Ana Filipa Gonçalves Catarino

Post-Abyssal Peacebuilding

Thinking Peace Through the Epistemologies of the South

Dissertação de Mestrado em Relações Internacionais, na especialidade de Estudos da Paz e da Segurança, apresentada à Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra.

Orientadora: Prof. Doutora Teresa de Almeida Cravo

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UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA

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Aos meus pais.

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ABSTRACT

Liberal peacebuilding, based on the ideology of liberal peace, became the hegemonic form of peace construction after the end of the Cold War. As performed by the United Nations (UN), liberal peacebuilding does not include endogenously developed answers to conflict in its formula for peace. The troubled relationship between the UN and the local has long been criticised by peace studies scholars, who have been exposing its hybrid character by recognising agency in local actors. My intention is to take these critiques further and draw attention to the importance of revealing the local understandings of peace that produced resistance to international intervention. For this, I suggest the integration by peace studies, of a new conceptual framework to deal with local epistemologies. The research question guiding this dissertation thus becomes: how can Boaventura de Sousa Santos' conceptual framework of the *epistemologies of the South* further the knowledge and practice of peacebuilding? The argument set out is that the liberal peace concept, as part of modern western thinking, constitutes an *abyssal line*, radically excluding all other forms of social, political and economic organisation found in post-conflict spaces that do not conform to liberal values. The epistemologies of the South are able to confront this hegemony through the practice of the *sociologies of absences and emergences* and the *work of translation*, which reveal local epistemologies. Integrating this framework into peace studies constitutes a conceptual advancement since it helps to explain different visions of peace, thereby contributing to a broader understanding of this concept and enriching *peaces* that are already known. Thus, the dissertation makes a twofold contribution: first, it constitutes an epistemological critique of the liberal peace as associated with modern Western thinking; second, it constitutes a conceptual contribution, since it explores different tools to investigate endogenous forms of peace. Its main goal is to inspire new research into peace and peace construction that follow the epistemologies of the South framework and thus help to deepen the understanding of these concepts.

Key-Concepts: Liberal Peace, Liberal Peacebuilding, Modern Western Thinking, Abyssal Global Lines, Epistemologies of the South.

RESUMO

A construção da paz de carácter liberal, baseada na ideologia da paz liberal, tornou-se hegemónica após o fim da Guerra Fria. Este modelo de construção da paz, desenvolvido pela Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU), não inclui na sua fórmula para a paz soluções para o conflito desenvolvidas endogenamente. A relação difícil entre a ONU e o local é há muito criticada pelos académicos dos Estudos para a Paz, que têm exposto o seu carácter híbrido, reconhecendo agência aos actores locais. A minha intenção é aprofundar estas críticas, chamando a atenção para a importância de expor os entendimentos de paz locais que produzem resistência à intervenção internacional. Para isto, sugiro a integração pelos Estudos para a Paz de um novo quadro conceptual para lidar com epistemologias locais. Neste sentido, pretende-se responder à pergunta: como pode o quadro conceptual das *epistemologias do Sul*, definido por Boaventura de Sousa Santos, desenvolver o conhecimento e prática sobre a construção da paz? O argumento exposto é que o conceito de paz liberal, associado ao pensamento moderno ocidental, constitui uma *linha abissal*, excluindo radicalmente todas as formas de organização social, política e económica existentes nos espaços pós-conflito que não se coadunam com os valores liberais. As epistemologias do Sul são capazes de confrontar esta hegemonia através da prática das *sociologias das ausências e das emergências* e do *trabalho de tradução*, revelando epistemologias locais. Integrar este quadro nos Estudos para a Paz constitui um avanço conceptual, uma vez que ajuda a expor visões de paz diferentes contribuindo para o alargamento do entendimento deste conceito e enriquecendo conceitos de paz já conhecidos. Desta forma, o contributo da dissertação é duplo: primeiro, constitui uma crítica epistemológica à paz liberal, vista como parte integrante do pensamento moderno ocidental; segundo, constitui um contributo conceptual, uma vez que explora diferentes ferramentas para a investigação de conceitos de paz endógenos. O objectivo principal é inspirar novas investigações sobre os conceitos de paz e de construção da paz que apliquem o quadro das epistemologias do Sul, aprofundando o conhecimento existente sobre estes conceitos.

Conceitos-Chave: Paz Liberal, Construção da Paz Liberal, Pensamento Moderno Ocidental, Linhas Abissais Globais, Epistemologias do Sul.

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INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 1990s the periphery of the international system was ravaged by several intra-state conflicts, which were qualified as a threat to international peace and security (Cravo, 2013: 22). In order to respond to the new international context after the Cold War and the rise of violence in the global South, the United Nations (UN) developed a set of mechanisms to deal with countries affected by conflict. These tools were consolidated in the famous report "An Agenda for Peace" that institutionalised, for the first time, the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, which aimed to "identify and support structures that (…) strengthen and solidify peace, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (UNSG, 1992: §21). The peacebuilding definition was deepened over the years in different UN reports (UN, 2000; UNDP, 2012) to express an increasing connection to the liberal peace. This paradigm can be briefly described as a combination of peace, democracy and a market economy, giving significant emphasis to the rule of law, human rights and neo-liberal development (Richmond, 2006: 292).

By that time, the UN already had some experience in peace missions, having tried to mediate conflicts such as the Israel and Palestine conflict and the conflict over Kashmir (Bellamy et al., 2010: 83-84). Yet, the five permanent members of the Security Council[1] were not in favour of major UN participation in the affairs of their allies and client states and the Cold War ideological divergences did not allow a coherent involvement, since it was not possible to agree on the promotion of a particular model of domestic governance (Paris, 2004: 15). Thus, only with the end of the Cold War is there an increase in the demand for peace missions and a willingness by UN member states to supply them.

The new climate in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States reduced their military and economic assistance to their allies (Paris, 2004: 16). This reality allowed a greater involvement of the UN in conflict and post-conflict scenarios, stimulated by requests for help in implementing peace accords and also by a more

[1] French Republic, People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States of America.

cooperative Security Council. There was a feeling of a triumph of liberalism and many in the West thought peace operations could be used to stop governments mistreating their people, resolve civil wars and spread democracy (Bellamy et al., 2010: 96). It was the "end of history", the idea that a huge consensus on the legitimacy of liberal democracy as the right form of government was emerging and that humanity might have come to the end of its ideological evolution (Fukuyama, 2007: 13).

Peacebuilding missions developed in this historical context. International relations were pervaded by a great optimism and reinvigorated collective security mechanisms were developed by the UN as a strategy for peace. The principles of market economy and multiparty democracy were endorsed as global recipes for development, peace and stability and international actors started to converge in the adoption of assertive responses to international challenges (Yannis, 2002: 825-826). The post-Cold War period witnessed the emergence and consolidation of the liberal peace, the ideological framework that has guided the United Nations peace action ever since.

Nevertheless, this development was not free of critiques. The first generation of critics also emerged in the 1990s and highlighted the practical issues of mission implementation and organisation (Cravo, 2013: 25-27). With the evolution of UN peacebuilding and a growing body of academic work on this subject, the critics started to pay attention to the model of peace being enforced. These critiques can be divided into two groups: the problem-solvers and the critics. The first identify different flaws in the liberal peace model but do not reject it, indeed, they make suggestions to upgrade its efficiency[2] (Cravo, 2013: 29). The critics[3] go further in their analysis, criticising the principles of liberal peace and stressing the hegemonic power relations that constitute peacebuilding practices (Chandler, 2010: 140; Cravo, 2013: 29). Hegemony is here defined in line with Gramsci's definition, as the capacity of a dominant class to exercise its power (in its political, economic, cultural and ideological dimensions) through the consent of the ones being dominated, without resorting to coercive tools (Sousa, 2005).

[2]See, for example, Paris, 1997, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004; Krasner, 2004; Ghani et al., 2006.
[3]See, among others, Chandler, 2006; Richmond, 2006; Duffield, 2007; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012.

Contribution

This dissertation is aligned with the second group of critics, nevertheless, it goes beyond the existing critiques of liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding by bringing to the discipline of international relations the concepts of an author who is mostly linked to sociological studies, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Professor at the University of Coimbra and author of "A Discourse on the Sciences" (1992), "Towards a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition" (1995) and "Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide" (2014). His concepts, alien to international relations, contribute to developing a broader framework of analysis and interpretation of the liberal peace, with the critique of modern Western thinking at its centre. Furthermore, they help to question liberal peace through the exposure of other forms of peace based on different epistemologies. The contribution of this dissertation is twofold: first it constitutes an epistemological critique of the liberal peace as associated with modern Western thinking; second, it constitutes a conceptual contribution, since it explores different tools to investigate endogenous forms of peace.

Research Question

In this regard, the starting point of this investigation is to understand how Boaventura de Sousa Santos' conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South (Santos, 2007, 2010a, 2014) can further the knowledge and practice of peacebuilding?

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

This work aims to provide a critical understanding of liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding and can therefore be included in the field of peace studies. A lot has been written on this (Fetherston, 2000; Richmond, 2004; Chandler, 2006; Jabri, 2013; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013), giving emphasis to the hegemonic character of liberal peace, which imposes a model of political, social and economic organisation that follows Western standards and disregards local features. The use of Boaventura de Sousa Santos concepts is intended to further these critiques and so contribute to a

better understanding of the power and domination system underlying liberal peace and more clearly explain its epistemological foundations. It is thus possible to deconstruct liberal peace's totalising character and lend visibility to locally constructed peace models. What is being highlighted is that liberal peace is associated with a very specific kind of knowledge and ways of reproducing it, which have been made hegemonic by modern Western science, through colonial and capitalist relationships with the global South. The South is here seen as a metaphor for the systemic and unjust human suffering caused by those relationships (Santos, 2014: 134).

Additionally, using the epistemologies of the South framework also constitutes a further step in the critiques developed on peacebuilding and the local (Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013, for example). These works recognise agency in local actors by assuming their capacity to contest international intervention. Liberal peace is, therefore, resisted through the practices of the everyday, consequently influencing the liberal model and producing hybrid forms of peace. Although the recognition of local agency and the realisation that liberal peacebuilding is not easily accepted by local actors is important evidence to justify questioning liberal peace, following Boaventura de Sousa Santos' concepts allows us to go beyond this reflection.

The author developed several concepts that I consider crucial to elucidating the way liberal peace operates and the effort needed to reveal alternative *peaces*. The first, which is the main analytical tool of this work, is the concept of *abyssal global lines* (Santos, 2007, 2010a, 2014). Modern Western thinking is considered an abyssal thinking that creates a system of radical distinctions. Consequently, the abyssal lines permanently erase any different realities existing on the other side of the line, claiming modern forms of thinking and universal organisation (Santos, 2010a: 23-24). The liberal peace model is seen here as one of these "abyssal lines". This concept is central to understanding how liberal peace has become a hegemonic peace of universal character without any apparent opponent.

In addition, the conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South is essential to establish alternatives to the current model of peace. This concept confronts the monoculture of modern science, recognising the plurality of heterogeneous knowledges (Santos, 2010b: 49). It makes an effort to rescue from oblivion alternative ways of thinking, which were often catalogued by modern Western science as beliefs and superstitions without any scientific validity. In order to renounce any general epistemology and therefore any form of universal peace, this dissertation associates the peacebuilding strategy with the *sociology of absences*, the *sociology of emergences* and the *work of translation* (Santos, 2002a), thus developing a post-abyssal peacebuilding model.

The sociology of absences intends to deconstruct the universal character of abyssal thinking by revealing epistemologies hidden until now and disregarded by modern Western thinking (Santos, 2014: 171-172). The sociology of emergences identifies the future possibilities and expectations enclosed in the knowledges brought to light by the sociology of absences (Santos, 2002a: 256). The work of translation allows mutual intelligibility among available and possible experiences in the world, as shown by the sociologies just mentioned (Santos, 2004: 179). These tools serve to describe the epistemological diversity of the world.

Relevance

This dissertation suggests using these concepts when investigating how peace is thought in post-conflict environments. Recognising the local as a space of resistance implies recognising its different epistemologies. Therefore, the relevance of this dissertation is to suggest employing a conceptual framework as yet unfamiliar to international relations when seeking alternative conceptions of peace, aiming to understand what their epistemological foundations are. The framework in question is the epistemologies of the South. In this way it is possible to have a broader understanding of local agency by revealing the perceptions of peace that have produced resistance to international involvement. The use of the epistemologies of the South supplements and deepens the work already achieved by hybrid peace theories, since explaining different epistemologies gives them relevance and renders

them as valid as modern Western thinking. Thus, the local is seen not only as space of resistance, but also, as a space of knowledge production.

Hypotheses

Therefore, this work aims to address three different hypotheses. First, analysing liberal peace through the concept of abyssal lines allows a broader understanding of its epistemological nature, constituting a deeper critique of this model. Second, using the concepts defined in the framework of the epistemologies of the South contributes to revealing alternative conceptions and practices of peace based on different epistemologies. Third, the UN can be one of the actors involved in a translation process aimed at establishing a dialogue between different models of peace.

Objective

The main goal of this dissertation is to integrate a new conceptual framework, the epistemologies of the South, into peace studies with the aim of inspiring new research into peace and peace construction and so deepening the understanding of these concepts.

Argument

The liberal peace concept as part of modern Western thinking constitutes an abyssal line. Likewise, it helps create a system of distinctions that radically exclude all other forms of social, political and economic organisation found in post-conflict spaces that do not conform to liberal values. Liberal peace is thus a hegemonic peace. The epistemologies of the South are able to confront this hegemony through the practice of the sociologies of absences and emergences and the work of translation to reveal different epistemologies. Therefore, integrating these concepts in the field of international relations constitutes an advance for peace studies, since these conceptual tools help identify different visions of peace and so contribute to a broader understanding of this concept and enrich already known *peaces*.

Methodology

This dissertation follows the hypothetico-deductive research model (Quivy and Campenhoudt, 2013: 144-145), in that it is based on an already existing theoretical and conceptual framework, the epistemologies of the South. Through the validation of the hypotheses exposed above it examines a very concrete reality, the practices of liberal peacebuilding. Thus, in order to understand what this concept means for the United Nations, it is necessary to analyse various official documents which constitute one of the primary sources used in this research. They span the period 1989 to 2012, reflecting a time that saw the emergence and consolidation of liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding, and include documents from the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary General and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, and similar bodies. The documents cover different areas: peace operations and peacebuilding, (UNSG, 1992, 2009; UN, 2000; UNPSO, 2010), security and development (UN, 2004; UNSG, 2005), democracy (UNSG, 1996), fragile contexts (UNDP, 2012), and peace mission mandates (UNSC, 1989, 1992b).

Another set of primary sources is the work of Professor Boaventura de Sousa Santos, since the argument of this dissertation is built upon his conceptual proposals. First, it is important to understand his critiques of modern Western thinking, relying on his earlier work (Santos, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995), since liberal peace is here criticised on an epistemological basis. Then, I explore the concepts defined in the more recently developed epistemologies of the South framework (Santos, 2002a, 2004, 2007, 2010a, 2010c, 2014), in order to develop the post-abyssal peacebuilding model.

The secondary sources of this work are composed of scholarly literature. First, on the liberal principles that influence liberal peace (Wilson, 1918; Hobhouse, 1971; Gray, 1988; Doyle, 1997; Falk, 2000; Kant, 2000, McGrew, 2002; Salle, 2010), then, on the discourse that legitimises its application (Helman and Ratner, 1992-93; Held, 1995; Zartman, 1995; Soysa and Gleditsch, 2002; Hill, 2005; Pureza et al., 2007). Sources on the peacebuilding concept and its evolution are also analysed (Galtung,

1976; Ramsbotham, 2000; Ottaway, 2002; Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005; Castillo, 2008; Parent, 2010; Bellamy et al., 2010).

Equally important is to have a broad perspective of the critiques of liberal peace and peacebuilding made so far. I first address those developed in the 1990s and the early 2000s (Durch, 1992; Mayall, 1996; Downs and Stedman, 2002). Then I look at the problem-solving critiques. The time span of the texts (2002-2006) was chosen because this period saw the consolidation of the critiques of the fast liberalisation of post-conflict environments (Paris, 2002, 2004; Krasner, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Chesterman et al., 2005b; Ghani et al. 2006). The time frame chosen for critical authors (2000-2013) is broader since they provide a wide-ranging set of critiques (Fetherston, 2000; Pugh, 2004; Richmond, 2004, 2007, 2009; Chandler, 2004a, 2006, 2008; Duffield, 2007; Newman, 2009; Jabri, 2013). Special emphasis is given to the critiques on the local (Richmond and Franks, 2009; Roberts, 2012; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013).

Dissertation Structure

This dissertation is structured in four chapters. The first, *Understanding Liberal Peace,* clearly defines the concepts of liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding. It sets out to identify the theoretical and ideological roots that underlie the bases of liberal peace. It also explores the development and implementation of peacebuilding in the UN framework for peace, thus contributing to a clear definition of the subject studied in this dissertation: liberal peacebuilding. The next chapter, *Liberal Peace Critiques*, presents a description of the different critiques made to liberal peace. It addresses the first generation of critiques, which are more concerned with practical issues of mission implementation and organisation, the problem-solving critiques, concerned with reforming liberal peacebuilding to make it more efficient, and then looks at the critical authors who question the liberal character of peacebuilding. This chapter is essential to establish my position regarding the already existing critiques of liberal peacebuilding and the local, and thus show the relevance of this work.

The third chapter, *Epistemologies of the South: Introducing Boaventura de Sousa Santos to International Relations*, contains an introduction to the author's work,

highlighting the concepts considered more useful to extend the critique of liberal peace and to contribute to the development of peace studies, with particular reference to abyssal global lines, sociology of absences, sociology of emergences and the work of translation. Lastly, the fourth chapter, *Learning From and With the South: An Approach to Peacebuilding,* relates this conceptual framework to the liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding and addresses the three hypotheses formulated above.

1ST CHAPTER | UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL PEACE

> The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and, to a very significant degree, the yardstick by which it is judged by the peoples it exists to serve (UN, 2000: § 1).

This chapter explores the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, as defined by the United Nations, one of the main tools for the maintenance of international peace and security deployed by the organisation since the end of the Cold War. The peace and security that the UN strives to keep are of a particular kind. They are rooted in liberal values and premises and thus represent the liberal peace, which became the UN´s mainstream approach to conflict. The goal is to define this peace while understanding where it came from, therefore the different theoretical currents of Liberalism that contributed to its formulation will be analysed. This is important to explain how the UN peace missions, and peacebuilding in particular, were conceptualised at a time of important changes in the international system and how intervention in other states' affairs became natural and justifiable. The historical evolution of these missions is also briefly described, to show their increased association with liberal peace. Finally, it will be explained how the UN endorses liberal peace assumptions in its policy documents.

LIBERALISM

There is this old idea that war is a consequence of authoritarian, anti-democratic ruling forces and that on the opposite side "liberal states (…) founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, (…) private property, and elected representation, are fundamentally against war" therefore "the very existence of liberal states (…) makes for peace" (Doyle, 1997: 206). This is the fundamental logic behind liberal peace: the idea the liberal state, due to the protection of individual political and economic rights is inherently more peaceful than other forms of rule. Liberalism is thus composed of a set of principles, common to all the branches of liberal theory, which can be identified in liberal peace.

The political label of liberal dates back to 1810 and the Spanish Courts, where a group of deputies rebelled against absolutist ruling. Nevertheless, the principles of liberalism are much older and its emergence is identified with England's Glorious Revolution of 1688, which resulted in the institution of religious tolerance and constitutional government. Liberal ideas were thus born from conflict and dissent with the abuse of political authority. Therefore, liberalism sought to answer the questions: who has the right to political authority and what are its foundations; what is the role of that authority and what are its limits (Kukathas, 2001: 123-124). Corentin de Salle (2010) identifies John Locke, Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek[4] as being among the main authors of liberal doctrine.

At the heart of liberalism lies the importance of freedom and liberty of the individual. To be free means to have the rights and privileges needed to be able to think and act autonomously, that is, to govern ourselves without being governed by others (Gray, 1988: 102-103). Being free represents the right to do what we believe we should do without constraints (Flamant, 1988: 14-15). Attached to this fundamental principle is a set of rights endorsed by liberalism. The first group can be summarised as freedom from arbitrary authority (Doyle, 1997: 207). These are considered negative freedoms and basically constitute the protection of each individual against society and, in particular, the power of state authorities (Flamant, 1988: 23). This group consists of both civil and personal liberties. Among these liberties can be found the right to be dealt with in accordance with the law, on the basis of an egalitarian and impartial application of the law (Hobhouse, 1971: 16-17); as well as liberty of thought and conscience, freedom of speech, writing, printing and peaceful discussion or religious liberty (Hobhouse, 1971: 19-20; Doyle, 1997: 207).

