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SECURING WHOSE PEACE? POWER, VOICE AND PEACE MEDIA INTERVENTION IN POST-WAR SOCIETIES

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Cover illustration: “As ondas do poder” (“The waves of power”, in English) by Margarida Figueira, 2014.
“Securing whose peace? Power, voice and peace media intervention in post-war societies”

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To my grandfather Mário (in memoriam)

To my parents
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Summary

Peacebuilding media intervention through the creation of peace media by international actors (normally, the UN or NGOs) in post-conflict scenarios has grown steadily during the last two decades and gained increasingly complex forms. Starting as public information within UN missions, then evolving to specific programmes broadcasted through local media (e.g. radio and video), they finally got the shape of externally set up media, particularly radios – the cheapest and furthest reaching media. By means of their programming, these media aim at contributing to the pacification and anti-polarization of societies as well as to provide the space for political accountability practices and fora, thus helping to create (formal) democratic structures and prevent, according to liberal literature, the (re)emergence of violent conflict and practices in post-war or unstable societies – hence contributing to the ends of peacebuilding. However, despite the growing number of peace media projects and international investment attached to them, as well as the increasing number of NGO, governmental institutions and UN missions allocated to this kind of agency, the consequences this kind of international intervention has regarding the construction of peace and the role of peace media within the wider intervention peacebuilding scheme are still imprecise or unidentified.

What is the actual role of peace media in the implementation of a liberal peace in post-conflict societies? Going beyond the formal discursive role peace media play in mediabuilding intervention strategies, this thesis examines discursively and genealogically the role peace media performs in the implementation of a liberal peace in post conflict societies. With reference to the work put forward by three key actors in mediabuilding- United States Institute of Peace, Search for Common Ground and Fondation Hirondelle - this study identifies and analyses the power dynamics behind peace media action and subsequent results. Stemming from the acknowledgement of the international system as a power-driven system and from the conception of peace as a situated concept and media as a non-neutral technology, this thesis argues that peace media contribute to the civil pacification of communities in a context of a broader and hierarchical liberal peace and liberal global governance frameworks.

**Keywords:** mediabuilding, peacebuilding, power, voice, hegemony, emancipation
List of acronyms

ANC – African National Congress.
CDG - Centre for Democracy and Governance.
CIMA – Centre for International Media Assistance.
CIMA – Centre of International Media Assistance.
CommGAP- Communication of Governance and Accountability Program
DDR – Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration.
DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo.
EPLO – European Peacebuilding Liaison Office.
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
FH – Fondation Hirondelle.
ICT – Information and Communication Technologies.
IGO – International Governmental Organisations.
NED – National Endowment for Democracy.
NGO – Non-governmental organisation
NOSM – New Online Social Media.
NWICO - New World Information and Communication Order.
SDC - Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency.
SFCG – Search for Common Ground.
SSR – Security Sector Reform.
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme.
UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services.
UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force.
UNTAG - United Nations Transition Assistance Group.
USIP – United States Institute of Peace.
USIP – United States Institute of Peace.
VOA – Voice of America.
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Introduction

Peacebuilding media intervention through the creation of peace media by international actors, such as the UN or NGOs, in post-conflict scenarios, has grown steadily during the last two decades and gained increasingly complex forms. Starting as public information within UN missions, then evolving to specific programmes broadcasted through local media (e.g. radio and video), they finally got the shape of externally set up media, particularly radios – the cheapest and furthest reaching media.

By means of their programming, these media aim at contributing to the pacification and anti-polarization of societies as well as to the creation of political accountability practices and fora, thus helping to create (formal) democratic structures and prevent, according to liberal literature, the (re)emergence of violent conflict and practices in post-war or unstable societies – hence contributing to the ends of peacebuilding. The principle is simple: just as media can be a weapon of violence, a tool to propagate a discourse which exacerbates conflicts, provokes social polarization and, in extreme cases, incites to violence and hate (e.g. Rwanda in 1994; Bosnia in 1995; Kenya in 2007-08), it can also be an instrument of peace, a means to pacify social and political tensions through specific contents and communication strategies.

However, despite the growing number of peace media projects and international investment attached to them, as well as the increasing number of NGO, governmental institutions and UN missions allocated to this kind of agency, the consequences this kind of international intervention has regarding the construction of peace and the role of peace media within the wider intervention peacebuilding scheme are still imprecise or unidentified. Also, many criticisms that have been directed towards the liberal peace have disregarded peace media action and subsequent consequences and analysis.

This study intends to fill this analytical gap and critically analyse the role of peace media within the dominant liberal peace framework.

State of the art

Several studies have examined the role of the media in war settings, analysing, for the most part, their capacity to exacerbate conflicts and provoke social polarization and, in extreme cases, incitement to violence, hate and killing (Rotberg and Weiss,
1996; Stewart and Carruthers 1996; Ferrandiz & Pureza, 2003; Thompson, 2007; Santos, 2008, 2010). The xenophobic messages broadcasted by the Rwandan waves of Radio-Televisión Libre de Mille Collines, in 1994, have been directly related to the upheavals and outburst of violence in the country (Lehmann, 1999; Allen and Seaton, 1999). Moreover, Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1995, as well as Kenya, in 2007, are also other representative cases, continually referred to in order to illustrate the media-destructive conflict pairing. Similarly, research on the media’s pacification potentials has been burgeoning, with particular focus on post-conflict societies (Frère, 2005; Howard, 2003; Ribeiro, 2004; Kumar, 2006; Spicer, 2010), demonstrating for the most part the need to include media in peacebuilding efforts and policies and debating the potential media areas, actors and methodologies of media intervention policies (Hieber, 2001; Hieber, 1998; Zint, 2009; Orme, 2010; Arsenault et al, 2011; Robertson et al, 2011). Nonetheless, except for Miller (2009), whose work focused on journalism training in Central Europe in the 1990s, there are no studies devoted neither to critically analyse presuppositions and policy strategies of peacebuilding media intervention on the ground nor to learn from critical reflection on media and peacebuilding. Oddly enough, none of the criticism which has marked the peacebuilding intervention debate - a) “liberal internationalism” and the resulting “experiment in social engineering” involving the transplantation of “Western models of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states” (Paris, 1997: 56); b) standard operating procedure (Miall et al, 1999), embodied in a "supply-driven" logic (de Zeeuw, 2001) and the failure to integrate local norms, resources and practices, forestalling self-government and local ownership (Lidén, 2009; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Paris, 2010) – has ever been extrapolated to the peace media intervention debate.

On the basis and as a consequence of this critical analytical gap – almost as a self-sustained process - I find two main reasons. The first is the technological nature of the media, which creates a perception of peace media prone to be regarded as a mere objective, efficient, rational, self-effacing vehicle and no longer as a situated agent, product and productive of a political agenda. I.e., technology is seen as devoided from any ideology. This apolitical nature attributed to the media gains even more strength when it conflates discursively with the explicit main goal of peacebuilding interventions - peace itself –, since peace, as a concept, is usually understood and presented as an idyllic, supreme and universal good, ontologically stable and indisputable (Richmond,
2008) – and this is the second reason. Peace media end up, therefore, emerging as a symbol of an ideal, supra-political and even altruistic and humanitarian technological and know-how transfer (Miller, 2009), despite being fuelled by complex political agendas, entailing ideologies and interests as well as interdependent and power dynamics.

Literature does not, hence, discuss three of the most important binary logics when reflecting on peace media within peacebuilding: it obfuscates the subjective ideologies embedded in technology, silences the power that underly discourses and does not question the role of governance in emancipation disguising these two concepts by using “good governance” and “empowerment” instead, though they are not the same thing.

By so doing, literature and analysis disregard the sociological, political and economic agency-network (Latour, 1986) underlying peace media action. By limiting the ability to recognise the power and ideological dynamics attached to their action and identifying their concrete role within peacebuilding intervention framework, literature has produced a segmented, thus fallacious, vision of peace media agency, contributing, hence, to an uncritical normalization of peace media action within peacebuilding scenarios and peacebuilding policies themselves.

**Research design and methodology**

This study adopts a critical and post-positivist perspective of the research puzzle. It intends to go beyond the formal discursive role peace media play in post-conflict societies and to discuss its ideology as well as identify the global dynamic its work entails and the way they fit the wider project of post-war reconstruction. It stems from three different but yet complementary theoretical presuppositions. The first and broader one is the acknowledgement of the international system as a power-driven system. The second one is the understanding of peace as a situated concept. Specific ideologies, contexts, agents and policies support a state of peace. As such, peace is here envisaged as not existing outside of thoughts nor interests neither space nor time. The third presupposition is the recognition of media as a non-neutral technology (McLuhan, 2002) managed by situated actors committed to a specific agenda in an agency-network (Latour, 1986) logic.
The research question focuses on the agency of peace media: what is the actual role of peace media in the implementation of a liberal peace in post-conflict societies? Based on previous presuppositions, I hypothesise that they contribute to the civil pacification of communities in a context of a broader, hierarchical, hegemonic, liberal peace and liberal global governance frameworks.

In order to put the research goals forward, three different methodological techniques are employed on a hierarchical and complementary basis: genealogy and archaeology, critical discourse analysis, and illustrative cases. These methodological tools allow for claims to be grounded, to go beyond vague generalisations and expose how power relations are produced, legitimised and reinforced and how certain voices are marginalised and silenced. It consequently apprehends what is otherwise overlooked by more traditional research methods, delving into questions left unexplored by rationalist and positivist research programmes – which is one of the main aims of this study.

Genealogy and archaeology – it is based on Foucault's genealogical and archaeological methodologies which seek to deconstruct what was previously regarded as linear and to uncover how it is that certain ways of thinking and approaches to knowledge have become “common sense”, dominant, institutionalised and emerged as a canon, demonstrating, therefore, how contingent the “taken for granted” has always been. By isolating and deconstructing components of accepted knowledge in time and discursive sequence, they show how ‘subjects’ are constituted in discourses, how certain ideas, truths, representations are chosen to be victorious while others are disqualified, why some procedures are judged rational and others not. As such, these techniques allow the unearthing of the power relations operating in particular events and historical periods concerning a specific issue, “the hazardous play of dominations” (Rabinow, 1991: 82). In this sense, archaeology and genealogy are very similar yet with subtle complementary differences. As Foucault (1980) explains archaeology is a “methodology” and genealogy a “tactic”. This means that the former is a way of studying the different games of truth and their nexus while the latter a way of studying the power relations, the processing aspects of them. On the present study these techniques will be used to demonstrate peace media are the result, as well as the

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1 Genealogy as method derives from German philosophy, particularly the works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), but is most closely associated with French academic Michel Foucault (1926-24).
expression, of a specific and situated ideology, a subjective peace conception produced by an exact political command, despite being usually presented as a neutral and apolitical technology for peacebuilding. Based on Kendall and Wickham (1999: 26, 27), archaeology will be used as following: “to chart the relations between the sayable and the visible; to analyse the relation between one statement and other statements; to formulate rules for the repeatability of statements; to analyse the position between subjects in regard to statements; to discuss surfaces of emergence – places within which objects are designated and acted upon; to describe institutions which acquire authority and pose limits within which discourse objects may act or exist; to describe ‘forms of specification’ which refers to the ways in which discursive objects are targeted [, a] form of specification is a system of understanding a particular phenomenon with the aim of relating it to other phenomena”.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) - discourse as language is the place where structures of domination, symbolic order and legitimacy converge, emerging as an important mechanism of controlling, constructing or transforming societies (Fairclough, 2005; Austin, 1962; Bourdieu, 1991; Jabri, 1996). In fact, positivist or cognitive assumptions about language as a transparent medium seem to ignore the role it plays in the creation of narratives and in the shaping of events or issues by assigning labels and roles (i.e., identify and link characteristics, motives, values, behaviours). The production of dominant forms of discourse is itself dependent upon differential access to resources which define structures of domination (Giddens, 1984). By peeling back the epidermal layer of discourse, the subjectivities of the agents and the policies behind them are exposed. This can be done using CDA, which draws on poststructuralist discourse theory and critical linguistics. For Critical Discourse Analysis, the main objective is to discover how discourse is implicated in social practices. Particularly important in CDA is a focus on how strategic acts of domination are (discreetly) performed in texts (Norris and Jones, 2005). It does so by examining the ways texts enact social relations of power and establish social identities. As such, it analyses the dialectical relationships between discourse and other elements of social practices and establishes a direct relationship between discourse and ideology. Therefore, Fairclough (2005) argues that discourse

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2 Fairclough (2005) argues that Discourse tends to be reduced by scholars to discourses and in order to avoid confusions he suggests then Semiosis as a different term for discourse in the abstract sense. For the purpose of this study, discourse will be the concept used.
may be initially approached as text, looking for choices and patterns in vocabulary; secondly, as discursive practice, meaning as something produced, circulated, distributed and consumed; and thirdly as social (and political) practice, hence with ideological effects and hegemonic processes. All communicative materials in the present study were, therefore, studied with the aim of uncovering the narratives of the dominant interpretations of peace, conflict and peace media in an effort to de-naturalise prevalent hegemonic practices of establishing meaning. "To describe a ... statement does not consist in analysing the relations between the author and what he [sic] says; but in determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it [the statement]" (Foucault, 1972, 95-6). For example, we may not ourselves believe in the natural superiority of the West. But if we use the discourse of "the West and the Rest" we will necessarily find ourselves speaking from a position that holds that the West is a superior civilization.

Progress beyond the state of the art

This study aims to discuss the power within peace media’s own discourse and the wider discourses that legitimate their existence and action; to explore the ideological canons and agendas underlying media technology tools and to discuss governance agendas within emancipatory proposals. By doing so it will allow for a an analysis that focuses on the sociological, political and economic agency-network underlying peace media within mediabuilding action, contributing, hence, to an indepth and so far never identified understanding of the concrete role peace media perform within the wider mediabuilding and peacebuilding architecture along with their limitation and possibilities.

Chapters outline

The study is divided into six chapters.

Chapter 1 – International system as power-driven system - This chapter argues that international system as all other systems are based upon and driven by power, which is multi-dimensional, ubiquitous and pervasive in societies.
Chapter 2 – Peace by proxy – This chapter aims to both deconstruct the universalistic idea of peace and to understand the specificity of peace as a political, ideological project. As such it presents peace as both product and producer of the layout of the world system and, consequently, as an ideological and power-driven structure; stemming from the critique of peace as non-universal good and rejecting deterministic perspectives of the international system, it systematises different categories of peace based on existing peace proposals and projects.

Chapter 3 – Peacebuilding: liberal peace in motion - This chapter intends to identify and present the clearly western genetic code of the liberal peace and demonstrate that this peace project, although legitimised by a supposedly rational and infallible knowledge, presented as universally-driven, obeys to a power logic and reflects not a universal product but rather the interests of those who hold the power to legitimise the knowledge and the discourses that inform and enform it, due to both a cumulative historical position and material and discursive power.

Chapter 4 – Mediabuilding as Peacebuilding - This chapter critically examines the dominant understandings underlying externally-supported interventions in the media sector as a specific component of liberal peacebuilding, and highlights the media as a technological power device aimed at perpetuating, transforming or destroying specific society and world orders.

Chapter 5 – The peace media canon into power-driven liberal governing practice - Bearing in mind this study’s theoretical presuppositions and framework, this chapter intends to assess the hypothesis presented in the introduction of this study: peace media contribute to the civil pacification of communities in a context of a broader and hierarchical liberal peace and liberal global governance frameworks.

Chapter 6 – Peace media and peacebuilding: securing whose peace? - This chapter intends to discuss the results obtained with the empirical analyses and reported in Chapter number 5, taking into consideration the theoretical and analytical framework used in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4
Chapter 1 – International system as power-driven system

“Reasoning about history is inseparably reasoning about power”³

- Guy Debord –

The international system has witnessed different world orders, since political units - i.e. a politically organized body of people usually under a single government (Free Dictionary, s/d) - emerged. Each world order corresponds to a ‘historical structure’, which is the result and a picture of a particular alignment of forces. By forces, I mean power elements and mechanisms in motion. Notwithstanding there should be no such thing as a trans-historical essentialism concerning the international system, since its conditions of existence, constitutive principles and norms as well as driving forces change and vary over time (Cox, 1883), there are ingredients of the international system which are invariable despite holding distinct expressions and intensities. These ingredients are called power elements and mechanisms.⁴ They are the raw materials out of which power relationships and dynamics are forged, giving birth to the international system and its own dynamics and structures of power, i.e., “power configurations” (Cox, 2004).⁵ These configurations are the guidelines and references for all that happens from micro to macro, in International Relations. Using Marxist terminology, power elements create the base out of which superstructure develops and is fuelled (Marx,

⁴ Although “the proposition that the nature of international politics is shaped by power relations’ is often listed as a defining characteristic of Realism” (Wendt, 1999: 96-7), all other international relations theories think power perform a central role in international relations. In fact, power permeates the entire political spheres; it is a pervasive element despite multiple faces, intensities and nature. The long history of discussions on the role of power in international relations, however, has failed to generate much agreement. Power is often perceived as an essentially contested concept (Lukes 2005; Haugaard 2010; Morrision 2002; Wartenberg 1990; Guzzini, 2000; Barnett and Duvall,2005; Berenskoetter and Williams, 2007) in social and political theory. Hans J. Morgenthau (1964: 27) suggests that ‘the concept of political power poses one of the most difficult and controversial problems of political science.’ Kenneth N. Waltz (1986: 333) notes that power’s “proper definition remains a matter of controversy”. Robert Gilpin describes the concept of power as “one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations” (1981: 13).
⁵ It is precisely the cumulative effect of these “power configurations” (Cox, 2004) that give rise to what I call “historical structure”.

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1977). The type, forms and trend of power determines the components of the superstructure – politics, state, law, morality, knowledge, war, peace, security. There is a continuous process of resistance and challenge by the less powerful and marginalised sections of the system, resulting in various degrees of change and attempts of change in the structure of power. When these challenges become strong and extensive enough, they can result in the total transformation of a power structure, with direct effects on the “historical structure” of that time. Power is, consequently, ubiquitous and everything we can see or conceive of is undoubtedly a product of power relations. This renders every decision, every representation and every aspect of the social life political. Though ubiquitous, power is changeable and holds a singular ability to modify itself by logic of variable geometry, i.e., increasing on one political dimension while simultaneously decreasing on another. This allows power to enable different trends and configurations in a given world order or creating different ones.

This chapter argues that international system as all other systems are based upon and driven by power, which is multi-dimensional, ubiquitous and pervasive in societies. However, since power is very diversified in terms of form (e.g. materially-driven; discursively-driven) and mechanisms (e.g. oppressive; democratic; corporatists), international systems can be drawn differently according to the ones who hold more power to pursue their interests (e.g. selfish, communitarian, solidary) and agendas (e.g. Liberal, Marxist, inclusive, exclusivist), creating different political orders (e.g. emancipatory, hegemonic, dominating). As such, this chapter presents the international system as a power-driven system, exposes the different nature and forms power can get, and exposes the way power forces get specific configurations which, in turn, lead and result in distinct world orders and historical structures. It will do so by, first, presenting the (contested) concept of power by way of exploring and debate the main mechanisms and chains of power which are at the origin and constitute the international system. Second, by showing that it is those different elements, specifically the doses and the nature of those elements at a given time, which constitute the international system at

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6 Indeed, power definition has been prominent in discussions of international interaction from Thucydides to the present day. The long history of discussions of the role of power in international relations, however, has failed to generate much agreement. Scholars disagree not only with respect to the role of power but also with respect to the nature of power (Morgenthau, 1964; Waltz, 1986; Gilpin, 1981; Guzzini, 2000; Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Berenskoetter and Williams, 2007).
that specific given time, making it to be one of domination, hegemony or emancipation – and most of the times a hybrid one.

The importance and purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it intends to discuss the first presupposition of this study - the international system as a power-driven system -, allowing better analyses of my study object – peace media – and exploring my hypothesis. Second, it is a necessary discussion to put forward Chapter 2 on “Peace by proxy”, which argues that peace is both product and producer of the layout of the world system and, consequently, an ideological and power-driven structure.

1. On power(s)

Simply said, power is the ability to get the world as you want it to or just as Kenneth Boulding (1989) said, power is "the ability to change the future" to one’s own terms. This change can be achieved either in short or long-term, either in a sudden or in a cumulative way. Foucault (1994: 343) explains accurately the latter: “the exercise of power [is a way] (...) in which certain actions may structure the field of other possible actions” (Foucault, 1994: 343).

Power is a double-edged sword: it can be both productive and repressive. Literature usually presents this dichotomist use of power (which Foucault understands as possibly simultaneous) as “power over” and “power to” (Connolly, 1974; Dowding, 1996; Lukes, 1986; Foucault, 1980; Allen, 1999).

“Power over” refers to domination, i.e., the ability to control another person or group making them to do what one wants them to do and make them comply by means of different threat tools, specifically force, exclusion, resources deprivation and, or discrimination. This can be done either intentionally or without noticing it since many systems of domination are embedded in certain cultures and inadvertently in people’s own subjectivities. Regardless of its intentionality, power over is intrinsically negative since what characterizes it is its detrimental effect on the interests of the power-subject (Lukes, 2005). That is why, for Hanna Arendt (1969), this conception of power is best portrayed as “violence” and she actually refuses to use the concept of power as such

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7 Sources of power can be intellect, resources, knowledge, strategy, stamina, among others.
8 Robert Dahl (1957) adopts a non-evaluative definition of power (over), on the basis of which power (over) is not to be considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’ per se, but its moral status is to be established case by case. For example, a basketball coach has power over his or her team which does not have negative consequences for the team.
since for Arendt power is always positive. Indeed, “power over” is closely intertwined with the concept of “violence”, its use and threat. Violence can have three expressions which interact in a causal logic: direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence (Galtung, 1996) – and so does “power over”. Direct violence refers to direct and visibly inflicted (Ibidem: 196) verbal or/and physical abuse. It is always explicit, personal and direct. Structural violence, in turn, results from the unequal distribution of power and knows the repression and exploitation and social injustice as its main expression (Ibidem: 32). The "structural" designation stems from the fact that it is the structure that is the means through which violence is transmitted. Contrary to direct violence, structural violence is latent, indirect and gradually built into the structures of society. Finally, the cultural violence, concept introduced by Galtung in 1990, is defined as any aspect or element that, "[existing in] the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal logic" (Galtung, 1990: 291), justifies and legitimizes the direct and structural violence, causing these to be accepted as correct or at least as not aberrant or wrong. Cultural violence is constructed through a process of socialization and acculturation, thus constituting the legitimating basis for other forms of violence to exist (Galtung, 1996: 2).

On the other hand, “power to” refers to one’s abilities to do something on one’s own. It is intimately related to the idea of freedom, empowerment and emancipation, which are the pre-requisites for that agency. Here power is understood as the opposite of “coercion” and “violence” (Arendt, 1969; Parsons, 1964; Barnes, 1981). Certain attributions of “power to” are co-extensive with attributions of “power over”. Like all dichotomies, this opposition is similarly blurred. Indeed, having “power over” someone necessarily includes some kinds of “power to” act on the part of the agent; conversely, without a certain “power to”, an actor will not be able to exercise his or her “power over” a second actor (Dowding, 1991). Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, “power over” relates to oppressing or dominating dynamics whereas “power to” concerns emancipatory ones.

Both definitions and understandings of power – “power over” and “power to” - are relational, ability-based and dispositional. They presuppose a relation towards others
and imply, even if latently and/or passively, a disposition and capacity to dominate, stand for or accept a certain reality or relation. Certainly, “if we speak of the power of laws, institutions, and ideologies, if we speak of structures or mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others” (Foucault, 2000:337). Indeed, “a society without any power relations can only be an abstraction” (Foucault, 1994: 343), and nothing else. This does not mean to say that power relations which were established are necessary nor that power “in any event, constitutes an inescapable fatality at the heart of societies, such that it cannot be undermined” (Ibidem). It simply means that power is omnipresent, pervasive and multidimensional. “It is produced from one moment to the next, at every point or rather in every relation from one point to another” (Foucault, 1978: 93). Everything we can see or conceive is a product of power relations. This makes every decision, every representation and every aspect of the social life political (Butler, 1999).

Although ubiquitous, power is changeable and holds a singular ability to modify itself by logic of variable geometry, i.e., increasing on one dimension while simultaneously decreasing on another. This allows power to enable different trends and configurations in a given world order or creating different ones. Indeed, “power is responsible for both change and continuity” in the international system (Berenskoetter, 2007: 13).

1.1 Materiality: force and resources as power

Materiality is usually defined in opposition to ideas, fantasy, fiction or even illusion. It is a reality that is easily perceived. It includes everything that is observable, sometimes even possible to be touched. When talking and reflecting on power, material elements are the ones which usually get highlighted due to its effortless visibility. This happens to common people as well as to academics and politicians. Material power elements are susceptible of being touched and their results regarding power are almost

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9 Susan Strange (1996) uses the concept of “structural power” to describe this indirect and even unconscious use of power. It works at levels where norms

10 Despite (or due to) its centrality, multiple meanings and perspectives of power coexist in International Relations. Some authors prioritise ideational factors and constitutive logics and others privilege material factors and causal rationalities (Hay, 2002). Stemming from the different ontologies and epistemologies one may adopt, in a nutshell, power is usually defined highlighting it as the ability to (re)construct discourses and shape practices (Klotz and Lynch, 2007; Wendt, 1999; Foucault, 1980) or the possession of material resources or capabilities (Waltz, 1979; Marx, 1977).
automatic both in terms of perception and outcome. Indeed, if, in a violent fight, one part has a loaded gun and the other one has none, it is fairly obvious that the former holds more power than the latter regarding survival as well as the use of threat in order to achieve what that person wants. Likewise, a family who earns a higher salary has more purchasing power than one with a lower one. These two examples, despite touching everyday lives, have the same logic as the macro one of International Relations. Concerning materiality and power in international relations, two different elements uproot: force (military capabilities) and economic resources. Both of them are based upon fear: fear of dying (the whole political unit or some of its members) and fear of impoverishment. Two International Relations Theories are particularly keen on the prevalence of material factors on the exercise of power. These are Realism and Marxism, along with their respective neo-perspectives.

Realism is the key international theory which defends force and military capabilities as the main elements to give and maintain power. For realists, except for Morgenthau (1948) the international system is an immutable anarchical system which means that there is no sovereign body that governs the interactions between nation-states (the key actor for this theory), and all states have to rely upon their own resources to secure their interests and maintain an international order which favours them (Waltz, 1979). In such a leaderless anarchic system, it is only through power that states are able to defend themselves and may hope to survive. In this sense, Realism principles are what one could metaphorically explain as Alexandre Dumas’ “The Three Musketeers” motto in reverse. Rather than the well-known saying “one for all and all for one”, Realism states that it is one for himself. Although Realism understands power in a variety of ways—e.g. militarily, economically, diplomatically (always elite-basis) — it underlines the distribution of coercive material capacity, making military might the determinant element of international politics (Slaughter, 2011). In his quote “before all, be armed” Machiavelli (2003) best sums this prevalence. According to Mearsheimer (1994), this Realist vision of the world rests upon four assumptions: first, survival is the principal goal of every state; second, since states are rational actors and aim at surviving, they will act to maximize their likelihood of continuing to exist; third, the world is dangerous and uncertain since all states possess some military capacity and no State knows what
its neighbours plan and aim precisely; four, it is the Great Powers that are decisive.  

The concept or category of Great Power is undeniably of great importance within Realist tradition. As Gilpin (1981: 30) states, “superpowers establish and enforce the basic rules and rights that influence their own behaviour and that of the lesser states in the system”. For Waltz (1979, 131), “states[’] (…) rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”. 

This focus and predominance of military elements when considering and reflecting on power is not, however, completely adequate to make sense of international relations as a whole. The world is a far more complex scenario and dynamics are more cumulative and managed than permanently radicalised and led to force. Additionally, a social and political order which has no justification but its own strength is powerless in the long term for it lacks legitimacy to the eyes of all others who don’t profit directly from that specific order. For example, one could say that the domination system of black slavery lasted for almost five centuries because slaves, despite being higher in number and having their resistance songs and practices, didn’t have what could actually be decisive: firearms or ownership of economic property, resources or productive assets. It was their clear lack of material power that made their subjugation to be lasted for five hundred years. Nevertheless, the struggle to abolish slavery and the slave trade as well as all forms of white supremacy did not end successfully due to the transference of those economic or military assets to the hands of slaves or their representatives. Actually, it was a discourse change that became pervasive, increasing important circles of forces that determined the abolition of slavery (e.g. the Declaration for Independence of the United States of America). Also, the Roman Empire fell neither because it decreased its military or economic might nor because it was military fragile in respect to

11 “Power is based on the material capabilities that a state controls. The balance of power is mainly a function of the tangible military assets that states possess, such as armoured divisions and nuclear weapons. However, states have a second kind of power, latent power, which refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power. Latent power is based on a state’s wealth and the size of its overall population. Great powers need money, technology, and personnel to build military forces and to fight wars, and a state’s latent power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when competing with rival states. It should be clear from this discussion that war is not the only way that states can gain power. They can also do so by increasing the size of their population and their share of global wealth, as China has done over the past few decades” (Mearsheimer, 2006: 72-3)

12 For Martin Wight, a great power is composed of many elements: “its basic components are size of population, strategic position and geographical extent, and economic resources and industrial production. To these must be added less tangible elements like administrative and financial efficiency, education and technological skill, and above all moral cohesion” (Wight 1978, 26).
its invaders/opponents/adversaries/enemies. In fact, due to increasing corruption which led to a growing disbelief in Rome as a project and a subsequent fragility of power structures, particularly governmental ones, within the territory, opening the way to high levels of contestation, disorder and the creation of different discourses that put into dispute the authority of the Emperor (Diakov, s/d).

Moreover, despite the centrality of states in international relations, there are many other international non-state dynamics and actors which are increasingly crucial for international relations, but which Realism and Neo-realism inaccurately dismisses as less important. The argument that in extreme situations what defines life and death is military capability to use or to threat with is insufficient to explain choices and dynamics within international politics arena.

Besides military capabilities, material elements of power also enclose economic resources and capital accumulation. Marxist and Neo-Marxist international relations theories are the two key paradigms which focus on the economic material aspects as key elements of the international system dynamics, even if acknowledging importance to non-material ways of accumulating and maintaining power, such as ideology\textsuperscript{13} or “false consciousness”, i.e., the claim or hypothesis that the proletariat is unable to “recognize inequality, oppression, and exploitation in a capitalist society due to its adoption of the views that naturalize and legitimize the existence of social classes in capitalism” (Çelik, 2007: 546). Ideological systems work, precisely, to integrate people into social networks of oppression and subordination throughout the cultural realm of society, hence, ensuring high efficiency. Marxists perceive the international system as an integrated capitalist system aiming at capital accumulation – economic resources are then of key prominence. For Marx (1977), the appropriation of resources from the natural world for the production of goods determines the character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life and, therefore, it is the foundation of social life and the key element for power distribution within social life, being it domestic or international. Within a capitalist mode of production, the social relations that matter are class-driven. Members of the working class engage in productive labour, while the capitalist class owns part of the means of production, the capital, which allows to pay for salaries, own factories and machines. Through this ownership and capabilities, the

\textsuperscript{13} The meaning of ideology as it informed critical social theory throughout the twentieth century, emerged in the work of Karl Marx to whom ideology referred to the ways in which society as a whole adopts the ideas and interests of the dominant economic class (Stoddart, 2007).
capitalist class gains the power to appropriate the labour of the working classes, who lack access to the means to produce the necessities of survival - including food, clothing, and shelter - for themselves (Ibidem). There is, hence, a structural and structuring asymmetrical power relation between these two classes. How is, then, capitalist order maintained?

According to Marx, the consent of the working classes for their own exploitation (bourgeoisie “power over” them) is secured by ruling capitalist class through two mechanisms: first, the equation of labour power with money, or wages; second, ideology. Regarding the first mechanism, workers exchange their labour power for wages, which they use to purchase the commodities that they produce, but which the capitalist class owns and sells. This mutation of labour into wages creates a false reality for workers because “what flows back to the worker in the shape of wages is a portion of the product he himself continuously reproduces” (Marx: 1977: 712). Wages construct an illusion for the working class that veils the exploitative relation of the appropriation of surplus value (Stoddart, 2007). It is here that the second mechanism performs a crucial role. The ideas and interests of the dominant economic class are adopted by the whole society through ideology. It is through the dominant ideologies of capitalism that the working classes take for granted and inevitable their exploitation within economic structures of inequality, which is henceforth perceived as normality. This is because, according to Marx, material reality sets boundaries on the ideas that may emerge as important, or even acceptable in a given social setting. This is why those who lack economic power consent to hierarchies of social power that privilege others (usually minority) while exploiting them: they are educated formally and informally to accept it as such.¹⁴

Neo-marxist theories, such as Dependency Theories (Prebisch, 1982; Singer, 1950; 1953) and World-System Theory (Wallerstein, 1974) also put the focus on economic resources and economic structures to justify the international sphere which is based upon and productive of a domination (“power over”) system. Dependency theorists (Prebisch, 1982; Singer, 1950; 1953) argue that there is an exploitative exchange relation between a developed core and an underdeveloped periphery, to which correspond different forms of labour control. In their pursuit of power, developed

¹⁴ In this argumentative and theory building point, Marx clearly sets an anachronical dialogue with Foucault and its “discourse as power” proposal, as I will show in the next section.
countries penetrate developing states through political advisors, missionaries, experts, international banking, security, trade agreements and multi-national corporations to integrate them into the capitalist system in order to appropriate natural resources and foster economic and political dependence (Ibidem). This goes along with what me and Borges (2009: 77) synthetized with the expression of “becoming one of us never really reaching us”, when referring specifically to peacebuilding and liberal governance framework from 1990’s onwards, but which could be extrapolated to any core-periphery and west-rest relation and framework. In turn, world-system theory (Wallerstein, 1974) believes that core countries do not exploit poor countries because: first, core capitalists exploit workers in all zones of the capitalist world-economy (not just the periphery), and therefore the crucial redistribution between core and periphery is surplus value, not "wealth" or "resources" abstractly conceived; second, core states do not exploit poor states—as dependency theory proposes—because capitalism is organized around an inter-regional and transnational division of labour rather than an international division of labour.

Nevertheless, this Marxist and neo-Marxist conceptualisations of international politics in terms of class and its reduction of the political to the level of class alliances and class struggle are just like Realism(s), to my view, insufficiently suited to the examination of the international system. There are many other forms of domination systems in the world with global and local expressions as well as dynamics than the ones mentioned by the abovementioned theories. Racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileged (or has been privileging) European people over non-European people (Quijano, 1993; 2000); the subordinate position of women along with European patriarchy over other forms of gender relations (Spivak 1988; Enloe 1990); discrimination against sexual minorities along with sexual hierarchy that privileged heterosexuals over homosexuals; or an epistemic hierarchy that privileged western knowledge and cosmology over non-Western ones (Mignolo 1995,2000; Quijano, 1991) are but few examples of other domination and oppressive systems. Moreover, the opposition and resistance movements to these forms of oppression are not solely carried out by the proletariat either, but by a whole range of different social movements: the women’s movement, the anti-racist movement, the student movement, LGBT movements and so forth (Grosfoguel, 2008a; 2008b). All of these forms of oppression and resistance counterparts cannot be reduced to a project of the bourgeoisie nor explained simply by
materiality (Manokha, 2009). Discourse has, hence, a pivotal role in shaping power relations and forms of domination and oppression, as well as liberation ones, as I will show in this next point.
1.2 Discourse as power

People tend to apprehend or to dismiss as less important or inexistent from their own knowledge what the words they hear include, exclude or neglect on specific topics, issues or groups. This is the power of discourse and is precisely what makes discourse a form of power.

Conversely to what is its usual meaning in common language - "a coherent or rational body of speech or writing; a speech, or a sermon" (Hall, 2006: 201) – discourse is here understood as a narrative, a system of thought, or knowledge claims, which assumes an existence independent of a particular speaker (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). It consists of several statements working together to form what Michel Foucault (1980a) calls a "discursive formation", i.e. a particular logical way of representing and, thus, legitimating reality and actions upon the latter. When declarations about a topic are made within a specific discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way excluding henceforth other ways of reasoning about the exact same reality (Hall, 2006).

Two examples are chiefly illustrative of what discourse is. The Patriot Act, an act of United States Congress which was signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 26th, 2001, is a good example of how discourses shape and frame objective reality, making it to be possibly interpreted and used in distinct, and even opposite, ways. The Patriot Act intended to reinforce the array of tools available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and federal prosecutors for identifying, regardless of judicial warrants and using surveillance and espionage, as well as disabling terrorist networks operating both within and outside the United States. If the Patriot Act might be accepted within the “anti-terrorism” discourse, the same public law has been highly contested within the “civil liberties” discourse. According to the American Civil Liberties Union (s/d), “this program not only exceeds the authority given to the government by Congress, but it violates the right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, and the rights of free speech and association protected by the First Amendment”.

The second example is the one used by Stuart Hall (2006) regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the process of determining the adequate concept and meaning within a specific context: Palestinians fighting to regain land on the West Bank
from Israel may be described either as "freedom fighters" or as "terrorists", depending on which discourse they are framed in. It is an objective fact that they are fighting. However, it is not that linear what the fighting means or what they become to our eyes when they fight. Both perspectives -"freedom fighters" or "terrorists" - can be made "true", depending on the description, the rationale and the narrative adopted to explain their action, i.e., the discourse embraced. People act on the perspective that has conquered their minds believing that that perspective is not a description, among many other possible explanations, but the truth. “Whether the Palestinians are terrorists or not, if we think they are, and act on that "knowledge", they in effect become terrorists because we [label them and we] treat them as such. The language (discourse) has real effects in practice: the description becomes “true” ” (Hall, 2006: 203).

Language, understood and applied in discourse, is therefore a space of presentation, representation and legitimation of reality. As Booth (2007) skilfully sums up, “to tell stories is to handle the world”. Indeed, “reality is a scarce resource” and, for that reason, “the fundamental form of power is the power to define, allocate and display this resource” (Carey, 1989: 87), and enjoy its distributive consequences, which foster and constitute “a central dimension of social [world] inequality” (Couldry, 2000: 7). In a nutshell, discourse has a framing and normative effect of reality – that is its major power: presenting, representing and, hence, legitimating perspectives and policies towards reality. It is, accordingly, a (contested) space of presentation, representation and above all legitimation, securing the relationship of government to the ones governed. “The relationship is legitimate when people in general accept the institutions and procedures of authority and decisions which emerge, even if they do not like them” (Cox, 2004: 310). Contrariwise to materiality which is based upon fear and necessity/greed/ambition, discourses are based on framing and legitimacy.

But how are discourses produced? How are they legitimised? Who produces them? And most interestingly how do they become pervasive in societies?

Discourses are produced through what can be called the “rules of exclusion” (Foucault, 1972) intimately associated with credibility – what later in International Relations Theory would be called the HAVES and the HAVES NOTS - and to which what I would add the “rules of naturalisation” in the sense that they are cumulatively perceived as inevitable and uncontested, though this uncritical take of normality is a process that can be both empowering for some and destructive or oppressive for others.
Both rules – exclusion and naturalisation - give discourses credibility and legitimacy, and allow them to be ubiquitous and prevalent.

The ones who are allowed to speak on a given topic, as well as the selected forms of knowledge that are given credibility or that are subjugated in the production of truth are the ones who regulate discourse. When a lot of interconnected statements, that describe one certain discourse (discursive formation), are produced through power it is a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 1976). “Truth isn’t outside power, or deprived of power”: on the contrary, truth “is produced by virtue of multiple constraints and it induces regulated effects of power”, (Foucault, 1976: 12), despite being presented and perceived as “conformity with fact or reality; verity: a verified or indisputable fact, proposition, principle”, according to the English Oxford Dictionary. Therefore, “each society has its regime of truth”, concerning its different areas and arenas, which is expressed in “the types of discourse [society] harbours and causes to function as true” by “the techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining truth”, “the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true”, “the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true from false statements” and by “the way in which each is sanctioned” (Foucault 1976: 112, 113). Therefore, “truth” is nothing but “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and functioning of statements”; it is linked “by a circular relation to systems of power which produce it and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which redirect it”. A “regime of truth” is supported by “politics of truth” (Foucault 1976:113, 114). It is called “regime” of truth because truth is produced, sustained, valorised and regulated by a series of mechanisms, techniques and procedures that are ‘political’, bearing in mind that politics has not only to do with institutions, but with the complex and constitutive field of power relations within which we ordinarily live –, and at the same time truth itself reinforces and induces effects of power. A regime of truth is thus the strategic field within which truth is produced and becomes a tactical element in the functioning of a certain number of power relations. As already mentioned, those who produce the discourse are the ones who usually have the power to make it true and the power to enforce its validity and scientific status – that is why they produce discourses and, consequently, regimes of truth. These “regimes of truth” organise and regulate power relations emerging, thus, as highly effective in terms of power (Foucault, 1976). As Foucault (2003) notes: “the delicate mechanisms of power cannot function unless
knowledge, or rather knowledge apparatuses, are formed, organized, and put into circulation” within a power relationship that produces or contests the truth. In “every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality” (Foucault, 1971: 10) so that power can be maintained/preserved without being felt as power. It is this apparent powerless, universal and normal nature that makes discourse incredibly commanding. This is attained in part, and paradoxically (remember that universal is defined as relating to or done by all people or things in the world), through the “rules of exclusion”. The only thing that makes this not such a contradiction is that even this exclusion rule is naturalised. In a society “not everybody has the right to say everything” (Ibidem). This position of Foucault is highly questionable since, first, it doesn’t apply as such to democratic contexts and, second, what is at stake here is not the right to ‘say’ something but rather the ‘capacity to influence’ discourse. However, the fact is that not everybody has the same authority to say something about a specific topic, issue, event, group or person/actor. Hence, everybody has the right to say everything, but the consequences differ depending on context, social authority, respect, legal framework. What matters here is that only experts on a topic or the ones already holding some kind of power are the ones who have the social authority to produce discourses which will be assumed as truth, perpetuating existing structures of “power over”.

Discourses are formed through the practice of producing meaning, i.e., "discursive practices" (Foucault, 1980a). This is intimately associated with knowledge and there is always a political character in the production of knowledge. Stuart Hall actually claims synthetically that “discourse is about the production of knowledge through language” (Hall, 2006). Giddens (1984) also states that the production of dominant forms of discourse is itself dependent upon differential access to resources which define structures of domination – here Giddens clearly starts a dialogue with structuralist Marxist perspectives on power.15 There is also here a discourse self-productive logic: why is our perception on a specific event, actor or issue different based not on their consequences, meaning, attitudes or implications, but rather on the

15 See section 1.1 of this Chapter.
discourse framework in which we were brought up? That is why discourse as power is so pervasive and decisive.

The idea of “discourse as power” is based on what I consider a triangular relation between ideology / discourse/ knowledge (although Foucault explicitly demarcates discourse from ideology)\textsuperscript{16}. Specifically, discourse creates reality, it does so based on a specific ideology\textsuperscript{17} which frames reality and, based on that ideology, discourses produce a specific knowledge which inform and legitimate practices that, in turn, nourishes and legitimates ideology, in a self-sustaining process.

Along with Gerrig (1997) states “ideology is the verbal image of the [subjective] good society”. It presents “how society should be organised, answering questions such as what the role of the state should be, what forms of differentiation among people should be accepted or rejected “(Schwarzmantel, 2008).\textsuperscript{18} It is a system of beliefs, values, principles that through advocating a specific conduct which its proponents promote. It is the belief that a specific standpoint is true and that from it one draws the kind of society one finds desirable and, hence, to be built. For example, a racist ideology is the belief that specific race is superior to any other or specific others and, consequently, is the basis for people’s negative (and sometimes violent) attitudes towards immigration, integration of foreigners in the labour market and so forth. Ideology is passed inter-subjectively to the whole society by means of discourses. These entail specific narratives and rationales framed as knowledge, which can be traditional, popular, common sense and scientific/scholarly. Since socially shared knowledge is also

\textsuperscript{16} Foucault explicitly demarcates discourse from ideology. For him, the notion of ideology, linked to Marxism, contains several problems (Foucault 1980a; Foucault 1980b; Foucault 2000). First, Marxism typically sees ideology as something fake, which stands in opposition to true knowledge. Instead, Foucault describes how “truth” is produced out of social relations and that political relations of power are “the very ground on which the subject, the domains of knowledge, and the relations with truth are formed”. Second, social theorists have often treated ideology as an effect of economic structures. By contrast, Foucault wants to re-locate the production of “truth” in social relations, rather than in social structures. Third, while ideology often takes a discursive form, the power effects of discourse are more subtle and complex than the model that suggested by Marxist theory.

\textsuperscript{17} Despite extremely central to social and political science analysis, ideology is a very flexible concept, giving rise to what Gerrig (1997) calls semantic promiscuity. In fact, there are many different interpretations of ideology. For some, it is dogmatic; others believe it to be a political sophistication. It may be seen as reflecting mainstream political thinking of a specific social class, or, conversely, as something fuelled by those alienated by the system or representing the lack of economic self-interest. Some perspectives believe ideology refers to intellectual thinking, behaviour or language and it is mainly focused on political or power realms developing explicative, legitimating, motivating or repressing functions (Ibidem).

\textsuperscript{18} “We constantly draw upon pre-existing discourses as resources for social interactions with others” (Stoddart, 2006: 203).
a form of social representation, it follows that if ideologies are the basis of social representations, also our knowledge is ideologically biased (Fairclough 1995, Laclau 1979). Ideology reproduced by means of discourses justifies the exercise of power, explains and allows for the judgment of policies and events as well as for the goals of political and social organized actions, it helps to distinguish the rights and the wrongs, points the moral and causing relationships between politics and social and economic dimensions and give rise and legitimacy to power relations, whether symmetric or asymmetric. Foucault (1991: 27) sums up this idea best when stating that, “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”. This allows for legitimacy; it legitimises and brings acceptable the relationship between the governed and the governor.

One of the best examples to illustrate this nexus “discourse-ideology-knowledge-power” is the orientalism thesis of Edward W. Said (1985) and the subsequent reflection of Stuart Hall (2006) ‘the west and the rest’. For Said, "orientalism" describes a discipline created by West in order to be able to understand the orient politically, sociologically scientifically, militarily during the post-enlightenment period. It is presented as universal objective knowledge despite being a situated epistemic perspective. Said argues that Western knowledge about the East is not generated from facts or reality, but from preconceived archetypes that envision all "Eastern" societies as fundamentally similar to one another, and fundamentally dissimilar to "Western" societies. Such knowledge is constructed with literary texts and historical records that often are of limited understanding of the facts of life in the Middle East. Orientalism refers, hence, to systems of constructing knowledge about--and producing —“the Orient” as a discursive object of colonialism and governance (Ibidem). If Orientalism doesn’t assume itself as a point of view, it hides as ‘knowledge’ its epistemic location, paving the ground for its claims about universality, neutrality and objectivity despite not corresponding to reality since it developed upon a subjective and geographic perspective. Hall (2006) begins pointing to the construction of “the West” as a concept itself and a “standard model of comparison” which supplies criteria of evaluation against which other societies may be ranked. Once a concept, the West “became productive in its turn”, creating knowledge about other places and peoples.
International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put up into circulation representations that are taken as truth, legitimating courses of action, norms, rules and policies (Doty, 1996). Elites implement a discourse in order to perpetuate their position of power, legitimating their actions in the name of a supposed common good or inevitable order of things, concealing their private interests. The receivers of the discourse are themselves co-producers of the social meaning discourse entails. According to Foucault (1971: 9), if discourse “has any power, it is from us and solely from us that it obtains it from”. Ernesto Laclau and Chantall Mouffe (2001) suggest that an acceptance of social inequality is produced as we incorporate hegemonic discourses into our individual subjectivities. This is mainly passed by means of institutions (e.g. schools, family, political organisations) and informal discursive spaces (e.g. cafe, streets, and clubs) (Foucault, 1971). We constantly draw upon pre-existing discourses as resources for social interactions with others.

