, 1954: 490). In other terms, material conditions had crucial psychological consequences. On the one hand, atomic technology hugely

amplified American self-confidence and assertiveness in the final phase of the war and its immediate aftermath. When news of the successful atomic test of 16 July 1945 reached President Truman at the Potsdam Conference, US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson noted that Truman was tremendously pepped up, with a new feeling of confidence. Churchill even noted that Truman was a changed man after having read the report (Sherwin, 2005: 68). Less than three weeks later, the atomic bomb was unleashed upon Hiroshima. In his statement announcing the use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima, Truman announced:

We are now prepared to **obliterate more rapidly and completely** every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall **destroy** their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; **we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war**. [...] If they do not now accept our terms they may expect **a rain of ruin from the air**, the like of which has **never been seen on this earth** (Truman, 1945).

Truman's words could not be clearer: they reinforced the perception that the US was the most powerful state of the world at the end of WWII. The USA had the means to "obliterate more rapidly and completely" the resources of any country, and threatened to bring "a rain of ruin from the air" still unseen "on this earth". These terms were strong and conveyed a theological sense of might that is only comparable to the acts of a religious god, so to speak. This kind of superiority was not only material and moral, as it also expressed the awareness of a "new era in man's understanding of nature's forces" (Truman, 1945).

The spiritual discipline developed in postwar discourses by the USA was obviously backed by the possession of a technological device that could erase any city, region or even state from the face of the earth. This had quite extreme consequences, for there was a psychological imbalance in the world that was clearly favourable to the USA. Behaving under any term defined by an actor such as the USA was not as an option *per se*, but a matter of ultimate survival: "Hiroshima and Nagasaki [...] became the symbols of a **new American barbarism**, reinforcing charges, with dramatic circumstantial evidence, that the policies of the United States contributed to the origins of the Cold War" (Sherwin, 2005: 68; emphasis added). But despite the barbarism, the Bomb also symbolised the American might, highlighting simultaneously the Soviet technological backwardness. This was a crucial, yet rather confusing, element in the war of nerves, or perceptions, between the two powers. It was also an incentive to look tough. Therefore, the Bomb had a dual

effect. On the one hand, it made the Soviet Union more restrained in its use of force, for fear of precipitating war. But it also made the Soviet Union less cooperative for fear of seeming weak (Holloway, 2005: 87).

In this overall postwar scenario, high levels of personal insecurities were to be expected (Lasswell, 1948: 895). As representations of the uncivilised were more vivid than ever, the belief in the possibility of barbarism, evil and total destruction was renewed. However, in the USA, the psychological effects of the two world wars were not felt as deeply as in Western Europe. To Toynbee, Americans had this “immunity from a living experience of war in their own country”, which made it likely that the traditional aversion to militarism would be overcome if the American people were to be faced with the choice between submitting to the Russians or fighting them (1954: 518). Aside from this, the people of the USA were “distant from the troubled areas of the earth”, making it “hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples” (Marshall, 1947).

Although insecurity was not experienced to the same degree by all the chief states involved in WWII, security was the objective of most of them. For instance, security was a major goal in De Gaulle’s ideological project since the beginning of the war:

We claim ‘Liberation’ and we claim it in the broadest sense of the term. If our effort is not to be ended before the enemy’s defeat and sentence, it is necessary that it will end in such a way that any French might live, think, work and act in dignity and security (De Gaulle, 1941; emphasis added).<sup>26</sup>

Security was also Roosevelt’s universal goal for the victory of peace, through “the enlargement of the security of man and throughout the world” (1943). Likewise, security was Bevin and Stalin’s mutually acknowledged aim, to zeal for their respective country’s security. To Bevin, it was an obligation for Britain to have security arrangements with France and other neighbouring countries, just like the arrangements had by the Soviet Union and her Eastern neighbours:

I stated that whatever we did would not be directed against the Soviet Union. To this he [Stalin] replied, “I believe you,” Anything His Majesty's Government do now in this matter will not be directed against the Soviet Union or any other country, but we are entitled to organise the kindred souls of the West, just as they organise their kindred souls (Bevin, 1948b).

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<sup>26</sup> Free translation of the author; in the original: “Nous disons "Libération" et nous disons cela dans la plus large acception du terme, car, si l'effort ne doit pas se terminer avant la défaite et le châtement de l'ennemi, il est d'autre part nécessaire qu'il ait comme aboutissement, pour chacun des Français, une condition telle qu'il lui soit possible de vivre, de penser, de travailler, d'agir, dans la dignité et dans la sécurité” (De Gaulle, 1941).

Moreover, the postwar reality required security to be rearranged according to new factors. In managerial terms, a critical innovation of WWII had to do with transnational organisation and growing interdependence. Arms production had become increasingly complex during the war, and started to involve more countries. As a consequence, no single nation could conduct war efficiently by itself (McNeill, 1982: 356).

On the other hand, after the war,

[T]he conception of the unity of Europe and the **preservation of Europe as the heart of Western civilisation** is accepted by most people. The importance of this has become increasingly apparent, not only to all the European nations as a result of the post-war crises through which Europe has passed and is passing, but to the whole world. No one disputes the idea of **European unity**. That is not the issue. The **issue is whether European unity cannot be achieved without the domination and control of one great Power** (Bevin, 1948b; emphasis added).

Europe could not be reconstructed “as the heart of Western civilisation” without the support of “one great Power”. Could European unity only be sustained by the support of American hegemony? According to Ian Jackson (2009: 47), it was Britain and France that took the initiative of inviting the US into the affairs of Western Europe, as they also sought to manage and orchestrate the American response to Soviet expansionism in the East. Jackson also refers that the joint purpose of the three states was to build a new world order based on democracy, collective security, and commercial liberalism (2009: 48).

Economic growth was definitely the critical factor allowing for the “[r]econstruction of US-Western Europe interdependence, a process of financial and economic system of agencies and agreements, following the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944”, which enabled “unprecedented levels of external interference in national practices”, namely through the leading role of the US dollar as a currency for international trade (Teixeira and Marcos, 2016: 15). In this context of emerging financial globalisation, US President Truman developed, in March 1947, his doctrine of aid toward Greece and Turkey, which were being intensively approached by Soviet undertakings (Truman, 1947). Poverty and hunger appeared as critical threats to its stabilisation. The “Truman doctrine” instructed that \$400 million would be channelled in military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey. The justification advanced by the American President was that “[t]he seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife” (*ibid.*). Those countries were in such a need, that their national integrity was at stake and depended on “modernisation”. Therefore, aid was vital

to resist subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures such as communism. In the case of Turkey, the “order” in the Middle East was also a crucial issue (*ibid.*).

In June 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall (1947) held a famous speech that initiated the post-war European Aid Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan. In it, Marshall depicted to American audiences how European economy was totally ravaged and defended a policy “directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos” (Marshall, 1947). As cities, factories, mines and railroads were destroyed, “[t]he breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete” (*ibid.*). Most importantly, Marshall’s speech also established a relation between the collapse of European economy and the breakdown of modern civilisation, by stating:

The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This **division of labor is the basis of modern civilization**. At the present time **it is threatened with breakdown**. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out (Marshall, 1947; emphasis added).

Had the civilised habitus been framed by a very material conditionality? Here, it is worth referring to the work of Norbert Elias (1990) once more, so as to elaborate on this seemingly unintended relationship between division of labour and modern civilisation.

Elias (1990) demonstrates that the division of labour was an important part of the civilising process, in that the partition of tasks throughout society gradually amplified the interdependence between individuals and their central state authority. The increasing state monopoly over the military cannot be dissociated from the state monopoly over the economy, as they are both the key to a state’s durability (Elias, 1990: 93). A monopolistic mechanism thus presupposes that the monopoliser – i.e. the state – accumulates resources and tasks that need to be distributed through an ever-growing number of persons, who become dependent on the state. Therefore, the larger the monopoly, the greater the division of labour will be in order to administrate it (Elias, 1990: 96). Elias concludes that economy and politics became fusional, mainly because creating and acquiring means of production and consumption involved very often the threat of, or the use of physical and military violence (Elias, 1990: 127). For all the warrior societies of the Middle Age, the spade was a natural and indispensable tool for acquiring means of production, as the threat of violence was an actual means of production (*ibid.*). However, the threat of physical



violence was not the only form of economic struggle. The threat of social degradation, loss of economic autonomy, financial ruin and material difficulties were also part of the struggle between feudal houses. Hence, physical violence and economic violence acted as a whole, and social existence was the main purpose (Elias, 1990: 128-129).

This deeper contextualisation enables to understand that Marshall's concern on the state of the division of labour was related to the state of the civilised habitus. Not only did he recognise the need to recover the European economy, as he also defended that Europe should be duly repositioned in the international division of labour, so that the basis of modern civilisation would not be disrupted. Besides, when Marshall further expressed that the European farmer “[f]eeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary **gadgets of civilization**” (Marshall, 1947), some degree of social degradation transpired. Such a statement clearly mirrored the imminence of material insecurity.

Charles C. Maier (2005) has showed how American officials worked hard to cultivate an ideological consensus around the theme of “productivity”. There was this notion that economic gains would relieve class conflict and minimise redistributive struggles (Maier, 2005: 221). In a context of discontent, starvation, and scarcity, which threatened to put Europe in a general state of strike, “[p]roductivity was the allegedly apolitical criterion that motivated recovery assistance” (Maier, 2005: 224). It also inhibited class conflict, by suggesting that the dividend of economic growth could reward both management and labour. Productivity could thus avoid political and social conflict, by adjourning basic struggles into “cooperative searches for optimal economic solutions” (*ibid.*).

Moreover, the perception of a “power vacuum” in Western Europe represented a serious risk of economic, social, and political disintegration (Weber, 1992: 644). And although contemporary statistics did not entirely bear Marshall's conclusion regarding Europe's poverty (Gilbert, 2009: 20), the Marshall Plan expanded Truman's doctrine to a wide program of recovery for Western Europe in America's most dedicated effort to reduce communist influence in Europe: “[g]overnments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States” (Marshall, 1947).

The Soviet reaction to the USA assisting Western Europe was basically

formulated by Andrei Zhdanov's, a high-ranking Soviet Communist official responsible for international affairs, in his key postwar statement (Pons, 2001: 18). To the Soviet secretary of the Central Committee, two diametrically opposed camps were dividing world politics: the anti-democratic imperialist camp, and the anti-imperialist camp. While

American imperialism was searching for markets for its goods and capital, and using economic aid to extort concessions from other countries and to subjugate them; it was building up its military power, stockpiling atomic bombs, and building bases around the world (Holloway, 2005: 75).

At the end of 1947, the Soviet Union created the Cominform as a direct reaction to the Marshall Plan, which she deemed expansionist and imperialist. In organising the Cominform, Stalin rejected the idea that communist parties could act independently. On the contrary, he took steps to consolidate the Soviet position in Eastern Europe with a communist monopoly of power. In February 1948, this took a dramatic instance, when communists who already formed part of the government seized complete control of their governments (Holloway, 2005: 76). Regarding the claim that US imperialism was rising during that period, Maier's argument is that "[h]egemony was in the cards", because

[g]iven the basic inequality of resources after the Second World War, it would have been very difficult for any system of economic linkages or military alliance not to have generated an international structure analogous to empire (Maier, 2005: 222).

This idea is interesting, in that it illustrates how a monopolistic arrangement such as imperialism or hegemony could arise from a situation of fundamental insecurity and loss of interdependent social relations. At this stage, the most common perception was that Europe depended decisively on America's support regarding vital aspects related to the fulfilling of basic needs. Hunger thus established an ontological relation of security for survival. Only through this basic reassurance could the civilised subjects of Western Europe be civilising agents again. In order for civilisation to be resumed and continued, the civilised subject of the West had to feel secure again. Through economic assistance, but also thanks to its monopoly over the atomic power over life, the USA could emerge as the monopoliser in providing security to the West, and thus make the the civilised habitus to continue, the civilising process to advance.

The evolution from economic interdependence to security integration was quite immediate. 1947 had been the year of economic association between the USA and Western Europe. To Gilbert (2009: 20-21), this sequence of events initiated the propaganda

campaign between the US and the Soviet Union; they were now enemies and the wartime alliance was dead. 1948 was a critical turning point in terms of security perceptions between the two great powers. Different perspectives may be held regarding that period. To the USA, the Soviet initiatives in Czechoslovakia and Germany in early 1948, and also the previous ones in Greece and Turkey, represented an expansionist move of the communist doctrine and a fundamental breach in the dispositions of the treaty, which deserved renewed attention given the importance of nuclear strategy and deterrence and the future of a divided Germany (Kaplan, 1969: 212, 217; Truman, 1947; Weber, 1992: 634). To Russia, America's demands and aid policies were acts of imperialism seeking to advance capitalist interests and not selfless pacific endeavours (Kaplan, 1969: 212, 217).

In 1948, Lasswell already reported that every social change of that time – evolution of population, death rate, production, scientific knowledge, movement across frontiers, movement of raw materials, products, machinery, foodstuff – was “weighed in the scale pans of power and responded to accordingly” (1948: 877). Lasswell was obviously discussing the bipolar relation between the US and USSR – “[a] good crop in Western Germany is chiefly evaluated, not in economic or humanitarian terms, but according to its effect upon Soviet-American power” (*ibid.*). Seemingly, each side of the *Oikoumenê* was struggling for its area of influence, where each one could expand and secure its monopolistic power over ideas, ways of life, social relations, wealth, death and life signifiers, *habiti*. Therefore, each side was doing the same: reinforcing interdependence among a community of believers who were to converge into the authority of a central institutional model. Besides, WWII had only terminated, that civil wars and revolutions were already mirroring the possibility of

[a] **new spectacle, the phenomenon of modern barbarism**, which, as it has developed in one part of the globe after another, has made us **feel sometimes that the civilised world was dissolving around us** (Butterfield, 1950: 139; emphasis added).

So, could the so-called “security dilemma” that eventually gave rise to the Cold War have been an “elimination contest” between the US and the USSR for the civilisation of Europe?<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> A “security dilemma” presupposes that “in the absence of a supranational authority that can enforce binding agreements, many of the steps pursued by states to bolster their security have the effect – often unintended and unforeseen – of making other states less secure” (Jervis, 2001: 36).

Elias (1989; 1990) showed that stable monopolies of power were crucial for the pacification of modern societies. But the absence of a global monopoly of power has meant that relations between states have consisted of “elimination contests”, in which political actors respond to security dilemmas (Linklater, 2007: 169). Regarding the question of a security dilemma between the US and USSR, Robert Jervis found ambiguities in the basic concept of security, namely what “the object of security is [...] and what is needed to make states and individuals feel secure” (2001: 39). In a security dilemma, Jervis referred, both sides prefer to maintain the status quo to the risks of expansion. That is why, although there are certain elements of security dilemma in the Cold War, the root of the conflict is essentially a clash of social systems, and the goal of mutual security was therefore not attainable. To the Soviet Union, mutual security was not even a goal, because it served the status quo, against which Soviets were (Jervis, 2001: 58-60). Consequently, the security of civilisation, if it was to continue, did not mean that international security was to be reformulated so as to include both the West and its wartime ally. It could proceed without having Russia as a civilised Other. The preliminary suggestion here is that the main implication of this East-West opposition is not to be thought in terms of a clash of civilisations, but rather as a struggle among the self-restrained, as the “Cold War” probably represents the most civilised example of conflict ever known. This point will be further explored in Chapter 8.

The need for an US-Europe association for security was definitely raised by the Czech coup of February 1948, encouraged by Stalin. This also precipitated the Anglo-French initiative to form the West European Union (WEU) in March 1948 (Weber, 1992: 646-647; Jackson, 2009: 51). But on 22 January 1948, Bevin expressed the need to include other countries, namely from the Benelux, in the following terms: “We have then to go beyond the circle of our immediate neighbours. We shall have to consider the question of associating other historic members of European civilisation [...]” (Bevin, 1948b). But Bevin also included other regions: “The United States and the countries of Latin America are clearly as much a part of our common Western civilisation as are the nations of the British Commonwealth” (Bevin, 1948b). And so did Bevin define Western civilisation as encompassing the American continent.

The Brussels Pact was signed on 17 March 1948 and established a military alliance between Britain, France and the Benelux countries to form the WEU (Jackson,

2009: 51). Among other things, it set up a formal military body to coordinate defence activities; but this did not include the US. Formally, the WEU requested negotiations with the US on a North Atlantic Treaty in October 1948 and the US are said to have initially rejected the initiative of a treaty on the ground that the defence of Europe should be short-term, driven by the immediacy of the Soviet threat (Weber, 1992: 649). However, Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman (1983) have proved that secret negotiations actually took place in the Pentagon in March 1948, well before those dates. In fact, Wiebes and Zeeman showed that, contrarily to NATO's official historiography that situates the first negotiations in July 1948, security arrangements had already been discussed between the US and West Europe in Washington on March 1948 in utmost secrecy (1983: 351). According to these authors, there even was an actual consensus between the US, Britain and Canada on the wording that would lead to NATO a year later (Wiebes and Zeeman, 1983: 352). The "spiritual union" was taking form.

Throughout Sections a) to d), the state of the civilised habitus around WWII was examined. First, the focus on the notion of barbarism (Section a) revealed that Nazism disrupted the civilised habitus, by exerting such an oppressive power that it de-civilised the behaviour of individuals acting collectively. Extreme aggressiveness and violence were unleashed, and proved that the state had the capacity to reverse the civilising process of the West. The civilised habitus was destabilised and the civilised subjects of the West were made insecure regarding their very identity.

Then, the analysis of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the concept of civilisation from the perspective of the West (Section b) showed that Russia had been deemed uncivilised since WWI, but had temporarily been part of the Western alliance as another victim of Nazi aggression. However, after the war, new justifications and stereotypes from the West reinforced the idea of how the civilised habitus should not be, having the communist Russia as an anti-model.

After that, focusing on the relationship between spirituality and Western civilisation (Section c) exposed both the wartime and postwar discursive role played by Christianity in the redefinition of the civilised habitus. Nazi barbarism had provoked an existential tension and a sense of guilt that was contained by theological representations of political realities. The security of the civilised subjects required their discipline to be

reasserted at the unconscious level, which the state did by playing on spiritual metaphors and allegories.

Finally, power and security insights disclosed a new postwar reality (Section d), in which technology played a central role. The geo-mental conceptions of the world shrank; power revolved around the two great powers that remained victorious after the war; possessing the nuclear weapon was the main life and death signifier for the whole world. As a consequence, not only did material power concentrate in two poles and start a struggle for influence, as metaphysical power was also compressed. Fear and insecurity were the roots determining that the civilised habitus had to be reorganised through distinct poles of interdependent relations in order to be re-secured. This was achieved through the interplay of material security, hegemony, concentration of power, and struggles for monopoly.

To sum up, the civilised habitus was showing fragilities since WWI, and revealed much insecurity both at the personal and collective levels. These were definitely exacerbated by the conditions surrounding WWII, and the sudden occurrence of mass atrocities that deeply altered the perceptions on Western standard of behaviour, and beliefs about human nature in general. This had indeed a deep impact upon the unconscious, which can be seen by the way Western actors represented distress and insecurity, but also used religious symbols in their discourses on Western civilisation. These conditions thus set the stage for NATO's emergence around a civilisational referent.



## **7. NATO's Cold War evolution: civilisation from referent object to standard**

Within the broader part dedicated to NATO's civilisational object of security, Chapter 6 questioned the extent to which WWII put the civilised habitus of the West in peril. This approach highlighted the West's overall state of insecurity at the time of WWII and contextualised the deep origins of NATO's civilisational referent of security. After having outlined the wider condition upon which NATO might have been fabricated as an organisation to defend the continuation of the civilising process, Chapter 7 will analyse the evolution of the civilisational referent object of security from NATO's birth in 1949 to the end of the Cold War. Did the perceptions on Western civilisation evolve throughout those years? If so, in what sense?

Throughout its sixty years of existence, NATO went through two distinct ideological and geopolitical eras, as it also had to respond and adapt to serious questioning by the international community on successive periods (Barany and Rauchhaus, 2011; Kay, 1998; Zorgbibe, 2002). As it will be seen across NATO's discourses from the 1950's to the 1980's, the Alliance evolved very aware of its time. Put in other terms, NATO consistently showed a self-reflexivity in questioning regularly its current pertinence in the world, what role it should play, what mission it should embrace. NATO has been evolving constantly, which compels to question NATO's referent object of security. If civilisation had proved to be a central concern in the deep origins and formation of the Alliance, then how did that concern evolve in the following decades? Did it somehow attenuate, or did it continue under different shapes?

Quentin Skinner has analysed the issue of conceptual and rhetorical change, and adverted that the transformations we might chart are not necessarily changes in concepts, but rather changes in the use of the terms that express those concepts (1999: 63-64). Skinner has been one of the key references of the "Cambridge School" of historians in the late 1960's, together with John Pocock and John Dunn, which has as basic argument that political ideas have to be situated in their proper historical and linguistic context (Koselleck, 2004: vii-viii; Schmidt, 2013: 13). He has in fact suggested two ways in which conceptual change can be mapped historically. The first is over *time*; a particular normative vocabulary can be employed differently depending on the epoch. Some norm/behaviour may lose its sense in a society, and therefore the terms associated to it may



become obsolete, or even disappear (Skinner, 1999: 64). The other way of conceptual transformation may be by *intensity*, meaning that this kind of change will reflect “an attempt to modify existing social perceptions and beliefs” (Skinner, 1999: 65). In this case, a society may eventually “alter its attitude towards some fundamental value or practice and alter its normative vocabulary accordingly” (Skinner, 1999: 66). As for the rhetorical change of concepts, Skinner argued these have to do with changing how a particular behaviour/norm is seen *morally*. For instance, an action previously regarded as commendable may come to seem condemnable, and inversely. As a consequence, all attempts to determine the correct use of normative vocabularies should be seen as ideological enterprises, because their application will “always reflect a wish to impose a particular moral vision upon the workings of the social world” (Skinner, 1999: 67).

In the light of Skinner’s hypotheses for conceptual and rhetorical change, one may conceive the possibility that the representation of civilisation, or civilised behaviour, might have actually suffered modifications through time, depending on the social priorities of a given epoch. On the other hand, they might also have incurred transformations of vocabulary for the sake of particular objectives such as changing collective behaviour regarding a precise issue. In this sense, the term “civilisation” or “civilised” may be replaced by other terms that fundamentally embody the same values, norms, behaviours, or status quo.

Furthermore, there are two temporal issues that are critical for this chapter, concurrent to the matter of conceptual change. One is NATO’s consciousness of time and future; the other has to do with the unconsciousness inherent to civilisation’s structural great duration. Reinhart Koselleck (2004) is an historian who has worked on both questions. On the one hand, Koselleck has explained how consciousness of time and future began to develop during absolutism and characterises modern society (2004: 21-22). He explained how a philosophy of historical process detached early modernity from its past, and inaugurated our modernity with a new future through the idea of progress. In the eighteenth century, the context was one where Church's traditional fixation on the End of the World made time static, and political prognostication cyclical, through a philosophy composed of a mixture of rational “prediction and salvational expectation”. But the idea of progress opened up a future where the predictable could be transcended, and new long-term prognoses could be made (Koselleck, 2004: 21-22).

On the other hand,

There certainly are also **structures** which are **so enduring** that they remain for contemporaries **part of the unconscious or the unknown**, or whose **transformation is so slow that it escapes their awareness**. In these cases, only social science or history as a science of the past can provide information that goes beyond the perceptible experience of given generations (Koselleck, 2004: 108).

These “[s]tructures of great duration, especially when they escape the consciousness or knowledge of former participants, can even be (or have been) “more effective” the less they enter as a whole into a single, empirically ascertainable event” (Koselleck, 2004: 112). Therefore, a structure of time/history is not attached to a single event; it lies outside the immediate consciousness of the event occurring.

In line with Skinner and Koselleck’s propositions, this chapter will develop two concurring arguments. First, throughout NATO’s evolution, the idea of progress played an important role in the Alliance’s deliberate representation of its role. In parallel, NATO’s civilisational referent of security inherently framed the organisation within an unconscious dimension, because the time of Western civilisation is structural. Together, these two interrelated claims will illustrate how NATO’s civilisational referent of security evolved in an open way because it is part of a long-duration structural time. Ultimately, the evolution of NATO’s referent object will prove to be undergoing an open process, in which both conscious and unconscious perceptions about Self and time cohabit. In this sense, the civilised habitus of the West was continued at the level of a democratic habitus.

### **7.1. The Treaty: making a new standard, continuing the civilised habitus**

This section will focus on NATO’s formative Treaty as a formal starting point in the Alliance’s discourse. In it, the guiding principles and mandate of the Organisation were formulated, alongside a basic conception of the civilisation of the West. It will be seen that although the security of the civilised habitus was central to NATO’s formation, its Charter indicated that the Alliance was to be way more far-reaching in its purposes.

The charter of an organisation is a key element to a group’s historic representation, as it contains the origin, the mission, and responses to new challenges. It also defines rights and obligations for the group, and works as its founding myth

(Malinowski, 1926 *apud* Liu and Hilton, 2005: 2). The charter also possesses a prescriptive dimension, in the sense it represents much more than a set of collective memories, or shared perceptions, and defines the general role of the group. Moreover, it legitimates the actions of the group as the right thing to do in conformity with its historic experience (Liu and Hilton, 2005: 2). Therefore, looking into NATO's Charter is a preliminary way of approaching how the concept of civilisation first entered the Alliance.

Right in the preamble of the Washington Treaty marking NATO's birth on 04 April 1949, it was stated that the Parties were

[d]etermined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and **civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law**. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security (NATO, 1949; emphasis added).

This particular way of presenting itself was clearly not that of a traditional alliance. NATO's essential proposition was not to safeguard the physical and immediate *existence* of its people, but rather its *attributes* of "liberty", "common heritage", and "civilisation", which are far more entrenched in time. If freedom, the common heritage and civilisation preceded the very existence of the people, then the existence of the people, its *raison d'être*, ultimately depended on the defence of its attributes.

Expressing the belonging to the North-Atlantic Organisation in such terms suggested that the history shared by its members was that of a civilisation that had evolved according to precise ideals, now rooted in the conscience of the people. In turn, the people recognised these ideals and acknowledged them as desirable parts of their lives. The Alliance thereby endorsed a structural entrenchment of values that were to be seen as natural. See for instance the following statement by José Caeiro da Matta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, at the signing ceremony of the Treaty, on 4 April 1949:

It can be said that there is **now being repeated around the shores of the Atlantic** – and on a much vaster scale – the picture which the **ancient peoples** knew at the time when the **finest conquests of the human mind and the highest exponents of civilization** were centered in the small but fertile area of the classical world (Caeiro da Matta, 1949: 479; emphasis added).

Through these words, Caeiro da Matta expressed a quite mythological view of the moment. The Atlantic was pictured in relation to the "ancient peoples" of a "classic world" that conquered "human mind", in a most probable reference to ancient Greece. Even though this position was not representative of all the members, Caeiro da Matta established

nonetheless a connection to historical time, as if that moment was a sort of apotheosis of the contemporary evolution of Western civilisation. When the defence and protection of civilisation was evoked by the Washington Treaty, it was not only a reference to the protection of a heritage from a common historical past, to a series of political achievements, to a specific mentality and vision of the world, or even to a cultural and identitarian bond. It was also a reference to a normative *acquis*, and above all, it appealed to a particular habitus entrenched in the (unconscious) history of the West. However, all those references by the Portuguese Minister, who was an official representative of an authoritarian regime, seem to transcend the principles of democracy and rule of law. Nuno Severiano Teixeira (1995) has accounted for the different geopolitical and geostrategical reasons for the invitation to Portugal joining the Alliance, through a long duration historical approach. One he highlights has to do precisely with the ideological nature underlying the idea of a Crusade against Communism in defense of Western Christian civilisation (Nogueira, 1980 apud Teixeira, 1995: 85). And if we refer to other cases of dictatorships joining NATO, as Greece and Turkey joining later, it seems their membership did not threaten the evolution of Western civilisation. In this sense, joining NATO could even represent an opportunity for improvement and civilisation through progressive democratisation. As it will be seen later in this dissertation (Chapter 8), democratic conditionality will indeed play a major role in NATO's post-Cold War policies of enlargement and socialisation.

So, NATO's link to "civilisation" not only reveals to be a relation of *representation*, as it is also one of *operationalisation*. By establishing the connection between the "civilisation of the peoples" and their specific geographical location in the "North Atlantic area", the Charter claimed to embody the people of a civilised region of the world. The relation of *operationalisation* was basically set from the moment the Treaty designed a military alliance to act as an instrument *of* and *for* the security of that civilised area. In other words, civilisation is actually present in both the ontology and referent object of security of the organisation.

Furthermore, the chief values and conceptions about social organisation and behaviour upon which the civilisation of the peoples is grounded were enumerated as "the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (NATO, 1949). These are

essentially the postulates of a “democratic alliance”, which is an ideal-type security arrangement (Haglund, 2004: 226):

[a] **democratic alliance** is said to be an entity that can and does take shape **independently of the existence of fear**, and can do so on the basis of a **perceived commonality of ‘identity’**, with the most salient elements of this shared identity being the norms and values associated with one political-cultural dispensation in particular: **‘liberal democracy’** (Haglund, 2004: 227).

This definition essentially questions whether it was actually fear of the Soviet Union that chiefly motivated NATO’s creation. It also links the setting of a democratic alliance to a particular conception of security that has to do with identity and ideology. From this perspective, if NATO is a democratic alliance, it should also aim at securing the “norms and values associated with [...] liberal democracy” (*ibid.*).

Indeed, the Treaty also made a material and economic assertion that widened the Alliance’s scope for action within the civilised habitus:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of **peaceful and friendly international relations** by strengthening their **free institutions**, by bringing about a **better understanding of the principles** upon which these institutions are founded, and by **promoting conditions of stability and well-being**. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage **economic collaboration** between any or all of them (NATO, 1949: art. 2; emphasis added).

