Towards a decolonial reading of Tivolem: E ainda há mais mundo, chega lá

Tese de Doutoramento em Literatura de Língua Portuguesa: Investigação e Ensino, orientada por Doutor Osvaldo Manuel Silvestre e Doutora Maria Helena Santana, apresentada à Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra

Setembro 2014

Universidade de Coimbra
Towards a decolonial reading of Tivolem:
E ainda há mais mundo, chega lá
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deep gratitude towards both my supervisors for their constant support and attention and also Prof. José Bernardes without whom this project would not have started off. Prof.ª Santana went out of her way to resolve many obstacles in/directly related to my academic labour here. Another guardian angel in Coimbra is Carmo Carpenter who opened her arms and her house for me and I can never thank her enough. Thanks to all my Coimbra friends — Indian and Portuguese, the Conceição family, Aurora . . . last but not the least, my family and loved ones for being constantly after me to finish the thesis — their patience for this supposedly interminable work!

The present research and thesis has been entirely supported by the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia in the framework of doctoral fellowship (SFRH / BD / 44576 / 2008) within the POPH/FSE programme. I am extremely grateful to FCT for all the financial support provided throughout.
Contents

Abstract/Resumo........................................................................................................... 6

Introduction..................................................................................................................... 13

I – E agora, José: Goa syndrome?
1. Mapping the tools: postcolonialism, postcoloniality,
   postcolonial theory/studies....................................................................................... 23
2. Whither non-anglophone postcolonial turn? .......................................................... 31
3. Lusophone postcolonialism: postcolonial desire
   /postimperial narcissism? ......................................................................................... 43
4. Decolonializing Lusophone/Portuguese imperial memory .................................... 52
5. Spectre of Goa ........................................................................................................ 74

II – The curious case of Portuguese subaltern colonialism
1. Portuguese Prospero’s exceptionalism behind Caliban’s mask .............................. 85
2. Oito-oitentismo between subalternity and peripherality.................................... 100
   2.1. When did Portuguese marginality take a sub-altun? ................................... 104
   2.2. Where/Can the subalter hide? ......................................................................... 106
3. Self-denial of co-evalness with other European colonizers? .............................. 112
4. Subverting the Portuguese decolonization (hi)story........................................... 124
5. Reprovincialization of Europe or intercolonial narcissism? .............................. 128
6. Global /South of nowhere .................................................................................... 136

III – Towards bebincaized Goan history
1. Colonial elites’ alienation....................................................................................... 168
2. Tivolem: routes and roots...................................................................................... 175
2.1 *Calibrations* and *regenerative criticism* ................................................. 181
2.2 *Counter-memory* .......................................................................................... 183
2.3 *vegdench munxaponn* ...................................................................................... 188
3. *Homecoming* ..................................................................................................... 190
3.1 Cultural dis/identification .............................................................................. 201
3.2 Colonial modernity vs. *Critical traditionalism* ............................................. 207
4. Politico-cultural mourning ................................................................................ 220
5. *Reflective nostalgia* ........................................................................................... 225
6. Alterna(rra)tives of/from Goa ............................................................................ 232

**Conclusion** ........................................................................................................... 243

**Bibliography** ......................................................................................................... 258
Abstract

Late capitalism has misappropriated the socio-cultural capital of imperial memory, postcoloniality being a case in point. Anglocentric postcolonialism and the privileged non–materialist literary readings failed to adequately problematize the socio-cultural geopolitics of imperial memories. Hence, the concomitant rise of Francophone, Italophone, Germanophone, Hispanophone, and Lusophone postcolonial studies along with doubts about the future of Anglophone postcolonial studies. The non–Anglophone postcolonial turn entails postcoloniality in its local or neo–eurocentric avatars with a rehearsal of the earlier reconciliatory vs. anti–colonial debate within Anglophone postcolonial studies. Notwithstanding the marginalization of the non–anglophone colonial histories within Anglophone postcolonial studies, it is contentious how the recent postcolonial scholarships engaging with other European empires reckon with the imperial turn and imperial historiography within their respective metropole centers.

In keeping with the criticisms against postcolonial scholarships of non–anglophone empires, the discursive deliberations of imperial memories within Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism appear mere nostalgic revisitations rather than critically revisionary in nature. Portuguese imperial history still continues on exceptionalist lines of neo–lusotropicalism and historical irony that such a small country established one of the first colonial empires which outlasted those of other European nations. Also, the long Colonial Wars and the
incoming *Retornados* prevail as anomalies associated with Portuguese imperialism. The exclusionary literary corpus of Lusophone postcolonialism exposes the selective amnesia and metrocentric nature of Portuguese imperial memories which surreptitiously sustain collective self-willed amnesia. The discursive marginalization of Asian ex–colonies within Lusophone postcolonialism in particular, and within imperial historiography at large, is read in terms of Ann Stoler’s *colonial aphasia* in order to engage critically with this imperial amnesia.