That is why discourse is such a powerful power device: it is pervasive in society and makes even those who lack economic power consent to hierarchies of social power that privilege others while exploiting themselves (Marx, 1977). Discourse works on individual social actors while producing hegemonic effects across a multiplicity of social locations. Our sense of self — our subjectivity — is constructed through our engagement with a multitude of discourses. This construction of subject positions shapes our acceptance of relations of unequal social power. It is important to notice that the production of dominant forms of discourse is itself dependent upon differential access to resources which define structures of domination (Giddens, 1984). That is why there is an intersection between the social production of knowledge and the perpetuation of inequitable power relations. World hegemony is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries – rules which support the dominant mode of production. Discourse is, thus, not a mere static unit of words and significances but a dynamic field of interests, tensions, conflicts and contradictions because it is a process wherein reality is produced and defined, topics and the way to talk about them are ordered, actors are perceived and interpreted, and practices are conducted (Barker & Galasinski, 2001).

Discourse is also not a closed system since it draws on elements in other discourses, binding them into its own network of meanings (Hall, 2006) – this is a
particular important and fiercely characteristics of discourse concerning power because
this allows a specific discourse to co-opt its opposition and to gain increasing audience.
The discourse of “Europe”, for example, drew on the earlier discourse of
"Christendom,” altering or translating its meaning. Traces of past discourses remain
embedded in more recent discourses of "the West" (Ibidem), which allows prevailing
groups to update and maintain their dominant positions according to the newness of
each epoch. This is also applied to what is called buzz words, i.e., a word used to
impress, or that is fashionable. For example, two of the most dominant and important
intervention systems which have been recently taking place in the international sphere
are the aid industry and peacebuilding interventions, creating buzz words such as
development, modernity, peacebuilding. However, despite the specificities of each
concept and word, the discourse they integrate is the same: liberal peace and modernity
(Holm & Sorensen, 1995; Santos, 2009).

To sum up, as Kakoff (1990: 7) states, “language is politics, politics assigns
power, power governs how people talk and they are understood”. However, if
discourses are this powerful, how can one interpret the persistent of austerity measures
in Greece since 2011 despite severe social contestation on the streets and a fierce
discourse adopted by most opposition parties and social movements which are clearly
against it? Philip Stephens (2014), associate editor and chief political commentator of
the Financial Times haver stated: "It is time to admit defeat. The bankers have got away
with it. They have seen off politicians, regulators and angry citizens alike to stroll
triumphant from the ruins of the great crash.” So the question that arises is: is the
relation of discourses and materiality regarding a power a mutual exclusionist one? Do
they overlap or dialogue? The next section intends to answer these questions by
problematizing the relationship between discourses and materiality.

1.3 Betwixt and between?

Materiality and discourses are not independent from each other and only together
they can make reality to be intelligible, perpetuated, contested or/and transformed. To
attempt any neat separation between discursive and material assuming the former as
purely linguistic and the latter as “real” assumes dichotomies, such as the ones
“word/world”, “subjective/objective”, “thought/ reality”, which hardly, if ever, represent reality.

On the one hand, to assume the clear prevalence of materiality over discourses is to erroneously dismiss as less important the ideational structures of dominance and resistance which are, actually, more pervasive in everyday life than material ones. Such an assertion leads to my argument regarding this debate - structural power and material world exists but they are solely constituted and given social and political meaning as such within discourse. For example, if someone beat us with a stone, the implications are not merely discursive. However, the idea of “aggression” and what it means it is based and produced by discourse. Another example at a macro level, when USA troops entered Iraq in 2003, it was certainly real, though the presence of a group of men on a peninsula is in itself “singu larly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning” (Doty, 1996: 5). Just when we label them military and American while also naming the Peninsula as being a “foreign country”, “Arab country” or specifically “Iraq” that meaning is created. Nevertheless, with that information it is still far from certain to understand what that event actually is, until discursive practices and discursive formations constitute it as a “war”, a “training exercise”, a “partnership” and so forth. Moreover, even if being labelled as war, it can still be categorized differently as “invasion”, “self-defence”, “war on terror”, determining, hence, the narrative to be available and to be spread. ”What is actually going on in a specific situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located” (Ibidem).

On the other hand, the well-known formulation of Jacques Derrida (1976: 158) that “there is nothing outside the text” may also mislead serious analysis. First, it excludes the importance of non-verbal communication, which is also part of discourse. The communication and the interpretation of what one thinks and perceives happens based on many more factors than just the spoken or written word. It is, in effect, conditioned by many more communicative expressions than the circumscribed meaning of a word or its position in the sentence (Glover, 2011). The exclusive focus on the text and the act of speech tends to reject or neglect other forms of representation of

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19 This example is based on the example given by Roxanne Lynn Doty (1996: 5): “When US troops march into Grenada, this is certainly “real”, though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representation that produces meaning. It is only when “American” is attached to the troops and “Grenada” to the geographic space that meaning is created”.

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meanings, such as images, sounds, colours (and their textures) or bodily expressions that enrich, in turn, communication simultaneously making it closer to the meaning to be transmitted (Möller 2007), since it enables it to be extracted taking into account a relationship between a rich context of things. Second, there is much more reality than the one described and presented within discourse. For example, the Declaration of Independence of the United States says that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” (Congress, 1976). However, this document was signed by slaveholders. Also, black people, unlike the white ones, had no form to escape slavery, nor have the right to private ownership and voting at best until the American Civil War or even up to the civil rights struggle in the second half of the twentieth century. This indissolubly interdependence (sometimes even merging) of discourses and materiality is clear evident in different other cases. There is an intersection between the social production of knowledge through discourse and the perpetuation of inequitable power relations, namely material ones but with subsequent legitimised ideational inequalities of superiority, inferiority. Fanon (2004) is particularly assertive using Colonialism as an example. One of his central claims is that colonialism constructs a “compartmentalized world” of colonist and colonized, where “race” is just as significant social force as class. Within this compartmentalized world, the colonized are subject to dominance that is material/economic as well as cultural and psychological. Fanon (2004: 5) writes: “looking at the immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost what species, what race one belongs to. In the colonies the economic infrastructure is also a superstructure. The cause is effect: You are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich”. Colonized peoples see themselves through the eyes of the colonizer, as the marginalized other to a valorised European culture. Thus, colonialism functions through economic and political domination, as well as through cultural one.

There is a place where both materiality and discourses get increasingly powerful. These places are institutions. In fact when material power and discursive power, separately and most of all together, are conflated into institutions, their power increases almost exponentially. According to Cox (1981: 135) “institutionalisation is a means of stabilising and perpetuating a particular order. Institutions reflect the power relations
prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations”.

Foucault’s goes even further and calls attention not to “the domination of the King in his central position, but that of his subjects in their mutual relations”, which means that “it is not the uniform edifice of sovereignty, but the multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function within the social organism’ (Foucault, 1980b: 96). One “should not [therefore] concern itself with the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central locations, with the general mechanisms through which they operate (…). On the contrary, it should be concerned with power at its extremities, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional forms and institutions” (Ibidem).

Cox and Foucault could be perceived at this point as producing contradicting thoughts. On the one hand, Cox sustains that institutions are the core of world power. On the other hand, Foucault argues that power is a dispersed and bottom-up dynamic. However, for me, Foucault’s capillary conception of power is subsequent and fuels the power of institutions, the place where material and discursive power agglomerate, rendering these places particularly powerful. In fact, it matters where the core of world power lies, for example – is it the USA? China? The United Nations? Al-Qaeda? Where are those actors and states? But most importantly, it matters all the regional forms and institutions that reproduce their power in an overlapping logic of proximity and subsidiarity towards communities and core/headquartes or power, respectively, even if for Foucault these don’t exist.

Power departs from material elements and constructs social organization and hierarchies by producing discourses, knowledge and truths, by imposing rules, specific discipline and order (Foucault, 1980a), through formal institutions but also by shaping human desires and subjectivities, giving the necessary means for dominant actors to maintain or increase their power and allowing also, nevertheless, spaces for resistance, being them collective, organised, inorganic or individual. It is as such at the micro level of everyday life and at the macro level of the international system, which are incontestably interlinked.
1.4 – Voice and power

Why is voice important to reflect on political power? In which way does it detach or distinct itself from discourses? And what does it add to the materiality vs. discourse debate?

The most immediate perception of the term “voice” is the sound of a person speaking. However, as Couldry (2001:1) argues, to understand the extent of its political and social nature and impact, one should hold the concept and idea of voice in a more comprehensive, procedural and political framework. It is self-evident that the sonic aspect of voice generates important insights, such as ones told us by the tone used and the sound textures created around them, for example, with evident hidden significations or intentionality. However, the mere sonic aspect “does not capture the range of ways, not necessarily involving sound, in which I can give an account of myself” (Couldry, 2010: 1) – this is the key issue when relating voice with power: the possibility to give an account, hence influencing the discourses and the perceptions of a given reality. It is of the utmost importance to take into consideration which role and power this concept of voice has in the political and decision-making process.

There is something very reflexive and consequential about “voice”. Paul Ricoeur (2009) captures this idea quite well when he states that “we have no idea what a culture would be where no one any longer knew what it meant to narrate things.” Voice gives people “power to” give an account, implicitly or explicitly, of the world within which they act, allowing them, hence, to narrate things and to express themselves on a wide-range of possibilities and scenarios or circumstances (Butler, 2005). Indeed, one of the main goals of talking is to tell each other our own accounts: e.g. what has happened that day, what we are going to do the next day, how one feels regarding a particular subject/thing/person, (in a new job, at a new workplace or social, in a new/particular stage of our life) - “we’re constantly giving accounts of ourselves to each other, we’re constantly implicating our accounts with the accounts that others give of us and give of themselves, and that’s not accidental” (Couldry, 2012). Interlocution is inevitable among human beings and it is always political, even if in an implicit way. Taylor (1989: 36-38) explains: “I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors (…) the nature of our language and the fundamental dependence of our thought on language

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makes interlocution (...) inescapable for us”. The process of interlocution tells what matters to us as human and social subjects, and defines social expectations (Goffman, 1969). It allows making diagnosis, exploring agendas in both spontaneous and systematised ways. It is precisely in this point that voice relates to power: “power to” define problems, to debate, to set agendas – both regarding material power and inequalities and discursive frameworks that legitimise a specific hierarchy in terms of knowledge, convention and ideology. That is why voice is important when dealing and reflecting on power. As they speak and talk, people denounce, support, create consensus, (re)invent identities, position themselves. From a political standpoint, voice is chiefly important, particularly as the dimension of “power to” is concerned and subsequently as far as “power over” intends to be successful.

One of the best ways to assess the importance and possibilities of a particular element or tool is to identify and analyse the way those holding power and those being oppressed relate and act upon that specific element. Voice is particularly elucidative. As voice matters, over the course of history many political regimes and international orders have implemented censorship to defend the status quo representing their interests. This was the case of Ancient Greece, where Socrates was sentenced to drink poison in 399 BC for his corruption of youth and his acknowledgement of unorthodox divinities (Lévêque, 1967); or in ancient China, where censorship was considered a legitimate instrument for regulating the moral and political life of the population. More recently, censorship has happened in many dictatorial regimes, in Portugal, Chile, Iraq, North Korea, Spain, Germany, Argentina, Brazil, China and so forth. The rationales for censorship have varied, with some censors targeting material deemed to be indecent or obscene; heretical or blasphemous; or seditious or treasonous (GILC, s/d), but the goal is just one: to control the agency voice entails and the narratives and discourses it might help to produce. Also, even when non-explicitly declared, censorship is also present in non-authoritarian regimes even if not formally instituted. It is a form of hegemonic power as well. Within these contexts, two forms of censorship can be found. The first one is self-censorship, which highly reflects the hegemonic power of those holding the greatest power in that given society, i.e., the act of censoring or classifying one's own work, ideas or opinions out of fear of, or deference to, the sensibilities of others, without overt pressure from any specific party or institution of authority. The second one is sporadic and explicit censorship. This one happens when there are sensitive issues that
the government or economic elites do not want to bring or to let others to bring to the public political agenda. One example is the censorship that has existed in democratic Spain towards pro-Republican demonstrations. Moreover, democratic political regimes have also created a voice fantasy or illusion by stating for mere formal (maybe manipulative) purposes that everyone has the right to voice and that everyone’s voice matters. This has been the case for most of the so-called today’s liberal democracies. Most of these – from, the USA to many European democracies, such as Portugal, the UK; France, Spain or Italy - provides a formal voice for its citizens but fail quite strikingly to listen, denying any consequences, strength or “power to” to their voices. Also, it is common that current analysis and readings the NOSM misread the phenomenon of “more voices” circulating via new media as “more voices being heard” and short-sightedly equate mediated visibility with recognition (Couldry, 2010: 82). But is it enough to have voices if they do not count? In terms of power, just to have a voice is never enough or suffices. To give sense to this importance and inconsistencies relating voice, Couldry (2010), states that there are two basic conceptions of voice: voice as a value and voice as a process. Whereas the latter refers to the human capacity to give an account of oneself and one’s place in the world, voice as a value is recognising that voice matters. Valuing voice involves “discriminating in favour of ways of organising human life and resources that, through their choices, put the value of voice into practice, by respecting the multiple interlinked processes of voice and sustaining them, not undermining or denying them” (Couldry, 2010: 2). To value voice as a value means thus to value voice in practice, and discriminating against frameworks of social, economic and political organisation that deny or undermine voice. To value voice or to be in line with “voice as a value” is to recognise people’s general capacities to give an account of themselves and the world and that has to have subsequent political consequences.

If voice is intimately related to discursive power, what does detach voice from discourse as a power mechanism and element? What is the specificity of voice that discourse as a concept does not entail? “Voice is socially grounded, performed through exchange, reflexive, embodied, and dependent upon a material form” (Couldry, 2010: 91), and so is discourse. However, voice is a form of agency, while discourse is a systematised result of an interlocking convergent exchange of voices and narratives. To have voice is to have the capacity to give an account of one’s lives that is reflexive and
continuous, an ongoing, embodied process of reflection (Couldry, 2009: 579-80). Voice is a tool that allows one to start to establish or to denounce material inequalities and (re)create narratives. Discourses are formed through the practice of producing meaning, i.e., "discursive practices" (Foucault, 1980a) through voices. Also, a specific discourse draws on elements in other discourses, binding them into its own network of meanings (Hall, 2006) – this is a particular important and fiercely characteristics of discourse concerning power because this allows a specific discourse to co-opt its opposition and to gain increasing audience. The discourse of “Europe”, for example, drew on the earlier discourse of "Christendom," altering or translating its meaning. Traces of past discourses remain embedded in more recent discourses of "the West" (Ibidem). It is voice that allows this interlocking dynamic to happen. When a discourse becomes dominant, it can become a canon. Discourse can be both passive and active in the sense that it is produced but it can also be widely and passively accepted as truth; while voice is always active in the sense that it always produces something: agreement, disagreement, transformation, for example.

Amid the debate discourse vs. materiality, voice works precisely as a bridge between discourses and materiality and is part of the balance and game of power between power over and power to. By being a form of agency, voice allows the power to denounce material forms of oppression as well as to denounce the dominating nature of certain discourses, even if not already knowing and proposing alternatives.

2. World orders

“World orders” are general (in the sense of geography and scope) power structures, which simultaneously create and are the result of a set of arrangements established internationally among key states and social forces who hold the greatest power in the world. A ‘world order’ intends to preserve a specific global political stability which serves its own material interests, ideology and favour its survival.

Among the possible different world orders, power is their common denominator and raw material. What distinguishes one from the other it is the specificity of their respective dominant actors and those actors’ will as well as conditions to use power (material and discursive one) in a certain way. Therefore, power, despite permanent, is changeable and holds a singular ability to modify itself by logic of variable geometry,
i.e., increasing on one dimension while simultaneously decreasing on another, enabling different trends and configurations in a given world order or creating different ones. There are, hence, different possible world orders, even if based on the same raw material – power -, depending on the specificity of the actors who hold the greatest power at each historical period. In fact, world orders are so structuring that usually a world order defines a historical period.

Each actor bases their action and policies on their respective economic and military assets as well as ideological convictions, knowledge and external influence. The sum of the different powers and uses of power of those actors give birth to many different possible configuration of forces. These, in turn, result in distinct cartographies and dynamics of power, consequently creating different kinds of world orders. Each world order creates its own systems of controlling events and actors in the world so that its layout and power can be preserved.

Bearing in mind that categorisations are always somewhat coarse and going along existing theoretical systematisations and proposals as well as History records, the outcome of these configurations can be, essentially, threefold as far as the international system and world orders are concerned: domination, hegemony and emancipation. These three categories are not necessarily clear-cut but rather blurred and sometimes dialogical and overlapped as I will later on explain.

2.1. Domination, hegemony and emancipation

Domination as world order is usually a stable and enduring structure of power, with the latter exercised by one actor (or set of actors) “over” another(s), using coercion or the threat of punishment for disobedience (Gramsci, 1971) as controlling mechanisms to preserve power and order. The concept of ‘power over’ is key here as well as violence, in its direct, structural and cultural expressions (Galtung, 1996). It is, usually, a group of states or elite social forces who, sharing an oppressive and centripetal exclusionist ideology, holds and uses power over a subaltern one which can regularly be divided into two distinct groups: those which benefit directly (even if not complacent with it) from that world political order, and those who are directly and openly oppressed within it. Even among each of those groups there are different sub-levels of benefice and oppression. For example, in a racist white supremacist order all
white people benefice directly from that order, being themselves racists or not, while non-white people are openly oppressed. However, white people particularly sensitive to anti-racism agenda or movements might be more oppressed than those supporting the existing system. Likewise non-white people who openly resist the racist system might as well be hardly oppressed than the ones coping with it. Also, in a patriarchal system, all men will collect add values for being men, regardless their agreement on women’s oppression, while all women, irrespective of their agreement with that order, will be always be subaltern and treated as such.

Since there are different circumstances and different groups over which power is exercised, distinct power mechanisms are used among dominating world orders. In fact, on the one hand, the structure of power within domination orders is commonly built upon coercion (Gramsci, 1971), which can be based on punishment and force or threat of punishment or of force (Ibidem; Gramsci, 1992),21 being it military, physical, economic or/and psychological. Coercion mechanisms are mainly used towards the oppressed groups, although they may affect all groups, since it is part of the regime norms. On the other hand, “power over” is also based upon inducement, this one essentially based on manipulation, and mostly directed to both the ones who hold power and the ones who benefit directly or indirectly from it. Manipulation, mainly in the form of discourse, intends to involve in a calculative way subalterns and intends to get legitimation and signification.

Domination systems distinguish themselves from hegemonic ones for here the leading group of a society does not transform its own interests and values into common sense for all the members of the respective society, but rather aims to supress the intellectual, political and economic development of its subalterns and impose their conception of the world through force and/or the withdrawal of rights. Manipulation can be used as a supplement to gain legitimation (e.g. propaganda during German Nazi expansion) - the media are a particularly important means to do so, as I will present and analyse in chapter 4. This component usually takes place since there is interest from the part of the ruling group to attract all the members that are not to be dominated or, to put into other words, that benefit directly from that specific order so that they upkeep the

21 Gramsci (1971) argued that there are two types of power mechanism effects: domination that is based on coercion, and hegemony that is based on consent. Hegemony, for Gramsci, signifies the process through which the leading group / ruling class of a society transforms its own interests and values into “common sense” for all the members of this society.
elite’s governance structure and make the systems of differentiation (e.g. slavery) that support and justify dominating elite’s power to be institutionally and socially acceptable. Slavery system, colonialism or more recently the Neuordnung Europas (New order of Europe, in English) of Nazi Germany are clear illustrations of domination systems. Within domination systems, voice as a process exists but it never happens to value as voice be a cornerstone of its order and rules. Indeed, the only voice that actually matters is the one of those holding dominant power “over”. This is easily explained almost using syllogism logic. If “voice as a process” (Couldry, 2010) allows people to make an account of themselves and the world and “voice as value” (Ibidem) allows people to diagnose and set agendas consentaneous with their interests and ideology that are taken into consideration by those ruling the system; if domination systems intends to supress the intellectual and ethic-political development of its subalterns and impose their conception of the world through force; domination systems will never recognise neither “voice as a process”22 nor “voice as a value” (Couldry, 2010) as one of their governing and ordering principles, not even in a disguised way – as possibly hegemonic orders do, as I will later explain.

Hegemony, in Gramscian terms23, and conversely to domination, bases its social power on consent rather than coercion (Gramsci, 1971) or inducement, although these two keep on existing. Cox (1993: 52) argues wisely that “Gramsci took over from Machiavelli the image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a necessary combination of consent and coercion. To the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases”. Hegemonic power works to persuade individuals and social classes to subscribe to the social values and norms of an inherently exploitative system, being them leading groups or subalterns. It is a form of social power that relies on

22 To deny “voice as a process” (Couldry, 2010) it is not the same as to deny one’s ability to speak but to deny one’s ability to make an account of himself/herself and the world from their subjective point of view.
23 The term “hegemony” has a long history before Gramsci. Derived from hegemon, literally meaning leader, and its Greek ἡγεμονία, hegemony traditionally signifies a combination of authority, leadership and domination. Gramsci stretches the traditional way it was used as well as the more specific perspectives proposed by the Russian Social Democrats, Plekhanov and Lenin (Ives, 2004). The original trait of Gramsci is the reflexion on the articulation between consent and coercion taking into account activities of government and operations of state power as well as ‘common’ people understanding of the world. As such, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is rich in large part due to its philosophical and epistemological elements that show how seemingly private or personal aspects of the operation of power while at the same time he puts forward an institutional ad social analysis of various classes and organisations in society, from actions of the state, to the realm of civil society and institutions such as school, churches, media, book publishers and entertainment companies and enterprises (Ibidem).
voluntarism and participation, and not solely on the fear of the threat of or actual punishment for disobedience. In this sense, it relates to Marx conception of “false consciousness”, which refers to the pervasiveness of ideology dominating the consciousness of exploited groups and classes as means to justify and perpetuate their exploitation. Consequently, people are unable “to recognize inequality, oppression, and exploitation (...) to its adoption of the views that naturalize and legitimize the existence of social classes” (Çelik, 2012). So they uncritically take up what that specific proposal offers as “normality” and, sometimes, as immutable reality or the perfected and natural order of things. That is why hegemony is usually perceived as a non-explicit form of social power, and this is precisely what makes it extremely powerful. Within hegemony, the values of the leading group are perceived as common sense and, therefore, they guide in a naturalised way the collective (institutional and individual) understanding of the world on a daily basis, despite being highly ideological, interest-driven, subjective and situated. It is a view of the world that is “inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed”, just like all common sense usually are, and which tends to reproduce what Stoddart (2006: 201) defines as “a sort of social homeostasis, or, in Gramsci words, “moral and political passivity” (Gramsci, 1971: 333). While coercive power is the exclusive domain of the State, hegemonic power and order spread around by means of the institutions of civil society, such as the Church, schools, libraries, street names, associations and clubs, architecture, the mass media, or the family along with political institutions and the state producing and disseminating almost in a self-sustaining logic the hegemonic governance framework (Gramsci, 1971). Hegemonic power and hegemonic orders are, hence, highly pervasive in societies, entering macro structures (e.g politics, economics, social norms) and micro realities (e.g. house routines) as well as individuals themselves. It is a “de-centred and de-territorialising apparatus of rule” that regulates “social life from its interior” (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 23) with a centred power locus. It is exactly the social action of everyday life that produces ongoing productive and reproductive hegemonic effects.

One of the key ideas of hegemony is creating (in the sense that it is not necessarily real) a middle-ground. Laclau (2002) is particularly clear about this point.

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24 It is not “the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness” (Marx, 1859).
25 This idea is intimately related to the concept of “empire” put forward by Hardt and Negri (2000). See section 2.1 of this Chapter.
To describe this idea of middle-ground he uses the concept of “hegemonic universality”: a hegemonic enunciation takes place when a specific and particular element assumes at a certain moment the representation of a totality which is entirely incommensurable when related to itself. When a specific particularity, project or order acquires a universal accepted signification, it ascends as hegemonic or as “hegemonic universality”, notwithstanding having already been contaminated by the specific social context which has the power to create the supposed universal, or neglecting the recipient to whom the putative universal term is directed to (Laclau, 2000). Since, by definition, hegemony is based on consent rather than coercion (Gramsci, 1971), “there is only hegemony if the dichotomy universality/particularity is constantly renegotiated: universality only exists incarnating—and subverting—particularity, but, conversely, no particularity can become political without being the locus of universalizing effects” (Laclau, 2001: 10). A class becomes hegemonic and dominant through these practices when it successfully neutralizes the antagonisms presented by the oppressed class or classes (Laclau, 1979). There is also on the side of the subalterns recognition of some gains within the hegemonic orders, as if it would be a unbalanced trade off, but nevertheless a trade-off where they actually gain something that it is important for them within the hegemonic society framework, which them themselves have apprehended, or for their immediate survival. Hegemony can, therefore, be perceived as the complex formation and organisation of (dominating) consent. I use domination into brackets exactly to highlight the slippery nature of hegemony. Within consent always lies a possibility or threat of coercion (explicitly or implicitly). It works just like harassment in workplace - you don’t’ need to give in, but you are in a position many issues are at stake if you say no, which diminishes clearly your rate of autonomy and freedom and raise the domination rate within hegemony. That is why James C. Scott (1985) presents hegemony as a place for “invisible power” where oppression and resistance are in constant flux and sometimes negotiation, by means of materiality and/or discourse, silence or arts, which are themselves a form of discourse. Hegemonic relation highlights the possibility of an oppressed group being confronted with multiple antagonisms whose identity as an oppressed group is underdetermined. Hegemony and counter-hegemony exist in a state of tension and each gives shape to the other and are constituted in a permanent negotiation between the universal and the particular (Laclau, 1996). Violence is, hence, present in hegemonic world orders, particularly the structural
and cultural one and rarely the direct one, in Galtung (1996) terms. What usually happens, however, is that structural and cultural violence are rendered invisible and legitimised by discourse, and direct violence, when exists, is also legitimised by means of labelling the ones to whom the violence is directed to as outsiders, deviants or an actual threat.

How do materiality and discourse work for hegemonic orders? What are their specific roles? How do they contribute to hegemonic power? And how do they dialogue?

Hegemony has indeed an undeniable material dimension which helps along with discourse to create and reproduce hegemonic power. Also, one of the key aims of hegemonic power networks and orders are to perpetuate material and capability inequality (Barnett & Duval, 2006), with the purpose of maintaining the status quo as such. However, it is the cultural superstructure of societies that is the key element that legitimises the flow of power within a hegemonic international system (Gramsci, 1971). Hegemony is mostly a cultural superstructure, a discursive order which gains shape in discourses but also in a set of practices that has acquired an independent dynamic which goes beyond the social forces that gave birth to it in the first place (Laclau, 2000), in a self-sustaining and discursive logic. This goes along with the proposal of Hardt and Negri (2000) who conceptualise hegemony, or to use their terms, “empire”, as a new international order that “becomes an integral, vital function that every individual embraces and reactives of his or her own accord” (Ibidem: 24). Thus, empire is a decentred and de-territorialising apparatus of rule that ‘regulates social life from its interior’ (Ibidem: 23). Therefore, they do not locate the subject of hegemony in any powerful state or group of states, or factor of production, but directly at the level of the individual. It does not influence, control, and invest only the economic or the cultural dimension of society but rather the “social bios” itself (Ibidem: 25). Yet, the reproduction of hegemony depends to a great extent on the social forces from which it originates and, most importantly, to the capacity of these forces to neutralise or resist, counter-hegemonic projects and forces and this has also to do with discourses but also with material structures and power.

How does hegemony work at the international level? What are their main power assets and mechanisms?
Along with Cox (1996: 62), hegemony is not merely an order among states, but rather a social, economic and a political structure – “it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three”. Therefore, world hegemony is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and to those social forces of civil society that act across national boundaries and support the dominant mode of production. These norms, institutions and mechanisms are the result of a widely appreciated sense of supremacy within the inter-state system, global political economy, as well as social and ecological systems (*Ibidem*). Material and discursive power are highly important, but for hegemonic orders, institutions are of crucial importance for they merge those two powers and hold the necessary authority to pursue the maintenance of that specific world order, even to the eyes of the subalterns. Indeed, international organizations are the key mechanisms in this framework through which universal norms of a world-hegemony are clearly expressed and sustained. Cox (1996) explains through identifying five chief characteristics of international institutions that express their hegemonic role in stabilizing and perpetuating a particular global order. First, international institutions “embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of the hegemonic order”, i.e. dominant economic and social forces, but at the same time permit adjustments to be made by subordinate interests with minimum pain. Second, “international institutions and rules are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order” generally initiated by the particular state which establishes the hegemony and are aimed at securing that international hierarchy of powers through influencing the decision-making processes directly or indirectly. Third, “international institutions ideologically legitimate the norms of the [existing] world order”. They reflect orientations favourable to the dominant social forces; thereby defining policy guidelines and supporting certain practices at the national level. Fourth, international institutions recruit and co-opt elite talent from peripheral countries in a manner called “transformismo” (Gramsci, 1971), i.e., outstanding personalities from the periphery are recruited to the central organizational hierarchies in order to allow them to internalize and transfer elements of modernization into their local settings (Ünay, 2010). Finally, “transformismo” (Gramsci, 1971:58) simultaneously serves to “absorb counter-hegemonic ideas” and reiterate them to be consistent with the hegemonic doctrine. That is why hegemony is not reducible to the social forces that gave birth to it in the first place (Laclau, 2000). Yet, the reproduction of hegemony depends to a great extent on
the social forces from which it originates, and most importantly to the capacity of these forces to neutralise or resist counter-hegemonic projects and forces. In fact, hegemonic power is something that is always contested, always historically depending and always unfinished or ongoing. In Gramscian terms, a revolutionary appropriation of the means of production is not a viable tactic for creating radical social change since ultimately the power of hegemonic orders derives from consensus. Gramsci option goes to a prolonged cultural “passive revolution” (Gramsci, 1971: 108) which will unearth the moment subaltern groups understand the hegemonic common sense that they had been taking for granted but that can be thought otherwise going along their own interests and ideology.

Domination and hegemony are sometimes conflated into a single concept. Both of them emerge and evolve at specific groups’ expense, creating unfair orders and systems, despite the rhetoric (or propaganda) that potentially justify them. The injured group is in both hegemonic and domination orders a contradictory group, which is both included and excluded from society. Žižek (2006: 565), talking about the case of the proletariat in capitalist societies, states that it is included in the sense that it is required “in order for the dominant to reproduce themselves and their rule,” however; the proletariat is excluded in the sense that society “cannot find a proper place for them”. Moreover, domination also shares somehow the search for consensus. For example, dictatorships always try to get a formal consensus on their own existence and order of things, even if just formally. They negotiate that consensus as far as the maintenance of their power isn’t put in danger.

This is also the same concerning voice in hegemonic orders. “Voice as a process” is undeniable; it is part of the negotiation between those holding the greatest power and its subalterns. However, to recognise voice as a process doesn’t exclude the fact that there can be explicit or implicit forms of censorship regarding specific issues or levels of critique. Also, “voice as a value” (Couldry, 2010), if existing, is very selective and only recognised to those that go along the ones holding greatest power agenda and interests.

Opposing both hegemony and domination lays emancipation, which, is “the freeing of people [as individuals and as groups] from those physical, [structural,

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26 As Galtung stated in his well-known article “A structural theory of imperialism” (1971) that only an amateur and imperfect imperialism needs military weapons. The professional imperialism is based upon structural violence and I would add discourse.
normative] and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do (...) [,which] means identifying and struggling against oppressive structures of power, and creating new structures and power relationships that promise to enhance human potentialities” (Booth, 1991: 319). War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, along with poverty, poor education, political oppression as well as other forms and structures of domination (Ibidem) that exist in global politics and international orders - being them authoritarian or hegemonic. In fact, the focus on the structural dimension of dominant forms of exclusion and subordination is central for emancipatory praxis. That is why, according to Wyn-Jones (1999:18), emancipation “problematize[s] and criticize[s] the status quo”. The concept of emancipation can in this way be seen as the opposite of status quo. While emancipation seeks libertarian structural change, status quo relates to the preservation of existing (oppressive) power structures. Nonetheless, this binary or dichotomist way of systematising reality opens the floor for new domination orders to be conceived as emancipatory ones, since they reject the status quo at that given time and fight for a new (global) order. As Laclau (1996: 1) argues, “there is no emancipation without oppression, and there is no oppression without the presence of something which is impeded in its free development by oppressive forces”. Therefore, the proposals and conceptions of emancipation are always formulated based on a specific understanding of exclusion and on a specific identification of the domination core, what Laclau (1996) and Žižek (2006) call the “place of the enemy”. Nevertheless, or because of that, the idea of participation, free-will, freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom from domination, are always part of the emancipation equation, which makes clear the need to put aside the mere idea of fighting prevailing status quo orders.

The concept of emancipation, which is just as hegemony and domination a contested one, was initially formulated within the Enlightenment period giving birth to Liberal reflexions on its definition as well as praxis. Interestingly, Immanuel Kant (1784) defined precisely Enlightenment as “the emancipation of man from a state of self-imposed tutelage... of incapacity to use his own intelligence without external guidance”. Such a state of tutelage is due not to lack of intelligence, but to lack of courage or determination to use one's own intelligence without the assistance and help of a leader. That is why Kant synthetises the emancipatory command in the latin expression “Sapere aude!”, which means, in English, dare to use your own intelligence.
Moreover, Kant also defines emancipation as “human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority” (1784). Knowledge and critical awareness are, thus, key ingredients for emancipation.

Even if recognizing knowledge and critical awareness as key ingredients for emancipation, the liberal perspective dismisses as less important the structural conditions for emancipation to either emerge or be condemned not to flourish, as if all responsibility to emancipate or to be dominated encompassed merely individual will. The example of União dos Palmares is clear regarding this point. It was a resistance, free society (free born, maroons, or refugee slave), created in XVII century, in the place where in the present day is Brazilian coastal state of Alagoas.27 The proof that slaves had critical awareness of the dominant and destructive structures slavery system held and perpetuated is that they organised themselves in order to create an illegal and fugitive free former slaves’ community. The problem was that material power structures (e.g. military might, economic resources) along with ideational ones (e.g. white discriminatory normative framework towards black people) were able to dominate, regardless of the individual emancipatory will of those slaves.

Although the concept of emancipation was never really defined by Marx, unlike other key terms such as ‘capitalism’ and ‘proletariat’, which are sharp throughout his writings, the concept emerged as a chief political idea and proposal within the Marxist theory and Marx thinking. For Marx, emancipation would mean the abolition of private property and the absence of capitalism subjugation which would, in turn, be conquered by reclaiming and increasing control over forces of production from the part of workers. Accordingly, emancipation would then be a process which starts to be drawn by means of the emancipation of workers from private property and servitude, since “the emancipation of the workers contains universal human emancipation – and it contains this because the whole of human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all relations of servitude are but modifications and consequences of this relation” (Marx, 1844). In Marxist terms, emancipation can be inherently destructive since in order to attain it one has to destroy the current order and this, Marx acknowledges, may be through violence (Kára, 1968). Class struggle becomes, thus, the primary driver for social change while alternative forms of transformative politics are rendered invisible within the structuralist framework. In this line, Robert Cox, also

27 To learn more, see: http://www.blackhistoryheroes.com/2010/05/zumbi-dos-palmares.html
states that it is within class conflict that emancipation should be achieved. In fact, although Cox offers us a conceptual tool — “social forces” — to identify and talk about alternative forms of praxis, he weds this concept to a production paradigm to the extent that it refers to a social grouping “engendered by the production process” (Cox 1996: 100). In order to be effective, however, emancipation must affect “all areas of social life” (Laclau, 1992: 121). The narrowing of the potential emancipation beneficiary and agent to a social class, within the relations of production, substantially constrains other individual and group identities as well as other forms of oppression.

Conversely to Marx and Cox, who clearly centres their analysis on economic structuralism, discharging other spheres perceived as less important, Habermas and Linklater focus on the political sphere as the key path and the fighting arena towards emancipation. On the word of Jürgen Habermas (1987), emancipation is an ongoing struggle for reflective understanding that will lead to people to be freed from domination and subjugation structures. He believes that the focus for emancipation is within the political arena. Accordingly, emancipation is an objective that may only be achieved through a radical form of democracy that truly involves participation of the people since the place of domination is either political repressive regimes or mere formal democracies that do not promote free and authentic participation, pre-conditions for true emancipation. Picking up from Habermas, Andrew Linklater (1994) recognised the need to understand the interconnections between different levels of exclusion but highlighted the specific role of the sovereign state as a problematic form of political community (Linklater 1994) since, according to him, some of the most important exclusionary practices get shape in prevalent understandings and practices of citizenship, hence globally obstructing emancipation proposals. Within this rationale, to emancipation be achieved, state boundaries would have to be reduced substantially so that a moment would come where the distinction between citizen and non-citizen become so insignificant that oppressive power relations could be thinned or even extinct, allowing for emancipation to emerge. This would be done in a double logic: by de-centring the sovereign state through both the sub-nationalisation of political authority, in order to protect cultural difference, and the internationalization of authority, in order to extend citizenship bond beyond the sovereign state. However, Linklater presents a very narrow conception of repression and domination and, likewise, of emancipation. Indeed, there are many different forms of dominance and exclusion.
that the ones dictated by the state and citizenship, such as gender, class, race, religion and sexuality, which the author doesn’t recognise in an explicit way. Licklater, hence, uncritically accepts the statist terms of IR dominant and exclusionary discourse, and by means of its insider/outsider dynamic effectively abstracts the state from its concrete social and political content, which goes beyond the simple nationality or formal citizenship. Rather than confront the complexity of different power relations that exist within as well as across sovereign state boundaries, Linklater abstracts and privileges one particular social relationship, that of citizenship, and what he sees as its associated identities: cultural/national identity, the statist identity of citizenship and our identities as humans. By ignoring both the way in which power relations intersect, and thereby generate a myriad of other identities, and the way in which these relations constitute not only the social bond of citizenship, but all others relations within a political community, Linklater is unable to foresee the exclusionary political implications that his approach legitimates.

Ernesto Laclau problematizes emancipation from the key question when dealing with emancipation – power (going along Marxist concerns but in line with Critical Theory). Laclau argues that the "paradox of freedom" is that "in order to have freedom you have to institute the other of freedom, which is power" (Worsham & Olson, 1999: 131). Emancipation departs from a specific state of exclusion/deprivation and represents “the elimination of power, the abolition of the subject/object distinction, and the management – without any opaqueness or mediation – of communitarian affairs by social agents identified with the viewpoint of social totality” (Laclau 1996: 1).

Accordingly six dimensions must be fulfilled in order to have emancipation: the dichotomist dimension; a holistic dimension; the transparency dimension; the pre-existence dimension; a dimension of ground and a rationalistic dimension (Laclau 1996: 1-2). The first one represents the discontinuity between the “emancipatory moment” and the social order that proceeds this moment, while the holistic dimension is related to that which proceeds or follows the moment of emancipation, representing, hence, the effect of emancipation on the rest of political and social life. Thus, both the dichotomist and the holistic dimensions relate to the sequential, before and after, aspects of emancipation, with the “emancipatory moment” representing the point of reference to each one. Transparency, in turn, represents the eradication of alienation in all of its forms (e.g. religious, political, economic) and occurs when there is “absolute
coincidence of human essence with itself and there is no room for any relation of either power or representation” (Laclau 1996: 1). In a sense, this dimension represents the utopian ideal of emancipation, which can never be realized. The fourth dimension of Laclau’s analysis is the pre-existence of what has to be emancipated since “there is no emancipation without oppression, and there is no oppression without the presence of something which is impeded in its free development by oppressive forces” (Laclau, 1996: 1). Transparency would allow for the free development of what was previously inhibited by the oppressive forces. The dimension of ground follows logically from the assertion that the past is the symptom of the present conditions of oppression. Therefore, it is also related to the first two dimensions, the dichotomist and the holistic one. It represents the level of the social on which the emancipatory moment occurs. According to Laclau, a truly radical moment of emancipation can leave no traces behind of that which it followed. Therefore, the act of emancipation has to transform the entire ground on which it is structured (Laclau 1996: 2). Thus, every emancipatory moment or act transforms the co-ordinates of the ‘antagonism’, i.e., the “limit of all objectivity” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001 [1985]: 122) or, in other words, the experience of the limit of order or what is established as order. Therefore, any political arrangement is always provisional, regardless of how powerful it may be. Antagonism retroactively recreates and renews the promise of transparency. As such, with every act of liberation a new antagonism is produced, which equally produces a new ground for emancipation. Finally, the fourth dimension is the rationalistic one, which relates to the core around which the symbolic order is organized.

Thus, at its base, emancipatory politics assumes that there is an ‘enemy’ that claims to be inclusive but is, in fact, exclusive, and also that there is some oppressed and/or exploited group that requires emancipation. Therefore, for emancipatory politics, rather than fight for inclusion, there is a desire to abolish the reigning order itself: to maintain the antagonism central to radical politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).28 That is why emancipatory world orders should be not as stable as dominating or hegemonic ones, and are always reinventing it and negotiating the elements of its own existence.

28 “Radical democracy”, for Laclau and Mouffe (2001), “the root of democracy”. The authors claim that liberal democracy and deliberative democracy, in their attempts to build consensus, oppress differing opinions, races, classes, genders, and worldviews, neglecting or even rendering invisible the plurality of differences that resist the aforementioned consensus. Radical politics is then the politics that not only openly accepts difference, dissent and antagonisms, but is dependent on it.
This is exactly the key emancipatory ingredient. In fact, Laclau (1996) acknowledges this never-ending process of emancipation when he mentions that one of the dimensions, transparency, is impossible, regardless of the efforts one puts on to achieve it: “if society is not totally possible, neither is it totally impossible… if society is never transparent to itself because it is unable to constitute itself as an objective field, neither is antagonism entirely transparent” (Ibidem: 129). Therefore, the dimension of transparency represents the possibility and the impossibility of realizing the emancipatory totality of society. Therefore, emancipation is the possibility to reinvent towards freeing the community from identified oppression mechanisms, systems or/and orders. Violence – direct, structural and cultural (Galtung, 1996) – is also present in emancipatory world orders, but they are always being questioned and overcome by means of emancipatory praxis. Here, voice plays a particular important role. Indeed, it is through “voice as a process” and “voice as a value” (Couldry, 2010) that the different forms of oppression can be denounced and emancipatory praxis and agendas can be put forward. “Voice as a value” within emancipation has to break the common ability of hegemonic societies to deal with voice: despite allowing very lively debate on different issues, they keep the spectrum of acceptable opinion very limited (Chomsky, 1998).

There hasn’t been so far any example of emancipatory world order, but rather examples of emancipatory politics or praxis, which increases the emancipatory potential of that specific world order. For example, the abolition of slavery, the end of formal colonialism, or the end of the Second World War and the freeing of Jewish people from oppressive nazi expansion and anti-Semitic policies.

2.2 - On commonalities: air pouches and governance

Despite the strong differences that separate dominating, hegemonic and emancipatory world orders, they are not necessarily clear-cut but rather blurred and sometimes dialogical and overlapped, sharing ingredients one with another. This is because none of these orders is pure, i.e., none of them is one hundred per cent totalitarian (in the sense of fulfilling all latitude, scope and levels of the world order) or

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29 As previously defined, “transparency”, in Laclau’s proposal, represents the eradication of alienation in all of its forms (e.g. religious, political, economic) and occurs when there is “absolute coincidence of human essence with itself and there is no room for any relation of either power or representation” (Laclau 1996: 1).

30 In this quote Chomsky is refering to power in general and not explicitly hegemonic power or orders.
politically omnipresent. For example, within the Roman Empire, which is perceived as a dominating structure of power within the Mediterranean area, there were some emancipatory politics, such as the ones defining and protecting citizen’s rights, though embryonic it may seem to today’s eyes, or the revolt of Spartacus. Indeed, these common ingredients can be understood both as resistance or part of the ongoing and prevalent system since oppression and resistance are in constant flux, even in highly oppressive environments (Scott, 1985). This can be exemplified with peasant and slave societies which responded to domination with forms of cultural resistance and non-cooperation over time (Ibidem). Similarly, though in a micro scale, the independence of Zimbabwean or the discussion in post-apartheid South Africa on the best political system to choose from that date onwards, there were different voices on how to build an emancipatory society. In the case of South Africa, Nelson Mandela preferred a political order combining forgiveness and space for all South African citizens, whereas other sectors of the ANC wanted what they understood as the total emancipation of black population, which entailed oppressive policies towards white population. Any emancipatory movement or project may contain in itself projects or horizons of different other world orders. In fact, to combat a given authoritarian order and to establish an emancipatory one may only be perceived as truly emancipatory by a given group and not by all groups affected and/or involved in the process. Similarly, in hegemonic world orders one can find elements or trends of dominating and emancipatory politics, just as the liberal world order after the end of the Cold War had, as I will later on explain in detail. Also the same world order can be perceived as hegemonic, emancipatory or dominating, depending on the eyes of the beholder. Today’s world order can be interpreted by western powers as emancipatory or hegemonic and by Middle East ones as dominating, for example, despite referring to the exact same world order.

Despite this commonality of sharing similar ingredients and mechanisms – that is analogous to a flowing liquid which, regardless of its density, always has air pouches in it - all of them share a common important, or even key, denominator – governance. Governance is the key of any of those aforementioned power structures and, essentially, refers to a consensual power dynamic that offers ways to solve, cope or coordinate social life problems. Unlike the concept of power, “governance” has not been a central term of contestation and analysis in political and social sciences. However, governance
is not in itself a political good or a pure solvent for world’s problems. It is based on power and can, hence, get many forms.

Governance does not necessarily imply government, though it can be put forward by means of government along with many other different actors and dynamics. It is “the process of collective decision-making and policy-implementation used distinctively from government to reflect broader concern with norms and processes relating to the delivery of public goods” (McLean & McMillan, 2009: 226). People govern when they congregate and form ways of being and behaving concerning interests they want to satisfy taking into account a supposed subjective order of things, which legitimises the power to create and put forwards governance. The principle forms of governance are politics, markets, norms and social forces: everything that by touching the main pillars of any society creates the conditions, possibilities and limitations to certain dynamics exist or stop existing and, consequently, influencing a specific result. Governance is indeed what determines the structure of world orders - power elements are raw materials, governance is power’s elements translation into people’s organised lives. To form a governance network, to legitimise, contest or question it, voice is a particularly valuable and efficient tool and form of agency, as discussed in section 1.4 of this Chapter. All world orders are based on governance. All of them are the result and the expression of a given governance and of a given voice position and voices interactions.

3 - Resistance: the disordering possibility to (em)power and order?

“The dissembling of the weak in the face of power is hardly an occasion for surprise. It is ubiquitous. So ubiquitous, in fact, that it makes an appearance in many situations in which the sort of power being exercised stretches the ordinary meaning of power almost beyond recognition” (Scott, 1990: 1). Indeed, just as power is ubiquitous and pervasive, so is resistance and it can take various different forms. In fact, resistance can also take the form of “power to” whenever it allows freedom, empowerment and emancipation and the pre-requisite for that power agency.