Free institutions were to be strengthened in a friendly environment, through an improved comprehension of the principles previously mentioned – “democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” – and through enhanced “conditions of stability and well-being”. Whilst seeming vague, all these principles and ideas converged in reaffirming the predominance of a specific social model, that of liberal democracy. Here, let us recall Marshall’s formulation of an economic plan for Europe in 1947:

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but **against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos**. Its purpose should be the **revival of a working economy** in the world so as to permit the emergence of **political and social conditions** in which **free institutions** can exist (Marshall, 1947).

The same reference to the “free institutions” made by NATO in article 2 of the Charter could not have been coincidental. Economic liberalism thus represented the material dimension of the Treaty, similarly to what civilisation implied in metaphysical terms. Together, the material and immaterial dimensions aimed at fortifying the civilised habitus for the future, in continuity to what had been redefined and reasserted since the end of WWII by Western powers (see Chapter 6).

Conclusively, at the time of its creation, NATO's primary referent object of security when it referred to such embracing ideas as "civilisation" and "common heritage" was a metaphysical entity that seemed to overcome the very conception of time. Expressed as such, and together with the economic feature of the treaty and its temporal wholeness, the primary referent of security indicates that NATO was born out of a wide-reaching alliance. Contrarily to a security community, NATO was formulated as a collective organisation of defence intended to protect its members through the sharing of commitments and capabilities (Haglund, 2004: 231).

The Treaty was also clear in establishing that the West preferred a specific formula: democracy, backed by a metaphysical argument uniting the peoples of the West. The principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law expressed in the Charter enclosed different historic temporalities, and were presented as the result of a long-term and continual process of cultural acquisition and social learning. Past and future were thus connected. On the other hand, the liberal democratic model of social, political and economic organisation seemed to be the guarantor that the civilising process was not to be reversed again. Democracy would fundamentally bring security for states and individuals.

Fundamentally then, the Treaty establishing NATO defined a precise standard of civilisation. The liberal democratic standard uniting the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation defined how the civilising process of the West was to proceed, through particular socio-political and economic norms that ultimately strengthened and reinforced the relations of interdependence between the Allies.

## **7.2. The 1950's – 1960's: "the peril from disunity"**

The 1950's and 1960's were two very dynamic decades, during which the world was readjusting to newly instituted postwar circumstances. Caught between an "alternation between adjusting oneself to fit into society and attempting to asserting oneself" (Baumeister, 1987: 170), Western society showed significant signs of being struggling for its identity. That struggle often took the form of myth-making – especially in the literature of the 1960's – in which self-made schemes of coherence onto the world

were sought (Baumeister, 1987: 171). In some important ways, NATO was no exception. Alexandra Gheciu very pertinently summarises the challenges of that time:

The effort to **reinterpret the West** intensified in the context of emerging tensions within the alliance in the 1950s, when NATO's decision makers were at pains to **reassure allied elites and publics** that, in spite of all the differences among the allies, there really was a Western community of shared values and norms, and that NATO was the embodiment of that community. **Collective efforts at history (re)writing** found expression not only within the public discourse articulated by NATO at that time, but also in confidential documents.

[...]

In other words, the **allies engaged in a discursive construction of the Western community** in an effort to minimize the importance of (or even erase) conflicts and differences between NATO member states, by affirming and disseminating to Euro-Atlantic publics the idea of a **common civilizational heritage and a sense of belonging to a community of values** (Gheciu, 2005: 54-55; emphasis added).

Gheciu's view emphasises issues of reinterpretation of the West, whereas elites needed to be reassured that a Western community was indeed possible. Achieving that would be a way to rewrite Western history, that is, write a new history in which Western nations would be able to coexist peacefully. To that end, NATO assumed the role of constructing discursively the idea that a Western community was real. Here, the civilisational narrative also played an important role.

This section will dissect in greater detail some of Gheciu's assumptions and show how, during those decades, NATO early expressed the need for self-reflection, had to respond to several calls for transformations, defend itself from claims of uselessness, and reaffirm the purpose of its mission. Along the way, NATO attempted to re-temporise its organisational identity by formulating renewed justifications. Seemingly, NATO invented itself as it went. The repercussions for the broader civilising process were always present, though. It will be seen that this was a phase of consolidation for the civilised referent of security, which implied a reassertion of the Western elites' commitment towards a high degree of interdependence among the NATO members. Only through reinforced interdependence could the civilised habitus proceed and advance.

Contextually, Western partnerships underwent periods of difficulty during those years. Between 1955 and 1969, some key episodes destabilised the West: Britain opted out of the European Economic Community; the Eisenhower administration refused to support British invasion of Egypt in 1956; under Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union renewed confidence to challenge the US in European areas of influence, also thanks to the launching of the Sputnik space satellite, and the acquisition of the Inter-Continental

Ballistic Missile (ICBM); Khrushchev and US President Kennedy clashed in 1961 over Berlin, which resulted in confrontation in Cuba in 1962, and almost precipitated the world into a nuclear war; in turn, De Gaulle was sceptical that the US would jeopardise the future security of western Europe and increasingly disengaged from NATO during the 1960's and actually pulled France out from the combined military command of NATO in 1966 (Jackson, 2009: 53-56).

The first challenge posed to NATO was the Korean War. In June 1950, when the communist-controlled North Korea invaded its pro-Western southern counterpart, concern grew for both sides of the Atlantic. Western Europe's fear was that the US would leave the continent unguarded against Soviet attempts to occupy West Germany, while it was too occupied containing communism in the Far East (Forster and Wallace, 2001: 111; Jackson, 2009: 51). The solution found to alleviate the US military burden was to rearm West Germany in order to contribute to Western Europe's defence (Pinder, 2009: 34). This adaptation by NATO members to the Korean War represented an organisational solidification in terms of threat perception, distribution of resources, and sharing of responsibilities and commitment. As a consequence, not only did the USA station troops permanently in Western Europe, as NATO forces were put under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower in an integrated military structure. In practical terms, NATO proved to be an effective alliance that was extending its scope and membership to the Eastern Mediterranean by incorporating Greece and Turkey in 1952 (Forster and Wallace, 2001: 111).

However, NATO's military investment in Korea focused mostly on security operations, while other dimensions of integration were minimised, in particular economic integration (Maier, 2005: 225). Against this background, a Declaration of Atlantic Unity first emerged in 1954 from the initiative of 154 citizens of Canada, USA, Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Denmark. The Declaration claimed for a reinforced and broader integration. The delegation was composed of well-famed social figures, such as scholars, press editors, publishers, political representatives, diplomats, military officials, corporatists, members of the clergy, scientists, attorneys, judges, writers, and bankers, among others. At the time, the group expressed its concern that despite NATO's success in reducing the "danger of direct military attack in Europe", the "enemies of freedom" could divert their efforts and be supported by isolationist countries. There was the perception of



an increasing “peril from disunity” (NATO, 1954). The final combined American-Canadian draft of the Declaration thus stated:

This is no time for half-hearted measures. [...] **we believe** that nothing less than an **effectively integrated Atlantic Community**, which would include German defense forces, will in the end adequately **meet the challenge of the times**. **Defense in today's terms extends beyond military requirements and into the political, economic and cultural aspects** of our lives. Yet **NATO is still basically a military alliance** (NATO, 1954: annex A; emphasis added).

These words firmly convey the will of a more advanced integration amongst NATO members. The basic military alliance was not *believed* to be sufficient, as the concept of defence was deemed to include wider political, economic and cultural requirements as well. There was the perception that the “challenges of the times” required more than a military alliance, as other dimensions of the North Atlantic lives deserved to be assimilated and duly upheld by the Alliance. The text of the Declaration then further specified:

We endorse the words of the Rt. Hon. Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, spoken at Bonn on February 10:

"Perhaps the time has now come to consider whether some of the **steps toward closer integration which we must take if our concept of civilization is not to perish**, should be taken within the larger framework of the North Atlantic Community [...]"

We remind our governments that NATO, in the words of its Secretary General, "is **something new and exciting and revolutionary, the most challenging and constructive experiment in international relations ever attempted**."

We ask our fellow citizens to **urge our respective governments to make this experiment succeed** (NATO, 1954: annex A; emphasis added).

Here, closer integration was clearly associated to a step forward in the civilising process. Without such step, there was the fear that the existing concept of civilisation could actually perish. Put in other terms, without deeper integration, or greater interdependence between NATO members, their civilisation could be at stake. Moreover, the self-representation of the Organisation as the most revolutionary and constructive *experiment* ever attempted in international relations was highly progressive. It implied that NATO had a very firm purpose of *transforming* the international system. In this sense, the 1954 Declaration of Atlantic Unity was not only a call for identity statement, as it was also a declaration of intentions regarding the execution of a precise vision of the world, in which Western lives were merging on the economic, political and cultural levels.

In 1956, non-military cooperation became indeed an explicit concern to NATO, when a Committee was put in charge of formally reporting on the subject. The text of the

report communicated a general concern on the Alliance's objectives and timely adaptation to contemporary reality. Indeed, the Report referred that, back in 1949,

[t]here was also the realisation – **conscious or instinctive** – that **in a shrinking nuclear world** it was wise and timely to bring about a closer association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for **other than defence purposes** alone; that in a partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection should also **promote progress and cooperation generally**. There was **a feeling among the government and peoples** concerned that **this close unity was both natural and desirable** [...]. There was, in short, a **sense of Atlantic Community**, alongside the realisation of an immediate common danger (NATO, 1956: par. 12).

This excerpt revealed that the Alliance had not only been born out of the need to defend Atlantic nations from a common danger, but also that progress, cooperation, and unity had been parallel requirements arising from “conscious or *instinctive*” realisations. This reference to “conscious or instinctive” visions at the origin of NATO, as well as the *naturalness* or *desirability* of a closer unity also gave a metaphysical sense to NATO's very existence. The sense of uncertainty regarding the consciousness or instinctiveness underlying the feeling of association is clearly used to elevate the transcendent bond unifying Western identities through space and time. In other words, NATO was said to result from both an immediate physical necessity, and an unconscious sense that uniting was the natural thing to do.

However, only seven years later,

Certain questions now take on a **new urgency**. **Have NATO's needs and objectives changed, or should they be changed?** Is the Organisation operating satisfactorily in the **altered circumstances of 1956**? If not what can be done about it? There is the even more far-reaching question: “Can a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all **without the common binding force of fear**?” (NATO, 1956: par. 22; emphasis added).

By questioning the pertinence of the Alliance in the absence of fear, the Report clearly implied that NATO had been born out of the fear of a common threat, and that such fear was not so evident in 1956. Against the background of the obsolescence of fear, the Report nonetheless revealed “[t]he **second and long-term aim of NATO**: the development of an **Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence**” (NATO, 1956: par. 28; emphasis added). Hence, in the presence of altered conjunctural circumstances, a longer-term vision of the Alliance was soundly stated:

The coming together of the **Atlantic nations for good and constructive purposes** [...] must rest on and grow from **deeper and more permanent factors that the divisions and dangers of the last ten years**. It is a **historical, rather than a contemporary, development**, and if it is to achieve its real purpose, it must be

considered in that light and the necessary conclusions drawn. A **short-range view will not suffice** (NATO, 1956: par. 35; emphasis added).

These excerpts of the 1956 Report on non-military cooperation in NATO clearly state how the Alliance early manifested the ambition to last, even after the original fear that seemed to have dictated its birth attenuated. They also convey a strong ontological sense of community, sustained by deeper and more permanent bonds than the contemporary *raison d'être* of the Alliance. Although expressions such as NATO's "deeper roots" and "real purpose" appear quite enigmatic, the reference to the ideas of instinct and naturalness still open the possibility for conceiving metaphysical and unconscious dimensions of civilisation. In fact, those expressions rather refer to the importance of the historical evolution and on-going development of the organisation, than to more episodic and contemporary changes. They reveal a consciousness of time and future, and also suggest the presence of long duration structures that remain in the unconscious. Clearly, civilisations are "continuities", in the sense they depict a heritage from the past, whilst coexisting with short-term patterns (Braudel, 1989: 42). In the end, a civilisation is more than a given economy, or a precise society; it is rather a long-term achievement, i.e., what a group of men manages to preserve and transmit throughout generations, persisting across time (Braudel, 1989: 49). Without referring systematically to "civilisation" *per se*, NATO still expressed a vision of continuity, in which the essential values it sought to defend and secure actually seemed to transcend political models, or geopolitical divisions of the world. In this sense, NATO revealed a vision of Western civilisation as an open process.

In 1962, though, the Atlantic Convention renewed the initiative of 1954 to issue a second Declaration of Atlantic Unity. As for the first one, the urge in 1962 was essentially to extend the Atlantic Community to the political, military, economic, moral and cultural fields, and thereby "guarantee the security against the Communist menace" (The Atlantic Convention, 1962). The measures recommended among other things: to "define the principles on which our common civilization is based"; establish an Atlantic High Court of Justice; agree on a NATO policy with respect to nuclear weapons; increase the volume and value of exports and promote special tariff concessions; make of the trade partnership between the USA and the EEC the basis of an Atlantic Economic Community, "open to other nations of the free world"; and to reconstruct the Acropolis as a symbol of the Atlantic culture.

Beyond those tangible objectives, the Declaration also made reference to historical representations of what the *heritage of Western civilisation* was:

The **Atlantic peoples are heir to a magnificent civilization** whose origins include the early achievements of the Near East, the classical beauty of Greece, the juridical sagacity of Rome, the spiritual power of our religious traditions and the humanism of the Renaissance. Its latest flowering, **the discoveries of modern science**, allow an extraordinary **mastery of the forces of nature**.

[...]

**Thanks to that civilization** and to the **common characteristics** with which it **stamps the development of the peoples participating** in it, the nations of the **West** do in fact constitute a **powerful cultural and moral community** (The Atlantic Convention, 1962; emphasis added).

These words, similar in tone to those of Caeiro da Matta in 1949, project the affirmation of an Atlantic identity that is the heir of a millenary “magnificent civilisation” and that has the power of morality and culture on its side to develop “the peoples participating in it”. But this position needs to be framed within the wider context of a Western crisis of identity during the 1960’s.

After the gradual recovery initiated in the 1950’s, the 1960’s were a period of fragility for the West, during which radical movements arose to condemn centrist liberalism for its immoral, cynical and exploitative Establishment (Gress, 1998). Against the background of the Cold War, a trend of pessimism regarding the West was manifest. In James Burnham’s *The Suicide of the West: an essay on the meaning and destiny of Liberalism* (1964), for example, the argument was that the West could not overcome the Soviet Union because it was too fragmented, too decadent, too soft, and not determined to assume a long-term struggle against a hostile enemy. According to Burnham, the reason for this weakness was liberalism itself, which had no answer to those who did not believe in its narrative of progress and common purposes. To historian William McNeill, in *The Rise of the West: a History of the Human Community* (1963), cultural change was understood as a never-ending process of interaction between societies, each equipped with its own package of skills, interests, and material conditions. This ideological context shows that issues of identity were indeed present at the time. Hence, the affirmation and re-affirmation of an Atlantic “unity” and identity, which was often put in historical and mythologising terms, as exposed above. Furthermore, those ideological conditions also reinforce the idea that the Cold War was a critical matter of geo-ideological struggle. The essential novelty of that “cold” struggle lied in the methods used by both the parties involved, namely diplomatic confrontation, ideological struggle, political, military and

economic competition (Roberts, 2005: 54). Were not these methods the mark of a now more *civilised* struggle, in which aggressiveness and direct confrontation were managed and self-contained (hence its “coldness”)?

To sum up, identity and purpose were pressing issues right from the initial decades of NATO’s life. In a way that was conscious of time and future, NATO associated a historical Atlantic identity with long-lasting purposes expanding out of military functions of defence. Organised citizens asked NATO for a deeper concept of integration, which was supposed to be total. Politics, culture and economy thus formed a material and ideological whole that ultimately represented the advancing steps of the civilising process.

However, NATO’s official responses to such demands were not very emphatic. In 1967, the Harmel Report by the Atlantic Council was supposed to elaborate on the tasks NATO would face in the future in order to strengthen its capacity for sustaining a durable peace. The Report nebulously concluded that “[t]he Alliance is a **dynamic and vigorous organisation** which is **constantly adapting itself to changing conditions**” (NATO, 1967: par. 3; emphasis added). So, similarly to the openness of the civilising process, NATO managed to maintain its scope for action open and quite vague. And despite the seemingly unconscious dimension of its conduct of affairs, it appears that NATO always had the rather conscious sense of questioning its pertinence along the way in order to remain flexible and adaptable to external developments. Although NATO’s organisational and identity crisis have been profusely analysed in reference to the post-Cold War period – as mentioned in the introduction – matters of survival, pertinence, and projection into the long-term future were an important part of NATO’s path soon in its existence.

### **7.3. The 1970’s – 1980’s: “the pace of change is accelerating”**

After an initial stage, during which NATO attempted to stabilise its organisational identity and normalise its core values, the 1970’s and 1980’s were equally important to the Alliance’s evolution. Throughout that period, many social movements, economic crises, ideological questioning, technological innovation, and political revolutions marked the international conjuncture. Based on that temporal stage, this section will analyse how the concept of civilisation and the treatment of time evolved in NATO’s discourses. As it has

been seen so far, the representation of time in NATO's discourses contributed to give the Alliance a sense of civilisational purpose. But did the perception, representation, or beliefs in Western civilisation somehow alter? Or did they remain fundamentally the same?

Hence, it will be seen that the two final decades of the Cold War were lived as times of imminent revolution, and introduced new "vocabularies" (Skinner, 1999: 63) in NATO's discourses about conjunctural change and norms.<sup>28</sup> Yet, change *per se* was dealt as it had been before. NATO's discourses on the state of the Alliance during the 1970's and 1980's focused significantly on reaffirming its identity and usefulness; on referring to the glory of past deeds and achievements; on attempting to stabilise Soviet behaviour through the imperativeness to abide by international standards of behaviour. However, near the end of the 1980's, a gradual shift at the level of the referent of object of security will be observed, namely towards the security of individuals.

In the 1970's, centrist liberalism suffered a second wave of attack especially directed at the liberal West, in association with economic crisis. According to the radicals, reason was not being used correctly by Western liberalism (Gress, 1998). The effects of such criticism could be seen in the increasing disillusionment with the superpowers (O'Hagan, 2002:112), and also in the rejection of dominant models through civil rights activism, ecological struggles, and movements of resistance to "pure war" and to the invention of "crazier sorts of weapons, like the neutron bomb, and 'Doomsday machines'" (Armitage and Virilio, 1999: 37). Above all, this rejection was mostly related to Western capitalism. As it was becoming obvious that growth was not operative, and that the development of the Third World could not follow the prescribed stages of liberal progress, modernisation theory was increasingly challenged by alternative thinking such as Immanuel Wallerstein's World-system theory and "dependency theories", interested in studying relationships between developed capitalist states and underdeveloped countries (Harvey, 2001: 6, 73; Kramer, 2009: 67; Wallerstein, 1974; Zarakol, 2011: 92).

On the occasion of a Declaration on Atlantic Relations, approved by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19 June 1974 and signed by Heads of NATO Governments in Brussels on 26 June 1974,

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<sup>28</sup> "Not only is our moral and social world held in place by the manner in which we choose to apply our inherited normative vocabularies, but one of the ways in which we are capable of reappraising and changing our world is by changing the ways in which these vocabularies are applied" (Skinner, 1999: 63).

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance declare that the **Treaty** signed 25 years ago to protect their freedom and independence **has confirmed their common destiny**. Under the shield of the Treaty, **the Allies have maintained their security**, permitting them to **preserve the values which are the heritage of their civilisation** and **enabling Western Europe to rebuild from its ruins** and lay the foundations of its unity (NATO, 1974: par. 1).

This first paragraph of the Declaration resonates like an ancient chorus of the Alliance. What was first enounced as the “common heritage” of the members in the formative Charter of 1949 is being established as a “common destiny” past twenty-five years of existence. “Destiny” remits to a certain degree of determinism as to how time develops and how history may be conceived and experienced. How could a “common destiny” be objectively validated? And, most importantly, what does that common destiny consist of? More than “awareness of present and future”, this form of assertiveness establishes a loose connection between past and future, without focusing on the present once more. This is a rhetorical representation of time and its meanings. Besides, it naturalises the sense that time would evolve favourably for NATO members in order for them to fulfil their common destiny, regardless of what that destiny might be.

Furthermore, the Declaration makes a positive balance of the state of security for the Allies, which most critically allows them to “preserve the values which are the heritage of their civilisation”. The text does not need to specify what those values are, because perceptions on NATO were assumed naturally. The world now knew or could imagine they would be related to NATO’s formulation of Atlantic unity, Atlantic identity, Atlantic adaptation to changing times, i.e., *Atlantic overall openness* – see Section b) on the 1950’s and 1960’s.

Finally, by referring to the WWII “ruin” of Western Europe, this Declaration of 1974 resorts to “memorialization”, a traditional aspect of historical narratives reinforcing power (Foucault, 2003: 67). In this case, the memory of Western European misery is recalled to reinforce the idea that it is now in much better shape, thanks to the existence of the Alliance. This move ultimately strengthens the projection of NATO’s organisational power. The historical narrative is evident; the Declaration refers more often to “shared representations of history” (Liu and Denis, 2005) – either of the past or the future – than to contemporary events or, simply, to the present. The narrative reproduces and perpetuates the knowledge of Western history. Further, the same Declaration states:

At the same time [the members] realise that the **circumstances affecting their common defence** have **profoundly changed in the last ten years**: the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has reached a point of **near equilibrium**. Consequently, although all the countries of the **Alliance remain vulnerable to attack, the nature of the danger to which they are exposed has changed** (NATO, 1974: par. 4; emphasis added).

This paragraph refers to the profound change of security conditions during the prior decade. Without pointing to specific examples or cases, the broader USA-USSR relationship is mentioned as the main determinant of those conditions. It was still the bipolar era, but the difference was now at a “point of near equilibrium”. However, this newly found equilibrium is not seen with much confidence or enthusiasm, as “vulnerability to attack” is said to remain, yet for different ever-changing reasons. So, seemingly, there is not a single stable element in all this security equation: circumstances affecting defence had been changing for ten years; the USA-USSR relationship was *nearly* equilibrated; vulnerability remained; danger was changing too. In other terms, insecurity was as much of an open process, as was NATO’s discourse about itself. Drawing on both open insecurity and an open alliance, NATO could represent itself as being able to encompass any evolving circumstance in the future. In other terms, no situation could constitute an exception, or an unpredicted event; Atlantic relations were predisposed to adapt and respond to any circumstance.

In 1974, the Declaration integrated more items and expands NATO’s list of functions to the field of development:

[The members] recall that they have proclaimed their dedication to the **principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress**, which are **the fruits of their shared spiritual heritage** and they declare **their intention to develop and deepen the application of these principles in their countries**. [...] In Europe, their objective continues to be the pursuit of understanding and cooperation with every European country. **In the world at large, each Allied country recognises the duty to help the developing countries**. It is in the interest of all that **every country benefits from technical and economic progress** in an open and equitable world system (NATO, 1974: par. 12; emphasis added).

Whereas in 1949 NATO’s guiding principles were “freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” (NATO, 1949) – they were now replaced with “democracy, respect for human rights and social progress, which are the fruits of their shared spiritual heritage [...]” (NATO, 1974: par. 12). This change in formulation is definitely not a conceptual change. Some vocabulary differs, but it essentially expands the conceptions of 1949 to the contemporary lexicon of the 1970’s. “Human rights, justice and social progress”, the



“intention to develop”, and recognising the “duty to help the developing countries” were all part of the 1970’s conjuncture and problems related to the social concerns and ideological rejections exposed above in the beginning of the section. Therefore, recalling on Skinner’s (1999) accounts, the Declaration rather represents a *rhetorical* change, in that NATO suggested and morally justified to help the developing countries outside the North Atlantic area, using an expression that is central to Wallerstein (1974): “It is in the interest of all that every country benefits from technical and economic progress in an open and equitable **world system**” (NATO, 1974: par. 12; emphasis added). In response to the social and intellectual trends of the time, NATO did define an agenda employing different terms, but it is an agenda actually linked to an international liberal ideology of intervention.

At the same time, the initiative of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was launched in 1973 and concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 with the general objective of improving East-West relations. The high representatives of 35 countries joined the Conference,<sup>29</sup> “Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace” (CSCE, 1975: 2). The Accords adopted a series of principles and policies in the fields of security, disarmament, economics, science, technology, environment, education and culture, among others. Despite the goodwill of the Accords, and the environment of general *détente* lived at the time, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact maintained ambivalent policies: “as they held talks with the other side on the question of arms control they were simultaneously bolstering their military capabilities” (Jackson, 2009: 58).

In what regards the Soviet Union, her invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 backlashed the *détente*:

Ministers expressed their concern that **for the first time in the post-war era the Soviet Union had used military force to impose its will on a non-aligned country of the Third World** and in a way which affected the overall strategic situation. Ministers denounced this use of force which jeopardises international peace and stability and strikes at the principles of the United Nations' Charter, and called for the **total and immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan must be free to shape their future without outside interference** (NATO, 1980: par. 3; emphasis added).

One notable and quite innovative element in this passage lies in the reference to the

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<sup>29</sup> Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia.

“people” of a non-aligned and out-of-area country, whose freedom and sovereignty appear as an obligation in the eyes of NATO Ministers. The imposition of force by the Soviet Union upon Afghanistan was not consensual among NATO members. While it was a source of renewed conflict with the Soviet Union for the US Carter administration, the Europeans “[v]iewed Brezhnev’s act as a defense measure and not a direct threat to the status quo in Europe” (Jackson, 2009: 58). Nevertheless, NATO’s reference to the USSR during the 1980’s was quite contrasting. On the one hand, the Soviet Union was said to require its associates “to act as a bloc, in order to preserve a rigid and imposed system”, to threaten to use force beyond its frontiers, and to have spent many resources to a massive military build-up. This was deemed excessive by NATO members, in the light of the Soviet “projection of military power on a global scale” (NATO, 1982: par. 4).

To NATO members, on the other hand, international stability and world peace required “greater restraint and responsibility” on the part of the Soviet Union. This requisition was an appeal to civilised behaviour. But apart from self-restraint, responsibility was now added as a feature of civilised behaviour. This is why NATO set forth a “Programme for Peace in Freedom”, aiming at preventing war, safeguarding democracy, promoting sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states: “On that basis, we will persevere in efforts to establish, **whenever Soviet behaviour makes this possible**, a more constructive East-West relationship through dialogue, negotiation and mutually advantageous cooperation” (NATO, 1982: par. 5; emphasis added). This expression reminds of Western discourse on Soviet behaviour in the 1940’s. Just as in the condescending tone used in British accounts of Soviet behaviour at the post-WWII conferences, Soviet behaviour was still not held as a stable, predictable, and trustful element. Finally, the Soviet Union was explicitly called upon to “**abide by internationally accepted standards of behaviour without which there can be no prospect for stable international relations**” and to join NATO “in the search for constructive relations, arms reductions and world peace” (NATO, 1982: par. 8; emphasis added). This was a clear formulation of a standard of civilisation as a precondition for international peace and stability.

Against this background, NATO did not miss the opportunity to reaffirm its identity by redefining its past deeds and the scope of its action. In 1982, NATO members declared for example that, although they had preserved peace for a third of a century, they were

prepared for an adjustment of aims and interests “at all times”, in a “partnership of equals, none dominant and none dominated” (NATO, 1982: par. 3). This move also balanced the relations among the members within the Alliance. As to NATO’s mandate, it was progressively broadened:

Our purpose is to contribute to **peaceful progress worldwide**; we will work to **remove the causes of instability such as underdevelopment** [...]. We will continue to play our part in the struggle against **hunger and poverty**. Respect for genuine non-alignment is important for international stability (NATO, 1982: par. 5.e.; emphasis added).

Accordingly to the phase of détente, NATO performed a language of appeasement, but it did not refrain from reasserting its original role as an organisation of defense in the international balance of power:

Our Alliance threatens no one. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. **We do not aspire to superiority, neither will we accept that others should be superior to us.** Our legitimate security interests can only be guaranteed through the firm linkage between Europe and North America. **We call upon the Soviet Union to respect our legitimate security interests as we respect theirs** (NATO, 1983; emphasis added).

Near the end of the decade, NATO itself acknowledged that it was “A time for reaffirmation” that required the members to come together and “re-emphasise” their unity, as the current state of East-West relations was being intensively reassessed (NATO, 1988: par. 1). Regardless of the critical changes ahead, was “reaffirmation” not what NATO had been doing for forty years? In 1989, NATO SG Manfred Wörner thus summarized NATO’s forty years of existence:

**The narrative is a continuing one and the pace of change is accelerating.** Yet international developments in the Spring of 1989 demonstrated only too well that the stability of international relations can be all too easily undermined by oppression, despite the inherent ability of oppressive systems to fulfill the aspirations of their citizens.

[...] In their summit Declaration, however, it was on **the Alliance’s longer term objectives** that [the leaders of NATO] placed the focus. An enhanced partnership within the Alliance and a determination to replace confrontation with cooperation outside the Alliance offer the prospect of addressing directly the fundamental issues which have been at the heart of Allied concerns since the signing of the 1949 Treaty – overcoming the underlying political causes of the division of Europe [...]. The fortieth anniversary Summit Meeting provided the occasion for the Alliance to rise to these challenges with a **blueprint for shaping the future** and a dynamic joint agenda for its progressive implementation (Manfred Wörner in NATO, 1989b: 181).<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Secretary General of NATO from 1988 to 1994.

This excerpt shows explicitly how NATO was anticipating a major change in international relations. The perception that time was accelerating revealed a pressure upon the Soviet Union from the international system, ever since Mikhail Gorbachev was brought to office in 1985. Gorbachev introduced dynamic and promising signs of overture in the Soviet government through his many reforms. His measures were critical to the securing of the Soviet economy, the opening of Soviet society, as well as to an active engagement with the West sustained by a vision that a unified continent could be possible in the future (Jackson, 2009: 59). Therefore, Manfred Wörner's words resonate like a preparation.