Privileging the propositions of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the mapping of Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism reveals how it is complicit with postcoloniality. Problematizing his *subaltern/semi-peripheral* hypotheses of Portuguese colonialism lends weight to the contention that contrary to the sociologist’s claim, the geopolitical space of Portuguese colonialism fails to act convincingly as counter-hegemonic globalization in its opposition to dominant version of postcolonialism. Rather, the assumed Portuguese marginality as the locus of enunciation of oppositional postcolonialism invokes intercolonial narcissism and further mystifies his call for *reprovincialization of Europe*. In fact, the marginocentric essentialist discourse of Portuguese imperialism remains concomitant with his undifferentiated call for defamiliarizing *vis-à-vis* the *imperial South*. Far from being decolonial interventions, the sociologist’s discourses necessitate the exigency of decolonializing of Portuguese imperial history.
*Tivolem* (1998) by Victor Rangel-Ribeiro discursively challenges some of the hypotheses by the Portuguese sociologist especially the phrase *pre-postcolonialism*. Arguing that far from running the risk of being colonialist in his eagerness to be anti–colonialist, as the sociologist claims, in *Tivolem* the colonial elite emerges as severely alienated. Observing the narrative’s elite standpoint, the reading well distinguishes the colonial elites’ reappropriating and reclaiming of the colonial past. Through the everyday epistemologies of return migrants from various Portuguese colonies around the 1930s, the fictional Goan village narrates the colonial socio-dynamics of the stayees and returnees, the elites’s *reflective nostalgia* rendered as social capital of communitarian ties. This reading also lays the groundwork to propose the term *bebincaized*, employed as a literary allegory for Goan history. The term intends to invoke alterna(rra)tives to the received Histories about Goa and its colonial past.

Decolonializing Portuguese imperial History reckons not only confronting the past, but also subscribing to the *imperial turn* in terms of a desanitized and comprehensive, as opposed to a selective imperial memory. And still there are more world, go on (*E ainda há mais mundo, chega lá* as in the title) would be a befitting amelioration of the Camonian exhortation that if more *world existed we would have gone there* (“*E se mais mundo houvera lá chegara*”).
Resumo

O capitalismo tardio tem-se apropriado do capital cultural da memória imperial, como é o caso da póscolonialidade. O póscolonialismo anglocêntrico e as leituras literárias não-materialistas não têm problematizado adequadamente a geopolítica sócio-cultural das memórias imperiais. Em simultâneo, verifica-se o crescimento dos estudos póscoloniais francófonos, italófonos, germanófonos, hispanófonos e lusófonos, juntamente com as dúvidas sobre o futuro dos estudos póscoloniais anglófonos. A viragem póscolonial não-anglófona implica rever a póscolonialidade em seus avatares locais ou neo-eurocêntricos, bem com a antinomia reconciliatório vs. anti–colonial anteriormente debatida no âmbito dos estudos anglífonos. Não obstante a marginalização das histórias coloniais não-anglófonas (dentro dos estudos póscoloniais anglófonos), é controverso o modo como as recentes correntes críticas de estudos pós-coloniais que envolvem outros impérios europeus lidam com a viragem imperial e com a historiografia imperial dentro das suas respectivas metrópoles.

Em consonância com as críticas contra as correntes póscoloniais de impérios não-anglófonos, as manifestações discursivas de memórias imperiais dentro póscolonialismo lusófono/português parecem mais revisitações nostálgicas do que verdadeiramente uma revisão crítica. Trata-se a história imperial portuguesa ainda numa atitude de excepcionalismo neo–lusotropicalista e da ironia histórica que permitiu a um país tão pequeno estabelecer um dos primeiros impérios coloniais, superando os de outras nações
europeias. Além disso, as longas Guerras Coloniais e a chegada dos retornados prevalecem como anomalias associadas ao imperialismo português. O corpus literário do póscolonialismo lusófono revela, através da sua exclusão, a amnésia seletiva e a natureza metrocêntrica das memórias imperiais portuguesas que, sub-repticiamente, sustentam uma amnésia coletiva e organizada. Assim, a marginalização discursiva das ex-colónias asiáticas no pós-colonialismo lusófono em particular, e na historiografia imperial em geral, é aqui lida em termos de afasia colonia (conceito proposto por Ann Stoler), a fim de analisar de forma crítica essa amnésia imperial.

Privilegiando as posições do Boaventura de Sousa Santos, o mapeamento do póscolonialismo lusófono/português revela como é conivente com a pós-colonialidade. A problematização dos seus conceitos de subalterno/semi-periférico aplicados ao colonialismo português dá peso ao argumento de que, ao contrário do discurso do sociólogo, o espaço geopolítico do colonialismo português falha em atuar convincentemente como globalização contra-hegemónica, em oposição à versão dominante do póscolonialismo. Em vez disso, a marginalidade portuguesa, assumida como o locus da enunciação do póscolonialismo de oposição, invoca narcisismo intercolonial e mistifica ainda mais o seu apelo para uma reprovincialização da Europa. Na verdade, o discurso marginocêntrico e essencialista do imperialismo português continua a ser concomitante com a sua indiferenciada atitude de desconhecimento em relação ao Sul imperial. Longe do seu objetivo, os textos do sociólogo
necessitam – na nossa opinião – a exigência de descolonializar a história imperial portuguesa.

_Tivolem_ (1998) de Victor Rangel-Ribeiro desafia discursivamente algumas das hipóteses do sociólogo português, sobretudo o termo _pré-pós-colonialismo_. Argumentamos que, longe de correr o risco de ser colonialista no seu afã anticolonial, como o sociólogo reivindica, em _Tivolem_, a elite colonial surge como severamente alienada. Observando o ponto de vista elite da narrativa, a nossa leitura também distingue a sua reapropriação e reclamação do passado colonial. Através das epistemologias quotidianas dos migrantes em retorno das várias colónias portuguesas pela década de 1930, a aldeia goesa ficticional narra a sócio-dinâmica colonial dos habitantes locais e dos retornados, em que a _nostalgia reflexiva_ das elites funciona como um capital social de laços comunitários. Esta leitura também estabelece a base para propor o termo _bebincaized_, utilizando-o como alegoria literária para a história de Goa. O termo tem a intenção de invocar alterna(rra)tivas às histórias recebidas acerca de Goa e do seu passado colonial.