Doyle (1997: 207) defines the second set of liberties as the protection and promotion of the capacity and opportunity for freedom. This group includes social and economic rights such as equality of opportunities both in education and the

[4]Some of their most important works are: Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* (1960); Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, Volume I (1835) and Volume II (1840); Mill's *On Liberty* (1869); Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom* (1971); Hayek's *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, Volume I (1973), Volume II (1976), Volume III (1979).

pursuit of an occupation. It also envisages the establishment of free trade unions, the liberty of free contract and personal responsibility. The right to education, regular employment and health care are also among these liberties (Hobhouse, 1971: 23). To guarantee these two groups of rights we need a final set of liberties that define the political rights of the individual, that is, the organisation of the participation of citizens in collective life (Flamant, 1988: 23). Among these rights are democratic participation, representation and universal suffrage based on the ideal of sovereignty of the people (Hobhouse, 1971: 28; Doyle, 1997: 207). One of the main concerns of liberalism is how to guarantee these liberties and the peaceful coexistence of millions of free individuals. This problem has been solved through institutional answers and the building of the modern state (Kukathas, 2001: 125; Salle, 2010: 17).

The first institution developed by liberalism to secure individual freedoms and peaceful coexistence within societies was the rule of law. Besides guaranteeing judicial equality and impartiality, it establishes a set of general and abstract rules that should guide the application of justice (Salle, 2010: 17). Law is thus the first step to liberty. Men and women are only free when they are controlled by principles and rules that all society must obey (Hobhouse, 1971: 19). Attached to the primacy of the law is the development of the constitutional state. The power and authority of the state must be limited by a system of constitutional rules and practices that guarantee the respect of individual liberty and equality under the law (Gray, 1988: 123).

Abuse of power is also avoided by applying another principle of liberalism, the separation of powers. This means that the executive, legislative and judicial powers are deliberately attributed to different entities (Kukathas, 2001: 131). Another important principle is that the protection of individual liberties implies the defence of private property and a free market. The value of a free market lies in the fact that it allows the non-coercive coordination of economic activities (Gray, 1988: 105). Private property is connected with the autonomy of the individual and their effective capacity to implement their plans and act according to their values without constraints (Gray, 1988: 108-110).

In the context of the international system, liberalism is also concerned with the peaceful coexistence among states, therefore the principles that rule societies internally should also guide their international affairs. "It is of the essence of Liberalism to oppose the use of force, the basis of all tyranny" (Hobhouse, 1971: 27). Liberals consider that there are great prospects for an expanded state of peace to emerge; the expectation is not to resolve conflict through war but to address grievances through international law and formal and informal institutions (Doyle, 1997: 210). This is due to three common perceptions: (1) international anarchy signifies the absence of global government, and is not equated with a general state of war; (2) states' international behaviour reflects their internal organisation and thus how they relate to individual human rights; (3) the aims of the state are mainly related to the protection and promotion of individual rights (Doyle, 1997: 211). One fundamental principle that rules the thought of liberalism about international relations is that, as the world becomes free, the use of force becomes meaningless (Hobhouse, 1971: 27). Therefore, the existence of other liberal states constitutes an opportunity to cooperate in commerce and unite forces against non-liberal states (Doyle, 1997: 211).

These basic trends can all be identified as core assumptions of liberal peace. Additionally, there are two main liberal influences on this model: Immanuel Kant and internationalism and Woodrow Wilson and idealism. The liberal concept of peace has been evolving since the first writings on this subject, and continues today. Next, it will be shown how these liberal theories still influence world politics today.

THE LIBERAL PEACE

Kant and Liberal Internationalism

In his "Perpetual Peace" theory, Kant argued that it was possible for a widening zone of peace to emerge if states followed some basic principles of conduct. For him, the absence of world government is not associated with a general state of war since international anarchy is tamed and subject to the law. International right

was the precondition for a state of peace (Doyle, 1997: 253-255). To achieve peace among nations some principles should be respected in order to build confidence among states, Kant called them Definite Articles. The first stated that "[t]he civil constitution of each state shall be republican" (Kant, 2000: 124), meaning the state should be able to combine moral autonomy, individualism and social order while maintaining private property and a market oriented economy. Concurrently, it should preserve juridical freedom on the basis of a representative government with separation of powers (Doyle, 1997: 257).

The second Article indicated that "[t]he law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states" (Kant, 2000: 124). He believed liberal republics would progressively establish peace among themselves through this federation. This would be an ever-expanding project able to create a separate peace (Doyle, 1997: 257). Finally, he thought "[t]he rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality" (Kant, 2000: 125). This article established a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. Foreigners should not be treated with hostility, and conquest and plunder were unjustifiable (Doyle, 1997: 258). This permits a constitutionalisation of peace and creates the necessary conditions for "Perpetual Peace". It is important to note that liberal republican states would maintain peace among them but the state of war would still be real between liberal states and non-liberal ones.

Following Kant's principles, peace among nations would be possible if states were constituted by representative, republican governments, respecting elected legislatures, the separation of powers and the rule of law, if there was a commitment to respect the rights of other liberal republics, and if social and economic interdependence was achieved (Doyle, 1997: 286-287). Kant laid the foundations for the development of a specific branch of liberal theory, liberal internationalism. In brief, it argues that "mutually reinforcing dynamics of transnational economic integration, the diffusion of liberal democracy and the growth of international governance creates the conditions for an expanding liberal zone of peace (…)" (McGrew, 2002: 268). It is believed that international cooperation is the rational answer to conflict between states that share a considerable level of interdependence

(McGrew, 2002: 274), therefore economic and commercial relations between states foster peace. An international market is also regarded as a source of peace since it "removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the dire sphere of state policy" (Doyle, 1997: 283).

Another factor that contributes to a general state of peace is the way states are internally ruled. Republican representation and separation of powers introduce domestic restraints on the waging of war, since citizens are asked, through their representatives, to give their consent on virtually every declaration of war (Doyle, 1997: 280). Liberal internationalists consider that war is mainly the result of the failure of internal political structures, thus peace also resides in transforming the ruling structures of states, in addition to reforming the international order (McGrew, 2002). This emphasis on internal structures is also recognised by the UN in its policy documents concerning the maintenance of peace, as will be shown later.

Regarding the conduct of international affairs, liberal internationalism sees international law as a fundamental piece for the maintenance of world stability, mainly because it ensures respect for the legitimate rights of all citizens and republics (Doyle, 1997: 282; McGrew, 2002: 270). Global governance is also key in dealing with questions of war and peace. It is considered that an international system of governance is needed to regulate and coordinate extensive areas of global activity and secure conditions for the maintenance of world peace and a liberal world order (McGrew, 2002: 270-273). This international system is composed of states that share their power with international organisations, transnational civil society, the corporate sector and other agencies. Another concern of Liberal Internationalism is to create conditions for the democratic and accountable working of this system (McGrew, 2002: 278).

These are necessary conditions for the emergence of a "Democratic Peace": the idea that liberal states do not go to war with other liberal states and tend to be in relations of amity between them (Dunne, 2001: 171). Behind this faith lies a very simple logic: if liberal democratic states are a guarantee of world peace there is a need to expand this form of rule and so widen the zone of peace. This reasoning

provides legitimacy for the "export" of Liberalism beyond its Western core and for interventionist practices of the West in the global South (Dunne, 2001: 172; McGrew, 2002: 277). Liberal values are being spread in order to expand the zone of peace through humanitarian intervention after the collapse of state structures, institutional leverage and conditionality (Dunne, 2001: 172-173). This kind of rationality is also expressed and used as justification for intervention in UN policy documents, as shown below.

Idealism

As mentioned earlier, another great influence on liberal peace is idealism. It considered that the maintenance of world peace required a "system of governance which had democratic procedures for coping with disputes, and an international force which could be mobilized if negotiations failed" (Dunne, 2001: 167). Basically, what was being defended was a "rule-governed global security system that protected states threatened by aggressive war" (Falk, 2000: 245). "Law-abiding states in these collective security arrangements were to come together as collective law enforcers against any state committing aggression" (Viotti and Kauppi, 2014: 135). The idealist values became more current after the scourge of World War I.

The greatest contribution of idealism to the development of liberal peace is its practical influence. It lays the necessary doctrinal foundations for the development of institutional arrangements to facilitate peaceful coexistence among states. The first attempt to institutionalise peaceful cooperation was the League of Nations, widely supported by the United States President Woodrow Wilson. He was one of the biggest enthusiasts of the creation of an international organisation that could help maintain peace after the end of World War I, as is evident in its fourteen-points discourse: "a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike" (Wilson, 1918: XIV). The League of Nations was supposed to enforce international law. There was a belief that international relations would gradually evolve to accomplish the ideals of justice and fraternity, and that rationality and morality inherent to the human being would also be stated in

diplomatic relations. This was a reflection of the confidence in states' goodwill and spirit of cooperation (Miyamoto, 1999: 30-32).

Although the League of Nations failed to attain its goals, mainly because the United States did not join, despite Wilson's enthusiasm, the idea of an organisation that would practise collective security would survive until the creation of the United Nations in 1945. This institutional development is the first materialisation of liberal peace. The UN was created to regulate and maintain peaceful cooperation among states. Through its different institutions and agencies it has established the political and economic norms that should be followed by the international community of states. Although the Cold War had sometimes troubled the activity of this organisation, the foundations were laid for the hegemonic development of liberal peace. During this period several peace missions were deployed, almost all related to the processes of decolonisation. At the time, UN action was seen in terms of preventive diplomacy, that is, intervention to prevent the escalation of local conflicts into regional and global wars (Bellamy et al., 2010: 84).

More critical authors warn that the idealist support for the creation of a general association of nations is related to the idea that peace is not a natural condition and therefore must be constructed (Dunne, 2001: 173). This reasoning legitimises intervention in the name of the liberal good. Idealists consider that peace and justice are the product of deliberate design and thus encouraging or even coercing non-liberal states to become liberal democracies is only part of the process (Dunne, 2001: 173). Currently, there is the belief that liberal states have a duty to help those whose humanity is threatened, which provides a justification for intervention in the institutional, constitutional and civil society mechanisms that can harm the liberal peace (Richmond, 2007a). This duty is well expressed in the UN's "responsibility to protect":

> Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from (…) crimes against humanity. (…) The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to (…) take collective action (…) [whenever] national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations (UNGA, 2005a: § 138-139).

Idealism, as liberal internationalism, has contributed to the definition of the core values and assumptions of liberal peace. They are a mix of "self-determination, liberal democracy, neoliberal economic reform, human rights, a balancing of state and human security, international legal regimes such as international human rights and humanitarian law" (Richmond, 2007a: 58). Later in this chapter, there will be an analysis of how these values are expressed in UN policy documents and peace missions. For now, it is important to stress that the state is still central in the projection of liberal peace. Without states it is not possible to expand the liberal zone of peace, since they are still the fundamental units of the international system upon which all the assumptions described above are founded. "Specific states do make the liberal peace possible" (Richmond, 2007a: 58).

The Importance of the State and Good Governance

Like Kant, who argued that the internal government of the state had to be republican, the contemporary liberal understanding of the state also defines the specific characteristics each state must possess in order to belong to the expanded zone of peace. These states are liberal democracies. Liberal democracy has been endorsed as the right model of governance by an "international civil service at large", comprising state and non-state, military and civilian, international and local actors (Jabri, 2013: 8). Liberal democracy is consensually seen as an agent of progress and capitalism as the only viable economic system. Indeed, it is believed that ideological differences are gradually being replaced by universal democratic and market-oriented thinking (Held, 1995: 3-4). One important feature of liberal democracy is representative politics; this justifies the sovereign power of the state while at the same time placing restraints on that power. Representative democracy is seen as an important institutional progress towards solving the problem of matching coercive power with liberty.

According to Held, "liberal democrats argued [that] the democratic constitutional state, linked to other key institutional mechanisms, particularly the free market, would resolve the problems of ensuring both liberty and authority" (1995: 9). Soysa and Gleditsch reinforce this position by stating that "[o]pen markets

create prosperity, strengthen institutions and indirectly create the conditions that promote democracy. Social peace also follows under these conditions as an unintended consequence" (2002: 29). The importance ascribed to free elections and the free market is related to the idea that collective good can only be attained if individuals interact in a competitive environment, pursuing their satisfaction with little interference from the state (Held, 1995).

To sum up, liberal democracies should have most of the following characteristics: elected governments, free and fair elections, universal suffrage, freedom of conscience, information on all public matters, right to oppose the government and associational autonomy (Held, 1995: 129). For Ghani et al. the twenty-first century state's role is "to produce and re-produce an inclusive political, social and economic order underwritten by the rule of law" (2006: 110-111). This model will be endorsed by the UN in its peacebuilding missions. The organisation recognises that "democracy contributes to preserving peace and security, securing justice and human rights, and promoting economic and social development" (UNSG, 1996: § 16).

Although liberal democracy is now seen by the international community as the only right model for ruling the internal business of a country, it was only in the 20th century that it was established as the main governance system in the West and adopted as the ideal model of government for the global South. Nevertheless, with the intensification of globalisation and the general process of economic, political and social integration that states are undergoing, the ideas of political democracy and market economy are rapidly being spread (Soysa and Gleditsch, 2002: 26). With the affirmation by the international community of liberal democracy as the sole legitimate model of governance, those countries that do not follow it started to be accused of bad governance, which is perceived as one of the main causes of underdevelopment.

Governance matters to "insure quality institutions that provide a stable environment for economic growth (…) and serve to moderate forces that may be detrimental to peace and social well-being" (Soysa and Gleditsch, 2002: 52). According

to the UN "[d]emocracy today is receiving widespread acknowledgment for its capacity to foster good governance, which is perhaps the single most important development variable within the control of individual States" (UNSG, 1996: § 24). States that are not capable of following the principles of good governance are characterised as failing states. This reasoning, also present in UN policy documents, created a greater legitimisation for Western intervention in the global South. These states are seen as in need of fixing and are helped to achieve the liberal good.

The Failed State

Indeed, the failed, fragile and collapsed state discourse started to emerge at the end of the Cold War. Helman and Ratner (1992-93: 1-3) consider that this phenomenon had its origin in the vast proliferation of nation-states after the end of World War II, owing to the decolonisation process and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Ayoob also reinforces this position, asserting that "[s]tate breaking and state failure, both unavoidable accompaniments of the state-making process, lie at the root of most conflicts that the international system has witnessed since the end of the World War II" (2009: 95). These states lacked experience in government, had weak institutions and limited economic prospects, all combined with ethnic strife to create the conditions for the collapse of many states (Helman and Ratner: 1992-93). The danger was evident, "[d]isease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms and drug cartels (…)" abounded all through the global South (Kaplan, 1994: 5). The consequence was states that could no longer perform the functions needed for them to be considered as such (Zartman, 1995:5).

According to Zartman, "[a] state is the authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory", therefore it must perform the following functions: the state as the sovereign authority, the state as an institution and the state as the security guarantor for a populated territory (1995: 5). Collapse means these basic functions are no longer performed, thus, the state suffers a loss of legitimacy, no longer having the right to rule (Zartman, 1995: 5). The failed state is also incapable of

remaining as a member of the international community, since it threatens its neighbours with refugee flows, political instability and random warfare (Helman and Ratner, 1992-93).

For Ayoob, this happens because post-colonial states were forced to build nation-states in a limited period, having to follow international norms that demand respect for human rights and with liberal democracy limiting the state's ability to pursue state-making; inevitably these processes led to crises that became unmanageable (2009: 98-99). The collapse of a state is not a sudden phenomenon, it is a "long-term degenerative disease" (Zartman, 1995: 8) and therefore something must be done to save these states from "self-destruction" (Helman and Ratner, 1992-93: 11). This reality "has augmented the impression that there are two distinct zones in the international system – the zone of peace in the North and the zone of turmoil in the South" (Ayoob, 2009: 96).

The discourse on fragile, failed and collapsed states became more prominent after the 2001 September 11 attacks and the inclusion of these concepts in some Western states' policy documents (Yannis, 2002; Woodward, 2004). Since then, failing states have been considered the primary global threat to international security. Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, violation of human rights, poverty and conflict are considered to be the responsibility of states and therefore their intensification is a consequence of state weakness (Woodward, 2004: 1). The rising importance attached to state collapse is related to the perception that the disintegration of a state in a world divided into states constitutes a primary threat to the international system (Yannis, 2002; Woodward, 2004) and therefore "[s]ecurity in the world (…) is largely predicated on the internal stability of the member states of the international system" (Yannis, 2002: 823). The same is recognised by the UN: "[a]ny event or process that (…) undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security" (2004: 2).

Although the concepts of failing, failed and collapsed states have become common in international politics, that does not mean these terms are free of critiques. Susan Woodward argues that the idea of state failure raises several problems since it

"is not defined in a way that makes it possible to analyse empirically" and has very different meanings to the various communities intervening in these spaces (2004: 4). This author also points out that the discourse around collapsed states tends to ignore the international community's contribution to this phenomenon, blaming only the internal actors' performance. The role that the imposition of modern Western social and political imperatives on post-colonial states, plus the effects of different strategies of development programmes allied with conditionality, might play in state fragility is rarely acknowledged (Pureza et al., 2007: 4).

Yannis reaffirms this criticism, stating that the idea of failed states "automatically attributes the entire political responsibility and moral liability for state collapse to local communities – generating a moral justification for outside intervention to assist 'those who have failed'" (2002: 818). This assistance is motivated by the belief that the state model defined above, liberal democracy, is the right model to guarantee international peace and stability. All the literature on fragile and collapsed states starts from this background, defining a "normative model of the state – a liberal democratic state that is market-friendly, transparent, and accountable, with very specific institutional requirements" (Woodward, 2004: 5). Underpinning the failed state literature is Western universalism, relegating non-western states to the position of the deviant other that does not follow the norms of what constitutes a successful state (Hill, 2005: 148).

Despite the criticisms, this discourse has entered the policy-making arena. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), for example, holds that there is a general consensus on the main features of fragility: fragility is not a fixed state but a continuum; fragile contexts are at risk of – or are affected by – crisis and are unable to either prevent or recover from one without substantial assistance; in fragile contexts public authorities no longer have the monopoly on legitimate violence, the ability to deliver services, or the capacity to collect public revenues (UNDP, 2012: 16-17). The report thus summarises the mainstream discourse on fragile states and indicates the logical conclusion: collapsed states are not able to fix themselves and therefore have to be helped by the wider, stable and developed international society. This logic provides the necessary excuse for intervention to guarantee a state's internal stability

and the world's peace and security. As the fragile, failed and collapsed state concepts started to emerge at the end of the Cold War, so the UN mechanisms to deal with this phenomenon started to be conceptualised at the same time. They were developed in accordance with liberal tradition, with liberal peace assumptions at its centre. Next, the emergence and development of the UN instruments for the maintenance of international peace and security will be analysed.

UNITED NATIONS' PEACEBUILDING

The Origin of Peacebuilding

The peacebuilding concept, as well as the concepts of peacekeeping and peacemaking, were already present in academic debates long before the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali enshrined them in its 1992 "An Agenda for Peace" (Ramsbotham, 2000). One of the first authors to use these concepts was Johan Galtung. Broadly, he defined *peacekeeping* as a dissociative approach aimed at maintaining the absence of direct violence with the assistance of third parties (Galtung, 1976: 282-283). For him, *peacemaking* is anchored in the conflict resolution approach, it "should not only be seen as a way of avoiding war, but also as a way for mankind to progress, to transcend incompatibilities or contradictions (…)" (Galtung, 1976: 290).

Nevertheless, Galtung considered that to resolve incompatibilities was not enough, it was necessary to "turn toward deeper-lying factors in the relation between the parties, in order to arrive at some ideas about how a self-supporting resolution could be found" (1976: 297). Accordingly, he developed the concept of *peacebuilding* which, in contrast with the idea of peacekeeping, is an associative approach to conflict aiming, in an extreme case, at integration. Peacebuilding related direct violence, which is first addressed by peacekeeping, to structural violence. The goal was to find the structures that can remove the causes of conflict and offer alternatives to it, which means finding the structure of peace (Galtung, 1976: 297-298).

Underlying these distinctions are Galtung's (1969, 1990) various definitions of violence. He distinguishes between direct, structural and cultural violence. Direct violence, as the term implies, targets the individual and is also defined as personal violence (Galtung, 1969: 169-172). Structural violence, however, is an indirect form of violence, not linked to the subject-object relation; instead, it is built into the structure, meaning unequal power relations. Social injustice is thus considered a synonym for structural violence (Galtung, 1969: 171). The author later defined a third type of violence: cultural violence, which means the "aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion, ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify and legitimize direct or structural violence" (Galtung, 1990: 291).