The way NATO managed to take advantage of this favourable evolution needs to be highlighted too:

The Allies' political solidarity, commitment to defence, **patience and creativity in negotiations overcame initial obstacles and brought its efforts to fruition.** It was the Alliance that drew up the **basic blueprints for East-West progress** and has since pushed them forward towards realisation. In particular, the concepts of stability, reasonable sufficiency, asymmetrical reductions, concentration on the most offensive equipment, rigorous verification, transparency, a single zone from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the balanced and comprehensive nature of the CSCE process, are Western-inspired (NATO, 1989a: par. 11).

The self-image of the Alliance's contribution to the encouraging state of affairs at the time is notoriously positive. Its role is perceived as fundamental in drawing up the "basic blueprints for East-West progress", which is revealing of NATO viewing itself as a model of behaviour for improving the world, and of efficacy in bringing military concepts into reality. The projection of such an identity is obviously favored by the internal developments of the Soviet Union, but in the end the overall progress is said to be "Western-inspired".

Finally, on the eve of the Cold War's end, Manfred Wörner – Secretary General of NATO from 1988 to 1994 – thus appraised the state of the Alliance:

So **whatever its past achievements, the Alliance clearly is not resting on its laurels; it is on the move**, indispensable as the only body that brings the combined weight of North America and Western Europe to bear on **today's challenges.** These remain considerable and our success cannot be automatic. Yet provided we **remain united, maintain a strong defence** and work hard to ensure **the support of public opinion** for what is after all the only realistic method of **managing change with stability,** I am convinced that at our fiftieth anniversary in 1999 we will have more and greater successes to report. **Our problems are the problems of success, so they cannot be impossible to solve.** Our societies are more humane and fair, our peoples more creative, our economies more dynamic. As long as the NATO member states **continue to build a stability and security**

whose benefits are enjoyed far beyond their boundaries, the **future will belong to the Western democracies** (Manfred Wörner in NATO, 1989b: xii).

Differently from others, these words relativize “past achievements” to emphasise the on-going pace of change. An Alliance “on the move” is an organisation that is constantly adapting to evolving challenges, and remains open to longer term processes of change. In this sense, other fields are progressively included in NATO’s scope of action, such as the use of outer space, or the multilateral tariff negotiations (NATO, 1989b: 69). Furthermore, “Managing change with stability” is said to be attainable through union, a strong defence, and the support of the public opinion. This reveals a strong belief and confidence in the future development of the international conjuncture, which may only pose problems in terms of success and which “will belong to the Western democracies”.

The objective of this section on the evolution of NATO between the 1950’s and the 1980’s was to enhance how the civilisational referent of security had evolved in the first decades of the Alliance’s life. The fundamentals established by the Charter of the Alliance were principles deeply entrenched in historical time and in the consciousness of the members, as they were said to constitute the normative *acquis* of the North Atlantic civilisation – democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Drawing on these principles, the Treaty of Washington was also explicit in formulating a precise identity for a civilised geographical area. In other words, NATO did not only emerge as the connection between the past and the future of the North Atlantic, as it also ascribed a civilised identity to a specific physical space – that which is composed of the member nations. The surging of such an alliance recalled the world that the civilised habitus of the West was being revived, well defined and reorganised through the creation of an international institution aiming at defending it.

In a first phase, the 1950’s and 1960’s were a period of consolidation for NATO’s identity. The appeals coming from outside actors in the Declarations of Atlantic Unity in 1954 and 1962 demonstrated the extent to which the North Atlantic elite was demanding deeper integration within the Alliance, namely through the integration of other sectors than common defence. By the end of the 1960’s, non-military cooperation was effectively put in practice. This search for reinforced interdependence manifested the fear that disunity could jeopardise the Alliance’s purpose, and ultimately Western power. Put in other words, the civilised habitus was at stake and this first phase essentially showed that the civilisational referent of security was being sorted out, reaffirmed and stabilised.

After that, the 1970's and 1980's composed a more stable period, during which the Alliance's overall discourse and action focused on equilibrating the relationship with the Soviet Union, mostly through increased control and reduction of nuclear armament. However, ideological challenges and conjunctural change were *à l'ordre du jour*. While the West was under strong criticism, NATO managed the numerous fronts of that change by insisting on the preservation of its core values, and by reaffirming its identity and usefulness through the reference to past deeds and glory. Still, NATO also adapted to the politicisation of issues such as poverty and underdevelopment, and showed its intent of expanding its competences to those areas of action. The norms popularised during this period suggested that the international standard of civilisation assumed different shapes, depending on the moral requisites of the time. As the West was undergoing a phase of strong criticism, the discursive use of "civilisation" might have lost its relevance and utility. However, while East-West relations were being tentatively improved by the Helsinki Accords of 1975, NATO did not miss the opportunity to highlight the issue of Soviet behaviour and to appeal to "internationally accepted standards of behaviour". This is to say that, without explicitly mentioning the need to safeguard the civilised habitus, NATO transposed that requirement to standards of behaviour already normalised on the international scene.



### **PART 3 – NATO and the Individualisation of Security after the Cold War: another stage of the civilising process?**

It was seen in Part 2 that the defence of Western civilisation had a central role in NATO's original formulation of its referent object of security. In line with the general claim of this research that the civilisation of the West is not a natural, spontaneous or innate idea when conceiving international security, Part 2 illustrated how WWII made Western powers redefine the rules for the habitus of the civilised subjects of security to be corrected and resumed. The civilised habitus of the West suffered a major breakdown because of WWII, but it was revived through different concepts and symbols such as democracy and spirituality, and through the representation of a specific barbarian Other – the Soviet Union.

By analysing the first four decades of NATO's life in those terms, Part 2 also showed that the sense of identity and purpose have always been pressing issues since the beginning of the Alliance. Although NATO's organisational and identity crisis have been profusely analysed in reference to the post-Cold War period – see in the Introduction, “the State of the Art” – matters of survival, pertinence, and projection into the long-term future were an important part of NATO's narrative soon in its existence. Indeed, in a way that is conscious of issues of temporality and future, NATO has associated a historical Atlantic identity with long-lasting purposes that expand beyond mere military functions of defence. The short-term, event-related, dimension of WWII was overthrown by NATO's interplay with longer temporal references, which has also influenced its civilisational referent of security. Not only has NATO evolved in an open way because it is part of a long-duration structural time, as civilisation has also been represented and projected into the long-term future as part of a “common destiny”, ascribing a sense of linearity and timelessness to the very idea of civilisation.

Part 3 will proceed with the final development of the argument: intervening to protect individuals in out-of-area countries is not a natural or spontaneous evolution of NATO. It is rather part of a careful reinvention after the Cold War that is entrenched in broader conjunctural changes, but that is still inscribed in the continuity of NATO's narrative about change. The end of the Cold War left plenty room for the redefinition of everything; every belief, relationship, practice, justification, or stereotype of the past fifty



years either ceased to be relevant, or needed to be rethought. In the new conjunctural context of the 1990's, multi-polarity was still virtual. Rules and practices were expected to transform, because the locus of symbolic power was uncertain now. At a deeper level, as Robert W. Cox (2002a: 76) puts it, the assumptions upon which prevailing forms of knowledge were based were challenged, and a different set of problems arose to be confronted. During the Cold War, two competing forms of homogenisation were the only games allowed. In the search for a new basis of knowledge, a new ontology of world order needed to be found that allowed "[p]erceiving the historical structures that characterize an epoch" (Cox, 2002a: 78). Although it seemed Capitalism, Liberalism and democracy had won over Soviet Communism, the post-Cold War period also liberated societies from old constraints, and could have represented a critical opportunity for renovating a world order based on enhanced multicultural dialogue as the "obscured diversity of the human situation" (Cox, 2002a: 77) was suddenly more apparent. However, that period opened a latent ideological struggle for what rules would dominate from then on. Rules and practices changed, because other elements transpired and rose above those of the previous period.

Part 3 will suggest that the main post-Cold War conjunctural change in the field of international security during the 1990's consists of the Individualisation of Security, a normative process through which Western civilisation could be upheld and continued. NATO has been a major actor in that process, as it strove and managed to be very influential in prescribing and putting in practice the new rules and practices of the Individualisation of Security. Its three main operations after the Cold War – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan – express the different ways under which the Individualisation of Security serves the civilisation of out-of-area states through specific transformation of behaviour and security rationales.

Part 3 is composed of chapters 8 to 11. Chapter 8 will approach the broader transformations within NATO as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, and their implications for the civilised habitus of Western security. Chapter 9 will elaborate in more depth on the Individualisation of Security as the chief evolution in the field of international security; it will offer a conceptual, theoretical and practical analysis of the phenomenon, and articulate it with my notion of the civilised subject of security. Chapter 10 will then analyse each of the three missions proposed – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan –

in the light of the Individualisation of Security as another stage of the process of civilisation of the West. Finally, Chapter 11 will recapitulate and offer a final reflection on the main findings of this dissertation.



## ***8. Post-CW NATO: new ways and reasons for coexistence***

Europe has entered a **new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself.** The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey toward a free society. The **walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny.** They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free (NATO, 1990: par. 1; emphasis added).

The bipolar division of the world ended when the Berlin Wall fell, on 9 November 1989. Eastern Communism and Western Liberalism had competed for several decades after WWII, and the Wall had symbolically and materially prolonged the general state of closure among European societies since 1961. But now, the most important enemy of the West had ceased to exist, and the new political stance of Gorbachev altered the perceptions on Russia as an earlier barbarian Other (Lebow and Stein, 1994: 370-375). In this sense, the end of the Cold War also represented a break from a certain temporality; a break from a different world that was to be maintained in the past, and from which Europe was liberating itself towards its new future and destiny. What remained in the past of the bipolar period had a strong role in the formation of memories and in the reinforcement of symbolic power. An important structural change was triggered, which opened the door for a “new ontology of world order” (Cox, 2002a: 77). This event suggested to the world that different systems of thinking and living could coexist in a seemingly pacific way from then on.

Within NATO, this turning point was expressed by the 1990 London Declaration, in which the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were no longer considered adversaries, and their representatives invited to establish regular diplomatic contact (NATO, 1990: par. 6-7). The implications of the end of the Cold War for NATO are evident. The Alliance had arisen to defend the North-Atlantic area from the ideological threat of the Soviet Union, and to deter any potential rival from using nuclear force against the Allies. Once that threat was no longer significant, NATO could have ceased to exist. But it did not. It continued, it transformed, it even developed and grew exponentially in material and symbolic importance.

Faced with the evidence of NATO’s continual existence after more than two decades, debating whether it should exist and for what reasons is not the purpose here. In the final section of Part 2, it was seen that NATO’s self-reflexive discourse in the late

1980's already suggested a plurality of functions and tasks for the future. NATO had remained open to change, it had evoked the upcoming possibilities of structural revolution and did not show intent of self-dissolution should that fundamental change occur. In 1990, the Alliance now intended to "be even more an agent of change" (NATO, 1990: par. 2). Definitely, the more traditional and Realist conception of an alliance could not be applied to NATO; and to understand its persistence, one has to accept that alliances may exist as security institutions that can develop many other purposes (Wallander, 2000: 705). Closure gave way to openness, spatially and ideologically.

To Michael C. Williams and Iver Neumann (2007), NATO's persistence and power in the post-CW period derived from a cultural strategy sustained by a powerful political and cultural narrative that was able to overcome the limitations of a purely military representation of the Alliance. Through this cultural strategy, symbolic capital and power were exercised upon the East and, consequently, issues like the union of the West and the security of Europe could be addressed. This ultimately provided the Alliance with a logic of continuity (Williams and Neumann, 2007: 89, 91).

Alexandra Gheciu (2005; 2008) has extensively worked on NATO's post- Cold War transformation, and highlighted the Kantian influence on the ideas and discourses dominating international security in that period. To Gheciu, Kantian premises reflect a general understanding of human nature that relies upon liberal actors committed to "discipline the irrational, violent side of themselves" (2005: 61). In this sense, self-discipline lies at the centre of identity (re-)formation after the Cold War, and is therefore present in liberal democratic norms and institutions, morality, and overall peaceful coexistence (*ibid.*). In this context, all former enemy polities were deemed to possess "the potential to learn liberal-democratic norms, and thus evolve into the kind of societies worthy of the full respect of/integration into the Western security community" (Gheciu, 2008: 82). Also, authors like Sonia Lucarelli (2005: 91-92) and Yannis Stivachtis (2010: 18) have already suggested that NATO's identity after the Cold War was reconstructed by essentially redefining what could be considered as appropriate and acceptable behaviour of outer participants. This was achieved by a whole narrative revolving around NATO's new Strategic Concept adopted in 1991, and the new mechanisms for cooperation and dialogue it implemented – such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

From the perspective of temporality and its symbols, NATO's persistence and continuity after the Cold War may be also seen from the perspective of an institution that acts like a structure "through which to facilitate the sharing of images of immortalizing connectedness" (Lifton and Olson, 2004: 38-39). NATO had experienced two life-defining moment as an organisation; after WWII, it was born; after the Cold War, it revived. The end of an *era* in NATO's history did not represent the end of its *time*, as that era could be replaced with different "shared images of continuity beyond the life of each single person" (Lifton and Olson, 2004: 39). In this sense, one may envision NATO's continuity after the Cold War as a symbol of Western civilisation's own immortality.

Consequently, reflecting on NATO as a security institution performing symbolic power, reinventing the boundaries of identity and behaviour, and looking into its many other purposes in face of a fundamentally new structural time appears to be much more constructive. This chapter takes on this historic change to analyse the deepest implications of this new era for NATO's civilisational referent. First, section a) approaches the conceptual dimension of NATO's immediate reinvention by analysing the New Strategic Concept adopted in 1991. This will allow outlining the main premises composing NATO's representation of a new security environment. Then, section b) will turn to the practical dimension of NATO's post-Cold War reinvention and highlight the importance of institutional practices to the continuation of the civilised habitus of the West. Here, Emanuel Adler's (2008) conceptualisation of "communities of practice" and in particular of NATO as a "security community" constitutes an elemental premise to better understand the influence of practices upon standards of civilisation. This will ultimately allow conceiving, I suggest, the practical development of NATO as a "civilising security community".

It will be seen that, within its post-Cold War reinvention, NATO's identity has remained essentially the same regarding representations of time, as well as the Alliance's constant will to adapt to and awareness of change, shaping expectations and dispositions (*habiti*) about what NATO is willing to do to protect North-Atlantic communities from whatever unknown threats. The significance of NATO's core values has remained the same as well, but democracy has been reinforced through diverse practices of socialisation that act at the level of cognition and behaviour. Those new forms of socialisation consist of new ways of behaving for partners and candidates to membership, as they also entail new

interdependent relationships. Moreover, the willingness to belong to NATO as a security community draws on the symbolic power of past memories and the fear of the loss of love as an ontological need for security. As a consequence, post-Cold War NATO set new rules of civilised behaviour, so civilised identities could be attuned.

### **8.1. The new Strategic Concept (1991): continuity amidst the new (in)security environment**

NATO's adoption of the new Strategic Concept in 1991 had a similar importance to that of its original Charter, because a new structural era opened, which required the Alliance to reinvent the organisation. NATO's clock had been reset to zero, and formulating a new Strategic Concept was as much a statement of intent and the display of a vision for the new era, as it also launched the conceptual grounds and narrative support for that organisational renewal. The new Strategic Concept not only identified NATO's tasks, purposes and objectives, as it also portrayed the general conjuncture of the post-Cold War environment. It was obviously not a prescriptive move, but it certainly enacted and performed a representation of the world that would be influential for post-Cold War international security. Besides, this new Strategic Concept reflects the rupture with the Cold War's "interpretive disposition" that mapped responsibility for "evil" in the Other, and responsibility for combating evil as a "burden of the self" (Campbell, 1996: 163). In this sense, as it will be seen, the new conceptualisation of NATO's strategy will reveal a redefinition of responsibility that is less a burden, but much more proactive and self-centred, while responsibility for evil has much more diffuse origins.

The most immediate and material effects of the new Strategic Concept regard the revision of the military strategy, which resulted in a substantial reduction of conventional and nuclear forces. This was felt especially in Europe, as the presence of US troops on European soil was drastically reduced, and European allies cut their own forces (Wallander, 2000: 718). NATO's reinvention has an evident European focus. Thus, the new Strategic Concept was deemed to arise from the "need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe" (NATO, 1991). The cause was that "developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in

which its aims would be met in the future”; therefore, a “fundamental strategic review” was necessary (*ibid.*). As it was seen in the previous chapters, the representation of time has continuously played a central role in NATO’s discourse. In this sense, it is interesting to note that NATO positioned its transformation in a parallel course to that of Europe’s future. Future NATO would reflect future Europe, and vice-versa.

The new Strategic Concept contains four parts: the strategic context; objectives and security functions; a broad approach to security; and guidelines for defence. The first part on the strategic context is a display of general duality that is consistent with how NATO represents time since the beginning. While the end of the Cold War is positively connoted, this is simultaneously overshadowed by the uncertainty of the future. USSR’s former satellites had recovered full sovereignty, the Warsaw Pact was dismantled, and former adversaries rejected the “ideological hostility to the West” (NATO, 1991: par. 1). The situation is best summarised as follows:

The **historic changes** that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfilment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have **significantly improved the overall security of the Allies**. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. **On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain** (NATO, 1991: par. 5; emphasis added).

The end of the USSR and its consequences were historic indeed; they had been expected and ambitioned since the late 1960’s by the goals set out in the Harmel Report (see page 136), and they now made the Allies more secure. However, although the disappearance of the USSR as the primary original threat is held as a favourable factor to the security of the Allies, it still opened a space of insecurity related to the uncertainty, to the vacuums of power that could have been left behind in the former Soviet states. And as the document proceeds with the definition of the “security challenges and risks” ahead, a clear rupture is made in terms of temporality, as they are said to be “different in nature from what they were in the past” (NATO, 1991: par. 7):

In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the **risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional**, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such **risks** if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These **risks** can arise in various ways (NATO, 1991: par. 8; emphasis added).

As for what could possibly cause those risks, the document identifies the “instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries



and territorial disputes” (NATO, 1991: par. 9). But those tensions should not threaten the security and territory of members, provided they remain “limited”. Yet, they could still “[l]ead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance” (*ibid.*). Regarding the nature of what could trigger NATO’s military action, the document stated that “Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context” (NATO, 1991: par. 12). Risks of a wider nature are identified as well, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, sabotage, and the “disruption of the flow of vital resources” (*ibid.*). To David Campbell (1996: 167), this process of threat diffusion can also be seen as *necessary*; the absence of a main antagonist upon which to formulate a foreign policy not only gave place to new dangers, as it also raised the need for new categories of meaning, new basis for knowledge and a new temporality.

The historic change and incoming uncertainties inherent to the end of the Cold War did not alter the fundamental purpose of the Alliance as originally set in the Washington Treaty. On the one hand, “the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity” (NATO, 1991: par. 14). These were to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, and based on the common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (NATO, 1991: par. 15). As for the fundamental security tasks, these are: to provide the “foundations for stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions”; to serve as forum for transatlantic consultations; to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against NATO territory; and to preserve strategic balance within Europe (NATO, 1991: par. 20). On the other hand, the new environment “offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security” (NATO, 1991: par. 14). The novelty thus lies in the *opportunities* offered to the Alliance to *frame a strategy*:

But what is new is that, with the **radical changes in the security situation**, the **opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before**. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the **diversity of challenges** facing the Alliance requires a **broad approach to security** (NATO, 1991: par. 24; emphasis added).

After the Cold War, NATO's purpose was to remain essentially the same in a changed structural context. Even if the security tasks needed to be reasserted, they were still consistent with what NATO had been doing between 1949 and 1989. The validity of the Alliance's purpose and functions was said to endure, as it was somehow indifferent to the new post-Cold War structural time. The very way of managing change is interesting. Although security changes were designated as *radical*, NATO remained the same, independently of time and structural changes; new times were rather seen as a new opportunity to set the dominant rules, and the Alliance's general posture was one of openness, multi-tasking, and preparedness.

In this sense, the centrality of risk is also clear. The new Strategic Concept document contains 59 paragraphs, and the noun "risk(s)" appears twenty-eight times. Far from initiating a new methodological approach at this stage of the dissertation, that number fairly suggests there was a strong intent behind the use of "risk" to express the idea that uncalculated dangers were a significant plausibility in the new security environment.<sup>31</sup> The multiple references to risk in the new Strategic Concept thereby consecrate uncertainty. Actually, change and uncertainty constitute a driving force for NATO, in that they define the need for its very existence. Here, the expression of "agent of change" is meaningful. It appears as a new *leitmotiv* in post-Cold War discourses and texts, and suggests NATO not only responds and endures change, as it also performs it by undertaking leading initiatives of security. NATO ends up defining what the post-Cold War security environment *is* or *can be*, by highlighting the many possibilities for insecurity.

The following section on the practical institutional evolution of NATO after the Cold War will show how the Alliance has in fact managed change and uncertainty in order to maintain order and the status quo of the West, and thereby expand the area for potentially new civilised subjects of security.

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<sup>31</sup> The notion of a "risk society" was originally formulated by Ulrich Beck in *Risk Society: towards a new modernity* (1992), who explained that in consequence of industrial societies moved by progress, wealth accumulation, unlimited possibilities, there are now ecological, financial and technological risks threatening the existence of those societies. In this "second modernity", society now faces uncontrollable and incalculable dangers with direct effects on human action and technology (Beck, 1999 *apud* Petersen, 2011: 8).

## 8.2. “The promise of democracy is for the civilised only”: setting the standards for Partners and new members

A narrative emerged in which there was no essential difference between those who are in the alliance and those who are not: **no adversaries are necessary, all states are potential members**, and **no states are necessarily adversaries**. The key mark of geopolitical delineation became the **social and political structures**, as well as the **cultural attributes**, of the states concerned. **Security and culture** became increasingly linked to the question of **democracy** [...] (Williams and Neumann, 2007: 76; emphasis added).

Past the conceptual dimension of NATO’s post-Cold War reinvention, this section focuses on the practical innovation of the Organisation. This approach takes the PfP of 1994, and the Enlargement Process opened in 1995 as the two chief references of this practical transformation, for they constitute the most important vectors of social, normative and cognitive change within NATO after the Cold War. It will be seen that those two institutional developments contain a critical dimension of symbolic power (Williams, 2007), as interactions between NATO and non-NATO countries were built upon relational dynamics affecting identities, habits, representations and memories. Ultimately, those interactions can be seen as a newly updated standard of civilisation. Surely, this will challenge the notion of what is “common” when applied to NATO as a security community; commonality in these cases is not linear, not natural, but rather conditional and accommodated. Although the overall benefits of the newly constructed relationship are mutual, the behavioral adaptation still reveals to be unilateral.

Emanuel Adler’s (2008) work on “communities of practice” conceives NATO as a “security-community”, and helps understanding the Alliance’s evolution after the Cold War within a social constructivist logic that surpasses the monolithic debates on why a defensive alliance should persist after its seminal threat has disappeared. The reason why Adler’s conception is only used at this stage of the work is that practices really developed more significantly after the end of the Cold War. This is illustrated by Adler with the successful expansion of security-community identities from NATO’s Western core to Central and Eastern European states during the 1990’s, through a cooperative-security community of practice, which grew from the Helsinki process and endowed NATO and the EU (Adler, 2008: 197).

The main features of a community of practice such as NATO are that it structures consciousness and intention; it constitutes agency; it encourages the evolution or spread of

social structures, namely by the acquisition of new material and organisational capabilities (Adler, 2008: 196). Therefore, adopting and sharing a new practice implied in processes such as new partnerships or memberships has transformative effects for the social structure. Furthermore, for a practice to be diffused, two things are essential: first, there has to be a numerical or geographical enlargement of the group of agents engaged in it; second, the agent adopting the new practice of a given community is the object of a learning process, in which meanings and identities are negotiated and transformed (Adler, 2008: 196). And for a security community to expand, it has to transform non-members' identities (Adler, 2008: 205).

In a security community such as NATO, members share rational and moral expectations and dispositions of self-restraint, in particular the abstention from the use of force. "Self-restraint makes violence unnecessary, because within security communities people deal with conflict through compromise and through legal and diplomatic means" (Adler, 2008: 204). Adler owes part of his thesis on self-restraint to Norbert Elias (2008: 205), who referred to self-restraint as the key factor of civilising processes. From an analytical perspective, shared norms and values are indispensable for creating and maintaining a collective identity, but practices are indispensable for reproducing these values. From a normative perspective, both liberal democracy and self-restraint norms and practice enable the existence and expansion of security communities (Adler, 2008: 220). Therefore, conceiving a security community as a "community of practice" allows covering the role of collective meanings that are established in individuals' expectations and dispositions, as well as the importance of sharing rational and moral expectations and dispositions of self-restraint, which is consistent with the general civilisational approach of this work. Hence, each of these two institutional processes – PfP and enlargement – allows conceiving the impact of norms transfer, socialisation and learning process upon the civilised subjects of security.

Great emphasis has been put upon the reinforcement of the democratic conditionality throughout these institutional phases and documents (Gheciu, 2005; Lucarelli, 2005; Stivachtis, 2010). Although democracy obviously constitutes the ideological covenant of NATO's continual reinvention, the socialisation process and the interactions at play between the Alliance and both Partners and aspirants to membership are much more revealing of the broader move underlying the social dynamics of

enlargement. The different institutional stages of the 1990's are a performance of power and knowledge in the civilising process of out-of-area countries.

### **The Partnership for Peace (1994)**

The PfP is an initiative launched by NATO in 1994 aiming at promoting military cooperation between NATO members and non-members – these are, in other words, “countries which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all” (NATO, 1995b: par. 4).

The 1994 document establishing the PfP is the “expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved through cooperation and common action” (NATO, 1994: par. 2). In joining the PfP, NATO member states and others subscribing to it commit “to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law” (*ibid.*). The other states joining and subscribing cooperate with NATO in pursuing the following goals: transparency of national defence planning and budgeting; ensuring democratic control of defence forces; maintain capability and readiness to contribute to operations under UN and/or CSCE authority; develop cooperative military relations with NATO for joint planning, exercises, training in order to be able to undertake missions of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; generally harmonize and develop forces able to operate with those of NATO members (NATO, 1994: par. 3).

Through these objectives and activities, partner states develop a web of military and normative interdependence with NATO members. Not only do partners standardise their domestic policies in light of those of the NATO area, as they also commit to the same democratic guidelines. Consequently, a tradition of cooperation and joint work is built among members and non-members, which enables operational readiness in case of need (Wallander, 2000: 721).

The PfP was successful and became very popular. On the one hand, NATO's approach to partners is very practical and operational. For example, after an initial invitation to observe exercises, and once the military contacts prove fruitful, partner countries can request to participate and eventually assist in planning the exercises (Wallander, 2000: 721). On the other hand, NATO's way of communicating with the

partners is directed towards individuals from political and administrative apparatuses of a partner country who share the same professional field – often the military – which facilitates the intensity and frequency of the contacts, and hence the socialisation and the transfer of norms (Lucarelli, 2005: 97). Moreover, although explicit teaching such as courses and seminars also occur, the area of technical advice is apparently a neutral way to reinforce NATO's position in bilateral relations. It does not take form of a teaching activity and is usually welcome as a state-to-state military cooperation (Lucarelli, 2005: 98).

However cooperative this institutional development may be, it still entails important features of the civilising process at the level of identity, interdependence, symbolic power and the ontological need for security. Sonia Lucarelli (2005), for instance, explains that the PfP launched a “categorisation process”, in which partner countries had to differentiate themselves from different out-groups through practices promoted by NATO itself. Within the Individual Partnership Programme, each partner country thus presents “its perception of its distance from the in-group” (Lucarelli, 2005: 92). This practice was strengthened, as the PfP was gradually ascribed a central role in enlargement, which NATO designates as the “self-differentiation process”, to actually refer to the level of initiative and commitment put by the partner into the standardisation effort. The self-differentiation process may prepare possible new members, or facilitate transition to membership, but it does not guarantee membership (NATO, 1995b: par. 38). As all partners are expected to “decide themselves which opportunities to pursue and how intensively to work with the Alliance through the Partnership” (*ibid.*), it means each partner determines the level of commitment it dedicates to the Partnership; it works as a channel for self-demonstration. Active participation in the Partnership grants the establishment of “patterns of political and military cooperation”, as it also enables partners to “become acquainted with the functioning of the Alliance”, through joint exercises, seminars, workshops, and day-to-day representation in Brussels and Mons (*ibid.*).

Within this process of socialisation, Partners are expected to “familiarise” with structures and procedures, deepen the understanding of obligations and rights implied by membership, develop democratic accountability and practices, demonstrate their commitment to “internationally-accepted norms of behaviour” (NATO, 1995b: par. 39). Commitment, the “partner's own efforts”, meeting the “minimum standards”, reinforcement and deepening of their Individual Partnership Programme, “distinguish

themselves by demonstrating their capabilities” are the “key to self-differentiation” (NATO, 1995b: par. 40, 41). This whole linguistic choice strongly suggests the inculcation of a learning process that is sustained by individual efforts at self-restraining, rationality, self-improvement. It is really about civilising the Self in light of NATO’s terms, code of conduct, rules, and standards.

NATO’s “self-differentiation process” also contains symbolic elements of expiation, suggesting that the applicant partner has to demonstrate its capacity to self-reflexivity by identifying the fundamental differences that distance him from the North-Atlantic identity. It is implied that the partner country undergoes a process of acknowledging its difference as an Other, categorising himself as a partner of limited commonality with NATO, at least originally. Although the PfP provides an arena for communication and works on a soft conditionality basis, it still revolves around the construction of a common interpretation of the same norm (Lucarelli, 2005: 98). In this context, self-restraint norms are the key factors of democracy, in that they enable the expansion of the security community when related to issues of peaceful change (Adler, 2008: 198). Under NATO’s conditions and democratic standards, the relationship issued by the Partnership is rather seized by the partner state that has to submit to self-restraint, than accommodated or tolerated by NATO members.