Descolonializar a História portuguesa imperial implica não apenas confrontar o passado, mas também contribuir para a _viragem imperial_ no sentido de uma memória imperial desigienizada e abrangente, ao contrário de uma memória imperial seletiva. _E ainda há mais mundo, chega lá_ (como se diz no título) seria uma nova versão condizente da famosa exortação camoniana — _E se mais mundo houvera, lá chegara._
Introduction
The present thesis aims to problematize the socio-cultural geopolitics of Portuguese imperial memories within the metropolitan scholarship in order to reckon the conspicuous discursive silence on Asian ex-colonies within Lusophone Postcolonialism, in particular, and within imperial historiography at large. It attempts to contest the imperial geopolitics within Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism by highlighting the afrocentered approach within this nascent scholarship. The thesis argues that these revisitations of imperial memories are not revisionary in nature; rather they indulge in *restorative nostalgia* (Svetlana Boym 2008) and *countermnemonic innocence* (R. Radhakrishnan 1996). The objective of the present thesis is therefore to call for decolonializing Portuguese imperial memories within the Portuguese academia.

The thesis contends that centric readings of Portuguese imperial memories continue to be recycled on lusotropicalist and exceptionalist grounds. In the name of revisionary imperial History, the Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonial scholarship is caught in a localized Lusophone postcoloniality, purportedly maintaining a blind eye to decolonial, and the imperial turn(s) not because of the specificity of its imperial past but due to discourses packaged in intercolonial narcissism and neo-lusotropicalist terms. Therefore, the present work argues that the socio-cultural and historical narratives of Portuguese empire are beset with *lusotalgia* (neologism borrowed from an unknown source) with the domestic and imperial history continuing to remain separable. Thus, in
order to be *at home with the Empire* (borrowed from Catherine Hall’s book’s title) it calls for repudiating the recycling and reinvention of the Salazar patronised Freyrian rhetoric of lusotropicalism.

Attempting to decenter the metrocentric Portuguese imperial History, the following chapters delineate the discursive marginalization of ex–Asian colonies within Lusophone postcolonialism in particular and within imperial historiography at large. Since the late 1990s there has been a spurt of publications on Lusophone postcolonialism with the touted groundbreaking essay “Entre Prospero e Caliban: Colonialismo, pós-colonialismo e inter-identidade” (2001b) [“Between Prospero and Caliban: Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Inter-identity” (2002) in English version] by Boaventura de Sousa Santos and a boom in literary readings on colonial wars and Portuguese African colonies. It is argued that Lusophone postcolonial scholarship is not only based on neo–lusotropical tenets and the neo–imperial agenda of *lusofonia* but also that these postcolonial literary readings indulge in selective amnesia and metrocentric Portuguese imperial memory. The present thesis reads Lusophone postcolonial discourses on colonial wars as selective revisitations that contrary to being revisionary sustain a collective self-willed amnesia.

The first chapter briefly introduces the commonality between the advent of Lusophone postcolonialism and postcolonialisms of other European empires, provisionally terming this as *non–Anglophone postcolonial turn*. Thus, it
attempts to map out not only the concomittance of Lusophone postcolonialism and postcolonialisms of other European empires, but also their inextricable interconnectedness with postcoloniality as delineated by Graham Huggan (2001). Also, this chapter argues that Lusophone postcolonial scholarship also partakes in what few scholars like Alessandro Triulzi (2006), Azzedine Haddour and Margaret Majumdar (2007) have criticized as the displacements of memory as a renewed amnesia in the name of revising imperial History. Thus, it also raises the exigency for a more comprehensive Lusophone postcolonial scholarship that is constitutive of other imperial histories within the Portuguese empire and the need to critically situate the terms Lusophone postcolonialism and Lusophone literatures in order to desanitize Portuguese imperial memories.

After briefly introducing postcolonialism, its cognate terms, and postcoloniality, the chapter turns to delineate some of the contours of what is coined here as the non–Anglophone postcolonial turn. The explication of imperial turn (Antoinette Burton 2003) helps to underline its disavowal critically within Lusophone postcolonial discourses. The discursive imbrications between Lusophone postcolonialism and the postcolonialism of other European empires highlight not only the metrocentric nature of the former, but also the disputable disciplinary dominance of literary studies. The rest of the chapter problematizes the privileging of literary readings of colonial wars and decolonization History of Portuguese imperialism. The selective examples are not intended to be close readings of individual scholars or aimed at undermining
their scholarship, but rather act as symptomatic references towards the arguments at hand. As a counter discursive strategy, two readings are rendered — the first is the Portuguese geographer Orlando Ribeiro’s *Goa em 1956* (1999), and the other of the Portuguese writer Gonçalo M. Tavares’s *Uma Viagem à Índia* (2010), in order to reiterate the decolonializing of Portuguese imperial memory encapsulated through the proposed term *Goa syndrome*.