From the perspective of Marx and Engels (1989), resistance to ideology and to the possession of means of production by capitalist elite must take a primarily material form, highlighting once more the predominance of material resources over ideology:
“the formation of ideas [come] from material practice; and accordingly (…) all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism (…) but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to the idealistic humbug” (Marx and Engels 1989: 258) – which are the material conditions. Political praxis must, hence, involve people acting for social change within the mode of production, which to use Laclau (1996) terminology is perceived as “the place of the enemy”. Just as material reality gives rise to the dominant ideologies of a society, people can only overcome the ideology of capitalism through action directed at transforming the economic substructure of society (Stoddart, 2007). Marx and Engels dismiss discourse as a resistance tool to a secondary stage. However, it is erroneous to perceive any social class as a homogeneous whole. Indeed, there are different rhetoric and experiences and elements that influence identities, even if many of the people resisting share being working class. Therefore, discourse is a key tool to resist and organise resistance of oppressive world orders, even when the ultimate goal, as it is established by Marxist tradition, is to control the means of production. Discourse also offers way to break positions of inequality and injustice and is capable of reversing the dominant structure, which highlights the multiplicity of subject positions, networks of power, and points of resistance which go beyond the confines of economic class and can be as pervasive as discourse as domination power tool and mechanism. That is also a reason why there is the need to control the discourses that circulate within societies and censorship emerges and, likewise, resistance movements start by affirming themselves through discourses. It is also important to note that resistance discourses are never as pervasive as the ones produced by those who already dominate the system (e.g. international system or any other given society). Nevertheless, when the subject gives himself the right to question the truth, its effects on power, and questions power on its discourses of truth, there is this art of insubordination, the de-subjugation of the subject in the context of the politics of truth (Foucault, 2007).

James C. Scott provides another perspective on resistance and “invisible power” that has been both influential and controversial and that I believe to be particularly interesting and useful in order to understand power and resistance dynamics. In his book “Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of resistance”, Scott (1985) introduces the idea that oppression and resistance are in constant flux, and that by focusing (as political scientists often do) on visible historic “events” such as organised rebellions or
collective action, one can easily miss subtle but powerful forms of “every day resistance” (*Ibidem*). Scott looks at peasant and slave societies and their ways of responding to domination, with a focus not on observable acts of rebellion but rather on forms of cultural resistance and non-cooperation that are employed over time through the course of unwanted, though persistent, servitude. Scott’s research finds that overt peasant rebellions are actually rather uncommon, do not occur when and where expected, and often don’t have much impact. Rather than seeing “resistance as organisation”, Scott looks at less visible, every-day forms of resistance such as “foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and sabotage”. He finds these in rural and factory settings, and also among the middle class and elites (e.g. through tax evasion or conscription), but particularly among rural people who are physically dispersed and less politically organised than urban populations (Scott, 1985). There are clear connections between resistance and the ideas of hidden and invisible power, which can somehow be conceived as “power to”. Just as hidden forms of power can be used by powerful actors to keep certain issues and voices off of the agenda, similarly relatively powerless groups can employ strategies of resistance which ‘hide’ their actions from the powerful, or which use codes to make them invisible.

Closely linked to the idea of resistance is Scott’s notion of “transcripts” (both hidden and public), which are established ways of behaving and speaking that fit particular actors in particular social settings, whether dominant or oppressed. Resistance is a subtle form of contesting “public transcripts” by making use of prescribed roles and language to resist the abuse of power – including things like “rumour, gossip, disguises, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms, folktales, ritual gestures, anonymity” (Scott, 1992: 137). These methods are particularly effective in situations where violence is used to maintain the status quo, allowing “a veiled discourse of dignity and self-assertion within the public transcript… in which ideological resistance is disguised, muted and veiled for safety’s sake” (*Ibidem*: 137). These forms of resistance require little coordination or planning, and are used by both individuals and groups to resist without directly confronting or challenging elite norms. Importantly, with his idea of ‘transcripts’ Scott recognises that the dominant as well as the weak are often caught within the same web of socialised roles and behaviour (Scott, 1992) often expressed without any explicit or conscious intent. In this sense Scott has a
cultural/psychological view of hegemony as subconscious and internalised (through transcripts) rather than as wilful, coordinated acts of domination. But with “resistance” he sees power as lying somewhere between structure and agency: “most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found neither in the overt collective defiance of power holders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites” (Scott, 1985: 136).

Resistance is, hence, always a disordering project. It intends to break using possible forces and mechanisms the status quo system or just to denounce implicitly or explicitly the inconsistencies, inequalities or disadvantages of a specific contested system.

As far as world orders are concerned, resistance is always present in explicit or implicit ways, within the system or as a sub-system with distinct agendas: block, transform, break, denounce, and contest dominating, hegemonic and emancipatory intentions, principles or practices. Even emancipatory orders might create resistant-opposing groups. When resistance is transmuted to power, it generates new sources, actors, and agendas of resistance. Forms of resistance and dynamics of resistance do not necessarily hold absolute intentions nor can their neither success nor failure be measured in terms of final outcomes. Resistance groups, dynamics and politics influence permanently the world orders on which they are developed. For example, domination world orders may become more oppressive and aggressive when faced with resistance;\(^{31}\) hegemonic, more negotiable, the emancipatory, even more plural or tending to hegemonic contour or precisely the opposite the domination world border becoming more negotiable or hegemonic, the emancipatory one more hegemonic depending on the ideology and materiality power of those in charge of both status quo and resistance dynamics in a given time.

\(^{31}\) Inability to rule subjects (Richmond, 2005).
Chapter 2 – Peace by proxy

“How is the tranquility of order” 32
- Saint Augustine –

How do peace orders come about? Do they grow up spontaneously? Is it a universal common good? Is it a human common value? Does is have a time and a place? Does it have a single meaning?

This chapter argues that peace, despite usually understood and presented as an ideal universal value, ontologically stable and indisputable, is a situated concept not existing outside of thoughts nor interests neither space nor time. Peace projects and orders are supported and fuelled by specific ideologies, contexts, agents and policies aiming at building a given political, economic, social and cultural order. They are not an objective and neutral goal or state, they are embedded and grounded in the international system, reproducing, hence, the correlation of the international system’s mechanisms and dynamics of power, serving the interests and ambitions of the ones who hold power and/or control the values of which power is being exercised, 33 which are inextricably linked.

Just as a looking glass which reflects but sets imprecise details which go beyond the prevalent features, making someone look prettier than reality provides, peace order reflects the international system but sets invisible or distorted the power dynamics which go beyond its formal layout and rhetoric directives. Peace order is a mimetic power device and structure intended to keep a specific international order, situated in time, space and ideological framework, maintained through a pretended good universal rhetoric or a logic or natural rationale which justifies it.

To both deconstruct the universalistic idea of peace and to understand the specificity of peace as a political, ideological project, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first one presents peace as both product and producer of the layout of the world system and, consequently, as an ideological and power-driven order. The second part,

33 “It is important to distinguish clearly in concrete situations between power as a value and the values over which power is being exercised” (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1968: 77).
stemming from the critique of peace as non-universal good and rejecting deterministic perspectives of the international system, it intends to systematise different categories of peace based on existing peace proposals and projects as well as world orders. In line with Judith Butler (1999: 189) when reflects on the relation between identity and politics - “the deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated” - I argue that the deconstruction of the common idea of peace is not the deconstruction of politics, but rather the establishment of the veiled political mechanisms and intentions through which peace is usually produced.

1 – The invention of peace

“We are at peace” - When someone listens to it, it is a universal sense of comfort and relief, except for those who benefit directly from the fact that war is being waged, just like arm traders or warlords. This common sensation one feels when facing or involved in the idea of peace is mainly because peace is usually perceived as what Plato would call an “ideal form”, an immutable, timeless, independently existing real thing, perceived as a universal good, a positive ideal atmosphere where life is respected and where all conditions for human fulfilment are possible to achieve, regardless of what concrete peace realities and contexts entail or offer. Peace is, hence, always aspired to: it provides an optimum, though idealistic, point of reference; it is viewed as a global objective, a worldwide truth, thus, with complete legitimacy (Richmond, 2008). This universal feeling of peace is, however, a misapprehension of what peace is concretely about.

First, there is no homogeneity of interests or a common purpose on peace, but yet many – within the same peace order/proposal, or among different ones. The example of Roman Empire can illustrate this internal differentiation. Pax Romana (Latin: “Roman Peace”, in English) a state of relative tranquillity throughout the Mediterranean world from the reign of Augustus, who laid its foundation, to that of

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34 War and peace are both social and political inventions: but war is generally seen as abnormal and peace needs to be juxtaposed with a non-peace situation in order to have any meaning (Howard, 2002: 45).

35 Augustus ruled from 27 BC to 14 AC.
Despite during long periods being internally at peace, the comfortable feeling that peace can theoretically give us wouldn’t be felt the same way by senators, workers, gladiators or other slaves within that period. In his own writings, Augustus (s/d) writes, describing his empire and his work in the name of Rome: “I have extended the limits of all the roman provinces. I have re-established the order in the provinces of Gallia as well as in Germania. I have [also] re-established the order in the Alps … without waging any unfair war against any tribe (…) many people have sent delegates and have claimed friendship to Rome”, transpiring the idea of generosity, recognition and consensus regarding the construction of the Roman Empire by all the people living in it. Also, one of the speeches of Vespasianus, an emperor representative in Gallia, to Gallia’s resistance groups is also clear example of the different perspectives of peace order as well as of the use of discourse in order to control peace subjective order and create consent and consensus among the subordinated. Vespasianus states that “we have used the rights that our victory has given us to do anything but (…) to create peace. You make part of the community, many times you even direct our armies. These provinces… and many others are in your hands to be governed. None domain is forbidden to you” (Tacito, s/d a). What was missing in this speech was the way core and periphery logic applied to Gallia and Rome, respectively, in terms of economic, military and political might. In turn, and conversely to Vespasianus’ speech, some subalterns of the Pax Romana had a different opinion regarding the ingredients of which Pax Romana was made. According to a subaltern whose testimony was recorded by Tacito (s/d b) in his “Agricultural life”, “the romans are thieves who snap the whole world (…) they are the only men who convey in the same appetite fortune and indigence. They plunder, kill, steal, and disguise all that under the false name of empire; when they create the desert, they call it peace”, highlighting the domination world order Rome had established to their eyes.

Peace can, then, be rooted in different orders, get many forms and mean many things (e.g. freedom, prosecution, security, inferiority, slavery, supremacy, discrimination, absence of violence, quietness) to different people and geographies, just as all governance forms and world orders. Peace has, therefore, no inherent meaning on its own, notwithstanding our most universal spontaneous perceptions of the concept, nor does it exist in a vacuum (Rasmussen, 2003).

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36 Marcus Aurelius ruled from 161 AC to 180.
Second, peace is a normative and ordering proposal supported and fuelled by specific ideologies, contexts, agents and policies which offers and plans a political project and, most of the times, a political order. As such, by the aforementioned definition, it cannot be an immutable truth, as is many times presented. “The world is always seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation, social class, dominance or subordination of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience and of hopes and expectations for the future” (Cox, 1981:128). The precise way we see the world is the basis to what we consider threats and to be at peace as well as the values and interests we are available to stand and fight for as well as the ambitions we have when building and aiming at peace. Peace proposals are then informed and enformed by each one’s (individuals, groups) ideology, institutional context, material capabilities. All conceptions of peace diagnose and prescribe an imaginary of (domestic and) world politics. “Social and political theory is history-bound at its origin, since it is always traceable to a historically-conditioned awareness of certain problems and issues” (Ibidem). Michael Howard (2002: 6) has an interesting statement that illustrates this subjective and situated nature of peace – “Throughout human history mankind has been divided between those who believe that peace must be preserved, and those who believe that peace must be attained”, even if living in the same space and time. Peace is, therefore, the time and place when specific social, political and economic expectations are met. It is entrenched in subjective views of the world and, thus, deep-rooted in politics and ideology.

The main theories of the discipline of International Relations offer different grand narratives to explain how the world system works, according to their own (ideological) presuppositions, and what they consider to be the goals to achieve as far as international order is concerned. Each theory has a specific ideology upon which it is based, and produces a specific knowledge and discourse on International Relations - the way they are, and sometimes the way they should be organised.38

So, if peace is such a subjective and situated (invented) concept, which consequently creates a high scale of peace possibilities, why are some peace

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37 Defining the nature of conflict and peace is the first step to identifying and responding to conflict with the installation of peace (Richmond, 2006: 376).

38 Within this theoretical panoply, peace is not necessarily a theoretical and analytical target, but rather a collateral outcome (Richmond, 2008), except for Peace Studies, which conceive peace as the main object of study and analysis.
conceptions dominating others or, at least, dominant over others? In short, ‘who’ defines ‘which’ peace? And how do peace orders come about?

2 – Peace orders as world orders

All peace “encompass[es] an imaginary of world politics and of the mechanisms, institutions, actors, and methods required to entrench them” (Richmond, 2005: 184). In a nutshell, the ones who define peace are the ones who have the “power to” do so through discourse and materiality. If we had to tell the abstract story of peace from the beginning, this would possibly be the sequential plot. Traditionally, security has to exist *a priori* in order to be at peace – physical integrity and survival are two of the most basic conditions as far as the most immediate conditions and feelings of peace are concerned. Therefore, the people who assure this immediate security are the ones starting the process. A primary form of this type of conceptualisation of peace lies in the well-known framework of a “victors’ peace” (Richmond, 2005), i.e., a peace on the terms of the victor (Sun Tzu, 2005). Here, victor’s peace can (and must) be extrapolated from the merely military field. In order to have a new international order, the former one has to collapse, or at least be overlapped by the new one. So, any new order will always contest the previous one. From the moment it is accepted (whether this acceptance results from a war, a crisis, an elections victory, or cumulative victorious processes) and it has successfully supressed or overlapped the previous one, it is considered as victor’s peace. It rests upon the role of the victor to establish a framework for a peace in its own interests and often in its own image. However, “if (...) [victors’] dominance is to survive, it must be legitimized: by their success in converting their subjects to their own systems of beliefs (...) and above all by their ability to maintain economic and political stability in the societies they govern” (Howard, 2002: 4). It cannot be achieved without significant resources - meaning military force, economic might or influence – and pervasive discourses that legitimate and render inevitable and normal the attribution of power to their own hands. The allocation of those resources, the creation and spread of legitimating discourses, the “power to” do so is often the site of peace power, which is usually conflated as the site of world power. The ones dictating peace order and establishing the rules on which states and social forces relate
are the ones configuring the world system.\textsuperscript{39} Failure to legitimise a specific order results in the subjugation of that order in relation to the victorious one. Peace is then a successful symbiosis of “power to” as well as ‘materiality’ (force and wealth) and legitimating ‘discourses’ (which would include ideology, knowledge and strategic formal and informal pervasive communication techniques and tactics) – just as world orders. Combined differently, they give rise to different typologies, conceptualisations, theories and orders of peace – just like world orders.

Within the Pax Romana order and peace, the Roman Empire protected and governed individual provinces, permitting each to make and administer its own laws while accepting Roman taxation and military control. The Imperial mystique was based on the ideology of victory, a victory gained over the enemies from abroad, over the ones threatening the security of the Empire or over the dissidents too elated. For those who lived within the Roman Empire, Augustus and his successors were the guarantee of protection and security. The expansionist propaganda didn’t disappear from political language in speeches but it was always justified with security and peace (Liverani, s/d). Also, Pax Romana was supported by different material, discursive and institutional power devices. The whole territory was divided into provinces and led by emperor’s nominated governors (these could be romans or selected from the local elite as long as the emperor trusted them to serve Rome’s interests). A single currency was created to facilitate trade and create a sense of Roman identity. The whole territory was connected by different roads and sea lanes and there were also clear incentives to expand agriculture and trade in order to guarantee the wealth of the empire and its populations. On the other hand, there was always present a very powerful discursive and ideational device of power, such as the cult of the emperor and the proliferation of cities which imitated the architecture and the way of life of the capital, Rome (Ibidem).

Describing warlike societies which can be extrapolated to what I would call the Kings, Nobels and the Pope peace, referring to Middle Age times in Europe, Michael Howard (2002: 2) is particularly interesting in this quote, telling exactly how this peace order came about: “When fighting is necessary for physical survival those who are good at it will predominate. If they pass on their genes to their offspring they will find ruling dynasties. They and their companions become warrior elites, whose interests and

\textsuperscript{39} “Legitimised order produces domestic peace which, in turn, legitimises the conduct of war.” (Howard, 2002: 3).
attitudes determine the nature of their culture, including religion, literature and the arts. They create a social and political order, which initially may have no justification but its own strength, but for which utility, prescription and, above all, religious sanction ultimately provides legitimacy.”

Along European history, and its overflow in North America, which is the place where the bulk of global discourse about war and peace have been constituted (Howard, 2001), there are many examples that show how peace orders reflect the power-driven international system.

Peace of Westphalia, created in 1648, is a key example. It affirmed the state as the unchallenged guarantor of domestic order and legitimiser of external war. The history of Europe was henceforward to be shaped by the relations between its states and the international order depended on their ability to create among themselves an effective international society – it was a mutually supportive trinity of monarchy, church and aristocracy.

Pax Britannica ("the British Peace", in English), copied from Pax Romana, is the term used to describe the period of relative formal peace in Europe and the world (1815–1914) during which the British Empire further expanded, becoming the global hegemon and performing the role of global rule setter and policeman. The status of great power was achieved particularly after its victory over Napoleon and the subsequent Paris Treaty in 1815, which left Britain with no other international rivals (Lasse, 2003; 2005). However, it wasn’t necessarily its military might that made Britain ascend to a superior and leading position, but rather its economic power and dominance. The British Empire controlled the main naval routes placing themselves in a dominant position on foreign markets. The presence of the Royal Navy linked to lack of power in other European countries placed Britain in a privileged position on the control of major commercial shipping routes (Pugh, 1999). In 1905, the Royal Navy had more power than any other two combined naval forces. Indeed, the British Empire controlled around 26,000,000 km2 of territory, including most of the key maritime trade routes, and 400 million people spread all over the world (Parsons, 1999). Alongside the formal control it exerted over its own colonies, the hegemonic position it held in world trade meant that it effectively controlled the economies of many countries, such as China, Argentina and Siam, which has been characterised as Britain’s "informal empire" (Porter, 1998; Marshall, 1996). Indeed, all that wasn’t part of the British Empire was either a proxy
government (as was the case in China, despite the case of the Opium wars which also shed light on the permanent resistance dynamics that hegemonic orders face) or extremely in favour of preserving good ties and would not challenge British dominance (most of Europe, USA or Japan). In short, the empire and informal empire meant that the world was as if it were one country, with London the capital – although resistance dynamics and actors existed, for example, piracy. There was also an immaterial empire that helped British dominance until the First World War (Smith, 1999). Peoples, societies and countries tend to imitate what they reckon to be successful and in this sense Britain’s industrialization and its obvious success in productivity became a reference for all countries that wanted to succeed and expand in economic terms (Carson, 1968). Likewise, they tended to adopt and adapt to themselves the outlines of Britain’s system of government. "Most peoples abroad looked upon Britain as the exemplar of what was highest and best in political achievement…", that the British system "was consciously copied, in full or in part, by almost every country of western and central Europe" (Hayes, 1958: 80, 81).

The rise of Britain as the hegemonic power marks a stage of imposition of a new world order that would be based on economic liberalism as the resulting ideology of the Industrial Revolution (Carson, 1968). The British diplomacy worked to facilitate global economic expansion that successfully marked the expansion of industrial capitalism, providing a stability phase only before seen at the Congress of Vienna, featuring the start of the British peace. English liberalism provided for the maintenance of stability for the benefit of trade, therefore, state power and its influence on the economy and on the individual was confined. It was believed that state power should be reduced to its minimum so that prosperity could be insured; including cuts in the army and navy, or just to keep them at levels necessary for protection against other states (Smith, 1776). According to Lessa (2003; 2005), the internal interest in liberalism expanded alongside British foreign policy which imposed British ideological bases to other nations. For example, the British interest in the independence of Latin American nations from 1820. Also, British requirements for market openings and free trade, which were actually ceded to the British in the entire non-European world, from Asia, with the opening of China and Japan, the Ottoman Empire and Latin America, making that, in 1850, under
the reign of Queen Victoria, Britain could consolidate its position as the largest power in the world.\footnote{The reign of Victoria was the longest in the history of the English monarchy and marks the apogee of British hegemony.}

The Pax Britannica declined with the end of the established order at the Congress of Vienna, in 1814-15, after the Crimean War and the consequent formation of new nation-states of Italy and Germany resulting from the Franco-Prussian war. The industrialization of Germany and the United States have further contributed to the dawn of decline of British industrial supremacy, with World War I marking the end of British hegemony (Lessa, 2003; 2005). However, the liberal order it created and promoted kept on existing by means of its hegemonic successor, the USA, which created the so-called Pax Americana. The terminology relates directly to the Pax Britannica, which it heirs.

Indeed, Pax Americana applies to the historical period of relative peace in the Western hemisphere and later the Western world, resulting from the preponderance of power enjoyed by the United States of America starting around the second half of the XIX century with its western expansion and the increasing north-american influence in the Southern part of the American continent, gaining strength between 1919 – 1945 and consolidating after the II World War and being, finally, reinforced with the end of the Cold War, in 1989.

Indeed, in 1945 with the end of World War II, and with the signing of the Bretton Woods Treaty the year before, the American progressive emergence was recognised as having overcome the British command in the international arena. Economically and military powerful, the United States drew foreign policies that could, according to USA interests and ideology, make the world a better and safer place. Just like Pax Britannica, the United States distanced themselves from the formal conquest and annexation, seeking foreign economic expansion and the opening of markets (Hurrel, 2005) along with the economic, political and military support of friendly regimes and with the creation of international regimes that would render standard, normal, and universally desirable a liberal form of organising societies and states and the relations among them. In the 1990’s, International peacebuilding, humanitarian interventions, international financial assistance are some of the intervention tools that allow “deviant” societies to get back to (or be inaugurated in) the path of progress, modern liberal path. In fact, one of the main strategies of the hegemonic power and
peace of the United States is achieved by a mixture of regulatory and legal frameworks of the international system through which the American influence exerts its power and interests on core universal standards (Hurrel, 2005).

Pax Romana, Pax Britanniça, Pax Americana reveal that as great powers rise they seek to push to their expanding spheres of influence the norms that provide order within their own polities. Accordingly, today's emerging powers will not embrace the existing international order erected during the West's watch. On the contrary, China and other rising powers will seek to fashion alternative orders based on their own cultural, ideological, and socioeconomic trajectories. If the next international system is to be characterized by a rules-based order rather than competitive anarchy, it will require a new normative consensus that rests on toleration of ideological and political diversity (Kupchan, 2014).

The ones which define peace may have different proposals: emancipatory, hegemonic and so forth. Also, to be able to set up the conditions for peace to be installed does not exclude that other people or nations think differently. Moreover, subalterns in specific peaceful world orders can propose their own conception of peace and to stand for them using precisely the same power elements, though the tactics are usually dissimilar from the ones already holding the power and interested in maintaining the status quo.

3 – Peace typologies: domination, hegemony, emancipation

Grounded upon the theoretical proposals discussed on Chapter 1 as well as the “peace orders/world orders” History tells us, there are three types of peace typologies: peace as domination, peace as hegemony and peace as emancipation. Notwithstanding their blurred separating lines, each of them represents and is the expression of different ideologies and conceptions of power and governance. Each of them is based on distinct conceptions and perceptions of threat and each of them hold a specific understanding of the epistemology, methodology and ontology of peace. However, and just as world orders, despite the strong differences that separate dominant, hegemonic and emancipatory peace orders and proposals, they are not necessarily clear-cut but rather hazy and sometimes dialogical and overlapped, sharing ingredients one with another. Indeed, none of these peace orders or proposals is pure, all of them share some
ingredients of the others, even if not explicitly. As such, each peace order can entail
different graduations of peace typologies (Richmond, 2005).

When imagining “peace as domination” one’s mind easily tends to comb
through ideas related with imposition; coercion; greed, force, oppression. These are
ideas that usually one dissociates from “peace”. This is an interesting point for a part of
the argument of this study: peace is always the result of a specific and subjective
political ordering. Peace as domination derives from a negative epistemology of the
concept and stems from an inherent ontology of violences and fear. Indeed, it is a
“victor’s peace” (Richmond, 2005), in its conventional meaning, based on open direct,
structural and cultural violence, resulting in a “negative peace” (Galtung, 1996), i.e., a
peace that is merely defined by the absence of war. In “peace as domination”, the
leading group intends to suppress the logical, ethical and political development of its
subalterm and impose through “power over” mechanisms its own conception of the
world – the media are a particularly important means to do so, as I will present and
analyse in chapter 4. “Voice as a process” and “voice as a value” (Couldry, 2010) are
suppressed within this type of peace. Peace as domination is, hence, the tranquility of an
oppressive order based on and supported by coercion, fear, threat and propaganda.
Peace as domination depicts the international system as an anarchical system where the
rule of force and fear orders the system and the actors within it. Peace as domination is
based on territorial and strategic over-extension, greed, and an inability to control
unruly all subjects despite its imposing coercive qualities. It is a clear low-intensity
peace, where many liberties are compromised and oppression systems and subsequent
violences’ dynamics are dominant.

Peace as hegemony is based on a consensual acceptance of the hegemon’s way
to organise societies and the relations among them. It is hegemonic because it is the
hegemon that leads this limited temporal and geographically bounded peace, though
power “to” is perceived as dispersed and “power over” almost inexistent. Hegemonic
peace is mostly dependent on the building of a common middle-ground or norms and
rules to which all members obey and reproduce not because of the hegemon’s use or
threat of force but mostly because all subordinated members recognise a potential good
or an inevitable good order to be submitted to hegemon’s established tracks. This
hegemonic consensus, in terms of norms, rules and practices are not 100% agreed. A
consensus is always a situation to which all agree, but whose elements are disapproved
by the members reaching the consensus. This means specifically that despite or because of being consensual, peace as hegemony presents elements with which each of the parts involves disagrees or contests but that are accepted. Peace as hegemony is, hence, the result of a normative and institutional framework derived from international institutions and organisations representing supposedly universal agreements and norms, though often geographically limited by boundaries that exclude actors who do not conform to such a view of international society. The values of the hegemon are perceived as common sense and, therefore, they guide in a naturalised way the collective (institutional and individual) understanding of the world on a daily basis, despite being highly ideological, interest-driven, subjective and situated. Peace as hegemony derives from a positive epistemology of the concept and stems from an ontology of negotiation, trade-off and illusion. It is based on consent rather than coercion, but its general outcome is also a “negative peace” (Galtung, 1996), i.e., a peace that is merely defined by the absence of war, even if having positive nuances as far as direct, structural or “cultural peace”\footnote{“Meaning aspects of culture that serves to justify and legitimise direct and structural peace” (Galtung, 1990: 291).} \textit{(Ibidem)} are concerned. Hegemonic peace usually lasts longer than domination ones since subalterns feel part of the peace project or, in other words, “voice as a process” (Couldry, 2010) is recognised. In these low-intensity hegemonic peace orders, peace is achieved and based upon systems of differentiation and exploration that despite being negotiated are rendered almost invisible, creating an artificial perception of grateful (though violent and, therefore, low intensity) peace.

There have been many examples of this type of peace, from Alexander’s conquest of the ancient world, the Pax Romana, to the Westphalian states-system. In Ancient China, spanning over four centuries, the period of the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AC) is considered a golden age in Chinese history. It was founded by the rebel leader Liu Bang, known posthumously as Emperor Gaozu of Han. Peace was achieved by victorious military conquests and maintained by a political order that privileged central government control of the different commands in which the conquered territories were organised. However, these ties were also controlled by diplomatic relations among the commands. The inclusion of local elites in the empire hierarchies through marriages was a common procedure to assure control and support since they met local elite’s power expectations (Gernet, 1974). Efforts were made to spread efficient agricultural
techniques in order to assure better economic production of the different territories and communities and people could improve their lives.

Peace as emancipation is based upon an order that intends “to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer 1982: 244), dealing with questions such as class, ethnicity, norms and justice, the distribution of resources, presentation and representation, discourse, power and knowledge, and a deeper concern with the ‘hidden hand’ of hegemony, patriarchy and domination, identified as the main sources of violences in the world (Linklater, 1990; Horkheimer, 1982; Marx, 1977). It is, hence, positive epistemology of peace as well as an overall, universal and holistic ontology of the concepts. Peace as emancipation is only attainable through dialogue, radical reform of politics, free universal communication (Linklater, 1990, 1982; Habermas, 2006b), the solution of inherent contradictions of capitalism (Pugh, 2000; 2005; 2011) and the nation-state (Linklater, 1990, 1982), self-determination and identity. Also, an emancipatory peace may arise through discourse ethics, specifically by shedding light and giving centrality to marginalised actors and discourses, which should be recognised and represented while discourses and practices of domination should be removed through radical reform. “Voice as a value” is the crucial element of any emancipatory peace proposal and order. Valuing voice involves “discriminating in favour of ways of organising human life and resources that, through their choices, put the value of voice into practice, by respecting the multiple interlinked processes of voice and sustaining them, not undermining or denying them” (Couldry, 2010: 2). To value voice as a value means thus to value voice in practice, and discriminating against frameworks of social, economic and political organisation that deny or undermine voice. To value voice or to be in line with “voice as a value” is to recognise people’s general capacities to give an account of themselves and the world and that has to have subsequent political consequences.
Chapter 3 – Peacebuilding: liberal peace in motion

“Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” 42
- Robert Cox –

“Truth itself has a history” 43
- Michael Foucault –

“Whether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed.” 44
- Albert Einstein -

The end of the Cold War evoked a growing optimism concerning the new world order. It was believed that the liberal project of modernity (e.g. democracy, individual rights and freedom, market economy, rationality as thought and policy reference) defended by the victorious western side, would finally become true. 45 However, the so-called “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999), which erupted in the 1990’s 46 and whose features distanced themselves from the classical, supposedly rational, interstate wars of the modern period, directly contradicted this optimist, challenging its victorious certainty.

Archetypal western lenses were put to analyse the aforesaid “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) settings and dynamics. Indeed, they were classified and analysed taking into account not necessarily the phenomenon as such, but the western hegemonic reference of organising societies and the relations among themselves: state, formal economy, rational war. Fragile States (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2003), informal economies (Duffield, 1994; 2001a; 2001b; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Francis, s/d), high

45 This study does not interpret or see the Cold War as a mere ideological conflict as much of existing literature on liberal peace usually sets it (ref, as if the results of the conflict were exclusively intrinsic or due to the ideological nature and specificities of the ideological projects, i.e., as if the Cold War was a pure competition based upon the pure value of each ideology, ignoring for example the great social and economic achievements obtained after the Second World War as a product of the then existing balance of powers.
46 Although a vast majority had been smothered under the veil of the bipolar dynamic of the Cold War.
participation of actors beyond the State (paramilitaries or militias, interests groups, religious or ethnic leaders), violence mainly directed towards civilians and not soldiers (Kumar, 1997; Kaldor, 1999), and the rhetoric of ethnic and religious identity (Ukiwo, 2005) are some of the features which characterized the debate on the typologies of conflict after the end of the Cold War, hence influencing diagnosis and prescriptions for these belligerent and considered deviant behaviours.

A growing number of academic literature (Duffield, 1994; Gurr & Harff, 1994; Zartman, 1995; Kumar, 1997; Rupesinghe, 1998; Crocker, 1999; Kaldor, 1999; Stiefel, 1999; Rotberg, 2002; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Jeong, 2000; Adedeji, 1999; Ramsbotham, 2000; Schlichte, 2003) and international political reports, particularly from the UN, OSCE, World Bank, UNDP and UNESCO emerged giving rise to an increasingly clear consensus regarding the causes of those wars and the way peace should be re-established and maintained. Based on this consensus, the international society developed several different forms of intervention – humanitarian intervention, development aid, peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions - aiming at creating a new liberal world order, founded on three major/dominant ideas: “peace as the preferred basis for relations among countries; democracy as the optimal way to organise political life within them; and the free market as the indispensable vehicle for producing wealth” (Mandelbaum, 2002: 1). Among all of these, the project of post-conflict peacebuilding emerged as one of the key instruments used to normalize the then labelled and perceived “unordered” societies taking as reference the specific liberal framework, considered and presented as the ideal universal one. Peacebuilding became then an essential guiding principle of the United Nations (UN) and other international actors’ framework of action in post-conflict scenarios since the early 1990s. However, despite its universal claim, the genealogy of the liberal peace as a way to organise societies is embedded in a part of the western political thought and history, and has been embedded in it for centuries. If the liberal peace is a Western or Global North theory, how and why did it become a universal and consensual proposal, usually conflated with a universal ideal peace?

This chapter intends to identify and present the clearly western genetic code of the liberal peace and demonstrate that this peace project, although legitimised by a supposedly rational and infallible knowledge, presented as universally-driven, obeys to a power logic and reflects not a universal product but rather the interests of those who
hold the power to legitimise the knowledge and the discourses that inform and enform it, due to both a cumulative historical position and material and discursive power. This chapter argues, first, that there is a pattern in International Relations related to the prevalence of the Western Modernity which is accentuated after the end of the Cold War, “gaining settings and minds” (Borges & Santos, 2009) around the world. This happens despite and due to the fact of being a “situated power in disguise” mechanism and project. Second, it argues that western political thought and policy have reproduced a science of peace based upon political, social, economic, cultural and legal western and strategic frameworks, by which conflict in the (western) world is judged and peace (worldwide) is constructed (Richmond, 2006).

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first one discusses and explores the matrix “west and the rest” which has been the reference for International Relations since modernity emerged. The second one explores the genealogy of the liberal peace recipe as a framework that legitimises the international intervention aimed at pacifying the periphery of the world system. Finally, the third one presents the peacebuilding model, i.e., the way the “West” translated liberal theory into an intervention model.

1. The “west and the rest”: the international “coloniality of power”

“The west” and “the rest” is a systematisation drawn by Stuart Hall (2006) of the prevailing (universalised) western discourse which emphasizes, in a binary logic, European uniqueness and non-western inferiority. While at first, it sounds geographic, “the west” is a social category, or even a concept, that once corresponding to western Europe, today describes a reality which is neither limited to Europe nor does it encompass the whole of Europe (Hall, 2006). Today, the “west” is usually replaced by “the global north” (Santos, 2007; Duffield, 2001a). Likewise, “the rest” is usually referred to as “global south”. The “west” is created as a synonymous with modernity and logically antonymous of backwards or underdeveloped to which corresponds the “rest”. It works as a system of meanings

Using Michele Foucault’s idea’s regarding discourse and Said’s work on “Orientalism”, Hall suggests that the persistence of such ideas continues to infect even the best intentioned contemporary scholars including those who sought to deconstruct the West as Karl Marx and Max Weber (Hall, 2006 [nnn]).

Countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Canada, USA or Japan are included in the so-called ‘West’. As Santos (2006) states, the symmetry between parties is always a horizontal relationship that hides a vertical relationship.
and representations providing a standard model of comparison which condensates diverse characteristics into a single word and picture easily remembered. Its utility as an abstraction supplies the “criteria of evaluation” according to which societies - their knowledge and social structures - are ranked positively or negatively, depending on how close it is to “the west” or the “rest”, respectively. It functions, henceforth, as ideology, a way of thinking, talking and deciding, crosscutting different levels, spaces and actors of legitimation.

Being a “historical construction” (Hall, 2006), how did this “west” concept emerge? How and when was it built? According to Hall (Ibidem), in order to get a view we must use some broad chronologies and historical generalizations with Europe’s history, which at the same time is also the history of the “rest”,\(^\text{50}\) despite acknowledging that “long historical processes have no exact beginning or end, and are difficult to date precisely” (Ibidem: 189). Tracing the construction of the “west” discourse back to Marco Polo and the Crusades, the European expansion coincides with the end of feudalism and the beginning of the modern era. On the one hand, the expansion of Portugal to Africa and the expansion of Spain into the so called ‘new world’ and the encounter with difference they have promoted contributed to the creation of the “western” identity (Hall, 2006). On the other hand, the initiation of Modernity, a human-centred period where the values of rationality, individuality and freedom were the pillars sustaining philosophy, politics, science and arts, created the DNA of the “west” and the western dominance as “difference” served to distinguish Europeans from non-western peoples. The Enlightenment expanded on this discourse, disseminating its beliefs while constructing a template for “rude” and “refined” nations (Ibidem).

Once a concept, the West “became productive in its turn”, creating knowledge about other places and peoples (Hall, 2006). The process of constructing the inferior “other” not only shaped how non-European societies came to be known, but also how Europe created its own identity as antipode to this other (Kothari, 2006). The construction of the Western hegemony was based on the invention of an “other” which by being presented as underdeveloped and inferior, was thus (legitimately) exploitable or susceptible of being taught (or civilized, depending on the preferred euphemism). This dichotomous paradigm expresses the otherness in the name of sameness, reduces the different to the already known, limiting the task of making sense of other worlds.

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\(^{50}\) Hall means that the emergence of the West is at the same time a global history.
(Mudimbe, 1988). Subsequently, non-western economic and social structures as well as people and their knowledge, when not destroyed, were subjected to a logic of inferiority and redefined to serve the “West” (ern colonizer) (Santos, 2007). When encountering difference, modernity usually ranges between rejection/destruction and assimilationist. History does not spare us from examples sustaining the former (e.g. Africa and American western-led colonisation). The latter is best portrayed in Tzvetan Todov’s “The Conquest of America” (1984), when describing Columbus’ arrival to America, he states that Columbus’ encounters with Amerindians produced an interpretation shifting between seeing the Indians as human beings, having the same rights as himself, and seeing them as identical, leading to “assimilationism”, i.e. the projection of his own values on the others. This double interpretation still characterizes the modernity encounter with difference (Blaney & Inayatullah, 2002).

Difference served as its “markers”. The difference of these societies and cultures from the West was the standard against which the “west’s” achievement and “rest’s” under-achievement was measured, going along what Foucault (1994) calls “systems of differentiation” one of the key methodologies to produce and reproduce power. It is in the context of these relationships that the idea of the “west” took on meaning. It obscures the wide differences among western peoples presenting them erroneously as a homogenous whole: it “draws crude and simple distinctions and constructs an oversimplified conception of difference” (Hall, 2006).

The bottom-line of this supposed western superiority is what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls “[western] indolent reason” (2000), in its metonymic expression, which takes the part by the whole. In this case, labels the west as developed and, hence, the non-west as undeveloped, neglecting its specificities and genuine identity, denies the existence of the parts outside the whole and interprets all possible variations of the parts as special features which do not affect the whole. Based on invented and biased symmetries, the indolent reason creates what Santos calls an “abyssal line” (2007), which categorises realities, informing knowledge and discourses. The abyssal line is based on and produces a system of visible and invisible distinctions where the invisible legitimises the visible (modern) ones. For example, the invisibilised knowledge of the “Rest” legitimizes the authority of the “West”’s knowledge. According to Santos (Ibidem), the invisible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social reality into two realms: the universe of "this side of the line", rational, modern,
scientific, individually-centred, westerner, and the universe "across the line", irrational, exotic, pre-scientific, superstitious, non-westerner. The division is so sharp that "the other end" vanishes, becoming non-existent, i.e., not relevant or understandable (Ibidem). Likewise, the birth of modernity can be also critically perceived as the “zero point” where everything that is worthy starts (Castro-Gómez, 2007). According to Santos (2006), the “[western] indolent reason” produces this abyssal line and subsequent categories that sustain the so called “west” by means of five (legitimised and legitimising) production logics of inexistence or inferiority (Santos 2006: 95-98), just like a mirror rationale: a monoculture of knowledge and rigor produces and legitimizes the ignorant; the monoculture of linear time produces or legitimizes the residual, the logic of social classification produces and legitimates the [upper and the] bottom, the logic of the dominant scale produces or legitimizes the local; the productivity logic produces and legitimates the unproductive.

This notion of “the west and the rest” (Hall, 2006) illustrates the discourse’s pervasiveness and the fact that it is those who have the material and symbolic means to control discourse that have the possibility to make it a reality, often through what Foucault (data) calls a “regime of truth”. Also Cox states that “knowledge is always partial or fragmentary in origin (...) the starting point is some initial subdivision of reality, usually dictated by convention” (Cox, 1981: 126). The “west and the rest” is indeed a “regime of truth” producer of many subsequent others, such as development; modernity, peacebuilding. It calls also attention to the position of Ramon Grosfoguel (2008) and the distinction the author makes about the “enunciation locus” and the “social locus”. Accordingly “the question is not just about social values in knowledge production or the fact that our knowledge is always partial. The key here is the locus of enunciation, i.e., the geo-political body of the subject who speaks. In western knowledge, the one who speaks is always hidden, concealed, and erased from the analysis. The "ego politics of knowledge" of Western philosophy has always favoured the myth of an "Ego" not located (Ibidem), highlighting its fallacious universality. By breaking the link between the subject of enunciation and the social and epistemic location, philosophy and Western science can generate a myth about a universal knowledge that conceals not only the one who speaks, but also the geopolitical epistemic location and body-political structures of colonial power / knowledge, from which the subject speaks” (Ibidem).
Two major fallacies result from this modernity-based “west and the rest” rationale. First, there is the linear time fallacy, which perceives time as a linear evolutionary and universal line towards modernity. This allows for the identification of those – societies, people, knowledge(s), individuals - which are retarded and advanced ones. This fallacy is based on the discourse of evolution, achieved through the reflexive reason of modernity, which constantly analyses and mediates practices projecting a better future (Giddens, 1990). Also Kant, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1998), states that the true vocation of (modern) reason must be to produce a will that is good, hence being a natural human and societal trend to improve and evolve each day. Second, the universalisation fallacy produces/creates a culturally and geopolitically-based knowledge as the only valid, thus, universal knowledge, leading to what Santos (2007) calls an “epistemicide”, i.e., the killing of epistemologies, or the “fallacy of the disappearance of the [Global] South”. These fallacies create and legitimise the global hierarchies which sustain power in international relations (discipline and) practice. Grosfoguel (2008a; 2008b) identifies nine spatial and temporal entangled global hierarchies, from which, for the purpose of this study, I highlight three and add a fourth one: an international division of labour at the core and the periphery where capital organised labour at the periphery operates with coerced and authoritarian forms; a global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileged European people over non-European people; an epistemic hierarchy that privileges western knowledge

51 The nine global hierarchies identified by Grosfoguel (2009) are the following “1) a particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labour (slavery, semi-serfdom, wage labour, petty-commodity production, etc.) were to co-exist and be organized by capital as a source of production of surplus value through the selling of commodities for a profit in the world market; 2) an international division of labour of core and periphery where capital organized labour at the periphery around coerced and authoritarian forms (Wallerstein 1974; 3); 3) an inter-state system of politico-military organizations controlled by European males and institutionalized in colonial administrations (Wallerstein 1979); 4) a global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileged European people over non-European people (Quijano 1993; 2000); 5) a global gender hierarchy that privileged males over females and European patriarchy over other forms of gender relations (Spivak 1988; Enloe 1990); 6) a sexual hierarchy that privileged heterosexuals over homosexuals and lesbians (it is important to remember that most indigenous peoples in the Americas did not consider sexuality among males a pathological behaviour and had no homophobic ideology); 7) a spiritual hierarchy that privileged Christians over non-Christian/non-Western spiritualities institutionalized in the globalization of the Christian (Catholic and later Protestant) Church; 8) an epistemic hierarchy that privileged western knowledge and cosmology over non-Western knowledge and cosmologies, and institutionalized in the global university system (Mignolo 1995, 2000; Quijano 1991). 9) a linguistic hierarchy between European languages and non-European languages that privileged communication and knowledge/theoretical production in the former and subalternized the latter as sole producers of folklore or culture but not of knowledge/theory (Mignolo 2000).”
and cosmology over non-western knowledge and cosmologies, institutionalised in the
global university systems; a political hierarchy where the nation-state is perceived, just
as the realist Robert Gilpin (1981) states the most efficient and valuable way to
organizes political communities in terms of military and subordinates well-being.

Most of these hierarchies are interconnected and mutually fuelled and this is
explained by the interdependence of discursive and material elements of power,
discussed in section 1 in Chapter 1. Indeed, built on a linear and evolutive time line and
on an ethnocentric perspective created by those holding greatest power to create not
only their own narrative but the others’ narrative, creating filters for political options,
the “west and the rest” has been the dominant organising factor within the international
system and its global power relations ever since modernity flourished. Aníbal Quijano
(2000) used the term “coloniality of power” in order to identify this permanent trend of
western domination in international relations at a macro and micro level in societies.
The “coloniality of power” refers to today’s structure or matrix of the international
system which results from a cumulative historical process based on western domination,
and which includes economic, epistemic and racial oppression of subaltern groups. This
matrix rescues the logic of “the west and the rest” and makes the living legacy of
colonialism in contemporary societies in the form of social discrimination that outlived
formal colonialism and became integrated in succeeding social orders. The context of
colonialism is decisive since it has penetrated each area of social existence, creating
power relations, defining subjectivities, epistemologies and settings which are desirable
and the ones that are undesirable and therefore exploitable or susceptible of being
“converted” to western international models. The traditional history and rules of the
International Relations focus almost essentially on the West History and its cumulative
knowledge, despite consensually presented as the universal international system.
Indeed, the foundations of the International law were embedded in the Ancient Rome
ius gentium and evolved along the West progression in time (Pereira & Quadros, 1997).
Also the key moment for the creation of the international system was the creation of the
nation-state – the universal model/unit for political organisation and the cornerstone of

52 Patricia Owens (2007) states that peripheral societies, i.e. non-western, have been performing a great
role in today’s unequal distribution of wealth, contributing hence for the enrichment of the core societies
and the increasing impoverishment of the peripheral ones.
all international system as we know it today – by means of the Treaty of Westphalia.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, International Relations have been understood as the history of the western, or to be more precise the European system.

However, and despite mainstream literature usually dismisses or even invisibilises this aspect making it merely part of a closed embarrassing phase of History, today’s international system owes its existence and perpetuation to the expansion of the European model of colonization, domination and de-colonization, stressing the importance of the colonial encounter and colonial politics (Bull, 1988). Therefore, “western civilizational claims have become the world-system” (Peñas, 1999: 84), making it to be fallaciously disconnected from coercion and domination power network that actually sustain the international system.

The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding has been especially important in the academic discipline of peace and conflict studies. It has been adopted by a number of scholars to suggest a framework for peace that addresses not only the latent forms of physical violence, but also aspects of a society that are structurally violent, and could lead to a re-emergence of fighting (see the discussion of positive peace in the article on peace and conflict studies).

\textbf{2 – The liberal peace project}

Grounded on Enlightenment philosophical thinking, the liberal has its bedrock upon the notions of “liberty”, “rationality” and “progress” and the belief that it is possible for all members of any society to benefit from these on a individual and collective and social level to achieve emancipation (Richmond, 2005). It is, thus, a highly western concept and proposal, although theoretically it aspires to include all humankind. As far as the international system is concerned, it was supported by the great powers since the XIX century - Great Britain and USA - making it to be cumulatively dominant but also quite selective regarding the different strands liberal peace and liberalism it proposes. Specifically, today’s liberal peace draws on the liberal internationalism of the immediate post-WWI, the funcionalist agendas of post-WWII,

\textsuperscript{53} The Treaty of Westphalia was signed on the 24th October 24, 1648, ending the Thirty Years War that had drowned Europe in bloody religious war. The treaty defined the principles of national sovereignty and became the constitution of the new state system in Europe (to learn more, see: https://www.marxists.org/history/capitalism/un/treaty-westphalia.htm).
and on an uneasy mix of self-determination, liberal democracy, neoliberal market economy, human rights, a balancing of state and human security, and international legal regimes such as international human rights and humanitarian law (Ibidem). All of these frameworks and concepts sprang from both emancipatory and conservative perspectives of the same liberal legacy, resulting in different (sometimes contradicting) proposals. This section will explore today’s conception and policies of the liberal peace, particularly the ones implemented in the periphery of the world system in post-conflict societies.

2.1 - The 1990’s: prospects and challenges for a new global order

As the Iron Curtain tumbled down, the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the bipolar world order evoked a growing optimism concerning the coming new world order. The changes on the soviet bloc (Gorbachev policies, fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the USSR) as well as the collapse of the communist political experience made possible for some to think that a new era in line with their liberal beliefs was about to come and be, finally, the reference for the organisation and structuration of the world order (Mandelbaum, 2002). In fact, the collapse of the communist political experience represented both a victory of liberal democracy and market economy as well as the prevalence of the civil and political liberties over social economic rights, not only in the bipolar ideological confrontation, but also as the most suitable ways and ideas to organise societies – locally and internationally - from then on. The promotion of these values and ideological project (e.g. democracy, rights and freedom, individuality and rationality, market economy), at national and international level, was perceived as the only sustainable path to international peace (Holm & Sørensen, 1995), which was conceived, thus, in liberal terms.