To different forms of violence, Galtung opposes different types of peace. He considers that the idea of peace is attached to three distinct principles. First, the concept of peace should represent social goals agreed by large parts of populations; second, those social goals can be complex and difficult, but not impossible to attain; third, peace should be seen as the absence of violence (Galtung, 1969: 167). This said, the absence of direct violence is considered a negative kind of peace and the absence of structural violence a positive one. This distinction appears because the "absence of personal violence does not lead to a positively defined condition" while the absence of structural violence means social justice, which is a positive condition representing an egalitarian distribution of power and resources (Galtung, 1969: 183). The triangle of violence should be followed by a triangle of peace "in which cultural peace engenders structural peace, with symbiotic, equitable relations among diverse partners, and direct peace with acts of cooperation, friendliness and love" (Galtung, 1990: 302).

This theoretical discussion inspired Boutros-Ghali to advance his own definition of the different tools available to deal with conflict environments, namely, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and to add a new instrument to those: post-conflict peacebuilding. Nevertheless, his understanding of peace was much more limited than the one defined above. Galtung's peace triangle was reduced to Boutros-Ghali's liberal peace. "An Agenda for Peace" was his response to the request of the Security Council to prepare "his analysis and recommendations on

ways of strengthening and making more efficient (…) the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping" (UNSC, 1992a: 3) in the post-Cold War era.

Impregnated by the optimism of that period, Boutros-Ghali was convinced that a new opportunity had arisen for the achievement of the great goals of the UN Charter: the maintenance of international peace and security, the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the fostering of economic and social development (UNSG, 1992: § 3, 5). He, thus, addressed the "ways to improve the Organization's capacity to pursue and preserve peace" (UNSG, 1992: § 6). The first, *preventive diplomacy,* tries to avoid disputes arising between parties, to prevent already existing contests from triggering armed conflict and to contain the spread of violent conflict; secondly, *peacemaking* was defined as the action to bring the parties of the conflict to an agreement, based on the tools available in Chapter VI of the Charter; finally, *peacekeeping* involves the deployment of a UN presence in the field, consented to by the warring parties (UNSG, 1992: § 20).

Peacebuilding Definition

Post-conflict peacebuilding is the novelty of this report, which defines it as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (UNSG, 1992: § 21). After this first approach, the idea of peacebuilding kept on being conceptualised in subsequent UN reports. Later, peacebuilding was defined as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building something that is more than just the absence of war" (UN, 2000: § 13). The precedent for peacebuilding with the UN-type intervention came with the operation in Namibia (UNTAG), launched in 1989. For the first time, in addition to keeping the ceasefire in place, a UN peace operation was mandated to assist with the creation of democratic political institutions (Paris, 2004: 22) and to "ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations" (UNSC, 1989: § 6).

The functions attributed to peacebuilding include the "monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development", which are recognised as "valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred" (UNSG, 1995: § 47). Other tasks are disarming and the destruction of arms, reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, repatriating refugees, strengthening the rule of law, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and training security personal (UNSG, 1992: § 55; UN, 2000: § 13). Most of these activities fall within the mandates of the various programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the UN system, attesting to the complexity of these missions (UNSG, 1995: § 53). Peacebuilding, like the other instruments for peace and security, can only be employed with the consent of the parties to the conflict, and it requires integrated action and delicate dealings with them to prepare the ground before peacebuilding activities can be undertaken (UNSG, 1995: § 23, 48). "The top peacebuilding activities are those that will enhance peace consolidation, or that will significantly reduce the risk of relapse into conflict and begin to resolve key causes of the conflict. Priority-setting must reflect the unique conditions and the needs of the country (…)" (UNPSO, 2010: 13).

Peacebuilding should be seen as a complement to the other tools already available to the UN to cope with threats to international peace and security. Once preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping have all been applied to the conflict stage they are supposed to address, "only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on durable foundation" (UNSG, 1992: § 57) to prevent "the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples" (UNSG, 1992: § 21). Post-conflict peacebuilding is also seen as a preventive tool since the measures it uses can also support preventive diplomacy (UNSG, 1995: § 47).

The overall objective of peacebuilding, according to Ramsbotham, is to construct a self-sustaining peace, designed to overcome the acute problems affecting countries subjected to prolonged conflict. Such problems are: political/constitutional incapacity, economic/social debilitation, psycho-social trauma and military/security

insufficiencies (Ramsbotham: 2000: 174). These are also called peacebuilding dimensions.

The first dimension to be addressed is the military/security one, since it is considered that "among the conditions for starting a process of conflict transformation and the rebuilding of political institutions, security, and economic structures is a secure environment" (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005: 3). Some of the responsibilities attributed to peacebuilders are the "reinstallation of order, support for local security forces, disarmament of combatants, facilitation of security sector reform, protection of elections, demining, and securing the repatriation of refugees and protection of human rights" (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005: 3). Rebuilding political/constitutional capacity is the task that comes next, intended to set up democratic political institutions. Political reconstruction includes: "rewriting a constitution (…); crafting new election laws; developing an election infrastructure (…) and organizing an election monitoring system with the participation of civil society organizations, both to build confidence and monitor the results" (Ottaway, 2002: 1006).

Economic recovery is essential to achieve social wellbeing; therefore, another dimension of peacebuilding is economic/social reconstruction. This aims at "building the institutions and capacity for market-based recovery and employment creation at the government level" (Castillo, 2008: 1268) and at addressing "serious macroeconomic imbalances and monetary and fiscal management issues with the weak bureaucracies, insufficient technical capabilities, and serious financing constraints" (Castillo, 2008: 1266). The psycho-social dimension is the least developed, but some efforts have been made to reconcile post-conflict societies and address the psychological consequences of war through transitional justice. This involves a number of internationally, nationally, and/or locally rooted peacebuilding measures, such as international tribunals, amnesties, truth commissions, criminal trials, reparation programmes and memorials (Parent, 2010: 277).

The first missions to receive a mandate to undertake similar tasks were Cambodia (UNTAC), Somalia (UNOSOM I) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR), all established in

1992 (Bellamy et al., 2010). The mandate establishing UNTAC, for example, clearly stated that "free and fair elections are essential to produce a just and durable settlement to the Cambodia conflict, thereby contributing to regional and international peace and security" (UNSC, 1992b). Peace operations were "now seen to provide the basis for the institutionalisation of a new peace based on democratisation, human rights, development, and economic reform, managed in an institutionalised setting by the UN" (Richmond, 2007a: 96).

Peacebuilding Reforms

The evolution of peacebuilding missions and their growth in number, as well some failures in maintaining peace such as happened in Angola, Rwanda and Sudan, for example, described some deficiencies in the peacebuilding architecture. The UN has been trying to deal with these flaws, although it has not always been successful, as some of the institution's reports show. The "Brahimi Report"[5], was one of the first documents to address these problems. The report conducted an overview of the previous 10 years of peace operations and concluded that the UN had systematically failed to meet the challenge of maintaining international peace and security and that it could not do better without serious reform (UN, 2000: § 1).

The Panel considered that for complex operations to be successful the organisation needed to strengthen both the quality and quantity of support provided by the member states. It recommended focusing on: clear, credible and adequately resourced mandates; more effective collection and assessment of information; improved headquarters planning for peace operations, and acquisition of the capacity to deploy more complex operations rapidly and sustain them effectively (UN, 2000: § 6). Some of these problems will be addressed in similar documents, especially the issue of financing peace operations and the adequacy of mandates (see, for example, UN, 2004: § 214; UNSG, 2005: § 111). Another issue raised by the Panel was the need for deeper institutionalisation of peacebuilding missions' management, therefore they suggested the creation of a Peacebuilding Unit within the Department of Political

[5] Lakhdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria, was the Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations that produced the report (UN, 2000: Annex I).

Affairs of the institution (UN, 2000: § 143). The lack of institutionalisation of peacebuilding would also be mentioned in subsequent reports, as we will see next.

A 2004 report stated that peace operations had been the operational face of the UN since the end of the Cold War, nevertheless, it recognised the failures of the organisation in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and called on the international community to be more vigilant in order to act preventively and to react when prevention fails (UN, 2004: § 84-88). The report endorsed three important ideas. First, it defended preventive deployment in cases where conflicts are emerging, but also as a preventive tool (UN, 2004: § 104-105). Second, it affirmed the use of military force as a vital component of any workable system of collective security, when legally and properly applied (UN, 2004: § 183). Finally, it acknowledge the need for "a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace" (UN, 2004: § 225).

To bridge this institutional gap it proposed the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission. This Commission would be "explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace" (UN, 2004: § 261). The Commission would be accompanied by a Peacebuilding Support Office established in the Secretariat of the UN, which would ensure effective integration of peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations (UN, 2004: § 266). One year later, the Secretary-General also suggested the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office in order to address the need to have, within the UN system, a body responsible for peacebuilding (UNSG, 2005: § 114).

The UN Security Council and the General Assembly would accept these recommendations in that year, 2005[6], with a decision to establish the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental body (UNSC, 2005: § 1; UNGA, 2005b: § 1), whose main purposes were

[6] Resolutions S/RES/1645 and A/RES/60/180.

> To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundations for sustainable development; to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery (UNSC, 2005: § 2; UNGA, 2005b: § 2).

Despite this institutional advance, the problems affecting peacebuilding have not been erased. In 2010, the organisation acknowledged the main challenges to peacebuilding to be: the financial challenge – that prevents a quick response to emerging conflict; the challenge of coordination at different levels; the challenge of communication – efficiently transmitting the mission's capacities and adjusting expectations (UNPSO, 2010: 16-22).

Peacebuilding and the Liberal Peace

A striking feature of all peace missions deployed by the UN since the 1990s is that they "pursued the same general strategy for promoting stable and lasting peace in war-shattered states: democratization and marketization" (Paris, 2004: 19). This strategy prompted some authors to qualify peacebuilding with the prefix of liberal. Newman et al., for example, define *liberal peacebuilding* as "the promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions associated with 'modern' states as a driving force for building 'peace'" (2009: 3).

According to Richmond, there is a clear conception of what type of peace should be the end result of UN peacebuilding operations (2007: 105). Most international agencies engaged with peacebuilding follow the same paradigm when structuring their work, thereby contributing to the consolidation of a peacebuilding consensus. This consensus has been creating a regime of truth about peace, spreading the generalised idea that the surest way to reach sustainable and lasting peace is by promoting market democracy, both within and between states, that is, by fostering a liberal democratic polity and a market oriented economy (Paris, 1997; Richmond, 2007a). Liberal peacebuilding not only embraces democracy and market economics, it promotes a wide range of liberal practices and values, such as secular authority,

capacity-building, centralised governance, institutions of justice, liberal human rights and the integration of societies into globalisation (Newman et al., 2009: 12).

The UN considers that the immediate post-conflict period offers an opportunity to build confidence in the political process and strengthen national capacity, so it is important to help restore core government functions (UNSG, 2009: § 3, 17). Because of this emphasis on the reshaping of the state, some authors[7] have started to associate peacebuilding with *statebuilding*, which is premised on the belief that the "political process in non-western states can be extremely influenced through the promotion of institutional changes introduced at the state level" (Chandler, 2006: 48). Statebuilding means building "effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law" (UN, 2004: § 229). Peace is thus equated with governance and is based on a methodological reordering of the institutions of the state (Richmond, 2006: 299).

"Liberal peacebuilding is premised upon the idea that democracy and a free economy encourage people to resolve and express their differences peacefully and that this is the best foundation for development and accountable governance" (Newman, 2009: 39). Peacebuilding, and its approach to the state, reflects the liberal assumptions discussed at the beginning of this chapter, thus endorsing a particular peace: the liberal peace. This is related to the belief that states constituted on a liberal basis are more peaceful, developed and concerned with humanitarian issues being better managed than non-democracies (Newman et al., 2009: 11). These are the core values of liberal peace theory, based, as was defined by Kant, on the constitutional, international and cosmopolitan sources of law that together connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustainable peace (Doyle, 2005: 463).

In brief, liberal peace clearly favours the Western experience of peacemaking, since it is based on a clear ontological, epistemological and normative agenda that assumes a universal character and legitimates intervention based on a hierarchical

[7] For example, Paris, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Chesterman et al, 2005; Ghani et al., 2006.

relationship which gives Western states the power to fix 'abnormal' political, social and economic practices (Richmond, 2006: 295-296, 304-306). This specific form of peace has become generally accepted by the international community and peacebuilding operations represent its operational face. Nevertheless, the concept has not attracted full consensus, and a number of critical voices have been commenting on its association with peacebuilding. The span of criticisms of liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding will be dealt with in the next chapter.

2ND CHAPTER | LIBERAL PEACE CRITIQUES

The previous chapter examined the ideological contextualisation and the historical evolution of the concept of peacebuilding. As this practice of peace implementation became more frequent, some critiques on its operation and its ideological content started to emerge. This chapter reviews the different types of critiques and remarks related to peacebuilding and the liberal peace project.

United Nations peace operations increased dramatically at the end of the Cold War, with the same number of operations deployed between 1985 and 1991 as were deployed from 1945 to 1985. This increase was due to the belief that, if quickly deployed with the consent of the belligerent parties, UN interventions could create the conditions for peace to flourish (Durch, 1992: 9). The mission mandates were more ambitious than before and the end of Cold War removed the obstacles to the organisation acting as a facilitator for peace transition. However, these operations exposed the international community's relative inexperience in dealing with post-conflict stabilisation (Paris and Sisk, 2009a: 6).

Scholarship on this subject was also nascent: "the literature provided detailed description of particular operations and countries, offering little systematic, cross-case analysis, or theorizing about the strategies or nature of the peacebuilding enterprise" (Paris and Sisk, 2009a: 6). The first set of critiques of peacebuilding missions appeared during this period and were mainly directed at the results of the first missions deployed. A brief analysis of UN intervention in post-conflict territories in the 1990s showed that the goals initially proposed by those missions' mandates were not being totally accomplished and that lasting peace was not being secured. The problems highlighted were mostly related to efficiency issues, with critiques being divided between those levelled at the actor and the missions and those aimed at the paradigm (Cravo, 2013).

The *critiques of the actor and the missions* indicated the severe limitations of the UN structure to deal with post-conflict situations and questioned its capacity to carry out the necessary peace missions. It was evident at the time that the request for UN involvement in conflict prone countries would be greater than the Organisation's

ability to respond, especially given the lack of resources available (Mayall, 1996: 1). The assets available to carry out peace missions were a major worry in the 1990s but other critiques were being addressed to the UN: shortage of qualified and experienced human resources; communication and coordination difficulties between the mission in the field and the UN bureaucratic apparatus; poor information gathering; mission length, and an absence of exit strategies (Mayall, 1996: 19-20; Cravo, 2013: 25-26). Another problem exposed was the drafting of unrealistic mandates as a result of organisational inexperience (Mayall, 1996: 19). It was also being recognised that peace implementation success was dependent on the difficulty of the local environment and the willingness of international actors to define a particular case as a security interest (Downs and Stedman, 2002: 44).

The *critiques of the paradigm* tried to show that the strategy of promoting liberal democracy and market economy was flawed since these assumptions could exacerbate the aspects they were trying to contain - violence and poverty - and act as destabilisers for the societies in question (Cravo, 2013: 27). Democracy and capitalism share a conflict prone character, both of them incentivise societal competition to achieve political stability and economic growth. Post-conflict states usually lack the institutional structures needed to channel internal disputes in peaceful ways; it can therefore be counter-productive to foster market democracy in this context (Paris, 1997: 57). Paris (1997: 58) proposes to address this problem through a "strategic liberalisation", sharing the aim of market democracy but developing peacebuilding mechanisms that control the effects of economic and political liberalisation.

As the theorisation on the liberal peace model and UN peace missions' performance developed, the obstacles facing peace consolidation became clearer (Cravo, 2013: 29). Nevertheless, Paris noted that the "students of peacebuilding have concentrated so intently on the operational details of these missions that they have tended to neglect the role that peace operations play in the diffusion of norms and institutional models from one part of the international system to another" (2002: 638). This warning represents the shift from the first generation of critics, interested in more pragmatic efficiency based criticisms, to a type of critique that is more

concerned with the ideological content of peacebuilding missions, that is, liberal peace. Therefore, with the evolution of peacebuilding practices during the early 2000s, scholarship started to develop more theoretical approaches and systematic cross-case comparisons of peacebuilding missions (Paris and Sisk, 2009a: 7).

The different positions taken by academics started to be catalogued in two major groups: the problem-solvers and the critics. This distinction was first made by Robert Cox (1981), who considered that problem-solving theory

> Takes the world as it finds it, with prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble (Cox, 1981: 128-129).

In contrast, critical theory is "critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about" (Cox, 1981: 129). These divergent attitudes towards liberal peace have profound consequences for the analysis of UN's peace missions, their goals and results. The literature review on this subject will be based on this theoretical distinction. It starts with the problem-solvers and their analysis of the importance, but also of the weaknesses, that current peacebuilding and liberal peace concepts, with their focus on statebuilding, present. Next, the critics' analysis of the liberal peace and peace missions will be reviewed, emphasising the power relations they promote and their universalising character. Special emphasis will be given to the critique of the relationship between the international and the local.

THE PROBLEM-SOLVERS

The problem-solvers' critics evaluate the problems associated with the liberal peace paradigm without rejecting its liberal character. Their goal is to isolate specific problems within the liberal peace framework and contribute to their resolution in order to consolidate and strengthen peacebuilding missions. "While upholding the values of democracy and the free market aspirationally, these critics

argue against the liberal peace approach on the basis that it is unsuitable in the context of post-conflict states and situations of state failure" (Chandler, 2010: 142).

The state is key in problem-solvers' analysis of the causes of conflict and the development of peace processes, and so these authors usually subscribe to the discourse on failed states described in the first chapter. They consider that this phenomenon is not only a question of humanitarian concern but also a matter of international security, which affects the interests of powerful states (Krasner, 2004: 93-94; Einsiedel, 2005: 13-14). Fukuyama (2004: 124-125) warns that where the internal governance of states is inadequate and leads to development problems, this has a profound effect on the concept of sovereignty and the Westphalian system, constituting a problem to all the members of the international system. Following this logic, Chesterman et al. (2005a: 359) argue that "[a] world of capable, efficient and legitimate states will help to achieve the goals of order, stability and predictability and promote national and human security". Therefore, they conclude that only through an evaluation of the state as a network of institutions can we properly understand, address and, probably, avoid crises in governance (Chesterman et al., 2005a: 362).

The centrality that the state has in problem-solvers' reflections is related to the importance given to state structures by international actors engaged in peacebuilding activities. According to Paris, peacebuilding missions are globalising the idea of what a state should look like and how it should act. He considers that besides trying to transform failed states into liberal market democracies, these missions aim at reconstructing state structures, that is, building "(…) centralised administrations that exercise exclusive authority over a bounded territory (…)" (Paris, 2002: 654). To achieve this goal, failed states have been submitted to an "international imperial power" (Fukuyama, 2004: 131) that assumed governance functions in many of these places. Fearon and Laitin (2004: 7) define the relationship between the global North and the global South as "neotrusteeship", which involves wide control of domestic political authority and economic functions by foreign actors. Paris (2002: 651) considers that peacebuilding represents a contemporary version of the *mission civilisatrice* since Western states clearly assume that liberal market

democracy is the most appropriate model of domestic governance for post-conflict states.

This characterisation of the peacebuilding framework does not mean that these authors are against this model or reject international intervention in war-shattered states: on the contrary, problem-solvers consider that the international community should have an active role in solving the problems of failed states and strongly support intervention in these countries (Krasner, 2004: 86; Chesterman et al., 2005a: 372). Fearon and Laitin (2004: 7) clearly state that "whether the problem is a failed state or a rogue regime that has been attacked and destroyed, statebuilding efforts led by major powers and international organizations are practically inevitable". Nevertheless, problem-solvers recognise that peacebuilding missions are not free of problems and sometimes disagree as to how those interventions should be handled and what priorities should be defined in peacebuilding missions.

Ghani et al. (2006) set out four reasons why the international community is unable to deal effectively with the challenge of failing states. First, there is a need to analyse the common patterns of persistent conflict in war-shattered countries. Second, the international community has to recognise the type of transition required for a persistent conflict to evolve into sustainable peace in order to develop a strategy of statebuilding. Third, the functions of a legitimate state, both at home and abroad, should be clearly delineated. Finally, the building of functioning states has not been the goal of international community politics and therefore some interventions have had the perverse effect of undermining some statebuilding programmes (Ghani et al., 2006: 102-103). Chesterman et al. (2005a) also stress that the humanitarian system is not prepared to deal with the conflicts it is addressing; a change in tactics is needed, along with greater involvement in politics. Providing assistance without a political strategy might reinforce the dynamics that led to conflict in the first place. Furthermore, they consider that there is a lack of coercive tools to deal with state weakness (Chesterman et al., 2005a: 375-381).