The second chapter titled “The curious case of Portuguese subaltern colonialism” is in continuation of the first one as it intensively engages with what is considered as the seminal and groundbreaking discourse that set the course of Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism. The focus on the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s essays and hypotheses on the *situatedness* of Portuguese colonialism and his call for “From the Postmodern to the Postcolonial – and Beyond Both” (2010) serves to nuance the criticism of postcoloniality and the geopolitics of Portuguese imperial memory. The second chapter thus contests the subaltern hypotheses of Portuguese colonialism by Sousa Santos, arguing that contrary to what the sociologist claims, the geopolitical space of Portuguese colonialism cannot act as counter-hegemonic globalization in its opposition to dominant version of postcolonialism, thus also criticizing the misappropriation of subalternity discourse. After a decolonial reading of the essay “Between Prospero and Caliban,” the second chapter goes on to argue that the situated Portuguese postcolonialism or *reprovincialization of Europe*, that Sousa Santos propounds, are rendered from an imperial
standpoint. Further, as shall be argued, the deployment of postcolonial tropes like *Prosperized caliban* and *Calibanized prospero* serve rather to mystify the Eurocentric nature of the discourses. Criticisms of Sousa Santos’s *epistemologies of the South* and its adoption as a cornerstone of World Social Forum (WSF) is also taken up in order to argue that far from presenting decolonial discourses, these enunciations and Sousa Santos’s interventions in Lusophone postcolonial studies are complicit with Lusophone postcoloniality. I have purposefully chosen to focus on those aspects of Lusophone postcolonial scholarship which the sociologist has delineated in terms of *oppositional postcolonialism*.

The third chapter engages in a decolonial reading of *Tivolem* (1998) by Victor Rangel-Ribeiro, a Goan diasporic writer. Through the everyday epistemologies of return migrants from various Portuguese colonies around the 1930s, the fictional Goan village narrates the colonial socio-dynamics of the stayees and returnees. The reading not only problematizes Sousa Santos’s phrase *pre–postcolonialism* (2002), arguing that far from running the risk of being colonialist in his eagerness to be anti–colonialist, as the sociologist claims, in *Tivolem* the colonial elite emerges as severely alienated. Employing Ato Quayson’s *calibrations* (2003) and Niyi Afolabi’s *regenerative criticism* (2001), the reading argues how the fictional village as a microcosmic Goa at an extra diegetic level serves to revisit the pre/colonial past as *reflective nostalgia* (Svetlana Boym 2008). In this respect, the third chapter contends the Portuguese
imperial *restorative nostalgia* (Boym 2008) as delineated in the preceding two chapters.

Foregrounding the elite narratorial standpoint in *Tivolem*, the third chapter thus highlights the literary agency of the colonial elite in the narrative not in their ambivalent role as accomplices and victims but as discursive agents of anti–colonialism and indigenous modernity. Literary fiction being an important mode to reappropriate history; the reading as a performative act problematizes the privileged canon of Lusophone literatures in order to decolonialize Portuguese imperial History. The crisscrossing of migrant Goan colonized subjects with other colonized subjects in *Tivolem* distorts the asymmetrical power relations from the colonial metropole center towards its peripheral colonies. Revisiting the historical interconnections between the colonies not only decenters the metropole but also circumvents here the imperial amnesia in the Lusophone post–colonial scholarship.

After the reading of *Tivolem*, the chapter proposes the term *bebincaized* to be employed as a literary allegory for Goan history, akin to Salman Rushdie’s *chutneyfied* history. It also cursorily discusses terms like *Indo-Portuguese literature, Lusophone literature of Goa, Lusophone Indian literature, Goan writing in English*, in a space clearing gesture to kick start debates on other literary corpuses besides the privileged colonial war and afrocentered approach within Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism. The aim is not to search for a nominative label but to draw attention to a promising literary corpus which
otherwise remains marginalized within the literary hegemony of Lusophone literatures. This lends weight to the arguments of displacements of memory already dealt with in the preceding chapters and the reading of Tivolem exegetically revises the narrative of Portuguese imperial History. Thus the three chapters in the present thesis are closely integrated with their thematic concerns and supplement each others’ arguments.

A few words regarding the ideological affiliations are in order. The geopolitics of the production of academic knowledges and situated knowing are critical understandings that inform the present work. As Stuart Hall states, “We all write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and a culture which is specific. What we say is always in context, positioned” (1990, 222). Knowledge is not only situated as the feminist scholar Donna Haraway affirms (1988, 575–599), but also interested, invested, and needless to add, ideological.¹ The geopolitical baggage² that scholars and academicians also carry informs their situated knowing and therefore there is a need for all scholars to constantly “examine their own complicity with the colonial imagination” (Jolly 1995, 22).

R. Radhakrishanan’s term counternemonic innocence helps to underline how the First World freely and unilaterally chooses “what to remember and what not to remember from the pages of history” (1996, 156). The present

¹.Conceptual and ethical debates in the humanities have prompted greater reflexivity in research practice, and acknowledgement of the situated and embodied nature of academic knowledge. (Gibson et al. 2004, 423)
². As Ambreen Hai prefers the term geopolitical baggage (Jahan Ramazani’s term 2001) to the singularity of terms such as “subject position.”(2009, 359)
arguments thrive in the decolonial spirit subscribing to activist thinkers like Frantz Fanon who had already forewarned about the debilitating effects of colonialism. Therefore, I prefer the term decolonialize to decolonize in order to underline the continuity of decolonization. Decoloniality as expounded by predominantly Latin American scholars like Aníbal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, and Nelson Maldonado-Torres et al. is also a relevant term that I subscribe to though not completely. The decolonial spirit was an integral part of anticolonialism and therefore the coinage decolonial turn calls for cautionary mention. According to Maldonado-Torres, the decolonial turn comprises of “diverse positions that share a view of coloniality as a fundamental problem in the modern (as well as postmodern and information) age” (2011, 1). Many scholars (Claude Alvares, C. K. Raju et al.), including those associated with the decolonial school, have well highlighted the need to decolonize knowledge and academic institutions.