The consensus on the liberal peace was based in a powerful convergence of academic (western) knowledge, (supposed) historical evidence plus political will and interest. The dichotomist representation of “liberalism vs. communism” as “winner vs loser”, respectively, presented a unitarian proposal of modernity,54 where liberalism is

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54 Two key moments were crucial for the modern ‘West’. First, the industrial revolution, which emerged in Great Britain in the middle of the eighteenth century and shorted distances, improved production and made everything faster and productive compared to other previous forms of production and transportation. The second, the French revolution, which claimed and substituted the popular will for
seen not as one possible project but as the only rationally, evidence-based, accepted and desired (Paris, 2005), dismissing not only non-western forms of organising societies and the international system but also Marxist proposals, themselves a legacy of modernity.

From a political point of view, permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, an organism regularly blocked during Cold War, were now in line with this new emerging world order which, markedly optimistically, challenged the classical principles of international relations, particularly the principle of non-interference and national sovereignty in the name of the protection and affirmation/promotion of human rights and the values of the winning ideology, specifically the promotion and implementation of the democratic model, human rights and the market economy worldwide.

In his speech, on the 16th January 1991, during the USA attack on Iraq, George Bush proclaimed the “forge” of a new world order that would foster “a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations”. Notwithstanding the uncertainty of the agents and spaces of this new world order, the ingredients to push it forward were identified and consensus-forming (Borges & Santos, 2009). The dichotomist interpretative framework which opposed “jungle” to “governance” and “conduct of nations” would be the motto for a series of documents and discourses that legitimised and informed subsequent liberal international interventions. As Featherstone (1995: 89) argues, the West understood “itself as the guardian of universal values on behalf of a world formed in its own image”. The new world order launched in the post-Cold War was dominated by three major ideas: “peace as the preferred basis for relations among countries; democracy as the optimal way to organise political life

dynastic inheritance as the basis for political legitimacy. The slogan of the French revolution expressed its aims: liberty, equality, fraternity. Both of these key-processes resulted in and, in turn, fuelled Enlightenment, a 17th and 18th century cultural movement of intellectuals which claimed reason and individualism to be at the crucial elements for development. It was also characterized by great revolutions in western science, philosophy, society and political thought, sweptwing away ideas grounded in tradition, faith and superstition. The French revolution had created the political context for what followed. They changed the way public life was conducted and the way individual lived, first in Europe and then, as west expanded, in the world, giving rise to a particular intellectual and political environment that where the result and that resulted in Liberalism and Marxism – two emancipatory, world-directed political, social and economic philosophies and governance projects. The simplest analysis should lead one immediately towards a perspective of similarity rather than polarity. Thus, given these three circumstances: they both developed at about the same time, during the 18th and 19th (to some extent also 20th) centuries; they both developed at about the same place, Western Europe; hey both developed as a reflection of a particular culture dominated economically by the capitalist system in a certain phase of its development, and culturally by the tremendous growth of natural science.
within them; and the free market as the indispensable vehicle for producing wealth” (Mandelbaum, 2002: 1).

However, distinct violent conflicts, which had been until then veiled by the bipolar dynamic of the Cold War emerged, challenging both the western linear time conception, best portrayed by Fukuyama’s (1992) “end of History”, and the optimism nurtured around the world liberal peace project itself, encouraging international interventionist policies.

2.2 – “New wars” and the core narratives on the periphery

The 1990s brought to surface a specific type of violent conflictuality which were analytically (and politically) labelled as “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999). Kosovo, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Rwanda were some of the affected scenarios of these violent conflicts.

The diagnosing power, based on knowledge and on (material, discursive and historical) built social authority, allowed international actors to interpret these crises and situations in terms of what they wished for the international system (Sogge, 2001). Indeed, the choice for the term “new wars” as (mainstreamed) category to define those violent conflicts not also highlighted the western perplexity when approaching this kind of violent dynamics, considered at odds with the classical western (rational) interstate wars of the modern period, but also created the political space to announce new international prescriptions to end them.

Western archetypal modernity lenses were put to diagnose these phenomena and analyse “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) settings and dynamics. This is particularly evident when paying attention to the fact that these violent conflicts were not classified and examined taking into account the phenomenon as such, but rather the western modern hegemonic reference of organising societies and the relations among themselves, i.e., state, formal market economy, rational war, proclaiming as deviant all that didn’t fit this modern organising rationale. The interpretative exercise to analyse these “new wars” was put forward using the same logic the “west” has always analysed non-western episodes, trends, places and dynamics: by way of creating two homogeneous
worlds, the (superior, developed, sophisticated) western and the (inferior, underdeveloped, barbaric or exotic) non-western. A possible analogy to describe these created dichotomies is the one of distorted mirrors. This because each locus/point of these antipodes opposition are the exact same elements, hence, carrying the same potential. However, one of them is deformed, opening the possibility for change, replacement, rescue or modelling (Santos, 2014). That is why the explanatory rhetoric to describe these phenomena was “fragile States” (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2002; Bayart, 2004), “informal economies” (Duffield, 1993; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Francis, s/d), high participation of actors beyond the State (paramilitaries or militias, interests groups, religious or ethnic leaders), violence mainly directed towards civilians and not soldiers (Kumar, 1997; Kaldor, 1999), and the rhetoric of ethnic and religious identity (Gurr & Harff, 1994; Ukiwo, 2005) – as opposed to consolidated states, formal economies, state actors, national political agendas, state military agents as targets and perpetrators.

Indeed, modern warfare was conceptualized, according to Clausewitz (1997), as state “politics by other means”. The violence used, in conventional modern war, was thus framed around the existence of legitimate actors involved, the nation-states, with regular armies submitted to international conventions, constraining the conflict parts behaviour during war. Since it was a political decision and strategy, and obeyed to international law, it was presented as abiding to a rational western modernity traits and DNA. Also, that same rationality would, it was believed, make all the efforts to be made to bring war to an end, hence creating peace. Conversely, in “new wars” what mainstream literature (Mackinlay, 2000) says is that what applies is irrationality led by sub-state level actors, making violence as a pervasive way to organise societies from a social and economic point of view. As such, contrasting with the liberal nation-state, the category of failed or collapsed states was chosen to define these places and to diagnose their main illness to the beholding western eyes: the absence of an effective central power and the breakdown of social contract (Chandler, 2005). The proliferation of sub-state groups and the subsequent privatization of violence challenged the very existence of a state and developed new methods and tactics of warfare apart from international law limitations (Kaldor, 1999). The groups are no longer defined by national political agendas but rather by ethnic and/or religious identities. Violence is used both as a necessary means to eliminate rival groups within the same state, making civil
population along with opposing armies as key targets (Mertus, 1999), and to control economic interests which would fund war efforts and improve their groups power (Kaldor, 1999). That is why some authors refer to those economic agendas – and not necessarily political ones - as the main fuel and motivation of these ‘new wars’ (Mackinlay, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). In fact, the acceleration of globalisation and trade opportunities along with the increasing primacy of the market over the state made organized crime and illegal transactions (Nitzschke & Studdard, 2005), and undue exploitation of natural resources to arise as an extremely attractive alternative opportunity (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The description of failed states\(^{55}\) (Rotberg, 2002; Wyler, 2007) or the explanatory adoption of greed and grievance\(^{56}\) (Hasendver & Rittberger: 2000; Gurr & Harff, 1994; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) evidently presented conflictuality solely as the product of domestic predatory and criminal elites, only pursuing their interests (Duffield, 1994; Chandler, 2006; Ukiwo: 2005; Francis, s/d; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

The war effort turns against its own formal economy and state infrastructure, absorbing resources that could be channelled to the formal economic development of the country, i.e. the formal national economy with an emphasis on agricultural production and state regulation follows a parallel economy, but organized, destructive and profitable (Duffield, 1994). The conditions for the perpetuation of an informal economy that guarantees high profits but opts for the lack of investment in sectors such as education, health or economic, development vital for the provision of an essential alternative to formal (peace) economy. As such, some authors suggest, violence become societies structure and cultural pillar, making “structural violence”\(^{57}\) and “cultural

\(^{55}\) Failing, fragile, weak, quasi, or crisis states are the usual labels given to those states whose governments are believed to have weakened to such an extent that they are unable to provide basic public goods like territorial control, education and healthcare, and legitimate institutions to their people. Most accounts of failed states center on the ‘erosion of state capacity’ or their inability to perform the basic functions of state responsibility like ensuring peaceand stability, effective governance, territorial control, and economic sustainability (Rotberg, 2002; Wyler, 2007).

\(^{56}\) "Greed” is shorthand for the argument that combatants in armed conflicts are motivated by a desire to better their situation and perform a cost-benefit analysis in examining if the rewards of waging war or joining rebellion are greater than not doing so. In turn, "grievance” stands for the argument that people rebel or/and wage war over issues of identity, such as ethnicity, religion, social class, rather than over economics (Hasendver & Rittberger: 2000; Gurr & Harff, 1994; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

\(^{57}\) According to Johan Galtung, violence is understood as all "avoidable offenses against human needs and, in general, against life” (Galtung, 1996: 197), and has three expressions which interact in a causal logic: direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence. Direct violence refers to direct and visibly inflicted (Ibidem: 196) verbal or/and physical abuse. It is always explicit, personal and direct. Structural violence, in turn, results from the unequal distribution of power and knows the repression and
violence” (Galtung, 1990) to be pervasive in affected societies, penetrating the normality of their everyday and structuring realities, despite the unusual - and aberrant to our eyes - logic behind it (Kaldor, 1999) and refraining any attempts to build a “structure and culture of peace” (Galtung, 1990).

Violence as daily social interactive code and as society structure challenges the status of exception that modernity gives to violence. It is the type of social and political relations established within “new wars” scenarios that is considered to be irrational. And it is also what gave room for perceiving these places as standing outside modernity, where open and direct violence is limited and circumscribed.

It is important, however, to underline that several of the elements that came to be identified as the outrageous features of “new wars” were already present in modern conflicts but remained hidden by the legitimacy and the rational logic said to apply (e.g. mercenaries, civil casualties, and destruction of entire villages).

Moreover, Mary Kaldor’s (1999) analysis demonstrate that the “new wars”, which are supposedly barbarian places when compared to the regular and modern way to wage war, are highly fuelled by specific features of modernity itself such as globalisation or the privatisation of violence. There is a clear gap on the new wars dominant analysis that plainly neglects, in Marxist terms, the role of the economic superstructure that condemns these places to peripheral position (Pugh, 2011). There is indeed a lack of any will to accept that some of these wars could have been caused by the international society itself (Demmers, 2004). Bickerton (2007: 94) synthetized this wash away of any international responsibility regarding the “new wars” and subsequent internalization of the causes of these violent conflicts as “domestication of [international] anarchy”, a process where the locus of disorder is believed to have descended from the international system to the domestic one. These violent conflicts were actually presented as deviant phenomena being the result not necessarily of the way the international system has been structuring itself and its power relations but rather as a consequence of the “rest” exploitation and social injustice as its main expression (Ibidem: 32). The “structural” designation stems from the fact that it is the structure that is the means through which violence is transmitted. Contrary to direct violence, structural violence is latent, indirect and gradually built into the structures of society. Finally, the cultural violence, concept introduced by Galtung in 1990, is defined as any aspect or element that, “[existing in] the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal logic” (Galtung, 1990: 291), justifies and legitimizes the direct and structural violence, causing these to be accepted as correct or at least not as not aberrant or wrong. Cultural violence is constructed through a process of socialization and acculturation, thus constituting the legitimating basis for other forms of violence to exist (Galtung, 1996: 2).

See previous footnote.
barbarian behaviours of underdeveloped people and communities, hence politically and ethically likely and compulsory of being corrected (Pureza et al., 2005). This paved the way to what one could call a(nother) modern crusade (Borges & Santos, 2009).

2.3 – Declaring and waging a(nother) modern crusade

The phenomenon of “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) came to be progressively perceived as a threat to the liberal proposal of a political order assured by the state on a systemic level (Milliken & Krause, 2002) and a clear obstacle to democracy and peace, as well as to market economy and trade development. Indeed, the beginning of the 1990’s turned out to be a key moment to expand the liberal peace project. In fact, notwithstanding the destruction brought on by those violent conflicts, its “pathologisation” and treatment as deviant behavior susceptible of being corrected has reinforced, firstly, the program of liberal modernity as a path to peace (Borges & Santos, 2009) and, secondly, the international consensus around these two dichotomist - darkness/barbarian and light/peace - where the negative could be rescued becoming, hence, positive.

Based on an academic and political consensus, the so-called international society, at a first stage within the United Nations framework and afterwards within the whole complex of development aid industry and peacebuilding, developed several different forms of intervention – humanitarian intervention, development aid, peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions - aiming at creating a new liberal world order, founded on three major/dominant ideas: “peace as the preferred basis for relations among countries; democracy as the optimal way to organise political life within them; and the free market as the indispensable vehicle for producing wealth” (Mandelbaum, 2002: 1). Among all of these, the project of post-conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding emerged as one of the key instruments used to normalize the then labelled and perceived “unordered” societies taking as reference the specific liberal framework, considered and presented as the ideal universal one.

Peacebuilding became then an essential guiding principle of the UN and other international actors’ framework of action in post-conflict scenarios since the early 1990s, following its inclusion in Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report An

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59 The expression of international society or international community express a “consensual” image which renders invisible the power relations.
Agenda for Peace, where “Peacebuilding” mainstreamed in the strategic vocabulary of international relations and the liberal peace was presented as a “universal” consensual project.

The 1990s brought a dilemma to international society: how to proceed with the liberal modernity project if a challenge of irrationally was uprising globally? In fact, the conflictuality that had shaken international society disregarded the linear historical evolution planned by liberal modernity. These spaces of conflict were perceived as nonstandard and unexpected dynamics and settings. The description of these conflicts as irrational and contradictory to the modern notion of violence as an exceptional solution emphasized the perception of deviance in these conflicts. These spaces were increasingly seen as “standing outside modernity”, susceptible and desirably waiting to be brought onto the right path: liberal peaceful modernity (Borges & Santos, 2009). Connoting the new conflicts with the label of deviant meant also that liberal modernity kept the status of the desirable and single alternative towards a pacific world. A generalized perception of moral responsibility to act and intervene emerged within international community as the result of a shared and growing sense of responsibility (*Ibidem*). A responsibility engaged in bringing to international system justice the perpetrators of these deviant behaviours and barbarian violence and also to assist societies returning towards the liberal modernity path. Western IGO constitute a transnational epistemic community, their consensual knowledge plays a key role in bringing new ideas to the political international processes (Checkel, 1997: 4).

The modern crusade was then reintroduced in the 1990’s, though the term crusade was never formally or explicitly acknowledged, of course. The term crusade is automatically associated to particular western perspective of History periods where the west, legitimised by the rhetoric of rescuing populations from darkness and underdevelopment, conquered territories and imposed religious, customary, social, political and economic cannons. It was, hence, imperialism in disguise.

Bringing societies to the evolutionary path through liberal modernity came to be identified as the moral duty of an engaged international society on quest for a new world order. “Peacebuilding became the mission code” (Borges & Santos, 2009); democracy and global (hierarchical) market-economy its political and economic instrument, respectively.
Taking into account the liberal principles and methodology that best fit western victorious powers – indeed, dominant liberal peace project is selective in terms of ingredients\(^{60}\), a strategy was crafted to govern the “new wars” settings, perceived by the core as anomalies, and make them not only part of the peaceful liberal hegemonic world order, but also an important oiled piece that would make its engine to be perfected, reinforcing its hegemonic nature and disguising or side stepping its domination features. The name of the strategy was “international intervention” and it has been aiming since then to order the world according to a hierarchical liberal world governance agenda, though its hierarchical traits have been regularly concealed behind words as “partnership” (Pureza, 2011), which artificially and erroneously portraits as equal and symmetric, completely different and asymmetric power realities.

This international intervention strategy has been constructed with different intertwined tactics – both discursive (e.g. narratives, buzzwords) and methodological (e.g. procedures, intervention mechanisms) – from the part of those holding power to do so – the “west” or “global north” - which would work simultaneously as “magnets and missionaries” (Mandelbaum, 2002: 43), i.e. they would be sent out to the world to convert (barbarian) infidels and promote, in hostile terrains, their “liberal creed” (Ibidem). Also, they would incorporate and attract those deviant terrains into their liberal order. This has mainly been reached through the building of an epistemic and a political (hegemonic) consensus on the objectives of the intervention and approaches to ending conflicts that are deployed in non-modern scenarios (Richmond, 2005: 85). In fact, liberal peace has become the reference of political thought not only because of the rational, universal and normative aspects of its program but also because of its cumulative discourses which have been giving an “only child” hermeneutical framework for intellectuals and politicians to interpret reality and to react upon it (Borges & Santos, 2009).

These discursive and methodological tactics, when merged, gave rise to different well-known institutionalised “west”-led international intervention forms and layouts: development aid; humanitarian intervention; humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, peacekeeping – they are all different forms of liberal peace international intervention tactics. All of these share the same bottom-line: the idea of universal forms of progress that lead communities of poverty and vulnerability to

\(^{60}\) See section 2.2 in Chapter 2.
security and welfare. Indeed, they stem from a non-deterministic assumption about underdevelopment and violent conflict (i.e. they are seen not merely as natural, indiscriminate or unscheduled, but as socially - and internally - constructed) and from a monoculture of “western knowledge, a linear evolution perception of time which presents development and peace as objective ideas, leading to empowerment, and sooner or later achieved by all world societies - the thesis of the end of history of Fukuyama (1992) best describes this feeling and belief. All of them were also presented as ideological and functionalist at the same time – this helps their legitimacy in discursive and implementation terms. On one hand, their proposal is ideological, as it represents a system of beliefs, values, principles and attitudes aiming at creating what Gerrig (1977) calls “the good society”, when defining ideology. It justifies the exercise of power and legitimises power relations, whether symmetric or asymmetric, since the goal is perceived as positive. On the other hand they are functionalists, since they aim at solving problems, such as violent conflict, underdevelopment, grievances – that injure humanity and are hence universally felt as negative.

Today, the liberal peace project is what I would call a huge political interventionist octopus, i.e., a thinking and decisive core with many soft arms that manage all spheres of social life worldwide. Those arms can be both “magnets and missionaries”, to use Mandelbaum (2002: 43) expression, and can take the form of market economy, representative democracy, rule of law, nation-state as well as the form of other sub-instruments that guarantee that this world order spreads and consolidates all over the world. Just like the octopus, which has numerous strategies for defending themselves against predators, including the expulsion of ink, the use of camouflage and deimatic displays, their ability to jet quickly through the water, and their ability to hide and to squeeze through tight places, despite their great size, the liberal peace can also be overtly present,

3 – Peacebuilding: adjusting liberal theory to international intervention policies

Among the liberal international intervention tools, the project of post-conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding emerged as one of the chief instruments used to
normalize what the ‘west’ perceived as ‘unordered’ societies in line with the specific liberal framework, considered and presented as the ideal, desired and universal model.

From a leading point of view, the United Nations emerged as the key-consensual actor front running peacebuilding (liberal task force) interventions, almost personifying the international liberal ideal agenda and peace, breaking its almost inertia regarding peace and war during the Cold War. This central and leading position of the UN also helped to give liberal peace a universal slant.

The protagonist role performed by the UN had its steppingstones in three specific moments: the Namibia peacekeeping mission in 1989 where the UN’s scope of action was clearly enlarged from its traditional peacekeeping actions to what would be considered the first peacebuilding mission (Paris, 2005:13); the dismiss of conflicts by delegation (e.g. proxy wars) in areas perceived as no longer worth of geopolitical interest opened a gap of assistance, where UN could or should intervene (Borges & Santos, 2009); finally, the Iraq war in 1991, assigned a different role to Security Council, entrenching an idea of action according to international law, within UN approval (Ibidem).

The UN mission in Namibia, in 1989, UNTAG, represented, in fact, the birth of peacebuilding model directed to post-war scenarios. It was later on synthetised in the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, “An Agenda for Peace”, Following its inclusion on the Report, “peacebuilding” mainstreamed in the strategic vocabulary of international relations and became an essential guiding principle of the UN and other international actors’ framework of action in post-conflict scenarios. The report marked a substantial expansion of the potential of the UN to contribute to “preventive diplomacy”, “peacekeeping” and “post-conflict peacebuilding”.

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61 “UNTAG was established in accordance with resolution 632 (1989) of 16 February 1989, to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. UNTAG was also to help the Special Representative to ensure that: all hostile acts were ended; troops were confined to base, and, in the case of the South Africans, ultimately withdrawn from Namibia; all discriminatory laws were repealed, political prisoners were released, Namibian refugees were permitted to return, intimidation of any kind was prevented, law and order were impartially maintained” (UN, s/d).

62 An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, more commonly known simply as An Agenda for Peace, is a report written for the United Nations by its Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The document outlines the way Boutros-Ghali felt the UN should respond to conflict in the post-Cold War world.

63 “Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).
Intended to “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN, 1992), this new interventionist model and methodology aimed no longer merely at the absence of war, as previous UN peace missions did since the creation of the UN, but at the construction of a different social order, conducive to nonviolent relations, and to a layered and interconnected liberal peaceful governance from within each state to global world order, in both a cumulative and *per se* logic.

More than a systematic framing of concepts and actions, the document is a conceptual structure and a political statement, where the liberal governance framework is consensually presented as the intervention strategy to gain a lasting peace worldwide, though particularly aimed at violent conflict scenarios (Borges & Santos, 2009). Two subsequent documents came to consolidate the strategies and to canonize the role the state, democracy, market economy and human rights had to play within war-torn societies and as a promoter of development. These were the “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” (Boytros-Ghali, 1995) and “The Agenda for Democratization (Boutros, Ghali, 1996).

Peacebuilding is a political, economic, social and psychological interventionist model which aim at empowering, reconcile and transform war-torn societies (Haugerudbraaten: 1998). It is initiated by means of addressing the perceived primordial root causes of the conflict and develops along a standard model aiming at institutional building; economic recovery and social engineering (Pugh, 2000: 3). Its ultimate goal is to promote world peace by means of formatting societies according to an institutional

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64 Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).
65 Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).
66 “Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation. . In the aftermath of international war, post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).
67 It is a UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, position paper offering a contribution on the current peace missions performance and future role of the UN in the world.
68 This document came to consolidate democracy as the best way to organize societies in order to achieve a global lasting peace.
and economic model that reproduces the Eurocentric modern cannon perceived as the closest to organizational perfection establishing, hence, the belief in the conditionality of modernity principles when building order and peace.

3.1 – The peacebuilding model

The articulation between the liberal project and peacebuilding intervention was achieved through the creation of a comprehensive technical-political framework which, wrapped in the well-known and commonly used “good governance” label, merged the functional and the ideological features of the liberal theory with a problem-solving rationale aimed to solve and prevent violence. Indeed, the idea underlying this liberal reconstruction project has been no other than to enable post-war societies to normalize (according to western ordering standards) its political structures and to establish “good governance” mechanisms, correcting the deviant political and social contours which, according to western narratives, permitted violence to erupt (Borges and Santos, 2009).

The concept of good governance became the guiding principle of liberal peace/peacebuilding modern crusade – the term “helps western publics and elites feel good about themselves and their triumphant system” (Sogge, 2002: 132) at the same time it is a catchy expression “serving as a coalition of interests because they admit many definitions while at the same time sounding clear, positive and morally beyond reproach” (Sogge, 2002: 131).

Understood as a transparent process responsible for the definition of adequate policies in order to achieve development (World Bank, 2000; Boutros-Ghali, 1994), the criteria/promotion of good governance became the new conditionality of political modernity (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). Its inherent logic of control assumed the condition status due to the necessity to contain and reverse the deviant behaviours through the principles of accountability and transparency in two complementary manners: first, international community’s supervision to the restructuring processes and the necessary report of national governments; and second, at national level through the vigilance of a society guided by democratic principles.

Defined as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace in order to avoid the relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), the peacebuilding model aimed to address three fundamental deficits present in war-torn
societies: the political and constitutional fragility or failure, the weak socio-economic condition and the psycho-social trauma. The identification of these deficits versed, accordingly, on a strategic action upon four main areas: military and security, political-constitutional, socio-economic, and social and psycho-social (Ramsbotham, 2005), all based on liberal ideology and aimed at building almost from scratch a liberal (peaceful) society. In fact, despite separated for intervention and analytical purposes, each of these dimensions support and fuel all the others, as I will later on explain. As liberal project, all of them share common presuppositions: the centrality of the state, the need for democracy and market economy, the respect for human rights, particularly the political and civil ones.

The military and security dimension is moulded by the western tradition, particularly the Westphalian legacy of the state’s monopoly of force, and based upon the belief that “without security, confidence will not be built nor a basis for extended peace established” (Hansen, 2000). It is, therefore, perceived as crucial within the transition from war to peace inasmuch it directly relates to the prevention of resurgence of the most visible violence and the promotion of general public security so that, it is believed, basic societal functions can be protected (Jeong, 2005). This interventionist military dimension focuses its mission and subsequent activities on two main pillars. The first one relates to the reform of the security sector, enhancing effective and accountable security institutions and agents, and creating a new state national army bringing together elements of former belligerent (para-state) groups. The United Nations supports security sector reform (SSR) to ensure the development of effective, efficient, affordable and accountable security institutions. Accordingly, the goal is to increase political and economic stability and thus promote the possibility of society’s economic development in the long-term (Ball, 1997). The second one relates to the DDR program, i.e. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, including child soldiers (Ibidem). These programs aim to substantially decrease the number of weapons in circulation outside military state structures. From an economic standpoint, this dimension of post-war reconstruction is seen to be extremely important, since it attempts to deliver former-combatants into active productive units of the formal national economy, fostering, hence, the liberal principles of economic growth (Kumar 1997).

The political-constitutional dimension presents as its key elements the state, the rule of law, democracy and individual rights, with particular emphasis on the civil and
political rights. This dimension is said to be an attempt to find mechanisms to be implemented in order to manage, in the first place, the problems of civil unrest in a “Clausewitz-in-reverse” logic (Ramsbotham, 2000: 172) – i.e., politics as the continuation of war - allowing for rationality, individuality and politics to be imposed, and, to invert the degenerative state failing in a governance reform perspective. It bases its operational formula on the institutional and rational assumptions that a strong democratic state, tackling the root causes of violence through political and electoral competition, representation, welfare, transparency, protection of citizens and respect for human rights, is a way of fostering lasting peace in societies. Good governance mechanisms such as “monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) are some of the measures which can be systematized in three main “modern” areas of intervention - governance reform (focused on the state and on democracy), the protection of human rights and support of civil society. In a top-down sequence, state reconstruction is the utmost emblem of this political process as it is regarded as the rehabilitation antidote to the “governance disease” (Zartman, 1995) affecting “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) scenarios. However, despite its macro-importance, state reconstruction is in itself insufficient to assure (liberal) peace and the prevalence of the polity. In relating state with good governance, democracy emerges for the peacebuilding model as the key linkage in the peacebuilding language and consequently state reconstruction is required to be supported by a (liberal) democratic political regime (Borges & Santos, 2008). The balancing components of democracy under the scope of rehabilitation go beyond horizontal linkages between parties and also include important vertical political dynamics, such as the legitimization of political power through representation and democratic choice, the promotion of a new political framework for social relations, loyalties and representation, and by assuring each citizen political and civil rights, highlighting individuals rationality and scrutiny skills. International “ democratizing assistance” has been mainly translated into technical and financial assistance. Support to emergent legal frameworks (e.g. constitutional engineering and legal reforms); preparation of involved actors (set up of elections commissions, training of national election supervisors; support to political parties; implementation of civic education measures) and organization and monitoring of elections are the three pillars of this
political intervention, emphasizing quite clearly the technical and the functional nature of the intervention. The protection of human rights and the support of civil society are the other key elements of the good governance framework which this dimension seeks to implement. The implementation of this reconstruction policy is usually put into practice firstly by deploying observation missions, supporting legal reforms particularly sensitive towards the topic, setting up national human rights protection commissions and funding local organizations which develop their work in this area (Pureza et al., 2005). Concerning civil society, intervention policies have been mainly directed towards the support of independent media and human rights organizations (Ibidem). The idea is to create and develop a civil society that can function as an important catalyst for grassroots change towards democratization (Belloni, 2008), “represent their local constituencies in decision-making processes and serve as a watchdog for government action” (Zeeuw, 2001).

The socio-economic dimension of peacebuilding model is intimately linked to the promotion of market economy, trade, and productive infrastructures aimed at capital accumulation and investment. Simply put, it aims to allow local economy to recover from war efforts and destruction and to integrate it in the international economic liberal superstructure. To put this dimension forward, different activities are identified within the peacebuilding model: recovery of production assets, creation of employment, demining efforts and policies (Davies, 1997), revitalisation of basic services (e.g. roads, transportation, electricity; hospitals; post services, schools), reintegration of internal displaced people and refugees as well as former combatants in the economy (Macrae, 1997; Pureza et al., 2005). From a social standpoint, the wealth that economic growth transfers to society is highly important along with the health and education facilities.

Finally, the psycho-social rehabilitation and reconciliation dimension relates to de-traumatise, healing, bringing justice and reconciling divided societies and groups, usually defined to local population’s eyes as victims and perpetrators. Reconciliation and social rehabilitation are considered one of the major components of the peacebuilding model (Jeong, 2005). Repression and violent attempts to eliminate identity and dignity of persons are identified as many of the repressive strategies of “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) which mainly targeted civilians and turned villages to resemble battlefields. According to Maynard (1997: 203), there was “an intimate exposure to brutality” which has left “individuals psychologically scarred and the
intricate network of social interaction deeply torn”. The extent of the impact of these wounds in individual and community life is all-pervasive: they are not mere deep psychological scars that can make individuals more likely to use violence, mistrust, or even unable to become a productive element in society, but the social fabric is also partly destroyed by being loaded with resentment, mistrust and fears (Ibidem). Violence disrupts social networks as well as individual and community life and healthy social patterns between similar and dissimilar groups are replaced by distrust, apprehension and outrage “Impairing community cohesion, interdependence and mutual protection (Maynard, 1997; 207). This dimension is precisely directed towards overcoming the individual and collective trauma that war violence provoked. There is a clear objective of transformation of collective memories, perceptions that each individual and each group has of the other, trying not to forget but to positively overcome all the negative marks that the war left. Psycho-rehabilitation therapeutics, truth and reconciliation commissions, judicial trials, restorative justice and social healing groups are some of the practices that attempt to fulfil this dimension’s goals.

These four dimensions are not closed in on themselves. This is a particularly important aspect of the peacebuilding model and the liberal peace project of which it is the best systematised spokesperson: harmony that allows for synchronisation, resulting in a supposed optimal and self-sustaining efficiency governing mechanisms of societies in all its dimensions (e.g. economic, social, political, military) and levels (e.g. ranging from the individual to the systemic; from the local to the international), crosscutting domestic and international realms, projecting liberal order to the world scale. 69

The media also contributes to this harmonisation process within peacebuilding and the liberal peace and order as we will see in Chapter 4. Indeed, if at a first glance or analysis media can be considered key actor within the civil society arena (Spurk, 2007) or the political one – which fit best the political-institutional dimension -, the truth is that they are a key harmonising element of the whole project, an optimiser of the different dimensions by themselves and of all the dimensions within the liberal peace project. In fact, the United Nations classified the development of local media as a

69 With reference to the international arena, assistance to the process of democratization is considered to be a major investment in international security as it is believed that democracy enhances political international stability and results in a widening of market access (Reychler, 1999). Regarding internal societies, democracy enables divergences between conflicting parties, which were beforehand disputed in war, now to be managed in a political and constructive platform (Kumar, 1997).
‘cross-cutting’ peacebuilding concern, ‘transcending’ all types of activities (UN, 1996: 3). For example, support for media may yield results in governance activities, particularly those related to decentralisation, anti-corruption and citizen participation in the policy process. The rule of law may be further institutionalised by support for an independent media that keeps a check on the judiciary, reports on the courts and promotes a legal enabling environment suitable for press freedom. Free and fair elections conducted through transparent processes require a media sector which gives candidates equal access, and report the relevant issues in a timely, objective manner.

3.2 – International power in peacebuilding inconsistencies

Many criticisms have marked the international debate since the 1990s, when peacebuilding intervention policies started to perform a crucial role in the international system governance, particularly from Critical Theory and even in a more specific way its Peace Studies research line. Critiques have mainly focused on two major issues: the liberal peace model’s underlying assumptions and the subsequent failure to recognise alternative views (Lidén, 2009; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Donais, 2009). Despite distinct, they all interrelate and are the expression as well as the result of the discrepancies in power (“to” and “over”) within the international system and the intention of those holding the greatest power to maintain and amplify or consolidate the existing status quo.

The first criticism refers to the conceptual foundations of peacebuilding upon the paradigm of “liberal internationalism” and resulting “experiment in social engineering” involving the transplantation of “Western models of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states” (Paris, 1997: 56). This critique is based upon two different, though interconnected, critical topics.

The first is best described by the well-known “standardisation versus particularism” critique (Ramsbotham, 2000). It criticises the existence of a standard prototype to be applied to post-war societies, regardless of the specific characteristics and dynamics of the local to which this peacebuilding “standard operating procedure” (Clapham, 1998), materialised in a “supply-driven” logic (Zeeuw, 2001). This critique stems from two major ideas. First, violent conflict has its own specific characteristics and is part of a specific socio, economic, political, military and cultural unique contexts (Ibidem). Second, only by taking into account the local reality, giving it voice, it is possible to
tackle the root causes of the targeted violent conflict and build a locally-driven “structural” (Galtung, 1969) and “cultural peace” (Galtung, 1996) since these are only possible if reflecting the community, i.e., if they are inclusive and reflexive (Lederach, 1997; Coockell, 2000; MacGinty, 2010). However, peacebuilding model has chronically and unequivocally neglected local actors and voices, keeping its architecture non-permeable to criticism and suggestions, particularly the ones sensitive to the need to involve in an active and voiceful way local community as a whole, and not just its leaders. This model is indeed highly preoccupied not to “interact with local norms and hegemonic relationships” (Pugh, 2000:4), but to transpose in an automatic way values, cannons, political institutions and economic options and structures intrinsically western, secularly consolidated, to societies, which are mostly non-western (Ramsbotham, 2000).

The second critical theme relates to the inconsistency between rhetoric and discourse, i.e., the promise of modernity principles as ideological and functional tools conducive to emancipation and peace, on one hand, and the building of governance and order, on the other. Indeed, despite the fact that the rhetoric of good governance underlying peace-building interventions is linked to modernity values as part of a whole ideological program, the implementation of good governance mechanisms developed by international organizations emerged as a selective, rather than a holistic process. This has progressively led to the imposition of legal and rational structures designed to heal societies affected by “political pathologies” (i.e. bad governance, corruption, irrationality and violence) in a technical and administrative way, leaving aside the application of capacity-building and empowerment. One of the best examples of this happens within the political dimension of peacebuilding model. Despite the importance and interconnectedness of all dimensions, the political one is arguably one of the most

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The idea of placing the emphasis of peacebuilding in its recipients is inspired by the observation of local groups who preserved and cultivated cultures of peace in contexts of armed violence (Ramsbotham et al, 2005, p. 217) and knows its theoretical roots in different authors. John Paul Lederach and his proposal of "peacebuilding form below" is one of the most important ones. Lederach presented a theoretical proposal that rejects the dominant interventionist and prescriptive model of post-war reconstruction and supports the creation of peace models that are built upon local cultures, resources and knowledge. The basis of the proposal is what Lederach calls the principle of "indigenous empowerment", suggesting that the transformation of the conflict must include the inclusion, respect and promotion of local human and cultural resources. For the author, this new approach requires us to adopt a different lens which allows us to look at the local scenarios and people not as the problem and the external elements as answers, but rather to understand the objective of long-term conflict transformation and validate it with the participation of local (Ramsbotham et al, 2005, p. 220). The "local" to Lederach (1997), is seen in a comprehensive and dynamic way, even if he puts the emphasis on the most common segments of the population, since Lederach understand that peace can only be built when involving the whole society. Along with other approaches, John Paul Lederach’s proposal (1997), contributed to the introduction of the subjective nature of peace in theoretical and political debates.
important ones when debating the place for voice and emancipation in societies. Within the political project of liberal post-war reconstruction, elections have been given the leading role in democracy, while less importance has been attributed to all other democratic practices, resulting in a minimalist conception of democracy (Borges & Santos, 2009). What results from this kind of intervention is the de-politicization of the local political sphere: the state entity becomes an empty shell where the lack of concrete political articulations and social relations reveals its artificial nature. In this context of intervention, and because political institutions can only coerce society when emerging out of existing social forces, the political rehabilitation project turns out to be more of a discursive product than a concrete reality, stressing the imbalance of the ideological proposition and the wider functional nature of these interventionist international policies and highlighting the hierarchical power nature of this liberal peace project. Ironically, political peace-building intervention can be regarded as a cyclical process beginning with the abnormal de-politicization of the local setting due to poor governance, and arriving at a new local de-politicization, this time by means of good governance mechanisms designed by foreign experts. Chandler’s logical (Chandler, 2005; 2006) and contradictory sequence going from “state without politics” as a generating element of war to “peace without politics” as a prescription to solve and prevent war, clearly expresses peace-building’s political contradiction: “politics as a barrier to peace”. As such, the promise of modernity within peace-building’s political rehabilitation project has been not fulfilled, and instead of ranging from the systemic to the individual level, political good governance mechanisms have mostly remained systemic. Indeed, peacebuilding emerged as the key strategy to bring modernity to deviant violent scenarios. However, despite ideological and functional goals, or because of that, in practice the ontological modernity rhetoric of empowerment was transformed into a technical, hierarchical tool, becoming part of a broader governance framework.

The second criticism is the failure of peacebuilding model in recognising alternative views. This miscarriage is justified by a cumulative and a conjunctural order of things. First, there has been since modernity emerged a cumulative trajectory of a monoculture of western knowledge (Santos, 2006); a monoculture of west-led linear time (Ibidem), which made that, on the one hand, subaltern knowledges were excluded, ommitted, silenced or ignored since they were represented an inferior, pre-modern humankind history; on the other hand, it strengthened the liberal peace project since no other rival
existed. Second, the victory of the so called west after the Cold War also reinforced the evidence-based evaluation that the best order to govern the world was the liberal one.

Liberal peace assumption has mostly implied a top-down universal approach, reflective of the North’s ideology and interests, aimed at states and less at communities, and often imposed as opposed to consensual. It also meant the neglect and failure to integrate local norms, resources and practices, forestalling self-government and local ownership conducive to emancipatory praxis. The most apparent reason for this rests upon the dry, technical, problem-solving and functionalist approach by which this peace-building policy has been characterized – which is well summed up by Roland Paris’s idea of “institutionalization before liberalization” (Paris, 2004) – and is thoroughly related to the prescriptive tone of this intervention policy as well as by the attempt to bring a certain kind of normality to domestic spheres and to world order. This is so because this model is highly preoccupied not to “interact with local norms and hegemonic [local and international] relationships”, which are clearly related to the root causes and perpetuation of violent conflicts within “new wars” scenarios, but to promote “a pattern of development that is determined by dominant democratic and neoliberal capitalist ideology” Pugh (2000: 4), which Roland Paris synthetises as “liberal internationalist model” (Paris, 2004), based on the idea of the liberal peace, within a hierarchical governance framework (Ramsbotham, 2000). Indeed, if the ideological beliefs of liberal peace are profoundly embedded on enlightenment ideas of equality, empowerment, representation, rationality, individuality, freedom, rights, capacity-building and emancipation - in practical terms -, however, it usually goes alongside an ideological interpretation framework extremely ethno-centred and fuelled by asymmetrical power relations, establishing a line between the HAVES and the HAVES NOTS of these (liberal) universal well-being recipes and somehow contradicting its own ideological (universal and emancipatory promising) principles. In fact, leading international actors prioritise the integration of the affected societies in world market economy and the institution of representative democracy, even if in a superficial and almost just formal way (Pugh, 2000). The goal is to guarantee a liberal peace controlled by the so-called developed world (Pureza et al., 2005). That is why, for Ramsbotham (2000: 179), this standardisation and superficial implementation of this supposed universal and emancipatory model is rather the expression of a subjective project integrated in a broader framework of North-South relations, West-Rest relations that are
based not necessarily on cooperation but rather on hierarchical governance. For Mark Duffield (2001a; 2001b), these dynamics entail and fit perfectly a neo-colonial framework and dynamics between the “western” “metropolis” and its “borderlands”. Accordingly, the diagnoses associated with the liberal interventionist order, e.g. human security, development and peace, are nothing but a discourse to legitimise international intervention from the core countries - metropolis – in order to physically intervene and influence as well as conditioning politics, policies, structures and behaviours in the developed world - borderlands – so that the security and the interests of west powers can be secured.
Chapter 4 – “Mediabuilding” as Peacebuilding

“If (...) dominance is to survive, it must be legitimized: by their success in converting their subjects to their own systems of beliefs”
- Michael Howard

“All propaganda is lies, even when one is telling the truth”
- George Orwell

The focus of donor agencies and governmental and non-governmental bodies on the setting up of media outlets, radio production facilities or media legis media in contexts of conflict escalation and peacebuilding has grown steadily in the last two decades and given way to increasingly complex forms of external media intervention. Underlying this focus lays a broad consensus, both academic and political, that the media can be both a weapon of violence and an instrument of peace and democracy, depending on given use.

At first merely considered as a public information mechanism within UN peacebuilding missions, media intervention has speedily evolved to reforming media laws, removing barriers against freedom of press and expression, strengthening constituencies for media reform, training journalists to develop the capacity for professional modern reporting, as well as setting up peace media (i.e. media aimed at alleviating hate speech, reconciling parties in a conflict, as well as inverting and preventing the cultural and structural elements that supposedly generate and fuel violence), making media intervention to fit the wider peacebuilding project of creating a liberal and sustainable liberal peace worldwide. That is why, and just like a mirror effect, media intervention within peacebuilding can be seen as ‘mediabuilding’ – the voice vehicle for the spread and amplification of the active principles of liberal values and political and economic projects.

71 The term “mediabuilding” is the result of a very rich discussion between myself, José Manuel Pureza, Oliver Richmond and Teresa de Almeida Cravo within a research project application.
72 Howard, Michael (2002 [2001]) The Invention of Peace & the Reinvention of War, London: Profile Books, pp.4
73 This quotation comes from Orwel’s diary entry for March, 14, 1942, when he was working as a “propagandist” for the British Broadcasting Corporation Eastern services. It was cited in C. Fleay & M. L. Sanders, “Looking into the Abyss: George Orwell at the BBC”, Journal of Contemporary History, 24 (1989): 503 – 18, 512.
This chapter critically examines the dominant understandings underlying externally-supported interventions in the media sector as a specific component of liberal peacebuilding, and highlights the media as a technological power device aimed at perpetuating, transforming or destroying specific society and world orders. As such, it is divided into four parts. The first presents the third presupposition – the media as a non-neutral technology - from which this study departs and explores the media as a technological power device. The second presents the origins and evolution of mediabuilding to highlight the continuum trait of these forms of intervention. The third part presents the liberal ideological component of media intervention and the way media fit, from a theoretical point of view, a wider global peace project. The third part focuses on media intervention within peacebuilding proposal and interventions. Finally, the fourth part intends to explore the utilitarian presence of mediabuilding within peacebuilding.

1. Media as a non-neutral technology

The technological nature of the media creates a propensity for them to be perceived as a mere objective, efficient, rational, self-effacing vehicle and no longer as a situated agent, product and productive of a political agenda. Technology is, therefore, usually seen and mostly perceived - like Harold Garfinkel (1967: 36) would say “seen but unnoticed” - as devoided from any ideology due to its friendly use and efficiency. However, if the premise of technology as neutral is accepted, how would we perceive, for example, its environmental, social and political impacts? Would we call them accidental side effects? Can the Wall of China or the Berlin Wall be regarded as a purely neutral, inanimate, brick-built construction, referenced by rational and technological goals? Can - or even should - we devoid the integration of the political and ideological purposes of such edifices? Can an object just be the sum of the parts it’s made of, or does it embodies something more? Doesn’t a Mercedes Benz tell something about its owner’s potential economic and social class?

“Each useful thing (iron, paper, etc.) is to be considered from a double point of view, in accordance with quality and quantity. Each such thing is a totality of many properties and is therefore able to be useful in different respects. The discovery of these different respects and hence of the manifold modes of utility of things is an historical
act. Of such a kind is the invention of social measurement for the quantity of useful things. The diversity of the commodity-measurements arises partly from the diverse nature of the objects to be measured and partly from convention” (Marx, 1867).

Technology is a product and a way of relating to reality. Its lack of neutrality is expressed and embedded in itself and regarding what it creates and the purposes it serves. Both mass media and new online social media make clear use of technologies to fulfil their purpose. In this line, they are a technological tool. This is where the non-neutrality of media starts. Nevertheless, there are also other elements that feed this non-neutrality trait which are closely related to discourse as language, ubiquity and mediation power. Media technologies serve a variety of social purposes, such as representation, communication, community formation, imagination and social action. Hence, media technology is highly related (sometimes even responsible) to wider social, political and economic transformations in societies and thus, media as technology and discourse can never be divorced from media wider contexts.

Based on the premise that technology and the trivialisation of the media in everyday lives are some of the important features of the media that help to render them as neutral in societies, this section intends to discuss the ideology that exists in technology, exploring, hence, the third presupposition of this study: the recognition of media as a non-neutral technology (McLuhan, 2002) managed by situated actors committed to a specific agenda in an agency-network (Latour, 1986) logic. As such, it is divided into three parts. The first one explores the argument that technology is non-neutral and the second one explains the power of the media in societies and the third deconstructs the idea that media are a mere arena for other actors in International Relations, rather than an actor or an agent of their own right.

1.1 – Technology and neutrality: an unsure relation?

When thinking about technology one’s mind easily tends to comb through ideas and notions of intelligence, efficiency, competence, automaticity which themselves entail a logic of infallibility, success and neutrality (Grayling, 2002; Feenberg, 2005). On the basis of this significance and liaison rationale lies the concept of rationality - an optimal reasoning strategy that allows rational beings to derive conclusions in a consistent, objective, logical and evidence-based way (Grayling, 2002) - and sharp functionality -,
leaving aside any injection of emotions, feelings, beliefs, instincts, ideologies or culturally specific moral codes and norms which would be considered subjective bias. Technology, therefore, appears to borrow the virtues one generally attributes to scientific rationality and practical utilitarianism, this last one in the sense that the criterion of virtue is utility.

However, if technology is neutral, i.e., if it is indifferent to all range of possible ends it can serve (Feensberg, 2005), then its immense environmental, social and political impacts are accidental side effects? If technology is neutral, so it is abstracted from any socio-historical context? Doesn’t technology make possible human creations? Aren’t humans political and social agents? The neutrality thesis of technology obscures its own social and political dimensions and places it beyond any possible controversy. Failing to recognize the non-neutrality of technological action would be similar to state that China or Berlin Walls are neutral constructions (Feensburg, 1991), since as they are inanimate, brick built and referenced by rational and technological goals, they don’t integrate any political or ideological purposes.

This study rejects any essentialist approach which defines technology in abstraction from any socio-historical context. Technology is here conceptualised taking into account both dimensions of the concept: the most evident and first-sight dimension, which is the objective and rational one, but also the networked and subjective one, which unearths technology as a non-neutral tool (therefore a power tool), fairly vigorous regarding social moulding and political action. As such, what I propose here is to understand technology “not only [as] a specific machine or a particular [technological] method, but [as] a more generic and interconnected system” (McQuire, 2006: 254), which uses rationality and efficiency as a reference, and is materialised in a bilateral phenomenon that frames through its action and structure social and political practices and perceptions. Feenberg (2005) best explains this definition. According to the author, “technology is a two-sided phenomenon: on the one hand the operator, on the other the object. Where both operator and object are human beings, technical action is an exercise of power. Where, further, society is organized around technology, technological power is the principle form of power in the society. It is realized through designs which narrow the range of interests and concerns that can be represented by the normal functioning of the technology and the institutions which depend on it. This narrowing distorts the
structure of experience and causes human suffering and damage to the natural environment” (Feenberg, 2005: 49).