Paris and Sisk (2009b) also outline some of the core contradictions of peacebuilding missions, with a special emphasis on statebuilding. The contradictions

are: (1) using outside intervention to foster self-government; (2) requiring international control to establish local ownership; (3) promoting universal values as a remedy for local problems; (4) underestimating the persistence and resilience of the deeply ingrained patterns of political and economic life; (5) promoting short-term imperatives that often conflict with longer-term objectives (Paris and Sisk, 2009b: 305-306). Chesterman et al. (2005a: 362-370) stress some of the difficulties that peacebuilders face: (1) questions of legitimacy – what is the best institutional arrangement for a given country; (2) ownership – avoid international protectorate while finding the balance between decentralisation of power and the creation of a centralised state; (3) political parties – can help the process of institutionalisation of power but they also might transfer inter-group conflict to institutions; (4) regional influences – neighbouring countries are involved in trade and social networks that can be important both to understand the flow of resources into the conflict country and to ensure that peace can last.

In order to surmount these problems and help create a more coherent and effective peace/statebuilding strategy, problem-solving authors make some suggestions as to how the international community should act towards collapsed states. Paris proposes "Institutionalization Before Liberalization" (2004: 179). He considers that a rapid liberalisation process can undermine a fragile peace. The core recommendation is that a framework of effective institutions should be constructed prior to promoting political and economic competition. Liberalisation should be delayed and political and economic freedoms should be limited in the short run, "in order to create conditions for a smoother and less hazardous transition to market democracy" (Paris, 2004: 188). Chesterman at al. (2005b: 2) also consider that the "creation of apolitical bureaucratic structures supported by an ideology that legitimates the role of neutral state authority in maintaining social order through prescribed procedures and the rule of law" is the most important requirement for making states work. Different institutional arrangements and local variables should be explored in order to maximize the prospects for liberal democracy and market economy to emerge and consolidate (Chesterman et al., 2005a: 365).

Some authors argue that the International Community should have a greater involvement in fixing collapsed states. Fearon and Laitin (2004: 21), for example, consider that "exit without a return to war demands some level of sustained transitional administration by international parties". The problem of state weakness needs an international collective action solution. Intervention is inevitable and must be shared across a wide range of states, international non-governamental organisations (NGOs) and corporations (Fearon and Laitin, 2004: 41). This reality means that an effective state must be constructed before international interveners leave the country, in order to sustain peace and provide order (Fearon and Laitin, 2004: 36). Krasner goes a bit further and advocates shared sovereignty arrangements (2004: 85). He argues that the national authority of the state should be shared with international actors that would bear responsibility for some aspects of domestic sovereignty (Krasner, 2004: 89). "National actors would use their international legal sovereignty to enter into agreements that would compromise their Westphalian/Vatelian sovereignty with the goal of improving domestic sovereignty" (Krasner, 2004: 108). In more serious cases he considers that international actors should even consider *de facto* trusteeships or protectorates (Krasner, 2004: 89).

As explained at the beginning of this chapter, problem-solving authors critique the liberal peace model and peacebuilding development but they do not question their existence and principles. According to Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 766-767) problem-solvers are concerned with solving immediate problems and are generally incurious about the wider structural factors that might have led to those problems. These authors follow the logic of the dominant paradigm that structures the liberal peace; their goal is not to confront the liberal model but, on the contrary, to reinforce it. Their work has contributed to the maintenance of the liberal peace framework and its suggestions have just anchored it more firmly. The aim of problem-solvers is to help the global North and its institutionalised power system to force the global South to follow the principles of liberal market democracy. Their work is mainly policy orientated and many problem-solver scholars have links to the policy world (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 767). The academic work they have been producing represents, besides the contributions to maximise the effectiveness of

peacebuilding missions, an important legitimacy tool for the action of global North actors towards post-conflict states.

THE CRITICS

Critical theory emerged in the years that separated the two World Wars and was influenced by the historical events of the time and by the European political landscape. Socialism and Social Democracy, Communism and class conflict were gaining momentum and social scientists were influenced by new ideas spreading across Europe (Held, 1990: 16-19). David Held identifies the Frankfurt School as the founders and main contributors of critical theory, with Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Leo Lowenthal; and Jürgen Habermas (1990: 14-15). These authors aimed to "lay the foundations for an exploration, in an interdisciplinary research context, of questions concerning the conditions which make possible the reproduction and transformation of society, the meaning of culture, and the relation between the individual, society and nature" (Held, 1990: 16). Critical theorists wanted to contribute to a critique of ideology and to the development of non-authoritarian and non-bureaucratic politics through the examination of contemporary social and political issues.

As mentioned above, the idea of critical theory as opposed to problem-solving theory was first problematised by Robert Cox. According to him, "[c]ritical theory (…) does not take institutions and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of change" (Cox, 1981: 129). The relevance of each theory is, therefore, determined by their relationship with existing structures of power, and the principal aim of critical theory is to challenge the supposed "naturalness" of the international system's current power relations (Duvall and Varadarajan, 2003: 77, 81). Critical writings about liberal peace and peace missions accept this logic of exposing the relations of power that underlie the liberal peace and peacebuilding. Critical authors tend "to see the discourse of liberal peace as an ideological and instrumental one, arguing that the rhetoric of freedom, markets and democracy is

merely a representation of Western self-interest, which has little genuine concern for the security and freedoms of those societies intervened in" (Chandler, 2010: 139).

The purposes and value of critical theory have often been questioned by more conservative authors[8] who accuse critical theory of not having practical relevance. Before describing the critiques put forward by these authors, it is important to draw attention to the value of critique. Critical theory, when exposing the power arrangements prevalent in the international system, is making room to challenge these dominant structures through both academic/theoretical and practical political resistance (Duvall and Varadarajan, 2003: 78). Critical theory is framed by a certain "guide" for action; it aims at having a practical relevance and therefore constitutes a "policy tool for those who are involved in challenging, confronting, and disrupting existing relations of power" (Duvall and Varadarajan, 2003: 84-85).

Among the critical authors of liberal peace we can find very different types of critique and also very different positions on whether the liberal peace has some principles that should be recovered or if it should simply be put aside. Critical theory is definitely not a homogeneous body, nevertheless, all the main critiques developed on the liberal peace system and peace missions go beyond identifying efficiency challenges and serve to expose the domination patterns that underlie these missions.

In the domain of peace, critical theory is influenced by peace studies. Peace studies was first proposed as a discipline by Johan Galtung with the aim of seeking a "general and complete peace" based on the reduction of violence to zero and relations of integration, cooperation and harmony to encompass the whole world (Galtung, 1964: 1-2). This general and complete peace would entail both the negative and the positive *peaces* defined in the first chapter. Critical authors, when discussing the power relations that structure liberal peace, and UN peace missions share the goal of exposing the limited character that the application of liberal peace takes on compared with the understanding of peace defined by Galtung, since the liberal peace fails to firmly confront direct, structural and cultural violence.

[8] As an example: Keohane (1989) *International Institutions: Two Approaches* and Waltz (1997) *Theory of International Politics*.

This said, the main general critique of liberal peace is its hegemonic character. The development of liberal peace is, as demonstrated in the first chapter, contextual and reflects Western interests in the preservation and advancement of the contemporary order (Richmond, 2004: 91). Nevertheless, this concept has been represented as universal by the international community of liberal states, disregarding the fact that liberal peace and its missions are a product of long-term evolution and the reflection of specific experiences, interests and perspectives (Richmond, 2007b: 247-248). This logic has also been followed by international relations theorists who have paid little attention to the importance of peace support operations in sustaining particular forms of global governance norms (Pugh, 2004: 39). According to Jabri, peacebuilding has a hegemonic status among both international actors and knowledge production actors, and is a major scientific research programme. Its hegemony is, therefore, "manifest institutionally and as a 'norm', it is manifest as a scientific programme and, furthermore, in its capacity to transcend distinctions" (Jabri: 2013: 5).

Peacebuilding and statebuilding are currently at the centre of Western states' foreign policy concerns, and international organisations' and NGOs' practice. This general consensus on the centrality of the liberal peace was favoured by the belief that its norms and governance frameworks are generally accepted. This creates hierarchical relations that are supported by the ideological hegemony of contemporary forms of liberalism: "(…) liberal epistemic communities of peacebuilders transfer governance regimes through a process of conditional funding, training and dependency creation to the more 'primitive' recipients in conflict zones" (Richmond, 2009: 62). The logic of liberal peace is now endorsed in almost every relation between the international community and non-western states through conditionality mechanisms that endorse liberal values such as democracy, the rule of law and free markets (Chandler, 2006: 3-4). According to Duffield "[t]he aim of the liberal peace is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities" (2007: 11).

Liberal peace is not only a projection of power, it is the enforcement of a particular ensemble of ideas, values and political purposes, too (Chandler, 2006: 18). Liberal peace is part of a global liberal governance network that joins state and non-state, military and civilian, public and private actors in the pursuit of an agenda of social transformation with the goal of obtaining global stability (Duffield, 2007: 12). According to Fetherston, liberal peace constitutes a structure of power that aims to discipline and normalise the spaces affected by conflict in order to render them ready to accept the liberal and neo-liberal forms of social, economic and political organisation (2000: 200). The author inscribes the liberal peace framework in the project of modernity which she considers produces a discourse of truth that aims for "total knowledge, total power, total enlightenment, the end of history, and simultaneously, the end of difference" (Fetherston, 2000: 190). Pugh also argues that peace support operations are not neutral and that, actually, they serve the purposes of an existing order within which adjustments can occur with the goal of controlling the unruly parts of the world and consolidating the liberal peace (2004: 41).

Related to this vision of the liberal peace as a hegemonic concept is the fact that international actors and mainstream international relations academics barely recognise that peace is actually a contested concept. Peace is presented as obviously meaning democracy, marketisation, human rights, the rule of law and development. This ideal form allows the intervention of international actors in places where this peace is not present (Richmond, 2007b: 251, 263). International intervention in conflict and post-conflict states that is justified by this ideal and universal form of peace is another widely debated issue among the critics. Pugh considers that liberal peace is represented as desirable and the ethical response to conflict, and so intervention in the name of peace is seen as a positive endeavour with the moral goal of maintaining order and security in the international system (2004: 48). This is so that the main international organisations see their role in the contribution to international peace in terms of peacebuilding, which now amounts to a norm in the international system, thereby legitimising particular types of intervention (Jabri, 2013: 4).

Because the liberal peace establishes models of governance in the main political, economic and social areas that are claimed to be universal and consensual, conditions were created for an epistemic community of states, international organisations and NGOs to intervene in order to direct reforms in post-conflict states in accordance with that general consensus (Richmond, 2009: 56-57). The logic is that post-conflict spaces are fragile and potentially dangerous and therefore intervention is necessary to cope with human suffering and the inefficiency of the state in question (Duffield, 2007: 114-115; Jabri, 2013: 11). The legitimisation of intervention is accompanied by a certain degree of paternalism, since the states in question are seen as incapable of acting in a responsible manner and protecting the most fundamental rights of their citizens (Chandler, 2004a: 63). Richmond considers that peacebuilding implies the "(…) transference of enlightened knowledge to those who lack the capacity or morality to attain such knowledge themselves" (2007: 268).

This paternalist aspect of liberal peace is closely related to the fact that conflict is not seen as having a political nature or political goals; at the same time, the solutions presented by the international community are also exclusively discussed in purely technical and functionalist terms (Chandler, 2006: 6). Thus, peacebuilding is approached as a fundamentally practical challenge: peace is achievable if the right steps are taken (Newman, 2009: 42). This happens because "(…) conflict is largely not interpreted in terms of political contestation, but primarily as a matter of the failure of government" (Jabri, 2013: 10). The corollary of the negation of politics is the idea that the "ungoverned" populations can be better governed with the help of external experts and capacity-builders, disregarding the importance of politics, self-government and political autonomy (Chandler, 2006: 7; Jabri, 2013: 14). When analysing the question of politics and global South conflict, Duffield argues that there is a crucial distinction between seeing the conflict as conducive to social regression or as a force of social transformation. For him, conflict can represent "sites of innovation and reordering resulting in the creation of new types of legitimacy and authority" (Duffield, 2007: 6).

With politics put aside, the goal of peace support operations is to build capacities for governance so that social collapse and possible conflict are prevented.

That said, the political authority of those who govern is related to their capacity to govern well and in accordance with international standards (Jabri, 2013: 12, 14). Sovereignty is, thus, reconceptualised as capacity instead of an indivisible right, becoming a duty. This is how a new international hierarchy of different levels of sovereignty is created; nevertheless, sovereignty maintains its legal and formal importance, conferring on relations of domination the label of partnership between formally two equal partners (Chandler, 2008: 344). The result is that external regulation is not seen as intervention any more, instead, it serves to empower and strengthen the states subjected to intervention since it helps to enhance their governance capacities and, consequently, their sovereignty (Chandler, 2006: 36). Duffield considers that northern governments have found new ways of reasserting their authority through new systems of governance that still reflect the South's subordination (2007: 8).

Another important set of critiques is related to the performance of the UN and the discrepancy between the goals of liberal peace and peacebuilding and its results. The international community has been practising reform and conflict resolution in war-torn countries with clear ineffectiveness (Fetherston: 2000: 201). Several problems of liberal peacebuilding are pointed out: democratisation can further violence, especially in ethnic conflicts; liberal human rights can be culturally inappropriate or contested; the rule of law can mask inequity and be enforced without the population's consent and with disregard for its social needs (Chandler, 2004b: 579; Richmond, 2009: 61). Neo-liberal economy and development create exclusion among international capitalist relationships, since post-conflict states are not able to compete in international markets, and at the same time they marginalise the needy and deepen poverty (Pugh, 2004: 46; Chandler, 2006: 14-15; Richmond, 2009: 61). Richmond and Franks also stress that peacebuilding missions do not get to the rural and isolated areas of post-conflict countries, which creates asymmetries between rural and urban areas (2009: 188).

According to Richmond, the UN's performance "has proven to be highly ambitious, often resulting in a 'virtual peace' based upon contested attempts to import liberal democratic models via military intervention, and political, social, and

economic institution building and reconstruction" (2007: 265). He adds that "peace through governance reproduces the empty shell of the state with only marginal qualitative impact on the lives of its inhabitants" (Richmond, 2007b: 265). Chandler talks about 'phantom states', when looking at the results of statebuilding (Chandler, 2006: 41). States retain their legal status as countries but have no capacity to be independent political subjects capable of self-government. The fact that the liberal peace is endorsed through force, coercion, conditionality or dependency by outsiders results in institutions and frameworks that do not affect the individuals in the short and medium term (Richmond, 2009: 56).

The concept of good governance and the model of state endorsed by peacebuilding missions are also highly debated. This is related to the critique of the concept of failed states. According to Jabri, the causes of conflict are portrayed as being related to institutional government and, therefore, intervention is directed at correcting the failure of states in order to establish the governance structures necessary for working states that can govern internally and participate in the international system (2013: 9-10). Richmond considers that intervention has been serving to construct Westphalian states that mimic the values associated with liberal states. Peacebuilding tries to recreate a "(…) state-centric order, territorial integrity and basic human rights, while also attempting to institutionalize political, social and economic reform according to the precepts of the democratic peace" (Richmond, 2004: 92). For Chandler, however, the focus on the state does not aim at constructing self-governing, independent and autonomous political subjects; on the contrary, the idea is to place responsibility on the intervened state even as it loses its policy-making authority (2006: 31).

The Local Turn

Underlying all the critiques presented is the problem of the relationship between international and local actors. Critical authors generally agree that there is a disconnection between the international understandings of war and peace and local perspectives (Fetherston, 2000: 195; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 764). This arises from the ignorance of local cultures demonstrated by international agents and

their neglect as part of the political, economic and social institutional framework of the intervened societies, which results in the perception that peacebuilding undermines local interests and needs (Richmond, 2009: 68). Duffield (2007: 123) sees the lack of connection with local cultures as an intentional endeavour, since, according to him, the liberal peace is hostile to traditional societies. Conflict has, therefore, the wider positive effect of eroding the cohesion of culture, customs and traditions. Thus, "(…) the rolling back of development and the deepening of poverty provide the urgency to intervene, the destruction of culture furnishes the opportunity for aid agencies to establish new and replacement forms of collective identity and social organisation" (Duffield, 2007: 123).

The detachment of liberal peace from local cultures and practices raises legitimacy questions, since the peace provided is the one it is deemed that people should have, instead of the peace people might seek for themselves (Roberts, 2012: 367). Local people are thus excluded from the peace process, which is usually negotiated at the elite level, and this often leads to local dissent, dissatisfaction and resistance (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 184; Roberts, 2012: 368). The local perspective of the international is profoundly negative; it is considered that the international is

> (…) [E]ndemically dysfunctional, contextually insensitive, disrespectful and distant, unaccountable, interest-based, normatively biased, ideologically fixed, mercenary in its naturalisation of capitalism and unwilling to address inequality or the historical injustices stemming from colonialism (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 772).

This disconnection between the international and the local can result in a loss of agency on the part of local actors and can lead to international actors failing to consider the causes of instability, resistance and, in some cases, ongoing violence (Richmond and Mitchell, 2012: 6).

The difficult relation between international and local actors has been receiving growing attention by critical scholars. This is called the "local turn" and is the result of the "recognition of the diffuseness of power (…) and its circulation, of the importance of culture, history and identity, the significance of local critical agency and resistance (…)" (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 769). But the local turn has also

operated at the policy-making sphere. International actors started to use concepts such as "participation", "local ownership" and "partnership" in their policy documents. This is mainly a rhetorical tool aiming to build local consent and legitimacy. The growing assertiveness of local actors and their greater capacity to pressure international actors has allowed a clear manifestation of discontent towards peacebuilding missions and has been one of the most significant reasons for major peacebuilding actors adapting the local turn (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 775).

Critical authors, who state the importance of the engagement of local people and civil society organisations in peace processes, are very sceptical of the local turn at the institutional level; they are critical of concepts such as local ownership. Richmond (2013) considers that this concept only serves to legitimise the work of peacebuilders and enable local agency to develop in a liberal setting. For him, concepts like human security, ownership or empowerment are directed at local civil society sectors who already share the principles of human rights, development and democratisation, as defined by liberal norms, and they do not reach local people in an inclusive manner (Richmond, 2012: 355). Furthermore, locals are not allowed to choose what they want to own and how ownership can be experienced, since the concept is explicitly determined by internationals (Richmond, 2013: 358-359). In another study, Richmond and Franks (2009: 181) concluded that peacebuilding "(…) is not localised, cannot engage with the non-liberal subject or their needs, and fails to build a liberal social contract or develop customary and hybridised understandings of a viable, context-driven, rather than internationally or donor-driven, form of peace in a local and everyday context".

Realising the inability of international actors to engage with local actors in peace processes, critical scholars started to explore the results of the confrontation between the peace formula developed by internationals and the practices at the local level and found hybrid forms of peace. The meeting of the everyday lives of local actors affected by conflict with strategies, institutions and norms of liberal international intervention results in unique forms of peace (Richmond and Mitchell, 2012: 1). Hybridity is the product of powerful local critiques and resistance to international action, and the perception that peacebuilding is not meeting the

expectations (Richmond, 2009: 54). For Roberts (2012: 367) hybridity is "a mix of the old and the new, functioning simultaneously, interwoven, overlapping, but with the hegemony of the old masked by the rhetoric of the new". The process of hybridisation consists of the reshaping of norms, institutions and activities of both international and local actors by means of everyday practices such as verbal interaction, organisation and even overt conflict (Richmond and Mitchell, 2012: 1).

The local is thus seen as a "range of locally based agencies present within a conflict and post-conflict environment, some of which are aimed at identifying and creating the necessary processes for peace (…)", instead of the "near empty space, willingly subservient to Northern models and interests" (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 769) as assumed by international actors. The local is, therefore, a place of agency rooted in the everyday. That is,

> The ways people make their lives the best they can, manipulating with whatever tools and tactics at their disposal, the surrounding natural, social, economic, and political structures, local and global, that empower or constrain their lives in the vandalized environment of post-conflict spaces (Roberts, 2012: 369).