The PfP thereby constitutes a community that non-members can join to develop liberal practices and learn to acquire self-restraint, in which meanings and discourses are negotiated under power dynamics (Adler, 2008: 206, 215). In other terms, non-members learn how to exercise ideological practices that capacitate them as civilised subjects. The PfP thus entails a cognitive and behavioural change.

## **The enlargement process**

There was **psychological euphoria at the end of the Cold War**. European countries were beginning to deepen and broaden their integration. At this unique juncture, **material power, historical developments, the evolution of institutions and practices, norms, and epistemic understandings were positively aligned**, permitting the enlargement of the community of practice and the spread of social structure (Adler, 2008: 219; emphasis added).

The enlargement of NATO after the Cold War needs to be framed within the environment of “psychological euphoria” Adler refers to in the abovementioned excerpt.

That environment marked decisively the wider European integration process in the 1990-decade. EU's Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, and initiated the ensuing course of the EU's own enlargement. General "alignment" was certainly enabled by the fall of the Berlin Wall, and mostly by the ideological homogenisation inside the *Oikoumenê*. The smaller war-torn European countries were no longer encircled by two opposing super powers. This situation provided Europe with the material and ideological freedom to gather and reunite under one same habitat. To the US Clinton administration at the time, admitting new members was a means of enlarging the zone in which wars do not happen. Therefore, NATO's extension eastwards could prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracies against future threats and thus keep the peace (Moore, 2002: 7).

In accordance with NATO's historic path line and general institutional overture to change, one may observe enlargement did not surge as that a radical development, although it was obviously not a natural or spontaneous development either. Originally, Article 10 of the Treaty already foresaw what NATO terms its "open door policy"; Allied states remained open to membership of other European countries, and new members had joined the Alliance episodically in the past.<sup>32</sup> After the Cold War, creating the PfP was an initial step towards the possibility of enlargement to former Soviet countries. The enlargement process began to be introduced discursively more intensively from the autumn of 1995 after NATO's intervention in BH in the following terms:

I believe, however, that we have an **historic obligation to stabilize the area to NATO's east** which for generations has been treated as a "**no man's land**" [...] If we can succeed in bringing the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into NATO's security community, we will achieve a **double benefit**: first we will **reduce future risks to our own security** and second we will over time increase significantly the resources and capabilities available to NATO's collective defence and new missions - thus sharing the burdens more broadly. In other words, the enlargement of NATO is an exercise not in charity but **in enlightened self-interest** (SG Willy Claes, cit. in NATO, 1995d; emphasis added).

Let me move on to the question of NATO's enlargement. It is in part a **consequence of the end of the Cold War**. A Europe without ideological or military dividing lines will **naturally grow together**. We see the admission of new members as part of this process (SG Willy Claes, cit. in NATO, 1995e; emphasis added).

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<sup>32</sup> Greece and Turkey joined in 1952; the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955; Spain in 1982; reunified Germany to include the former Eastern part in 1990 (see NATO: [http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49212.htm?selectedLocale=en#](http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm?selectedLocale=en#) [14 March 2016]).



This was accompanied in September 1995 by the publication of NATO's "Study on Enlargement", which did not take the form of an objective study *per se* – at least not as an academic might envision it – but rather a statement of reassurance through policy guidelines that confirm NATO's intent of enlargement.

The Study conceives enlargement as a tool contributing to "enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area", among other things by supporting and promoting democratic reforms, and "Fostering in new members of the Alliance the **patterns and habits** of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current Allies" (NATO, 1995b: par. 3; emphasis added). Stability and security are the transversal referents in the whole document; they justify that NATO enlargement should also "Complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to new democracies in the East" (NATO, 1995b: par. 4). The enlargement of NATO is clearly held as one part of a wider "evolutionary process" that will strengthen Europe's stability and security (NATO, 1995b: par. 11). Furthermore, the basic principles and values of the Washington Treaty are profusely enounced as playing a major role for possible new members, together as the PfP as a pivotal preparatory platform for future aspirants to NATO membership – as exposed above.

Two years after the publication of the Study, during the Madrid Summit of July 1997, NATO invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks. Their accession was completed on 12 March 1999. In April 1999 at the Washington Summit, NATO launched its MAP together with its newly revised Strategic Concept (NATO, 1999d; 1999e). On the occasion, seven countries immediately were invited to join the MAP, but their accession talks would only start in November 2002, and definite accession occur in March 2004.<sup>33</sup>

The MAP actually institutionalises the 1995 Study on Enlargement, in an ultimate "practical manifestation of the Open Door" (NATO, 1999b: *Implementation*, par. 1). Participation in the MAP occurs on the basis of invitation by the Alliance, self-differentiation, and does not imply any timeframe. It cannot be considered as a "list of criteria" for membership (NATO, 1999b: par. 3), because it supposes the "aspiring

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<sup>33</sup> On 29 March 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia formally became members of NATO. Information on this particular accession available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/03-march/e0329a.htm> [25 March 2016].

countries themselves have identified as matters which they wish to address” (NATO, 1999b: *Implementation*, par. 1). The learning process underlying the MAP is also evident, as the level of experience is expected to be acquired over time, without any deadline, and to be cumulated towards other procedures duly scheduled on a case-by-case basis (NATO, 1999b: *Implementation*, par. 5).

Among other things, “aspirants” must conform to the basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty such as democracy and individual liberty, but also – and this fairly retells the classic standard of civilisation approached in Part 1, Chapter 5 – to settle their international disputes peacefully, to pursue good neighbourly relations, and to abide by the rule of law and human rights (NATO, 1999b: *Political and Economic Issues*, par.1, 2). As Stivachtis (2010: 14) basically puts it, the new standard of civilisation does not require states to achieve objective criteria, but rather that they become more like “us”. Possible future members are also expected to “**describe** how their policies and practice are evolving [...] and **to provide their views on**, and **substantiate** their willingness and ability to comply” with NATO’s *acquis* (NATO, 1999b: *Political and Economic Issues*, par. 4; emphasis added). Again, the semantic choice of these provisions suggests that *aspiring* candidates need to do a critical exposé and profess their faith in their self-capacity to comply with the norms of NATO’s *acquis* in order to “pass the test”.

Alexandra Gheciu (2005; 2008) has extensively analysed the dynamics of teaching, persuasion, and role-playing practices drawing on sociology and social psychology. She explains the instantiation of those types of practices in NATO’s interactions with Central and East European (CEE) political actors in the context of enlargement (2005: 77). NATO’s position is not proactive, but rather reactive to the aspirants’ line of conduct. Information about membership is provided, the rules and the benefits of compliance are clearly set, domestic actors are expected to decide whether or not they are willing to pay the price of compliance (Gheciu, 2005: 80). Accordingly, integration would be a matter of the candidate’s own merit and self-discipline (Gheciu, 2008: 82-83). The goal of this type of role-playing, according to social psychology, is to alter the behaviour of targeted individuals by having them adopt actively the role of another person. Like persuasion, it seeks to affect the understandings, attitudes and desires of the socialised, but it is different in that role-playing aims at changing their behaviour. To Gheciu, role-playing is a part of habitus-building, for the acquisition of new behavioural

dispositions is an important part of the socialisation of individuals into the culture of a given social group (Gheciu, 2005: 95). NATO thus *guides* this process of becoming, by helping build self-disciplined, democratic states, change particular forms of behaviour and instil new common-sense understandings about security (Gheciu, 2008: 88).

Therefore, the good student is thus a civilised student in the becoming; besides conforming to the established set of principles, he also needs to be self-conscious of his own path in self-restraining. Performance is not enough; a future member has to undergo an ontological metamorphosis. Regarding the actual outcomes of that whole civilising process through socialisation, Trine Flockhart (2005) has analysed how international organisations operate norms-transfer through processes of socialisation and observed how these may produce quite different outcomes. Flockhart's analysis takes international organisations as socialising agents, and the CEE states as the socialized to show that similar efforts of socialisation from the part of the socialising agents have resulted in different outcomes for different states in similar situations (Flockhart, 2005: 43). According to her claim, the transfer of democratic norms may lead to changes in behaviour, identity and basic values of the socialised, *if* and *when* the transfer process is successful. Gheciu also claims the CEE have only adopted international norms if they correspond to their interest. When norm compliance entails too many costs for decision-makers, Gheciu finds, they will engage in the rhetoric of compliance, but avoid carrying out costly domestic reforms. When there is tension between international and domestic norms, compliance will depend on the strength of sanctioning mechanisms (Gheciu, 2005: 80).

What is important to retain is that such process is hardly totally successful and hence, the changes in behaviour, identity and basic values are often superficial, or apparent. Therefore, NATO politics of enlargement as exposed above still need to be seen from the perspective of NATO's own performance, agency and identity. Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener (1999) have focused on the rationality of both EU and NATO's enlargement decisions, and claimed it has to be situated in a context of *a priori* and changing meanings regarding the identity and norms of the West. The authors suggest:

Enlargement is not simply a means to extend membership to a new member state; it also involves **incorporating what was previously the Other**, i.e. including members from another type of order. Enlargement in the post-Cold War context hence not only poses **the challenge of a missing Other**; both organizations also face a second **challenge of having to incorporate members whose notion of belonging developed in a different context**. Transgressing the

Cold War borders of order, therefore, raises the question of **belonging anew** (Fierke and Wiener, 1999: 726; emphasis added).

Enlarging NATO implies expanding the security-community to new members, new spaces, new cultures and traditions that were not part of the North-Atlantic's original nucleus. The issue of "incorporating" a former Other thus suggests new members represent a sort of assimilated Self. A new member has become "like us" but the notion of belonging has deeper ontological roots that defy the notion of order. The notion of belonging remits to the interdependent bond that develops towards the community, hence the challenge of "belonging anew". To Gerard Delanty (2003: 10), enlargement is not just about getting bigger, as it is crucially a matter of cultural transformation. Although his is a civilizational approach of the EU enlargement, the process is parallel to NATO's, and from a civilizational perspective it reveals to be a "testimony to the historical condition of indeterminacy that comes with the entry of multiple forms of agency, temporal and the creation of new dynamics of social change and systemic integration" (Delanty, 2003: 16).

Against this background, and aware of all the implications underlying the membership accession as we have seen so far, it is with some caution that one interprets that for the Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, joining NATO and the EU was a "return to the roots of our culture and statehood", and that for the Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi Hungary's accession in March 1999, his country had "come home", "back in the family" (Moore, 2002: 11). Although there are obviously centuries of history behind these two countries' national identity that could explain the extent to which those statements are close or far from being accurate, the claim of membership as responsibility cannot be dismissed. In 1996, Former NATO Secretary General Willy Claes had said of the enlargement process that mere "security consumers" were not needed, but rather states who can bear the full responsibility of membership (Moore, 2002: 9).

Hence, joining the club after the self-realisation and self-education processes entailed the responsibility of not only respecting all the political, social and military commitments, as they also implied the responsibility to endorse NATO's narrative about the long-lasting North-Atlantic identity. The old bipolar configuration of responsibility for evil in the Other was replaced by another mental configuration of responsibility: one located in the proactivity of an enlarged community of security, in which identities, narratives, habits were more homogenous than ever. An enlarged area of community and

an increased influence also imply that new meanings were given to new relationships of interdependence, which ultimately required the regularisation of behaviours through a deep psychosocial learning process aimed at reinforcing self-restraint and civilised habits towards a democratic regime of security.

## **9. A new architecture for international security: the Individualisation of Security**

The analysis of NATO's post-Cold War evolution as a civilising security community in Chapter 8 showed the importance of evolving concepts and practices to the Alliance's continuity as a coherent collective identity that manages to maintain and reproduce its core values and objectives. From a normative perspective, the existence and expansion of NATO as a security community was enabled by both liberal democracy and self-restraint norms and practices (Adler, 2008: 220), and increasing consensus around those norms. Before that, Part 2 already revealed the importance of values – material, spiritual or ideological – in sustaining the organisation's narrative on identity and pertinence.

Since its inception, NATO's enunciation of the core "values" guiding the Alliance has traditionally revolved around democracy and Liberal ideas. In 1949, the Treaty referred to "freedom, common heritage and civilisation" of the peoples, based on the *principles* of "democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (NATO 1949). In 1991, the new Strategic Concept now referred to the "common values of democracy, **human rights** and the rule of law" (NATO, 1991: par. 15; emphasis added), whereby "human rights" appeared in the substitutive place of "individual liberty".

With NATO's post-Cold War politics of enlargement, when conceiving the PfP for instance, the importance of values was still *à l'ordre du jour*, but exposed in relation to geography:

At the basis of these activities is a **question of values**. Elbert Hubbard, an American writer of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, once wrote that "morality is largely a matter of geography". By that he meant that **where you live in the world largely determines what you believe. Within the North Atlantic Alliance we have never believed that values are largely a matter of geography**. We draw together countries from both sides of the Atlantic, from the very North and South of Europe, from the very West and in the future from the East (SG Claes cit. in NATO, 1995e; emphasis added).

Through a long-lasting narrative on values, NATO has proved that these transcend national frontiers. As a result, the community of values is expanding in Europe beyond the current geographical limits of the Alliance. With the end of the Cold War and the enlargement of NATO, values have thus proved to surpass geography (Bunde and Noetzel, 2010: 298).

The reference to values was rapidly broadened but in a much more detailed

manner: “**Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights**, and safeguarding of **freedom, justice, and peace through democracy** are **shared values** fundamental to the Partnership” (NATO, 1994: par. 2; emphasis added). From then on, the “shared democratic values” would be the most generic expression found in NATO’s official documents regarding “values” (NATO, 1995b; 1999d; 1999e). The assumption is that all the above-mentioned principles constitute the all-encompassing set of democratic values. However, NATO’s defence of values is closely related to how security is conceived, performed and perceived. Therefore, by introducing the “promotion” of fundamental freedoms and human rights as a new set of principles to value, the Alliance assumed a more proactive position that denoted its concern for individual rights and for Human Security more broadly. This change was fundamental and critical for the Alliance’s scope of action, and played an increasing role in its conception of security and military activities (Moore, 2002: 16-17).<sup>34</sup>

This section focuses specifically on this significant incorporation of new individual values. It introduces the notion of “Individualisation of Security” to express that most decisive and influential normative trend of post-Cold War international security, which has progressively re-oriented security policies and their related discourses and rationales from the state to the individual. The expression “Individualisation of Security” *per se* should not be interpreted as a naïve or simplistic apology of the individual; it is rather used to describe the political process of transformative discourses using individualistic valuations of human societies in relation to the state. As it will be seen, the Individualisation of Security consists of the new visibility given by political actors to a referent object of security other than the state, i.e., the individual. Furthermore, the Individualisation of Security also expresses a tangible security practice, from the moment it determines how security policies are directed, involving not only its referent object, as its subject of security as well (Booth, 2005; Walker, 1997).<sup>35</sup>

Although relations of security are traditionally formulated and articulated from the state to the state, they have been, since the end of the Cold War, increasingly designed by the state to the individual, or the sum of the individuals. As they manage how states

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<sup>34</sup> The following sections especially dedicated to NATO’s missions in BH, Kosovo, and Afghanistan will approach this issue in more depth.

<sup>35</sup> The “subject of security” is the actual and practical recipient of a given security policy, independently of its referent object.

behave towards individuals, international policies of security are possibly the most decisive for the becoming of human communities, for they remit to their physical survival, and to some extent to the possibility of choosing freely the way to conduct their lives (Booth, 1991, 2007).

But after the Cold War, the individual also lied at the heart of the conduct of war and inaugurated a new conception of war, “one that sought to invoke humanity in its justifying discourses” (Jabri, 2007: 94). Indeed, individual insecurities have been persisting realities that arise in many cases from oppressive and persecutory state practices, often associated to dictatorial or totalitarian political regimes, or in consequence of the instability of failed states. The 1990’s brought the notion of individual insecurity to increasing political and public attention, namely in the decision to use force in order to intervene on the international scene – although such trend may transgress the conceptual and political barriers of national and territorial sovereignty (Bellamy, 2004). In the late modernity, wars are definitely *interventionist* and have a constitutive role in forming and reconstructing identities, because they act on behalf of individuals, not states. Specifically, “war brings forth or establishes identity of the interveners and the intervened” (Jabri, 2007: 96).

As it was shown in Part 2, the civilisational referent has been central in the formation and evolution of the Alliance at a more unconscious level. Against this historic and psychosocial background, the post-Cold War evolution towards a newly defined set of values needs to be questioned as it has important consequences for NATO’s architecture of international security, and for NATO’s relation to its civilisational referent. Indeed, how are we to understand the *a priori* paradoxical relation between NATO’s primordial civilisational referent of security, and the Individualisation of Security, as a normative change focused on an individual referent of security? Put in other words, to what extent does the Individualisation of Security fit into and correspond to NATO’s civilisational purpose? This section thus takes the Individualisation of Security as a specific normative development, in order to observe how the evolution of international security relates to civilisational NATO and illustrate how this specific post-Cold War change can be understood in the light of the civilisational factor.

This chapter is composed of three sections. Section a) will outline the main conceptual and philosophical premises that led to the Individualisation of Security. It will be shown that the Individualisation of Security consecrates security as a value-based system,



which has problematic implications for the civilising process. Then, Section b) will approach humanitarianism as the practical manifestation of the Individualisation of Security. It will highlight how humanitarianism deeply relies on power relations in the process of its institutionalisation in the political and military fields, which requires a critical stance as well for the consequence upon the subjects of security. Finally, Section c) will draw the preliminary conclusions on the implications of the Individualisation of Security for the civilised subjects of security.

### **9.1. The Individualisation of Security as the consecration of a value-based system**

Thinking of security in terms of individual human subjects seems to be the result of a liberal, natural and silent evolution (Tjalve, 2011). To Richard Cohen, for example, “individual security” is not only synonymous with the most popularised expression of “Human Security” and human rights, as it also stands “at the centre of any real international security system built around liberal democratic ideals” (Cohen, 2001: 7). In this sense, the Individualisation of Security would be the natural outcome of a particular ideology, Liberalism. But this dissertation has drawn precisely on the need to question natural and silent evolutions, in search for imposed meanings and controlled perceptions regarding the security of individuals. So what are the fundamental ideas underlying this reorganisation of international security around individual needs? And how can it be related to the broader civilising process of the West and to civilised subjects of security?

This section proposes to look into the conceptual and philosophical path leading to that change of security mentality. Although this evolution is not exclusive to post-Cold War NATO, this will allow shedding some light into the normative implications of doing security for individuals instead of states. It will be seen that despite the favourable and seemingly positive evolution towards the making of more humane policies, the Individualisation of Security remains a philosophical, political and military phenomenon that deserves deeper reflection for further considerations on its role within the wider civilising process of the West. Questioning the genealogy (Foucault, 2001; Guillot, 2011) of the Individualisation of Security consists in mapping and reconstituting the process

through which an individual-centred system of security has emerged and produced standardised effects.

First, conceiving security as a system of values inevitably establishes a relation between security and ethics (Burgess, 2011). Burgess has argued that security practices can only be achieved as a certain form of *negotiating values*. In other words, Burgess suggests, security always results of an *ethos* and an *episteme*, i.e., of a valuing choice in terms of a philosophy of life, culture, individual and collective anxieties and expectations, concerning what may be sacrificed in the name of what is to be preserved. Security thus implies an identification of what we like, what threatens what we like, presupposing that a campaign of normativity might be deployed, in order to define what actions are to be undertaken, how much suffering is needed to prevail, and what sacrifices are to avoid the threat. And above all, ethics and security must be considered as a whole, for they evolve according to the same logic or discourse on humanity (Burgess, 2011: 1-5). If, as Burgess states, a threat to security is implicitly linked to what has value to us, then security is a system of values, for “It is linked to the possibility that what we hold as valuable could disappear, be removed or destroyed” (Burgess, 2011: 13). In these terms, when NATO associates its post-Cold War mission to values such as human rights, it definitely focuses on the better way to preserve the individual. Accordingly, then, valuing the individual is the consecration of security as a value-based system.

However, thinking and practicing security as a system of values has deeper implications that need to be discussed. Philosopher Anthony Kwame Appiah (2007) suggests that values are in fact *desires*, that is, important attributes that we want other individuals to possess:

Talk of **values**, then, is really a way of talking about **certain of our desires**. Which ones? Well, when we appeal to what we take to be universal values in our discussions with one another – the value of art or democracy or of philosophy – we’re talking about **things we want everyone to want**. If exposure to art is valuable, then, roughly, we’d like everyone to want to experience it. **If we say democracy is valuable, then, roughly again, we want everyone to want to live in a democracy** (Appiah, 2007: 21; emphasis added).

Thus put, values appear to be intrinsically imperialistic, as they entail an inherent tendency to wish that others adopt them, act accordingly, and think the way one deems to be the best for anyone. The underlying assumption behind such a will to universalise values is a belief that what is valued as being something good cannot harm the Other, which is an ideological feature of Liberalism as well:

All versions of liberalism, however, share the idea that **liberal values possess a universal character and that the spread of democracy and human rights is a basic condition for a peaceful world order**. In addition, liberal states are seen on principle as possessing greater value, which on the positive side facilitates the formation of a security community within the framework of the democratic 'in-group' and creates sustainable peace, but on the negative side promotes delimitation in regard to the non-democratic out-group and can tend to encourage conflict (Bunde and Noetzel, 2010: 303; emphasis added).

In the light of this rationale, one has to consider whether a system of values might imply some degree of assimilation due to that desire of projecting values, and thus constructing a commonality with the Other. Hence, there might be some paradox in this idea of a community of values. Peter Burgess also suggests values are universal from the community's point of view, but they are particular and situational from the moral communities' point of view. As abstract concepts, values are only significant if they are universally valid. In other words, if a given value is not a value everywhere and forever for the members of a community, then it is not a value. Nonetheless, the principles composing a consensual value for a community are not necessarily universal *de facto* (Burgess, 2011: 143). As a value cannot be absolute or universally valid, it ultimately may rely on its symbolic stance as well. Values can be symbolic when they function as ideal-type references. So, even if we are to assume that the individual is a consensual universal value, the characteristics shaping the individual may not be as consensual. The same holds for other values such as art or democracy, to borrow on Appiah's examples (2007).

So far, it has been seen that the Individualisation of Security as a value-based system implies the projection of the desires of the Self, which is a Liberal feature extending the project of Modernity. In this sense, the Individualisation of Security entails an ideological representation of what is valued as the best way to live for Others. Groups and individuals have always coexisted in a relation of signifying reciprocity (Booth, 2007: 226; Delanty, 2003). The evolution of the one has been accompanied by the evolution of the other; and their identities have been defined mutually. However, the value of the individual for society has not always been the same, and it is generally acknowledged that the affirmation of the individual as a value is the result of a process that has its deepest origins in the Christian religion (Dumont, 1983). Likewise, the importance of the individual in the provision of security by the state has not always been the same, and this section will now continue elaborating on how the Individualisation of Security after the

Cold War illustrates a shift from more traditional physical security to a precise value-based system.

Historically, from the Roman era to the Napoleonic period, going through the French Revolution, the conception of security has always been fairly a good that belongs to individuals, according to Emma Rothschild (1995). But the author stresses that this individual propriety has always coexisted with the notion of a collective good that is primarily achieved and executed by the state. Here, the idea of social contract, as initially formulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century, presupposes that the individual abdicates of a part of his freedom, and transfers the competence and the duty of preserving his security as a citizen to state agency (Rothschild, 1995: 60). Security is thus a matter of transferring loyalty and individuality in order to establish a bond of citizenship with the state:

Claims about common security, collective security, or world security do little more than fudge the contradiction that is written right into the heart of modern politics: we can only become humans, or anything else, after we have given up our humanity, or any other attachments, to the greater good of citizenship. Modern accounts of security are precisely about subjectivity, subjection, and the conditions under which we have been constructed as subjects subject to subjection (Walker, 1997: 71).

According to this view, the idea of social contract would also imply transferring the individual's subjectivity; by abdicating his humanity towards citizenship, the individual sacrifices and abnegates a part of his Self, thereby turning into a "subject of subjection" in order to be secure. This is consistent with an important feature of the civilising process of the West developed in Part 1 and Part 2, namely that interdependent relations develop between the nation-state as a provider of security and the civilised subjects. Drawing on the preliminary conclusion of the Individualisation of Security as an ideological liberal projection, this means the value of the civilised individual has been in fact previously possessed by the state authority. In other words, the individual displays a subjectivity that allows the state to perform his security. In this sense, the Individualisation of Security contains an inherent presumption that security is to be brought to civilised subjects, when states fail to be civilised. In this sense, states may be the barbarians.

Throughout the vast majority of the twentieth century, the notion of state security prevailed, the state being the central referent object of international politics (Bilgin, 2003; Booth, 1991; Krause and Williams, 1997; Walker, 1997). After WWII, the idea of individual security was broadly consecrated by the developing field of human rights. As it

was seen in Chapter 5, section c), states broadly adhered to human rights and self-determination after WWII to make their civilised status credible in a newly decolonised world (Donnelly, 1998; Gong, 2002). However, during the Cold War, the notion of common security was preponderant, but the search for security was mainly a function of relations of force, enmity, state positioning, mutual survival, and was determined by the actors in possession of nuclear armament (Bilgin, 2003). Due to the possibility of nuclear annihilation, the idea of commonality basically consisted in insuring the physical survival of the Other for the sake of mutual survival. Indeed, the ideological gap dividing the world at the time made the notion of commonality fairly restricted; the West was warding off the soviet Evil, and considered it an estranged reality with which it had nothing in common (Jervis, 2011: 34-35). Individual rights on each side of that gap were not the primary concern of sovereign states struggling for their respective ideological power. Although the individual has never been absent from the idea of security, he was rather assimilated to it, as a merging part of the state. Individuals compose the state, and the prevailing idea has been traditionally that the security of the state implies the security of its citizens. During the Cold War in particular, the prevailing conception of state security implied staying out of the possibility of total destruction by another state, that is, state security corresponded to the absence of a threat of annihilation in the most material and physical terms.

In the realm of social science, the more recent origins of the Individualisation of Security can be seen early in the 1980's, when Critical Security Studies emerged as a project aiming at developing a new thinking confronting the typical visions of the Cold War. In fact, the individual as a referent value of security arises within Peace Studies, having Johann Galtung's work as particularly decisive in distinguishing structural violence from personal violence (Bilgin, 2003: 204). During that decade, Peace Studies evolved around a conception of "positive peace" that focused on the well-being of individuals, a culture of peace, and social and economic justice. From then on, positive peace would be privileged in opposition to the "negative peace", which conceived peace as the mere absence of conflict and war, and was thus representative of state security. This opening towards the notion of positive peace led to a widening of Peace Studies relatively to issues of health, economic well-being, environmental stability, and armament. This expanding view influenced the development of Critical Security Studies, and encouraged more comprehensive approaches within the critical project, oriented towards the security of

individuals (Booth, 2007; Buzan and Hansen, 2010: 156-160; Krause and Williams, 2007; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 18; Wyn Jones, 1999).

In the public policy of international organisations as well, the UNDP report on human development introduced in 1994 the notion of “human security” in the UN system (UNDP, 1994). A decade later, the EU by its High Representative Javier Solana ordered a special working group a report on the doctrine of human security for Europe (Kaldor et al., 2004). Since then, “humanitarianism”, “ethical foreign policy”, “human development” and “human security” have been nonetheless at the top of political agendas and international security policies. Seemingly, the semantic and normative loads associated to these notions indicate a movement of unprecedented ethicality within IR.<sup>36</sup> They are now common ground and integrate the international lexicon of political agendas and policymaking (Chandler, 2008; Evans and Sahnoun, 2002; Ramel, 2003).

Des Gasper and Oscar Gomez (2015) are quite critical of the human security discourse; to them, its emergence in the 1990’s was part of “revisiting and rethinking these 1940’s post-Second World War themes, for the post Cold War era” (Gasper and Gomez, 2015: 102). The authors focus on how “personal security” transpired in the initial 1994 report by the UNDP as an “imperfect label”, because the psychological dimension was missing (2015: 103). Ultimately, “the personal security ‘lens’ was an artefact to focus on a particular set of threatened values, but in practice it has largely been used to look at some particular types of threat” (Gasper and Gomez, 2015: 112). This is to say that individual-centred security policies and personal security are different things. In other words, valuing individual needs and insecurities in political agendas does not automatically imply that individual well-being is actually achieved.

Later on, the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged for the first time in 2001, in the reports of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001). The ICISS’ formulation of R2P entails a three-fold conception of responsibility as follows:

First, it means that the **state authorities are ‘responsible** for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare’.  
Second, the **state is responsible to the international community** to fulfil this

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<sup>36</sup> As a matter of fact, those concepts and expressions were very well accepted and adopted in the codes of conduct of many international organizations, NGO’s, and foreign policies of some states such as Canada, Japan and Norway – concerning human security, mostly – because they were rooted in positive and progressist moral values, as they also generated important financial support (Ramel, 2003; Shusterman, 2006; Suhrke, 1999).

duty. Third, **other states can intervene** to protect a population when a state has defaulted on the first two responsibilities (Weber, 2009: 586-587; emphasis added).

So as to give a more institutional expression to these non-binding premises, R2P was endorsed as a doctrine at the UN World Summit in 2005 by UN member states that unanimously agreed with their responsibility to protect their populations from the four most inhumane crimes, that is, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. As such, it is presupposed that failure in doing so gives the international society legitimacy to would act in formally sovereign states through various provisions set out in the UN Charter (Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Evans and Sahnoun, 2002; Piiparinen, 2012).