As a migrant research student from North India on a PhD fellowship (FCT) at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Coimbra and now residing due to familial circumstances in the United States, I see my present work as a sojourn in the ongoing process to learn how to sow those seeds which will blossom in the spirit of what Ranajit Guha claims — “Let a hundred flowers blossom and we don’t mind even the weeds” (1988, 43). Some non/academic epiphanic moments, subtle and not so subtle experiences of socio-academic racism, overwhelming small talk of Indian cuisine, spices and of course the
quintessential *caril* (curry), the brief argument with the Portuguese librarian who claimed that the *Basilica of Bom Jesus* in Goa *é nossa* (is ours), unforgettable sight of the valet-parking restaurant — Contemporary Colonial Cuisine in Frankfurt, learning/unlearning to protest in politically correct manner, groping around in the conference circuit . . . the list is really endless. With this brief mention of my own geopolitical baggage, I intended to highlight the *situatedness* of the present work.
I - E agora, José: Goa syndrome?
1. Mapping the tools: postcolonialism, postcoloniality, postcolonial theory/studies

The present chapter attempts to decolonialize the term Lusophone postcolonialism by raising the exigency for a more democratic canon within Lusophone literatures in order to desanitize Portuguese imperial memory. It aims to draw attention to promising literary corpuses which otherwise remain marginalized within the literary hegemony of Lusophone literatures. In a space clearing gesture and in order to kick start debates on other literary corpuses besides the privileged colonial war novels within Portuguese/Lusophone postcolonialism, the following pages problematize Lusophone postcoloniality by highlighting that it is a causatum of the postcoloniality which scholars like Graham Huggan (2001) have delineated with respect to anglocentered postcolonialism.

Though Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism is relatively new, the spurt in publications and post–2000 scholarship is sufficient proof that this discourse has finally arrived within the Portuguese academia. But its arrival is not in isolation, it partakes in what for lack of a better term shall be referred to here as — the non–Anglophone postcolonial turn. Also, there is more to the belated initiation of non–Anglophone postcolonialisms than mere decentering the anglocentric focus of postcolonial studies. The Anglophone centered postcolonial studies was not without pitfalls with the criticism of postcoloniality being one of the most ungratifying one but not without reason. This raises
certain legitimate questions — can the critical discourse of postcoloniality explicate the purchase of the *nouveau* interest in non-Anglophone postcolonialisms? In what manner do these so-called revisionary colonial Histories revisit the imperial memories and how do they engage with the *imperial turn* (Antoinette Burton 2003)? Are we witnessing postcoloniality in its local or neo-Eurocentric avatars? Is Lusophone Postcolonialism also a euphemism for the same? These are crucial questions but out of the scope of the present chapter to answer intensively. The ambiguity of the terms — postcolonialism, postcoloniality, postcolonial theory/studies, etc. — call for clarification of their employment in the present thesis.

Distinguishing postcolonial studies, postcolonialism (hyphenated, un-hyphenated), postcolonial criticism, postcolonial theory, postcoloniality and other variegated forms is indeed a daunting task. Ever since these terms came into circulation, their clarifications, ambiguities, criticisms, and dis/avowals have not ceased, as evident from the number of handbooks and introductory references, etc. Nevertheless, an attempt shall be undertaken to face this daunting task because delineating these terms would nuance the understanding of associated labels like Lusophone postcolonialism and also because such terms carry lot of ideological baggage and point to the enunciator’s standpoint.

Scholars like Bart Moore-Gilbert (1997) make a clear distinction between postcolonial theory and postcolonial criticism. For them the “holy trinity” (Young 1991) of Said, Spivak and Bhabha and their discursive association with
the high French theory and deconstructionist readings represents postcolonial theory while postcolonial criticism comprises of a wider critique of colonialism and imperialism, colonial discourse analysis, etc. Post–colonial studies used interchangeably with post–colonialism became a dominant trend in Anglo-Saxon academies of the global North from the late 1980s onwards. The hyphenated version (post–colonial) privileges historical periodization denoting the period after colonialism which some scholars contest arguing that the period of colonialism is not yet over, while the unhyphenated version engages with “colonialism and its past and present effects, both at the local level of ex-colonial societies as well as the level of more general global developments thought to be the after-effects of empire” (Quayson 2000, 2). Many scholars do not follow this neat distinction and in such a case the unhyphenated also includes the chronological marking.

Debates about postcolonialism centre on five key issues — its genealogies, boundaries, fields, locations, and ideologies (Zeleza 2006, 92). Appiah’s seminal question “Is the Post– in Postmodernism the Post– in Postcolonial?” (1991) points to the theoretical and historical origins of postcolonialism whose concomitance with French poststructuralism and postmodernism has been severely contested not to mention its sharing with the latter the understanding of power dynamics between the cultures of the West and the Third World. In fact, “much of the early criticism of postcolonialism centered on its perceived affinities to the antifoundationalism of post–
structuralism that, it was claimed, made it ideologically depoliticized or depoliticizing” (Zeleza 2006, 96). The temporal and spatial scales of postcolonial discourse in terms of its boundaries have also been well debated. Walter D. Mignolo rightly criticizes the temporal privileging of eighteenth-century post-Renaissance empires which elide “a crucial and constitutive moment of modernity/coloniality that was the sixteenth century” (2000, x–xi).