According to Richmond and Mitchell (2012: 2) the failure of liberal peacebuilding is, in reality, a sign of the success of local agency and its claims for autonomy. Liberal peacebuilding often underestimates local capacity but peace processes could actually be more successful if they respected and adopted indigenous ways (Roberts, 2012: 372). This does not mean romanticising the local, which also contains power relations and hierarchies that favour some over others, it only recognises its agency and valuable contributions to peace processes (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 770).

Critical authors alert international actors to the hybrid dimension of the implantation of liberal peace and the importance of respecting and integrating everyday concerns and practices in the peacebuilding structure. Richmond (2009: 73) considers that peacebuilding requires, first, international consensus on how it should be done, but more importantly, a process of negotiation between the locals and the international community, thus allowing a debate about what type of peace is being fostered in various conflict zones around the world. Roberts (2012: 368) suggests a

popular peace "designed by local societies, furnished externally by international society, and mobilised internally through formal and informal institutions". Popular peace is the result of acknowledging, hearing and responding to everyday lives, democratising peacebuilding and rendering it genuinely participatory (Roberts, 2012: 370). Richmond and Mitchell (2012: 33) call for a new approach to peacebuilding, one that "examines the unique responses, practices, tactics and agencies that emerge at the interface between international peacebuilding actors and local actors with whom they engage", recognising that everyday peace is a unique, dynamic, contextualised and contested form of peace.

I shall recognise the importance of these critical approaches to the local and the relevance of using the concept of hybridity in the context of liberal peace analysis. Hybrid peace theories perform the hard task of exposing the resistance and contestation of local actors towards the imposition of externally formulated recipes for peace, which are not context sensitive, or, as these authors put it, sensitive to the everyday. These authors' work, which acknowledges the local actors' agency, constitutes an important tool to question liberal peace and peacebuilding missions. Nevertheless, I consider they only emphasise local agency after the point of intervention by internationals. Recognising hybrid forms of peace and exploring them is important to confront the totalising character of liberal peace, yet, as Roberts (2012) puts it, the hybridity produced still carries with it the hegemonic relations between the global North and the global South. This said, I believe there is still some work to be done to deconstruct liberal peace's hegemonic relationship with the local.

My aim, with this dissertation, is to draw attention to the local before intervention has occurred. Recognising agency and resistance to local actors implies recognising the local as a place of different epistemologies and, therefore, different conceptions of peace. Although I endorse the knowledge produced on the local, I believe this field of research would profit from seeking and identifying the epistemologies that, when confronted with the liberal paradigm of peace typical of modern Western thought, produce resistance and thus create hybridity. Identifying those epistemologies implies recognising the local as a space of knowledge production. This acknowledgement gives visibility to epistemologies ignored until

now, deeming them as valuable as Western modern rationality. This way, local knowledges and local conceptions of peace acquire renewed strength to contest the model of peace fostered by international actors, given that the liberal peace no longer benefits from the status of exclusivity.

For this, I rely on the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, first, to develop an epistemological critique of the liberal peace as part of modern Western thinking, and afterwards to suggest that the discipline of peace studies should adopt the conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South in order to easily reveal and explore local conceptions of peace. His concepts serve to re-establish cognitive justice around the world, since they confront the monoculture of hegemonic Western thinking with the plurality of knowledges existing in the world. Revealing different forms of peace thus allows the creation of new hybrid *peaces* of a non-hegemonic character. The next chapter explores Boaventura de Sousa Santos' concepts, which are considered pertinent to a different view of the local.

3RD CHAPTER | EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE SOUTH: INTRODUCING BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

One of the aims of this dissertation is to advance new conceptual tools that can address the diversity of *peaces* in the world. Although critical theorists identify the universal and totalitarian character of liberal peace and its goal of rendering post-conflict states as close as possible to liberal democracies, ignoring local conceptions of peace, I consider these authors address the local only partially. The choice of Boaventura de Sousa Santos' work arises from this realisation. This author's characterisation of modern Western thinking allows the building of an epistemological critique of the liberal peace, thus contributing to a better understanding of the hegemonic relationship between peacebuilding and the local. Furthermore, he has developed a set of tools that are able to describe the epistemological diversity of the world. From my perspective, those tools can be used to depict different ways of conceiving peace by confronting the limited character of liberal peace with the plurality of endogenously conceived *peaces*.

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During his long career, Professor Boaventura de Sousa Santos has addressed issues such as globalisation, sociology of law and the state, epistemology, post-colonial theory, democracy, interculturalism, social movements and human rights. He has written several books and articles, some of the most important being: "A

Discourse on the Sciences" (1992)[9], "Towards a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition" (1995), "Porque é Tão Difícil Construir uma Teoria Crítica?" (1999), "Democratizing Democracy. Beyond the Liberal Democratic Cannon" (2006), "Another Knowledge is Possible. Beyond Northern Epistemologies" (2007), "Epistemologias do Sul" (2010a) and "Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide" (2014) just to name a few titles of his extensive work.

In order to understand Boaventura de Sousa Santos' concepts and theoretical proposals we have to understand his position with respect to modern Western thinking. Western modernity is a social and cultural paradigm that developed from the sixteenth century onwards and became consolidated in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries (Santos, 2010c: 230). It had its origin in the revolutions of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton and led to an unprecedented social and technological transformation (Santos, 1992: 11). Western modernity developed a single model of scientific rationality, first in the domain of natural sciences and later, by the nineteenth century, in the domain of social sciences. This rationality acquired a global and totalitarian character since it identified as irrational all forms of knowledge that did not follow its epistemological principles and methodological rules, namely, common sense and the humanities (Santos, 1995: 11-12).

The negation of the world's epistemic variety, caused by the complicity between modernity and scientific knowledge, can be considered a form of coloniality. The concept of coloniality expresses the epistemic difference between the western world and the colonial world that rules the belief in the superiority of western science and knowledge, giving origin to the current international power system structured on the social classification of the world population based on the idea of "race" (Quijano, 2002: 4; Mignolo, 2003: 632). Celebrating this scientific revolution as the point of arrival for human knowledge had the consequence of negating the non-modern humanity the capacity to think (Mignolo, 2003: 632, 634). Therefore, it is not possible to conceive of modernity without coloniality. Boaventura de Sousa Santos also shares this idea as will be seen later in this chapter.

[9] First published in Portuguese in 1987.

This conceptual framework suited the interests of the rising bourgeoisie, which saw the society it was starting to control as being in the final stage of the evolution of mankind (Santos, 1995: 14). Hence, the global and totalitarian character of modernity is not explained by the power of its principles but by the fact that a particular form of knowledge has coincided with a particular moment in history: the emergence of capitalist economy (Mignolo, 2003: 639). The intimate relation of Western modernity with the development and expansion of capitalism is one of its most important features (Santos, 1994: 84). Also associated with it is the expansion of colonialism, another foundation of Western modernity. For Boaventura de Sousa Santos these two characteristics of Western modernity are mutually dependent since colonialism is a "set of extremely unequal exchanges that depend on denying humanity to the weaker people in order to overexploit them or exclude them as being discardable" and capitalism is inconceivable without overexploited and discardable populations (Santos, 2010c: 233–234). For him, colonialism and capitalism are part of the same constellation of powers.

The disbelief in common sense and the humanities demonstrated by modern science is related, on one hand, to the distrust of the evidence of our immediate experience and, on the other, to the promotion of total separation between human beings and nature. Modern science aims to know nature in order to control it (Santos, 1992: 14-15). It has, therefore, two main consequences: its scientific method is based on the reduction of the complexity of reality and its scientific rigor is gauged by the rigor of measurements, signifying that to know means to quantify (Santos, 1995: 13). Modern science is "a causal knowledge which aims at formulating laws in the light of observed regularities and with a view to foreseeing the future behaviour of phenomena" (Santos, 1992: 17). Knowledge in the form of laws aims to achieve order and stability in the world, which is a precondition for the technological transformation of reality. Modern knowledge is meant to be utilitarian and functional, to be valued more for its capacity to produce transformation of reality than for its capacity to understand it (Santos, 1995: 14). This is as true for natural sciences as for social sciences: if it "had been possible to discover the laws of nature, so would it be possible to discover the laws of society" (Santos, 1992: 18).

The great novelty of Western modernity was the discrepancy between social experiences and social expectations. In fact, according to Western modernity, "experience does not have to, and indeed should not, coincide with expectations" (Santos, 2014: 138). It starts from the assumption that the experiences of the present will be exceeded by the expectations of the future. This excess of expectations of the reality of experiences was given the name of progress (Santos, 1999: 210). The asymmetry between social experiences and social expectations was rendered normal by the two pillars on which Western modernity is based: social regulation and social emancipation. Social regulation is constituted by the principles of the state, the market and the community[10], while social emancipation is formed of the aesthetic-expressive rationality of literature and the arts, the cognitive instrumental rationality of science and technology, and the moral-practical rationality of ethics and law[11] (Santos, 1991: 1).

The project of Western modernity aimed at the harmonious and reciprocal development of both pillars, whereby the harmonisation of potentially incompatible social values, such as justice and autonomy, solidarity and identity, and equality and freedom, would be ensured (Santos, 2014: 138). This project is both ambitious and revolutionary and so its possibilities are endless, producing excessive promises that contrast with the shortfall in accomplishment (Santos, 1991: 2). The management of the excesses and deficits of Western modernity, which has been entrusted to modern science, have caused the collapse of the pillar of emancipation into the pillar of regulation (Santos, 1995: 7). This process culminated in the concentration of emancipatory energies in the realm of science and technology. Simultaneously, because of its relation with science, the principle of the market has progressively shrunk the principle of community and colonised the principle of the state (Santos, 1991: 2-3).

The two pillars are related to two forms of knowledge: knowledge-as-regulation – defined along a line between ignorance, seen as chaos, and knowledge, consequently meaning order; and knowledge-as-emancipation – conceiving

[10] Mainly inspired by the works of Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith and Rousseau, respectively.
[11] The constitution of the pillar of social emancipation is drawn from the work of Weber.

ignorance as colonialism, and knowledge as solidarity (Santos, 1999: 205). As Nunes helps us understand, the first form of knowledge sees the diversity of modes of knowing and intervention in the world as a symptom of chaos, made of irrational pre-scientific notions that are hostile to modern science and which only this rationality can transform in order (2003: 59). For the second, the intention of modern science to legislate about other forms of knowing is seen as a colonial manifestation, arising from the marginality, discredit or liquidation of everything that does not fit the principles of the rationalising order (Nunes, 2003: 59-60). Colonialist ignorance refuses to recognise the other as equal and so converts him into an object (Santos, 2010c: 230). This second form of knowledge opposes this pretension with a solidary conception of knowledge, made from coexistence, dialogue and interaction between different forms of knowing and experience (Nunes, 2003: 60).

These two forms of knowledge were supposed to balance each other, meaning that knowledge-as-emancipation would be fed by the excesses of order and knowledge-as-regulation by the excesses of solidarity (Santos, 2014: 139). The growing overlap between the development of Western modernity and the development of capitalism led to the total supremacy of knowledge-as-regulation over knowledge-as-emancipation: order became the hegemonic way of knowing, while chaos became the hegemonic way of ignorance (Santos, 2010c: 231; 2014: 139). Furthermore, such primacy allowed the reconfiguration of knowledge-as-emancipation in accordance with knowledge-as-regulation. Thus, colonialism was recoded as a form of order, while solidarity was equated with chaos (Santos, 2014: 139).

It is important to note that the distinction between social regulation and social emancipation ruled only the metropolitan spaces. The colonial territories were ruled by the logic of appropriation/violence (Santos, 2010c: 230). "In general, appropriation involves incorporation, co-optation, and assimilation, whereas violence involves physical, material, culture, and human destruction" (Santos, 2007: 51). While the logic of regulation/emancipation that governs metropolitan places was unthinkable without the distinction between the law of persons and the law of things, the logic of appropriation/violence only recognised the law of things, of both human

and nonhuman things (Santos, 2014: 123). Through this process, modern science, increasingly at the service of capitalist development, was able to impose itself as hegemonic. As a consequence, colonialism as a social relation survived the end of colonialism as a political relation (Santos, 1999: 205; 2010c: 231).

Western modernity, besides seeing its constituting pillars become distorted, has also failed to fulfil its promises. The promise of equality remains unaccomplished, and inequality has actually been rising among countries and within countries. Liberty has not been achieved either; constant manifestations of violations of the most basic human rights can be found worldwide, even in formally peaceful countries. Perpetual peace is a mirage, every year thousands of people die as victims of conflict. The domination of nature led to a severe ecological crisis that largely affects the poorest populations in the world (Santos, 1999: 197-199). Western modernity is thus formed of a set of modern problems that cannot be solved by modern solutions (Santos, 2014: 233). That said, Boaventura de Sousa Santos looks at critical theory for answers. However, he finds the following perplexity (Santos, 2010b: 7): why has critical emancipatory thought, largely traditional in Western culture, in fact not been able to emancipate? It seems the global North has little to teach the world and that, in reality, colonialism has impaired its ability to accept the existence of other narratives beyond the universal history of the West. Surprisingly, Eurocentric critical theory has also been affected by this incapacity (Santos, 2014: 19). This reality sends the author on the quest for new epistemologies, that he designates the *epistemologies of the South*.

If modern problems cannot be solved by modern solutions and if both the modern paradigm and critical theory face a common crisis, the time might have come for different paradigms to be developed. According to the author, to find solutions to modern problems we must reinvent social emancipation. He starts from the premise that cultural diversity and epistemological diversity are reciprocally embedded, and, therefore, he looks to replace the monoculture of scientific knowledge by an *ecology of knowledges*, as we will see below (Santos et al., 2007: xx). These solutions should be constructed through a process of learning from the South, because only through the experiences of the social groups that suffered the consequences of the

epistemological exclusivism of modern science can we go beyond modern critical theory. The South is here seen as a metaphor of human suffering caused by capitalism and colonialism (Santos, 2010c: 227). This need to learn from the South comes from three important conclusions (Santos, 2002a: 238). First, social experience is much wider and more diverse than what Western scientific and philosophical tradition knows and considers important. Second, social richness is being wasted, which lends strength to the idea that there are no alternative knowledges. Lastly, to combat the waste of experience, to make visible alternative initiatives and movements and to confer credibility to them, it is necessary to propose a different model of rationality.

Through the epistemologies of the South, Boaventura de Sousa Santos proposes "a plurality of collective projects, articulated in non-hierarchical forms by translation procedures, to replace the formulation of a general theory of social change" and "hybridization, fully aware of the power relations that intervene in the process, that is, looking into who or what gets hybridized, in what contexts and with what purposes" (Santos, 2010c: 228). If the faces of domination are multiple, resistances to it and their protagonists are also multiple, and therefore, rejecting single principles implies the impossibility of gathering all resistances and agencies under a great single theory (Santos, 1999: 202). As an epistemological, political and cultural orientation, he proposes that we detach ourselves from the imperial North in order to learn from the South. This learning only happens to the extent that the South is conceived of as resistance to the domination of the North, and what we should look for in the South is what has not been totally destroyed or disfigured by such domination (Santos, 2010c: 231).

The author considers that all critical knowledge must start precisely with the critique of knowledge (Santos, 1999: 205). The epistemologies of the South are built from an epistemological tradition that has been marginalised and discredited by modernity, knowledge-as-emancipation. According to it, ignorance means colonialism, meaning thinking of the other as an object. Knowledge, on the contrary, is to acknowledge, in the sense of raising the other from the condition of object to the condition of subject. This knowledge-acknowledgement is what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls solidarity (Santos, 1999: 205). Solidarity implies the recognition of the

other as equal and as an equal producer of knowledge, recognising and celebrating the particularities that contribute to each production of knowledge. The epistemologies of the South, by going from colonialism to solidarity, foster the development of a non-colonial order that bounds current experiences and expectations of future actions, and consequences, aiming at a decent life (Santos, 2014: 156, 163).

ABYSSAL GLOBAL LINES

To describe the way modern Western thinking operates the author developed the metaphor of *abyssal global lines* (Santos, 2007, 2010b, 2010c, 2014). For him, modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking that creates a system of radical distinctions. This system has been developed because of the existence of abyssal lines that permanently erase any different reality that exists on the "other side of the line", claiming modern forms of thinking and universal organisation (Santos, 2010b: 29). The main characteristic of abyssal thinking is the impossibility of the copresence of the two sides of the line. The visible distinctions that structure social reality on the modern side of the line are supported by the invisibility of the difference between this side of the line and the other side. Abyssal thinking is primarily the product of modern law and modern knowledge; they constitute the main global lines of modernity (Santos, 2007: 46). "In each of the two great domains – science and law – the divisions carried out by the global lines are abyssal to the extent that they effectively eliminate whatever realities are on the other side of the line" (Santos, 2014: 120).

Here, the only concern is modern knowledge. Abyssal thinking attributed to modern science the universal capacity of distinguishing between what is true and what is false. This primacy left out two other groups of knowledge: philosophy and theology. The dispute between these three forms of reasoning - modern science, philosophy and theology - although widely acknowledged, happens on the same side of the line, the modern side. This explicit division is based on the invisibility of forms of knowledge that cannot be described as any of the above and they are: popular, lay,

plebeian, peasant or indigenous knowledges. It is impossible to apply the scientific distinction of true or false to them, therefore they disappear as valid knowledges. Furthermore, it is also impossible to integrate them in the realms of philosophy and theology, the other two forms of knowledge accepted by modernity. The other side of the line knows no real knowledge, only beliefs, opinions, and intuitive or subjective understandings (Santos, 2007: 47; 2014: 120).

These experiences are wasted experiences, made invisible both as agents and agencies. Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues that the colonial zone was the initial social territory of these experiences (Santos, 2010a: 26). The colonial is the state of nature where civil society's institutions have no space. Western modernity is characterised by the cohabitation of civil society and the state of nature. The colonial zone is the space of incomprehensible magical practices, whose weirdness attributed a condition of non-humanity to its agents. Civil society and the state of nature are separated by an abyssal line that refuses to recognise the latter, and therefore, the state of nature is declared non-existent (Santos, 2014: 121-122). This means "the present being created on the other side of the line is made invisible by its being reconceptualised as the irreversible past of this side of the line. The hegemonic contact converts simultaneity into noncontemporaneity" (Santos, 2007: 50). Modern humanity is not thinkable without modern sub-humanity. The denial of one part of humanity is fundamental for the declaration of the other part as universal.

The logic of the abyssal global lines is still functioning at the present time; actually, these lines are moving and redefining themselves. The other side of the line is enlarging while the modern side is becoming increasingly smaller. This is happening because the logic of appropriation/violence is gaining ground over the logic of regulation/emancipation. In reality, besides contracting, regulation/emancipation is being appropriated by the logic of appropriation/violence (Santos, 2010b: 38). This shift is a consequence of the growing number of individuals subjected to the logic of appropriation/violence, typical of colonial spaces. The colonial is taken as a "metaphor for those who perceive their life experiences as taking place on the other side of the line and rebel against it", independently of the site where these experiences occur (Santos, 2014: 125-126).

The reason that governs and nurtures abyssal global lines is considered a "lazy reason" by Boaventura de Sousa Santos. He characterises the hegemonic Western model of rationality as such after the work of Gottfried Leibniz[12] (Santos, 2004: 158). Indolent reason was the frame for all the great philosophical and epistemological debates of the last two centuries. The consolidation of the liberal state in Europe and North America, the industrial revolutions, the expansion of capitalism, colonialism and imperialism, constituted the social-political context in which lazy reason flourished. The indolence is manifested in the way it resists any change of routine and how it transforms hegemonic interests into true knowledge (Santos, 2002a: 240-241). In order to deconstruct this reason, thus enabling the occurrence of changes in the structure of knowledge, the author proposes a different model, that he calls *cosmopolitan reason*, the reason that grounds the epistemologies of the South (Santos, 2014: 164).

Cosmopolitan reason is based on the recognition of three limitations of modern Western thinking (Santos, 2002a: 239). First, the understanding of the world far exceeds the Western understanding. Second, the understanding of the world and the way it creates and legitimises social power is closely related to modern conceptions of time and temporality. Finally, Western rationality narrows the present while it expands the future. The constriction of the present, caused by a particular conception of totality, transformed the present in a fugitive moment. Concurrently, the linear conception of time and the planning of history made it possible to expand the future indefinitely because the meaning and direction of history lie in progress and if progress is unbounded, the future is infinite. The larger the future the greater are its prospects when compared with the experiences of the present (Santos, 2002a: 239; 2014: 181). The future is infinitely abundant and infinitely equal; it only exists to become past. A future like this does not need to be thought, here is the foundation of lazy reason (Santos, 2002a: 254).