The technological domain’s power (or un-neutrality) is supported by two complementary dimensions. The first dimension is the technology itself, and in this sense, this study distances itself from Habermas's (1971) approach which states that in its proper sphere technology is neutral, even if outside that sphere it causes the various social pathologies that are the chief problems of modern societies. From a Marxist perspective, a good is never just a good but has value in it (Marx, 1867) and a value is never neutral. Materials, colours, sounds of technological devices, which are attached and dependent of their own technological nature, gives textures to their surrounding environments (McLuhan, 2002), influencing moods as well as the atmospheres in which actors develop their daily life. Also, technology itself has several different types of communicative content, even if not saying a word. Some technologies, such as automobiles and desks, communicate the status of their owners (Forty, 1986); others, such as locks, communicate legal obligations; most technologies also communicate through the interfaces by which they are manipulated. A computer program, for example, transmits the designer's conception of the problems to which the program is addressed while also helping to solve those problems (Suchman, 1987). In any transportation system, technology can be found organizing large numbers of people without discussion; they need only follow the rules and the map. Again, workers in a “well-designed” factory find their job posts almost automatically because of the structure of the equipment and buildings — their action is coordinated — without much linguistic interaction. “We are never faced with objects or social relations, we are faced with chains which are associations of humans . . . and non-humans . . . No one has ever seen a social relation by itself . . . nor a technical relation” (Latour, 1991: 110). In using technology, or certain technologies, “we make many unwitting cultural [economic, social and political] choices” (Feenberg, 1991: 8). For example, the impact of technology on labour and leisure we witness today influences life from the organization of labour to modes of thought (Marcuse, 2002), being part of the mesh of foucaultian “politics of truth” (Foucault, 2007).

The second dimension is technology as a tool susceptible of being instrumentalised. This aspect is intimately connected to the lack of operational autonomy (Deleuze, 2002; Pool, 1983), i.e., the acknowledgement of subjectivities among the actors which create
and make use of technology, as well as among the structures in which those actors are
integrated (e.g. companies, political parties, social movements, countries, communities).
Technology can do “anything but add itself on to [or fulfil the potential – good or bad] what we already are” (McLuhan, 2002: 20). Likewise, for Diamond (2012: 5),
“technology is merely a tool, open to both noble and nefarious purposes” depending on
our axiological, ideological and subsequent judgemental position. Technology is, thus,
co-opted and manipulated to one’s cultural, economic and ideological ends, explicitly or
merely by suggestion. As Andrew Feenberg (1991; 2005) states, whenever in
technological domain there are rational actors implied, technological action becomes a
site of power and of creation, expansion or consolidation of ideologies. Marshall
McLuhan (2002) also synthetized this idea with the well-known quote “the medium is
the message”, i.e., “what one did with the machine, that was its meaning or message”

These two aforementioned aspects are key-elements to understand technology as a
power tool. Both of them are intimately linked to the acknowledgement of technology
as a subject-driven (even if not conscious) tool. It is precisely within the subjectivity
domain that technology and ideology best merge, giving rise to the idea that
“technology is ideology” (Feenberg, 1991), even if it is “invisible ideology” (Lefort,
1986). Additionally, it underlines the path dependence of the technology towards the
specificities of the ideological projects that its hosting societies support.

Traditionally, the hierarchy of the technical gets completely merged with social
hierarchy (Habermas, 2006), which highlights even more the governing and controlling
character of technology – those who rule or who hold a higher position in societies are
the ones controlling technology’s manufacturing and mostly its purpose and content.

By content I mean not only the explicit (e.g. the written text in newspapers) but also the
implicit one (e.g. ‘the medium is the message’ and the ideological dimension of the
medium), what one would synthetize, based on McLuhan (2002) well-known quote
already aforementioned in ‘the medium and the message are the message’. Latour’s
point is not that there is no social dimension to existence, but rather that ‘the social’ is
always already technical, just as ‘the technical’ is always already social. Technology
emerges, hence, as a control governing mechanism (Deleuze, 2002). In this sense, and
according to Deleuze (Ibidem), the digital era represents a shift from “disciplinary” to
“control” societies. Whereas disciplinary societies depended on moulds, physical

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structures, such as Bentham’s panoptic architecture, control societies operate by modulation, a flexible form of active ongoing shaping defined by the (imperceptible) ubiquity of digital information.

This said, it doesn’t mean that the end of technology flows won’t find any resistances or cannot be divorced from hegemonic elites. In fact, there is no unidimensionality or linearity allocated to technological flows, i.e., there is also a response, a resistance or a flow-back (Feenberg, 1991; Deleuze, 2002). Moreover, the flood of information that characterises digital culture is simultaneously the extension of control and the possibility of its disruption. Along this line, technology might be regarded as a power tool towards coercion, conformation, control, subversion or revolution, since it is always ideological (and most of the times strategically) in its both ends.

In the last decade, with the democratisation of the access to technology, particularly to media technologies (e.g. new online social media, Wikipedia), the possibility and the existence of resistance movements is highly evident. However, despite systems of differentiation (Foucault, 1994) in terms of access start decreasing, the forms of institutionalisation concerning technology are still different regarding elites or higher social classes and resistance movements. However, just as power is diffuse so is resistance and technology also allows for resistance to uproot in grassroots and in elite domains.

1.2 – The puzzle holding media power

The word ‘media’ comes from Latin "media", the plural of "medium", which means "the one standing in the middle”, according to Porto Editora’s Latin-Portuguese dictionary. Even if not in explicit terms, the idea of mediation is implicit since its inception. The idea of the media as we know them today dates only to the 1920’s, the decade where people began to speak of the ‘media’. A generation later, in the 1950’s, the idea and concern of a ‘communication revolution’ started (Briggs & Burke, 2009). Regardless of the terms or concepts given to portrait and describe a specific reality, the concern with means of communication is very much older than that. Rhetoric, the art of oral and written communication was taken very seriously in ancient Greece and Rome and it was studied in the Middle Age and with even greater enthusiasm during the Renaissance or Modern times. This is because of the importance of what Jesus Martin-
Barbero calls “fields of mediation” (1993: 139), i.e., the various places by which social action has been mediated through the public circulation of images and text, being them started by those in power or contesting it. So why do we place any value and credence in media outputs at all? How is media power – the particular concentration of symbolic power that the media represent (Couldry, 2000) – reproduced as legitimate? And how does technology relate to media power?

In all historical periods and societies it is visible the existence of a hierarchical co-relationship of discursive domains and actors which influence with a high level of social authority the social and political action of societies. The Catholic Church in Europe during the Middle Ages is a good example of this kind of authority, which then had even more strength since it crosscut the different social and political classes at that time. Since then, there has been no other discursive domain, sphere or actor with the power to captivate information and influence interests as well as political agendas but the media. Likewise, the value one acknowledges to the media is almost dogmatic, since unquestioned. Four distinct elements make the media one of the most powerful discursive actors within today’s societies: (discourse as) language; technology, mediation and ubiquity.

Positivist assumptions on language as a linear and transparent medium to communicate and to objectively describe reality seem to ignore the active role it has in creating narratives, which themselves hold subjective lenses regarding reality. Within narratives, language performs a central role in modelling events and issues through the attribution of labels and roles (i.e., identify and associate characteristics, motives, values, behaviours to actors, groups or issues). Language doesn’t therefore limit itself to reflect reality simply and objectively, rather it actively builds its own version of the facts (Jabri, 1996) through symbolic subjective and ideological filters. These, in turn, are built upon a cultural, ideological and symbolic pre-existing and latent order allowing the direct association of a specific meaning subjectively chosen to a certain reality, restraining the potential variety of interpretations of its object or subject. This is what Stuart Hall (1973; 1993) named ‘encoding’, i.e., the producer of the media message (encoder) framed (or encoded) meaning in a certain subjective way which is, in turn, influenced by frameworks of knowledge, relations of production and technical

74 Napoleon stated “there are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run, the sword is always beaten by the mind” (Bowdish, 2006).
infrastructure, creating a specific meaning structure and forming or reproducing a meaningful discourse (*Ibidem*). Hall (1993 [1980]: 95) also clarifies that “certain codes may, of course, be so widely distributed in a specific language, community or culture, and be learned at so early age, that they appear not to be constructed (...) but to be 'naturally' given(...), [which] does not mean that no codes have intervened; rather, that the codes have been profoundly naturalized. The operation of naturalized codes reveals not the transparency and naturalness of language but the depth, the habituation, and the near-universality of the codes in use. They produce apparently natural recognitions. This has the (ideological) effect of concealing the practices of coding which are present”. As Latour and Woolgar put it in Laboratory Life, ‘the result of the construction of a fact is that it appears unconstructed by anyone’ (1979: 240) The rules of exclusion identified by Foucault (1972) perfectly fit to explain this discursive power.

Likewise, this capacity and richness of verbal language also applies to non-verbal language (Möller, 2007). The technological nature of the media allows them to explore the non-verbal language in a strong and unique way. The use of images, colours, sounds, textures and soundtracks promotes the potential and contextualises verbal language, making it incredibly and increasingly richer, thus, contributing to a better communication impact. It comes as no surprise, thus, that TV is widely recognised as the most privileged communication and information media (Dunn, 2005). By presenting bodies, body language, voices and action, conversely to the mere sound that radio transmits or the text newspapers distribute, TV gives a cognitive and emotional experience without competitors within conventional media. On the other hand, the great transformations as well as technological developments that media have undertaken in the last decades (which are highly comparable to Gutenberg’s revolution) give media a great capacity to reach increasingly wider geographies allowing them to bridge otherwise unbridgeable realities, creating ‘stretched-out networks’ (Callon & Latour, 1981). This applies both to geography – according to Marshall McLuhan (2002), the true message of any medium or technology is to be sought “in the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces to human affairs” (Mcluhan, 2002: 18) - and to contents. That is why authors like Gitlin (1980) and Roach (1993) state that there is an increasing cognitive dependency towards the media. Eugene Shaw (1979: 101) sums up greatly this mediation power the media entail when he affirms that “the understanding that people have concerning much of social reality [is itself] (...) offered on loan by the
media”, to the extent that the recipient is not able to control the accuracy of the social representation. James Carey puts forward this idea in a sharper way. According to Carey (1989: 87), “reality is a scarce resource” and, as such, “the fundamental form of power is the power to define, allocate and display this resource”, highlighting, just as Foucault would argue, that the power of the media is the power to produce the “politics of truth” (Foucault, 1972). Moreover, it is important to note that media technologies do not mediate between themselves and people A and B, rather they mediate among people and that is what distinguishes them from all others as a specific variety of (content mediating) technology, being them conventional media (e.g. radio, newspapers, television) or new online social media (e.g. facebook, youtube, myspace, twitter). Media are technologies which mediate the representation and perception of reality, therefore, are intrinsically related (sometimes even responsible) to wider social transformations.

On the top of all these, media are ubiquitous in people’s lives, through newspapers, radio, online platforms or TV. It is, in fact, difficult to conceive a day where our routine doesn’t come across at any moment with information or entertainment content of the media, even if one doesn’t look for them deliberately. The ones who don’t access the media in a deliberate and voluntary way also end up, on their daily life, to be flooded by media contents (informative or entertaining ones) – newspaper stands, radios in public spaces, such as cafés, dentists, hairdressers, free press distributed in public transports (e.g. Destak, in Portugal) – allowing media to have an important say and modelling capacity regarding political agendas, security threats, success models (Zinnes, 1968). Couldry sums this idea in what he calls ‘the myth of the mediated centre’ (Couldry, 2003a: 162-3), i.e., “the belief, or assumption, that there is a centre to the social world, and that, in some sense the media speaks for that centre. “This myth underlies our orientation to television, radio and the press (...) as the social centre, and our acceptance of that centre position in our lives as legitimate”. There is also another important aspect of media ubiquity which relates and justifies media power. Media is not something superimposed on social practice. They become “obligatory passing points” (Callon and Latour, 1981: 287) not because it is imposed as such, but because they themselves and their social representations are “endlessly reproduced through the details of social practice itself” (Couldry, 2000: 5).
Due to language and technology, media are a very rich actor, from a communication and narrative-building perspectives. Due to ubiquity and mediation capacity, media end up modelling “what the people knows or ignores, pays attention to or dismisses, highlight or neglect” (Shaw, 1979: 96). Therefore, people tend to “include or exclude from their own knowledge what the mass media include or exclude from their own contents” (*Ibidem*). The media are the discursive actor to whom everyone who wants to inform or be informed access.

In other words, the media have the ability to validate the construction and the interpretation of specific narratives regarding events, actors, issues, policies. There are two examples which do sustain this argument. The first one relates to the rating agencies which despite having existed for long time have passed, since 2008, from a virtually unknown role to an absolute centrality in terms of financial and political questions (UNCTAD, 2009), mostly due to media coverage which have underlined their prominence in the EUA subprime crisis and subsequent effects on American and European financial crisis as well as regarding financial stress of states, companies and citizens. Automatically, the demands of citizens towards states are framed by those rating agencies discourse and agendas – contesting or accepting them. The second one is the case of the Radio Television de Milles Collines, in Rwanda. Directed by Hutu who supported the then President Habyarimana, who got killed in an aeroplane crash, reported as terrorist attack, the Radio Television de Milles Collines started a strong appeal – labelled by themselves as “final war” (Smith, 2003) giving it a clear ethnic framing and justification, and a logic of “kill or be killed” (Kellow & Steeves, 1998). The hate speech, which was broadcasted through that radio, identified in a very explicit way the Tutsi – to whom they referred as “cockroaches” or “tall trees” – and moderate Hutus as a threat to Hutu’s survival. The radio also gave precise places where Tutsi and moderate Hutus could be found in order to be eliminated. Radio Television de Milles Collines was consensually identified as one of the main responsible of the ethnic hostility and subsequent mobilisation which created the opportunity and justification for the genocide of 1994 in the region to happen (Orentlicher, 2005).

However, the power of the media isn’t an absolute one. There is also power attached/allocated to the acts of viewing and listening, i.e., audience members are active subjects who filter the information according to their own system of beliefs and ideology, and can also be active producers of meaning. In fact, contrary to popular
assumptions, the mass media cannot directly change most people’s strongly-held attitudes or opinions since audiences tend to select and interpret media messages in accordance with their existing attitudes and beliefs, and their use of the mass media tends to reinforce these (Lazarsfeld, 1948; Katz et al., 2005 [1955]). Therefore, the influence of the media is not consistent across the audience; instead, the impact varies according to the individual and the situation (Ibidem). This possibility of resisting media-encoded reality is what Stuart Halls defines as ‘decoding’ processes. According to Hall (1973; 1980) media audiences decode the messages to which they are presented with, interpreting them in possible different ways than the way they were encoded, depending on their collective or individual’s cultural background, economic standing, and personal experiences. In fact, contrasting other media theories that disempower audiences, Hall advances the idea that audience members can play an active role in decoding messages as they rely on their own social contexts, and might even be capable, or hold the ‘power to’ change messages themselves through collective action (Ibidem). This also goes in line with Foucault’s conception of power.

Nevertheless, as Hall (1981) and Mulvey (1989) have pointed out, media usually apply a host of strategies (e.g. stereotyping, essentialising; reductionism, naturalisation, binary oppositions, deletion, fantasy, disavowal) that predispose and guide media public towards contents favouring existing and dominant power structures. By challenging resistance conceptualisation, spaces and politics, requiring “a new way of thinking about power and inequality” (Melucci, 1996: 179), as well as the “centralities and marginalities in relation not merely to material resources (…) but control over [discourses and] the construction of meaning” (Ibidem: 182). According to Marx and Engels (1968), the mass media are a means of production which in capitalist society are in the ownership of the ruling class, simply, hence, disseminating the ideas and world views of the ruling class, and denying or defusing alternative ideas. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. According to this stance, the mass media functioned to produce ‘false consciousness’ in the working-classes. This leads to an extreme stance whereby media products are seen as monolithic expressions of ruling class values, which ignores any diversity of values within the ruling class and within the media, and the possibility of oppositional readings by media audiences (Ibidem).
Media are hence one of the places where ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ converge and dispute. According to Laclau (1996), emancipatory processes from or within the media should entail as key member literacy and critical awareness. Literacy begins to be possible in a situation in which there is a proliferation of discourses opposed to oppression. In situations of oppression, the oppressed do not immediately or necessarily recognize them as such, but once discourses of liberation begin to proliferate and circulate, oppression can then become a question. For Laclau (Ibidem), a literate culture is a "culture of questions," and it is the ethical and political obligation of educators and progressive intellectuals to create such a culture, one that is democratic to the extent that the possibility of unlimited questioning exists. This understanding of hegemonic struggle as an ongoing and never-ending process offers a cogent critique of the liberal dream of a fully reconciled society from which "all antagonism and power relations would have been eliminated." Laclau argues compellingly that the "paradox of freedom" is that "in order to have freedom you have to institute the other of freedom, which is power."

2 – Media Agencies: Whose actor? Which actor?

In International Relations Theory, the media are usually presented as an arena where (real) actors move in order to obtain increasing power (Realism; Marxism; Post-structuralism), a space for public opinion to emerge (Liberalism) or as a functionalist actor (Copenhagen Security Studies - Buzan et al, 1998). Barthwal-Datta (2009), defined greatly this insisting trend as an "Westphalian straightjacket”. Also, within sociology and media studies, literature has mostly based its analysis on the production, message and reception processes of the media rather than on reflecting or acknowledging their status as actor in their own right. In fact, within agency reflections, the action of the media is mostly seen as a social space within which ‘real actors’ produce representations wage their battles or enforce their agendas (Castells, 2010), highlighting the role of media as an intermediary mechanism.

I argue that media, just as all other actors, are simultaneously an actor and a platform for other actors to use according to their agendas. On the one hand, they have agency, they set agendas are actors formed by different people/groups with distinct motivations, profile, trajectories. They, hence, reproduce the same institution (e.g.
media outlets) in different ways. On the other hand, the media are also a space in which different actors operate, being susceptible of being instrumentalised by political agendas and parties, powerful economic groups, or different other lobbies. However, this possibility of becoming a puppet on a string doesn’t render the media as a mere platform and no longer an actor. E. Shaw (2000) suggests the use of a conception of media as agent and structure. However, if to be an actor is both to have agency and be a platform, there is no need to concept the media separately as an actor and a structure for all other actors to move on. For this purpose, I find the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) perspective more useful. According to ANT, it is the combinations and interactions of elements (humans and non-humans) that matters and that makes any analysis and theory successful. In this sense, the media are a multi-levelled, discourse and technologically driven actor.

3 – Media intervention within Peacebuilding

Having its roots in earlier decades, media intervention only emerged as a significant intervention tool of development and peacebuilding policies in the 1980’s and 1990’s, just following the end of the Cold-War. Since then, it has evolved from relatively modest programs with minor donations of equipment and training hours for journalists to long-term, multi-faceted media projects with multi-million dollar budgets, engaging an increasing number of distinct governmental and non-governmental actors (Price, 2002), as well as geographic areas to be targeted. From late 1980’s to 2002 multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, private foundations and international civil society has spent around 600$ million to $1 billion on media projects (Hume, 2002). From its beginning to its latest forms, a common denominator has been identified: the need to normalise and standardise societies according to the models that those actors that are discursively and materially able to do so, prescribe for the proclaimed diagnosis and as path for success.

By definition media intervention refers to all activities and projects that secure, exercise, challenge or acquire media power for tactical and strategic action (Couldry, 2013). Media intervention, depending on its procedures rather than on its outcomes, can be positive or negative. Negative media intervention refers to coercion measures towards media, such as the physical destruction of media outlets (e.g. bombing their
facilities), jamming their signal, switching off transmitters or making use of censorship. It can be done from inside or outside of the targeted country. Examples of each of these forms of negative media intervention can be found in different scenarios and decades since the middle of 20th century, if not before. During the Cold War, the jamming of radio broadcasts to east of the Iron Curtain and vice-versa was commonplace and it still is a tactic of distinct actors within violent conflicts, authoritarian regimes and political tension situations (BBC, 2013; Iran focus, 2011). Indeed, Spain jammed Radio Euskadi in the 1960’s and 1970’s, England was said to have jammed Egyptian broadcasters during the Suez crisis (Berg, 2008) and, recently, there is, among many others, the example of Ethiopian government jamming of Deutsche Welle broadcaster (Schadomsky, 2010) during parliamentary elections. Likewise, bombing media outlets were part of ordinary choices in the Second World War, and still keep happening: namely, in South Kivu where local radios are continuously attacked by rebel forces (Willum, 2003); and in Kosovo, where, on the 23rd April 1999, NATO bombed the Belgrade's main TV station (Amnesty International, 2009). In turn, censorship has been ever-present in negative media intervention tactics/strategies. However, since the end of the Cold War and liberal international interventions started, besides the traditional way censorship is applied, internationally or externally-driven censorship has also started to emerge. One of the examples was when, on the 28th March 2004, following Paul Bremer’s orders (the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad), US troops padlocked the door of Al Hawza, a popular Shiite newspaper. The reasons evoked for the forced closure were the claimed evidences that the newspaper was inciting violence against coalition troops. It was asserted that continuing to allow the flow of inaccurate anti-American rumours was hindering the possibility of promoting peace and unity (Allen & Stremlau, 2005).

Positive media intervention, also commonly called “media assistance” (Price, 2002; Kumar, 2006), can also take different forms but their common denominator is to consist of actions of creation, transference or building up, i.e., apparently non-destructive actions. Positive media intervention can actually take the form of training local human resources, producing media contents and programmes to be broadcasted in local media, setting up radios, TV or newspapers, reforming media laws, and providing consultancy services to local professionals and decision-making actors (Price, 2002).
The genesis of the idea behind the proposal of media intervention lies in the belief that reality is not limited to its objective dimension but yet develops and is built subjectively by different actors based on their perception, social experience and, particularly, assimilated discourses (Harris & Morrison, 2003). In this sense, the media are seen as key instrument to shape perceptions, behaviours, social constructions, political actions and axiological hierarchies, emerging as a crucial bargainers of social and political reality for media gather the necessary conditions to be able to influence imagined (individual or collective) reality (Ibidem: 14), with obvious repercussions in social dynamics either at the relational level (e.g. attitudes and behaviours) or at the structural level (e.g. redistributive social organization and management of economic resources). The bottom-line of media intervention within peacebuilding is clearly that if programmed to do so, media are the recognised key vehicles to successfully build peace in the minds of women and men, as well as in the structure of the societies in which they live in.

3.1– The increasing recognised importance of media in pacifying world efforts

From a political-institutional point of view, the Constitution Treaty of UNESCO (1947) best summarises the idea that underlies the principle for peace(building) media. At the beginning of its statement, it says “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”(UNESCO, 1947). This particular understanding of the role of media as peacebuilders agents echoed in different other international documents. The first to mention is the Helsinki Final Act (OSCE, 1975). In its preamble to Section III, signatories’ states recognise the need to expand the cooperation and dissemination of information at the level of the media and media outlets aiming at promoting mutual understanding of the peoples as well as the general objectives that the Final Act endorsed. Three years later, on the 28th November 1978, UNESCO publishes its Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, apartheid and incitement to war. In its Article III, UNESCO is particularly clear: “the mass media have an important contribution to make to the strengthening of peace and international understanding and in countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to
war. (...) the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all peoples, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples, (...) [making] nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others, to ensure the respect of the rights and dignity of all nations, all peoples and all individuals without distinction of race, sex, language, religion or nationality and to draw attention to the great evils which afflict humanity, such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, thereby promoting the formulation by States of the policies best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and equitable settlement of international disputes”. More recently, in 1999, the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/243 acknowledges the importance of the mass media as a way to build and broadcast a culture of peace worldwide.

However, despite the cumulative acknowledgement of the role of media in building international (and local) peace, the actual conquest of a relevant role within the organigram of UN peacebuilding missions only happened in early 1990’s. Three main reasons justify this centrality. First, the deep technological and structural transformations that mass media have suffered make them an increasing efficient and challenging means of action (Tehanian, 2002). Second, the victory of the Western bloc in the Cold War, and the subsequent passage from a bipolar to a unipolar world removed barriers to the international spread of television channels, radio stations as well as publications, and paved the way for the expansion of both the liberal ideology and the democratic political model of organising societies, within which the media perform an inescapable role (Howard, 2003), giving people greater familiarity with the media and, in turn, giving media growing reputation. Finally, the fourth and eventually the most striking one, the appearance of what literature defines as “hate media”, i.e., media that spur ethnic hatred and promote violence (Price, 2000; Bratic, 2005a). One of the most cited examples was the case of Radio Télévision des Mille Collines in Rwanda. The programming broadcasted on this radio station was actually seen as one of the key responsible or triggering elements of the genocide of thousands of Tutsis, in 1994 (Thompson, 2007), generating instability along the whole Great Lakes region, particularly Uganda, Brundi and DRC. Similar cases also happened in the violent conflicts which took place in the Balkans, Liberia, Burundi and the Soviet Republic of Georgia (Frohardt and Temin, 2007). The increasing proliferation and efficient impact of these ‘hate media’ reminded the international community of the historical impact of
Nazi propaganda, claiming for counter-action measures (Bratic, 2005a). In a counter-hate and antidote logic, international interventionist actors, such as the UN, bilateral donors and NGOs, started to set up media aimed at working as a catalyst for positive change and peace promotion (Howard, 2003). They were coined as “peace media” (Bratic, 2005a) to highlight both their counter-hate identity and engagement with peacebuilding efforts.

3.2 – Early stages of the media as core-led normalisation tool for the periphery

Despite media intervention rapid development/emergence after 1989, particularly the positive one, these kinds of initiatives and intervention policies were not born in a vacuum of ideas or past experiences. Rather, they were indirectly shaped by theories, assumptions and concrete policies formulated particularly during and after the World War II and perfected and updated according to respective historical structures. Two particular examples are of great importance as periphery core-driven “normalization” tools. These are: Communication for Development, which can be seen as the embryo, and Media Development, best portrayed as the direct antecedent.

3.2.1 - Communication for development: the embryo

Communication for Development is a prescriptive research line or approach initiated within the Modernization Theory. According to its scholars (Lerner, 1958, Schramm, 1964; Lipset, 1959), the introduction of modern media and communications systems, as well as practices, were critical prerequisites of modernity, which was perceived to be equivalent to the American or European model, i.e., “the west” (Hall, 2006). Against the model of state socialism, modernization theory emphasized the construction of Western-style political and social institutions as indicators of progress, arguing that such constructs were vital in the creation of vibrant industrial democracies. Indeed, according to this school, countries in the considered ‘Third World’ were ‘backward’ in comparison with countries in North America and Western Europe. The panacea for this

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75 “On a visit to New York, talking to some UN peacekeepers, with this idea - Here, I’m not talking about propaganda. I am talking about truthful propaganda, to counter hate propaganda” (Bratic, 2005a: 26).
‘backwardness’ was a process of evolution terminating in modernization, which involved a phased, lineal, irreversible, progressive, and lengthy process modelled on the development paths of the developed world (O’Neil, 1998; Himmelstrand, 1994). A key dimension of this process is free trade, whose success would be highly dependent on agricultural goods, which in turn, should had a comparative advantage on a competitive market (*Ibidem*). In his 20th January 1949 inaugural speech, President Truman (1949) synthetized this world division as well as its modern recue intention and perspective: “We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas”, crosscutting decades, implied and sometimes overtly stated, there was the presupposition shared by academics and politicians that the goal of development should be to propel traditional or indigenous cultures towards modernity and that traditional practices and institutions that were not modern stood in the way of development. Along this rationale, and bearing in mind that Communication for Development kicked off in the 1950s when Propaganda had a central role, the media were perceived as key/vital/forefront actors: they could transmit and communicate new knowledge to underdeveloped societies, such as agricultural techniques and so forth (Bessette, data). Just as it was believed that ‘west’ and the ‘rest’ shared a common platform of evolution, though in different points of the evolutionary process, it was also (erroneously) assumed that once introduced, modern media systems would function in identical ways in developing countries as they did in developed ones, fostering industrialised societies and democratic regimes (Lerner, 1958, Schramm, 1964; Lipset, 1959). The flow of information, within this model, was openly unidirectional representing what some authors have called a new form of colonial domination (Galtung, 1971).

Daniel Lerner’s (1958) ‘The Passing of Traditional Society’ was one of the key studies that served as an illustration of this initial dominant paradigm in the field of development communication. He argued that the media were key socializing institutions and a chief tool to encourage indigenous populations to embrace modernity. Despite patriarchal and simplistic, Lerner’s proposed model of social change inspired many different programming of UN and bilateral donors’ agencies (Hyden & Leslie 2002). Likewise, Walt Rostow published ‘The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto’ (1991) which highlighted the positive widespread adoption of
ICTs and media platforms (mainly radio), perceived as hallmarks of modernity. In 1963, Everett Rogers released the ‘Diffusion of Innovations’, which stressed the importance of the mass media as conduits for changing the work practices of the rural poor. And one year later, Wilbur Schramm, in partnership with UNESCO, released ‘Mass Media and National Development’ (1964). Together, these proposals created a model that inspired international communication for development action. In fact, during these two decades - 1950s and 1960s -, the UNESCO and other major UN agencies, such as the FAO, UNDP and the UNICEF promoted communication tools and usage within the framework of development project implementation. USAID also supported different development projects utilizing the media for communication, information, or educational purposes. Local media were “expected to emulate Western patterns of behaviour and contribute to the construction of democracy” (O’Neil, 1998: 3).

However, from the 1970’s onwards voices from development practitioners and developing countries academics raised fundamental questions and criticisms regarding this mainstreamed one-way transmission of information from the sender to the receiver. Some of the most important contributors to this policy change was Paulo Freire who produce seminal works on participatory communication, particularly ‘The Pedagogy of the Oppressed’ (1970) and ‘liberating pedagogy’ (1979), where he proposed a dialogical communication model, which emphasised a close dialectic between collective action and reflection and works towards empowerment. Also, Everett Rodgers (1976) recognising the need to spread communication technologies worldwide, particularly related to agricultural and health, shed light on the need to take into account the social systems to which those technologies were directed to. Also, during the 1980’s the communication for development initiated a debate on the structural conditions for development to happen and on the dependence of the media regarding other wider and deeper social and economic processes to be successful as far as development is concerned (Narula & Pearce, 1986; Shore, 1980). Being increasingly critical, these analyses didn’t get much echoe in international intervention policies.

From the large UN summits during the 1990s and 2000s the participatory element of communication was increasingly consolidated. The Rome Consensus, in 2006, makes

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77 No consensus exists around a common definition of participation: it varies depending on the perspective applied. However, all of them share a common element in describing what participation would be: involvement of ordinary people in a development process leading to change (Tufte & Mefalopulos, 2009).
the case for the consensual role of communication for development as a strategy for fostering sustainable social and economic processes. The approach is participatory, and involves deepening communication links through a broad range of tools and methods that put those most affected by poverty and other underdeveloped or fragile situations at the centre of the process, so that they can voice their perspectives and then act on these ideas to improve their situation in relevant and sustainable ways (WCCD, 2006). Altogether, the Rome Consensus established a paradigm for media development that still lingers today and contributed to the consolidation of the media within media intervention systems, being it development aid, peacebuilding initiatives or humanitarian missions.

However, there is still a question that remains unanswered and that still challenges the paradigm of communication for development: if media themselves are ‘west’ created and local ‘rest’ participation is doomed to exist within a restricted western development model, how far from neo-colonialism is today’s communication for development?

### 3.2.2 – Media development: the direct antecedent

The term "media development" by and large refers to efforts by organizations, people, and sometimes governments to develop the capacity and quality of the media sector within a specific country or region (CIMA, s/d) experiencing efforts for democratisation. Although it existed before in an ad hoc basis, “media development” only emerged as a significant component of international development aid in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War. Initially, media assistance was mainly a form of direct aid to formerly state-socialist media, sent to ‘democratize’ them. In the ensuing years however, countless agencies and actors poured into Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America (Kumar, 2006) contributing significant amounts of money to help develop independent media and encourage “innovative programs for democracy promotion (Ibidem: 5).

Rhetorically, this intervention figure was sustained by two pillars, quite similar to those which would support media intervention within peacebuilding policies and missions from 1990s onwards. First, there was the belief that History had ended with the universal triumph of liberal democracy, and that this political project of organising
societies was inevitable and much-desired (Fukuyama, 1992). Second, there was the conviction attested by (western) theory and experience that, as Carothers (2004) says that free and independent media are the cornerstone of any democracy promotion effort. Moreover, it was then emphasised, similarly to the rhetoric of communication for development, “the construction of western-style political and social institutions as indicators of progress, arguing that such constructs were vital in the creation of vibrant industrial democracies” (O’Neil, 1998: 3). According to James Miller (2009:11) “foreign aid that fostered media modernization was among the most privileged – and perhaps effective –of the democratising development interventions the west could offer” at that time.

The goal of media development, within the context of supporting democratic transitions, was indeed to move the media from a monopolist state-owned stage to one which is more opened and has editorial independence, serving, hence and supposedly, what was said to be the public interest (Miller, 2009). In fact, as Monroe E. Price et al (2002: 4-5) state, the intervention method should allow societies to evolve on a self-overcoming logic from pre-transition where there was no freedom of expression’ and ‘no civic liberties’ to a ‘mature transition’ where both ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘full civil liberties’ could be experienced and, finally, to a ‘late and mature stage’ (Price et al, 2002: 4-5). Conversely to communication for development, whose discourses and practices were flooded by the ‘development’ buzzword, media development gets to know a different central catchphrase: democracy. Although within media development, ‘development’ and ‘democracy’ are often conflated into a single concept, just as within peacebuilding media intervention, ‘development’, ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ are also time and again conflated into a single concept and mission. Internews,\textsuperscript{78} the Baltic

\textsuperscript{78}Founded during the 1980s, Internews, established itself as a global entity involved in media assistance in the 1990s when it increased in size and in prominence in response to the media assistance needs of many post-communist countries. It establishes itself in a country and founds a local ‘Internews’ that will carry out the work of a media assistance NGO. Their goal is to establish NGOs that eventually are not seen as ‘Western assistance organizations’ and can carry out continuing efforts in that country. These local NGOs constitute the 16 member organizations of Internews International (based in Paris), an association established in 1998. Internews Network (based in California) takes the lead in project and resource development, while the country-based Internews International members focus on project implementation on the ground. Internews has also increased its concentration on media policy reform and issues involving ownership, regulation and licensing, access, censorship, development assistance, public versus private broadcasting, privacy, journalistic ethics, consumer education and the digital divide. The OSI has provided funding to Internews Europe for at least one lawyer in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Media Centre, among different other institutions, were some of the most prominent actors in promoting media development.

Media development was clearly the direct antecedent of the complex media intervention that gained shape from the 1990s onwards, still lingering today, particularly in African and Middle Eastern countries.

3.3 – Step by step into UN peacebuilding architecture

The process of incorporating media for peace in the overall architecture of the UN peacekeeping has evolved and established itself in a phased process which culminated with the journalist from the New York Times, Keith Spicer (1994), dubbed with a positive slant, "propaganda for peace."

79 The Baltic Media Center, which has trained journalists in Eastern Europe and elsewhere since the early 1990s, ended its work in 2005. The Denmark-based media assistance NGO received much of its funding from the Danish government. In the years following the Cold War, the center focused on training journalists in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Poland and Russia. As the Baltic countries moved toward democracy and eventual European Union membership, the BMC gradually shifted more of its focus to Russia, Southeast Europe, and other countries where the need was greater. In recent years, the center also organized projects in Afghanistan, the Middle East and North Africa, Nigeria and Southeast Asia. European governments funded much of the BMC’s international development work, while the center charged Western European media outlets for various training and consulting services. The BMC’s stated mission was to train and encourage media to participate in the promotion of democracy and international cooperation.

80 Propaganda is the gerund form of the Latin verb propagare, which means to spread or to propagate. Although originally referring to the biological reproduction of fauna and flora, its meaning has changed over time. Today’s meaning, which is intimately related to content and persuasion, or even manipulation, dates back to 1622, when the Catholic Church attempted to stem the rise of Protestantism during the Counter-Reformation and Pope Gregory XV issued the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide to counter the growing Protestant threat in order “to reconquer by spiritual arms” those areas “lost to the Church in the debacle of the sixteenth century” (Simpson and Weiner, 1989: 632). The use of propaganda was later broadened to “any association, systematic scheme, or concerted movement for the propagation of a particular doctrine or movement”. So, gradually, the use of the word expanded from the religious to the political realm (Ibidem). According to Aristotle A. Kallis (2005: 1) propaganda is “a systematic process of information management geared to promoting a particular goal and to guaranteeing a popular response as desired by the propagandist”. It is akin to advertising and public relations, but with a specific political purpose. It is designed to manipulate others’ beliefs and induce action in the interest of the propagator by drilling (successfully) the message into the listeners’ heads using in an overly simplified manner images, slogans and symbols that play on prejudices, identities, senses of belonging and emotions (REF). That is why Lasswell (1927: 627) defined it as “the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols”. That is why one common propaganda technique is bandwagoning, in other words appealing to people’s desire to belong especially to the winning side, rather than the rightness of the position. The ultimate goal of propaganda is to entice the recipient of the message to come to ‘voluntarily’ accept the propagandist’s position as if it was one’s own. Propaganda may be aimed at one’s own people or at members of other groups. It can be designed either to agitate the population or to pacify it. There can also be two types of propaganda: white propaganda is produced by a correctly identified source and is not intentionally deceptive, and black propaganda which is purposefully deceptive in giving the impression
The first phase took place in the 1980’s. The media were used as a key element to assist in humanitarian terms (Howard 2003b). Their function was to inform on food and water distribution and supply and alert for mined and battlefield zones (Florian, 2004). They were, hence, designed and set up to merely supply humanitarian information (Wimhurst 2002: 287). This kind of service continued to exist on the coming media intervention phases/stages.

Inaugurating the second phase, the first step towards the complexification of media within peacebuilding missions was progressively developed during the 1990s when media for peace ceased to be merely used and perceived exclusively as a means for humanitarian information (Wimhurst, 2002), and started to play the role of public information tool “to gain and maintain a broad support and understanding of peace...
operations” (Coker, 2003: 9). Its tasks and goals are now incorporated along the ones supporting the concept and strategy of what is commonly named in international relations and politics as “Public Diplomacy”. The first time an active role for peace media was adopted by the UN was in Namibia, in 1988, and later in Cambodia, Rwanda and Haiti. It involved setting up outlets such as radios, as well as imposing controls on local media so that hate media could be prevented. But still, these efforts were aimed more at promoting understanding of the UN mission rather than long-term reform of journalistic practice or media structure. However, despite these practices, the idea of integrating peace media within peacebuilding missions and peace efforts worldwide was

81 In this quote, Coker (2003) was referring to UNAMISIL in Sierra Leone.

82 Public Diplomacy is a planned, unilateral and direct, though not necessarily open/explicit, communication process with foreign peoples aiming at affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments (Malone 1985) not only concerning ongoing public policies of the state that is drawing its public diplomacy strategy but also with regards to its cultural, political and socio-economic models. That's why Public Diplomacy can emerge as an important alternative to the use of force, in terms of power affirmation and accumulation. The logic behind this communication system is retrieving the well-known expression “gaining the hearts and the minds.” It seeks to create a favourable image of a specific “country's policies, actions, and political and economic system, assuming that if public opinion in the target society is persuaded to accept that image, it will exert pressure on its government to alter existing, hostile, attitudes and policy” (Gilboa, 2001: 4) The idea can also be to use public diplomacy to provide the public in the target society with more balanced information on one's own country, in order to counter the domestic propaganda of the target society's government. It includes “activities (…) in the fields of information, education, and culture” (Ibidem). It is based on the idea that soft power goes along with hard power in order to best attain identified goals. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Culture is the set of practices that create meaning for a society, and it has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites; and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment. In fact, despite the conception of soft power only emerges with Joseph Nye in … the practices and the acknowledgement of the possibilities of this form of exercising power dates much before in History. For example, after its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, the French government tried to repair France’s shattered prestige by promoting its language and literature through the Alliance Française, created in 1883 (Nye, 2008). Many channels and actors are involved in public diplomacy activities. However, among them, the mass media emerge as a crucial one and possibly the strongest in terms of impact and, therefore, efficiency. In fact, if participation in festivals and exhibitions and the construction and maintenance of cultural centres, as well as teaching the language - cultural channels - are targeted for specific audiences, mainly at an elite level, and work in the long-term logic, the media target the general public as well as specific audiences, can both work and have impact in the short-term and long-term as well as in both information and education or cultural areas, emerging, thus, as the most crosscutting actor and platform for public diplomacy. Recognising that, many governments started to set up their own radios, openly or in a covered way, which would broadcast information and entertainment consensaneous to their own agenda in order to shape public attitudes all over the world towards their respective ideologies and interests. Well-known examples of this kind of media intervention during the Cold War are the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe on the American side, and Radio Moscow on the Soviet side. The Reagan administration established Radio and Television Martí designed to destabilize the Castro regime in Cuba, and President Bill Clinton established Radio Free Asia - primarily to promote democracy and protection of human rights in China - and Radio Free Iraq - to undermine Saddam Hussein's regime. Later, TV Alhurra and Sawa radio were also established by the US government in the Middle East region. Much of these instruments can only be put into practice when actors have the material power to do so. Public diplomacy can also be seen as a covered media action inspiration for “mediabuilding”.
only formally adopted, in 1995, on the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, in 1995, where the then secretary-general of the UN Boutros Boutros Ghali, that peacebuilding missions should have the "capacity for effective intervention [...] in order to allow them to explain their mandate." After this statement, the establishment of this type of informative structures of the mission itself eventually happened in some peacekeeping operations, including the UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia (Manuel 2004). However, although the document published by the then UN Secretary-General noted the need to "create structures for the institutionalization of peace", there was still no reference to the implementation of projects of "peace media" in post-war reconstruction scenarios. It was only with the mandate of Kofi Annan (January 1997 – December 2006) that the idea of integrating radio and publishing periodic information in line with the peacebuilding intervention model took shape and was implemented (Hieber, 2001).

It was, thus, inaugurated the third phase of this media peacebuilding integration, during which specific UN-driven mass media started to gain increasing complexity and preponderance in the field. Early examples of this kind of media intervention can be identified in UNCTAD mission in Cambodia, UNTAG in Namibia or UNAMET in Timor-Leste, where the main goal of the UN radios was to form the civic conscience of citizens in order to prepare them for elections (Manuel 2004). These were, in fact, what one can consider the embryonic experience of the wider and deeper media intervention projects that took place in Kosovo (1999 onwards) and the DRC (2002 onwards), where specific radio stations were created and media reforms and training were launched, making media intervention stronger than ever before.
3.4 – Peacebuilding media intervention beyond the UN

Even though the increased complexity and evolution of media intervention has been UN-led, the activities of this form of intervention were never circumscribed to the UN, though they were further legitimised and gained centrality by means of it.\textsuperscript{83} UN peacebuilding radios started to be set up in partnership with different international NGOs, such as the Fondation Hirondelle or Search for Common Ground. Also, post-conflict local actors started to develop their own media initiatives – always aid conditioned, as I will explain in section 4 of this chapter –, just like, among plenty other examples, Radio Mandeleo, a community peace radio supported by a local platform of NGO, the CRONGD/Sul Kivu (Roemersman, 2002).

There is also increasing interest/pressure from the part of particular western states which include assistance designed to promote a free flow of information and independent, free media that hold elected representatives accountable (Price, 2002), although sometimes donor governments place media assistance within broader categories of international development, making more difficult to identify these flows. Indeed, in official policy documents describing the goals and objectives of foreign aid to developing countries or territories, the European Commission, the United States government, and other donor governments and foundations identify media freedom as crucial to building democratic, prosperous societies. These donor governments view efforts to promote democratic governance and assist media as a fundamental element of international development work, along with more established efforts to provide emergency food or material aid. Sometimes, all these scenarios and actors converge. For example, at the end of 2001, the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives launched the Afghanistan Emergency Information Program, which aiming at humanitarian programming, was structured as a partnership among International Organization of Migration, the Voice of America, and the Afghanistan Media Resource Center. This programming counted on $1.7 million to supply information about humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan’s people (Price, 2002). Western governments and

\textsuperscript{83} It is important to note that the UN is an organization itself perceived as impartial and neutral, despite actually hidding or representing power relations. This point does not intend to be a radical critique of the UN to the point of presenting the UN as being solely an instrument for a particular agency or power dominant service, but to acknowledge this dimension of the UN that fuels, in fact, much of the critique and analysis this study puts forward.
foundations have also been ramping up their support to media intervention initiatives as well as many western universities which have been involved in much of these “mediabuilding” efforts, particularly as journalism training and law consultancy are concerned. Therefore, the spectrum of actors beyond the UN has been widening, sharing all a specific political power and enunciation locus: the West.  

4 – Mediabuilding as a peace “regime of truth”

Peace media intervention has been growing as a strategic field within which the “truth” on the effective media outlets and professionals to build peace is produced, sustained, valorised and regulated. This truth is built by using a series of institutionalised discursive and implementation mechanisms, procedures and methodologies or, as Foucault (1994) would argue, “instrumental modes” (mutually fuelled) presented as inescapable elements and performances if peace is to be constructed. These “instrumental modes” create and reproduce “systems of differentiation” (Ibidem) that artificially oppose non-liberal media and war to liberal media and peace, in an almost manichaeistic way: the good (liberal) peace media, which create the good (liberal) peace society and all the other media and peace agendas which are many times rendered invisible, and which despite differences share the same inferior or doomed to fail labels in terms of peace construction and preservation. If presented as such, the option to choose emerges as quite evident and understandable. As previously stated, in Chapter 2, the universal meaning of peace as a concept and idea is a sense of comfort and relief, a place and time where and when life is respected and all conditions for human fulfilment are possible to achieve. Peace is, hence, always aspired to. If the recipe to achieve is based on scientific knowledge and experience, then there should be no reason to doubt it, but instead to passively embrace it. The liberal peace media intervention emerges, thus, as a tactical element of the liberal peace, which entails and intends to perpetuate power relations, particularly at the structural level. Liberal peace media intervention is, hence, in Foucaultian terms, a sub-“regime of truth” integrated in a wider “regime of truth” called “peacebuilding”. Indeed, it is a power-driven system encompassed in a wider realm/system of international relations. To express precisely

84 Interview, UNDP Representative, New York, 2012.
85 See section 1.2 in Chapter 1.
this proxy effect; this study labels the liberal peace media intervention as “mediabuilding”.

How does this regime emerge? What does it include or exclude from its narrative? What media and forms of organising societies or scale (local vs. international) does it portray as inferior or doomed to fail? How does it become a powerful and unquestionable, self-sustaining “truth”?

This is mostly explained by the network of power that sustains mediabuilding. The process of creation of mediabuilding regime of truth starts precisely on the top level of the international power hierarchy: those holding the material power to fund and influence and those with recognised knowledge authority to put forward efficient recipes to promote peace globally and to validate that discourse. This is to say donors and what Price, Noll and DeLuce (2002) call “intermediaries”, i.e., those who design and implement projects usually in cooperation with local partners in the recipient countries, and produce the knowledge and/or training that sustain, justify, legitimate and reproduce this “regime of truth”. All of them share the same power locus – the west (Hall, 2006), core (Wallerstein, 1974), metropolis (Duffiled, 1994; 2001a; 2001b). The term “intermediary” is applied since it refers to those actors standing precisely in the middle of the mediabuilding architecture and chain, i.e., a linking piece between donors and local recipients. On one hand, they are dependent on the money of donors and funders; on the other hand, they are the ones informing, justifying and/or implementing the best way to apply mediabuilding in what were, to Western eyes, deviant fields – post-war societies or (still) non-liberal societies. Although intermediaries, they are also part of the top of the pyramid intervention since they have the “power to” produce the knowledge, set recipes or/and to intervene and they benefit directly and indirectly from their mediabuilding action – in a direct way, they get their work funded, recognition and sense of mission accomplished; in an indirect way, they preserve a world order that favours their interests and ideology. The term intermediaries also shed light on another fiercely methodology for the creation and sustainability of this regime: networks or partnerships, which are both a power element and a typical liberal entrepreneurship term. “Networks allow for some redundancy as a safe guard of their proper functioning” (Castells, 2009: 20).