The four major areas of postcolonial studies — the colonial past; the postcolonial present; exile and diaspora; and the politics of multiculturalism (Young 1999, 32) — have been especially maligned as susceptible to metropolitan academic consumption in the present global capitalism. Arif Dirlik acerbically (mis)answers Ella Shohat’s query — “when exactly . . . does the postcolonial begin” as “when Third World intellectuals have arrived in First World academe” (1994, 328–329),3 thus lending weight to the criticism that postcolonial studies reflects the preoccupations of the cosmopolitan elites rather than those of the Third world subaltern. As Ania Loomba observes, ‘postcolonial theory’ has largely emerged from within English literary studies and “the meaning of ‘discourse’ shrinks to ‘text’, and from there to ‘literary text’ and from there to texts written in English because that is the corpus most familiar to the critics” (1998, 96).

Not surprisingly, many critics have proposed counter-discourses in order

---

3. Postcolonial theorizing may have “entered” in the academic market with the arrival of Third World intellectuals to the United States but certainly did not “begin” then. (Mignolo 2000, 100)
to foreground the antagonistic ethics of postcolonialism rather than qualify the colonial dynamics in terms of hybridity, complicity or mere inversion of status quo of power. Amar Acheraïou’s re-routing process termed as *postcolonial realignment* (2011, 194)⁴ or Simon During’s *critical postcolonialisms* (1998, 46) are some examples of such counter-terms and discourses. Mignolo also urges a distinction of *postcolonial theories* as an academic commodity (in the same way that postmodern theories were and are commodified), from *postcolonial theorizing*, as critiques subsumed under subaltern reason and border gnosis (2000, 100). During thus distinguishes between *critical* and *reconciliatory postcolonialisms*, arguing that the former seeks radical alternatives to modernity based on non-Western traditions and lifeways, while the latter works to reconcile colonized peoples to colonialism, “the categories such as hybridity, mimicry, ambivalence . . . lacing colonized into colonising cultures thus rendering postcolonialism as reconciliatory rather than a critical, anti–colonialist category” (1998, 31).

He also points out how from its beginnings; postcolonialism was constructed around internal divisions of *reconciliatory* and *anticolonialist* wings. The first set out “modes of analysis that undid the hard opposition

---
⁴ For Acheraïou, *postcolonial realignment* is — indispensable and “necessitates a significant conceptual and ideological shift through three major interrelated processes: first, movement away from the cultural and spatial turn that runs alongside political pessimism in order to engage actively and critically with material globality; second, reconnection with the histories of anti-colonial struggles, which are more than useful and relevant in today’s neocolonial global order; third, a need for diasporic postcolonial discourse to interact and even align itself with the postcolonial discursive practices of the South . . . (2011, 194)
between the colonized and the colonizer,” while anticolonialist postcolonialism remained attached to the emancipatory drive of the postwar struggle against formal colonialism, which it treated just as an oppressive force (During 2012, 332). Stuart Hall identifies a nostalgia running through certain arguments for a return to a clear-cut politics of binary oppositions in terms of as he queries — “isn’t that the shift from politics as a ‘war of manoeuvre’ to politics as a ‘war of position,’ which Gramsci long ago, and decisively, charted?” (quoted in Chambers et al. 1996, 244). In refuting the agonistic standpoint of postcolonialism, the present work does not intend to vy for a clear-cut politics of binary oppositions as Hall above suggests. In fact, Alastair Bonnett identifies two interconnected forms of radical nostalgia — the nostalgia of anti–colonialism posed “a challenge to monolithic visions of modernity (both Western and communist),” while the nostalgia of post–colonial critical scholarship may be identified “in the post–colonial yearning for the political drama and moral clarity of the era of socialist revolutionary anti–colonial struggle” (2010, 87).

As Stam et al. inform, “before Postcolonial Studies emerged in the mid–late 1980s, as a term, as a rubric, that kind of thinking was called Anti–Colonial Studies or Third World Studies” (2012a, 19). According to David Scott, the decline of liberationist Third Worldism of Bandung witnessed the emergence of a new field of cognitive–political discourse about colonialism. This field was “located geographically and institutionally in the North Atlantic academy (the
United States and Britain, in particular) and driven most often by diasporic and exilic intellectuals of Third World origin,” concerned especially with the dependence of the anticolonial nationalists on certain epistemological assumptions regarding culture, class, subjectivity, history, knowledge and so on (1999, 11). For Scott, this is the moment of postcoloniality, with Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) playing the most important part in opening it up and making it visible as a space of criticism. Postcoloniality opened up the register of the politics of colonialisit representation, “the whole question of the decolonization of representation itself, the decolonization of the conceptual apparatus through which their political objectives were thought out” which had remained under theorized in the space of anticoloniality (ibid., 10–12). Some scholars instead prefer to use the term *transcolonial*, for example, David Punter, for whom the critical question “what comes after” as in post–colonial implies entering into the “‘competitive postcolonial,’ to participate in attempted statistical resolutions, to call in the ambiguous ministry of weights and measures” (2000, 78).