Considering how humanitarian ideas had been evolving since the 1990's, as exposed above, and how humanitarian interventions had already been taking place prior to this "indoctrination" – as in BH, Kosovo, Rwanda, or Somalia – R2P appears to be more of the same. As its normative content basically postulated circumstances that had already been authorised for more than a decade, R2P may be seen rather as a political and rhetorical move (Chesterman, 2011: 282). As it will be seen in further detail in the next section, R2P reinforced the idea and the narrative of a cosmopolitan responsibility of the states towards their own citizens, as well as the citizens of other states. Additionally, the adoption of R2P as a "doctrine" protects UN decisions from the critique of the eventual coerciveness against *de facto* states. That is why some authors such as Touko Piiparinen (2012: 388) and Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2011: 828) find that Libya and Côte d'Ivoire constitute ground-breaking precedents of R2P, for they represent the first application of R2P in coercive campaigns against the consent of functioning states. Ultimately, by inculcating that sense of "responsibility" whilst presenting the possibility that external actors may disable state sovereignty, R2P also contributes to the standardisation of self-restraining practices.

Furthermore, going back to the broader intellectual and philosophical movement of valuing the individual, Louis Dumont estimates it created an interiorisation of morality into each one's conscience. To Dumont, besides being an individual sample of the human species in every society, the "individual" is a moral being, independent, and autonomous, who carries supreme values fitting in the modern ideology and society, in opposition to the traditional ideology and society where the value lies in the society taken as a whole

(Dumont, 1983). Richard Cohen refers to the “globalisation of concern” in an age of growing interconnectivity between states and peoples:

[c]oncern about the human condition within a state has become the direct and immediate interest of the world community. Violations of human rights in one state become very quickly known to the citizens of other states. Damage to the security of individuals in one country, by external or more often by internal forces, now means that other peoples and their governments feel that their own security is diminished (Cohen, 2001: 8).

At the same time, valuing another individual other than the Self is necessarily a collective movement. In fact, after the Cold War, and in parallel with the rising globalisation, the thought of cosmopolitanism intensified. According to Anthony Kwame Appiah, cosmopolitanism is the equivalent of ethics in a globalised world, and encloses two ideas, which often clash with each other. The first is that we, as human subjects, have obligations towards persons other than our family and acquaintances; the second is that we value particular human lives, in respect of their legitimate difference (Appiah, 2007: xiii). Consequently, cosmopolitanism arises from a universal concern towards those who are at distance, whom we do not necessarily know or resemble, but with whom we share the same essential human nature.

From the 1990’s onward, the idea that the state is not the end of security *per se*, but rather just a means to attain it (Booth, 2007: 228) continued to be reinforced. The state appeared to be increasingly limited as an agent of security. NATO’s revision of its Strategic Concept in 1999 may be understood in that very context; the addition of peacekeeping and conflict prevention activities to its military mission reflected its willingness to abridge state sovereignty in the name of human rights:

Genuine security as conceived by the new NATO is an almost tangible entity. The security order to which the allies aspire appears a strikingly Kantian one – an expanding pacific federation, informed by a common commitment to democratic principles and embedded in an increasingly integrated Euro–Atlantic area. Security for the new NATO not only encompasses the rights of the individual; it ultimately rests on the sovereignty of the individual rather than the sovereignty of the state (Moore, 2002: 24-25).

The main conceptual findings on the Individualisation of Security point to the notion that after the Cold War international security was increasingly thought in terms of universalising values that sought to enhance the human commonalities, especially human vulnerabilities. As a consequence, a cosmopolitan sense apparently flourished, which highlighted the fundamental sameness between distant Others, and consequently inculcated a moral obligation, a responsibility to *care*, and act for their sake. This



evolution depicted a fundamental search for the basic ideas that could bind people together after the bipolar struggle for ideology. Human rights became the standard of civilisation *par excellence*, and dictated that civilised states would abide by them domestically. The Individualisation of Security thus inspired states to self-restraint, hence to civilised behaviour towards their citizens. In this sense, the well-being of individuals was seen as a concurring goal to state sovereignty, and states lost their predominance in securing individuals to the governance of international organisations in the field of human rights.

The impact of the Individualisation of Security on international security is unequalled: thinking of security in ethical terms implies a series of valuing choices regarding the conduct towards Others, and regarding the management of the lives of Others; and these choices are closely related to a Western ideological tradition of Liberalism. The end of the Cold War logic of physical survival and ideological divide, together with the rise of a cosmopolitan sense might have enhanced the moral consciousness of the individuals' value as bearers of principles and ideals. Accordingly, the individual may be seen as the corporeal embodiment of ideology, as a receptacle of liberal values. From this perspective, protecting individual lives is to protect liberal values. International security has evolved as the result of a reflexive exercise of values, in that a threat to individual security actually represents a threat to the values underlying the system of international security and, at the same time, a threat to whom defends or bears these values.

However, the Individualisation of Security does not only consist of ideational changes, because it is not limited to political agendas, guidelines and discourses. As the Individualisation of Security also depends strongly on ethical deliberations, on valuing choices, it has materialised into new ways of *doing* security, namely through humanitarian wars. The next section will precisely proceed by exploring further the implications of performing the Individualisation of Security as a value-based system.

## **9.2. The Individualisation of Security in the hands of the military: reproducing civilising power**

This section approaches the security practices oriented towards the individual. It will show that the Individualisation of Security has altered the way military interventions are thought, justified, represented and executed. Put in other terms, behaviour in the field of war has changed significantly. Approaching the Individualisation of Security in these terms will require focusing on the political agents performing it, on the institutional dynamics displaying it, and on the kind of relations resulting from it. It will be seen that power is an ever-present element in the interactions underlying the Individualisation of Security, hence the importance of the relational aspects existing between states and individuals when individual-centred security policies are at stake. In this context, Michel Foucault's work on biopower and biopolitics (2003) will be decisive to conceiving how the Individualisation of Security also fits in a balance of power, domination and control.

According to Martha Finnemore (1996), patterns of military intervention cannot be understood out of the normative framework in which it occurs:

[n]ormative understandings about which human beings merit military protection and about the way in which such protection must be implemented have changed, and state behavior has changed accordingly (Finnemore, 1996: 155).

As seen in the previous section, normative understandings regarding the referent object of international policies of security effectively changed in the 1990's. Individual-centred ethics was increasingly shaping international security as a system guided by values. Accordingly, behaviour regarding security interventions was changing, as states redefined what the appropriated means and ends of any individual-centred intervention would have to be.

The new visibility of the individual as a central concern of international security may be framed within the practice of a new humanitarianism, or a "transformed humanitarianism" (Barnett, 2005). In contrast with an initially apolitical humanitarianism (Chandler, 2002), the scale, scope and meaning of humanitarian action expanded substantially in the 1990-decade. During that period, there was a political and financial intromission of some states into the work of humanitarian actors, which Michael Barnett (2005) considers revealing of the politicisation of humanitarianism and of the "civilian"

object, through geopolitical, social, economic and also normative factors arising from a multipolar world.

David Chandler (2002; 2004) interprets this new humanitarianism from a critical standpoint, arguing that it is a *subterfuge* for Western states to assert their policies in a dominant collective system of international security. The moral argument is thus instrumentalised, and ethics exported to that field of action by a language of morality and ethics, instead of politics, introducing naturally the notion of “humanitarian intervention”. Referring to the example of the intervention in Iraq in 2003, Alex Bellamy (2004) even sees that new humanitarianism as a source of exceptionalism that normalises humanitarian wars by a forced morality, to the detriment of the human condition. On exceptionalism, Scott Watson (2011) sees humanitarianism as a category of securitisation, and defends that humanitarianism rivals security because it legitimates urgent security measures. In this sense, humanitarianism represents a structured field of action, based on discourses and institutions capable of implementing urgent measures. Humanitarianism is theoretically distinct from the security logic of human security, for it gives priority to the concept of life and human dignity, as being above states’ interests (Watson, 2011: 5).

The notion of humanitarianism prevails to describe individual-centred security policies, but it does not seem to be merely guided by cosmopolitan impulses. On the contrary, the views exposed so far have enhanced its politicisation, securitisation and even the possibility of serving the Western projection of power. This suggests the importance of inquiring on the actors who implement those policies, i.e., on the agents of humanitarianism.

Emma Rothschild (1995) has found in the agency of individual-oriented security of the 1990’s a political incoherence arising from the relation between the individual and the state. Although security is aimed by individuals, it can only be achieved by a collective or political process. But under the humanitarian pattern of the 1990’s, the individual security in a given independent state depends on the intervention or agency of a foreign state in that independent state, interposing the sovereignty’s sensitivities. This is why, Rothschild suggests (1995: 86), organisations like the EU, NATO, the Red Cross or the UN High Commission for Refugees have more power in assuring the personal security of an individual than any other local or municipal political institution. To us, the incoherence is only apparent, having in mind what has already been evidenced concerning the duality

of values connecting the state and the individual. Valuing the individual as a referent of security policies does not imply that he is to pursue his security himself. Actually, the transfer of competences to institutions and external support when implementing individual-centred security policies may be explained by the lack of self-capability and autonomy of human subjects (Chandler, 2001: 83). The difference now lies in the international governance of security matters; international organisations represent the most collective level of political organisation given the current global interdependence of the world. The creation of institutions watching over and ensuring the values of a community (Burgess, 2011: 144) is indeed a central element in the study of the Individualisation of Security. However, an important point is made by David Chandler, regarding how the moral or normative commitments towards human rights have legitimated the policymaking by less responsible elites in the realm of international organisations. Ethical decisions have not been democratic, because they are not assessed by the popular will, nor by voting, but rather by ethical committees representing the will of the Good and the great (Chandler, 2001: 85-87).

This perspective on decision-making raises an important question concerning the ethical motivations of the agents performing the Individualisation of Security. If the values inherent to action do not consist of cosmopolitan nor universal values because they do not represent the will of the majority, then what are the values guiding humanitarian decisions? In *From Kosovo to Kabul (and beyond): Human Rights and International Intervention* (2002), Chandler again argues that Western states sponsor and reinforce a new regime of human rights for internal political motives. To Chandler, this new outbreak of humanitarian concern has to do with the need Western governments have to re-legitimize their moral purpose in an era in which liberalism cannot present itself as the best alternative to Communism. Chandler further states that after the Cold War it has been increasingly difficult for Western states to legitimize their policies for traditionally capitalist reasons, and they have in fact been pushed into the moral argument and to the exportation of ethics for two main reasons. The first is that it allows them to relocate the object of criticism on the outside, away from Western central governments. The second one is that, in foreign affairs, the governments do not have to match action and rhetoric the same way they do at the domestic level (Chandler, 2002).

The different critical perspectives exposed so far have suggested that the option to intervene, i.e., to use military force in order to protect the individuals of another state, is an arbitrary process. There is thus an underlying value deliberation made by international agents of security that is sometimes linked to the need of projecting ideological power. But according to the logic of humanitarianism, the ultimate value of such pondering would be bare human life. However, if life is the value to be deliberated for an ethics of security, then the issue of *choosing* lives is called into question, as it remits once more to the states' ultimate power over life – similarly to what was shown in Chapter 6, section d) on the possession of nuclear power as the main life and death signifier.

Michel Foucault (2003: 239-240) identifies the hold of power over life – biopower – as one of the key phenomena of the twenty-first century, in the sense that the state appropriated the biological dimension of man as a living being, and exercised its power over him as a species. Foucault (2003: 240-241) argues that we have evolved from a nineteenth-century premise that “took life and let live”, to a modernity that intervenes in every sector of human life in order to “make live or let die” – the right to life and death was one of the classical and basic attributes of the sovereign who determined who was to die or was allowed to live. This particular evolution of power is not individualising, according to Foucault, for it is addressed to man as a species; this is what the biopolitics of human race consists of (Foucault, 2003: 242-243). Clearly, biopolitics has substituted the geopolitical problematisation of traditional security that had territorial sovereignty as a main referent object (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 283).

Drawing on Foucault's original formulation of the concepts of biopower and biopolitics, several authors have underscored other aspects and dynamics of IR also related to the individual. Mark Duffield (2008: 145-146), for instance, applies those notions to human security and development, and considers they are inherent to the liberal ideology, because they take human life as a referent object, and because they can only be achieved through the containment of the underdeveloped life's mobility. Duffield explains that containment is not geopolitical but biopolitical, since it functions as a barrier separating and reproducing the generic divide between the developed and underdeveloped worlds in terms of life opportunities, which he calls the “global life-chance divide” (Duffield, 2008: 147; 2010). Regarding R2P, for instance, Patricia Weber (2009) uses Foucault to argue that the ICISS constructed a notion of sovereignty centred on the right of the population to life,

establishing a biopolitical system over the responsibility to prevent, protect, monitor, control and regulate non-Western human lives. Sovereignty was not only substituted by the idea of responsibility, as biopower was also instituted.

Against this background, the Individualisation of Security corresponds to a massification of power, in the sense that it offers a wider sample of referents of security to the agents' scope of action. But this leads to a question question: what makes an individual more valuable than another for a given interventionist security policy to be adopted? This is precisely the question raised by Foucault:

How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings? How, under these conditions, is it possible for a political power to kill, to call for deaths, to give the order to kill, and to expose not only its enemies but its own citizens to the risk of death? Given that this power's objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die? How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower? (Foucault, 2003: 254).

Further along this line of reasoning, Foucault introduces the idea of state racism, which basically consists in distinguishing and ranking races. So, there is an equation, a deliberation that is exercised by state power in order to promote the survival of selected elements of the human species (Foucault, 2003: 255-256). In a biopolitical system, then, the imperativeness to kill – or let die – is only tolerable if it results in the elimination of the biological threat to the improvement of the human specie, and not a victory over political adversaries. In a normalising society, racism ends up being a pre-condition making the killing acceptable. By “killing”, Foucault also refers to indirect forms of killing, such as exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for certain persons, political death, expulsion, rejection, etc. (Foucault, 2003: 256). All together, biopolitical practices actually attempt to regulate life and the very conditions of death, and thus constitute a type of “truth” about the world (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 272). Accordingly, humanitarianist accomplishments also need to be thought as a discriminate process involving the management of the human species, which goes well beyond plain ethics.

It has been seen so far that implementing the Individualisation of Security has been fairly related to ideological and political reasons, mostly of the West. The post-Cold War period is rich in ideological motivations; notwithstanding the absence of Communism, all attentions were channelled onto Liberalism as a perfectible system. In contrast with the bipolar period, the politicisation, securitisation and ideologisation of how and where

humanitarian intervention could occur fundamentally expanded the scope of military action. In this sense, humanitarianism has also implied that perceptions about security could have been affected unconsciously, or in other words, humanitarianism has thus affected the unconscious through symbolic meanings of life and death.

### **9.3. The implications of the Individualisation of Security for the civilised subject of security**

At this point, how can we relate the specific change of security mentality centred on the individual to the broader civilising process of the West? This section will review the main findings of the previous parts of this chapter on the Individualisation of Security, in order to assess its role in the civilising process and in the production of civilised subjects of security, and serve as a transitioning point to the next chapter. These preliminary considerations will launch the analytical basis for the following sections on NATO's interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Firstly, conceiving the Individualisation of Security as the materialisation of a system of values showed that security is ontologically linked to the individual, in that it is a good designed for him and to be enjoyed by him. Even though national security has prevailed as the main referent object for most of contemporary History, security policies have ultimately preserved individual persons coexisting within states that detain the monopoly of the use of force. But ultimately, in a secure state, individuals are also secure.

What has mainly changed with the end of the Cold War is the issue of agency, in that the idea of social contract linking the citizen to his state has expanded to the competences of international organisations dedicated to international peace and security, such as the UN and NATO. There is in fact an altered subjectivity of the individual, in that he is not only a national citizen, as he is also representative of wider social groups and, implicitly, a member of the UN or NATO as well. Besides, there is also a normative transformation, which has to do with the assertion that the individual is a value to preserve; the life of every individual has value, and the values of every individual compose world order. The individual has paradoxically acquired a more collective dimension, because he embodies the commonality of ideological values unifying human groups. As a

consequence, the emerging need for international organisations to intervene militarily in sovereign states to protect individuals also suggests that the international community makes the assertion that the values of Others fail in assuring the security of individuals. From a more opportunistic point of view, it can be added that the states' military participation in UN or NATO missions for protecting individuals also has a strategic motivation, and can contribute as a factor of modernisation of national armed forces, and also as a factor of that state's external credibility (Teixeira, 2010: 56).

Secondly, when conceived as a military practice, the Individualisation of Security revealed that the moral argument for war does not necessarily mean that it arises from a cosmopolitan concern towards the protection of individual lives. Critical literature has been quite clear in equating humanitarian practices to demonstrations of power by institutions, which are motivated by liberal ideological purposes related to the perpetuation of some *status quo*. By approaching the Individualisation of Security under the perspective of biopower, it was evident that the biopolitical referent does not tend to be individualised, but rather massified in a depersonalisation of moral individuality. Critical works such as Patricia Weber's (2009) or Mark Duffield's (2008) have highlighted that biopower is also determined by ideological motivations of life containment and control. This form of power that is to be exercised over life thus determines its cessation or continuation, as well as the way it is to continue. The exercise of such power arbitrarily shapes the understanding of which values are the prevailing ones in human societies, and hence shapes the very understanding of the world. Therefore, when conceiving the Individualisation of Security, it is important to keep in mind that power does not apply merely to the living individual, but to the political and symbolic value of his life as well.

This evolution of international security in the sense of individualisation appears to be related to the civilising process in several different ways. The Individualisation of Security clearly arises from both psychogenetic and sociogenetic factors. While Elias identified the self-containment of individual impulses in human relations, as well as the centralisation of interdependence converging into the monopolistic state, the Individualisation of Security shows the rising of a cosmopolitan consciousness of the world whereby the interdependence between individuals make states or groups of states to act in territories other than their own, in a sort of decentralising process of the original monopolistic state. The Individualisation of Security thus implies a transformation of



behaviour in both men and states in international society, mostly through the inculcation of responsibility, and through the establishment of new boundaries for appropriate behaviour regarding individuals.

Furthermore, it was seen that the liberal ideology has played a continuous role in the process of conceiving security as a system of values that is to be projected to Others. Therefore, one may understand that the human rights regime appeals to a progressive liberal understanding of civilisation (Donnelly, 1998: 14). Moreover, through the institutionalisation of human security and R2P, among other humanitarian formulations, the Individualisation of Security also produced an international discourse of discipline and normalisation: a conduct that is respectful of individuals should be natural for all states. For all these reasons, the Individualisation of Security illustrates the extension of the civilising power through international organisations and, therefore, can be considered as another stage of the civilising process coming from the West.

## ***10. The Individualisation of Security within NATO***

It was seen in Chapter 8 that NATO's post-Cold War evolution as a security community included significant civilising elements. These consisted of new socialising practices such as the PfP and the MAP, destined to a major transformative practice of the 1990's: enlargement. But enlargement procedures were designed following specific standards of civilisation that not only transformed the Alliance as an organisation by encompassing more members and a wider geographical scope, as they also required previous change and adaptation from aspiring members that had to undergo a significant learning process of self-restraint and subjection to democratic values.

While those changes were rather endogenous within the context of NATO's more regional realm, Chapter 9 also showed a parallel process of transformation taking place on a much broader level. The Individualisation of Security took place on an international scale; as it has involved more widely international organisations, states, and individuals interrelatedly, it thus represents a major development in the field of international security. The Individualisation of Security has implied the reformulation of security policies and the very conduct of war, and has reconfigured them around a different conception of life-valuation having the Liberal individual at its core. Therefore, to which extent has NATO as a security community been influenced by the Individualisation of Security as another stage of the civilising process? Or put from the perspective of a civilising security community, how does the Individualisation of Security within NATO contribute to the "combined effort of institutionalization of self-restraint" (Adler, 2008)?

This chapter will show how critical the relation between the Individualisation of Security and NATO is. It will be seen that as a normative transformation of international security, the Individualisation of Security was in fact very significant for the Alliance, as it complemented and served the purpose of its institutional reinvention after the Cold War. Fundamentally, the Individualisation of Security also served the sustainability of NATO's civilisational referent. The role of the individual referent of security will be assessed in NATO's military operations in BH, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Despite their particularities and differences, each of these three missions will be analysed according to the referent object of security, the justification advanced for the intervention, their formal mandate, their objectives, their normative principles, their self-declared results, followed by broader

considerations on the civilised subject of security. A *caveat* needs to be made; these *will not* be exhaustive interdisciplinary analyses of the very complex conflicts at stake that review the wide scope of factors and dimensions involved. Instead of focusing solely on the *conflicts*, what I propose is to focus on very particular aspects of the *missions* related to whether and how NATO has represented individual subjects of security and has related them to the civilising process. In this sense, for the sake of what is the main motivation of the dissertation, many aspects of the conflict will appear as very synthesised references, while others will be absent, although they all possess an undeniable role in understanding the conflicts.

### **10.1. Bosnia: from “Denying Flight” to “Deliberate Force”**

NATO’s overall trajectory throughout the conflict in BH may be seen as a stairway leading to an ultimate geopolitical and military affirmation. Indeed, what began as a supporting mission of a strictly humanitarian presence by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), ended with an intensive bombing campaign and post-conflict presence on the ground. However, in conformity with the premises set out in Chapter 10 about the Individualisation of Security, NATO’s intervention in Bosnia also shows that there is a wider context surrounding the humanitarian justification for NATO’s involvement that allows for several considerations on the civilised subject of security.

The war in Bosnia was the consequence of the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia. After the fall of many Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, free elections were held in 1990 in all republics of the Yugoslav Federation. In Bosnia, as in other Yugoslav republics, these elections were won by nationalist parties that soon started to confront each other regarding the future of Bosnia. Populated by Bosniaks (43.8%), Serbs (31.4%) and Croats (17.3%), Bosnia became the object of territorial claims from the neighbouring republics of Croatia and Serbia. On 1 March 1992, 63.7% of Bosnian voters turned out for the self-determination referendum, with 99% voting for independence. The consociational mechanisms that ensured the institutional cohesiveness of Bosnia collapsed. On 6 April 1992, as the EU and the USA recognised Bosnia’s independence, the Serbs

proclaimed secession, sieged Sarajevo and rapidly violence extended to the whole country (Bougarel et al., 2007: 4; Delpla et al., 2012: 2-3).

The events unfolding during the summer of 1992 definitely internationalised the Bosnian war. The most decisive was the mediatisation of four large prisoner camps – in Omarska, Trnopolje, Manjace, and Keraterm (Hansen, 2006: 104) – run by Serb Bosnian forces, which had been documented by non-governmental human rights organisations and Western media (Weisbord, 2010: 136). The public opinion was suddenly confronted with pictures of brutal violence that reminded of the barbarous concentration camps of Nazi Germany (Gutman, 1993). As a reaction, in August 1992, the London Conference was organized on behalf of the UN and the European Community, which agreed on a framework for peace talks in Geneva, and the Serbs conceded to letting the UN monitor heavy weapons in several cities (Hansen, 2006: 104). On 14 September 1992, the UNSC Resolution 776 declared the deployment of the UNPROFOR to Bosnia, which would become the largest peacekeeping operation ever taken by the UN, growing into 40'000 people by the end of 1994. The force had a traditional peacekeeping mandate that was not to engage in fighting, but ensure a peaceful political settlement, delivering humanitarian aid, which required in many cases the permission of the dominant forces in the area, often the Bosnian Serbs (Hansen, 2006: 104-105).

Although UNSC Resolution 781 had banned all flight in Bosnia by military aircraft that were not assigned to UNPROFOR, the ban was largely ignored by Serb aircraft, and hence UNSC Resolution 816 later allowed for NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone with Operation Deny Flight. In that initial phase, NATO's contributions to UNPROFOR were strictly of enforcing UN embargoes in the Adriatic, monitoring the no-fly zones, and providing the UN headquarters with personnel and equipment to (NATO, 1992b: par. 7). Since the beginning of Deny Flight, NATO showed its preparedness and readiness for further steps in enforcing the implementation of UN decisions:

We recall that **UNSCR 770 authorizes all measures necessary to ensure relief deliveries to Bosnia, and that interference in relief activities is an international crime. All must refrain from any action which might jeopardize the safety of UNPROFOR and other UN personnel. If requested by the UN, the Alliance would be prepared to take appropriate measures if any of these personnel are threatened or harmed** (NATO, 1992b: par. 10; emphasis added).

Indeed, the situation actually deteriorated and, as “the operation evolved, UN authorised NATO to fly additional missions providing close air support to UNPROFOR soldiers on the ground, if requested, and to protect UN designated safe areas” (Beale, 1997: 2).

NATO’s presence throughout the conflict in Bosnia may be seen in two different phases. The first phase taking place during most of the war’s duration, from 1992 to early 1995, was largely dominated by the fragile performance of UN peacekeepers, a series of failed attempts at peace agreements,<sup>37</sup> the continuing reports of Serbian atrocities, and more than 370 UN peacekeepers taken as hostages (Hansen, 2006: 105-108). Here, NATO’s role was essentially one of operational deterrence, though it flew more than 100,000 sorties (Beale, 1997: 2). In face of the increasing evidence of ethnic cleansing and the occurrence of large-scale massacres by the Serbs (Gutman, 1993), the traditional UN peacekeeping was considered to be failing (Bougarel et al., 2007: 5, 11; Delpla et al., 2012: 2-3; Wallander, 2000: 725).

After threatening Bosnian Serb forces of retaliation many times without taking it to the end, NATO ended up bombing for the first time in the history of the Alliance, on 10 April 1994, after an UNPROFOR soldier was killed by Serb artillery. The targets were a Serb mobile command post and a tank shelling the town from the position believed responsible for the UNPROFOR soldier’s death (Beale, 1997: 25). However, the limits of NATO’s airpower in the context of a peace operation with a humanitarian mandate came out many times during the conflict; NATO’s airpower was unable to deter Bosnian Serb aggression or counter-attack. Its biggest airstrike so far had happened when 39 aircrafts damaged the Ubdina runway. In essence, “NATO’s reputation was so severely tarnished that the entire alliance was threatening to unravel” (Beale, 1997: 29).

NATO’s second more muscular phase in the conflict occurred in 1995, after the Srebrenica massacre. Srebrenica had been an UN-designated “safe area” for Bosniaks since 1993, but it had remained vulnerable, as only 7’600 blue helmets had been deployed there by the UN. On 6 July 1995, the Army of the Republik Srpska (VRS) attacked the Srebrenica enclave despite its status as a safe area. As the Serb forces advanced without being confronted by NATO aviation, General Mladic’s soldiers entered the town, and

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<sup>37</sup> In 1993, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was the first attempt to solve the war, with the strong support of the foreign minister of the EU. In July 1994, a new peace plan was proposed by the Contact Group, composed of the USA, Russia, Britain, Germany and France, but it was rejected by the Bosnian Serbs (Hansen, 2006: 105-107).

massacred about 8,000 Bosniak men during the following days, while the rest of the population of the enclave was expelled toward central Bosnia (Delpla et al., 2012: 6-7). In the words of Noah Weisbord:

Lightly armed UN Peacekeepers in Srebrenica were overrun and thousands of boys and men were massacred as the liberal democracies stood by. Srebrenica became a disgrace for the post-World War II liberal internationalists, including Clinton, without a principled doctrine on the use of force after the Cold War. The massacre strengthened the arguments of the proponents of humanitarian intervention, who had pleaded for a more muscular response to foreseeable Serb aggression. [...] The massacre of boys and men in Srebrenica not only lent weight to the arguments of the humanitarian interventionists. It also strengthened the hand of liberal isolationists who argued that Western intervention causes more harm than good. Ultimately, however, the massacre at Srebrenica strengthened the resolve of the Western powers to intervene militarily to prevent massive human rights violations (Weisbord, 2010: 136).

Following Srebrenica, the shelling of Sarajevo's marketplace – another UN safe area – occurred for the second time on 28 August 1995. After the UN military commanders concluded “beyond any reasonable doubt” that the brutal mortar attack had come from Bosnian Serb positions, NATO commenced bombing on 30 August 1995 bombing, as a direct response. The proclaimed objective was to “reduce the threat to the Sarajevo Safe Area” and to deter any future attack to it or any other Safe Area (NATO, 1995a). The conviction of NATO SG was that this response to the mortar attack would contribute to attaining a peaceful settlement through diplomatic means. Here, deterrence was still the dominant rationale. Such NATO attacks were justified as responses to specific attacks from local parties, mainly Bosnian Serbs. This response initiated Operation Deadeye, and occurred under the provisions of Operation Deny Flight, jointly decided by UN Peace forces under UNSC Resolution 836, the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and the Force Commander, and in accordance with the NAC's decisions of 25 July and 1 August endorsed by the UN SG (NATO, 1995a). The initial strikes had begun on 30 August, but were suspended on 1 September to permit meetings between UN and Bosnian Serb officials. But on 3 September, the NAC considered the Bosnian Serb reply to UN demands was not a sufficient basis for termination of air strikes, so they reinitiated on 5 September. The objective on this specific occurrence was to attain “the compliance of the Bosnian Serbs to cease attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas; the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total exclusion zone around Sarajevo, without delay; complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel and NGO's and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport” (NATO, 1995c). Two weeks later, on 14 September 1995, NATO

suspended operations when the Bosnian Serb forces largely complied with UN demands to cease attacks on the designated safe areas of Sarajevo, Gorazde and Tuzla; remove their heavy weapons from a 20-km exclusion zone around Sarajevo; and open the Sarajevo airport and roads leading into the city (Beale, 1997: 31).

Although it can be said that NATO's objectives were set out in a "palliative" way, depending on how the situation evolved, Operation Deliberate Force represents the final culmination of a more coercive use of airpower. In the words of Willy Claes, NATO SG at the time: "The result was a textbook demonstration of the use of limited force in the service of diplomacy – Clausewitz would have been pleased – and the first significant and sustained military operation in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance" (NATO, 1995d). The Operation was considered a success of airpower, to serve as an example of precision technology, integrated planning, and less emphasis on (American) military's ground role (Beale, 1997: 32).

I would argue that no other organisation in the world could have used force so effectively and discriminately. We proved that NATO is not a blunt Cold War instrument, but that it can indeed be used flexibly on behalf of tightly controlled political objectives in the profoundly different and more complex security environment of the post-Cold War era (SG Claes cit. in NATO, 1995d).