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86 The term “mediabuilding” first emerged inspired by different rich discussions between myself, José Manuel Pureza, Oliver Richmond and Teresa de Almeida Cravo within a research project application.
Concerning the donors, there are three kinds of international donors – as in many other fields of international development and peacebuilding – state/bilateral donor agencies, IGO and private foundations. They are almost all situated in Western countries or responding directly to them (a sign for liberal west hegemony) – and the major donor is precisely the development agency of the State (still) holding today the greatest power: USAID from the USA. The tendency of USAID media intervention has been obeying to US interests and definition of threats – this is particularly important /illustrative for the argument of this study. Indeed, since the early 1980s, USAID has supported the growth of independent media as a part of its strategy for promoting democracy and open societies. Earlier programs focused on Latin American countries, training journalists and assisting independent media outlets. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, USAID launched a major effort to develop and strengthen independent media in Eastern Europe and Eurasia (Price, Noll & DeLuce, 2002). Since the 1990’s USAID also started media programs in other parts of the world, particularly in Africa and the Middle East (USAID, s/d). Different reports (Asgede, 2001; Kumar, 2004; Arsenault et al, 2011) explaining the specific conditions and profiles of media that can promote and sustain peace in post-conflict societies have also been produced by USAID, contributing discursively to the consensus around mediabuilding.

Similarly, SIDA (Sweden) and DFID (United Kingdom) perform an important role regarding funding and normative media-peace consensus-building. According to SIDA itself, “freedom of expression and the emergence of free and independent media, including their role in fostering accountability, are (...) given priority. As a part of media development SIDA especially focuses on improving the legal framework [according to liberal standards], strengthening the professional capacity and supporting economic sustainability [perceived as key in liberal capitalist societies]. SIDA works [in partnerships] across the spectrum with journalist, media organisations, NGOs and public institutions, in long term cooperation countries, in conflict and post-conflicts countries and in Eastern Europe” (SIDA, 2013: 9-10). In turn, DFID (2000; 2013) has supported different initiatives to make media an atmosphere of political tolerance and non-violence, particularly in specific countries, such as Serbia, Russia, and Sierra Leone.

87 There can also be private enterprise which sends electronic material.
Likewise, different IGO also provide support and legitimacy for media intervention. The UN is a key actor among mediabuilding: it was the kick-off institution of mediabuilding, leading within the first decade mediabuilding initiatives; the fact of formally representing almost all world states and peoples, the UN gives increasing legitimacy to this area and strength to the consensus around it. The action of the UN is divided into intervention missions and programming; the production of knowledge and reports; and funding. It undertakes these works by means of its specialised agencies, such as the UNDP and UNESCO as well as the World Bank, along with its specialised departments, specifically the Peacekeeping one (DPKO). The UNDP supports journalism training and incentives media to include development, youth and civil society issues on their programming and work dynamics (UNDP, 2013; 2014). According to Bill Orme, who I interviewed in New York, in 2011, UNDP also lists resources and create documents which “gives people guidance, the basics, things people should do should not do...principles...”. UNESCO is particularly focused on media as a vehicle for the promotion of a culture of peace and for that has several programmes and reports in order to mobilise and train media journalists, and provision of required equipment for media activities (UNESCO; 1998; s/d). UNESCO has also given particular attention to the promotion of community radios for peace,88 as many publications show (Fraser & Restrepo Estrada, 2001; Tabig, 2002; Ramakrishnan, 2007) as the “Empowering local radios with ICT”, 89 among many others, proves. Also, UNICEF is particularly sensitive to the media as a way to build and sustain peace and foster development and education. This is visible in its publications, events90 and funding targets. This UN agency also gives importance to local community radios and not infrequently highlights the need for the participation of local communities in the setting up of media outlets.91 The World Bank has increasingly seen media development within target societies as vital for the achievement of many of its goals, particularly

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88 UNESCO has created a Chair on community media at the University of Hyderabad, see: http://blog.ucommedia.in/
89 See: http://en.unesco.org/radioict/about-project.
90 The UNESCO Chair on Community Media (University of Hyderabad) and AMARC Asia-Pacific, in collaboration with UNESCO, International Media Support, Community Radio Forum of India and the Indian Academy of Self Employed Women, organized a two day seminar on “Voices for Change and Peace: Taking Stock of Community Radio in South Asia,” in New Delhi on January 17-18, 2013.
91 UNESCO’s International Programme for the Development of Communication (UNESCO-IPDC) has approved funds in the amount USD 60,000 in contribution to the establishment of the first ten Community Radio Stations in India. See: http://mt-shortwave.blogspot.pt/2007/04/unesco-approves-funds-for-community.html.

The fact that these so much different UN agencies are involved in mediabuilding – using both common buzzwords but distinct frameworks – is self-evident that media is a crosscutting agent of the liberal peace project, but also that for a specific idea and methodology to be consolidated as a cannon, it has to be legitimised among different publics. As Sogge states when reflecting on the aid system, “In the 1990’s, aid speak at the top became saturated with terms such as ‘sustainability’, ‘civil society’ and ‘empowerment’. These ideas sprang from the emancipatory camp of social movements, but they found themselves cast in supporting roles in market fundamentalist scripts” (Sogge, 2002: 141). “if (...) [victors] dominance is to survive, it must be legitimised: by their success in converting their subjects to their own systems of beliefs (...) and above all by their ability to maintain economic and political stability in the societies they govern” (Howard, 2002: 4).

At the European level, the European Commission is the major source of funding for media assistance at the European level. Almost all of its media assistance work has been part of its larger program of human rights and democratisation. The Council of Europe, OSCE, European Reconstruction Agency and Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe are also key actors with particular importance, particularly the OSCE which had a key role in media intervention in the Balkans.

Besides all of these IGO, large and small private foundations have also supported the growth of media in post-conflict societies. These include the Ford Foundation, the Independent Journalism Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, Soros Foundation Network, Open Society Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations, Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Knight Foundation (Price, Noll & DeLuce, 2002; Sullivan, 2007). Research, training and programming are some of the targets of these foundations initiatives.

All these institutions have uncontested credibility within today’s international system. However, their power to legitimise is not enough. Their funding proposals and reports as well as diagnosing initiatives have to be grounded in experts’ knowledge. Think tanks and western universities are a key actor for this purpose. Demonstrating

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this need to legitimise policies and intervention through the social authority of knowledge is the fact that the expression “research shows that …” is one of the stock phrases in mediabuilding documents and discussions. However, “while research may reflect genuine inquiry, its actual uses in the mediabuilding can be manipulative. Those who decide have to legitimate their decisions and win arguments. Research reports are [therefore,] trump cards” (Sogge, 2002: 153). Indeed, “command over ideas is often more decisive than the mere transference of resources” (Ibidem: 14), particularly when trying to create hegemonic orders, i.e. a system based on consent rather than coercion (Gramsci, 1971). As to think-tanks, USIP, CIMA, CDG and CommGAP are the most important ones, although some of them also direct their work towards programming.

USIP, based in Washington DC, dedicates its research and programming towards building knowledge and methodologies on “Media, Conflict and Peacebuilding” – the way they define their working area on the website. It provides plenty of reports and newsletters as well as online and public events serving that purpose, usually including some partners or consultants in the area. Likewise, created in 2006 and intending to “raise the visibility and improve the effectiveness of media development around the world”, CIMA, also based in Washington DC within the structure of the NED, “provides information, builds networks, conducts research, and highlights the indispensable role media play in the creation and development of sustainable democracies” that will, accordingly, lead to peace (CIMA, s/d). The institution convenes donors, implementers, academics and other stakeholders in the media development community, reinforcing the power of their network and the credibility of their work. The aforementioned knowledge productin actors are, in fact, key institutions to legitimise mediabuilding. They opt for a problem-solving (Cox, 1981) perspective within a liberal framework and synthetized their theory in the most simple and accessible way so that their content is reachable by everyone interested in the topic. A different discourse is set by some Western universities – London School of Economics, Annenberg Communication Department in University of Pennsylvania, UN Peace University. Although these do not adopt a problem-solving approach it is still far from a critical understanding of the media in these settings, which makes them part of the mediabuilding legitimation architecture.

All of these institutions share the same western-driven low intensity recipe concerning media and peace “Media sector support is a critical prong of strategies to
support democracy and good governance” (Centre for Democracy and Governance, 1999: 35). These words – democracy and good governance - are indeed, the central pieces that sustain the need for media to build liberal peace, within today’s liberal theory and politics framework. This centrality is built upon an ideological and functionalist perception of the media. On the one hand, it is ideological as it is based on democratic and market economy principles; on the other hand, it is functionalist bearing in mind the liberal narrative on the elements that generated and perpetuated war violence: a barbarian inter-ethnic violence (Gurr, 1994) within failed or fragile governance states (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2002) where abuse of power, corruption and unequal distribution of resources and wealth was common (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Indeed, it is believed that a sound media sector, by creating spaces for debate, improves accountability and the democratic functioning of a society, the economic growth and thereby reduces the chance for violent conflict (Bratic & Schirch, 2007) and improves the mechanisms for good governance as a whole (Norris, 2007; Beckett &Kyrke-Smith, 2008; DFID, 2008).

This connection – media, democracy, good governance, economic growth - which is dominant in mainstream discourses, almost creates what I would call a “new common sense”, without any need for debate. Within this new common sense, democracy, economic growth and good governance are perceived and transmitted in words as if their meaning wasn’t susceptible to different interpretations and procedures or methodologies. Indeed, and in an almost contradictory but efficient way, this new common sense although overlapped the ideal and universal form of what the “power to people” (the governance of the majority; no oppression), “freedom from want”, and “good” (morally excellent; virtuous; righteous; pious, according to English Dictionary), respectively, meanings entail, making them to sound clear, positive and morally beyond reproach (Sogge, 2002), in practical terms the implementation of all three has emerged as a selective process, as presented in section 2.2 and 4.2 in Chapter 3. This new common sense is mostly achieved through discourse, specifically wording, inter-relations between concepts and by rendering invisible any other interpretations to be made of these concepts or any critique of these.

From the three intertwined pillars – democracy, market economy and good governance - departs all the mediabuilding methodology, impacting political, economic, social and psychological areas of societies and dimensions of peacebuilding. From a
political standpoint, media within the liberal peace framework is understood be a tool for conciliation and anti-polarization in society (Coleman & Ross, 2010; Howard, 2003a), as well as political accountability and watchdog; (Carothers 2004), thus contributing to create active citizenship and democratic structures in post-war societies, contributing “to the architecture of good governance” (Odugbemi, 2008: 15), and prevent the (re)emergence of violent conflict. Specifically, the media does so, according to meadiabuilding proponents, by providing a public space for divergent opinions and interests from local constituencies. Underlying this belief is the functionalist and ideological perspective that a sound media sector improves the democratic functioning of a society, thereby reducing the chance for violent conflict (Howard, 2003a; CIMA, 2008; Gamic, 2014). Accordingly, access to information is essential to the health of democracy since it ensures (theoretically) that citizens make responsible informed choices (CIMA, 2008), and that elected representatives uphold their oath of office and carry out the wishes of those who elected them. There is “a systematic link between the roles of the press as watchdogs over the powerful and the transparency of government” (Norris & Odugbemi, 2010). Also, during elections, the media can promote the public place for debates to happen, making opponents to fight with agendas and arguments (and not with bullets as in previous war times) their discrepant political views and allowing for citizens to inform better their decisions on who to vote for (Frère, 2011; Nwokeafor, 2014). Moreover, free and fair elections require a media sector which gives candidates equal access, and report the relevant issues in a timely and objective manner, just as modern journalism dictates (Center for Democracy and Governance, 1999; Miller, 2009). For this political mission of liberal media to be accomplished, media outlets must have a degree of editorial independence, be financially viable, integrate diverse and plural voices, and serve the public interest. Legislation to secure this must be also a priority within mediabuilding and subsequent liberal media outlets created by the locals.

From an economic point of view, the media mediabuilding is considered particularly important when it comes to fostering economy, within the liberal framework (Putzel & Zwan, 2005). It does so by providing accountability, offering the space for advertisement recipes for companies, promote programming directed to train people to improve their activity, for example agricultural techniques (Santos, 2007). Also, by means of creating a modern liberal mediascape where public service
broadcasting led by private or internationally-led media outlets also creates jobs and a supposedly flourishing market (Putzel & Zwan, 2005). Socially, the media can help to denounce social problems – such as lack of water, limitations in health system, contribute to the creation of a sense of belonging to a wider national community rather than to an ethnic group (Santos, 2007), and foster anti-polarisation and peaceful social relations by addressing community relational grievances underlying potential conflicts (Howard, 2003a). Finally, from a socio-psychological standpoint, mediabuilding can be key in order to overcome war trauma and give pervasive tool to memory policies (Howard, 2003a), contributing for good governance as a cross-cut value along societies.

These prescriptive discourses based on research and triumphant western experience has a pervasive power. Nevertheless, for them to be embedded in societies, they have to be translated into practices. To translate discourses into practice is to define the tools with which the injection of this rationale is best done and to create the methodologies for it to be self-sustained. As far as intervention methodologies are concerned, I would synthetize them into four verbs: training, consultancy, funding and narrating – which I will explore later on this section. Each of these can be directed towards distinct areas that are needed for the construction of a liberal mediascape conductive to liberal peace, specifically: journalism training; media law and regulatory reform; media management training; and setting up media outlets or producing contents that are distributed along local broadcasting networks.

Indeed, the remit of media assistance within peacebuilding missions and policies is incredibly large reflecting their wide and crosscutting goals and the intertwined project mediabuilding is: it ‘includes reforming media laws, removing barriers to access [to the media], strengthening constituencies for media reform and capitalizing the media (Center for Democracy and Governance, 1999: 1). Sometimes the different typologies interweave with each other, being different to identify the line dividing the distinct areas. All four intervention areas share common presuppositions and methodologies and all of them relate to the larger liberal peace project, both at national and international level. Also, each and every area stems from the perception that the capacity of media systems to fill the roles ideally required depends “on the broader context determined by the profession, the market, and ultimately the state” (Norris and Odugbemi, 2010).

**Journalism training** involves a wide range of activities aiming at “improving professional skills in writing, reporting, editing; production research and management;
raising awareness of journalistic ethics; strengthening journalism education programs in universities; developing instructional materials; and facilitating continuing dialogue among the journalists, owners and educators in the region” (CCDG, 1999: 31). There is also the inclusion of advanced training for investigative journalism, along with training in specialist subjects such as human rights, economics, or the environment, and technical training for sound and video. These trainings are promoted directly and indirectly. In terms of direct training, – Internews, Panos, European Youth Press, African Centre for Peace and Security Training, IREX, Danish BalticMedia Centre, Medienhilfe are key actors. Based on the West, they send experts and professionals to train local journalists and technicians in post-war or conflict-prone societies. Sometimes, the other way around flow also happens: the local journalists and technicians have the opportunity to come to western universities and professional centres to get the training. As far as indirect training is concerned, donors assist the development of new journalism schools, the reform of existing journalism faculties and curriculum, and the development of press centres (Price, Noll & DeLuce, 2002). The ultimate goal, as described by proponents, is “to develop the capacity for professional, objective reporting” (CDG, 1999: 10), one of the pillars of modern journalism. All the training is based upon the language of universal human rights, such as freedom of expression, and the export of Western press practices and idealized social roles (Miller, 2009) which rarely apply on a customary base to reality, being it western or non-western. Three reasons, in particular, justify this. The first one is that there are two intrinsic problems with basilar values of modern journalism: the objectivity claim and the primacy of institutional sources over non-institutional ones. Modern journalism has embraced since its beginning the ethic of objectivity as defining its core public service mission. Accordingly, along with “the truth”, objectivity is the value that makes a specific journalistic work professional or not, because it allows to merely report the facts, refraining the journalist to take any part on the reported story/event and keeping the truth accessible to the general public.\footnote{Although some have phrased objectivity differently, such as the Pew Research Journalism Project (s/d) for whom the term doesn’t imply that journalists are free of bias (…) [but] rather (…) [that] the method is objective", the truth is that objectivity is a strategy to go along hidden information.} However, the truth is itself subjective and objectivity ends up being a strategy to go along hidden information, which makes the media to be less prone in looking for uncomfortable issues or debates, hence contradicting the role of watchdog the media should perform. Concerning the
information sources, the cannon of modern journalism privileges institutional entities as sources in detriment of non-institutional ones, in order to supposedly guarantee trustworthy information. However, what this professional and ethical rule dictates is the supremacy of institutions over individuals, making more difficult the role of watchdog. Second, the liberal mediascape within liberal west societies is integrated in an economic-political-media complex – Herman and Chomsky (2002) has labelled this as “propaganda model” 94 – which aims at manufacturing a consent on all the issues needed to protect the interests of the dominant elite. Third, the journalism that mediabuilding training presents and supplies is drawn according to mainstream Western conventions and occupational ideologies (Miller, 2009) and not a universal conception of journalism. Hence, local norms, practices and traditions are neglected or dismissed as less important when facing this superior – although flawed – form of doing journalism. As James Miller concludes, journalism training is fundamentally about universalizing the western local - so-called “world journalism” (Minshall, 2001: 40) - and assuming an unjustifiably causal relationship between Western journalism and good-governance.95

The second area for mediabuilding intervention is media law and regulatory reform. Actually, despite being trained to be highly competent in light of the tutorial journalistic liberal and modern standards, journalists as well as the media outlets to whom they work will not be able to survive unless there is media law that promotes transformations of existing media (usually state owned by dictatorial regimes or representing each party in the conflict), the establishment of a legal and regulatory framework for licensing, proclaim and protect free speech, including apparatus for dealing with speech that is particularly sensitive in a post-conflict environment but still allowing for a “marketplace of ideas” – a common liberal expression linking media with the economic capitalism competition model. Another type of intervention at the law and regulatory level involves working with the legislature and judiciary, which are the ones responsible for protecting citizen’s rights, namely the rights to free speech and

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94 The propaganda model is a conceptual model developed by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky which explains how propaganda and systemic biases messages along with economic and political elites interests dominate the mass media in a very imperceptible way. The model seeks to explain how populations are manipulated and how consent for economic, social and political policies is "manufactured" in the public mind due to this propaganda. The theory posits that the way in which news is structured and filtered (through advertising, concentration of media ownership, government sourcing and others) creates an inherent conflict of interest which acts as propaganda for undemocratic forces (Chomsky and Herman (2002)).

95 How good? For whom? These questions will be developed on Chapter 6.
independent media; both of which are enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which liberal legislation is particularly attentive. Laws of this kind are also seen as necessary to prosecute media abuse and hate media. West consultancy experts are usually hired to craft or help to craft such legislation. Once the necessary media legislation is in place, it is equally important that the judiciary has the capacity to enforce the laws (Frohardt & Temin, 2003). Another strategy concerns the media regulatory environment. A balance needs to be struck so that starting a media outlet is not an overly complex, time-consuming, bureaucratic task, but nor is regulation lax enough so that almost anybody can have their own radio station or newspaper. Complete state control over media is considered not the solution, but neither is the total absence of regulation. Some type of government oversight over the licensing process is often in order, but one that is shielded, to the extent possible, from heavily political or corrupt influences. Curiously, one of the justifications for this type of intervention is the belief that “it may be difficult for governments, particularly in developing countries still building and consolidating their democracies, to effectively design and implement such regulations” (Frohardt and Temin, 2003: 11).

Since media outlets are supposed to work on a liberal environment, market economy capitalist dynamic, training on media management is also crucial for mediabuilding to build the capacity and skills of media owners, managers, editors, professional media associations, and individual journalists to increase the sustainability and professionalism of private media outlets. Also, enhancing the ability of independent media outlets to resist unwanted influence from the government or elsewhere is critical to developing their ability to avoid abuse and manipulation. This strengthening is often a product of media plurality and longevity, both of which make using media to incite violence increasingly difficult. Plurality creates strengthen numbers; with a variety of diverse independent media outlets in place, if one or even several are co-opted the effect is mitigated (Frohardt & Temin, 2003). Also, the media can also provide an infrastructure for trade (Price 2001), by means of advertisement, for example.

Finally, there is the creation of media outlets and contents, usually labelled as “peace media” (Hieber, 1998; 2001; Bratic, 2005a; Egleder, 2012; Santos; 2010). By means of their programming, these media aim at contributing to the pacification and

96 Interview with Helen Hume, New York, 2012.
anti-polarization of societies as well as to the creation of political accountability practices and fora, thus helping to create (formal) democratic structures and promote economic growth. It is believed that as such they can prevent the (re)emergence of violent conflict and practices in post-war or unstable societies. The BBC ‘soaps’ made for Russia and Kyrgyzstan explained how market economies could work in a localised context. Sometimes it is possible for international dominant actors to require local media to transmit programmes and messages such as was done in Bosnia by the Office of the High Representative. The temporary use of UN-staffed TV and radio stations in Haiti and Cambodia are also good examples.

This interventionist part is put forward by NGO’s from the Global North, and reinforced by press freedom advocacy groups. Amid the NGO involved, the former usually implement by means of their “technical expertise” and “organizational resources” (Kumar, 2006: 9) mediabuilding initiatives that aim at production of media contents and programmes, setting up radios, reforming media laws, forming human resources and providing consultancy services. NGOs such as Search for Common Ground, Fondation Hirondelle, Internews, Panos, IREX, Danish BalticMedia Centre, Medienhilfe, among many others. Over the last ten to fifteen years, the role of media freedom NGOs such as Free Press Unlimited, Reporters Sans Frontieres, Article 19, the International Press Institute, and Committee to Protect Journalists, and others has evolved from letter writing, protest campaigns to lobbying, policy making, and direct aid to news organisations in some cases. The Independent Federation of Journalists, the world’s largest organization of journalists, strengthens the role of national journalist associations and, in particular, their contribution to press freedom and human rights issues. Certain entities, like the Commonwealth Press Union, the World Association of Newspapers, and the World Press Freedom Committee have grown from or originated in industry associations, which have greatly expanded their roles as champions of press freedoms for their members. Also, western media outlets both public and private have a role here. Deutsche Welle. Likewise, private contractors such as consultancy firms perform also an important role in both reforming media laws, making media management sustainable or profitable (Ibidem). These create a circuit of knowledge production and reproduction. The European Journalism Centre, which has focused on basic journalistic training, and the European Institute for the Media, which has focused on media monitoring initiatives, cooperates with the European Commission and a range
of media NGOs and universities. The European Institute of Media is not essentially a media aid organization, but has grown into one based on its work as a research organization with specific media priorities.

By means of exploring these four interventionist areas, it is possible to understand the mediabuilding as a great and coherent project. In fact, all the areas of mediabuilding are clearly interlinked among themselves.

All the methodologies and activities on the different mediabuilding intervention areas can be synthetized into four verbs: training, consultancy, funding and narrating. By training, the Free Dictionary says “a. the process of bringing a person, etc, to an agreed standard of proficiency, etc, by practice and instruction”; consultancy “a business or agency offering expert or professional advice in a field”; funding “to allocate or provide funds for (a program, project, etc.)”; narrating, “to give an account or tell the story of (events, experiences, etc.). All these verbs share at least one commonality: a power relation between those who know and those who want to learn; those who got to the science and practice of peace and those who want to get there. It is precisely the formers that are the end recipients of the mediabuilding chain. They usually perform a passive partner role in the sense that they receive and obey to the procedures that programming tell them to do. Even though participatory methodologies are incorporated in mediabuilding, the truth is that participation can only happen amid an already expected and circumscribed sphere of liberal framework action and initiative. Also, there is a dependency relation that is built here: material dependence; the need to be integrated in the international system. Standardized solutions protoed down the chain predispose actors to ignore local contexts, close off alternatives and undercut recipients’ self-confidence and respect for local views and problem-solving capacities. This gives strength to this regime of truth – everyone repeats it.

The United Nations classified the development of media as a “cross-cutting” peacebuilding concern, “transcending” all types of peacebuilding activities (United Nations, 1996: 3). The capacity of media systems to fill the roles ideally required depends “on the broader context determined by the profession, the market, and ultimately the state” (Norris and Odugbemi, 2010), and so do these contexts depend on the media and their performance. While media can be considered key actor in the civil society arena, they also overlap other functional and ideological areas of democracy and governance. For example, support for media may yield results in governance activities,
particularly those related to decentralisation, anti-corruption and citizen participation in the policy process. The rule of law may be further institutionalised by support for an independent media that keeps a check on the judiciary, reports on the courts and promotes a legal enabling environment suitable for press freedom. Free and fair elections conducted through transparent processes require a media sector which gives candidates equal access, and report the relevant issues in a timely, objective manner.

The media are key promoters of the whole dimensions of peacebuilding, making them come directly to the people, educating the latter towards the former, and thus optimizing the penetration of the standardised liberal peace models in the post-war societies to which mediabuilding is directed to (Bush, 2004). Mediabuilding tools and methodologies emerge, hence, almost as the active principle of the liberal peace prescription and remedy. They are a optimising liaison of the different dimensions of the liberal peace and also an optimising element of these post-war societies to the wider liberal world system. As Sheila Dalas, from Radio UNAMSIL, has stated “the UN is good at dealing with Governments, but to deal with the people at the grass-roots level, this is where the radio comes in” (Ribeiro, 2006). As with other non-state actors, the main aim of peace media action is to consolidate civil peace, which is, in turn, a crucial dimension to legitimize, at population level, the recipe for liberal peace (Richmond, 2005). This is the way and the model which external actors believe to be the ideal in order to (re)build a sustainable peace. However, it is precisely here that the risk lies – the contribution to an unsustainable peace – entering the theory vs. policy debate and the importance and synergies of power when reflecting and implementing peace.

4.1 – The unsaid or the strategic silences

The rationale for (liberal) media and (liberal) peace is presented as logical and automatic, sometimes even linear, as if no further explanation was needed to explore their relation or that the reality on which mediabuilding intervenes doesn’t have its own dynamics and that the actors involved do not have specificities, agendas and idiosyncrasies. In fact, the actual reality of (liberal) peace and (liberal) media is far more complex than the one portrayed by dominant discourses, being those presented by academics, reports, institutional documents or programming descriptions. The complexity mediabuilding entails lays precisely on the unsaid.
Mediabuilding is flooded with buzzwords such as, “market oriented free press”, “objective and factual information”, “balanced reporting”, “accountability”, “democracy” or “good governance”, whereas the structuration of the international system, alternatives to liberal peace are always neglected, rendered invisible or actually inexistent. This is what Michael Pugh (2005: 32) calls the “the silence surrounding structural violence” or what Sogge synthetizes in the quote “structural power is rarely the stuff of headlines” (Sogge, 2002: 115).

Second, it is never admitted that all this discourse and knowledge is produced by a specific “enunciation [power] locus” (Grosfoguel, 2008a; 2008b) and is not the result, as usually presented, of a universal high standard conception of the world only achieved by a given modern status of societies. By un-powering mediabuilding, its dominant actors are concealing international power relations and agendas that are, most of the times, explicative of different forms of oppression and violence in today’s world system.

Third, in between the lines there is a pathologisation of the local and the establishment of a never-explicit hierarchical relation between the West, reflective, modern, peaceful, and rational; and the Rest, traditional, irrational, exotic and inferior. Ironically, among this latent relational hierarchization the legacy of colonialism is usually forgotten.

Fourth, the key elements, values and proposals that make mediabuilding attractive - democracy, economic growth, freedom of expression, good governance - are transmitted in words as if their meaning wasn’t susceptible to different interpretations and procedures or methodologies. In fact, albeit all these concepts/terminologies/notions are interpreted as whole and complete concepts in terms of emancipation, the fact is that for “good governance” to be achieved in dominant liberal terms, all those complete concepts have to be moulded to lower intensity forms and only able to be used in a circumscribed scenario, which reinforces the game rules of liberal hegemony and today’s power relations in the international system.

All this leads to what me and Borges (Borges & Santos, 2009: 77 ) have glossed as “becoming one of us never really reaching us” to highlight the promise of joining West, but is the hierarchical element introduced in the power dynamic, showing the way the modernity package became an instrument of governance driven by Western powers and international organizations. Indeed, the co-optation of the modernity media model
did not necessarily result in the accomplishment of the modernity emancipatory promise, but rather in the normalization of societies through technical and administrative therapeutic interventions in order to control them domestically and improve their (subaltern) standing in the international sphere.
Chapter 5 – The peace media cannon in(to) power-driven liberal governing practice

“The smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum....”

— Noam Chomsky 97

Bearing in mind this study’s theoretical presuppositions and framework, this chapter intends to assess the hypothesis presented in the introduction of this study: peace media contribute to the civil pacification of communities in a context of a broader and hierarchical liberal peace and liberal global governance frameworks.

Why choose peace media as study object? Peace media 98 are one of the media intervention tools within “mediabuilding”. Taking into account the goals of this study, peace media are the best “mediabuilding” option to analyse: they are the most complete and richest normalisation and modelling media power device. They condensate all other peer tools in a direct (e.g. journalism training) or indirect way (e.g. media legal reform), thus becoming a particular advanced/rich example of “mediabuilding” itself. Moreover, they optimise the active principles of liberal values and political and economic projects, emerging as an amplifying tool of the liberal agenda and its expected results.

In order to assess the hypothesis of this study this empirical chapter is divided into two parts. The first, which includes section 1 and 2, relates specifically to the last part of the hypothesis. It aims to identify the broader and hierarchical liberal peace and liberal governance frameworks by means of identifying the knowledge/discourse “enunciation locus” (Grosfoguel, 2008) - the geopolitical body of the subject who

98 A more holistic approach is that of the so-called “Peace Media” (Santos, 2008). Part of a wider proposal, it has, since the 1960s, emerged and developed along different approaches within academia: Communication for Development, Peace Education, P J and Galtung’s (1996) idea of “positive peace.” It constitutes an embracing and holistic set of complementary theoretical perspectives and proposals (Hieber, 1998; Howard, 2002) rather than a single research line. It integrates informal and formal media (Spitulnik, 2003) and aims to direct their information and programming towards inverting violence and building positive peace (Galtung, 1996). For the purpose of this study, as previously mentioned, peace media relates to the setting up of media aims at bringing belligerent parties closer together, eradicate all forms of violence and build a long-lasting peace in societies.
speaks – and the narratives they produce (which are also representative of their enunciation *locus* and power position) as well as the power networks they create or are embedded in, from a material and discursive point of view. By establishing the link between the subject of enunciation, the epistemic location and the ideological, political and economic agendas and cross-cutting them with the narratives they produce, it is possible to establish the subjective nature and identity of the ones holding the power to tell the specific stories that govern the world. It also allow us to identify the reason why they have chosen those narratives, and the material power that fuels the engine that reproduces those narratives which are, in turn, disseminated to assure the accumulation of that material and discursive power. Methodologically speaking, this first part will both identify the genealogy and archeology of the encouraging and propagandistic peace media rhetoric as well as the “ideal” of media within “mediabuilding” itself. It will, hence, highlight what this “regime of truth” includes and excludes from its narratives, and draw the power network that supports those narratives and policy initiatives, and give them legitimacy. It is, hence divided into two parts: a discursive one and a networked one. To put them forward, five different questions will be answered making use of discourse analysis, genealogy and archeology:

- Which are the institutions or experts that say the kind of peace that should be built?
- What is the relation those actors (institutions and experts) have among themselves?
- What is their relation/connection to the core/centre of power?
- What do they include or exclude from their narratives?
- And what do those narratives have to do or say about the centre/core of world power?

The second part, which includes section 3, focuses on three representative case studies of peace media intervention projects: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Search for Common Ground (SCG); and Fondation Hirondelle (FH). Search for Common Ground is the oldest one among these three, having actually started as media development actor. It is an NGO specialised in media intervention at different levels, but it is highly specialist in peace media contents production. Fondation Hirondelle is a Swiss NGO of journalists and humanitarian aid professionals. Since 1995, it has been
creating or supporting independent, civic-minded news media in conflict, post-conflict and crisis zones. Finally, the United States Institute of Peace as discourse producer and programming implementor. These illustrative cases are representative of the diversity of existing projects of peace media as well as representatives of the major players/institutions on “mediabuilding”. The analysis of these illustrative case studies will be based on three analytical vectors.

1- The enunciation locus: Explore the relations of these actors and the discourses with the wider power relations in the international system; identify how do they relate with other spheres of mediabuilding, peacebuilding and the liberal order

2- Discourses: Which conflict (e.g. root causes, elements of generation and perpetuation of violence, domestic or systemic causes) and peace narratives (conditions and elements peace necessarily entails) they (re) produce, and what do they say about their own organisations and agendas. what are their conflict narratives?

3- Programming (which is sub-divided into two sections): the first section is dedicated to analysing their working dynamics, i.e., their organisational hierarchy and work flow; the second section will analyse the editorial line and contents broadcasted by means of discourse analysis and taking stock on the theoretical framework of this study. As such, different questions are intended to be answered:

- Do these media constitute mechanisms that question or accept the established power structure and social inequality?
- Do they lend support to other voices than the prescriptive liberal ones?
  - Do they value voice as a process or voice as a value?
- Which root causes of conflict do they tackle? Structural, discursive,
- What kind of society do they propose? Dependence-based, emancipatory?

This chapter intends, thus, to identify the mechanisms that show that peace media, despite being present as an apolitical, universal, neutral technology, do have however a subjective, political and geopolitical strategic command compliant to a specific liberal ideological and power-driven discourse, reinforcing the three presuppositions of this study.
1 – The cannon: stories of consensus, stories for consensus

The choice for the option of the concept “cannon” is neither naive nor unintentional. Underlying the notion of cannon is the awareness that ideas are not self-made, nor do they pop up out of thin air. Instead, they are brought up by a specific group of thinkers engaged in a particular idea/belief system and activity and having the power (discursive and material) and ability to do so. Cannon creates a discursive unity and homogeneity and is the result of a forum which elects the ideas considered to be worth value to follow and that are actually followed. Indeed, the existence of a cannon gives the community creating it a leading role: it reproduces power. That is why Sanders (1987) affirms that “a cannon is not only a cannon because it survives but also because it gives survival power to the community which evokes it”, by rendering invisible or discrediting other alternatives or different ways of thinking about the same issue, particularly the ones that might challenge the status quo that sustains them. Cannon is a consolidated philosophical structure built over time and ideas, but yet rock sustained. It creates a guiding reference for daily practices, knowledge creation, public policies and for framing ideologies, by means of discourse and materiality and as such it influences and creates a unifying and aggregative project and audience.

Cannon is also particularly linked to consensus. However, let us not deceive ourselves with the notion of consensus. Although, according to the English Oxford Dictionary definition, consensus is related to a “general agreement or concord; harmony”, in practical terms a cannon, despite its supposed universal agreement nature, results from a power relations architecture. This section intends to draw the genealogy and archeology of the peace media cannon and to debunk it regarding power and agendas, by means of discourse analysis.

1.1 – Peace media: the emancipatory genesis

The first reflection upon media and peace was put forward by Johan Galtung with Mari Holmboe Ruge (1965) in their seminal article “The Structure of Foreign News”, where they do a detailed diagnosis (using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies) of the way mainstream media dealt with and subsequently created reality, emphasising the mediation role of the media discussed here in section 1.2 of
Chapter 4. For the two authors, two issues were of particular importance: the criteria to select some events to be covered in detriment of others; and the identities created and reproduced by labeling certain actors and events in a particular way or due to a specific topic. Accordingly, “since we cannot register everything, we have to select, and the question is what will strike our attention” (1965, 65). Twelve criteria were believed to filter foreign news broadcasts in the world – i.e. “news value” (Ibidem) - though despite the authors explicitly referred to “the world”, what they actually meant was “the west”: frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, reference to elite nations, reference to elite people, reference to patterns and reference to something negative. According to these criteria, the analysis put forward helped to draw some conclusions on what is worth telling, what can be kept in silence and why those choices are made. As such, distant nations in order to be in the news have to produce events that capture attention particularly easily to be broadcasted. Also, “for a far away nation to make news it will be particularly necessary that the news it gives fits a pattern of expectation (Ibidem:82). This leads to the fact that the lower the rank of the nation, the more negative its news have to be in order to capture attention (Ibidem: 83), and the more consonant the news have to be. The typical example would be news that emphasizes the difficulties low rank nations have: signs of 'immaturity' in terms of payment crises, political instability, murder at the top of society, and so on (Ibidem, 82). Also, if a nation is low in terms of rank it must compensate for that in terms of proximity if it wants to be news in foreign countries. In other words: “the toptop nations of the world will each have their own set of underlings that they overreport from, relative to what they report from other low rank nations” (Ibidem: 82). The same logic that applies to nations, applies to people too. Specifically, the lower the rank of the nation, the higher will a person have to be placed in that nation to make news. This may lead to an image of the world underdog nations as extremely elite-dominated with a non-existing mass of rank-and-file people. In political terms this image will probably tend to reinforce the conditions that make such images warranted. This will also make for poor identification particularly if elite action in low rank nations is also negative (Ibidem, 83). Common people must do something negative to make news, and the lower the person is, the more negative should it be (Ibidem: 83), whereas elite people can have their day-to-day routine reported, rank-and-file people will only make
news when something happens that stands in a very marked contrast to their ordinary existence (Ibidem: 83).

Concerning topics or events, “the remote and the strange will at least have to be simple if it is to make news - complexities can be taken care of if they are found within one's own culture, but not if they are found at a considerable distance” (Ibidem: 80-1). The less personal the news, the more negative will it have to be. In other words, when something positive happens it is more likely to be attributed to people, whereas something attributed to non-people will have to be negative to hit the news. In a sense this may also be seen as a reflection of the dominant idea of man as the maker of his own progress against the forces of nature that tend to inundate him with floods or shake him to pieces with earthquakes (Ibidem: 83). Finally, “Positive events will have to be particularly short of duration to appear as news.” (Ibidem: 82). However, there can be some lucky ones: “once an event has 'made it' the news channel will be more readily open for the follow-up events, at a lower threshold value. The effect of this will be the creation of 'news strings' that may create artificial continuities just because the channel is open” (Ibidem: 82). Also, there is news that can enter the news loop not because they are important by themselves, but because they happen to be in periods where little else happens abroad.

To sum up, news from peripheral - or in Galtung and Ruge words “underdog nations” - countries “will have to refer to people, preferably top elite, and be preferably negative and unexpected but nevertheless according to a pattern that is consonant with the mental “top dog nations” pre-image of those realities. It will have to be simple and it should, if possible, provide the reader with some kind of identification - it should refer to him or his nation or group of nations. This will, in turn, facilitate an image of these countries as dangerous, ruled by capricious elites, as unchanging/willingly unchangeable in their basic characteristics, as existing for the benefit of the core countries, and in terms of their links to those peripheral ones. Events occur, they are sudden, like flashes of lightning, with no build-up and with no let-down after their occurrence - they just occur and more often than not as a part of the machinations of the ruling or opposition elites” (Ibidem: 82).99 There is, hence, an articulation of media

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99 This was further strengthened by the publication of Johan Galtung’s influential article “A Structural Theory of Imperialism” (1971) in which Galtung incorporated media within a wider cultural and economic imperialism productive of unequal power relations in the world.
contents and framing with broader social and economic forces, perpetuating a worldwide “structural violence” (Galtung, 1971; Galtung & Höivik, 1971).

According to Galtung and Ruge (1965), the structure and contents of news were based on world power relations at a macro and micro level that tended to reproduce, and hence perpetuate, oppressive and unequal forms of organising societies and establishing the relations among them, whereas at the same time respecting editorial practices, journalistic ethics and education and high technology tools, established and created for addressing public service demands. Indeed, much of these choices and news values were based upon modern professional journalism precepts, particularly objectivity and the increased reliability of institutional sources when compared to non-institutional ones (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2000). These same journalistic practices made media to cover violent conflicts as sports journalism covers football matches, for example: there was a focus on ‘winning as the only thing’ in a zero-sum game of two parties (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000, 10) without any effort to go beyond the mere competition logic or understand the complex dynamics that justifies and fueled violence. The structural imperialist reflection along with the perception mainstream journalism dealt with violent conflicts made Johan Galtung propose a new conception and practical tool to cover violence in the world. This different way to do journalism was labelled by Galtung as ‘Peace Journalism’, a socially ethics journalism that would open the possibility to challenge “structural violence” (Galtung, 1971; Galtung & Höivik, 1971) created by the status quo or by war, by giving voice to all sides including non-elite people, and was committed to peace as a value. “Peace Journalism” would then oppose to the existing dominant journalism model that he labelled as “Violence/War Journalism”.

Galtung’s proposal tries to redefine journalism by giving it conceptual and practical tools to cover events in a more accurate and human perspective, mostly in regard to violent conflicts, but it can be applied to all violence related issues. The main goal of Peace Journalism is to make information not just a cumulative sum of events, but a constructive element that, committed to peace as a value, gives people the chance to get to know and understand all the dynamics implied in violent conflicts and in violent practices or structures. Using as a starting point the idea that public understanding of key issues depend, at least to some extent, on how they are reported, it aims to use language and technological power to broadcast contents that help societies
and groups to contextualize group violence and understand its root causes, explaining reasons and perceptions on both sides (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, xviii). Usage of words or expressions such as “we are under threat,” “evildoers” and “people on the other side” or binary oppositions of “us and them” (either explicitly or almost imperceptible) as well as the reproduction of stereotypes and incitement to social polarization are excluded from any journalistic commitment to peace (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, 95–122). As such, four basic principles on which Peace Journalism should be based were presented—peace/conflict oriented, truth oriented, people oriented and solutions oriented—as opposed to war journalism (violence, propaganda, elites and victory oriented), considered to be the dominant one in nowadays journalistic practices. Despite being centered on open violent conflict scenarios, one can perfectly identify a latent concern about the role journalism plays in the management of diversity among multicultural (even if formally peaceful) societies, since it highlights the need to give voice and humanize all parties involved. According to Peace Journalism proposal, journalism should focus on invisible aspects of violence and its deep-rooted causes, expose falsehoods and half-truths on all sides and concentrate on violence prevention (Galtung, 1998). Peace Journalism has been criticized among academics and media professionals (Hanitzsch, 2004; Loyn, 2003) for its critical approach towards the concept of journalistic objectivity, which Peace Journalism questions and aims to deconstruct. The name Peace Journalism itself reflects the disruption with the idea of objectivity and the evident and explicit choice for peace as an agenda-setting reference. Galtung’s proposal of Peace Journalism is highly counter-hegemonic and emancipatory-driven since its main goal is to free societies and communities from identified oppression mechanisms, systems or/and orders as well as from violent dynamics and elements, which are intimately inter-related.

Likewise, a research line started to develop as far as (pedagogical) entertainment and informative debate are concerned which was later on labelled as “peace

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101 The peace journalism model was further developed by Conflict and Peace Forums, a think-tank based in UK in a series of international conferences and publications in the late 1990s, e.g. The Peace Journalism Option (1998); What Are Journalists For? (1999); and Using Conflict Analysis in Reporting (2000). In their book “Peace Journalism” (2005) Lynch and McGoldrick summarised and elaborated the basic tenets of Galtung’s approach as well as highlighting the misunderstandings and scepticism levelled at peace journalism by discussing dominant misconceptions and emphasising the ways in which it is regarded as unprofessional, biased or partisan.
Paulo Freire was the most relevant scholar in this field, drawing from and upon Catholic liberation-theology and Marxist ideas to forge a concept of popular literacy education for personal and social liberation which converges to this study’s conception of emancipation. Freire’s theory stems from the conviction that no form or system of education is or could ever be neutral (1993, 2010) and that all pedagogy is a call to action or to no-action and, therefore, an instrument of people’s domination or emancipation. Accordingly, bias is inherent in any selection and ordering of facts. One’s understanding of how the democratic possibilities of citizenship might be achieved depends on a partisan assessment of current conditions, and where one wants to go: hence, a political standpoint. “Literacy” became the buzzword, but according to Freire, it can read just the words or read both the word and the world. Questions such as “what does history tell us? what is the current situation? what should be done about it?” are common when determining curricula and when educating and teaching.

Based on this assumption, Freire draws a profound critique to dominant forms of teaching. On Freire’s words, existing dominant forms of teaching are not neutral, though usually claimed as such. By claiming education as neutral or just the simple replication of facts or objective science and knowledge many educators indoctrinate learners through education for the status quo maintenance. Freire labelled this form of education as “banking education” (1993: 53), i.e. depositing information – “the teachers issues communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorise and repeat” (Ibidem). This does not happen by accident. The choice for this form of education is nothing but the intention to “minimise or annul the student’s creative power and to stimulate their credulity serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed”. By quoting Simone de Beauvoir, Freire affirms that the interest of the oppressors, under the guise of humanitarian values in education is “changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation that oppresses them” (Ibidem: 515), so that the status quo can be maintained and the oppressed might receive the euphemistic title of “welfare recipients” (Ibidem), which helps to create a hegemonic effect on oppression systems.

“It would be naive to expect the dominant classes to develop a type of education which

102 Peace education is “the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level” (UNICEF, 1999:1).

103 See section 2.1 in Chapter 1.
would enable subordinate classes to perceive social injustices critically" (Freire, 1985, 102) and not to charm, through discourse, by means of dream censors, curricula regulators, stories of teacher empowerment and highlighting the commonality of their interests with their national ruling class, make (subordinated) people to unconsciously support their own oppression (1993). This Freire’s idea goes along with Marx “false consciousness” concept explored in Chapter 1.

Dominant educative processes domesticate people where there exists a dominant culture of silence in which people are taught to accept what is handed down to them by the ruling elite without questioning it. Hence, their understanding of their social reality is limited to what they are taught and told to accept and believe. Freire (1993) points out that in a culture of silence the masses are mute, that is, they are prohibited from creatively taking part in the transformation of their society and therefore prohibited from being. Even if they can occasionally read and write because they were taught in humanitarian - but not humanist - literacy campaigns and educative systems, they are nevertheless alienated from the power responsible for their silence.

In order to invert this situation and practices Freire (1993; 2010) advocated for a “problem-posing education” (i.e. emphasizing dialogue and critical thinking) over this traditional and dominant “banking education” (1993: 53), where the use of student-centered methods could lead to critical consciousness, that is, an awareness of the necessity to constantly unveil appearances designed to protect injustice which he labelled as dehumanization, "spiritual weariness, historical anesthesia and cultural invasion” (Freire, 1994: 123). As such, critical consciousness serves as a foundation for action toward equality and democracy (1993; 1973; 1985). For this, Freire’s proposal was labelled as “peace education” proposal. Here peace is perceived in a positive ‘galtungesque’ understanding of the concept: “positive peace” (Galtung, 1964), which is highly linked to the conception of emancipation in its broader and demanding sense. Peace education is overt with its intentions to confront, understand, and resist violence. Peace education does not pour knowledge into the minds of students or tell students what to do, so though being anti-oppressive status quo, it is neither a process or system of indoctrination (Mayor, 2005). Nor does peace education utilize a system of experts who come into the classroom and tell students what to think, rather it helps learners to begin to raise questions and gives students the tools they need to direct their learning. It is an education about how to learn and not what to learn in both terms of agenda and
contents. It is an inquiry and debate-led education that, according to Freire, helps motivate learners to raise questions themselves, and become reflective and active learners, and participate actively in their communities (Freire, 1993; 1985).