Generally, postcoloniality is employed in the sense of continuity of colonial conditions as witnessed in the present neo–colonialism. Jane Hiddleston clarifies that “if postcolonialism involves some form of critique and resistance, despite its proponents’ awareness of capitalism’s neo–imperial effects, postcoloniality is a looser term for a current moment or epoch,” being at the same time a condition rather than an intellectual engagement or standpoint (2009, 5). The present thesis deploys the term postcoloniality as specifically
elaborated by Graham Huggan in the book *The Postcolonial Exotic* (2001). Huggan makes distinction between postcolonialism as concerning largely localised agencies of resistance and postcoloniality referring to the global condition of cross-cultural symbolic exchange. Thus for him, postcoloniality “is a value-regulating mechanism within the global late-capitalist system of commodity exchange” (2001, 6). Though Huggan focuses on Anglophone centered postcolonialism, his arguments stand valid even in the case of non-Anglophone postcolonialisms, as we shall see in the following pages. For John McLeod, Huggan’s book with its sociologically inspired analysis of the ‘institutionalization’ of postcolonial studies points out how “postcolonial studies’ analysis of empire and discourse on race has itself become a commodity, another item for sale in a consumerized world,” in others words, “the commercialism of ‘postcoloniality’ ” (2007, 188).

Huggan’s concerns about “metropolitan cultural consumption” had already been echoed earlier by scholars like Aijaz Ahmad, Benita Parry, etc. Diverging from Dirlik’s rejectionist conclusion that “postcoloniality is the condition of the intelligentsia of global capitalism” (1994, 356), Huggan reiterates that postcolonialism and postcoloniality are inextricably interconnected or rather “postcolonialism is bound up with postcoloniality — that in the overwhelmingly commercial context of late twentieth-century commodity culture, postcolonialism and its rhetoric of resistance have themselves become consumer products” (2001, 6; italics in original). In fact, the
category of postcoloniality conveniently elides its own emanation. Postcolonial literature now caters to the neo-imperialist consumption substituting the earlier ‘exotic’ corpuses like ‘Commonwealth literature,’ etc. This lends weight to Dirlik’s comment that “within the discourse of postcoloniality, the literally postcolonial are increasingly marginalised as the postcolonial is abstracted as ‘method,’ and appropriated for First–World concerns that have little to do with the colonial per se” (1999, 154). The following parts will attempt to delineate some of the discursive intricacies between Anglophone centered postcolonialism and the recent postcolonial scholarships engaging with other European empires.

2. Whither non-anglophone postcolonial turn?

Since its inception in the 1980s, a dehistoricized and decontextualized postcolonial studies advertently or inadvertently privileged the British colonial history, as commented by Harish Trivedi — “the postcolonial has ears only for English” (1999, 272). The criticisms of this undifferentiated discourse to include the colonial histories of other European empires were generally raised by scholars. In 2007, John McLeod observed, “the field’s centre of gravity is shifting, so that postcolonial studies is now more generally alert to the different European empires, and their legacies, which shaped European colonialism and made it a variable phenomenon” (11; italics added). One of the examples of this
gravity shift was *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures: Continental Europe and Its Empires*, edited by Prem Poddar, Rajeev Shridhar Patke et al. (2008), but clinical contributions on various empires not only highlighted the discursive magnitude of such a task but also the urgency of comparative imperial studies.

Since 2000, there has been undoubtedly a spurt of publications on postcolonial studies on non–anglophone empires and consolidation of Francophone, Italophone, Germanophone, and to a certain extent, of Hispanophone, Lusophone postcolonial studies. This is surreptitiously coincidental with questions being raised about the future of Anglophone postcolonial studies. Is this coincidence a mere case of shift in the Anglophone postcolonial field’s centre of gravity, as McLeod had pointed out (2007, 11); a rather belated attempt to “complete the cast of continental colonizers and present the entire assembly in a wonderful mis-en-scène,” (Poddar et al. 2008, xv–xvi)? Or an ‘anxiogenic’ (Ponzanesi’s term) tendency in “comparative postcolonialism” (quoted in Keown et al. 2009, 3) but without accounting for the specificities of European colonial empires? Whether rendering visible the presence of other colonial and postcolonial trajectories (McLeod 2003, 58–9) is akin to ‘comparative postcolonialism’ is a moot point.5

5. Keown et al. cite the example of *Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures* (Poddar et al. 2008) as part of recent publications that have already begun to trace the contours of a comparative postcolonialism. (2009, 4)
This is not to imply that postcolonial discourses on other European colonial empires were absent, but rather to point out that this *non–Anglophone postcolonial turn* has taken place predominantly in the European metropole academic centres and concomitant with doubts raised about the future of postcolonial studies during the late 1990s. Without being dismissive or generalizing the entire non–Anglophone scholarship, the following part attempts to delineate the critical geopolitics behind the post–2000 proliferation, keeping in mind Huggan’s above mentioned distinction between postcolonialism and postcoloniality. While postcolonial field’s centre of gravity has been shifting in order to present the entire *mis-en-scène* of different European empires, the non–Anglophone postcolonial scholarship launches itself from the claim to deprovincialize the anglocentric focus of post–colonial theory. Whether the loss of, to borrow Radhakrishnan’s term, *countermnemonic innocence* (1996, 156), in Anglophone imperial History and literary studies, was initiated by migrant intellectuals moving into Western universities or was concomitant with the migrants and refugees also moving in the first world, is an interminable debate.