From this summary and preliminary exposition of NATO's involvement in BH, one could assume NATO naturally participated with operational success in a post-Cold War conflict according to the new premises it had already anticipated in its new Strategic Concept of 1991. Despite the usual internal debate regarding decision-making and the most adequate balance of US and European contribution to the Alliance's intervention, the focus for the remainder of this section on the Bosnian war will be on NATO's treatment of the individual referent of security and its framing within the civilisational narrative.

## **Civilising the Balkans, civilising the Bosnians?**

In Bosnia, **the Alliance served notice that the international community cannot continually be defied and all rules of civilised conduct abandoned with impunity. NATO's intervention restored the credibility of the international community.** The air campaign of the Alliance - coordinated fully with the UN - against the besieging Serb army has given hope to the inhabitants of Sarajevo that their long ordeal is coming to an end (SG Claes, cit. in NATO, 1995e; emphasis added).

NATO's civilisational sense is continual. In the words of its SG Willy Claes, the role of the Alliance was put straightforwardly: by intervening in BH, the Alliance notified the world that civilised behaviour had to be upheld and barbarian behaviour punished. And by doing so, it also returned the credibility of international powers to intervene where they deem they must, in order to restore hope in the lives of Bosnian individuals. However, such a strong assertion cannot be stated and understood out a favourable context, i.e., there are a set of conditions from which NATO SG benefitted in order to proclaim such discourse. It will be seen in the remainder of this section that these conditions are deeply related to the civilising process.

In what is considered to be the deadliest conflict in Europe since WWII, with an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 people killed, ethnic cleansing was used by Serb and Croat forces and resulted in the displacement of more than 2.1 million people (Bougarel et al., 2007: 5). Claims that the Serb offensive was accompanied by successive waves of ethnic cleansing referred to the violence and expulsion of populations on the basis of ethno-national criteria, massive or selective executions, sexual violence, and the opening of camps (Delpla et al., 2012: 3). In the Bosnian war, ethnic cleansing was the critical factor determining that the international community became involved in a humanitarian case for intervention. Formally, the population was to be secured, and not the state.

Early in the beginning of the conflict, NATO expressed the situation in former Yugoslavia as one of “carnage and lawlessness” (NATO, 1992b: par. 1). In its discourse, the primary responsibility for the conflict in BH was attributed to the leadership of Serbia and to the Bosnian Serbs: “Although all parties to the conflict have contributed in their own way to the present state of affairs, the main responsibility falls on the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) including the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]” (NATO, 1992a: par. 5). The Alliance also characterised the Serbian leadership and Bosnian Serbs by depicting their enactment of barbarous practices towards the Bosniak population: “[they] have sought territorial gains by force and engaged in **systematic gross violations of human rights** and international humanitarian law, including the **barbarous practice of “ethnic cleansing”**. There is the systematic detention and rape of Muslim women and girls” (NATO, 1992b: par. 2; emphasis added).

Although NATO's public statements during the war focused more on the operational dimension of the intervention, there are intertextual and contextual elements



that help framing NATO's discourse about the Bosnian conflict into wider considerations about civilisational representations. Conceptions of time and space for instance had a critical influence in the representation and understanding of the conflict as a struggle for civilisation (Behnke, 2008; Campbell, 2006; Hansen, 2006). The suggestion here is that NATO discourses decisively contributed to a "geopolitics of morality". This implies that spatial representations were articulated in ways that defined the representations of values at the same time. On the one hand, NATO's intervention in BH is indeed geopolitical. Faced to a deadly conflict on "Europe's doorstep" (Beale, 1997: 2), the foreign policy decision-makers pragmatically applied what Gearóid O'Tuatháil calls a "common sense geopolitics" (1999: 113-114), that is, an inherited geographical knowledge of the world that is taught in educational establishments, part of national identities, widely disseminated by the media, and in some cases ethnocentric and stereotypical. In the case of BH, this common sense geopolitics served to appeal to a practical spatial sense of the world, and frame certain issues within a cultural discourse in order to give sense to certain dramatic events.

On the other hand, this geopolitical dimension is related to wider socio-cultural representations of the Balkans with deep value implications. Andreas Behnke (2008: 39-40) has portrayed NATO's treatment of BH as a "civilisatory project" that reproduces the metaphysics of security as one cultural identity, in a process of rearticulating the relation between security and cultural identity after the loss of a constitutive Other – the USSR. Within the particular temporal and spatial framing of the Bosnian war, the West is the place of peace, morality and unity, while Bosnia is the space of conflict, immorality and fragmentation. Time and space are also structured to absolve the West from any involvement in the violence and conflict in Yugoslavia in general, and Bosnia in particular (Behnke, 2008: 34). As a result, the Western narrative on BH presents it as a fixed spatial identity, where only the immediate context of the conflict is considered, and where the main focus of violence comes from a Serbian faction, depicted as senseless, disruptive, with no political objective (Behnke, 2008: 34-35), hence irrational and barbarian.

Lene Hansen (2006) has valuably documented the issue through a thorough discourse analysis. Hansen shows how the humanitarianist discourse of Western Europe on Bosnia evolved around two basic discourses – from the Balkan discourse to the Genocide discourse. In the Balkan discourse, the war was constituted as the product of ancient

Balkan hatred, which was violent, tribal, hating, and backward, and unable to break those patterns toward civilised and Western forms of behaviour (Hansen, 2006: 85). From this perspective, responsibility rested in the equal parties of the conflict themselves, and the West could not resolve it based on this essentialist assumption that the Balkans had a natural orientation towards some form of barbarity. The existence of such discourse on the Balkans nonetheless contraries the anthropological findings of Anders Stefansson (2007), who shows that the Balkans have a long history of longing for Europe, in the sense inhabitants want to be considered as “real” Europeans:

On the perceived fringe of Europe, the idea of ‘Europe’ carries much more explosive, symbolic weight than in the heartlands of Europe. Thus, people in Sarajevo and other parts of the former Yugoslavia value, articulate and strive to behave according to the ideals of the educated, refined, cultivated, knowledgeable and highly bourgeois European citizen, perhaps more than is the case in countries closer to the centre of Europe (Stefansson, 2007: 62).

But as reports of Serbian atrocities reached the Western media, a counter-discourse emerged, centred on the construction of the war as genocide. This Genocide discourse placed responsibility above the civilisational difference between the West and the Balkans, and motivated the West to end its policy of inaction and act towards the victims of the conflict (Hansen, 2006: 85, 98, 111). The Balkan space was rearticulated as a space of three factions by “separating a multicultural and democratic ‘Bosnian victim’ from a ‘Serbian aggressor’” (Hansen, 2006: 85). In this sense, the ethno-political emphasis of the conflict served as a spatial reference for the Western representations of the civilised Self and barbarous Otherness for its enactment of responsibility. To sum up, “The construction of ‘Western responsibility’ was pursued not only through an incorporation of a traditional security discourse of interests, but through a radical rearticulation of the spatial and temporal identities of the ‘Balkan discourse’” (Hansen, 2006: 99). Put in other terms, the representation of the Balkans as an uncivilised space was artificially transposed onto the characteristics and behaviour of its population.

An important factor contributing to that radical discursive rearticulation of space, time and identities was the recourse to collective memory and to historical references of the Holocaust and WWII within the Genocide discourse. In the Bosnian war, the use of these memory discourses had an important role not only in representing the civilised Self and the barbarian Otherness, but also in defining the civilised subject of security. Andreas Huyssen (2000) has showed that since the 1980’s memory discourses had been

intensifying, energised by the expanding debate on the Holocaust and by media attention on the anniversaries of events linked to the history of Nazism and WWII. In that context, Huysen even suggests that by the end of the 1990's, there was a certain "globalisation of the Holocaust discourse" and memory. Accordingly, the Holocaust is held as the symbol of failure of the project of Enlightenment, and also as a proof of Western civilisation's failure to reflect on its constitutive ability to live in peace with difference and Otherness, functioning as a metaphor for other traumatic histories and memories in historically distant and politically distinct from the original event (Huysen, 2000: 22-24).

In the midst of the Bosnian war, Roy Gutman's publication of *A Witness to genocide: the 1993 Pulitzer Prize-winning dispatches on the "ethnic cleansing" of Bosnia* (1993) accounted for the appalling conditions of prisoners, their summary executions, mutilation, gang rapes, torture. Through the testimonies of eyewitnesses, official statements and photos, the representations of the camps in Gutman's investigative work contained analogies with Nazi Germany, reinforced by the statement of human rights abuses of an unseen dimension in Europe since Nazism: mass deportation, forced marches, regime of starvation, executions, abandonment to the elements (Hansen, 2006: 161-162). Still in 1993, at the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, Elie Wiesel, a Nobel Prize Winner and Holocaust victim, would address US President Clinton in the following terms: "Mr. President, I cannot not tell you something. I have been in the former Yugoslavia last fall. I cannot sleep since what I have seen. As a Jew I am saying that. We must do something to stop the bloodshed in that country" (Wiesel, 1993 cit. in Beale, 1997: 15).

Therefore, the Bosnian war vividly reminisced collective memory of past atrocities and humanitarian failures, to reveal an enemy that it was moral to fight as in a sort of second Holocaust, as stated by O'Tuathaíl:

[a] Second World War-like Holocaust with clear moral divides [makes possible] the realisation of an already articulated desire to 'punch some Nazi in the face'. Liberated from geopolitical constrictions and confining rules of engagement, the Bosnian war makes possible the pleasure of moral supremacy, and the consequent thrill of administrating righteous violence (O'Tuathaíl, 2006: 363).

Now, as an alliance born from the scourges of WWII, NATO obviously benefitted from an important symbolic capital in that matter, which it did not miss the opportunity to recall the world. When depicting how European and Americans each considered the situation in BH, SG Willy Claes referred at the end of the conflict that to the European

Allies, “the haunting memory of the Balkans as the powderkeg of Europe was paramount – hence the emphasis on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping, and the desire to avoid an intervention”, while for the Americans, the emphasis was “on the moral aspect and the desire to assist the victims of aggression” (NATO, 1995d). These were clear references to critical moments of history for both Europeans and Americans, to whom the Bosnian conflict evoked the memories of their different participations in the world wars. For the Europeans, it was WWI, born from the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo in 1914. For the Americans, following a tradition coming from the Cold War, both world wars constituted a memory element in political discourses, which President Bill Clinton clearly reminded:

In this century especially, America has done more than simply stand for these ideals. We have acted on them and sacrificed for them. Our people fought two world wars so that freedom could triumph over tyranny. After World War I, we pulled back from the world, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred. After World War II, we continued to lead the world. We made the commitments that kept the peace, that helped to spread democracy, that created unparalleled prosperity and that brought victory in the Cold War (Clinton cit. in CNN, 1995).

Through these timeless parallelisms, the moral legitimacy of Allied members participating in past conflicts was linked to that of the present. The underlying rationale is anachronistic, as it presupposes that what was morally done by Western allies in the past shall repeat itself in the present or the future.

Moreover, in combination with the timeless morality of the intervening parties, the conflict itself suffered from a particular play of temporality that is related to the very Balkanisation of the conflict, according to David Campbell:

If ethnic and nationalist conflicts are **understood as no more than settled history or human nature** rearing its ugly head, then there is **nothing that can be done in the present** to resolve the tension except to repress or ignore such struggles. [...] The only alternative consistent with this understanding would be for nature to be miraculously overcome as the result of an **idealistic transformation at the hands of reason** (Campbell, 1996: 173-174; emphasis added).

To Campbell, the conflict was represented with a “timeless quality” that blurred the understanding of its causes, because ethnicity and nationalism tended to be treated as *natural* developments of historical animosities and earlier conflicts, when in fact they can be thought of as “questions of history violently deployed in the present for contemporary political goals” (Campbell, 1996: 174). In this sense, a chaotic human nature and history would be at the origin of the Bosnian war, with its barbarous practices. In BH, identities

appear diffuse, heterogeneous, decentralised; there are no Bosnian citizens that are representative of one single or homogenous identity. NATO refers to “Bosnians”, “Bosnian Croats”, or “Serbian Bosnians”. The spatial entity NATO sought to preserve did not have a corresponding identity (Behnke, 2008: 35).

“Unfortunately, **we failed** to recognize the fact that **former Yugoslavia was not some side-show** but rather the main arena in which **the rules of the game for the post-Cold War security order were being established**” (SG Willy Claes cit. in NATO, 1995d; emphasis added). Whilst acknowledging the *failure* of the “we” in allowing that ethnic cleansing could still be possible on the margins of Europe, this statement also symbolises the West’s assumption of a responsibility in failing at the civilising process of former Yugoslavia. Definitely, this statement could not be clearer in indicating the essential requirements of the civilising process: *post-Cold War security order*. BH represented a decentralised heterogeneous space that was the core challenge of the post-Cold War rearrangement of interdependence and order. Attempting to overcome these conditions by focusing on the Individualisation of Security was thus a step towards civilisation. For that, the post-conflict phase is critical for observing how NATO performed the psychosocial management of the Bosnian environment and subjects of security.

The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed on 14 December 1995, with an immediate priority upon the human component of the conflict: implementing human rights, and enabling the return of all displaced persons and refugees. But Dayton also redrew the boundary lines of BH and made official the existence of two separated entities within a single independent state: the Serb Republic, and the Muslim-Croat Federation (Hansen, 2006: 108; Price, 2002: 144). “In this way, the peace agreement endorsed the territorialisation of the constituent peoples of Bosnia and therefore also the main result of war and ethnic cleansing” (Bougarel et al., 2007: 6).<sup>38</sup>

Seemingly, after a “textbook demonstration of the use of limited force in the service of diplomacy” (1995d), to recall on the words of SG Claes, NATO’s role in BH was to remain subaltern to that of international diplomacy. But Dayton created the Implementation Force (IFOR), a new international force of 60,000 troops under NATO command to “secure the peace” (Clinton cit. in CNN, 1995), which would be renamed the

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<sup>38</sup> For an extensive and critical analysis of the Dayton Peace Agreement, see David Chandler (2000) *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. London and Sterling: Pluto Press (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Chandler’s title speaks for itself; it is a critique of the democratisation process in BH, as it was led and implemented by international agency.

Stabilisation Force (SFOR) one year later. This provision gave NATO “complete control of military activity within the state”, including competences that went well beyond that of military duties, such as monitoring security conditions for the electoral process, humanitarian missions, boundary-lines changes (Chandler, 2000: 44-45).

In October 1995, NATO SG had already introduced the idea that a post-operation presence was necessary. The success of Deliberate Force as a permanent achievement in terms of security and stability needed to be complemented by a “NATO peace implementation force on the ground”, in light of the continuing *responsibilities* to secure the peace and thus guarantee an independent Bosnia. NATO’s presence was not to be indefinite though:

Finally, we will have an exit strategy. This will not be an open-ended commitment. This will not be intervention in a civil war - as in Vietnam; it will not be an exercise in nation-building - as in Somalia. Our mission will be limited in scope and duration (SG Willy Claes cit. in NATO, 1995d).

In other words, NATO’s military mandate had in hands the securing of a disposition of peace with important and complex socio-demographic dynamics.

In this context, and to overcome the “Overemphasis on institutional and electoral issues” and approaches from above found in some literature on postwar BH (Bougarel et al., 2007: 13), the discussion now turns to the subjects of security. How were the civilians in BH made secure? How did NATO protect and enhance their security? But also, who were they? This last question relates to the fact that NATO discourses during the conflict predominantly referred to the victims of ethnic cleansing as the main referents of security. In this sense, the Bosnian subject of security was represented as the Bosnian victim of Serbian violence. Lene Hansen (2006) brings interesting nuances to the conceptualisation of this Bosnian subject of security. To her, the Bosnian subject is a “dual subject”: while the leaders were the responsible because of their Balkanness, the innocent civilians were ambiguously located as both a product of the Balkans and distinct from their leaders, but without being civilised though. They were rather the result of a “negative difference to their Balkan leaders” (Hansen, 2006: 112). Hansen further explains that as the civilians are held as non-political and non-military, as soon as they take action, they are moved from the privileged innocent space of civilians, to that of the political parties’. As a consequence, the Bosnian subject is no longer embraced by the responsibility of the West and is depoliticised: “In short, the humanitarian responsibility discourse constitutes responsibility

as applicable to a passive subject only” (Hansen, 2006: 113). From this perspective, the premise is that being an innocent civilian in BH is not an indicator of civilisation. He is just *not responsible* for barbarian acts because the leaders are, and he remains so as long as he remains passive. But he still represents the Balkans, a place of deeply entrenched uncivilised behaviour, hence his duality.

In this context, it is worth reflecting on some of the strategies NATO adopted and co-participated in BH after the conflict. One critical point is provided by Pascale Siegel (1998) in a study on the information activities in peace operations – commonly known as “psyop” – led by NATO in BH from December 1995 to 1997. Although it is an official NATO term, the expression “psychological operations” was not used. Siegel elaborates on how NATO planners implemented a campaign targeted at the local population of BH designed to shape attitudes and behaviour in favour of IFOR troops and operations. The campaign was called the IFOR Information Campaign (IIC) and it was conducted by PSYOPS forces according to NATO’s specific doctrine for peace support psychological activities (Siegel, 1998: 67).<sup>39</sup> The primary mission of the PSYOPS Activities was to “deter armed resistance and hostile behaviour against IFOR/SFOR troops and operations” (Siegel, 1998: 79). Considered as the motor of socio-political change, the Bosnian population was shown how elected leaders should behave in a democratic country, in order to raise people’s expectations towards their leaders (Siegel, 1998: 81). To that end, the operations consisted of diverse media and communication activities, including for example a newspaper, a monthly youth magazine, radio stations, television spots, but most importantly it entailed “step-by-step psychological processes to entice attitudinal changes” (Siegel, 1998: 72). This was achieved by exposing the local population to selected messages, specific sequences of ideas, to create an acceptable alternative course of action in the mind of the target audience. For instance, explanatory pamphlets would not mention rejections or polemical statements by the leaders, because persuasion was deemed more important than informing (Siegel, 1998: 75-76). Although messages were presented in a specific sequence to obtain cumulative effects leading to behavioural change, IFOR and SFOR PSYOP campaigns were not adapted to the local populations’ media consumption habits (Siegel, 1998: 76-77).

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<sup>39</sup> See NATO, “Annex J: Peace Support Psychological Activities,” Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, PfP UNCLASSIFIED, Brussels, 11 December 1995.

Another peculiar sector of activity performed by the SFOR has been explored by Monroe Price, regarding the management of memory by the SFOR and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) after the conflict, in what he considers to be one of the “most comprehensive possible catalogues of the exercise of authority” (2002: 151). The efforts led by these international organisations with military authority were to “change perceptions of the present through manipulation of a sense of history”, to shape memory, to “reconstruct consciousness” (Price, 2002: 138, 144). In practice, to counter the local propaganda that emphasised the past hostility between ethnic groups and instigated fear of extermination, standards for existing stations were established, while other stations were closed down (Price, 2002: 142-143, 151). Therefore, the

OHR would establish two commissions, one to 'ensure that media standards are respected and would issue licenses. The other would be of an appellate nature and would deal with complaints on media treatment or media behaviour in the communications process.' In a neat reversal of SRT Pale's Nazi comparisons, the officials noted that the foundation for the new media strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina was based on the Allies' post-war experience in Germany. Here, the power of Second World War memories was mobilised against the broadcasters, rather than against the Western powers (Price, 2002: 150-151).

Both the psychological operations led by the IFOR for shaping attitudes and behaviour through persuasion of local population in BH, and the management of memory by the SFOR and OHR appear as nothing but an artificial process of pacification through inculcated psychological mechanisms. These aim clearly at developing civilised *habiti* regarding self-restraint and acceptance in face of an international presence, as well as appropriate political expectations and standards. In this sense, the IFOR primarily assumed that the Bosnian population was lacking basic civilised *habiti*, preventing them from voting adequately for the “right” reasons and for the “right” politician. This can be seen as the IFOR performing an education in democracy for non-socialised partners. In relation to the management of memory, the Genocide discourse combined with the past historic references to WWII perpetuated a sense of guilt and served as constraining tools.

NATO's post-conflict military presence aimed primarily at internal stability for the realisation of free elections, security and democratisation. However, the two examples referred above point to an involvement that overcame the mere military mandate, and rather encompassed sensible activities focused on psychosocial conditions of the local population. In this sense, the Bosnian subject of security for whom NATO acted under the SFOR is one that is on the process of becoming civilised, through the inculcation of



democratic values that correspond to the liberal model of statehood. Clearly, identity issues in BH were rather immobilised in time and in the memories of the subjects, rather than reconciled, or made co-habitable on the basis of sharing and tolerance, while ideological models were actively being implemented into the psyches. Oliver Richmond (2014: 87-88) has critically enhanced how the state and peacebuilding processes initiated by the Dayton Agreement applied a “mainstream state-formation understanding of a power struggle between ethnic groups”, which ultimately made BH more ethnically polarised, and its political agendas increasingly separatist, and not less. Richmond further emphasizes that the neoliberal model of statehood has been *unable* to reconcile pluralism, either ethnic or material, and rather been absorbed by the need to sustain a status quo world order (Richmond, 2014: 88).

However, in the case of NATO, it does not seem to be a matter of mere *inability*, but rather of total lack of purpose. To quote David Campbell, “The West’s inability to act in pursuit of a political goal in Bosnia stems from its unwillingness to make multiculturalism that goal”, which would require “resolving in favour of plurality one of the mostly hotly contested cultural controversies in the United States and other Western nations, a controversy that is central to the reproduction of the identity of those states” (Campbell, 1996: 176). Could NATO’s narratives and discourses about the war have focused on reconciliation through multiculturalism and plurality? Although this was an option, there is an ultimate fact about NATO that makes the hypothesis quite illusory, which is its intrinsic deficiency towards multiculturalism.

NATO is *not* multicultural; it transpires and proclaims the Western values whenever and wherever it has the opportunity to do so, as a defensive alliance that expands through civilising practices. It is important to stress that this is only *one* valuing choice among many possible others; opting for multiculturalism for instance could have had important repercussions towards the realisation of the “civilisational constellations” ambitioned by Gerard Delanty (2003), where the option of cultural and identity openness takes over closure. Instead, static notions of ethics, responsibility, identity and culture have prevailed and defined NATO’s post-Cold War becoming. NATO’s intervention in BH defines itself through what it was and essentially did: a gradually muscular intervention through airpower that ended a civil war to then help implement and stabilise the same basic

insecurities through a military presence involved in the psychosocial and ideological transformation of the local population.

It was seen that ethno-religious identity was portrayed as the main social divider in BH during and after the war, reviving many cultural stereotypes and giving them new meanings. But new socio-demographic and spatial issues arose after the conflict, calling the cultural representations into question and enhancing the complex reconciliation between different identities. There is some anthropological literature that has shown there are various other factors underlying socio-cultural cleavages to be considered in postwar BH (Bougarel et al., 2007). These involve, for example, wider Bosnian assumptions of a ranking among cultural mentalities placing urban as cultured behaviour, and rural as non-cultured, which contraries many studies that portray ethno-religious identity as the paramount social division in BH (Stefansson, 2007: 59-60).<sup>40</sup> Another example has to do with the intense longing for security of displaced Sarajevo Serbs, who have sought to revisit Sarajevo after the war; their narratives and spatial practices illustrate the importance played by geography and imagined territorialities for transcending the ethnic boundaries previously erected (Armakolas, 2007: 98). Finally, the presence of Westerners and internationals working in postwar BH has seemingly complexified the identity issue, as they have created new physical and symbolic boundaries between themselves and the local society, reproducing prejudices about the lack of competence or the cultural deficits of the local population in their attempt to restore the authority of the Bosnian state (Coles, 2007).

To sum up, the outcome of the war resulted in complex socio-demographic conditions that aroused issues of perception regarding cultural and social hierarchy and also marginalisation. In that context, although the feeling of security for the Bosnian subject was crucial and constituted the primary motive for humanitarian intervention, NATO, among other international agents, made it secondary and contributed mainly to rearranging the conditions in which democratic statehood could be achieved. The individual referent of security that legitimated an international intervention in the first place was rather managed as the recipient of ideological policies, more than thoroughly secured as a humanitarian subject of security.

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<sup>40</sup> Anders Stefansson (2007) has focused on post-war Sarajevo and explored the cultural and social transformations experienced in the city after the departure of a large portion of the pre-war population and a massive influx of people displaced by war. He shows that pre-war inhabitants of Sarajevo portray themselves as strangers in their own city when faced to the arrival of what they consider to be “peasants”.

## 10.2. Kosovo: the “Allied Force”

The **end of the ideological confrontation** in Europe has meant the end of a direct military threat to Allied territories. But **history has not come to an end**. The far-reaching political changes across Central and Eastern Europe have not, unfortunately, been universally peaceful and benign. Indeed **scenes of cruelty and human suffering** which **we thought had disappeared with the forties** have made an **unwelcome comeback in the nineties** (SG Solana cit. in NATO, 1999a; emphasis added).

In Javier Solana’s words, NATO’s SG, the end of ideological confrontation did not mean the end of violence and hostility, as much as the end of a specific conjunctural time did not mean the end of history. The time of ideological confrontation was rather replaced with the continuity of a history ruled by the same scenes of cruelty and human suffering from the past. Seen from the perspective of security, the end of the “cold” insecurity from bipolar times did not mean renewed security. Instead, insecurity continued under different shapes, indifferent to time.

NATO’s Operation Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo fairly resulted from cumulated experience and discourses, both from the recent involvement in BH and from its forty years of existence, governed by a mixture of openness and closure, managed by both assertiveness and uncertainty – an “assertive uncertainty”. After Bosnia, Kosovo may be considered as the intervention that decisively made NATO to evolve into a key humanitarianist actor, moving up from sanctions enforcement, to limited and sustained air strikes, and finally to the deployment of a large-scale peacekeeping operation, which also called the Alliance to resolve on critical matters such as what role to assume as a regional crisis manager, how to justify intervention, how to produce an internal consensus, or how to use force in the service of diplomacy (Sperling and Webber, 2009: 494-495).

Kosovo was a province of the Serb Republic, whose importance to Milosevic’s regime was mainly symbolic; with its numerous historical sites, and Serbian Orthodox churches, it was considered the cradle of Serbian civilisation (Lake, 2009: 104). Alex Bellamy has reviewed the trajectory of decline in the value of human life in Kosovo between 1974 and 1999, to show that after the 1974 Constitution, the Kosovar Albanians were widely portrayed as “inhuman savages, a gang of terrorists and rapists hell-bent on irredentism and genocide” (2000: 122). Bellamy further explains that as these views began to inform rulers in Belgrade, the Serbian leadership acted accordingly by stripping a whole community of its citizenship, political existence, basic rights, and identity, so that Kosovar

Albanians were excluded from all forms of public life. After what Bellamy considers to have been years of dehumanisation of each group by the other, when the conflict broke out in 1998-1999, Serb paramilitary groups “committed atrocities on a massive and systematic scale, killing at least 20,000 Kosovar Albanians and maybe as many as 50,000” (Bellamy, 2000: 120).

Human right issues in Kosovo had not been addressed at the end of the war in BH, and the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the 1990’s aimed at using violence to overthrow the Serbian regime (Marshall and Inglis, 2003: 98). In March 1998, Milosevic decided to crack down on the KLA and the Kosovar Albanians, and as the crisis unfolded in mid-1998, NATO planners and members started to consider the military options for dealing with the problem (Stigler, 2002: 127). In late February 1999 a final diplomatic solution to the crisis was proposed at Rambouillet (France), which consisted of an agreement requiring that the Yugoslav government permit NATO to monitor the safe return of Albanian Kosovars to the region. The conditions presented included the complete surrender of control over Kosovo, the transfer of Kosovo to NATO administration, an occupying force of 28,000 NATO troops with free movement throughout Yugoslavia, a final settlement within three years, and a referendum on the status of Kosovo within Yugoslavia (Lake, 2009: 105). But negotiations failed and Milosevic refused to sign the Rambouillet Agreement in March 1999, as he seemed to doubt of the Alliance’s willingness to fight for Kosovo and of the credibility of its threats (Allen and Vincent, 2011: 15; Marshall and Inglis, 2003: 98; Stigler, 2002). On 22 March 1999, US special envoy to the Balkans, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, met with President Milosevic to discuss the deteriorating situation in Kosovo, and made clear to him that the consequences of his refusal to surrender control of Kosovo to NATO would be grave. To this, Milosevic responded: “Yes, you will bomb us” (Lake, 2009: 83). After this failure, as the Serbs launched “Operation Horseshoe” designed to rid Kosovo of its Albanian population in brutal ways (Bellamy, 2000: 121), NATO decided to use coercive air power to force the Serbs to make concession over Kosovo (Allen and Vincent, 2011: 8).

On 24 March 1999, the bombing campaign began to halt ethnic violence directed at Kosovar Albanians. OAF was launched on humanitarian grounds. It represents in fact the apotheosis of NATO’s post-Cold War politics of humanitarianism, calling upon a collective consciousness regarding humanitarian interventions, mostly by overcoming the

principle of territorial sovereignty and by challenging international law and the UN Charter on the topic of the non-defensive use of force (Falk, 2002: 68-69). The underlying rationale is “that there are some crimes so extreme that a state responsible for them, despite the principle of sovereignty, may properly be the subject of military intervention” (Roberts, 1999: 103).

Despite its humanitarian grounds, NATO’s legal basis for intervention was very weak and contested, which makes it all the more unique. Formally, OAF was unauthorised by the UNSC, but justifiable and supported by some previous UNSC Resolutions directed at the Serb government, and general international law stating that military intervention against another state could be justified in cases of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, such as humanitarian distress on large scale (Roberts, 1999: 102-106). The UN SG Kofi Annan expressed at the time the disapproval of NATO acting without UNSC authorisation, whilst affirming the need for intervention as well. The arguments presented by Annan then were that state sovereignty had been redefined in that states were now understood as the instruments at the service of people, and that abusive states could not precede the people in the light of the renewed consciousness of individual rights (Moore, 2002: 20). This is all to say that NATO’s intervention was legally acceptable, as long as the humanitarian reasons rose above all other considerations.