Freire defended that his theory and methodologies should also be applied to media contents and not being limited to formal spaces of apprenticeship (1993; 1998). Accordingly, instead of having media consumers, the emphasis should be shifted to having media participants. According to him, the cultural industry is characterized by the existence of means of transmission, and not by systems of communication (*Ibidem*). Transmission entails a hierarchical relation of power and an acritical role of the recipients, while communication sets a horizontal exchange of contents, perceptions and opinions. By centering education on revealing systems of oppression, Paulo Freire intended to develop a questioning attitude towards the violence of the status quo, particularly through the exploration of language and identity and by challenging the banking-model of teaching and learning which is present in school but also in media – both in information and in entertainment. Autonomous learning and questioning relates to individual and national autonomy and democratic, voiceful participation models active intense and deep citizenship in a democracy.

The 1970’s marked a particularly emancipatory perception of the potential of media and were accompanied by the emergence of proposals which translated it into normative and methodological tools. These perceptions and proposals were located on a Marxist school of thought and characterised by status quo agents (being them politicians or academics) as alternative, radical or hippie segment of academics of that time. Buzzwords like “liberation”, “oppression”, and “structuration” were common among these emancipatory proposals, identifying in a discursive explicit way both the diagnosis of the world system problems – the super-structure on which the world is based - and their agenda – emancipating world people’s of structural forms of oppression, particularly economic ones and its discursive counter-parts.

### 1.2 - Emancipation “revisited” and reconstructed

The 1990s witnessed the uncontested hegemony of (economic) Liberalism on a global level, but also shed light and mainstreamed Peace Studies proposals where Galtung and Freire reflexions stood. The end of the cold war and the unipolar world
under the umbrella of a hegemonic liberal power made words and expressions such as “culture of peace” (Galtung, 1990; 1996) or “peace media” (Hieber, 1998; 2001; Bratic, 2005a; Egedler, 2012; Santos, 2010), along with concepts such as “fourth power”, “watchdog”, “public sphere” and “accountability”, as the expression of a desired articulation between media, empowerment and governance which became recurrent in mediabuilding rhetoric. As such, this section will first explore the Peace Studies co-option by dominant institutions in the international sphere from the 1990s onwards. Afterwards it will explore the liberal rhetoric which relates media with empowerment and governance, so that the different contributions and their adaptation to the 1990s onwards power agenda, particularly as far as media, peace and emancipation are concerned, might be identified.

Concerning Peace Studies proposals, there was a clear option for a cultural and agency focus in detriment of a structural analysis put forward by Galtung. In fact, during the 1990s, the concept of structural violence (Galtung, 1971; 1996) was simply used by dominant political analysts to explain “endemic” war economies (Duffield, 1993; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Francis, s/d) and was never applied in mainstream or institutional literature to refer to the international system and the way it organised and rank in practical terms the different societies in the system as centre, semi-peripheral, peripheral. The “cultural peace” (Galtung, 1990; 1996) component of Galtung’s proposal was, in turn, used to define what was needed at local level but also at the international level, reinforcing two key ideas: first, a primitive understanding of differences that allowed for violence to erupt in “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) settings; and second, the idea of the celebration of multicultural identities and dialogue within this new internationalist order. Even if in a subtle way, this positioning of the concepts helped to underline the trend of internalising the causes of violence in “new wars” and externalise the therapeutics.

However, as peace studies proposals were rendered empty, ineffective or toothless as far as its emancipatory and critical proposals were concerned, liberal understanding of the political sphere and the role media should perform in governance started to become central and clearly empowering in nature. Four interlinked main ideas supported this liberal empowerment proposal. First, the idea of “the fourth power”, a

104 “Meaning aspects of culture that serves to justify and legitimise direct and structural peace” (Galtung, 1990: 291).
hyperbolic\footnote{Hyperbolic in the sense that it is not compared to the legislative, judiciary or executive powers. Media are not representative nor do they obey to a mandate.} claim aiming at positioning the press and journalism at the same level of all other democratic powers, such as legislative, executive and judicial ones (Mesquita, 2003). It aims to affirm the role of journalism as a counter-power actor which controls the three powers due to the power they wield and the oversight function they exercise (Hanitzsch, 2007), i.e., exerts the function of watchdog – and this is the second idea on which media’s liberal empowering proposal is based on. The media are, hence, perceived as guardian of the public interest in the sense that any role of a watchdog journalist can be that of a power abuse controlling, a protector or guardian of the public interest (Voltmer, 2010), i.e., media supply the citizens with information they must have "to prevent the abuse of power" (Marder, 1998: 20) and to "warn citizens about those that are doing them harm" (Coronel, 2008: 3).\footnote{As happens with many other concepts and proposals, the watchdog and fourth power conceptions can also be coopted to help maintain order and warn against contestation tactically labelled as "disorder".} Third, “media accountability”, i.e., the general (particularly western) belief that governing democratic power (e.g. legislative, executive and judiciary) has to be accountable in the public’s interest, or in other words, they are expected to behave in certain ways that contribute to the public good (Siebert et al., 1956; McQuail, 2005) and that this watchdog control will have positive public interest consequences: “the nearer any medium gets to operating as a mass medium, the more it can expect the attentions of governments, since it affects the exercise of power” (McQuail, 2005, p. 42). Finally, the public sphere or,\footnote{Though the concept of the public sphere originated in the 18th century, German sociologist Jürgen Habermas is credited with popularizing the term in his book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962; English translation, 1989).} in Habermas’ (1989) terms, an area in social life where individuals can come together to freely discuss and identify societal problems and through that discussion influence political action. It is "a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment"(Hauser, 1998). The public sphere can be seen as "a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk" (Fraser, 1990) and "a realm of social life in which public opinion can be formed" (Habermas, 1989: 3). It allows citizens to have the “space in which to develop and articulate "public will," and (...) [to] influence political decision making” (Arnold, 2008). It is, hence, concomitant with Couldry’s (2010) idea of “voice as a process” and “voice as a value” since it recognises the importance of a sphere where people might discuss and form a public opinion so
that they are able to influence decision-making according to their general interest and agenda.

To sum up, the media is the forth power in any state because it is the platform where public opinion can be created and informed; it is the place where information is spread. Ideally, it is supposed to be representative of the citizens and, as such, it works as a watchdog and help bringing governments accountable by unveiling wrongdoing (not only in government but also in the private sector). Media become, thus, the element in between the state and the citizens, transmitting communication and allowing the debate between the two: the state can communicate with the citizens and the citizens can also communicate with the media and back to the state (Hirshman, 1970).

1.3 The cannonic result: towards funded normalisation

Despite its empowering rhetoric within the well-known and peacebuilding consensual triangle “media-governance-accountability” (Norris, 2010), the fact is that media, and particularly peace media in post-conflict societies, were increasingly rendered empty of all this emancipatory and empowering potential and drawn to create an illusion of having the same conditions as all other peaceful countries in the centre of the world system and making them to prevent direct violence (Galtung, 1996) from occurring while at the same maintaining them in the periphery of the world system. I.e., keep the status quo intact and making post-conflict peripheral societies to be part of it but in a subaltern position which is kept, on the one hand, by the structural economic division of the international system and, on the other hand, by means of creating narratives concomitant with the maintenance of the status quo.

The narratives and discourses produced, as far as peace media were concerned, made them to be rendered empty from their empowering potential and made to merely perform the role of pacifying social relations, a crucial element to stop “direct violence” (Galtung, 1996) to exist and keep hegemonic liberal order on tracks both in ethical and functionalist perspective. Media started to be presented as key to mediate inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions (Curtis, 2000; Davidson, 1993; Howard, 2001; UNESCO, 2005; Ribeiro, 2006; Putzel et al, 2005; Price et al, 2002; Hieber 1998; Kumar, 2006; Bratic & Schirch, 2007), as a vehicle for interculturality (UNESCO, 2005; Kumar, 2006); as a gender norms catalyst (USIP, 2012) and as a democratic optimiser.
particularly in times of elections (Frère, 2011; Allen & Stremlau, 2005; Kumar, 2006), regarding the rule of law (Monroe & Thompson 2002) and within a nation-state political unit (Voltmer, 2010; Allen & Stremlau, 2005; Kumar, 2006). The problem here was that not only all of these peace areas for debate and action were circumscribed to the most formal and conservative perspective of liberal peace, but also that key issues for the true path toward social emancipation and emancipatory peace, within which media have a high potential, were put aside, dismissed as less important or even rendered invisible. Moreover, they represented the direct transposition of the low intensity version of the emancipatory ingredients the liberal proposal integrated.

Evidence on this kind of manipulative perception of peace media may be found in this quote: “Information deals with attitudes and opinions that are slow in forming. This puts a premium on pro-activity in international responses to incitement. You need to get there as early as you can. And if it is to be most effective, information needs to be presented to people in ways in which they are prepared to accept. We need to ask how people get their information. What sort of information do they trust, and how do they process it? How do they think about problems, why do they think as they do? In some situations, hiring street-theatre troupes might be the most appropriate step” (Metzl, 2002: 44).

2 – The network

Like mediabuilding architecture, explained in section 4 of Chapter 4, peace media intervention structure and network can be systematised into a vertical and horizontal interactive three layered scheme and flow, where donors, intermediaries (i.e. discourse and knowledge producers, programming organisations and operational partners) and local partners and/or settings perform their roles and activities in a chain and inter-dependence logic, which is crucial for the maintenance of an hegemonic order.

As far as donors are concerned, they are mostly “West”-based, being governments, private foundations and private companies (these particularly linked to oil, financial banking or technologies), but there is also a very high amount of funding coming from international governmental organisations, such as the UN and its specialised agencies as well as from European organisations, like the EU or the OSCE, which are committed to the west liberal peace agenda. Sometimes, as I will explain in
the next section of this Chapter, externally-set up peace media outlets can also get some of their revenues from advertisement, but this is still very residual. I use the term “still” in both an explicative and analytical way: explicative because it is a fact; analytically since if the project is to build a liberal holistic peace taking as reference the dominant labelled as “successful” liberal recipe, this form of financial revenue should be much more common in a near future. Also, there is a high level of exchange and partnership among mediabuilding funding and operational institutions. Presenting his own testimony, a UNDP representative stated in an interview that he had “ended up working a fair amount as a UN colleague, with people at UNESCO with whom I worked before at the CPJ and elsewhere”.108

By means of different typologies (e.g. institutional funding; ad hoc funding), this money funds the research, policy agenda, programming of different organisations, such as CIMA; UNESCO; UNDP; CommGAP; USIP; SFCG; Fondation Hirondelle, all of which are based in the “west” countries and close to the decision power locus of the liberal order.

Most of them work in the peripheral countries of the international system, as far as peace media is concerned. This aspect is particularly curious when relating their peace building agendas, the reflection produced on media and the high levels of violence in the West countries, direct, structural or cultural.

3 – Illustrative cases

Among all these actors, three emerge as particularly representative of peace media intervention as conceived in this study. The three illustrative cases are: the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Search for Common Ground (SFCG), and Fondation Hirondelle (FH). Each of them is representative of a specific area: discourses/knowledge production or programming. USIP is particularly recognised for setting up research and programming agendas, and it also develops its own programming on the ground; Search for Common Ground is an NGO specialised in peace media and communication and its work entail both radio stations and contents production to be broadcasted in local radios; finally, Foundation Hirondelle is an NGO.

which sets up radios and news agencies. Moreover, all three case studies are interlinked in a network logic, which Figure 1 in the last section of this Chapter shows.

As previously explained in the introduction of this Chapter, all of these three illustrative cases will be analysed at three levels: enunciation locus; discourses and programming. The enunciation locus relates to the geo-political and epistemological body of the subject who speaks and acts. Discourse analysis will take into account the narrative they put forward regarding the root causes of violence and violent conflicts, the key ingredients to build peace; their definition of peace, and the power relations they establish openly or in subtext logic. Among all discursive materials they produce, I have chosen all that related to post-conflict media intervention with particular focus on radio intervention. Finally, programming refers to the media intervention outlets and programs these institutions deploy and set up on the ground. This study will analyse them in terms of discourse and agenda.

3.1 – United States Institute for Peace

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is a clarifying representative example of knowledge production and programming, emerging as a particularly important actor in the field of mediabuilding - specifically in the area of peace media - from 2007 onwards. As far as “media, conflict and peacebuilding” (the self-proclaimed axis of this issue working area) is concerned, “it looks at ways to use media as peacebuilding tool around the world”, with specific focus in Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan and Pakistan as can be easily perceived when analyzing their geographically targeted areas.

3.1.1 – Enunciation locus

USIP is the federally-funded, “independent, nonpartisan conflict management center created by Congress [in 1984] to prevent and mitigate international conflict without resorting to violence” (USIP, s/d1). Despite not being a government agency and presenting themselves as a “unbiased”, it is intimately connected to USA foreign policy guidelines as their main geographical action areas clearly illustrate: “Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan, Libya, and the Two Sudans” and, as they highlight in their mission description: “works to reduce the costs and risks for American military and civilians deployed to conflict areas abroad by training them to peacefully mitigate and manage conflicts, (...) helps to create safe and stable environments for people living and Americans working in these regions, (...) increase[s] the government's ability to deal with conflicts before they escalate, reduce[s] government costs, and enhance[s] our national security” (USIP, s/d1). Importantly, “the United States Institute of Peace also is a powerful symbol, representing America’s commitment to peace and our country’s abiding interest in avoiding the staggering costs of war—both human and fiscal” (Ibidem). USIP does so by means of “teaching and training, research and analysis, and global grant-making” as well as by performing the role of convenor – it “welcomes world leaders to present their vision for peace, brings together bipartisan leaders to address difficult issues like genocide prevention, and fosters dialogue and collaboration among U.S. government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.”

Curiously, the enunciation locus of the USIP is not explicitly declared on the territory on which they operate upon. As a senior program officer of the USIP said, the Institute tries “not to brand its work as USIP-supported, it is all about the production being local”. Therefore, “the USIP has the authority of the programming and [internationally retains] the credits, but at a local level while the Iraqi production is highlighted, the USIP logo also appears but without any identifying text. That is the middle ground we have to choose to represent ourselves on the program”, particularly as far as the Iraqi context is concerned.

All these elements combined make USIP an epistemological, normative and geopolitical “western” actor using their power in accordance with its agenda, i.e. furthering its own ideology and the interests to maintain and safeguard the hegemonic position in the world, both in terms of discourses and materiality

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110 Although they also state “elsewhere” in some of their description texts.
111 “The Institute’s independence gives it unique access, credibility, and convening power among a variety of stakeholders, including governments, civil society, militaries, private businesses and scholars worldwide. Its small size enables flexibility, agility, and a non-bureaucratic approach to conflict management” (USIP s/d1).
112 Interview with senior program officer of USIP, Washington D.C., 2011.
3.1.2 – Discourses

From all the interviews undertaken by this study, it was very rare that the USIP was not mentioned as one of the most important institutions in the field. In a 2010 Perrault’s article, the USIP Board of Directors Vice Chairman George E. Moose claims “there is an explosion of information out there. The concerns with an increase in media are that you get more information but the information is less in-depth and some of it is not reliable. USIP people are increasingly quoted because USIP has become a reliable source” (Perreault, 2010). Through their reports, articles and policy briefs many academics, politicians and practitioners get to know the forefront of the intervention lines and analysis of peace media area.

Despite relying also on the work of external consultants for the production of some of their reports and policy briefs, USIP is a very coherent actor in terms of discourse, concomitant of the dominant liberal narrative and agenda described in section 2 of the Chapter 3, and which can be synthetised in “dominant liberal peace canon”. Among the general peace media discourse it produces, four discursive elements (i.e., discursive labels and the positioning or organisation of observed reality) should be highlighted: overlapping violent and conflict with “extremism”; option for a manicheist and biased analysis of violence and peace dynamics in post-war societies (and respective extrapolations to the international system); vagueness of prescriptive terms; advertising the indispensability of the dominant liberal peace program as a successful coherent whole.

By construing this particular perception of reality which crosscuts all articles, reports and policy briefs produced by the USIP, these discursive elements become the legitimating pillars of the USIP itself – its own regime of truth - as well as its programming and the liberal peace proposal. They become, subsequently, the reference for programming and for the establishment of the rankings of success (i.e. the identification of how well the society upon which USIP operates evolved positively and peacefully or not), and integration of peace media and actors within the international liberal (peace) order (i.e. if they are reliable or pariah societies and states), in a self-sustaining and hierarchical logic. USIP defines the reality upon which it acts, diagnoses it, prescribes media recipes and makes judgements based on its own readings of that same reality upon which it acts and from which its enunciation locus benefits. In short,
USIP is simultaneously the analyst, the executor and the supervisor of its own agenda and work. Even, when presenting assessment analysis (e.g. Himelfarb, 2012; Arsenault et al, 2011) the methodology is seldom if at any time presented, assuming a general incontestable consensus on the role of the media within peace and the way peace orders should look like and opting, therefore, for a functionalist and acritical or challenging analysis of its work, which sheds light on the interest of USIP in maintaining the liberal peace order.

The first element is the tendency to both overlap violence and conflict with “extremism” (Moore, 2012) often characterised with a high density of irrationality entailing no political agenda, or being associated to a highly simplified and reductive almost ad absurdum agendas which allows for a trench logic – to be “with us or against us”. An example of this can be found in Dolan (2014) where he explains how peace media can counteract hate speech and the term rebels are equated in this reductive and binary way: “assuming it's possible to act fast enough to block rebels from airing broadcasts from a small local radio station, jamming is a slippery slope for international organizations operating in the world's newest sovereign nation” (Dolan, 2014). It is precisely this simplistic analysis that often leads to the barbarian and irrational narrative: to automatically describe violence and conflict as an expression of nothing but identitarian conflict lines, evidencing a superficial analysis of the violence dynamics on the ground and reinforcing the mainstream Western-prejudice arguments on irrationality, barbarism or pre-modern aspects of these dynamics. Likewise, peace is overlaid with “statebuilding”, “nationhood”, “unity” – traditionally western ordering concepts. Quotations of their discourses will further illustrate this point. In Afghanistan, according to USIP, “the primary obstacle to statebuilding (...) is the historical and ongoing inability of Afghans to establish a mutually acceptable balance of power between any central government and periphery communities and institutions. By serving as an interlocutor for center-periphery relations, the media could help transform statebuilding from a zero-sum conflict to a positive-sum process in which disagreements are resolved peacefully” (Fraenkel et al, 2010). Two important subtexts may be unearthed from this quote. First, there is a trend to internalise the causes of violence and to externalise the theurapeutics, which entails an obvious hierarchical and “west/rest” logic and discourse. The term “inability” to justify the “primary obstacle” to “statebuilding” (a concept presented within this discourse as overlapping “peace”) and
to encapsulate the conflict in the Afghan History as if the country and the society were hermetic settings. The second subtext is the perception of time as a linear evolution line ranging from negative/pre-modern conflict to positive/modern/peaceful dynamics, settings and contexts, which also fits the “west/rest” discourse. Regarding Iraq, USIP diagnoses the country as a "deeply rooted, intractable, and dynamic conflict landscape (...) [particularly in terms of] three key conflicts: citizen-state, ethnic, and intercommunal” (Dolan & Gray, 2014), as if these were the main (if not the only) elements of generation and perpetuation of violence, and as if barbaric traits would still inhabit that area.” It also omits the international interferences and stakeholders in the Iraqi conflict, particularly US responsibility in the ongoing violence.

The second element is the option for a manicheistic analysis of post-conflict societies, creating a power-based system of differentiation, as if black and white logic best fitted the complexity of post-war societies and if only binary lenses would make a proper analysis of the existing tensions and contestation dynamics and politics on those settings. Accordingly, on one side, there are the irrational extremists, while on the other side there are the good peaceful and peacebuilding actors among which there is USIP and its local partners. In fact, to be a USIP local partner is often equated to evidence that those actors are pro-peace. There is also the establishment of a hierarchical and missionary perspective of the peace media and the liberal peace intervention. Wording such as “help” in - “The intended outcomes of the Sawa Shabab program are to help South Sudanese youth understand their own potential as individuals, respect the differences they have with others and bring young people together based on the commonalities they share” (Dolan, 2014) – and “has not yet developed” in - “Pakistan’s media community has not yet developed an adequate or widely accepted strategy for responding to this context of persistent extremism and conflict.” (Byam & Neu, 2011) – denote a hierarchical and paternalist relation between USIP and its peace media programming, located on the top, and local people, located on a subaltern position.

The third is the superficiality of diagnosis and the vagueness of prescriptions contents which, on one hand, allows strategically to internalise the causes of any peacebuilding lack of success, and on the other hand, to make the most mainstreamed and superficial interpretation of those concepts, reinforcing the liberal hegemonic rules of the liberal peace game and correlations of power. “Finally, there is also an aggregative trend in USIP discourses in the sense that whenever media are proposed as
a peacebuilding tool, they add up another dimension of the liberal peace to make everything successful, e.g. law, economic sustainability, market economy, reinforcing the comprehensive (although selective) liberal project that aims to be built in these societies.

3.1.3 – Programming

Programming in peace media is not necessarily one of the strongest points of USIP if we compare the amount or articles, reports and policy briefs produced with the number of programming interventions. Nevertheless, it has clearly important peace media intervention programming in Iraq, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most of the times, programming discourse pursues the trends identified in USIP discourse, although it is adapted in a cosmetic and seductive language to its local targeted audience.

In Afghanistan, USIP peace media intervention was directed towards funding and setting up specific media programming, among which three are particularly clarifying in terms of programming agenda. The first one is the radio drama “One Village, A Thousand Voices”, which was set up in “close collaboration with Afghan partners” (Omestad, 2013). It was a weekly radio program which spotlighted “themes of citizen participation and responsibility in connection with Afghanistan’s (...) elections for president and provincial councils”, which were then scheduled for April 2013. Among the justifications for this programming, it was stated that “elections (...) [are] widely seen as an important step toward consolidating representative democracy and channeling political disputes through peaceful political processes” (USIP, 2013b). As USIP’s deputy director of Afghanistan programmes Scott Smith notes, “elections are ultimately a means of conflict resolution. They allow political differences to be resolved according to agreed-upon rules, avoiding the need for violence.” Smith argued the intention is to dramatize not only elections but specific elements of them — “discussion, the search for consensus and the acceptance of an outcome fairly arrived at, even if we don’t agree with it.” (Omestad, 2013) It was also a radio drama that intended to broadcast discussion on the issues of the rule-of-law and justice behind the village conflicts. It is heard in Pashto and Dari “on Afghanistan’s most popular radio network, Radio Azadi, on Mondays and repeated on Fridays. A call-in discussion segment, with a rule-of-law specialist present to comment, follows each Friday airing” (Ibidem). This
radio drama also intends to “encourage Afghans to manoeuvre through their often difficult, hybrid justice system — traditional, informal justice mechanisms along with more formal, state-based courts — in ways that resolve their disputes without violence” (USIP, s/d3) Is the hybridity that needs to be explained? And if the Hybridity needs to be explained to the local, does it actually makes sense to exist? Who determined it? Doesn’t this reflect the hegemonic nature of the liberal peace these peace media aim to implement? Why don’t these peace media promote a wide debate on the possible structures of justice? Why do they opt just to explain and not to facilitate an in-depth debate on the nature of this hybrid justice? The aim here is to impose, in a hegemonic soft way (i.e. dominating with a negotiation basis), forms of organising societies, in this case justice.

The second peace media radio programming in Afghanistan is a 40 investigative radio broadcasts, each highlighting a specific war crime or human rights abuse that occurred in Afghanistan in the last 35 years. Each episode was 30 minutes long and included a roundtable discussion with relevant experts to interpret and highlight the specific controversies of each case (Pazhwak, 2011). Who are the “relevant experts”? They are the academics and practitioners with an understanding of the topic close to the one of the USIP, hence legitimating USIP discourses and programming by means of knowledge.

Finally, USIP gave a grant in 2011 to the nongovernmental organization Free Press Unlimited to build local journalistic capacity and reduce intergroup tensions through the production of weekly radio programs in Dinka and Arabic (Murray, 2012). Conversely to Afghanistan, Pakistan has been much less operated upon by the USIP. According to its activity records, USIP supported “U.S. and Pakistani non-profit organizations producing media geared toward women and youth, countering extremist messaging” (USIP, 2012). They never define extremist making people to use the negative common sense meaning that is usually attributed to it, making people who want peace to detach themselves from those groups, even if not knowing them, and to get closer to USIP, its programming and agenda.

In Iraq, USIP has set up two programming interventions in the peace media area. The first one that must be highlighted is the “Witnesses to Peacebuilding” series. In a dramatic way, the video brings to life USIP’s work in Iraq, and challenges traditional

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113 Interview with senior program officer of USIP, Washington D.C., 2011.
assumptions of who peacebuilders are and what the process can look like in the context of war. In Iraq, in 2011, USIP launched premieres "Salam Shabab" ("Together Youth", in English), a multi-media program which includes a website and a nationally aired ongoing TV series on at-risk youth. The formal mission of “Salam Shabab” is to build the foundations for peace by empowering Iraqi youth to be confident, responsible and participatory citizens of their society (Dolan & Toriello, 2011).

In 2014, Sawa Shabab was started in South Sudan. It was produced in collaboration with Free Voice South Sudan, an information resource for media and non-governmental organizations of the U.S. Task Force on South Sudan,\(^{114}\) which is presented by the USIP as a “a media development NGO” (Dolan, 2014). Sawa Shabab is an entertaining drama based on a peacebuilding curriculum developed between USIP and local partners. The curriculum seeks to increase knowledge and change the attitudes and behaviors of youth listeners regarding their roles in building peace in South Sudan. The series' curriculum focuses on three main goals, identified by local experts as critical to building peace in South Sudan: “Co-Existence and National Identity”, i.e., “to promote peaceful co-existence and mutual respect among South Sudanese youth from different cultural and tribal orientations”; “Youth Empowerment and Personal Responsibility”, which means “to create the foundations of peacebuilding by empowering South Sudanese youth to be accountable, independent and participatory citizens of society”; and finally, “Gender” which USIP defines as “to promote peaceful and democratic growth in society by fostering an understanding of gender equality” (USIP, s/d2). They are modeled by the characters in the drama. For example, during the first season, the show follows Rose, a high school-age girl who left her rural village with her mother in search of greater opportunities in town. She is determined to pursue her dreams of becoming an actress, despite being forced into a marriage with a much older man. Meanwhile, Winnie has recently returned to South Sudan from America with new ideas, but she struggles to be accepted back in her home country. Taban, another main character, is a student by day and sells eggs by night to support his family. “As a young man in South Sudan, he also has ambitions: to find his father, a profession and love” (Dolan, 2007) Another example happens in the 14th episode where after Ms. Mary has banned the student union from wearing traditional jewellery, ChoCho encourages Winnie not to give up. Taban and ChoCho travel to see Taban’s father in the village, but the visit is not what he thought it

\(^{114}\) To learn more, see: http://freesouthsudanmediacenter.com/about/.
would be. Richard and his father get into a fight and he learns from he only received his promotion because of his family connections (USIP, s/2). The U.S. Institute of Peace provides funding and the peacebuilding framework for "Salam Shabab" (Arabic for "Peace Youth"), but the production, direction and participants in the show are, as a USIP senior program officer puts it, "Iraqi from top to bottom".

The full season of Sawa Shabab includes 20 episodes in English and Arabic, as well as five episodes in Dinka and Nuer. The drama is broadcasted by different radios, such as the Foundation Hirondelle’s Radio Miraya,\textsuperscript{115} the Catholic Radio Network\textsuperscript{116} and other local radio stations throughout the country. The declared outcomes of the Sawa Shabab program are to “help South Sudanese youth understand their own potential as individuals, respect the differences they have with others and bring young people together based on the commonalities they share” (Dolan, 2014). The word “help” is highly revealing of the hierarchical relation between USIP and its local audience. Nevertheless, the PRIX JEUNESSE Foundation and the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) awarded Salam Shabab with a Special Prize, which was accepted by the Senior Program Officer Theo Dolan “on behalf of the USIP and Iraqi partners”, recognising Salam Shabab for “promoting cultural understanding” (\textit{Ibidem}).

Despite being claimed by USIP representatives that they “try to facilitate dialogue with the local people to figure out the programming. We facilitate the means by which people can resolve conflict on their own, we think the prescriptive way doesn’t always work best”\textsuperscript{117}, there is no evidence

3.3 – Search for Common Ground

Created in 1982 at the height of the Cold War, SFCG has since then put the media as the central intervention tool of their work and peace as their main general goal. At the beginning, it focused its work on “building bridges between East and West” (Marks, s/d) through media and, since the end of the Cold War, this NGO activity has been

\textsuperscript{115} See section 3 of this Chapter.
\textsuperscript{116} The Catholic Radio Network (CRN) is a media project constituted by community-based radio stations broadcasting in Frequency Modulation from Juba, Yei, Torit, Yambio, Rumbek, Tonj, Wau, and Malakal. CRN has also a station in the Nuba Mountains. To learn more, see: http://catholicradionetwork.org/
\textsuperscript{117} Interview with senior program officer of USIP, Washington D.C., 2011.
focusing its work on what they consider an increasingly “diffused” (Ibidem) and local conflictuality – which the literature has labelled as “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) as previously described in this study. They currently work in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States, with TV programming in 18 countries, radio programming in 21 countries and reaching 81 million people, and have a staff of over 400 reaching millions through media projects (SFCG, s/d5). It formally works “to transform the way the world deals with conflict - away from adversarial approaches and towards collaborative problem-solving”, using what they conceive as a multi-faceted approach, employing media initiatives and working with local partners in government and civil society, “to find culturally appropriate means to strengthen societies' capacity to deal with conflicts constructively: to understand the differences and act on the commonalities” (SFCG, s/d1). It undertakes its work in different countries in the world, most of all in the “rest” countries, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte D’Ivoire, Kenya, Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, with particular focus in post-conflict or conflict-prone societies.

3.3.1– Enunciation locus

Based in Washington D.C. and in Brussels, the SFCG claims as its main philosophical and epistemological standpoint the belief that “differences stimulate social progress, rather than precipitate violence” (SFCG, s/d2) and that the “respect for and cooperation with those we disagree with is considered the norm for individuals, communities, organizations, and nations” (Ibidem). Accordingly, differences among or between communities can be handled in a “joint problem-solving” perspective and methodology, rather than violence (Ibidem). Therefore, its mission is to “transform the way the world deals with conflict, away from adversarial approaches, toward cooperative solutions” (SFCG, s/d2) and they do so through communication. Media perform, among its activities, one of the crucial roles in its SFCG’s work.

It is, hence, a predominantly rational and individualistic perspective of human and societal interaction and a problem-solving option as key technique to successfully tackle conflicts. The emphasis on the individual agency situates the organisation in the dominant liberal ideological and epistemological point of view. The problem-solving approach, i.e., an option for not to interrogate the origin, nature and development of the
reality upon which they intervene, reinforces its belonging in today’s liberal status quo.

As far as funding is concerned, SFCG relies in a wide range of institutions, specifically, “west” corporations (mainly related to financial banking, oil and technologies), multilateral organisations (particularly the UN and its specialised agencies and missions), governments both in West and the Rest, although the great majority is from the West, and private foundations and NGO, also mainly western (SFCG, s/d3).

118 “Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed toward an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts. (…) Problem-solving theories can be represented (…) as serving particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order. Indeed, the purpose served by problem-solving theory is conservative, since it aims to solve the problems arising in various parts of a complex whole in order to smooth the functioning of the whole. This aim rather belies the frequent claim of problem-solving theory to be value-free. It is methodologically value-free insofar as it treats the variables it considers as objects (…) but it is a value-bound by virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own framework.” Cox, R. (1981: 208-209)

119 AngloGold Ashanti; Barrick Gold; Becton, Dickinson and Company; Beacon Hotel and Corporate Headquarters; BP Fabric of America Fund; British Petroleum; Chartis; Chevron; Clarke & Sampson, Inc.; Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Attorneys at Law; Deutsche Bank; Fuentes-Fernandez Consulting, LLC; Gelman, Rosenberg & Freedman; Greystone Financial Group, Inc.; Honest Tea; Hunton & Williams, Attorneys at Law; Kekst and Co.; Mastercard Matching Gift Program; MicroSoft; Rabinowitz Dorf Communications; Statoil; Systematic Management Services, Inc; TerpSy; TradeMark

120 Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi; European Union; FAO; International Criminal Court; UNHABITAT; UNICEF; UNDEF; United Nations Women; UNDP; UNHCR; UNFPA; MONUSCO; UNOPS; World Bank.

121 Australian Agency for International Development; Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Aid; Canadian Foreign Affairs; Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; German Foreign Ministry; Liberian Ministry of Youth and Sport; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs; New Zealand Embassy; Norwegian Foreign Ministry; Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance; SIDA; Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs; FCO; DFID; USAID; US Department of Defense; US Department of State

122 Alliance for Peacebuilding; American Endowment Fund; Amnesty International; ANAMIF; Arsenault Family Foundation; Bahrain Foundation for Reconciliation and Civil Discourse; Belson Family Fund; Betsy Gordon Foundation; Brodsky Family Foundation; Cal Turner Family Foundation; Campaign for Good Governance; Carleton University; Catholic Relief Services; Chasdraw Fund; Christian Aid; Church of Norway; Civicus; Coexist Foundation; Compton Foundation; Concern International; Conflict Management Initiative; Cordaid; Creative Learning; Development and Peace; Dobkin Family Foundation; ECC-MERU; Edmund & Betsy Cabot Charitable Foundation; El-Hibri Foundation; Foundation for Global Community; Freedom House; Gill Foundation; Glenmede Trust Company; Guerrand-Hermes Foundation; Haas Fund; Harold Grinspoon Charitable Foundation; Healing of the Nations Foundation; Helen Keller International; Henry Luce Foundation; Hess Foundation; Howard Buffett Foundation; Hunt Alternatives; Innovations for Poverty Action; International Medical Corps; International Organization for Migration; International Rescue Committee; Isabel Allende Foundation; JAMS Foundation; Jewish Community Foundation; John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; Johnson Family Foundation; Kathmandu University; Kellogg Foundation; Knight Foundation; Marble Collegiate Church; Marin
3.3.2 - Discourses

The (re)production of discourses and knowledge is mainly done by means of their programming and by how SFCG diagnoses the problems which their programming is intended to solve. SFCG discourse and the way they make reality to be perceived is epistemologically liberal, as stated in the previous point of this section. Three discursive ideas are clearly the bedrocks of SFCG discourse, which create its contribution to today’s liberal regime of truth.

The first discursive idea is the focus on the individual, which is a typical liberal western perspective of the world: the disregard for the structural reality on which the world exists on an individual and collective basis. Accordingly, the capacity to be or not to be violent lies first and foremost on the individual as if society wasn’t also due to be held accountable for individual choices and reactions. This is particularly evident when stating: “our differences – beliefs, values, and backgrounds – lead to conflict. These disagreements are natural. It’s when we respond with anger, fear, or even hatred that we’ve started down a destructive path. But violence is not inevitable. Disagreements are opportunities to learn new perspectives. Conflict is a chance to work together and find a solution that addresses everyone’s needs. We’re not saying that it’s simple or easy to respond constructively. It takes courage. But everyone can do it” (SFCG, s/d4).

The second one is the understanding that conflicts are better solved if transformed into a “middle ground” agreement (Ibidem), i.e., “a new vision of the future together (...) that meets everyone’s deep-seated concerns and values”. Again, the responsibility of any middle ground is, in a subtext, said to be held by the individual. Accordingly, middle ground is something that “people can aspire to and are willing to work towards. Finding it often takes creativity and a sense of basic safety, but we believe it leads to long-term solutions for the most people” (Ibidem). SFCG intends to “transform conflict from violent to cooperative, to change the everyday interactions...
between people in conflict from destructive to constructive” (Ibidem). Sometimes, structural conditions are mentioned, but they seldom get a proeminent position, if any, in the contents broadcasted by these peace media. Transforming conflict can be as simple as “reframing” a situation – creating a new context in which people attack common problems, rather than each other. A win-lose, you-or-me mindset just perpetuates violence because it disregards the fact that the people involved still have to co-exist after someone “wins”.

The third discursive idea is that peace is related to humankind and to individual capacity to cope and live peacefully with different others, and not as a result of political choices. In view of that and accordingly, in order to live in peace “we have to make a long-term commitment to work in partnership with local people from various sectors of their society (…) [and] approach each other and our differences with respect and a constructive mindset. In fact, for SFCG violence is generated by individual incapacity to live with different otherness (Ibidem). When analysing specific cases and prescribing specific recipes that legitimise their action and agenda, SFCG represents violent conflicts and peace as such “Guinea is arriving at a critical point, with recent incidences of political and social unrest creating a new urgency to address the issues of democracy and good governance” (SFCG, s/d8), isolating the local society as the cause of their own conflicts and presenting democracy and good governance, despite not putting forward any further definition of each of these values or concept, as the key solutions to violence.

Moreover, there are also two tendencies which are not as present as the three previous ones, but which also highlight the type of reality perception SFCG discourse promotes (and subsequently underlying its enunciation locus). The first tendency is the same propensity which USIP has to separate in a binary logic violence and peace and create power-based system of differentiation. For example, when presenting a testimony of a former “rebel” soldier after attending a SFCG workshop on peace, there is a clear binary and judgmental division between violent conflict and peace as if no dialogue existed between these two scenarios and if people had to chose between being good and peaceful and being bad and driven by violence: “After the discussions on human rights, peaceful resolution of conflict training, and radio programs, I decided to take a solemn oath to commit myself to making peace and to being an activist for reconciliation in my community. My objective is to encourage and sensitize the people...
in general and the Anti-Balaka in particular, so that together we can make peace». Antonio began organizing young guerrilla fighters, encouraging them to become champions of peace” (SFCG, s/d7). Two inferences can be drawn: firstly the simplification of individual change as if a workshop would be enough to tackle conflict memory and as if society and its structures didn’t contribute to individual’s behaviour; secondly, the connotation of champion and peace and, this one as a subtext, violent and loser.

The second tendency is the propensity to portrait violent conflicts as merely based on ethnic and religious division lines, neglecting or dismissing as less important the way societies are structurally organized and their international interdependence. This is best illustrated on the following quote which refers to the Central Africa Republic upheavals on the 5th December 2013: “Increasing divisions between Christians and Muslims, combined with the inability of institutions to mediate and defuse the rapidly escalating tensions, has led to widespread violence, creation of new militia groups, and the breakdown of social and economic life.”

There is another point that should be highlighted: the identification of government and state as reliable and positive authorities and the subsequent subtext which eliminated all other opposing and contestation actors as negative and unreliable – “SFCG is fundamentally changing the way listeners and viewers obtain their information. Listeners and viewers of SFCG programming are less likely to believe rumors and more inclined to obtain information from the radio, local NGOs, and the government”.

3.3.3 - Programming

Peace media radio production is a major component of SFCG work in terms of media. By means of media products, such as soap operas (sometimes called “radio dramas”), they intend to influence mass perceptions, attitudes and behaviors with positive messaging in order to have a “profound impact on how people think about themselves, their neighbors and their society” (SFCG, s/d6). They communicate themes such as “tolerance or democratization”, believed to be “relevant to the needs of the people and in support of our other activities” (Ibidem).
West Africa countries and the Great Lakes region are two geographical areas on which SFCG have had their greatest and biggest projects on peace radio programming.  

Talking Drum Studio (TDS) is a vast peace media project targeting West African countries, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. In Liberia, SFCG had its studios in Monrovia and in the town of Gbarnga producing nine regular weekly programmes that address “governance, reconciliation, and conflict issues”. In fact, it is the political sphere of peacebuilding agenda that gets the highest attention from the part of SFCG programming. Among these there was the radio drama “Today Is Not Tomorrow” which was broadcasted between 2003 and 2013 and had over 900 episodes (s/d6); and the radio drama “Blay-tahnla” (i.e., “At the Crossroads”, in the Kpelle tribe’s local language) which approaches issues such as tolerance, good governance and democratization, in addition to “themes reflecting society’s struggle with its natural resource management, security sector reform, decentralization, transparency and accountability, human rights, health and other life-saving issues” (SFCG, s/d9). According to SFCG, in “Blay-tahnla”, the characters “have fought a long war which devastated the lives they all had worked for. But they remain resilient as they struggle to reshape their lives. In their day-to-day they confront serious issues and must learn to cope with an environment rich in natural resources but yet very poor. The characters come from different places, background and experience and travel long and far until they meet at the crossroads – Blay-tahnla. There they discuss and argue; they disagree and fuss; they grow and learn; and they build and develop. Eventually, they all strive in pursuit of one thing – common ground” (Ibidem).

In Sierra Leone, TDS was established in 1997 aiming at reducing immediate political and ethnic violence and promoting long-term peace and stability by stressing, according to its website four core themes: accountability; youth and engagement; leadership; identity; and ethnicity. It used radio as a means for promoting dialogue among polarised groups and reducing ethnic and political tension among such groups by stressing themes of non-violent conflict resolution, democratisation and reconciliation. Each radio programming had a different format, sharing nevertheless the same goal: “to encourage peace and reconciliation”. “Bush Wahala” is a radio drama series that
promotes popular education to land rights with specific reference to land grabbing by “Agribusiness”. Its self-proclaimed goal is strengthening the capacity of communities to negotiate fair land deals without violent confrontation, raising awareness in rural communities of their rights so that they can make informed decisions and bringing the ongoing conflicts over existing land investment to public attention and thereby supporting the actions of rural communities in ensuring fair land deals (SFCG, s/d10).

TDS also has information programming, such as “Golden Kid News”, a news and issues (radio/television) programme that is partially developed, reported, and produced by children; “Common Ground Feature”, which is a news series in a magazine style featuring stories depicting interests and issues that are shared by conflicting groups. It also has specialised programming, such as the “Home Sweet Home”, focused on targeting information for returnees and refugees and “formatted in a soap-opera style, with information intertwined with the dialogue to provide not only an entertaining drama, but also a series that informs and educates refugees about the issues they must face and overcome in returning home” (Ibidem). There was also the serial drama “Atunda Ayenda” (“Lost and Found”, in English), which was launched in December 2001, “addressing the disarmament and demobilization process, the programme later focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants, and [which] now has shifted attention to democratisation and good governance.

In the Great Lakes region, which is commonly labelled as highly prone to tension, mostly due to the emergence of violent conflicts in the recent history of several countries of the region, just like the Rwanda’s genocide in 1995 and its spill over effects on the neighbouring countries as well as the DCR conflict and the ongoing violence in North Kivu, “Generation Grands Lacs”. The project specifically targets the quickly growing youth demographic in the region, fostering comradeship/solidarity and understanding across borders through discussion and debate (SFGC, s/d11). In Rwanda, to “help the reconciliation process (…), Search for Common Ground team (…) used radio broadcasting to promote solidarity and forgiveness. The radio program Turumwe (translating to We Are One) is one of the examples, striving to reconnect the shattered ties between the Hutus and Tutsis (SFCG, s/d12).
3.4 – Fondation Hirondelle

Fondation Hirondelle is a Swiss NGO of journalists and humanitarian aid professionals. Since 1995, it has been creating and supporting “independent, civic-minded news media in conflict, post-conflict and crisis zones” (FH, s/d1), specifically in Kosovo, East Timor, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania. In detail, FH works in 4 domains: production and broadcast of credible, relevant and impartial information; support and train media in the field of journalism, management, technical maintenance and business models; development of the conditions for sustainable media and enable the media outlets to be financially, institutionally and technically viable; research and network to advance the role of media in societies (Ibidem).

3.4.1 – Enunciation locus

Based on Genève, FH stems from a clear western conception of journalism and the way information should be passed onto citizens. Accordingly, its “top priority is to make its media credible through fact-based, professional journalism. It does not allow its staff “to express personal opinions on air” (FH, s/d1). Moreover, since it “works to create or support sustainable media that can run themselves without help from Fondation Hirondelle and international aid donors”, FH develops “media management, advertising and revenue generating structures” (Ibidem). In short, with a clear western and liberal capitalist perspective.

As far as funding is concerned, FH is financed mostly by western governments – USA through USAID, Germany by means of its Federal Foreign Office, Switzerland through Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs), France through the Expertise International, the French embassy in Kinshasa and Bangui, and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie; Ireland by means of Irish Aid, and Sweden through SIDA and The Netherlands through its embassy in Kinshasa. Besides western public funding, FH counts also with a great amount of private funding, such as the one coming from Cordaid (Dutch NGO), Karl Popper Foundation, Fondation Provictimis (Swiss Foundation), NED (American private
non-profit organization). Also, as far as operational partners are concerned, FH counts on Fourah Bay College,\(^{124}\) in Sierra Leone, the United Nations, the Radio Télévision Swisse, the private Swiss company Vicario Consulting,\(^{125}\) Radio Tunisienne, the Mali Union of Free Radio and Television stations (URTEL) and the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the United Nations. Finally, FH integrates several networks, specifically the Bonn Network,\(^{126}\) CIRTEF,\(^{127}\) COPEAM,\(^{128}\) Geneva Peace Building Platform,\(^{129}\) and En Quête d’Ailleurs,\(^{130}\) which as a whole represent clearly FH “west” enunciation *locus*.

### 3.4.2 – Discourse

Fondation Hirondelle is from these three illustrative examples, the one with less discourse production. However, institutional presentations allow to some extent to draw the narrative of violence, conflict and peace that FH subscribed and which informs its programming and action. Accordingly, “conflicts and crisis situations are often linked to

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\(^{124}\) To learn more, see: [http://www.fbcusl.8k.com/](http://www.fbcusl.8k.com/).

\(^{125}\) Vicario Consulting provides support to Fondation Hirondelle in recruitment and staff development policy, with a particular focus on multiculturalism. It is a human resources consulting company founded in 1999 which works with private companies, government departments and international organizations. To learn more, see: [http://www.vicario.ch/](http://www.vicario.ch/).

\(^{126}\) The Bonn Network was born from a conviction that media can play a key role in conflict prevention and peace building. This international network brings together intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and media organizations, as well as donors and researchers. It aims to pool the resources and expertise of members to promote efficient cooperation. Fondation Hirondelle is a member of the Bonn Network.

\(^{127}\) The French-speaking Radio and Television International Council (CIRTEF) promotes dialogue and exchange between broadcast media that use the French language in their national or regional programmes. Convinced of the important place of radio and television in serving the community, CIRTEF helps its members to fulfil their social, cultural and educative role by promoting cooperation between them. Fondation Hirondelle is an associate member of CIRTEF.

\(^{128}\) The Permanent Conference of the Mediterranean Audiovisual Operators (COPEAM) was founded in Cairo in 1996. It is a forum for dialogue and cooperation aimed at bringing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean closer together, particularly actors in the audiovisual and cultural sectors. COPEAM’s members include radio and television stations, professional associations, intergovernmental institutions, international organizations and NGOs, cultural and research institutes, independent producers, universities and local institutions. Fondation Hirondelle is a member of COPEAM.

\(^{129}\) Founded in 2008, the Geneva Peace Building Platform promotes cooperation and dialogue between those involved in peace building, via conferences, debates and discussions. The platform is a partnership between four organizations: the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of International Development Studies; the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP); Interpeace; and the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO). Fondation Hirondelle regularly participates in its work.

\(^{130}\) En Quête d’Ailleurs (Investigating Elsewhere) promotes collaboration and exchange between Swiss media and journalists and those in countries of the South and East. Through its reports, it allows the public in different countries to know more about each other. Through some 50 special reports, En Quête d’Ailleurs has already explored a number of themes such as unfair trading, access to water, and migration. Fondation Hirondelle is a founder member of this Swiss association.
lack of information, rumours and propaganda” (FH, s/d2). Thus, in conflicts and crises, independent information is key “to restore hope and trust”, allowing “populations that are victim to take key decisions and form their own opinions” (Ibidem). The emphasis on peace building elements is often put on the “rebuild [of] their infrastructure [and of] (...) the social fabric of their societies” (Ibidem).

“Each day, Fondation Hirondelle enables people suffering from the consequences of war and poverty to know what is going on in their country. Fondation Hirondelle gives them a voice, offers them the possibility to make choices in their daily lives” (Ibidem). There is here clear evidence of circumscribing the causes of war to the internal borders of each society. There is also the idea that the voice they give to the local people is enough not to allow for violence to re-erupt.