Subaltern cosmopolitanism "refers to the aspiration of oppressed groups to organise their resistance and consolidate political coalitions on the same scale as the

[12] See Leinbniz, Gottfried (1985) [1710] *Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil*. La Salle, IL: Open Court.

one used by the oppressors to victimise them, that is, the global scale" (Santos, 2014: 135). It is manifested through the initiatives and movements that constitute counter-hegemonic globalisation, that is, movements that struggle to transform unequal exchanges into exchanges of shared authority (Santos, 2002b: 29-30), fighting against economic, social, political and cultural exclusion created by neoliberal capitalism and globalisation. These groups strive for an egalitarian redistribution of social, material, political, cultural and symbolic resources in order to blur unequal power relations (Santos, 2010a: 42). Subaltern cosmopolitanism does not aim for uniformity or a general theory of social emancipation. It envisages equal weight for the principles of equality and recognition of differences. Therefore, it is the result of gathering together the different local, progressive struggles with the purpose of enhancing their emancipatory potential through translocal/local linkages (Santos, 2014: 135). Post-abyssal thinking starts from the idea that the diversity of the world is inexhaustible and that it lacks an adequate epistemology, that is to say, the epistemological diversity of the world remains unconstructed (Santos, 2010a: 43).

To break with lazy reason and affirm cosmopolitan rationality, the author proposes to expand the present and reveal the diversity of the world, while constricting the future. This is possible through the use of two different sociological tools: the *sociology of absences* and the *sociology of emergences*. The great diversity exposed by the sociologies of absences and emergences cannot be explained by a universal general theory, because it would always favour some specific knowledge to the detriment of others. Therefore, he proposes a *process of translation* that is able to create mutual intelligibility between possible and available experiences (Santos, 2002a: 239).

SOCIOLOGY OF ABSENCES

The sociology of absences has the general goal of deconstructing the idea of totality as a form of order. Totality has two main consequences (Santos, 2002a: 242). First, because nothing exists outside totality that is or deserves to be intelligible, this is seen as an exhaustive, exclusivist and complete reason, although it is just one of

many rational logics present in the world and is only dominant in modern Western societies. Second, total rationality cannot envisage the parts separated from the whole. Therefore, Western modernity has a very limited and selective understanding of the world, but also of itself. It is nevertheless interesting to see that this total rationality, originally from the West, is in fact derived from the East. Total rationality is the response of the West to its cultural and philosophical marginality relative to the East, which comprehends a wider diversity of worlds (earthly or not) and times (linear, cyclic…). Aware of its eccentricity with respect to its origin, Western rationality retrieved from it only what favours the expansion of capitalism and colonialism, as it was a limited project from the start. Therefore, the complexity of the world was reduced to the earthly world through the processes of secularisation and laicisation, and the diversity of times was reduced to linear time through the concepts of progress and revolution (Santos, 2014: 168-169).

This condensed version of the world was made possible through a conception of the present time that reduces it to a fleeting moment between the past and the future This happens because, has shown above, Western modernity is organised around the shortfall of social experiences (lived in the present) compared with social expectations (the promises of the future). Therefore, contemporaneity forms an extremely small part of simultaneity, meaning that what is considered contemporary is a small sample of the existing reality (Santos, 2002a: 245; 2014: 138). There is a wide variety of social practices that remain invisible although happening at the same time as modern practices. This asymmetry actually hides a hierarchy: the superiority of those who establish the time that determines contemporaneity. Thus, a person who is ploughing the land today is considered a pre-modern peasant (Santos, 2014: 170). The critique of totality is an indispensable step to recover the experiences wasted by modern Western rationality. What is envisaged is to broaden the world through the broadening of the present, in order to identify and value its inexhaustible richness. To broaden our own rationality we must practice the sociology of absences. The goal of this research method is to transform impossible objects into possible ones and with them to transform absences into presences, and so analyse the fragments of social experience that were not socialised by total reason (Santos, 2002a: 245-246).

There are five ways to produce the non-existence that the sociology of absences envisages contesting. The first is the *monoculture of knowledge and the rigour of knowledge*. It consists of transforming modern science and high culture into the unique standards of truth and aesthetic quality. Non-existence is produced in the form of the ignorant (Santos, 2010b: 22). The second is the *monoculture of linear time*. It is the idea that history has only one recognised meaning and direction, which is progress, modernisation, development and globalisation. It declares to be backward everything that, according to the linear temporal norm, is asymmetrical in relation to what is considered advanced. This monoculture produces the non-contemporaneity of what is contemporary. Take as an example the encounter of an African peasant, considered pre-modern, with an official of the World Bank, a symbol of modernity. Ahead of time are the core countries of the International System, and, with them, the dominant knowledges, institutions and forms of sociability they produce. Non-existence is, thus, generated in the form of backward (Santos, 2002a: 247; 2014: 173).

The third is the *monoculture of the naturalisation of differences*. It consists of the distribution of populations according to different categories that naturalise hierarchies. This distribution results in relations of domination, derived from the natural inferiority of some populations. Relations of domination are the consequence and not the cause of that hierarchy; in fact, they can be considered a burden for those classified as superior. The white man's civilising mission is one example (Santos, 2010b: 23). A more recent example is the UN's "responsibility to protect", according to which the international ccommunity has the responsibility to intervene in cases where national governments cannot avoid massive violations of human rights. The fourth is the *monoculture of logic of the dominant scale*. In Western modernity, the dominant scale is the universal and the global. These realities are not sensitive to specific contexts and thus determine the irrelevance of other possible scales. In this case, non-existence is produced in the form of the local (Santos, 2002a: 248). Fifth and last is the *monoculture of the capitalist logic of productivity*. It considers that the only valid type of productivity is the capitalist one, with economic growth being an unquestionable rational goal. All other forms of productivity are deemed unproductive (Santos, 2014: 174).

The sociology of absences derives from two questions: first, how has Western modernity, based on such a selective understanding of reality, managed to achieve such importance, and second, how can that conception of totality and the rationality that supports it be confronted and overcome (Santos, 2014: 175). For each of the five non-existences Boaventura de Sousa Santos proposes an ecology. The purpose is to reveal the diversity and multiplicity of social practices and to give them credibility, in opposition to hegemonic and exclusivist practices (Santos, 2002a: 253). First, *the ecology of knowledges*. It is necessary to identify other knowledges and other standards of rigour that operate in a credible manner in social contexts, as well as practices declared as non-existent by total reason. The ecology of knowledges argues that there is no general ignorance or general knowledge. It is the incompleteness of all knowledges that facilitates epistemological dialogue and dispute between different knowledges (Santos, 2002a: 250). The concept of ecology of knowledges will be developed later in this chapter.

Second, *the ecology of temporalities*. Societies consist of diverse temporalities and thus the disqualification, suppression and unintelligibility of many practices are related to the use of temporalities that are strange to Western capitalist modernity. The broadening of the present thus occurs by relativising the linear time (Santos, 2002a: 251-252). The sociology of absences stems from the idea that different cultures produce different temporal rules. Therefore, "[i]t aims to free social practices from their status as residuum, devolving to them their own temporality and thus the possibility of autonomous development" (Santos, 2014: 177). Third, *the ecology of recognition*. The sociology of absences challenges coloniality, searching for a new interaction between the principles of equality and difference. It aims at mutual recognition, serving to deconstruct both difference and hierarchy (Santos, 2002a: 252; 2014: 178). Fourth, *the ecology of trans-scale*. The local has to be conceptually de-globalised, which means retrieving from the local whatever is not the result of hegemonic globalisation. The goal is to find a focus of resistance against the unequal power relations generated by such globalisation, in order to construct a counter-hegemonic globalisation (Santos, 2002a: 252; 2014: 179). Finally, *the ecology of productivities*. To retrieve and value alternative systems of production, such as

popular economic organisations, workers' cooperatives, self-managed enterprises and a solidarity economy (Santos, 2014: 180).

ECOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGES

Active resistance is essential to confront abyssal thinking. Political resistance is therefore required and it should be anchored in epistemological resistance. Boaventura de Sousa Santos believes that there is a need for a new post-abyssal thinking that he labels subaltern cosmopolitanism (Santos, 2010a: 41). It is intimately related to the activities and groups that constitute counter-hegemonic globalisation. The importance of this specific type of cosmopolitanism lies in its clear realisation of incompleteness, without, nevertheless, striving for completeness (Santos, 2007: 64). The plurality of non-Western understandings of reality show that the possibility of hybrid understandings that mix Western and non-Western thoughts, is almost infinite (Santos, 2010b: 48). Post-abyssal thinking implies thinking "from the perspective of the other side of the line, precisely because the other side of the line has been the realm of the unthinkable in western modernity" (Santos, 2007: 66).

Post-abyssal thinking can be described as learning from the South through an epistemology of the South. It opposes the monoculture of modern science with the ecology of knowledges (Santos, 2007: 66). The ecology of knowledges recognises the plurality of heterogeneous knowledges, meaning the epistemologies of the South make an effort to rescue from oblivion alternative ways of thinking that were often classed by modern Western science as beliefs and superstitions without any scientific validity (Santos, 2010a: 44). The ecology of knowledges aims to grant equality of opportunity to different knowledges to show how they can contribute to another possible world, which, for the author, implies "a more just and democratic society, as well as one more balanced in its relations with nature", that is, the possibility to achieve alternative ends (Santos, 2014: 190).

Post-abyssal thinking is structured by three main ideas. First, the acknowledgement of radical copresence. Radical copresence attributes

contemporaneity to both sides of the line in equal terms by recognising various kinds of contemporaneity. This way, simultaneity is equated with contemporaneity. Rescuing the other side of the line from the past implies abandoning the linear conception of time (Santos, 2007: 66; 2014: 191). Second, post-abyssal thinking is based upon the ideas of epistemological multiplicity and plurality of knowledges, attributing validity to other forms of reasoning beyond scientific knowledge. Post-abyssal thinking thus renounces any general epistemology (Santos, 2010a: 45). Third, counter-hegemonic globalisation is an important characteristic of post-abyssal thinking in that the ecology of knowledges acts as a counter-epistemology. The ecology of knowledges aims to guarantee epistemological consistency for pluralistic, propositive thinking (Santos, 2010b: 51-52).

According to the ecology of knowledges, there is no unity of knowledge but neither is there unity of ignorance. "All ignorance is ignorant of a certain knowledge, and all knowledge is the overcoming of a particular ignorance" (Santos et al., 2007: xlvii). Ignorance is not always the starting point; it can be the point of arrival. A determinate learning process can cause the other knowledges to be forgotten. The utopia of inter-knowledge is to learn other knowledges without losing the knowledge we had before. The ecology of knowledges is guided by prudence, since the accumulation of different knowledges is followed by the constant raising of questions, for which it is only possible to find incomplete answers (Santos, 2014: 188, 206).

The ecology of knowledges, recognising as it does the plurality of knowledges, cannot ignore modern science. Scientific knowledge has not been distributed in a socially equitable form, consequently the interventions it promotes in the real world usually serve the social groups with greatest access to such knowledge. This way, social injustice is actually fostered by cognitive injustice (Santos, 2010a: 48). The ecology of knowledges does not exclude scientific knowledge but gives it a counter-hegemonic use.

> Such use consists, on one hand, in exploring the internal plurality of science, that is, alternative scientific practices that have been made visible by feminist and postcolonial epistemologies, and, on the other, in promoting the interaction and interdependence between scientific and non-scientific knowledges (Santos, 2007: 70).

Therefore, the knowledge proclaimed by the ecology of knowledges is knowledge-as-intervention-in-reality instead of knowledge-as-a-representation-of-reality. Access to reality is permitted by concepts, theories, values and language, since we cannot have direct access to it. Notwithstanding, the knowledge constructed upon reality intervenes in it and has consequences. Thus, "knowledge is not representation, it is intervention" (Santos, 2014: 207).

The credibility of a cognitive construction is measured by the type of intervention it promotes in the real world. The value of some of modern science's technological interventions is not called into question, nevertheless possible interventions promoted by other forms of knowledge should be recognised (Santos, 2014: 201). In each particular situation, the ecology of knowledges favours context dependent hierarchies, in light of the concrete results envisaged or accomplished by different forms of knowledge. These hierarchies determine the form of knowledge that guarantees a greater participation to the social groups related to such intervention (Santos, 2010a: 51) It is here that the urge for egalitarian and simultaneous copresence and for incompleteness lie, since it is not possible for a single type of knowledge to account for all the interventions in the world. Thus, all types of reasoning are incomplete in a variety of ways, because it is impossible to eradicate incompleteness (Santos, 2007: 71). Intersubjectivity is also important. Different knowledge practices happen at different time and space levels, therefore, in order to interconnect those different practices it is important to learn and act in a variety of scales (interscalarity) and to expand our temporal frame, acknowledging different rhythms (intertemporality) (Santos, 2010b: 54-55).

Another important aspect of the ecology of knowledges is *action-with-clinamen*. To Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the important distinction to make in the realm of social sciences is not the difference between structure and agency, but the distinction between conformist action and action-with-clinamen. Conformist action is routinely, reproductively and repetitive action, without capacity of questioning social reality. While, clinamen represents a deviation from reality as we know it, it has a transformative character (Santos, 2010a: 54-55). This specific type of action is not concerned with a dramatic break with Western reality, as revolutionary action is, but

instead it performs a slight deviation from that reality whose "cumulative effects render possible the complex and creative combinations among atoms, hence also among living beings and social groups" (Santos, 2007: 77). The ecology of knowledges acts to identify the circumstances that take full advantage of the probability of the occurrence of action-with-clinamen and to define the various possibilities within which the deviation can occur. Clinamen represents an important input to post-abyssal thinking thanks to its capacity to pass through abyssal global lines (Santos, 2010b: 60).

SOCIOLOGY OF EMERGENCES

The sociology of absences amplifies the present, adding to the already existing reality what was turned into non-existent by modern Western rationality. Still, the present is also amplified by the sociology of emergences, adding to this new reality the future possibilities and expectations it contains. Whilst the sociology of absences operates in the field of social experiences, the sociology of emergences operates in the field of social expectations (Santos, 2002a: 256-257). It consists of replacing the emptiness of the future according to linear time with a future of plural and concrete possibilities that are at the same time utopian and realistic (Santos, 2010b: 24). The future is thereby contracted, becoming scarce and consequently an object of care (Santos, 2014: 182). The future is no longer the place of high, probably never realised, expectations; instead, expectations start to be based on tangible possibilities and capacities (Santos, 2002a: 257). Contracting the future consists of narrowing the gap between the future of societies and the future of individuals, since the second is much shorter than the first. The future's limited character and its dependency on the management and caring of individuals render it a factor of enlargement of the present (Santos, 2002a: 254).

The sociology of emergences entails "the symbolic amplification of signs, clues, and latent tendencies that, however inchoate and fragmented, do point to new constellations of meaning as regards both the understanding and the transformation of the world" (Santos, 2007: 64). Its central concept is the "Not Yet", proposed by

Ernst Bloch (1995). "The Not-Yet characterizes the tendency in material process, of the origin which is processing itself out, tending towards the manifestation of its content" (Bloch, 1995: 307). Bloch developed this idea because he considered that the concept of possible was largely ignored by Western modernity, despite its importance in revealing the endless wealth in the world (Santos, 2014: 182).

The Not Yet inscribes an uncertain possibility in the present. A present possibility can, in the future, either fulfil the expectations as it can reach frustration. Thus, transformation is accompanied by both chance and danger. It is the uncertainty connected to the possibility of transformation that, for Boaventura de Sousa Santos, acts to enlarge the present while contracting the future. Because the horizon of possibilities is limited, it is important not to waste the prospects of change offered by the present. Therefore, to take full advantage of those prospects requires precaution and great attention to protect them and maximise the probability of hope in relation to the probability of frustration (Santos, 2002a: 255; 2010b: 26). This is why, for the author, the future according to linear time that recognises only one direction must be replaced by a future where multiple paths are conceivable. "Caring for the future is imperative because it is impossible to armour hope against frustration, the advent against nihilism, redemption against disaster (…)" (Santos, 2014: 184).

The sociology of emergences acts either upon the possibilities (potentiality) as upon the capacities (potency). Not Yet has a meaning (as possibility) but not a direction (Santos, 2002a: 255). Thus, the sociology of emergences conceives the discrepancy between experiences and expectations without resorting to the idea of progress. It aims at a balanced relation between the two, radicalising expectations built on real possibilities and capacities, here and now (Santos, 2014: 185). As Boaventura de Sousa Santos warns us, these are the preconditions to social emancipation.

> The expectations legitimated by the sociology of emergences are both contextual, because gauged by concrete possibilities, and radical, because, in the ambit of those possibilities and capacities, they claim a strong fulfilment that protects them, though never completely, from frustration and perversion. In such expectations resides the reinvention of social emancipation, or rather emancipations (Santos, 2014: 185).

The sociology of absences and the sociology emergences each helps, in its own way, to slow down the present, providing it a with a denser and more substantive content than the fleeting moment between the past and the future that modern rationality has reserved for it (Santos, 2002a: 258). The importance of both sociologies is that they render contemporary realities that have until now been invisible, enlarging the understanding of the present and also revealing the multitude of directions the future can take. Both sociologies are grounded on a subjective dimension. The sociology of absences derives from non-conformism and an insurgent cosmopolitan consciousness regarding the waste of experiences, while the sociology of emergences derives from non-conformism and an anticipatory consciousness regarding a desire whose fulfilment is within the bounds of possibilities (Santos, 2014: 184). The knowledge produced by both sociologies is an argumentative knowledge that aims at persuading rather than demonstrating and that instead of aiming to be rational, wants to be reasonable, with its evolution being based on the credible identification of emergent knowledges and practices (Santos, 2002a: 258).

The multiplication and diversification of experiences available and possible raises two problems: the problem of extreme fragmentation and atomisation of reality and the problem of the impossibility of giving sense to social transformation. From the perspective of cosmopolitan reason, the world is composed of multiple totalities, all necessarily partial and incomplete, and thus, the task is not to identify new totalities or adopt other meanings for social transformation, it is rather to propose new ways of thinking those totalities and conceiving those meanings (Santos, 2002a: 261). That said, it is unreasonable to try to capture all this multiplicity in one grand theory; actually, this would be contrary to the sociological work just proposed, since a general theory always proposes the monoculture of a given totality and the homogeneity of its parts. In order to make sense of the findings of the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences, Boaventura de Sousa Santos proposes the *work of translation*, a procedure that creates reciprocal intelligibility between the experiences of the world, both those available and those possible (Santos, 2002a: 262).

WORK OF TRANSLATION

The alternative to a general theory is the work of translation. Intercultural translation

> Consists of searching for isomorphic concerns and underlying assumptions among cultures, identifying differences and similarities, and devolving, whenever appropriate, new hybrid forms of cultural understanding and intercommunication that may be useful in favouring interactions and strengthening alliances among social movements fighting, in different cultural contexts, against capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy and for social justice, human dignity, or human decency (Santos, 2014: 212).

The work of translation facilitates reciprocal intelligibility among culturally diverse social experiences, undermining the idea of original and pure cultures and emphasising the idea of cultural interaction (Santos, 2014: 217). It thus opposes the universalism lying at the centre of modern Western theories and the idea of incommensurability between cultures. The idea of impossible understanding between cultures and the idea of universality are closely related since they represent the relationships of destruction and assimilation between Western-cultures and non-modern cultures. These relationships disregard non-Western cultures as relevant alternatives, represented as they are by military conquest, ideological indoctrination or linguistic repression, among others (Santos, 2014: 212).

The work of translation seeks to capture two aspects: the hegemonic relation between different social experiences, revealing the remains of colonial heritage, and what is beyond that relation, recovering historical-cultural possibilities interrupted by colonial relations. It is in this double movement that social experiences become able to be submitted to relations of reciprocal intelligibility (Santos, 2002a: 262). The work of translation focuses on both knowledges and practices, but also on their agents. Intercultural translation can have two types of dialogue, between Western and non-Western ideas and practices, and between different non-Western conceptions and practices. This work aims to learn from the anti-imperial South, taken as a symbol for the "global, systemic, and unjust human suffering caused by capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy and for the resistance against the causes of such suffering" (Santos, 2014: 222-223).

Translation between knowledges, concepts, and worldviews takes the form of "diatopical hermeneutics". The use of this concept is inspired by the work of Raymond Panikkar[13]. It consists of the interpretation work needed between two cultures to identify similar concerns and the different responses thereby provided (Santos, 2014: 219). This means that all cultures are incomplete and can thus be enriched by dialogue and confrontation with other cultures. Therefore, diatopical hermeneutics does not strive for completeness; actually, it wants to raise awareness to mutual incompleteness by facilitating dialogue between different cultural commonplaces, with the goal of arriving at reciprocal understanding (Santos, 2014: 219-220). Diatopical hermeneutics conceives universalism as a Western particularity, relating the critique of universalism to the rejection of a general theory. It instead presupposes a *negative universalism*, the idea of the impossibility of cultural completeness (Santos, 2002a: 264).