In the Kosovo crisis a NATO intervention was blocked in the Security Council by the threat of a Russian veto, so that alliance members finally decided to intervene without the approval of the United Nations. **Liberal values perceived to be absolute prevailed over established procedural norms of the international community.** Whereas most of the European states hastily denied that the decision could in any way create a precedent, American policy makers made it clear that they regarded **the decision of a community of democratic states as perfectly legitimate. Why, the argument ran, should Western democracies accept the veto of authoritarian regimes** against the use of force to prevent something worse from happening, particularly as they had reached **their decision by consensus?** (Bunde and Noetzel, 2010: 305; emphasis added).

Put in those terms, such intervention ultimately represented a victory of liberal values, whereas consensus among a community of Western democratic states alone was perceived to be sufficient to prove the legitimacy of its decisions. In this sense, there is as an undeniable ideological stance in surpassing established procedural norms of the international community, which contradicts the idea conveyed by NATO that there is no ideological confrontation in the post-Cold War period. The difference in this case is that this confrontation occurs at the level of areas of influence, to define realms of interventions in different cultural spaces.

In operational terms, OAF was conducted strictly through airpower. The threat of a ground occupation at Rambouillet had not produced many effects on Milosevic, which is why airpower is seen as the major means of deterrence and coercion in Kosovo, in addition to other economic and diplomatic pressures (Allen and Vincent, 2011: 3; Byman and Waxman, 2000; Stigler, 2002). From March to May 1999, the frequency and intensity of NATO strikes increased, with an average number of sorties per day climbing from 100 to 300, as the target list also expanded to include dual-use infrastructure, such as bridges, communications, and power-generating facilities (Lake, 2009: 106-107). NATO also engaged in “crony targeting”, attacking factories owned by regime members and supporters, which also had a real impact on the daily lives of Serbian population and economy (Lake, 2009: 107).

With a zero casualty conflict for the NATO forces, OAF branded a “Western way of war”, one that “must not touch the West physically”, which in Kosovo implied no troops on the ground, a fight from the air for minimum Allied casualties, followed by an actual occupation after the cessation of hostilities (Shaw, 2005: 77-78). Besides, it was also the affirmation of what James Der Derian calls a “virtuous war” for its “technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualize violence from a distance – *with no or minimal casualties*” (Der Derian, 2000: 772; emphasis in the original). In fact, supporting Der Derian’s claim that virtuous wars are dominated by constant mediatisation that promotes “a vision of bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars” (*ibid.*), NATO’s public management of the operation was unprecedented. OAF was so highly mediatised, that press conferences and briefings were conducted on an almost daily basis, either by NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea, by military commanders or the SG himself.<sup>41</sup> The media and the public could assist to the spectacle of NATO’s intervention and accompany very closely its developments. This included, for example, considerations on the state of the weather in Yugoslavia (NATO, 1999c), as well as other communications focusing on the pilots’ performance, in an attempt to humanise and moralise them by depicting their daily tasks and ethical deliberations:

The pilots work in 12 hour shifts. For some it is their first combat missions. But they are all extremely motivated. They have 4 hours preparation before they get into the cockpit, during which they have enormous briefings, very detailed briefings, they take enormous care to identify the targets, to have all the latest

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<sup>41</sup> This can be verified online with a timetable that speaks for itself: <http://nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm> [06 September 2016].

information to ensure that they can be extremely accurate. They fly for 6 hours in gruelling circumstances, and then when they get back, they have a debriefing of 2 hours in which they analyse the mission, they share information to make sure that that accuracy is upheld (Shea cit. in NATO, 1999g).

Given the aforementioned legal conditions surrounding NATO's intervention in Kosovo, such detailed mediatisation may be seen as an ethical compensation for any formal illegality, ensuring some form of moral legitimacy. After this generic presentation of NATO's mission in Kosovo, the section will now turn more specifically to questions on the Individualisation of Security and the civilised subject of security.

### **The ultimate responsibility for barbarity: was history repeating itself?**

NATO's intervention in Kosovo thus consecrates much more emphatically than in BH the importance of individual security, human security and human rights into the Alliance's discourse and policies, backed by those of its most prominent members' leaders. However, the case of Kosovo displays many discursive similarities to BH, intertwining discourses on the Balkans, responsibility, ethnic cleansing and memory. Here are some examples of the justifications advanced for the intervention early in the beginning of OAF:

**Our actions are directed against the repressive policies of the Yugoslav government, which is refusing to respect civilized norms of behaviour in this Europe** at the end of the 20th century.

The **responsibility for the current crisis rests with President Milosevic**. It is up to him to comply with the demands of the international community (SG Solana cit. in NATO, 1999b; emphasis added).

**The responsibility for this conflict sits squarely on Milosevic's shoulders**. He is causing the damage to his country and his people. **The values of the Milosevic regime** - built around **ethnic hatred and systematic brutality** - come from an era of the darkest past. **They have no place in today's world** (SACEUR General Clark, 1999; emphasis added).

We act **to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo** from a mounting military offensive. We act **to prevent a wider war**; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded **twice before in this century** with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace.

**By acting now we are upholding our values**, protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace. [...]

In 1989, Serbia's leader, **Slobodan Milosevic, the same leader who started the wars in Bosnia and Croatia** [...] stripped Kosovo of the constitutional autonomy its people enjoyed; thus denying them their right to speak their language, run their schools, shape their daily lives (Clinton cit. in BBC, 1999; emphasis added).

We act also because we know from **bitter experience throughout this century**,

most recently in Bosnia, that **instability and civil war in one part of the Balkans inevitably spills over into the whole of it**, and affects the rest of Europe too. Let me remind the House. There are now over 1 million refugees from the former Yugoslavia in the EU.

[...]

We must act: to **save thousands of innocent men, women and children from humanitarian catastrophe, from death, barbarism and ethnic cleansing by a brutal dictatorship**; to save the **stability of the Balkan region**, where we know chaos can engulf all of Europe.

[...]

**The choice is now his. Milosevic can choose peace for the peoples of Kosovo** and an end to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's isolation in Europe. Or he can choose continued conflict and the serious consequences that would follow (Blair cit. in The Guardian, 1999; emphasis added).

These excerpts all compose a fair picture of the narrative surrounding NATO's intervention in Kosovo: the sole responsibility for the ethnic cleansing of innocent people from Kosovo lies in Milosevic, the barbarian leader with previous record of brutal wars in former Yugoslavia, who consistently refuses to abide by civilised norms of behaviour. Faced to that, the "we" – NATO members – acts to prevent history from repeating itself, that is, they act to prevent past atrocities of the two world wars from happening again, because the Balkans have this reputation of an uncivilised habitus that brings instability to the rest of Europe. Differently from Bosnia, the passages above focus much more on Milosevic, and make direct references to him, in a personification of the enemy leadership, just like the following ones:

I think the time has come to take a closer look at the Serb state media. It is not really a media at all, it is part of **President Milosevic's war machine** and **over the last few weeks as I have been standing here I have been aware that as the Spokesman of this Alliance I have under pressure, day and night, to explain and justify NATO's actions to all of you here, and via you to public opinion at large, and to face your very justified and very appropriate questions. But it also has struck me that President Milosevic doesn't have to justify anything.** There is no independent media in Serbia, particularly nobody there to ask the government why they are conducting a campaign of killing, rape, maiming and forced deportations of innocent civilians inside Kosovo; or to ask Milosevic why he brought this situation upon his country by constantly rejecting diplomacy, and indeed taking on the entire international community, and NATO, in a conflict that he can't win (Shea cit. in NATO, 1999c; emphasis added).

There have been some civilian casualties - I regret them very much. But they would have been far higher without our careful targeting, high technology and skilful service personnel. And let us not forget that **Milosevic has been deliberately moving refugees into strike zones** to try to create civilian casualties - a **hideous and evil act** (SACEUR General Clark, 1999; emphasis added).



NATO thereby appears to be performing a role-play, in which a sense of moral pressure is delivered to transparently explain and justify each and every of its acts, including civilian casualties. But this is quickly obfuscated by Milosevic's total lack of justification in front of the public, and responsibility in deliberately harming civilians.

In this context, other discursive tools may be found in NATO's narrative on Kosovo that have already been approached earlier, which prolifically contributed to enhance the Alliance's symbolic power in humanitarian interventions, with a civilisational might appealing to the collective unconscious. One of them, for example, is the association to Christian values and to the spiritual authority of the Vatican:

**On the humanitarian side**, all of you are aware, how can you avoid it, of **a new wave of ethnic cleansing, 20,000 plus entered Albania yesterday, perhaps as many as 50,000 are immediately behind them trying to go to Albania**, [...]. Let me put it this way, everybody in the international community has condemned this latest round of ethnic cleansing. **The Vatican** announced it yesterday as a **disgrace that bloodies Europe**, and this is certainly the sense of all of the allies as well (Shea cit. in NATO, 1999c; emphasis added).

Another more frequent reference, already seen in BH, is related to the memory of WWII and the Holocaust:

**Sarajevo**, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where **World War I began. World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region**. [...] Just imagine if **leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die**.

[...]

Two million Bosnians became refugees. This was **genocide in the heart of Europe - not in 1945, but in 1995**. Not in some grainy newsreel from our parents' and grandparents' time, but in our own time, testing our humanity and our resolve.

[...]

We learned that **in the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites more brutality**. But firmness can stop armies and save lives. We must apply that lesson in Kosovo before what happened in Bosnia happens there, too (Clinton cit. in BBC, 1999; emphasis added).

Here, discourse mixes Balkans, genocide and memory in a positivist approach of time that is best performed by the US Ally. President Clinton's words basically suggest that if it happened there once, it will happen twice. Andreas Huyssen has explained that the legitimization of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo largely depended on this reference to the Holocaust memory, mobilising a "politics of guilt in Europe and the United States associated with non-intervention in the 1930's and 1940's" (2000: 23).

So again, and similarly to the discourses of the 1950's exposed in Part 2, and to those on BH as well, the values at stake in Kosovo transcended the specific period of the operation. In parallel, OAF actually consecrated NATO's long-lasting values:

50 years ago, the signatories of the Washington Treaty vowed "to safeguard the **freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples**, founded on the **principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.**" **These values are as relevant today as they were in 1949.** Back then, they had to be defended against a heavily armed totalitarian great power. Today, they have to be **defended against a brutal political leader**, a leader whose policies of **deliberately engineered hatred** seems to come from an era long believed behind us. If Europe is to enter the 21<sup>st</sup> century as a community of democracy, pluralism, and human rights, we simply cannot tolerate this carnage at its centre. To stand idly by while a brutal campaign of forced deportation, torture and murder is going on in the heart of Europe would have meant declaring **moral bankruptcy.** **Now, as in 1949, we are called upon to demonstrate that values are not only something to be preached, but upheld** (SG Solana cit. in NATO, 1999f; emphasis added).

To SG Solana, as for other secretary-generals before him, the relevance of NATO's founding values is timeless. Those values are in fact so vital that they needed to be defended from Slobodan Milosevic, the "brutal political leader" who "deliberately engineered hatred", a kind of hatred belonging to the past that was encapsulated in time and moved to the present by the hands of Milosevic. In this sense, defending those values was an enterprise equivalent to defending the minority of Albanian Kosovars, who ultimately impersonate the values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, as Solana insisted in his speech.

This has important implications, not only in face of the lessons drawn from a recent History – Holocaust of WWII – but also from a more distant past, an uncivilised time. The year after OAF, at a time when revisionism was the Alliance's main challenge (NATO, 2000a, 2000b), NATO's new SG Lord Robertson would recall on the motives and accomplishments of the intervention in the following terms:

**The last year of the twentieth century, in the heart of Europe, two hours flight from Paris, a few hours drive to Budapest, houses with satellite TV - and the savagery of the Middle Ages.**

But NATO drove out the Serb forces, and KFOR re-established security in the province. Families returned to their scorched and bullet-ridden homes. Children again began to study - inside tents. But they did so in their native language for the first time in ten years. And with KFOR's help, a new school for Poklek was built.

[...] **The message to me and NATO Generals Clark and Reinhardt was simple: NATO was their saviour.** Their joy and gratitude was as humbling and exhilarating as was the intensity of the sorrow as we honoured the photos of the 10 murdered children (SG Lord Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000a; emphasis added).

**[t]he Kosovo crisis looked like a regression into Europe's darkest days. Atrocities were committed on large scale, deportation trains were rolling, extreme nationalism carried the day.** Until the Atlantic community said "stop". We ended the violence. We stopped and reversed ethnic cleansing. We committed ourselves to the long-term future of Southeastern Europe. And we are learning **the lessons of Kosovo to prepare ourselves for the future** (SG Lord Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000b; emphasis added).

These statements are rich in symbolic references that strongly empower the civilisational narrative. In “the last year of the twentieth century”, the time of modernity, the time of civilised norms, in the “heart of Europe”, so close to civilised spaces of Paris and Budapest, Kosovo was perceived as a return to the “savagery of Middle Ages”, a “regression to Europe’s darkest days”, meaning a retrocession to both uncivilised time and behaviour. The savagery and the darkness of the crisis in Kosovo could nonetheless be countered by NATO the “saviour”, the hero-like figure acclaimed by the children of Poglek.

The postwar phase is much more expressive regarding the representation of the Kosovar subject of security, who is mainly related to the figure of the Kosovar refugee, but who is also dually constructed, as in the case of BH. It will be seen in the remainder of this section that the Kosovar subject of security is framed within a “refugee discourse” that was much more concerned with the containment of population flows than with their actual security. After Milosevic agreed to NATO’s terms on 3 June 1999, the crisis was brought to an end, and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed to implement the peace settlement. KFOR’s mission was to establish a military presence aimed at securing the overall environment in Kosovo, at the level of potential renewed hostilities, the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugees, but also at providing initial basic civil administration and other non-military functions pending the arrival of international organisations and control the borders (NATO, 2009). Notably, the exit strategy for Kosovo was pondered quite differently from Bosnia’s: “Crisis management in today’s Europe means long-term engagement – I know of no crisis that was resolved by debating exit strategies” (SG Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000b).

Now, the refugee discourse assumed two different shades. One may be verified before and during OAF in the discourses of Western leaders enhancing the high numbers of refugees (1 million) spread across Europe (The Guardian, 1999), threatening the stability of neighbouring countries (BBC, 1999). As for NATO, the refugees were referred

to as the object of the intervention, having as a priority getting them back to their home, and were discussed in relation to the count of thousands of people crossing borders, to the living conditions at the camps, and to the reports of atrocities committed at them (NATO, 1999b; 1999c; 1999f; 1999g). The second manifestation of the refugee discourse in Kosovo occurred after OAF, in which the figure of the refugee constitutes a criterion for measuring NATO's operational success: "At the end of the day, Serb forces were out, KFOR was in, and the refugees were home. This is as good a definition of success as you can get" (SG Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000b). Here, objective numbers were evoked by SG Robertson: 1,3 million refugees and IDP went back to their home, 50,000 houses were rebuilt (*ibid.*). From then on, responsibilities were cast as follows: "[w]e must condition our support on the progress made by the Kosovars themselves. We must make it clear to them that is they who bear the ultimate responsibility for Kosovo's future" (*ibid.*). However, it is interesting to observe how both moments of the refugee discourse are interconnected in time, for the initial focus upon the threatening aspect of refugees still mattered when it came to justify the intervention a posteriori:

Indeed, it is worth taking a moment to contemplate the implications of not taking action against Milosevic and his thugs. First, we would have **guaranteed turmoil** and **undermined the security balance** in Southeast Europe for years, if not decades. **One million refugees** would have been **stranded in neighbouring countries**; the conflict would have simmered, and likely spread [...]. The **ripple effects from the instability** could, **like the scattered refugees**, have **spread to all the Continent**. And the same slick commentators would be telling NATO we should have acted (SG Lord Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000a; emphasis added).

Retrospectively, NATO's discourse now mentioned the instability underlying the flow of refugees in Europe, as the potential for "ripple effects" and insecurity is equaled ("like") to the spread of "scattered refugees". This goes in the sense of Jim Whitman's (2000) argument that the unprecedented response to the refugee crisis in Kosovo was mostly motivated by a concern in containing the refugees within the region and in maintaining political support to the military campaign against Serbia, and not based on concerns with human rights. Very sceptical of any genuine humanitarian reasoning in Kosovo, Whitman refers that the issue of the Kosovar refugees had been a problem for the Italian government since 1997, which had even declared the state of emergency regarding the public danger represented by the incoming flux of refugees from Kosovo, ending up repatriating most of them (Whitman, 2000: 167). In this sense, there would be an undeniable biopolitical concern ruling the humanitarian rationale as well. Therefore, the Kosovar subject of

security is restrained in the duality of his character as an innocent victim of an uncivilised political leader on the one hand (just like the Bosnian subject), and of his character as a biopolitical element threatening the stability of a civilised European core.

Against this background, it is hard not to reflect on NATO's timeless narrative on values and question how those values can be articulated with the biopolitical dimension of humanitarianism:

We have challenges to face in Kosovo. I am the first to admit that some of them are very difficult. But let us be clear -- these are the **challenges of success. A success for our values. A success for the project of building a just and peaceful Euro-Atlantic community. A success for the safety and security of future generations.** One year after NATO planes took to very dangerous skies to **stop a profound evil**, that success is the true story of Kosovo (SG Lord Robertson cit. in NATO, 2000a; emphasis added).

This statement about NATO's success is striking for its egocentrism. In fact, in the light of unsuspected humanitarian reasons, assessing Kosovo's "challenges of success" could have focused on the individuals' emancipation or security, for example. Instead, success was portrayed in terms of a fruitful projection of the values of the Self.

Such discourses on the refugees, framed in a duality of humanitarian and biopolitical concerns, elude the cosmopolitan appreciation of humanitarianism, and rather point to the political and symbolic value of individuals' lives in out-of-area countries to shape the understanding of which values are the ones that must prevail. In Kosovo, NATO could uphold its values, project them into the future of any other unstable neighbouring state, and continue the process of civilisation.

Similarly to BH, this process was equally sustained by psychological operations (PSYOPS). Although official material regarding PSYOPS is hard to find within NATO sources, the most frequent source of information in that concern is related to the US ally's governmental and military sources. In the US, PSYOPS are only one element of the broader field of operations called "Information Operations", among others such as electronic warfare, military deception, operations security, or computer network operations (Romanych and Krumm, 2004: 56). Information Operations aspire to "affect or defend information systems, and influence decision-making", so they are a key contribution to the "commander's effort to achieve information superiority" (*ibid.*), which is particularly important in contexts such as Kosovo's where the support of the population is rather divided between areas of cultural influence. But the PSYOPS team specifically focused on "influencing the attitudes, perceptions and behaviour of Kosovo's indigenous populace",

by conducting loudspeaker and face-to-face operations, and producing “handbills, posters, and other print products as well as radio and TV programming” (Romanych and Krumm, 2004: 59).

For example, in a US Department of Defense (DoD) report entitled *The creation and dissemination of all forms of information in support of psychological operations (PSYOP) in time of military conflict*, what can be seen as an official governmental-level definition of PSYOPS is contained:

[t]he goal of PSYOP is to **influence the behavior of the target audience**. This presumes that the goal can be accomplished by **influencing their perceptions**. Critical, of course, is the **theme of the message**. But equally important is the **packaging of the message**, which must be suitable for the target audience and the dissemination media of choice (DoD, 2000: 23).

PSYOPS are presented as particularly successful in BH and Kosovo, namely radio broadcasts are considered to have worked acceptably, while TV broadcasts were not satisfactory (DoD, 2000: 7, 49). The report also identifies some weaknesses and shortcomings of US military PSYOPS forces in Kosovo, such as their Cold War-oriented structure, often antiquated equipment, and inadequacy of PSYOP planning support to the geographic CINC (DoD, 2000: 21).

Indeed, during the campaign, many leaflets were launched from the air by NATO forces.<sup>42</sup> Here are the partial transcripts of some of them, which can be seen integrally in Annex A on the Kosovo Psyop Leaflets (page 259):

1. “No fuel, no power, no trade, no freedom, no future – Milosevic. How long will you suffer for Milosevic? [...] Don’t let Milosevic hold you hostage to his atrocities”.
2. “Attention VJ Forces! [...] Remain in Kosovo and face certain death, or leave your unit and your equipment, and get out of Kosovo now. If you choose to stay, NATO will relentlessly attack you from every direction. The choice is yours. NATO”.
3. “[...] Thousands of innocent and unarmed people are feared dead. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are fleeing Milosevic’s *pogrom* [sic]. Do not allow misguided patriotism to bind you to his atrocities. [...] NATO remains resolved to Defend the Defenseless in Kosovo-Mehtohija”.

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<sup>42</sup> Some examples may be found on NATO’s website [www.nato.int/kosovo/leaflets](http://www.nato.int/kosovo/leaflets) [6 September 2016].

These examples of NATO leaflets clearly portray Milosevic as the personification of the enemy, whose partisans may choose to follow or not, when faced to NATO's threat of relentless attack. The atrocities are perceived to belong exclusively to Milosevic, in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of his partisans. The innocent, unarmed, defenceless people NATO claims to be defending are not endowed with that possibility of choosing.

The case for PSYOPS in Kosovo reveal how, even after BH, the Balkans were not only perceived as a threat by NATO, as they also represented an opportunity for the West to play on its self-perception again, to project its values, to re-experience their validity and even superiority (Burgess, 2011: 123). The deep issues of cultural identity at stake in Kosovo actually recall what James Der Derian terms a "mimetic war":

**A mimetic war is a battle of imitation and representation**, in which the **relationship of who we are and who they are** is played out along a wide Spectrum of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance, estrangement and hostility. [...] It draws physical boundaries between peoples, as well as metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical other of life, death. [...]

**People go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of others: that is, how they construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves** through representations (Der Derian, 2009: 271; emphasis added).

The centrality of perceptions, representation, and meanings is all the more evident as they indicate the importance of behavioural change for NATO's permanence in Kosovo. Hence, without the local belief that regime change was indeed necessary, and the corresponding enactment of democratic social practices, NATO could not solidify its argument for a protracted involvement in Kosovo. OAF did more than display NATO's force and assertiveness in defying and pressuring international law and public opinion. The Alliance's intervention operated at a deeper unconscious level. Not only did it mediatise intensively the mission for a reproduction of moral legitimacy and a dissemination of a particular representation of international security, as it also used PSYOPS to civilise the habits of the local subjects in order to change their perception of their own security.

### 10.3. Afghanistan: taking command of ISAF

NATO's involvement in Afghanistan surges as a direct consequence of the post-9/11 US-led invasion. James Sperling and Mark Webber (2009: 501) have claimed that the Alliance has suffered an existential crisis since then, in part because of fundamental internal disagreements over the security interests at stake in Afghanistan. To Gheciu (2008: 79), this is in part because it has sought to redefine its role through a renewed effort to deepen and expand the Western security community via the promotion of liberal-democratic norms.

The attacks of 9/11 on the World Trade Centre in New York are generally held as a paradigmatic event comparable to the end of the Cold War, which changed security in many parts of the world. Literature on the continuities and discontinuities provoked by 9/11 is so abundant and diversified that attempting to compile it has become redundant. In fact, borrowing on James Der Derian's words:

[t]here is very little about 9/11 that is *safe* to say. Unless one was firmly situated in a patriotic, ideological, or religious position (which at home and abroad drew uncomfortably close), it is intellectually difficult and even politically dangerous to assess the meaning of a conflict that phase-shifted with every news cycle [...] (Der Derian, 2009: 264).

However, critical aspects have remained as a legacy of 9/11 and its management by US foreign policy that have broadened the study of IR and security studies to include more assiduously questions of risk, migration, ethnic profiling, securitisation, exceptionalism and biopolitics, among others (Amoore and de Goede, 2008; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008; Booth and Dunne, 2002; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Jackson, 2005; Neocleous, 2007; 2011).

Although elaborating specifically on international terrorism and on how 9/11 changed international security is not the goal of this section, those phenomena are nonetheless what prompted the political conditions that enabled NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. Put synthetically, the USA launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on 7 October 2001 with the help and support of a coalition of free-willing nations. Its immediate objective was to pursue those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, eradicate Bin Laden's network, and take action against the Taliban regime that sponsored him



(Flockhart, 2012: 90-91). OEF was justified by the US according to a “two-track approach of national interest-based counter-terrorism alongside so-called humanitarian relief efforts” (Holland and Aaronson, 2014: 8), which implied that the language of national security primarily sustained the need to avoid a second 9/11; secondarily, the terrorist nature of the Taliban regime and its human rights abuses arose as an additional concern. There has been critical research suggesting that, despite US administration’s claims that avoiding civilian casualties was a top priority, OEF launched such a fulminant campaign upon vulnerable civilians that the number of casualties could only outdo the principles of justness, proportionality, morality and responsibility of the operation (Benini and Moulton, 2004; Conetta, 2002; Wheeler, 2002).

As a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked for the first time in its history the Article 5 of its Charter, which not only meant that the attacks on the US represented an attack on all members of the Alliance, as “It also testified to our recognition that what had been attacked, in addition to thousands of innocent people, were the values on which our societies are based” (NATO, 2001b: par. 1). In practical terms, this implied Article 5 could be stretched beyond territorial defense to include defense against terrorism, which involved increasing intelligence cooperation, overflight rights, deploying naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, and the provision of AWACS planes to the US (De Nevers, 2007: 37). On 8 October 2001, the day after the US and the UK began the military intervention in Afghanistan, NATO SG Lord Robertson expressed the Alliance’s military support and readiness for consultation and defensive measures if necessary, and thus specified: “This operation is not directed against the people of Afghanistan. It is designed to strike against al-Qaida terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan” (SG Lord Robertson cit. in NATO, 2001a).

Terrorism had been acknowledged in NATO’s new Strategic Concept of 1991 (par. 12), and then recalled in that of 1999 (par. 24) as a risk possibly affecting the Alliance’s security interests in the post-CW context, to which arrangements for consultation and response coordination already existed (NATO, 1991: par. 12). In this sense, and in the light of what has been seen so far regarding NATO’s openness to change and management of conjunctural temporality, the novelty of NATO’s performance within the context of the global counter-terrorist effort lies in a “seemingly endless, but often exaggerated, narrative of NATO failure and decline” (Sperling and Webber, 2009: 501).

The novelty would reside rather in technical and operational issues, than in real identity change. Indeed, after 9/11, the Prague Summit of 2002 inaugurated NATO's new "discourse of transformation" determining its ensuing narrative of adaptation to the changes of the twenty-first century, by "transforming NATO with new members, new capabilities, and new relationships with our partners" (NATO, 2002: par. 1).

[t]he Prague Summit began to pull the Allies towards even more radical change. An enlargement summit became a transformation summit. Prague was so important a watershed because it encompassed transformation across the whole spectrum of Alliance business. This extended from new members and new partnerships with the European Union and Russia through new capabilities and new missions to the most radical reform ever of the Alliance's internal processes and structures (SG Lord Robertson, 2003).

Moreover, in Prague, Allied members also endorsed a new Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism as an official NATO policy (NATO, 2002: par. 4.d), which identified four military roles for Alliance operations against terrorism: defensive measures; consequence management in the event of an attack against a member state; offensive counterterrorism; military cooperation with non-military forces. Globally, "NATO's military guidelines are more defensive and reactive than those of the United States" (De Nevers, 2007: 37-38).

The Alliance was involved in "formal combat operations to remove the Taliban from power" since 2001, with the US providing over 90 per cent of the sorties over Afghanistan, delivering 99 per cent of the bombs (Barany and Rauchhause, 2011: 298). However, NATO's military command in Afghanistan started in August 2003, in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a force assigned by the UN with the primary objective of enabling the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never become a safe haven for terrorists (NATO, 2015). The initial mandate of ISAF was restricted to maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas from enemy combatants. But in October 2003 the United Nations Security Council authorized the gradual expansion of ISAF's mission throughout Afghanistan; ISAF missions and operational responsibilities expanded beyond Kabul, to provide security and reconstruction assistance throughout Afghanistan, and also to aid in the fight on terrorism, drugs and organised crime (Barany and Rauchhause, 2011: 298; Sperling and Webber, 2009: 501).

Although many security problems assail Afghanistan, ranging from crime and

drug trafficking to terrorism, ISAF had rather a limited mandate that did not cover missions other than peacekeeping, so formally it did not have a *counterterrorist* mission (De Nevers, 2007: 54). Still, the command of ISAF implied NATO was the main entity responsible for security. In very practical terms, NATO assumed a central role in the global war against the Taliban, by assisting actively the reform of the security sectors not only of Afghanistan, but Iraq as well. Since 2004, NATO has played a central role in training Iraqi security forces, involving the mentoring of Iraqi military officers, and their training at NATO facilities (De Nevers, 2007: 52). In Afghanistan, the same role was actively endorsed in 2006 as the mission was expanding territorially to the entire country, through further mentoring and equipping of the Afghanistan National Army and police, aiming at training 70,000 troops by 2010 (Barany and Rauchhause, 2011: 299; Kay and Kahn, 2007: 171).

Furthermore, the overall situation in Afghanistan required a “comprehensive approach” involving more than military means, following the view that local security was contingent to reconstruction and development (Williams, 2011: 64). Specifically, the “comprehensive approach” was applied through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), consisting of joint civil-military teams intended to “help expand the legitimate governance of the central government across Afghanistan, enhancing security through security sector reform and reconstruction efforts” (Williams, 2011: 68). Besides the provision of security, PRT’s are directly involved in nation-building tasks, such as the construction of schools, hospitals and the digging of wells, thus forming a strategy for Afghanistan that combines security, governance, and development (Gheciu, 2008: 108).