3.4.3 – Programming

FH works to develop media outlets with popular appeal and a wide audience. Its top priority is to make its media credible through fact-based, professional journalism. It does not allow its staff to express personal opinions on air. Internationals never go on air, but only journalists from the country concerned. Broadcasting is in local languages insofar as possible. Fondation Hirondelle’s radio stations each have their own professional and ethical codes of conduct. Editorial policy gives priority to a daily and concrete defence of human rights (FH, s/d1; s/d2).

Many radios have been set up by FH in post-conflict societies, specifically: Radio Okapi and Radio Agatashya in DRC; Radio Blue Sky in Kosovo; Star Radio in Liberia; Moris Hamutuk in Timor-Leste; Radio Miraya in South Sudan, Cotton Tree News in Sierra Leone, Radio Ndeke Luka in Central Africa Republic. All of them share the same presuppositions and mission: information is crucial to promote peace just as lack of information can lead people to violence and war. Although not explicitly relating to Freire’s world literacy (1993), information in this context and within FH, refers to the capacity to know the world in its multiple levels and dimensions, as can be interpreted by the different uses they give to the concept.

Star Radio was launched, in Liberia, by Fondation Hirondelle in 1997. It was the only Liberian media outlet with national coverage that “is genuinely independent”. Its
programmes played and according to FH continue to play an essential role in the daily exercise of democracy, focusing mostly on “the things that affect Liberians on a daily basis: economic development, health, education, good governance, women’s issues, child protection, (...) handicapped people and war veterans”. Since 2008, the station has been managed by Star Radio Inc, an organization recognized under Liberian law. Its management and staff are 100% Liberian. Fondation Hirondelle and Star Radio Inc. are now linked by a partnership agreement: Star Radio has full editorial and managerial responsibility for the station, Fondation Hirondelle provides support in the fields of fundraising and building the radio’s institutional set-up (FH, s/d6).

Radio Blue Sky in Kosovo was set up by Fondation Hirondelle in partnership with the United Nations mission on the ground, from August 1999 to June 2000, and had afterwards migrated to the RTK, Kosovo’s public broadcaster. It broadcasted programmes for all the citizens of Kosovo, with a particular focus on displaced people, minorities and youth, and counted on an ethnically mixed staff. Its first priority was news, which was broadcast in the Albanian language but also Serbian and Turkish, which intended to make information more accessible to everyone, but was also believed to be “a powerful symbol for tolerance in the social and political context of the time” (FH, s/d5).

On March 27, 2000, SFC set up in Central Africa Republic the Radio Ndeke Luka, a national peace radio station that broadcasts to the whole country. It was the successor to Radio Minurca, the United Nations radio in the CAR, which stopped working. Since 2009, Radio Ndeke Luka is officially registered with the High Council of Communication. A process is under way for Fondation Ndeke Luka, a registered Central African NGO with close links to Fondation Hirondelle, to gradually take over the management of Radio Ndeke Luka. Its programmes are broadcast on FM every day, within a radius of 100 km around the capital and 80 km around the two big urban centres of Bouar and Bambari. The rest of the country is covered on shortwave, while the programmes are also available via mobile phone and on the radio’s website. All the radio’s staff is nationals and the annual budget for the project is 850,000 euros coming mainly from the EU, the SDC, the canton of Geneva, Dutch NGO Cordaid and the French embassy in Bangui, influencing, hence, the programming agenda and contents. In terms of editorial line, Radio Ndeke Luka has chosen the following general

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To learn more, see: http://www.radiondekeluka.org/.
values to be the reference of its work and agenda-setting: honesty; otherness; and openness to the world (Radio Ndeke Luka, s/d1). It also states that it aims to support the construction of a democratic regime and to develop local citizenship as well as local economic, social and cultural life (Ibidem).

In Timor-Leste (FH, s/d4), FH set up in 2001 the radio program Moris Hamutuk, meaning “living together” in tetum. The programme was also produced in bahasa of Indonesia and sometimes in local dialects. Its focus was to inform inhabitants of Timor-Leste about the situation of refugees in the West, among whom there were some warlords, and to inform the refugee population about what was happening in East Timor. It employed six journalists from East Timor, an administrator, a technician and interpreters. Three journalists from West Timor also contributed on a part-time basis, providing reports notably from the refugee camps. To obtain the widest possible audience on the island, Fondation Hirondelle also helped boost the broadcasting capacity of Radio UNTAET, notably by installing a transmitter at the top of Kutalaut Mountain. In the spring of 2002 as UNTAET was leaving East Timor, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who headed UNTAET from November 1999 to May 2002, proposed that Fondation Hirondelle ensure the transition of Radio UNTAET to become the future public broadcaster of East Timor, RTTL. Fondation Hirondelle subsequently took on this project with funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was successfully completed at the end of 2006. When the UN left, Fondation Hirondelle took over management of the radio and television, which were then gradually transferred to the national broadcasting entity. This work included contributing to development of a public broadcast law, training RTTL managers and journalists (in management, administration and finance, journalism, production) and updating the studios. Thus Fondation Hirondelle succeeded in transforming a UN media outlet into a national public service broadcaster (Ibidem).

Radio Okapi\(^\text{132}\) was set in 2002 by FH and MONUC (now MONUSCO), and is mainly funded by the governments of UK, Switzerland, Canada, Sweden, Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands. It produces and broadcasts news and entertainment programming in five languages (from 4 AM to 9 PM in French, Lingala, Swahili, Tshiluba and Kikongo). It has very diversified programming going along the

\(^{132}\) To learn more, see: [http://radiookapi.net/](http://radiookapi.net/).
peacebuilding model described in Chapter 3. Curiously, it divides its programming into the following structure: Society, Culture, Sports, Economy, Politics, Environment, Elections and Job offers. Two inferences can be drawn. First, there is an obvious dominant liberal western choice for this contents division. The Guardian, The New York Times, Le Monde and many similar others share this kind of structure which is markedly different from alternative media such as the ones Piakara Magazine; Periodico Diagonal, among others. The second inference is the centrality of the “Elections” theme as if this periodical democratic ritual had precisely the same importance as all other areas which happen on a daily basis and who are on a daily basis directed towards the praxis of democracy. Since 2010, FH has created an advertising department Hirondelle Communication to allow for the generation of revenue to develop the economic viability of partner radios (85 radios at the end of 2014), through the production and broadcast of institutional communication campaigns (UN and international agencies, NGOs, etc.). In 2015, Fondation Hirondelle will launch a new enterprise specializing in content production and services, to help develop innovative editorial products that fit the future needs of the DRC, aimed mostly at women and youth (FH, s/d3). These two steps contribute to the integration of this radio outlet and its subsidiary agencies in the world market economy.

Since 2006 to May 2014, Fondation Hirondelle was in a partnership with the UN radio Radio Miraya, providing editorial expertise, staff, training, equipment and logistical support. Radio Miraya provides “vital information to its listeners, in English and Arabic, covering the implementation of the CPA roadmap and explaining the significance of the 2010 elections and the referendum which followed” (FH, s/d7), self-declaring itself as “the Pulse of the New Nation”. Over the last eight years, Fondation Hirondelle raised 24 million USD to fund its activities in Radio Miraya. The governments of Switzerland, The Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and Norway, and the European Union all contributed to Fondation Hirondelle’s involvement in Radio Miraya. At a time when South Sudan finds itself in the grip of a political crisis and on the verge of a humanitarian disaster of unprecedented scale, Fondation Hirondelle is, more than ever, committed to providing objective, non-partisan news and programming to the people of South Sudan, while at the same time working to protect journalists and safeguarding freedom of speech (FH, s/d8).
Finally, Cotton Tree News was created in 2007 in Sierra Leone. It is a news and information service based on the university campus and includes ongoing training, in cooperation with the university’s Mass Media Department in the University of Sierra Leone. In its original project form, CTN’s team of journalists produces six hours of programmes per day in English and in the four national languages. The team includes stringers and student volunteers working under a Fondation Hirondelle editor in chief. Programmes are broadcast on Radio Mount Aureol (the University radio station) and on a network of partner radio stations throughout the country. Three two-hour programme slots are produced for broadcast at peak listening times during the day. In 2010 Fondation Hirondelle and the University of Sierra Leone worked on a new concept for the project, with a dual aim: to create an independent national radio station (with its own broadcasting capacity) and also create a Media Centre of Excellence which could serve the whole West Africa region. We are still seeking funding for this project. In this context, Fondation Hirondelle was forced to suspend its involvement in financing and overseeing Cotton Tree News programmes on January 28, 2011. The University has decided to continue alone with a more modest format (FH, s/d10).

Despite the different cultural, political and economic backgrounds of these different societies and its specific history, it is striking evident that the recipe drawn by FH to attain peace within these post-war settings is precisely the same in terms of contents and priorities and the same in terms of partnerships and funding. If at a first glance this could mean an evident proof that peace is universally and ydilically understood as overlapping the dominant form of liberal peace, this proves exactly the opposite: peace is a highly subjective and power-driven project dependent upon the correlation of forces within the international system. Even if, from a working logic FH priviledges the local staff, the externally-driven and paternalistic nature of the contents they produce are highly revealing of the pacification nature of these peace media.

### 3.4 – The network

This section intends to highlight the material and discursive power network that sustains the peace media cluster of mediabuilding which these three cases illustrate and which reinforces the argument of this study.
Figure 1 - The discursive and material power network of USIP, Search for Common Ground and Fondation Hirondelle. 

Infographic design by Ivone Raha
Chapter 6 – Peace media: securing whose peace?

“All of us who professionally use the mass media are the shapers of society. We can vulgarize that society. We can brutalize it. Or we can help lift it onto a higher level”.

- William Bernbach

“The condition of the world is a political choice”

- D. Gordon

The critical questions we are entitled to ask is: for whom is peace media for? What purposes does it serve? What role does it perform? What kind of peace does it promote?

This chapter intends to answer these questions by discussing the results collected in the previous Chapter and taking into account the theoretical and analytical framework put forward in this study. It also anticipates some of the critiques that might be arise and detaches itself from a mere deconstructionist perspective of mediabuilding. As such, it is divided into three parts. The first part synthesizes the flaws of peace media within mediabuilding liberal framework and infers conclusions concerning the research question of this study: what role do peace media perform within peacebuilding architecture? The second part will identify resistance points at different levels: individual, institutionally, West-based, Rest-based and question what role these actually have as a counter-hegemonic efforts? The third part identifies some almost automatic conclusions that readers of this study might draw and with which this study disagrees, hence contributing to a better understanding of this study’s argument.

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133 Keith Reinhard (2006-05-05) "Response to "Distinguished Communicator" Award". California State University, Fullerton.


135 See Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4.
1 – The role of peace media in the hegemonic liberal peace within post conflict societies

Bearing in mind that the international system is a power-driven system, that peace is a situated concept supported by ideology, context, agents and policies and that media are a non-neutral and highly pervasive technology managed by situated actors committed to a specific agenda in an agency-network, these sections intends to discuss the actual role of peace media in the implementation of the dominant liberal conception and project of peace in post conflict societies.

1.1 - Peace media: flaws and implications

Stemming from the previous chapter conclusions, existing dominant peace media, within mediabuilding liberal framework, hold three main flaws concerning long-lasting emancipatory peace building.

The first flaw is what I synthetize as “superficiality”. Despite peace media hold the potential for emancipatory praxis, as sustained by scholars such as Galtung (1971) and Paulo Freire (1993; 1994), the truth is that peace media within mediabuilding are circumscribed to dealing with social relations, particularly important political moments, such as elections, or escalation atmospheres and dynamics, or making local economic activities to fit production standards and demands of the economic international system. This is not accidental, but rather by intentional design. In fact, the ones holding the greatest power within today’s international system have the ability to make peace media to be rendered superficial in a very natural way, even with a positive slant, and are highly interested that peace media undertake their work as such. Therefore, peace media within mediabuilding are superficial both by design and as a consequence of a correlation of power forces in the international system. In other words, given the correlation of power forces in the international system which privileges the leading west liberal powers, and intending to maintain the status quo and their predominance within a hegemonic liberal international system, the dominant liberal powers create a specific model of peace media aimed at creating a sense of public sphere logic and peacebuilding construction but which in practical terms are designed to simply de-escalate social relations and facilitate the conditions for formal political democratic
practices to happen, leaving aside the whole potential of peace media and the different dimensions that would have to be included in order to build an emancipatory and long-lasting peace. Within this context, peace media end up as mere platforms and actors of a hegemonic low intensity or minimalist peace, as conceived in Chapter 2. They are drawn to merely pacify social relations as far as ethnic, religious and social interactive routines are concerned, neglecting the deep-rooted causes of the conflict, dismissing as less important the structural dimensions of violence and not allowing local people to have their own voice, i.e., recognising “voice as a process” but denying “voice as a value”. Although presented as key actors within peacebuilding processes, they are circumscribed to a mere mediator and social relations pacifying role based upon moralism and assistentialism, or solely a facilitator of political dialogue in times of elections and do not contribute to the questioning the economic and social conditions that are given to them and, secondly, to the densification of political relations.

What results from this kind of intervention is the de-politicization of the local technological mediascape with evident repercussions on the political dimension of these societies. And here we get to the second critique: the apoliticization and technicisation which gets evident in a double front, almost in a loop effect: in the rhetoric – media are presented as apolitical and technical tool, despite being ideologically situated and with a specific political agenda and intentionality; in the result: they reduce a platform for political debate into a space to merely mediate social relations and a space of formal political (emptied) relations. It is important to highlight that peacebuilding intervention is a process that begins, among other reasons, (and according to the diagnosis agents, i.e. the “west”) because of the abnormal de-politicization of the local where new wars were waged due mainly to poor governance from the part of the ruling elites and to a lack of political articulations among elites and population (Chandler, 2005), and ends up promoting a new local de-politicization processes, this time by means of good governance mechanisms where media are a key platform and actor, designed by foreign experts. Chandler’s (2005) logical sequence which highlights the inconsistency and irony of peacebuilding interventions by claiming that local scenarios are going from “state without politics” as a generating element of war to “peace without politics” as a prescription to solve and prevent war, clearly expresses peacebuilding’s political contradiction: “politics as a barrier to peace” (Chandler, 2005). The media become a pacifying, almost in a “negative peace” (Galtung, 1996) logic, where “voice as a value”
(Couldry, 2010) is denied to citizens and where the lack of possible political articulations reveals its artificial nature. Political inequality leaves many with no control over the major decisions that affect their lives. For Cox, too, “whereas the right of self-assertion is celebrated, in a social and economic context the individual’s capacity to exert control over the systemic factors that determine its implementation is removed. Consequently, just as in one-party, authoritarian regimes, politics is about depoliticizing people, by removing the economic determinants of everyday conditions from political control” (Cox, 1992).

The third flaw is almost a corollary of the preceding two others and has to do with an inconsistency between rhetoric and practices/outcomes. In fact, peace media theoretical proposals as well as some of the programming framework are particularly promising in terms of emancipation and empowering people to make their own choices by means of creating the channels and flows through which their own narratives, beliefs and ideologies can be discussed in public service logic. However, what happens on the ground, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, is what Noam Chomsky (1998, 43) summarises when reflecting on pervasive invisible forms of social control: “the smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum”. In Marxist terms, material reality sets boundaries on the ideas that may emerge as important, or even acceptable in a given social setting. This is why those who lack economic power consent to hierarchies of social power that privilege others (usually minority) while exploiting them: they are educated formally and informally to accept it as such (Marx, 1977). In fact, all debates and focus are drawn towards a restricted and very selective liberal framework, only focusing on individual and social issues or in economic questions but as long as they don’t question the whole dominant liberal model of organising societies, which reinforces the rules of the (liberal) game and, hence, the hierarchical power relations that sustain it.

When looking at this puzzle, several questions arise. Why do the media appear to be essential in the field of social relations and during election periods and not in others? The media serve chiefly to alter the conditions of generation and perpetuation of violence on the ground or to legitimate international institutions at local and international level and local institutions at international and local level? What motivations underlie these choices and which consequences it generates? Isn’t the West
also affected by a low intensity peace that can at any point start a new war? Isn’t this important in an increasingly interdependent world?

“New wars” (Kaldor, 1999) settings – the scenarios to which peace media are mostly directed to – usually present cleavages, tensions and violence along ethnic and/or religious lines. Identitarianism plays a particularly important rule both in creating agendas and mobilising people towards the conflict, legitimising it. Also, the psychosocial consequences of these wars and dimension of the affected societies is tremendous (Maynard, 1997) and, as a consequence, social relations in post-conflict societies become extremely securitized as there is a generalised insistence on framing the social relational pattern on a dichotomised dynamic that includes the perception of threat, on one side, and security seeking, on the other side, often mediated through fear, hatred and violence (Santos, 2010). In fact, these sharp and hostile dividing lines among ethnic, religious or social groups could be primarily understood as just a result of a successful leaders’ speech act, which makes their own group (ethnic, religious, political) perceive others as an existential threat (in terms of survival, economic resources or political representation), ends up entrenched in people’s lives and experiences. The dividing and antagonist rhetoric is no longer just framed and sustained by a leader’s discursive construction but, because of the war, starts to be sustained by a very deep, personal and intersubjective experience, which goes beyond persuaded audience and starts a degenerative and rooted long cycle of violence and hatred (Maynard, 1997; Santos, 2010). As such, social relations are one of the most important triggering and mobilising elements of violence, becoming hence one of the most important elements to tackle if direct violence is intended to be reversed. Moreover, these relations – pacific, positive or violent - are established mainly at discourse level and, hence, the media might and should perform a key role here.

Another aspect that would make direct violence to be inhibited is the legitimization of the peace order to the eyes of the locals. This is mainly conceived by means of elections. The basic principle that governments should be chosen by the ballot and not the bullet has become enshrined as an ‘emerging right’ in international law (Frank, 1992) and in the international system. In post-conflict societies, competitive elections have become one of the instruments used not only to promote democracy but

\[\text{136 I.e., labelling something or someone as a security issue and threat and convince the audience of that (Buzan et al, 1998)}\]
also to attempt to consolidate and confer legitimacy upon the new political liberal peace order. They also provide a clear signal that legitimate domestic authority has been returned to the hands of the local population—no longer “warlords” or the so-called “international community”. However, they also have another purpose: the purpose of west-led institution-building, legitimating international institutions at the local level and the local institutions in the international (liberal hegemonic) sphere (elections work as an initiation and confirmation rituals) and reinforce the rules of the liberal world system game that makes the “centre”, “metropolis” or the “west” to hold greatest economic and political power than the “periphery” (Wallenstein, 1978), “borderlands”(Duffield, 2001a) or the “rest” (Hall, 2006). From then on, those societies are part of the dominant so-called international community—and are no longer conceived as “pariah” or “rogue” state—and can hence have access to privileged political and economic relations within liberal power networks which would otherwise be inaccessible to them. In an increasingly interdependent and capitalist world, the access to foreign markets and the establishment of positive diplomatic relations are equivalent to wealth, safety or even survival. It is all about to enter, using Meyer’s words, a “world prestige system” (1987: 56). For all of these reasons, elections have become a filter in international system integration and, hence, a central part of the process of peacebuilding. Since media allow for discourses to flow, issues to be framed, and positions to be clarified as well as narratives to be oriented and directed to a wide social spectrum, the media are key actors in these periods. Other topics which do not relate to social and inter-ethnic/religious sharp cleavages nor refer to elections are also included in peace media programming, as presented in section 3 of the Chapter 5. Nevertheless, they are dismissed as less important and are allowed to a very little space in terms of agenda.

Mediabuilding in its holistic and emancipatory potential turns out to be more of a discursive product than a concrete reality, which stresses the imbalance of the

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137 This is particularly so for first-time elections in countries transitioning from authoritarian rule or civil war. In some cases, such as Namibia in 1989 or Mozambique in 1994, elections clearly played a vital role in making a decisive break with the past. In others, such as Angola’s abortive 1992 elections held under the Bicesse peace accord, flawed elections created more problems than they solved. Haiti’s parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995 led to the first ever transition of power, but administrative inefficiencies undermined the credibility of the broader electoral process. By contrast, in Cambodia, technically successful electoral processes were soon overwhelmed by the realities of power politics as the “losing” party at the elections returned to power through hard-line tactics. In Bosnia, premature elections helped nationalist parties cement an early grip on political power, while in Kosovo and East Timor a more measured timetable appears to have helped the process of political development of the nascent political systems.
ideological proposition and the wider functional nature and dominant selective ideology (clearly driven by capitalist/market economies and power-over systems of power) of these interventionist international policies. Indeed, highlighting the articulation of the modernity project as a whole on a world scale, peacebuilding aims at controlling and disciplining non-Western governments and populations in order to protect the functioning of the global capital (Pugh, 2004) and to prevent the disorder and instability of underdeveloped regions from spilling over to industrialized countries (Duffield, 2001b). Conversely to other forms of domination that History tells us, the last purpose is not necessarily accomplished through invasion or the mere rescue and cure of these irrational, barbaric and deviant societies, but rather through the sophisticated dynamic of “becoming one of us, but never reaching us” (Borges & Santos, 2009: 77), revealing that the rhetoric of “other-regarding” or “self-effacing” ethics that inspired peacebuilding intervention is nothing but the reflection of an informal empire, despite espousing a specific kind of ideas and values connected to local empowerment and capacity-building. In contrast to historical formal empires which explicitly denied the right to self-government and were based on hierarchy rather than equality, and on force rather than consent, the informal empire behind peacebuilding denies, in its turn, any form of direct political control and surprisingly reinforces the formal legal status of sovereignty. The empire is then, as David Chandler (2006) remarks, in denial, but yet in continuous expansion. From Namibia to Angola, Rwanda, Liberia, Guatemala, Timor Leste, Afghanistan and Iraq, the political project of peacebuilding has been extending its sights, finding settings in which to trace a path to modernity, but in a specific functional and segmented way that guarantees and bolsters the leading position of developed countries in the race towards modernity. This situation has been reached primarily through the building of an epistemic and political consensus on the objectives of intervention and the approaches to ending conflicts that are deployed in non-modern scenarios, and on the conditionality of this political and social system to attain peace. All these answers and inferences lead me to argue that the media are a pacification tool directed to the local societies within a liberal and wider context of liberal global governance.
1.2 - Whose voice? Whose and which peace?

“Yes, you can change presidents, but you don't get much choice in this country about important things. They have all the guns. They have all the tools. They have all the power. We call it freedom of choice. There is an illusion of choice. (...) We're given the illusion of choice by the meaningless of choices of trivial things. (...) Everything else you're kind of guided towards by focus groups and marketing research.”

– George Carlin -

Peace media allow for local people to have voice. This is a general punch line in all institutional presentations or descriptions of peace media intervention and programming. In fact, by means of participating in soap operas as actors, by participating in radio debates or by being interviewed within the context of journalistic reports, local citizens have voice: they use sounds and sometimes they are allowed to give an account of themselves. However, is this enough to build peace? Is this enough even for the praxis of democracy that liberal peace always presents itself to stand for and export to the ones who have still not converted to the liberal creed? In effect, there is an obvious formal recognition of the “voice as process”, but what about “voice as value”? Can there be peace media which can value voice if the contents, discourses and perceptions they produce are predetermined within a liberal peace locus, a particular geographically situated locus, and where the limits of what is debatable are established even before the debate begins? Whose voice is then listened to within the power-driven international system? Whose peace is this? And to which peace typology does it in fact correspond to? These are precisely the questions that frame this study.

I propose to start with the enunciation locus of these media and to the chain that connects its starting point, i.e., funding and policy institutions, to the end of the chain, i.e., the local post-war societies.

USIP assumes itself as a clear defender of the interests of American foreign policy and its corresponding conception of national security and defense. What exactly is this concept and what it entails? If it is national, it is situated. If it aims at preserving

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something or someone’s security, it is not neutral, but rather committed to specific national interest agendas. This is also very visible if analysing the local scenarios to which their peace media programming is directed to.

In turn, FH and SFCG also depend on funding to put forward their media outlets and programming. Although it is formally based on a highly participatory working dynamic from the part of the local staff, the contents and the programming they produce are highly western in terms of mindsets and clearly privileges externally-driven and even paternalistic perspective not only of what peace should be but what peace should be in those locations. By diagnosing and prescribing the needs of these post-war societies not to fall again into violence, external actors are already defining what is debatable, be susceptible and important to handle. Through peace media, external actors are circumscribing the way peace should be built and the way the local population should participate in it (thus infantilising it), and are narrowing the emancipatory potential of peace media to a mere procedural tool for a low-intensity peace building. Moreover, regarding the subject of local participation, Cox skilfully (1992) argues that despite the right of self-assertion might be celebrated, the actual right of self-assertion could only exist in a social and economic context where the individuals the capacity to exert control over the systemic factors that determine his rights implementation. Questions arise: do FH and SFCG defend the view of its funders or the empowerment of local? And if these media depend on west-led funding, what is the margin for any change or resistance from the part of the local as far as the donors’ agenda is concerned? This probably means that FH and USIP defend the perspective of the settings that strategically agree with the view of the funders. What does it tell us about the international system and what about the type of peace that these peace media are creating?

International system is power-driven, but it is not anarchical, as Realists say. It is a system built upon vertical and subaltern relations and based on a material and discursive power which privileges the West and its liberal legacy and proposals in a hegemonic order that combines structural domination and local restricted civil emancipation. This allows to control the living conditions and demands of the different people’s in the world so that, on one hand, the West interests and survival are safeguarded and assured and, on the other hand, west liberal ideological beliefs and forms of organising societies are adopted (though in a “becoming one of us, never really
reaching us” logic) in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, so that the status quo they represent might be preserved.

Peace media as been transformed and disguised as the charitable and/or do-gooder voice of the ones who hold the greatest power in today”s international system, within a liberal hegemonic peace framework where the political liberal project is best represented by democracy; a democracy in which individual citizens are recognized as equal in their civil and political rights, whereas in the economic sphere it is property, and not the individual citizen, who enjoys rights.

2 – Resistance knots

As previously discussed in Chapter 1, as far as world orders are concerned, resistance is always present in explicit or implicit ways, within the system or as a sub-system and each of resistance initiatives, actors and politics hold and present distinct agendas which hold various degrees of resistance and different levels of action, hence targeting a variety of /several goals. They can intend to block, transform, break, denounce, or/and contest status quo. Even emancipatory orders might create resistant-opposing groups in the sense that their resistance is not passive but rather active and deliberately opposing the status quo. When resistance is transmuted to power, it generates new sources, actors, and agendas of resistance. Forms of resistance and dynamics of resistance do not necessarily hold absolute intentions neither their success nor failure can/should be measured in terms of final outcomes. Resistance groups, dynamics and contentious politics influence permanently the world orders on which they are developed. For example: domination world orders may become more oppressive and aggressive when faced with resistance; hegemonic orders can develop to be more negotiable; and the emancipatory, even more plural or tending to hegemonic contour. The exact opposite can also occur: the domination world border becoming more negotiable or hegemonic; the emancipatory order more hegemonic depending on the ideology and materiality power of those in charge of both status quo and resistance dynamics in a given time.
Concerning differentiated types of resistance to mediabuilding, I systematise them into three categories: “individual and small community agency” resistance; “inside status quo/systemic” resistance, which the metaphor of the Trojan horse best portrays; and, finally, the “institutionalised resistance” which is also metaphorically described in this study as “using the same currency”.

2.1 – Counter-hegemonic individual or small community agency resistance

At the individual and small community level, I can identify two different resistance strategies: individual thinking and the setting up of alternative media.

The first is more passive or latent than active and is connected to the critical capacity of each individual to filter information. In fact, despite its great power, one must not convey the power of the media in absolute terms. The acts of viewing and listening also include/encompass the attachment and allocation of power, i.e., audience members are active subjects who filter the information according to their own system of beliefs and ideology and can also be active producers of meaning. In fact, the mass media cannot instantaneously and automatically change most people's strongly-held attitudes or opinions since audiences tend to select and interpret media messages in accordance with their existing attitudes and beliefs, and their use of the mass media tends to reinforce these (Lasswell, 1948). As such, there is, theoretically, a space for resistance for peace media to emerge. However, this space for resistance should also be questioned as far as we live in an interdependent and hegemonic world. Recalling Fanon’s (2004) reflection on colonialism, the dominant perception of the west makes the rest to see itself through the eyes of the west, as the marginalized other to a valorised western culture.

The second form of resistance is the setting up alternative media. It is an ideologically-driven and active resistance strategy: it challenges the corporate media system and the resulting symbolic power of capitalist mass media by overcoming “the entrenched division of labour” (Couldry, 2003b: 45) - producers of stories vs. consumer of stories. According to Couldry, the emancipatory and progressive potential of alternative media lies in opening up access to media production to a broad(er) public. This would allow challenging the mass media’s power of naming by confronting the
reality constructed by capitalist mass media with other versions of social reality. The strong emphasis on media actors that gain media power by producing alternative media shows the subjective orientation of this approach. The NOSM are a particularly important platform within this resistance strategy. “New media”, “social media”, “networking media” are different terms used to refer to new online communication tools such as blogs, facebook, youtube, twitter. They are specifically defined by offering, at any time, through any electronic device, free access on demand to contents created or chosen by individual users in an interactive (creative or reproduced), mobilising and networked logic (Aday, 2010; Bennett, 2003). They allow for the same construction of narratives – public and private - as conventional media do, but their working logic is based not on the masses (which means one centralised point of production and the masses at the reception) but rather on the concept of irradiation (Malini, 2007). Information is sent and shared in micro, but multiplying, segment logic, fuelled by multiple identity preferences (e.g. political, gendered, sexual, cultural, ethnic, national) in a free direct expression, and access rational (without any mediation but the technological). This constitutes their originality. With it three main important consequences arise concerning its potential to promote resistance towards these status quo. First, NOSM NOSM can be immune to mass media political economy. The ownership of today’s media rests on large economic groups or the state, which tends to favour political and economic elite interest, seek to audience accumulation, promote increasing commodification of information (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) leading to what some refer in a derogatory fashion as ‘infotainment’. Second, NOSM working dynamic doesn’t go along gatekeeping procedures nor does it need to produce rapidly and along the perspective of editors or elites, which tends to produce stereotyped information ridden with plenty of silences and half-truths. Third, NOSM easily dodges modern journalism’s canons, specifically those who dictate the dominance or the privileging of institutional, formal resources instead of popular ones and enable other sources, narratives and voices to be equally heard. Therefore, the eruption of NOSM has challenged traditional and conventional flows of information and communication, defied state information monopoly as well as corporate information control and created the possibility for alternative public spheres and forms of resistance to emerge. With the introduction of NOSM, new activists, new groups, political parties and discourses previously excluded from participation, entered the political marketplace of ideas.
However, it is important to note that, first, resistance discourses are never as pervasive as the ones produced by those who already dominate the system, a reminder that power is a product of combining material and discursive dimensions as argued in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, when the subject gives himself the right to question the truth, its effects on power, and questions power on its discourses of truth, there is this art of insubordination, the de-subjugation of the subject in the context of the politics of truth (Foucault, 2007). Second, conventional mass media and status quo actors also have access to NOSM platforms openly or in disguise as cover action.

### 2.2– Inside status quo resistance

The “inside status quo” resistances are the ones which challenge the logic and power of the status quo but not as an opposing or subaltern agent, rather the resistance agency is established right into the status quo key (or most prominent) actors, those who hold the greatest power within the “enunciation locus of power”, to recover Grosfoguel’s (2008a, 2008b) term (e.g. UN, World Bank). This type of resistance is probably best illustrated by the allegory of the “trojan horse”, i.e. resistance within and very close to the power locus and structures. It is important to highlight that, despite the Trojan horse whose intention was to destroy Troy and its power in an abrupt and decisive way, the “Trojan horse” strategies I am referring here do not intend to destroy abruptly but rather in a cumulative and challenging way.

CommGAP (Communication for Governance and Accountability Program), hosted by the World Bank (one of the key symbols of neoliberalism and liberal peace), in Washington D.C., emerges as one of the most important pieces of resistance within the status quo, precisely because it has a very emancipatory perspective of the social and political role of the media - it spots the importance of giving people voice and recognising its subsequent emancipatory political consequences - and is situated in one of the liberal peace headquarters.

CommGAP is a trust-fund program of the World Bank, which in practical terms means that it is organized outside the World Bank’s main budget, i.e., it is set up by a specific group inside the WB but funded by an outside donor which, in this case, is the British government by means of its development national agency - DFID. CommGAP

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develops its work towards three specific areas: research and advocacy; training and capacity building; and operational support through which they try to work directly with projects on the ground in developing countries.

According to a CommGAP representative, in an interview, in Washington D.C, “the whole purpose of setting up this program was to promote the use of communication techniques in development and in the World Bank, which is an institution particularly cautious about the media. So the goal was to promote this participatory dialogue oriented perspective in development and specifically in those areas where the work is about reforming the government, making it more open, more transparent and more accountable to citizens.”\textsuperscript{140} The choice for the World Bank to host this project has also to do with the fact that “when you turn up at anywhere and you say you work at the World Bank, people take you serious. They might actually not agree with what you are doing but they take you serious and in that way you get things on the agenda that you wouldn’t get otherwise”.\textsuperscript{141}

The example of CommGAP is illustrative of Scott’s perception of resistance as an activity “to be found neither in the overt collective defiance of power holders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites” (Scott, 1985: 136).

2.3 – “Same currency” or institutionalised resistance: New World Information and Communication Order

Discourse and materiality get increasingly stronger when merged into institutions. Resistance dynamics that can get institutionalised are particularly interesting since they use precisely the same formal and accepted strategies and places of legitimation as the status quo does. One example of this “same currency” resistance is the proposal of a “New World Information and Communication Order” (NWICO).

The international debate that conceived the term “New World Information and Communication Order” (NWICO) is one of the best examples of organised and institutionalised resistance towards a hierarchical information and communication world system that helps to reproduce and perpetuate on a world daily basis cultural, economic,
political and social system of differentiation and unequal power. The notion was first used in a 1976 report by non-aligned-countries during the Cold War era, whose primary concern was with the ‘lack of balance’ in the content and flow of news.

In the 1970s, inspired by this new critical take on the role of communication in development, members of the Non-Aligned Movement put forward a proposal for a New World Information and Communication Order that, accordingly, would help to fix the North/South (West/Rest) imbalance concerning the control over communication flows. In response to these calls, UNESCO formed the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems chaired by the Irish Nobel laureate Seán MacBride. In 1980, the commission released its final report: “Many Voices, One World: Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow: Towards a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order” (UNESCO, 1980), commonly referred to as the MacBride Report. The document suggested many reforms concerning the flow of information, specifically: an equitable distribution of radio spectrum, the end of the dominance of Western news agencies, and laws protecting the information sovereignty of individual states (Ibidem).

Many criticisms emerged, particularly from the part of the United States and the United Kingdom, two countries particularly powerful within the international system and with great power in broadcasting through media. They criticized the NWICO and the MacBride Report labelling it as “anti-free press” since it would allow states to restrict the free flow of information. The logic behind this view is that governments should play no role in the shaping or nurturing of culture, and that it is the marketplace alone that should govern culture (Mayer, 1983). In the aftermath of the report, both the UK and the US withdrew from UNESCO, and only rejoined in 1997 and 2003, respectively.

Even though the NWICO failed in its efforts and attempts at programmatic reform, countries throughout the developing world continued to push for reform to improve the prevalence of American media products and Western control over communication infrastructures (Boyd-Barrett 2006, Chadha & Kavoori, 2000; Ya’u 2005).

Today, television channels such as Al Jazeera might be seen as a challenging element concerning west domination among the media. However, several questions arise: is Al-Jazeera that different in terms of journalistic values from “west” news
media? Aren’t the formats of their programming similar to the ones done in the “West”? Aren’t critique programs such as “The Daily Show”, “Colbert Report” or “Last Week with Jon Oliver” inspiring the same types of critique programming in the Middle East, for example? Does this say something about the pervasive hegemonic power of the West or about universal forms of resistance? Also, it is important to underline, as far as resistance to liberal hegemonic order is concerned, that an increasing number of people no longer have to rely on conventional media to be informed about what is happening in the world. The NOSM, in this sense, emerge as an important resistance world tool, as discussed in the section 2.1 of this Chapter.

3 – Creating no dogmatic myths: a discussion on hasty deductive conclusions

After reading through the critical analysis this study has undertaken, some automatic and critical conclusions might emerge from the part of the reader. This section intends precisely to refrain readers from making that step and to recognise spaces of middle-ground and resistances to domination forms and systems that exist worldwide.

The first hasty deductive conclusion is that the “Global North is the only predator and the Global South the victim”. In fact, predation is worldwide; it is not restricted to the West, though western countries are today better-positioned to do so. If history teaches us anything, it teaches that whenever there is an actor holding the greatest power, it will take advantage of the situation, imposing its own rules upon others, being rules that best serve its own interests and ideology. It is also important to note, as Galtung (1971) highlights in his article “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, that there is harmony of interests between the centre in the centre and the centre in the periphery. There are more disharmonies of interests within the peripheral nations than with the centre/core nations; there is disharmony of interests between the periphery in the centre and the periphery in the periphery nations.

The second hasty deductive conclusion would be that “Mediabuilding is a coherent negative whole”, i.e., characterized by a generalized and tuneful absence of positive attributes. In fact, despite being a highly organised and almost self-sustaining intervention model at the media level, as discussed in Chapter 4, mediabuilding is not 100% a coherent project and can integrate positive and emancipatory-driven projects,
though the domination nature of many other aspects of mediabuilding, such as the conformation to a pacified and accepted peripheral position in the world, though they are fairly residual and most of the times inefficient to reverse the domination. This is mainly justified by its hegemonic nature \(^{142}\) that demands a permanent and ubiquitous negotiation between agendas and individual resistance agency at all levels of mediabuilding architecture. One example, which has to do with programming best illustrates this point. The community Radio Mandeleo in the South Kivu in DRC is a good example of how mediabuilding can have positive and emancipatory-driven dynamics and to give a chance – but still it is just a chance - for “voice as value” to happen in their community. Created in 1993 by a group of local NGOs - CRONGD / South Kivu - Bukavu, it is formed by a team of eight local journalists associated to Radio Clubs, which are clubs where common or non-journalist people meet to discuss past emissions on radio and debate about the relation between its contents and their daily lives and which also allow participants to cover the activities of their own communities and make their own informative and debate programs that are subsequently broadcasted through Radio Mandeleo (Roemarsma, 2002; Willum, 2003). \(^{143}\) The aim is to inform other communities their projects and experiences in development, disseminate news and events in their regions, usually related to human rights violations and abuses of local authority (Willum, 2003; Panos, 2002; Roemarsma, 2002). Sometimes their work is edited by the staff of Radio Mandeleo, other times it is transmitted directly, which can be also seen as sign of non-dominating practices. In its programming Radio Mandeleo intends to promote peaceful and constructive coexistence among the various ethnic Congolese (this is indeed the priority of radio programming Mandeleo within the regional context in which it operates), explain the more remote causes of the conflict through History, read the elements that were the genesis of the outbreak of violence, namely, the logic of clientelism, relative deprivations, social cleavages and wealth dating back to the Congolese colonial history (Willum, 2003; Panos, 2002; Roemarsma, 2002). The aim is to understand the causes

\(^{142}\) See section 2.1 in Chapter 1.

\(^{143}\) The issue of Radio Mandeleo occupies every day of the week the following hours: from 5:25 a.m. to 9 am; from 11h55 to 14h and 15h to 21h05 and transmits predominantly in French and Swahili, the two most widely spoken languages in eastern DRC. However, 15 minutes every day of the week are devoted for ethnic groups in South Kivu province to issue programs to inform or discuss local issues in their own languages. Ethnic groups such as Balega, Bahavu, Babembe, Bashi, Bafuliru, Batembo, Banyindu and Banande often use this opportunity to issue their own programs once a week (Panos, 2002; Willum, 2003).
and dynamics and thereby increase the success of replacing the installed culture of violence into a culture of peace (Panos, 2002). However, and despite the fact that its production costs are extremely low and there has been an effort of self-financing, Radio Mandeleo relies on external financial support, specifically from 11:11:11 a Belgian NGO, Catholic MISEREORE German organization, the National Endowment for Democracy US-based and the Belgian government. Curiously, the only donor with whom Mandeleo Radio signed a formal contract was precisely the NGO 11:11:11 (Willum, 2003). In terms of training, all journalists, have the support of the Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, the world organization of AMARC community radio and the PANOS Institute for Central Africa, which highlight the hegemonic balance within which mediabuilding exists and is developed.

The third hasty deductive conclusion would say that “There are no ethical concerns in mediabuilding”. However, many mediabuilding practitioners and their NGOs are motivated by the most genuine sense of altruism; no doubt in at least some cases, their efforts are often undertaken in difficult and even dangerous circumstances (Miller, 2009). According to Catherine Woolward, the Executive Director of EPLO, there is actually a “strong belief among them [peacebuilding institutions] that they are actually helping these societies to become ‘better’”.144 Also, as discussed in Chapter 3, modernity has given a Unitarian, perceived as superior and forefront hermeneutical framework for intellectuals and politicians to interpret reality and to react towards it by means of creating public policies that would bring people’s lives to an increasingly developed societies. There and peacebuilding, is always a latent or explicit ethical rhetoric and feeling allocated to development. The liberal modernity project emerges as a proposal and recipe that brings every society to an increasingly developed, modern, rational and fair evolutionary path. The narrative of its rationality and progress has, in fact, been so explored along with dismissing other epistemologies and forms of organising societies as inferior, that modernity emerged almost as the one and only desirable project. As such, the hegemony of the modernity idea and the power of its structures in shaping actors’ and agents’ behavior has also been trapping researchers and politicians in a liberal modern-driven hermeneutical mechanism. This limits the analysis of the problems to the dynamic of modernity or non-modernity, and proposes in a simplistic rationale to heal labelled “non-modern societies” through the perceived as ex

144 Interview with EPLO representative in Brussels, June 2010.
mediabuilding model might entail, most of its practitioner find it difficult to propose alternatives, faced otherwise with the prospect of embracing the reality and dynamics offered by the deviant, abnormal and “un-modern” societies, as if no middle ground could ever exist or be interesting to explore.\footnote{Interview with senior program officer at USIP, 2012.} There is, hence, an ethical drive and hermeneutical addicting limitations. This third hasty deductive question relates closely to the second one in what was discussed in section 2.2., in Chapter 1, there are no pure realities, all of them entail dominant traits and resisting or deviant air pouches.

The fourth hasty deductive conclusion would say “the social and ethnic causes of war should be dismissed as less important”. In fact, it is widely recognised that post-conflict societies are highly and densely securitised not only in terms of issues, such as resources or political representation, but also in terms of relationships between groups, or victims and perpetrators. Although the destructive and disastrous effects of war are no longer news and have indeed been documented since Greek times, the specific war tactics of the “new wars” using civilian communities as human shields, and intimately related to widespread exposure to brutal personal and community attacks has brought forth new repercussions to social interaction, even after negotiated settlements (Maynard, 1997). The psycho-social consequences of these wars is huge and, as a consequence, social relations in post-conflict societies become extremely securitized as there is a generalised insistence on basing the social relational pattern on a dichotomised dynamic that includes the perception of threat, on one side, and security seeking, on the other side, often mediated through fear, hatred and violence. The psycho-social wounds and rehabilitation is, therefore, crucial to build a long-lasting peace and this should be tackled by the media by means of their informative and entertainment programming.
Conclusion

The aim of this study was to critically understand the exact role of peace media in the implementation of peace in post-conflict societies. By simply analysing its rhetoric – “give voice to people”, “build peace”, “bottom-up tool” - peace media emerge to the eyes and sensitivity of the beholder as clearly potentially emancipatory, i.e., allowing to eliminate all forms of oppression and “power over” dynamics, by giving voice to the people and valuing it in political terms. However, when analysing its discourses and programming through the lenses of both the features of the international system and the specificities of today’s international order (west and the rest and market economy) the perception of the role of peace media in post-war societies ranges from a “power to” agent to a “power over” tool in disguise, not only by means of discourses but also through material power.

The discourse analysis undertaken by this study in the presentation of the peace media outlets, its programming and the NGO which set up these media projects, as well as in the diagnosis they produce concerning the scenario on which they intervene suggests an approach of peace media based on three fundamental axes.

The first axis is the use of generalities, allowing for strategic inaccuracies and imprecisions to happen. The choice for “good governance”, “peace”, “democracy” without specifically identifying the nature and the limits of these concepts allow for, first, the illusion that the local actors can co-opt these terms and adapt to the specificities of their settings and, second, for possibility of the ones holding the greatest power to politically analyse each success or failure cases as what at a specific moment best fits international actors interests. This is the power of the uncertainty created. Moreover, this ubiquitous imprecision also creates an increasingly empty common sense on these highly dense political terms. As a result, domination and hegemonic interests and praxis feel increasingly at ease by using these emancipatory concepts in a ventriloquist way.

The second axis is the production of an extremely simplistic, Manichean and binary narrative and vision of the dynamics of both post-war settings, on the one hand, and the peace media and peacebuilding recipes, on the other hand. Similarly to the first axis, this approach is also strategic concerning the recovery of the idea/notion of discourse as power. In fact, there is a propensity of international peace media actors to
overlap, in their narratives, violence and conflict with “extremism” and “rebels” often characterised/depicted with a high density of irrationality entailing no political agenda, or being associated to a highly simplified and reductive almost *ad absurdum* agendas which allows for a trench logic – to be “with us or against us” logic. Likewise, peace is overlaid with “statebuilding”, “nationhood”, “unity”, which are traditionally western ordering concepts, and peace media agents as triumphal and a unequivocally population-driven and positive-driven.

The third axis, which can be understood as a corollary of the previous two, is the domestic internalisation of the burden of the responsibility of violence and conflictuality, whereas the responsibility of the international system in an ever-integrated globalized and co-dependent world might be wilfully discharged or overlooked - as if the violence dynamics lived in war and post-war societies were exclusively the negative consequences of the local elites and population.

Concerning peace media programming, despite the complexity underlying any war or violent conflict there is a clear focus on the pacification of social, ethnic and religious relationships regardless of what causes them and a clear emphasis upon election periods. These two focuses highlight (erroneously), as discussed in Chapter 6, on the one hand, that the causes of conflict are only identitarian and that it depends on individual and collective identity groups, irrespective of their living conditions, to build and maintain peace. On the other hand, it shows the focus on the preference of the liberal system to maintain the necessary appearances, even if those appearances do not conform reality in terms of peace and violence. In other words, there is a focus on the formal democracy and on the formal pacification, i.e., direct and institutional peace, irrespective of the violences lived on a daily basis by the local populations, so that the integration of these societies on the (economic and political) world system can happen and the system can profit from that.

As argued and showed along in this study, the international system is driven by power, opting for “power over” praxis while mostly relying on rhetoric of “power to”. As such, its dominating and emancipatory features become increasingly hegemonic and obey to a co-relation of power forces that privileges a colonial form of organising societies. In fact, today’s international system tries for a delicate balance among domination, hegemony and emancipation. Peace media, by means of discourse, become a central piece within this governance framework, policies and dynamics.
The cases shown in this study illustrate the strategy employed by peace media, i.e. the control of peace on the peripheral societies; to internalise domestically the burden of the responsibility of violence and conflictuality, while the responsibility of the international system is discharged or overlooked; to maintain the status quo and its inherent unequal and colonial power relations; and to be a platform of hegemonic negotiation.

Peace media are, hence, both a platform and an actor of a hegemonic peace building praxis and agenda which integrates within itself emancipatory ingredients (particularly discursive ones) and dominating ingredients (particularly material ones) especially regarding the cultural specificities of the countries and societies on which peace media act upon, and the super-structure of today’s liberal international system. They, therefore, contribute to the maintenance of hegemonic unequal power relations and international system under the guise of liberal peace, by means of the civil pacification of communities in a context of a broader, hierarchical and hegemonic liberal peace and liberal global governance frameworks.
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