The sociology of absences and emergences, together with the work of translation, contributes to the development of an alternative to the indolent reason, in the form of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls cosmopolitan reason. This alternative is based on the idea that global social justice is not possible without global cognitive justice (Santos, 2002a: 273). The work of translation represents, in addition to intercultural dialogue, inter-political translation, a "procedure that promotes the intermovement politics at the source of counter-hegemonic globalisation" (Santos, 2014: 213). The work of translation assumes great importance when promoting the interaction of different non-hegemonic knowledges and practices since it contributes to their reciprocal intelligibility and consequently to the possibility of aggregation, thereby facilitating the construction of counter-hegemony (Santos, 2002a: 265). Intercultural translation is, therefore, a political project which intends to evince shared cultural meanings in order to turn demands into objectives worth fighting for. Political interconnection allows mutual intelligibility among forms of organisation and objectives of action (Santos, 2014: 213, 222).

The goal of the work of translation is to create constellations of knowledges and practices strong enough to provide credible alternatives to neoliberal

[13] Panikkar, Raymond (1979) *Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics*. New York: Paulist.

globalisation, which constitutes another step of global capitalism on the path to subject the inexhaustible totality of the world to mercantilist logic (Santos, 2002a: 274). The purpose of the work of translation is to overcome the natural fragmentation of the wide diversity of social knowledges and experiences in the world, revealed by the sociologies mentioned above, with the goal of building a solid, consistent and competent anti-imperial South (Santos, 2014: 224). This establishes the conditions for the development of specific social emancipations of specific social groups, grounded on transformative practices that reinvent the present with a view to having a better future (Santos, 2014: 234).

4TH CHAPTER | LEARNING FROM AND WITH THE SOUTH: AN APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING

Peacebuilding is both a concept and a practice. As a concept, it is an idea developed with the purpose of constructing peace in countries affected by real or imminent conflict. The adjective "liberal" that generally precedes peacebuilding stems from its ideological content. Liberal peacebuilding aims at constructing a liberal peace. Although liberal peacebuilding has acquired a status of hegemony within the international community, it is not the only conception of peacebuilding. The peacebuilding concept varies according to the sort of peace it wishes to build. Newman, for example, distinguishes three different types of peacebuilding: transformatory peacebuilding, realist peacebuilding and liberal peacebuilding (2009: 47-50), and many others can exist. But besides being an idea, peacebuilding is also a practice and an intervention mechanism designed to restore peace in post-conflict countries. This mechanism has been most widely developed by the United Nations, as shown in the first chapter, but it is also employed by regional organisations such as the European Union and the African Union.

The goal of this chapter is threefold. First, to construct a critique of liberal peace based on Boaventura de Sousa Santos' abyssal lines metaphor, to show the association of liberal peace with the reasoning that structures modern Western thinking. Second, to develop a conceptual proposal that constitutes an advance for peace studies through the incorporation of the conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South, thus developing the concept of post-abyssal peacebuilding. The third purpose is to relate post-abyssal peacebuilding to the UN's actions, raising the hypothesis of integrating a different kind of peacebuilding and a different idea of peace into the UN framework. This is a purely exploratory chapter. The ideas presented are merely a draft of work that requires further research. The purpose is to open a debate on, first, the possibility of developing a post-abyssal model of peacebuilding, inspired by the epistemologies of the South, and, second, the possibility of integrating that model into that UN's peace structure.

LIBERAL PEACE: ANOTHER ABYSSAL LINE

Like modern Western thinking, liberal peace acts in an abyssal manner in the sense that it effectively eliminates whatever realities are on the other side of the line. Liberal peace does not recognise the existence of other peace models that do not conform to liberal values. Therefore, liberal peace contributes to the negation of the epistemological diversity of the world by reinforcing the foundations where modern thinking lays its universal and totalitarian character. Liberal peace constitutes an abyssal line that distinguishes between the right form of peace, which is achievable through liberal market democracies, and disposable experiences of peace rooted in popular, lay, peasant or endogenous knowledges and made invisible both as agencies and agents.

According to Santos and Meneses (2010: 9-10) all valid knowledges are contextual, either in terms of political or cultural differences. Therefore, even the dominant epistemology, which is modern Western thinking, is contextual and is based on a dual difference: the cultural difference of the Western Christian modern world and the political difference of colonialism and capitalism. The transformation of this contextual knowledge into universal knowledge is the result of an epistemological intervention that was only possible through the force of the political, economic and military intervention of modern colonialism and capitalism and its imposition on non-Western peoples and cultures. Hegemonic principles and practices have thus been established through the construction of abyssal lines that negate the existence of the plurality of the world (Santos, 2014: 124). Likewise, liberal peace became hegemonic through the maintenance and perpetuation of the cultural and political relationships that gave primacy to modern Western thinking: colonialism and capitalism.

The relationships between global North and the global South fostered by peacebuilding are based on a deeply unequal power status and create high levels of dependency between international actors and local actors (at both a state and civil society level). This dependency is manifested in political and economic terms, and results in a big loss of autonomy for local actors, who are expected to follow the

dictates of liberal peace. The colonial aspect of these relationships is manifested by the imposition of a particular model of governance, liberal democracy, typical of Western countries but not widely developed in the global South. Capitalist relationships are manifested through the imposition of the free market, privatisations and an economy based on the extraction of natural resources.

Like modern Western thinking, liberal peace is rooted in the discrepancy between social experiences and social expectations. Intervention by international actors in post-conflict spaces creates great expectations of the future possibilities of peace, which are often disappointed with the course of peacebuilding missions. As seen in the second chapter, peacebuilding missions rarely accomplish their initial goals. Nevertheless, the difference between present experiences and future expectations, in this case the expectation of lasting peace, is a fundamental characteristic of the reasoning that structures liberal peace. The idea of progress is rooted in this divergence. The path to peace is a one-way road from chaos and destruction to the stability conferred by representative democracy, the free market and the rule of law.

This fixed model of progress, related to the belief that a specific model of governance will bring peace and stability to post-conflict countries, results in highly planned, repetitive and inflexible peace missions designed to foster peace through technocratic solutions alone. The consequence is, once more, that more creative locally-based solutions that are rooted in epistemologies different from modern Western thinking are disregarded. The rigid character of peace missions is evidence of how modern Western thinking works. As seen above, modern Western thinking reduces the complexity of reality in order to control it; therefore, reality is defined in the form of laws that describe regular phenomena with the goal of predicting their future behaviour (Santos, 1992: 17; 1995: 13). The same is valid for liberal peace and peacebuilding; a general law of peace is defined and equally applied to all post-conflict scenarios. Like modern knowledge, liberal peace has a utilitarian and functional character and produces the transformation of reality based on a static and limited conception of progress.

The supremacy of the pillar of regulation over the pillar of emancipation is, as explained before, clearly present in liberal peace. Modern Western thinking is structured along a progressive line that goes from ignorance to knowledge. Following this logic, the pillar of social regulation that is prevalent in modern thinking conceives the diversity of modes of knowing and intervention in the world as symptoms of chaos, which is at the extreme point of ignorance. On the other hand, knowledge is conceived as order, and in this case order means the state, the market and the community (Santos, 2014: 139). The same rational logic can be found in liberal peace. Chaos, the post-conflict failed state turmoil, is the initial position of a progressive process that, through international help, will end in a state of order and stability, represented by the construction of a solid state founded on democratic principles and the rule of law, which facilitates the establishment of the free market and contributes to the flourishing of a strong civil society. Order is thus achieved when post-conflict states resemble modern Western states.

But, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007: 54-55) warns, the logic of regulation/emancipation is being corrupted by the logic of appropriation/violence. Liberal peace is also affected by this phenomenon. Although the discourse of liberal peace develops around the principles of the state and the market, the ways these principles are enforced resemble the logic that has always ruled the colonial relationship between the global North and the global South, the logic of appropriation/violence. Peacebuilding intervention, conditionality and even the disguised discourse of partnership are all coercive tools whose purpose is to impose liberal peace on post-conflict states. This shows the deeply unequal power relations that still operate between the global North and the global South, whereby the stronger power has an almost absolute control over the lives of the weaker party. What becomes evident is that Western modernity can only be spread if it contradicts its founding principles (Santos, 2014: 127). Liberal peace, based on the idea of representative democracy and engagement with civil society, is actually implemented through mechanisms of force that completely disrespect local concerns and different conceptions of peace.

POST-ABYSSAL PEACEBUILDING

Having in mind Newman's distinctions of peacebuilding (Newman, 2009: 47-50), the concept of peacebuilding based on the epistemologies of the South could be classified as transformatory. That is, concerned with a solid resolution of conflict that addresses the root causes of violence, based on the premise that peace requires bottom-up community initiatives that give free expression to local desires and anxieties. According to the author, this form of peacebuilding comes close to advocating emancipation as the primary goal of peacebuilding as it rejects universal approaches to the resolution of conflicts. Transformatory peacebuilding pays greater attention to context and community needs, respecting different processes relating to politics, economics, justice and governance, other than the liberal model (Newman, 2009: 47).

Following this transformatory logic, a peacebuilding model based on the epistemologies of the South would be grounded on the idea of solidarity. In this particular case, solidarity entails the recognition by the International Community of the other affected by conflict as an equal subject and as equally capable of producing knowledge in order to work on constructions of peace that take advantage of the opportunities to live well (Santos, 1999, 2014). Solidarity should be transnational and work both between the global North and the global South, as well as within the global South; entailing coexistence, dialogue and interaction between different forms of knowledge. As it was clear in the previous chapter, global cognitive justice is a necessary premise for social justice, and I consider it is also necessary for peace.

What is being sought is a post-abyssal peace, a peace that aims at *buen vivir* (good living) (Santos, 2014). This is an emancipatory project, sensitive to specific contexts, and thus does not aim to form a great theory of peace. A post-abyssal peacebuilding project demands sociological imagination of two kinds: epistemological imagination and democratic imagination. The first, helps with recognising "different knowledges, perspectives and scales of identification and relevance, and analysis and evaluation of practices"; the second, "allows the recognition of different practices and

social agents" (Santos, 2014: 181). Both have a deconstructive as well as a reconstructive dimension.

What is advocated is that, in making peace, there should be a main goal that must be followed, and that is social emancipation (or emancipations); nevertheless, no specific peace model is advanced since it is considered that there is no right or wrong in building peace as there are no right or wrong forms of political, social and economic organisation. Instead, the goal of post-abyssal peacebuilding would be to relate different social practices and knowledges in mutual constructive relations. The objective of post-abyssal peacebuilding would be to provide the tools for dialogue between social actors that have experienced conflict, but also between those that have not, in order to share both the experiences of violence and experience of peace, with a view to reaching common emancipatory concepts of peace. This process, both internal and international, aims at emancipating not only those who have been affected by direct violence and open conflict, but also those who, for some reason, are victims of colonial and capitalist violence in formally peaceful societies.

I want to relate, here, the concept of emancipation to the importance of dreams. For me, emancipation is based on the right of societies to construct and pursue their most fundamental dreams. According to Gaston Bachelard,

> It is not with numbers, it is not with the course of history that we can overcome the millennial darkness. No, it is necessary to dream - dream in the awareness that life is a dream, that what we have dreamed beyond what we have lived is true, it is alive, it is here, present in all its genuineness before our eyes[14] (1970: 19).

Drawing on Bachelard's work, Rubem Alves draws attention to the concept of fundamental dreams, which have a general character, living on the minds of everyone, and so creating a sense of togetherness (Alves, 2002: 36-37). In my view, every human being on earth has the right to explore the possibilities the world has to offer. This is not synonymous with searching for progress or development in Western terms, on the contrary, emancipation means reclaiming from exclusion the large

[14] Originally in French: "[c]e n'est pas avec des chiffres, ce n'est pas en courant sur la ligne de l'histoire qu'on peut percer les ténèbres des millénaires. Non, il faut beaucoup rêver – rêver en prégnant conscience que la vie est un rêve, que ce qu'on rêve au-delà de ce qu'on a vécu est vrai, est vivant, est là, présent en toute vérité devant nos yeux."

majority of the world currently under colonial and capitalist oppression, giving them the possibility to construct their own dreams. The change that post-abyssal peacebuilding envisages is, therefore, to be seen in the present. Since it is in the present time that these possibilities can be tried and, eventually, accomplished, thus fulfilling fundamental dreams. Peace has to be made from concrete possible realities instead of never-accomplished expectations. That is why, in post-abyssal peacebuilding, the present becomes more significant than the future.

Sociology of Absences

Post-abyssal peace rejects any formulation of a general or totalising peace. In contrast with liberal peace, it is not a fixed model of what are the right conditions to achieve stability. On the contrary, it wants to explore different conceptions and possibilities of making peace and does not defend a final end result; actually it conceives the likelihood of existing many *peaces*. Therefore, post-abyssal peacebuilding practices the sociology of absences which, as described above, aims to explain that what does not exist is in fact actively transformed into non-existent, that is, into non-credible alternatives (Santos, 2002a: 246). Relating to peace, it means that liberal peace, widely affirmed as the right model to achieve lasting and sustainable peace, is in fact one of many other ways of practising peace and that other ways must be explored.

Post-abyssal peacebuilding, thus, confronts the five modes of production of non-existence described by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010b: 22-24)[15]: monoculture of knowledge and the rigour of knowledge, monoculture of linear time, monoculture of the naturalisation of differences, monoculture of logic of the dominant scale and lastly, monoculture of the capitalist logic of productivity. Hence, post-abyssal peacebuilding addresses each of the ecologies the author developed to challenge the five monocultures. The ecology of knowledges, as just said, aims to reveal other forms of peace that can operate credibly in post-conflict contexts, rejecting general and universal conceptions. The ecology of temporalities aims to show that different forms of peace can coexist at the same time, as they are

[15] The five modes of production of non-existence are dealt with more detail in the third chapter.

contemporary. It deconstructs the idea of a standard linear progression of time associated with a form of peace, the liberal model, ahead of all the others. Divergent conceptions of peace are no longer regarded as backward. It intends to devolve to each social practice its own temporality and thus allow them to develop autonomously (Santos, 2002a: 251).

The ecology of recognition implies embracing difference and rejecting the social hierarchies that helped to create the "moral obligation" of intervention of the global North in the global South in order to show it the way to civilisational progress and development. "By enlarging the reciprocity circle – the circle of equal differences – the ecology of recognition creates a new exigency of reciprocal intelligibility" (Santos, 2014: 178). The ecology of trans-scale aims at identifying local manifestations of resistance against the unequal power relations that are produced or favoured by liberal peace. Finally, the ecology of productivities confronts the paradigm of capitalist productivity endorsed by the liberal peace. It sets out to give visibility to initiatives that "share a comprehensive conception of 'economy' in which they include such objectives as democratic participation; environmental sustainability; social, sexual, racial, ethnic, and cultural equity; and transnational solidarity" (Santos, 2014: 181). These initiatives include movements of peasants and indigenous people fighting for land and land ownership, urban movements fighting for housing, movements against development mega-projects and popular economic movements, among others.

Sociology of Emergences

Post-abyssal peacebuilding also practices the sociology of emergences, by replacing the idea of a progressive process to obtain peace, based on mainly technical procedures, with the idea of care. According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the sociology of emergences consists of replacing the emptiness of the future according to linear time with a future of plural and concrete possibilities, simultaneously utopian and realist, which are constructed in the present by means of activities of care (2010b: 24). "At every moment, there is a limited horizon of possibilities, and that is why it is important not to waste the unique opportunity of a specific change offered

by the present" (Santos, 2014: 183). The sociology of emergences alerts us to the possibility of different *peaces* but also to their fragility, which is why, in order to maintain hope instead of reaching frustration, it is important to deal with those *peaces* cautiously. Cultivating these different forms of peace makes room for the development of social emancipations. Emancipations, once again, are not seen as a final stage of development, what the sociology of emergences shows is that new possibilities of peace are constantly emerging and thus need to be carefully observed.

Work of Translation

In order to construct a more solid peace, post-abyssal peacebuilding should implement a work of translation directed at the sharing of experiences, knowledges and practices of peace. The work of translation gives coherence to the results of the sociologies of absences and emergences while, at the same time, deconstructing the universalism that lies at the heart of liberal peacebuilding. "Intercultural translation is a tool to minimize the obstacles to political articulation among different social groups and movements fighting across the globe for social justice and human dignity when said obstacles are due to cultural difference and reciprocal unintelligibility" (Santos, 2014: 213). As mentioned above, at the centre of post-abyssal peacebuilding is the need for dialogue between different experiences of war and peace, both between global North and global South actors, and also within the global South.

In order to unveil the logics of conflict and violence that structured war-torn societies it is necessary to work with the people and the social groups they represent. To achieve a durable and solid peace it is important to step down from the scale of the state and high politics and search for answers in the lower layers of society. What is envisaged is a process of peace construction that engages large sectors of society, thus breaking with the logics of power that have pervaded the political landscape of those countries during conflict and that, premised by the current peacebuilding model, have tended to prevail in the post-conflict society. This requires a broader understanding of the actors involved in the conflict. It is not only the political leaders of the different factions and the men and women who fought that constitute the conflict masses; all the people in war-torn countries are affected and involved in

conflict, and consequently, all the population has to be involved in the process of peace. For that reason, they should participate in processes of translation in order to explain their conceptions of peace and so avoid the hegemonic imposition of liberal peace.

This participatory process creates the possibility of a bottom-up political delineation of the peace each society wishes to achieve in the aftermath of war, in a rejection of the idea of a general peace formulated and developed by external actors. It is through the dialogue proposed that a transformative process of war into peace can emerge and work to change the present, and create conditions for concrete social emancipations of real social groups, in order to construct a better near future (Santos, 2014: 234). Post-abyssal peacebuilding becomes even more relevant when we note that the majority of conflicts that liberal peacebuilding sought to stop happened, so far, on the other side of the line, and were most typically from the global South and from spaces that were subject to some form of imperial rule or domination, whether colonial or not. Post-abyssal peace, therefore, contributes to overcoming those forms of domination through the larger transformation of promoting global cognitive justice in order to obtain global social justice. The acknowledgment and identification of different conceptions of peace involves the identification of different models of social, political and economic organisation and thus serves to deconstruct the domination patterns fostered by the colonial and capitalist model.

Post-abyssal peacebuilding constitutes a conceptual framework that I consider extremely valid to address post-conflict environments. International relations, and peace studies in particular, would benefit from a conceptualisation of peace based on the epistemologies of the South. The sociology of absences helps us to understand the existing reality on the ground as it serves to confront the liberal peace with endogenous conceptions of peace. The sociology of emergences warns about the importance of preserving those *peaces* revealed by the sociology of absences, which can easily be destroyed by interaction with international actors. Finally, the work of translation helps to establish a dialogue between multiple experiences of peace that can learn from each other and together create spaces of common resistance to the imposition of liberal peace and associated exploitative relationships.

The post-abyssal peacebuilding model, based on the conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South, supplements the work so far developed by hybrid peace theories. These investigations recognise that local actors are able to resist international intervention and produce hybrid concepts of peace, therefore possessing agency. With the epistemologies of the South it is possible to reinforce this work by revealing, defining and mapping of the epistemologies that underlie and inspire local agency. Here lies the relevance of bringing Boaventura de Sousa Santos' concepts to peace studies. It makes it possible to further the knowledge about the local that has been produced so far, to establish more precisely who the local is and what it thinks. The great contribution of the epistemologies of the South is their search for hybrid understandings of peace through the work of translation. Nevertheless, those hybrid understandings have an emancipatory character, since they are the product of a dialogue between equally valid knowledges and confront the hegemonic character of the hybrid *peaces* that result from the current interaction between the international and the local, which is still based on profoundly unequal relations of power.

EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE SOUTH AND THE UN

Now that the post-abyssal peacebuilding model has been defined, inspired by the epistemologies of the South proposed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, there arises the question of the possibility of integrating this model into the UN framework for peace, the UN being largest international organisation concerned with peacebuilding activities. The pursuit of post-abyssal peacebuilding implies participating in a process of translation aimed at identifying and starting a dialogue between different *peaces*. Therefore, the goal of this last section is to find out if the UN could be one of the actors concerned with this translation work. In my view, the translation process is a valuable way to deal with the local and its epistemologies. It serves to establish and value local formulations of peace by recognising agency in local actors and, more importantly, by acknowledging them as valid producers of knowledge with the capacity to define their own standards of peace.