Therefore, in terms of the referent of security, although an international military presence in Afghanistan emerged primarily through OEF to basically defend US national security and arguably the international community from Al-Qaeda, NATO’s referent of security within ISAF was formally the new Afghan government. In practice, such mission revealed very difficult. Afghanistan’s endemic insecurity, and other factors such as the shifts in alignments and threat perceptions caused by systemic changes, NATO’s limited military capabilities and the very nature of the fight against terror limited NATO’s role (De Nevers, 2007: 35). Even so, to Trine Flockhart, the NATO operating in Afghanistan is entirely different from the NATO of the Cold War; not only has the Alliance transformed from an organisation characterised by a “practice of talking” to a “practice of doing”, as it

also changed its narrative from “NATO bringing democracy” to “NATO bringing stability” in the case of Afghanistan (Flockhart, 2012: 78-79, 83). As previously done in the sections on NATO’s missions in the Balkans, the present one will now focus on the particular contribution of NATO’s presence in Afghanistan for the conceptualisation of the civilised subject of security.

### **Terrorists among the civilised, or civilisation amidst terrorism?**

There is a major factor defining the post-9/11 cultural and ideological zeitgeist, that is, the revival of Huntingtonian claims shaping discourses of civilisation versus terrorism. It will be seen that discourses on civilisation and terrorism ultimately construct the civilised subject of security as a de-politicised one, in essentialist/anachronistic terms, and point to the ever-growing persistence of cultural configurations of security.

NATO discourses and narratives on Afghan subjects of security and civilisation need to be related to predominantly American intertextual elements. Individual security and civilisation in Afghanistan are indeed topics very dependent on US discourses and policies, which can be framed within two fundamental sets of interrelated discourses: the “civilisation discourse”; and the “terrorism discourse” (Jackson, 2007).

The “civilisation discourse” emerged as a rallying argument very soon after 9/11, more evidently in US speeches before and during OEF:

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. **This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight.** This is the fight of **all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.**

We ask every nation to join us. [...] Perhaps the **NATO Charter reflects best** the attitude of the world: **An attack on one is an attack on all.** The civilized world is rallying to America's side (Bush, 2001; emphasis added).

Civilisation was presented as matter of all of those who, in the world, believe in progress, pluralism, tolerance and freedom. It is interesting that the US President referred to the NATO Charter and the NATO motto. In fact, their respective elaboration of civilisation is much alike: defending civilisation is to defend its values. However, when it comes to US foreign policy specifically, there is a strong neoconservative influence shaping perceptions of Otherness according to binary narratives of eradication of Evil, displacing complex or critical analyses of what happened and why (Der Derian, 2009: 265). Indeed, religious

ideas plays a central role in neoconservatist ideology and discourse, and this relationship was cemented by interpretations of 9/11 as an apocalyptic contest between Good and Evil (Haynes, 2005: 404-406). To Michael C. Williams (2007: 92), the rise to prominence of neoconservatism in this period demonstrates a vivid relationship between culture and security, in which symbolic power remains essential. As a consequence,

The logic of **political conflict is transformed into cultural conflict** – and political issues become susceptible to **representations** of where one stands in relation to authentic American **culture and its values** – and, by extension, **how much one values the country, culture**, and ‘ordinary’ people of the country. Whether one shares a concern to defend those values and virtues, or is instead part of a perfidious liberalism that opposes and undermines them, becomes a **defining fulcrum of political identification, representation and rhetoric**. In this way, opposition to American foreign policy (or at least to the foreign policies that neoconservatives support) can be cast as **part of a larger and longer struggle over whether one values America itself** (Williams, 2007: 119; emphasis added).

Thus put, Williams’ words evoke clearly the renewed importance of culture, representations, values, and rhetoric, perverting the sense of the political. In other terms, these elements are part of an unconscious ideology that guides a larger and longer struggle of valuing a geopolitical unity, which in this case is the US. This is also revealing of a symbolic struggle occurring within the American Self, through which there is a quest for reasserting identification and interdependence processes.

These perspectives on the role of culture put recent assertions of a global resurgence of religion into perspective. As 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror seem to have redefined world order in a much darker, more apocalyptic way, disrupting the very notion of normality, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger argue that world politics after 9/11 displays in fact much more continuity than change: “rather than heralding a new era in world politics”, 9/11 was merely “symptomatic of certain key aspects of world politics” that seem to have been forgotten in the aftermath of the attacks (Kennedy-Pipe and Rengger, 2006: 539-540). The one thing that is new, according to them, is the *belief* that there has been a great change in the architecture of world politics, which the authors deem is a delusion that has contributed to a very dangerous set of assumptions generating far greater insecurity than delivering security (Kennedy-Pipe and Rengger, 2006: 540).

As a consequence, together with the role of cultural representations highlighted above, beliefs also play an important role in post-9/11 conceptions of security, which is indicative of a feeling of insecurity regarding how to categorise and define the Self and

Otherness. In this context, the “civilisation discourse” typical of the Bush administration is significant, for it ultimately sets the terms of who is the civilised and who is the uncivilised, by defining what the appropriate conduct is and its opposite on a global scale.

Now, in relation to the “terrorism discourse”, Richard Jackson (2007) defines it as consisting of terms, assumptions, labels, categories, and narratives used to describe and explain terrorism. This discourse, Jackson says, has emerged as one of the most important political discourses of the modern era, alongside climate change, human rights, global poverty, and arms proliferation (Jackson, 2007: 394).<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, the “terrorism discourse” contains the discursive foundations of the “Islamic terrorism discourse”, another strand composed of a series of oppositional binaries, labels and terms, such as the savage versus the civilised, the medieval versus the modern, the West versus the Islamic world (Jackson, 2007: 401). In this context, Dana Cloud (2004) has explored the role of widely circulated images of Afghan people in building public support for the 2001-2002 US war with Afghanistan. She argues that representations of women participate in the category of “clash of civilisations”, which constitutes a verbal and a visual ideograph linked to the idea of the white man’s burden:

They construct paradigmatic binary oppositions, encourage viewers to adopt a paternalistic stance toward Afghan women, and offer images of modernity, aligned with light, in contrast to the darkness of chaos and backwardness. Through these contrasts, the images enact the clash of civilizations and take part in a dominant cultural and political rhetoric justifying U.S. intervention on the basis of that ideograph (Cloud, 2004: 291).

A paternalistic stance towards women of Afghanistan is thereby evoked through the construction of binary oppositions of Self and Other, and the modernity is figured as liberation. These images ultimately participate in a set of justifications for war, while the actual motives for war are also blurred by statements such as the following:

Afghanistan's people have been brutalized -- many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.  
[...] Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.

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<sup>43</sup> Jackson’s discourse analysis focuses on the relationship between textual and social processes, and it is particularly concerned with the politics of representation. His research is based on more than 300 written and spoken English-language ‘Western’ texts authored primarily between 2001 and late 2006, including: official speeches and documents of senior policy makers; books, articles and reports by major think-tanks, public intellectuals and journalists; and academic books and scholarly articles in the core terrorism studies and international relations journals (Jackson, 2007: 395-396).

We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions -- by abandoning every value except the will to power -- they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies (Bush, 2001).

Bush's words depict the Afghan people as the victim of a brutal imposition of religious practices. Accordingly, the Taliban leaders are the responsible for an irrational and barbarous conduct, which is the same kind as "the murderous ideologies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century". Having in mind that those leaders are also those who were supporting and harbouring a terrorist organisation, which motivated OEF, they ultimately represent both Evil for the civilised world and the Afghan population. As a consequence, the link between Islam and terrorism was established. To Mahmood Mamdani (2002), that link became a central media concern following 9/11, resulting in new rounds of culture talks, and religious experience has turned into a political category, differentiating good Muslims from bad Muslims, rather than terrorists from civilians. Mamdani nonetheless questions the tendency to read Islamist politics as an effect of Islamic civilisation, and Western power as an effect of Western civilisation, because cultural explanations of political outcomes tend to avoid history and issues. Therefore, when 9/11 is placed in a historical and political context, terrorism is best understood as a modern construction (Mamdani, 2002: 766).

After this, how can NATO's role as commander of ISAF be understood in relation to the Afghans, as both subjects of security and civilised subjects? Since the beginning, NATO discourses as commander of ISAF employed a clear focus on its peace-supporting role towards the local subjects. When the Alliance took command of ISAF on 11 August 2003, NATO Deputy SG Alessandro Rizzo, would thus set the tone at the ISAF assumption ceremony:

[o]ur ceremony today demonstrates that the international community remains **committed to Afghanistan, to its people, and to its future**. As of today, NATO will assume the strategic command, control and coordination of ISAF. The Alliance is taking on this mission for one simple reason: to ensure that ISAF has the support and the capability it needs to **help Afghanistan achieve the peace and security** this country deserves.

[...]

NATO has long experience in **leading and sustaining peace-support operations**, and that experience will be brought to bear here in Afghanistan, in **support of ISAF and the Afghan National Authority**.

[...]

So to the **people of Afghanistan**, I say to you that we are here today to forge a strong partnership. [t]o **assist you** in achieving your own dreams and **aspirations for peace and security, unity and freedom and human dignity**

**and liberty. All principles we share with you. All principles upon which NATO was founded** (NATO Deputy SG Rizzo, 2003; emphasis added).

On the same day, the Commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant-General Götz Gliemeroth also stated:

[t]he main message that I would like to deliver is that **we are here in Kabul primarily to support the Afghan Transitional Authority** and, thus, **the Afghan people on their way to a secure, democratic structure.**

[...]

Personally, I'm looking forward to getting **to know the inhabitants of Kabul** and to **making close contacts within the community.** No doubt the **Afghans have a fine reputation for their friendliness, openness and courtesy towards the soldiers of ISAF and to the international community as a whole.** The vast majority of the population of Kabul fully understands our mission: **We are here to assist the Transitional Authority** in its stated goal of **establishing a secure environment** for the **benefit of all.**

[...]

**The overwhelming support of the people of Kabul** is obvious. But there still exists an **extremist minority** who will **hide behind the peaceful citizens of Kabul,** making for a **highly complex security environment.**

And finally, but not less important, we must ensure that people do not have false expectations of ISAF. **We are in Kabul to assist the government** in establishing security, and the Afghan people must understand that. Therefore the **primary responsibility rests with themselves and their Transitional Afghan Authority** (Lieutenant-General Götz Gliemeroth cit. in NATO, 2003; emphasis added).

Both these excerpts point alternatively to either Afghanistan, the Afghan Transitional Authority or the Afghan people as the recipients of security that is to be supported – and not *provided exclusively* – by ISAF: “help”, “support”, “assist” are the recurring words used to depict NATO’s role in Afghanistan. The ultimate objectives to be achieved in Afghanistan are set as “peace and security”, “a secure, democratic structure”, “a secure environment”, but also the *values* of “unity and freedom and human dignity and liberty”, which are the founding principles of NATO, presented as universally sharable. Moreover, when these speeches apostrophise directly the Afghan population, they reassert NATO’s role as one that is limited to mere support, in a way that also projects the responsibility onto that very people: “responsibility rests with themselves and their Afghan Transitional authority”. This fairly illustrates Renée de Nevers’ argument that NATO plays a “largely supportive role in US efforts to combat terrorism” (2007: 35), or Mark Neocleous’ (2011) claim that NATO’s performance in Afghanistan may be seen as that of a “police of civilisation”, in which enforcement lies ahead of defense. Alexandra Gheciu has been all the more assertive:

[N]ATO’s vision of its role in Afghanistan revolves around the idea of



identifying and defeating those Afghans seen as the enemies of modern civilization, by virtue of their opposition to the norms of human rights, the rule of law and democracy, and, simultaneously, helping and training the other Afghans, teaching them to build good institutions of governance and, more broadly, to build a modern, reliable polity. The civilian population is thus seen as both the referent of security [...] and the source of threat—as certain individuals/groups within the population support the Taliban and potentially Al Qaeda and as such pose a threat both to the Afghan government and the process of state reconstruction, and to international security (Gheciu, 2008: 108).

According to Gheciu's statement, NATO's command of ISAF upholds the values of civilisation – not the Western though, but the *modern*. Therefore, barbarism in Afghanistan would be conceived in relation to temporality, and not geography, which demises the influence of the geo-cultural agency of a civilising process in Afghanistan, so as to emphasise *content* instead, i.e., structures, institutions, norms, statebuilding. Yet, another important issue transpires in Gheciu's account, which is the duality of the civilian population, as it is both the referent of security and the source of threat, given the complexity of the Afghan context, in which terrorism intertwines with insurgency. In this sense, the Afghan subject of security is held by international forces on the ground as having both the potential for civilised behaviour when/if he inserts in that process of statebuilding peacefully, and the potential for terrorist activities.

In this context of exacerbated duality, the role of PSYOPS has been central. As put by Thomas E. Nissen (2007),

[i]t must be recognised at all levels **within NATO and ISAF** that the **information war**, or the **battle of perceptions**, is just as important, if not more so, as the physical battle. It is **winning the local population**, and not the physical destruction of the Taliban, that will win this battle, even though the destruction of pockets of resistance is necessary (Nissen, 2007: 9; emphasis added).

Afghanistan is thus the theatre of a “battle of perceptions”, in which information is a critical tool used differently by the parts, creating fundamental asymmetry in the information war – in opposition to the kinetic dimension of NATO's progression. In this context of fundamental struggle for the dominating knowledge, information and psychological operations are indeed crucial.

According to Arturo Munoz (2012), who has extensively documented the US Information Operations in Afghanistan since 2001, PSYOPS were employed since the beginning of the US military intervention in Afghanistan to gain popular acceptance for the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the presence of foreign troops, and the creation of a democratic national government. The work mentions the basic Information Operations and

PSYOP themes used by the US over the years, such as: *the war on terror justifies US intervention; coalition forces bring peace and progress, just like the Afghan government and the Afghan National Security Forces do; Al Qaida and the Taliban are enemies of the Afghan people; monetary rewards are offered for the capture of Al Qaida and Taliban leaders, as well as for turning in weapons; US forces have technological superiority over the Taliban; democracy benefits Afghanistan, and all Afghans need to participate in elections* (Munoz, 2012: 32).

Likewise, NATO's "master narrative" in Afghanistan was regularly defined and reviewed by its Media Operations Centre, in a guidance document "designed to assist all those who play a part in explaining the situation in Afghanistan and the ISAF mission, but especially those who deal with the media" (NATO, 2008: 1), regarding how the main topics should be treated publicly, including the transfer to lead security responsibility, civilian casualties and human rights, why NATO is in Afghanistan, and the enduring issues of the mission. In October 2008, for example, some of the main headline messages to be disclosed were (NATO, 2008: 1-3):

- *Afghanistan remains NATO's number one priority. This is not an operation of choice, it is one of necessity. We are in Afghanistan for the long term under a United Nations mandate for as long as we are needed and welcomed by the Afghan people.*

- *The significant increase in security incidents this year is due to an increased use of asymmetric tactics by insurgents, an increase in the operational presence of ISAF and ANSF, and an increased freedom of action for insurgents operating from inside Pakistan. [...]*

- *To minimise the risk of harming civilians COM ISAF has mandated his forces to take all measures deemed necessary to avoid the loss of life. These include directions on using airpower. A new methodology of civilian casualty reporting has also been established.*

- *It is important to emphasize that our actions are in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA)<sup>3</sup>. To this end, every opportunity should be taken to enable the Afghan authorities to articulate successes to the public.*

- *NATO does not use body counts as a measure of success.*

But despite an apparent initial success, disenchantment grew stronger with the Karzai administration as well as resentment against NATO and US military tactics negatively affecting local populations (Munoz, 2012: 1). Munoz refers to an ABC/BBC/ARD survey questioning Afghans on their opinions on air strikes, which suggested there is a strong tendency to blame the US, NATO and ISAF for harming civilians (Munoz, 2012: 41).

So, how can NATO efficiently fulfil its supporting role as provider of security if local perceptions see its presence as harmful? One may conceive that in such context information, representations and perceptions might be so important in NATO's discourses. Although the ultimate goal of a civilising process in Afghanistan equates to statebuilding, it was seen that the learning and socialisation processes basically focus on primary perceptions of amity versus enmity, security versus insecurity, terrorist activities versus inactivity. Those binaries ultimately compose the boundaries of civilised and uncivilised behaviour.

Finally, despite the revival of Huntingtonian claims, and the particularities of the discourses performed, the case of Afghanistan shares with BH and Kosovo an essential struggle for prevailing forms of knowledge and memory. It is a struggle unilaterally controlled by NATO, which strives for dominating the timeless values and symbols that are to be inculcated to local subjects of security. In that enterprise, the goal of security often appears secondary to the ideological stances of statebuilding processes. As an example, Lawrence Bartlett (2012) accounts for the appalling life of Afghan civilians at a time when NATO was discussing an exit strategy. Bartlett reports that in 2011 alone more civilians died (3,021) than the total number of NATO troops killed in 10 years (3,007). Besides, he also refers to the nearly 500,000 refugees as the highest number of the decade, which Peter Nicolaus, UNHCR's representative in Afghanistan, described as the "biggest mistake UNHCR ever made", while acknowledging that the international community also failed to help the refugees return home and find means of earning a living and reintegrate society (Bartlett, 2012). In contrast with BH and Kosovo, the refugee issue in Afghanistan has not only been clearly dismissed, as it also shows the different biopolitical concerns involved in each case.

## CONCLUSIONS

Of course, **mere survival is not enough**; what matters equally is how far and how well survival **reflects a more thoroughgoing adaptation to new circumstances**. NATO's efforts to do just that, however imperfect or ill-judged, is the real story of the last two decades. The epithets of decline, dissolution and even death are, in this connection, misleading; while they allude to the very real problems NATO has encountered, they usually refer to a single operational experience or historical moment. **Longer-term processes of change** are, consequently, ignored. In fact, from 1989 to 2009 the alliance has engaged in a **ceaseless process of transformation**—of structure and organization, of operations, partnerships and membership (Sperling and Webber, 2009: 491; emphasis added).

Thinking of NATO in terms of survival is rather pertinent. Almost everything changes constantly; events and social phenomena emerge, disappear or evolve. NATO has survived, but to what extent has its survival actually been at stake? The Alliance has proved to be adapting continuously. Not only has it managed to transform itself in face of structural change, as it has also transformed the contexts in which it operates, and led the way to normative evolutions in the field of international security as a self-proclaimed agent of change. However, amidst change, NATO has also managed to keep some things timeless and unchanged.

In this dissertation, it could be seen that some elements have been recurrent throughout NATO's existence. Indeed, the different shades of its civilisational purpose were evidenced, as well as its awareness of temporality, which it represents in very open and symbolic terms, according to its sense of linear progress and constant improvement. In this sense, NATO belongs to, and feeds itself upon, the very narratives on Modernity that Critical Theory seeks to deconstruct. NATO is thus a historical and ideological product of Modernity.

Conceptualising the “civilised subject of security” was my main theoretical contribution in this work. It not only allowed drawing the lines upon which to look at civilisation in a deeply critical way, as it also allowed coping with the complex relations connecting the individuals' sense of identity, their perception of security, and broader social processes. These connections were in fact established from different points: social cognition, sociological processes, behavioural transformations, power relations, symbolic representations, and psychoanalytical needs. All together, these connections helped picturing how the civilised subject of security has been in the West across time: a self-

restrained individual who looks up to the state in search for the symbolic representations necessary to his feeling of security. Throughout the last five centuries, civilised subjects of the West have grown on the sense of certainty and naturalness those symbolic connections unconsciously provide them. As they cumulated this assurance within their collective learning process, they cumulated symbolic power, and were able to impose upon and dominate non-Western Otherness with the actual belief that behavioural and social norms from the West could only be beneficial. The West built upon that belief and that symbolic capital to assemble the preliminary system of international security that basically ensured that Westerners would be secure outside the West, which included the liberty to *believe* and *behave* as they did in the West. All of this also contributed to the cumulated security experience of the West through time, so it has come to be comprised in the civilised habitus of Westerners, and constitute their unconscious history.

Historicising NATO's emergence in 1949 around a narrative of civilisational defense after WWII, implied looking at how the civilised habitus was at stake at the time. It was seen that the fundamental beliefs of Westerners about how civilised they really were, or about how uncivilised they could be, were strongly disrupted, which required a reassertion of justifications and symbolic meanings, in order to continue with the civilised habitus. The symbolic capital of the West had been destabilised as a consequence of both world wars, and needed reassurance. It was in this context that NATO was created and built upon its narrative of the origin. In this sense, NATO's civilisational referent of security is a fundamental part of its identity, a foundational principle, an original meaning.

The initial significance of the civilisational referent was sustained throughout the 1950's and 1960's, and the idea of civilisational unity was even reclaimed. More integration, or interdependence, was demanded by Western elites. The civilised habitus of the West was still on the process of reassurance, as the perception of security was not definite, or stabilised. As the 1970's brought strong ideological criticism to the West, civilisation became more discrete in NATO's discourses. Instead, the Organisation's values and usefulness were persistently reaffirmed by referring to symbols of security and memories, fed by the references to past achievements and glory. But it also adapted conceptually, to include issues such as poverty and underdevelopment, thereby expanding the Alliance's competences.

The new structural era that opened with the end of the Cold War provided NATO with many opportunities to dominate the new architecture of international security. Across the 1990's, this was operated on two interrelated levels simultaneously. One occurred with a political and institutional reinvention centred on new ways of relating to non-members and to potentially new ones, by gradually assimilating them into the Alliance's narrative about collective security and identity. In both cases, this process entailed conditioned socialising practices and learning processes that increased interdependence and regularised behaviour according to democratic standards, so that NATO's new partners and members would be ultimately seen as civilised, but would also see themselves as such.

The other concurring stage consisted of the Individualisation of Security, cumulatively anchored in the system of international security throughout the three interventions analysed. The Individualisation of Security was deconstructed and denaturalised by framing it within the ideological and normative context of the 1990's. The main findings regarding the Individualisation of Security suggested that the valuation of individuals when formulating security policies, or deciding to intervene militarily in third sovereign states, has particular political and ideological stances related to the maintenance of the status quo, and world order, empowering in fact the agency of international organisations. It was also seen that the positive connotation of the Individualisation of Security as a system of values may be used to justify and sustain biopolitical arguments and practices destined to control and contain human life.

The preliminary relationship between the Individualisation of Security and the civilising process was set in terms of an apparent rise of a cosmopolitan consciousness whereby the interdependence between individuals make states or groups of states to act in territories other than their own, in a sort of decentralising process of the original monopolistic state. The Individualisation of Security thus implies a transformation of behaviour in both men and states in international society, mostly through the inculcation of responsibility, and through the establishment of new boundaries for appropriate behaviour regarding individuals. The Individualisation of Security also produced an international discourse of discipline and normalisation: a conduct that is respectful of individuals should be natural for all states. For these reasons, the Individualisation of Security illustrates the extension of the civilising power through international organisations and, therefore, can be considered as another stage of the civilising process coming from the West.

The Individualisation of Security constitutes another stage of the civilising process because it has expanded the civilised habitus to non-Western spaces, by normalising the rationale for military intervention, and by transforming the beliefs and behaviours about security. In BH and Kosovo, that rationale was articulated in terms of NATO's ethical responsibility to intervene in defense of civilians, mostly ethnic minorities, victims of barbarian practices such as ethnic cleansing. The Individualisation of Security thus contributed to NATO's civilisational narrative in both those non-member countries, through discourses representing a geopolitics of morality, through barbarian analogies and comparisons. They represented local time and space as stagnated entities, in contrast with the timelessness of the Alliance's values and moral authority. They also employed memory discourses referring to WWII and the Holocaust, powerful features of the Alliance's symbolic capital.

In Afghanistan, the Individualisation of Security could be seen under two different manifestations; one related to the Afghan referent of security, the other encompassing all subjects of counter-terrorist policies. The specificities of this operation locate NATO outside Europe in a threat context radically different, in which discourses on civilisation and terrorism intertwine and confuse. For the first time, NATO acted under Article 5 of the Treaty, outside Europe. However, the discursive similarities to BH and Kosovo are related to the reference to the attack on the Alliance's values, hence the continuation of a moral argument for NATO's presence in Afghanistan.

Throughout the operations, the importance of NATO's public speeches and justificatory discourse decreased. The initial mediatisation of Bosnia and Kosovo might have corresponded to an initial normalising phase, in which the effort to inform and shape public consciousness was stronger.

In each of the three interventions, behaviour change was a major objective, ultimately aimed at another interrelated goal: regime change. For that, psychological operations were put in practice through different approaches destined to induce behavioural transformations, such as radio and television broadcasts or air-dropped leaflets. With the Individualisation of Security, humanitarian and biopolitical concerns mixed, and produced discourses framing each of these countries as spaces of behavioural duality, where barbarism was always the original problem, and civilisation only possible under certain controlled circumstances and standards. Whereas BH and Kosovo's

barbarism was represented in terms of a demonized leader and of essentialist ethno-political stereotypes, Afghanistan's barbarism was associated to both the possibility of terrorist insurgency and more basic battles of perceptions focusing on primary perceptions of amity versus enmity, security versus insecurity, terrorist activities versus inactivity.

In each case, NATO's justifications, narrative on change and overall discourse on civilisation was very often framed within binaries of civilised and uncivilised behaviour, denoting the continual influence of Logocentrism under Modernity, as a hegemonic system of representing the world. The consequence of Logocentrism is, as Richard Ashley suggested (1989), that hierarchical meanings are imposed regarding the non-members of the Alliance, and the non-Western world more widely. In this sense, all that NATO does not consider civilised within international security – identities, practices, behaviour, norms – is conceived as an essential political deviation.

The consequences of this limiting form of thinking and representing the world are quite perturbing, for they enhance and revive the global potential for war. Vivienne Jabri (2007) actually speaks of a “global matrix of war” that is now constituted of two dominant sets of practices; one includes the wars fought in the name of humanity, legitimised by discourses centred on care, rescue, and human rights (as in Kosovo). The other includes war confronting an enemy deemed to constitute an existential threat (as in Afghanistan). Discursively, they are both framed “in terms of progress and civilisation, a battle for modernity itself” (Jabri, 2007: 136-137). In a context of globally defined war, Jabri says, cultural difference is defined in terms of antagonism and mutual threat. Local grievances of distinct conflicts such as Kashmir or Israeli-Palestinian conflict have come to constitute “a global civilisational antagonism of cultures that pits western liberalism against Islam, which is ultimately the realisation of Huntington's “clash of civilisations” (Jabri, 2007: 138). Moreover, the global matrix of war has elevated the cultural difference, around two elements: the racialization of the Other in a late modern colonialist rendition of politics; and the depoliticisation of conflict through a culturalist discourse (Jabri, 2007: 161).

Whereas war presented a decivilising potential for both states and individuals at the time of WWII, one may now think of how the Individualisation of Security contributed to its civilising nature. Alessandro dal Lago and Salvatore Palidda interestingly use the expression “civilisation of war” to allude to this culture – both civilian and military – “that has been produced by Western countries in just under two decades in relation to the



conflicts with those who threaten (or are presumed to threaten) Western security” (Dal Lago and Palidda, 2010: 5). This definition, they claim, has nothing to do with either the stereotypical ideology of Western civilisation or the so-called clash of civilisations theorised by Huntington. Likewise, the intent of my work was rather to highlight the processual possibilities inherent to civilisation, quite in Elias’ manner:

As a precaution against misunderstandings perhaps one should add the obvious: the civilization of humanity itself is an on-going process and a possible aim of action. Nothing in present and past experiences justifies the assumption that the humanization of humanity is an impossible task, nor is there any good reason for the assumption that it is more likely than decivilization. It is neither more, nor less likely. It is a useful and indeed an indispensable task to bring to light more factual knowledge of civilizing and de-civilizing processes and the conditions under which they become operative in relation to each other (Elias, 1991: 82).

The Individualisation of Security as practised and performed by NATO is consistent with its original civilisational referent, for the security of the North-Atlantic area and wider ideological and normative influence have been upheld. But ultimately, it also transformed the dominant perceptions and fundamental beliefs of the twentieth century on war. From an aberration, failure and deviation of the civilised subjects, the justifications and memories of wars like those of BH, Kosovo or Afghanistan are likely to remain in the future as protective wars destined to secure innocent human lives from barbarian ideologies, either from the West, or from the non-West. This could be at the origin of how meanings of security are erroneously and unconsciously shaped.

The unconscious connections between civilisation and security have not been questioned by the Westerners themselves, for the symbolic capital of the West has remained largely undisrupted so far – although the current refugee crisis and the Great Britain’s exit from the EU may be increasingly challenging that. The feeling of security of the civilised subjects of the West should endure, as long as it is not unsettled by fundamental death anxieties coming from either their civilised space, or from what they perceive to be uncivilised Otherness. In this sense, it is likely that the control and contention of non-Western lives may remain outside unconscious history, precisely because the Western perception of security is what needs to be upheld by Western elites if its cohesion as a civilisation is to endure. Hopefully, this dissertation has revealed the epistemological potential of the concept of civilisation in making domination and control visible.

**Annex A. Kosovo Psyop Leaflets**





## **Attention VJ Forces!**

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Over 13,000 Yugoslavian service members have already left the armed forces because they can no longer follow illegal orders in Milosevic's war against civilians in Kosovo.

Remain in Kosovo and face certain death, or leave your unit and your equipment, and get out of Kosovo now. If you choose to stay, NATO will relentlessly attack you from every direction.

**The choice is yours.**

**NATO** 

03-G-09-L004



# NATO strikes

In the last weeks, Serb military and police, under direct orders from Slobodan Milosevic, emptied the villages and cities of Kosovo-Metohija, and burned or bulldozed thousands of homes. Heads of families have been pulled from the arms of their wives and children and shot. Thousands of innocent and unarmed people are feared dead. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are fleeing Milosevic's *pogrom*.

**Do not allow misguided patriotism to bind you to his atrocities.**

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

*Defending the Defenseless.*



**NATO will intensify its strikes until the forces used in the repression of civilians in Kosovo-Metohija are withdrawn, the refugees are allowed safe return, and your leaders resume meaningful negotiation.**

**NATO remains resolved to Defend the Defenseless in Kosovo-Metohija.**

04B-02-L001

**NATO**





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