To practise the work of translation entails being ready to learn new forms of peace and implies recognising that liberal peace is not the only model of peace, thus negating its universality. The outcome of this process is also hybridity, but the hybrid concepts of peace that might arise are the result of a process of dialogue that allows for mutual intelligibility among culturally diverse social experiences, instead of the process of violence that international intervention in post-conflict countries currently represents, and the hybrid peace theories expose. The goal, therefore, is to see if the UN would be open to participating in this translation process, while recognising and explaining the numerous difficulties and obstacles that the integration of post-abyssal peacebuilding into the UN framework would represent and also warning about the risks of cooptation and subversion that this would represent for the epistemologies of the South project.

It would not be an easy task. The peace model envisaged by the UN proposes exactly what the epistemologies of the South want to deconstruct: a universalist model based on relations of political and economic dominance that aims to transform societies according to the development model followed by the West. Nonetheless, the goal is not to propose a complete transformation of the UN's system, values and form of action. What I want to do is to explore the possibility of integrating into the UN some of the proposals reflected in the post-abyssal peacebuilding paradigm set out above, though I am quite aware that this is in itself problematic. This exercise raises some ethical, and even moral questions, since it starts from a critical perspective and not from a problem-solving approach. However, I am not upholding the importance of maintaining the UN peacebuilding model, although improving it, or recognising the validity of the liberal approach to peace. What is envisaged is to understand if, despite the great risk of cooptation, the epistemologies of the South project can be advanced by a structure like the UN, by penetrating the international policy-making arena and influencing it.

The epistemologies of the South are underpinned by three main ideas: learn that there is a South, learn to go South and learn from and with the South (Santos, 1995: 508). The UN has already achieved the first two: it knows very well there is a South and how to get there. Yet, this awareness is not based on emancipatory

practices; on the contrary, the UN has been the face of the exclusionist colonial and capitalist model. The awareness of the South derives from the desire to maintain the relationships of domination that have prevailed between the global North and the global South since the 15th century and from the need to intervene in the global South when this is deemed to be in the interest of the global North. The first obstacle to the participation of the UN in the process of translation is its identification with modern Western thinking, which impedes the acknowledgment that the liberal peace is not the only valid peace in the world. Recognising the incompleteness of all forms of knowledge is a basic premise for subscribing to a process of translation, and therefore the UN has to acknowledge the limited character of liberal peace if it wants to participate in a translation process.

The United Nations is a modern institution; this is clear in its structure but also in the manner in which its bodies and agencies operate. It follows the logic of knowledge-as-regulation that became dominant in modern Western thinking since it is mainly based on the principles of the state and the market (Santos, 2010a: 24). Although called a union of nations, from the very first the UN has been an association of states, and more, an association where the most powerful states form a club with the power to decide and act, almost without restraint, on important issues that affect all the members of the organisation. The UN, for example, hosts two of the most important and powerful promoters of capitalism worldwide, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which, besides attaching their aid to the liberalisation of economies, also make aid conditional on the development of modern liberal states. To sum up, the UN serves to promote capitalist and colonial forms of domination; liberal peacebuilding is just one of many examples of the structures created to maintain the modern system as it is.

This raises the second major obstacle to advocating the participation of the UN in the translation process. The UN is a highly hierarchical structure with fixed power relations that nurture the supremacy of the permanent members of the Security Council, over the international system. These states have almost unlimited powers when dealing with questions of war and peace, with these subjects being subordinated to their political will. If the work of translation is to be properly

developed there is no place whatsoever for unequal power relations, since only relations of shared authority allow reciprocity between the groups participating in the translation work (Santos, 2014: 214). A dialogue developed with such an organisation is obviously of an unequal character since the international actor is much more powerful that any local actor participating in the translation process. Furthermore, the translation work is subject to the will of that specific group of states and is undermined whenever its development does not represent the interest of the Permanent Five.

Nevertheless, when posing the question as to whether it is possible to integrate the principles of a post-abyssal model of peace and peacebuilding in the UN framework I am raising the possibility of reform of the UN's system. Furthermore, the epistemologies of the South, although envisaging a holistic transformation of international politics, given that they argue for a change of paradigm by replacing the relationships of colonial and capitalist domination with bonds of solidarity, ask that we do not blindly reject what Western modernity has produced, and that we should wonder what actually can be integrated as part of the ecology of knowledges (Santos, 2007: 69). Therefore, I am seeking the transformation that could perhaps occur in UN peacebuilding if the organisation was willing to develop a more sensitive approach to specific post-conflict contexts and to accept the existence of different *peaces*. That said, following the epistemologies of the South proposal it is important to strive to try to understand if it would be possible for the UN to change its approach to the local in order to learn from and with the South through a translation process.

The UN has, for the last 15 years, been paying greater attention to the local, not only with respect to peace and security, but also, for example, in the fields of development and environmental sustainability (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). The local has been mainly related to the concept of ownership: the idea that local populations and governments have an important role to play in the establishment of peace. Local ownership has emerged mainly to enhance the legitimacy of UN interventions, calling on the institution to promote locally owned peace construction projects, and to be aware of the emergence of local capabilities (UNDPKO, 2008;

Richmond, 2012). Thus, the UN has widely integrated the logic of the local in its policy documents. A report states that

> Local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a critical role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the country's future (UNSG, 2009: § 12).

Similar discourses have been propagated by different UN agencies and offices concerned with peace construction and development, in particular the Peacebuilding Commission and the UN Development Program.

Despite the general development of this rhetoric, "(…) it remains far from clear what it means, what external actors (…) can or should do in order to facilitate it, or how tensions that inevitably arise between the priorities of national owners and those of international donors (…) are to be reconciled" (UNPSO, 2011: 2). More important than the uncertainty of the definition of local ownership and the doubts about how to operationalise it is the fact that the local is being conceptualised within the liberal paradigm, since it is international actors who identify the relevant local actors with which to engage. For the UN, the local is important and valuable, not because it expresses and develops its own ideas about peace but, on the contrary, because it is an important instrument for the more efficient assimilation of the liberal project. The local the UN wishes to promote and empower is the "civil society of like-minded activists who agree with human rights frameworks, development, and democratization, as projected by international norms" (Richmond, 2012: 355).

The discussion about the local is being reinstated because the approach of the UN to the local is one of the biggest obstacles to the participation of this organisation in a process of translation aimed at learning different understandings of peace, and, therefore, changes in this area are compulsory for the UN to integrate post-abyssal peacebuilding. This change would entail dismissing the concept of local ownership. According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the idea of the local is developed through opposition to the scales of the universal and the global, the dominant scales. As a result, specific contexts are considered particular and incapable of being credible alternatives to the dominant scale (Santos, 2014: 173-174). This is the prevailing logic behind the local as defined by the UN and dismissing that concept

would therefore be an important step in the transformation of its peacebuilding model. The organisation would need to approach specific post-conflict contexts and accept their conceptualisations of peace. Those *peaces* might not be based on the state and the market, but on traditional forms of social and political organisation and popular forms of economy instead.

The local would need to be recognised for its own value and not for its importance to developing the liberal project. Thus, the UN would need to be able to recognise that what is produced by the locals is valuable and it should not be wasted. That said, the liberal project would have to make room for endogenous forms of political, social, cultural and economic organisation. Take the example of Bali, Indonesia, where in the 1960s the traditional irrigation systems based on ancestral religious, agrarian, and hydrological knowledge was replaced with more scientific ones. The result for the rice crops was so disastrous that the new technological irrigation system had to be replaced by the old one, based on ancestral non-scientific knowledge (Santos, 2014: 205). This example is illustrative of the importance of local knowledge in local contexts, but also of the value of such knowledge to the broadening of knowledge in general. The UN, when approaching specific post-conflict contexts, cannot ignore the reality already existing in the field. Local forms of organisation have to be balanced with the liberal conception of progress, and the reforms adopted should be the ones that suit local needs and specificities rather than the ones that more easily advance the liberal project.

In order to participate in a process of translation that aims to establish a dialogue between different conceptions of peace the UN has to abandon the idea that peace means the progress defined in Western terms, and to acknowledge that sometimes, maybe most times, the best solutions for peace lie in ancient knowledges and locally based forms of political, social and economic organisation. This different view of the local is another basic premise for a change in the current model of peacebuilding and the integration of the work of translation by the UN. Losing the conceptualisation of the local, as opposed to the global, would mean starting a learning process from the South and with the South, that would inevitably render the liberal peace project more flexible and predisposed to dialogue with other *peaces*.

This learning process implies endorsing non-liberal solutions, in both the global North and the global South, when it becomes clear that those solutions solve the problem in question in a satisfactorily manner, even if it means adopting solutions considered archaic or backward.

In the context of peace construction, this process of learning would lead to the emergence of many different forms of peace, some being of an emancipatory nature, possibly rendering the liberal peace obsolete in the long term. Achieving the interaction of the governance model of the liberal peace, in political, social and economic terms, with endogenous peace perspectives is an emancipatory endeavour. The *peaces* resulting from this learning process are socially more just, since they address the grievances of local populations claiming more equitable and horizontal relations of power. The goal of a learning process from and with the South is to conceive emancipatory *peaces* that address populations' most fundamental dreams.

So, the integration of post-abyssal peacebuilding in the UN peace structure faces three main obstacles: first, the association of the organisation with modern Western thinking; second, the power relations that structure the UN and its hierarchical constitution; third, the conceptualisation of the local as a space of particularities. Going back to our hypothesis, can the UN be one of the actors involved in a translation process aimed at establishing a dialogue between different models of peace, the exploration of the obstacles faced in this process leads me to the conclusion that this hypothesis cannot be confirmed. The UN would need to go through profound changes before it could participate in a fair and equal process of translation. It would need to lose its modern character and abandon the pursuit of relationships of a colonial and capitalist character. Basically, a new international organisation, based on a more solidary and democratic structure, would be needed. Besides these obstacles, the risks for the epistemologies of the South project would be too great. A counter-hegemonic project would essentially face the danger of being coopted and transformed in order to suit hegemonic projects, thereby more efficiently fulfilling the role the concept of local ownership has played so far: using the local to more easily impose liberal peace.

The epistemologies of the South aim to start a dialogue between progressive actors in order to reveal the epistemological diversity of the world and achieve cognitive justice, the precondition for social justice. Therefore three sociological tools are used: the sociology of absences, the sociology of emergences and the work of translation. When thinking about peace, and with the post-abyssal peacebuilding model defined above in mind, I consider that the sociologies of absences and emergences, that is, the work of revealing the different epistemologies of peace in the world, should, for now, remain with academia. The idea of post-abyssal peacebuilding needs to be further studied, developed, structured and consolidated. Bringing the sociologies of absences and emergences to the study of international relations, particularly the study of peace, would allow a broader conceptualisation of the local and consequently a broader understanding of peace.

The third sociological tool, the work of translation, should continue being developed by the social actors involved in the contestation of hegemonic forms of peace, acting both in the global South and in the global North. This way, translators should be "good subaltern cosmopolitan intellectuals" (Santos, 2014: 231). They can be found in NGOs, social movements and any social group or organisation working to construct specific solutions of peace for specific contexts. What is asked of them is that they should be able to constantly translate academic knowledge into non-academic knowledge, and vice-versa. The goal is to construct an imperial South, with the interconnection of the extreme diversity of social experiences of the world. Here lies the importance of the work of translation. Through the association of the epistemologies of the South project with thinking about peace is possible to relate the different forms of peace existing in the world, in the search for a post-abyssal peace.

This is a transformatory project with the capacity to gradually develop to help the emergence of an ever-increasing number of emancipatory projects that can work together to contest the current colonial and capitalist rule. Post-abyssal peacebuilding is not concerned with rapid changes; it is more preoccupied with the construction of emancipatory alternatives that bear fruit at the present time. Post-abyssal peacebuilding does not look ahead to a distant radiant future, it envisages working with concrete possibilities here and now. The goal is to break with the

suffering provoked by the colonial and capitalist system of domination we live in, reaching for emancipatory forms of social ordering that allow every single one of us to live our most fundamental dreams.

CONCLUSION

Liberal peace became hegemonic after the end of the Cold War. That period saw the perfect conditions in place for the emergence of a solid concept of peace that could be consensually integrated in the UN peace framework. This allowed the development of the peacebuilding concept, which was then applied to post-conflict environments. It entailed the construction of a liberal state, based on representative democracy and the rule of law, and a liberal economy, based on the free market. Nevertheless, liberal peacebuilding soon started to show problems of both application and conceptualisation. Contrary to the lasting peace promised by intervention in post-conflict countries, the result of these missions was often a return to conflict. Consequently, critiques on peacebuilding implementation and the liberal concept of peace started to appear. These critiques were on different levels, ranging from the more conservative that argued for reform, to the more critical that sought to dismiss the whole liberal peace concept.

This dissertation can be included with the critical works on peacebuilding and the liberal peace. It has two basic premises: first, like other critical authors have said, the peace promised by the UN has never been fully accomplished and, in reality, applying the liberal peace to post-conflict countries has had perverse effects, representing simply another domination instrument used by the global North on the global South; second, the critical thought developed on liberal peacebuilding and the local reflects the consequences of local agency resistance to international intervention, but does not explore the conceptions of peace and associated knowledges that produce such resistance. Thus, is considered that critical conceptualisations of peace would benefit from a reflection on liberal peace and peacebuilding that fosters a better understanding the hegemonic relationship between the global North and the global South, which is rooted in a specific epistemology, namely, modern Western reason. In addition, the knowledge of the local would be furthered through the use of a conceptual framework that helps to identify the local epistemologies that support local understandings of peace, as opposed to the liberal paradigm.

I decided to explore the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos to help me address these two premises. He has dedicated part of his academic career to the study of knowledge and to the relation between the hegemonic epistemology, modern Western thinking, and subaltern and devalued epistemologies, manly associated with the global South. The research question that governed the development of this work therefore was: how Boaventura de Sousa Santos' conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South can further the knowledge and practice of peacebuilding?

My goal was to draw attention to the diversity of epistemologies existing in the world and to the different formulations of peace they might influence. I am concerned with identifying and defining the local *peaces* that confront international liberal peace and produce hybrid understandings. Thus, the studies on the local that have until now been concerned exclusively with local agency at the moment of intervention, can be furthered by attributing the due importance to local epistemologies, and thus recognising local agency more widely. The relevance of Boaventura de Sousa Santos' work to the study of liberal peace lies in his quest to reveal the oppressor character of modern Western epistemology on which the liberal peace is founded, and to expose the plurality of knowledges extant in the world.

The author pursues his quest by defining modern Western thinking as an abyssal thinking, in the sense that it permanently erases the other epistemologies present in the world. This is a central concept to analysing how liberal peace interacts with other models of peace. Furthermore, he constructs a conceptual framework to demonstrate the epistemological diversity of the world, and I consider this to be extremely valuable for the field of peace studies, since it helps to develop broader understandings of peace, based on endogenous knowledges. Those concepts are the sociology of emergences, the sociology of absences and the work of translation. The first two serve to rescue from oblivion the variety of knowledges that oppose modern Western thinking and that have been qualified as inferior by it. The last one aims to establish a dialogue between different knowledges so as to arrive at common emancipatory practices.

I have, therefore, related this conceptual framework to the liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding concepts. The analysis of the model of liberal peace through the concept of abyssal lines allows a broader understanding of its epistemological and ontological nature, and thus constitutes a deeper critique of this model. Envisaging liberal peace as an abyssal line clearly shows the connection between this model of peace and modern Western thinking. Liberal peace is another manifestation of the colonialist and capitalist character of this thought, as it represents relationships of coercion and violence that impose social, political and economic models that are often strange to local epistemologies. Hence, the first hypothesis of this dissertation is validated, in that the use of the concept of abyssal global lines makes it possible to construct an epistemological critique of the liberal peace.

The second hypothesis, using the concepts defined in the framework of the epistemologies of the South contributes to revealing alternative conceptions and practices of peace based on different epistemologies is also validated, through the definition of a peacebuilding model that serves to accommodate different epistemologies of peace and establishes a dialogue between them. The goal of post-abyssal peacebuilding is to identify emancipatory types of peace, thus conferring epistemological justice on the variety of *peaces* in the world with the goal of achieving social justice for those affected by the exploitation of the capitalist and colonial system. Post-abyssal peacebuilding facilitates the dialogue between progressive actors concerned with emancipatory types of peace, in the quest for common understandings of peace and with the goal of strengthening the counter-hegemonic opposition to the liberal peace.

Finally, I felt that this would be an unfinished work if I did not explore the possibility of the UN integrating the post-abyssal peacebuilding model. I found three obstacles to this exercise: first, the prevalence of modern Western reason in the functioning of the organisation; second, its highly hierarchical constitution and the deeply rooted power relations that structure it; third, the UN conceptualisation of the local as a space of particularities. Overcoming these obstacles would entail a significant transformation in the United Nations structure and form of action, changes that the most powerful states governing the organisation, the five permanent

members of the Security Council, would not be willing to make. Those changes would signify an enormous loss of power and an alteration in the domination relationships that have structured the world for the last five centuries and have put those states at the top of the international system. Therefore, the last hypothesis ruling this work was not validated. The work of translation, as mentioned before, should lie in the hands of progressive actors that will fight for the affirmation of alternative emancipatory concepts of peace, both in the global South and in the global North.

So, recalling the research question that guided this dissertation, the knowledge about peacebuilding would be furthered with the integration of the conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South by peace studies. This conceptual framework helps to look at local agency in more depth, allowing understanding of its resistances to international intervention and externally formulated models of peace. It does so by bringing to light the local concepts of peace that have structured such resistances, thus revealing the knowledges, that is, the local epistemologies, which inspired those endogenously formulated visions of peace. This expands current understandings of peace and thus the knowledge produced by peace studies is enhanced through the disclosure of the epistemological variety of the world. Furthermore, the epistemological enrichment fostered by the epistemologies of the South confronts the hegemonic character of modern Western thinking and, consequently, the universal character of liberal peace, thereby fulfilling one of the goals of critical studies, which is to question the power relations that structure international reality.

Using the conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South is consistent with the search for a "general and complete peace", the aim of peace studies as defined by Johan Galtung. According to him, peace should entail the non-existence of violence and be equated with social justice, meaning an egalitarian distribution of power and resources based on relations of integration, cooperation and harmony, and encompassing the whole world (Galtung, 1964, 1969). Having a broader understanding of peace paves the way for a more constructive manner of addressing the problems of war and conflict that affect vast populations in the world and prevent them from living their most fundamental dreams.

Therefore, the epistemologies of the South also represent a mechanism to approach the practice of peacebuilding, in the sense that, the work of translation makes it possible to create a dialogue between the different perceptions of peace revealed. This dialogue should take place both between peaces arising from epistemologies different from modern western thought and between those peaces and the liberal peace. The consequence is the emergence of models of peace that are context sensitive and better fit specific post-conflict realities, thus obtaining more lasting solutions for the problems affecting those populations. The epistemologies of the South framework can promote the practice of peacebuilding because, in contrast with the present reality of hybrid peace, the dialogue proposed is developed in a context of equal relations of power and equally valid forms of knowledge. Peacebuilding can thus be a process of shared understandings with the goal of achieving emancipatory *peaces*, instead of the process of violence that liberal peacebuilding represents.

The work developed in this dissertation should be developed further and indeed some research paths appear evident at the moment. First, to deepen the integration of Boaventura de Sousa Santos work into the field of peace studies. This dissertation is a first attempt to bring this author to this field of knowledge, but more research on this subject is necessary. Therefore, the concept of post-abyssal peacebuilding should be further studied and developed. Like any other concept of peacebuilding, it needs to be consolidated to ensure the development of a coherent model. For this, the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos should be explored by other peace studies scholars with a view to better define how the peace construction model associated with the epistemologies of the South can be operationalised in post-conflict contexts. Additionally, the author's contribution to peace studies should be complemented by the work of authors who, like him, study the hegemonic character of modern Western epistemology and share the struggle to restore epistemological justice to the world.

Moreover, I consider that it would be very interesting to understand how Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Johan Galtung works complement each other, where they overlap and where they diverge. Both authors share a broader understanding of

reality than the Western perspective and, therefore, more expansive understandings of peace than the liberal one. Research in this direction would strengthen the dialogue between different disciplinary fields, and definitely enrich peace studies.

Finally, new research on countries subjected to UN peacebuilding should be developed using the conceptual tools defined in the epistemologies of the South. Such works should ask the following question: what concepts of peace, framed by which epistemologies, engender hybrid understandings of peace in the context of UN interventions? The answer would reveal the *peaces* that different actors in post-conflict countries would like to have developed if they had not been subjected to the liberal model. It would also allow cross-case analysis so that the common patterns of these *peaces* could be identified and thus facilitate the translation work between these actors.

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