Alec Hargreaves’s tragic–comic image of Francophone studies and postcolonial studies as “ships passing in the night” (2003), or other invocations like “belated liaison” (Chris Bongie 2003), “an overdue encounter” (Alison Turner 2011) of these two fields seem to tell only part of the story of the *non–Anglophone postcolonial turn*. According to Michael Syrotinski, given the fact
that the scholarship of Homi Bhabha, Edward Said, and Gayatri Spivak — the three prominent figures associated with the emergence of postcolonial theory — owes a clear intellectual debt to an earlier generation of French theorists; these dialogues should have begun much earlier (2007, 1). A number of genealogical lines of influence are now beginning to be drawn, and within this narrative, one more or less accepted view is that postcolonialism cuts its theoretical teeth in the wake of ‘poststructuralism’ (Syrotinski 2009, 216).

A similar theoretical genealogical tracing has also been made regarding the contribution of Italian radical philosophers by many scholars including Jacqueline Andall et al. (2010). Fabrizio De Donno et al. also claim that Italy’s contribution to postcolonial studies has been in the formation of postcolonial theory with Italian radical philosophers such as Antonio Gramsci, Antonio Negri and Giorgio Agamben who emerged from both a Marxist and a post–structuralist tradition of thought, being “instrumental in shaping the directions of postcolonial scholarship, although the specificities of the Italian context in the formation of their ideas have not always been duly recognized” (2006, 372). Robert Young’s coinage *franglais mixture* (2001, 18)6 points to another such *maître à penser* reclamation. While one scholar argues that “any assessment of

6. According to Young, Jean-François Bayart wrote a whole book objecting to postcolonial theory as an unpleasant Anglo-Saxon intrusion into the purity of French thought and despite its noisy appearance in contemporary French intellectual culture, the French political scientist and director of research at the prestigious Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris dismisses the postcolonial by claiming that its sources are entirely French, even if its identity is Anglo-Saxon, which therefore makes “postcolonial theory” altogether superfluous. (2012, 19)
the emergence in France of a mode of criticism explicitly identifiable with postcolonialism should go back to 1989” (quoted in Murdoch et al. 2005, 7), another scholar, David Murphy, attributes that the lack of French translations of Anglophone postcolonial theory texts “have made it difficult for francophone studies specialists in France to take the insights of Anglophone postcolonial theory into account” (ibid.).

To mention one example, the French version of Bhabha’s *Location of Culture* appeared thirteen years after its initial publication. As regards the interface of Lusophone discourses and Postcolonial studies, Shohat points out that because of the question of the Black Atlantic and slavery, Lusofonia has been visible in Postcolonial Studies but in terms of ‘Lusophone world,’ this will have to be connected to India, Goa, the Indian Ocean, Macao, even the remnants of Portuguese settlements in what is today Abu Dhabi, those areas, the Gulf Area (2012, 38).

Not purchasing the above explications, scholars for example, Murdoch and Donnadey find the gap of Francophone criticism between the 1960s and the twenty-first century intriguing and raise a critical point that the lack of translations does not explain why francophone critics had ceased writing their own texts (2005, 7). Thus, this discontinuity drags along like a conspicuous tag

---

7. Hargreaves puts it as —

the general slowness of French scholars to embrace the problematic of what is now known as postcolonialism stands in paradoxical contrast with the pervasive influence of French and francophone writers and theorists among many of those who have helped to make postcolonial studies such a vibrant field of inquiry in the anglophone world. In recent years, these early influences have been increasingly recognized by anglophone scholars. (quoted in Murdoch et al. 2005, 55)
on the proliferation of francophone postcolonial scholarship witnessed in the last decade. The Editorial Introduction of the *International Journal of Francophone Studies* published in 2007, introspects more convincingly why postcolonialism did not thrive in France — “The fact that postcolonialism thrived not in France but in Anglo-American schools of criticism could be perceived as the work of repression: postcolonial France disavowing its colonial past and the trauma of the Algerian War” (Haddour et al. 2007, 12). *Disavowing the colonial past* is a critical argument that should well be examined in the case of other metropolitan centers of ex-colonial empires. In the case of Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism, the sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos underlines that with regards to colonial discourses, “the subalternity of Portuguese colonialism resides in the fact that, since the seventeenth century, the history of colonialism has been written in English, not in Portuguese” (2002, 11). Thus, most of the non–anglophone postcolonial discourses indulge in reproving the marginalization of the non–anglophone colonial histories and postcolonial discourses eliding why non–anglophone metropoles did not invest in postcolonial scholarship or any ex-centric scholarship for that matter.

Thus, in a bid to elide this *belatedness* behind the discursive mask of *provincializing the anglocentrism* of postcolonial studies, the *nouveau* non–anglophone postcolonial discourses excessively emphasize the specificities of their respective imperial histories running the risk of turning them into exceptionalisms. Anthony Soares’s *caveat* is worth recalling here —
“Lusophone Postcolonial Studies seeks to bring “critical attention to bear on the specific situations of the Portuguese-speaking world, but in a manner that, ultimately, should not restrict its comparative framework to one that elects the Anglophone postcolonial model as its only comparator” (2006, 7). Crucially, this caveat is elided in Sousa Santos’s subaltern hypothesis which privileges the Anglophone model as the norm (2002, 11). In fact, such a rhetoric of specificity can lead towards the discursive segregative pitfall of Anglophone vs. non-Anglophone postcolonial studies, a point also raised by Charles Forsdick in francophone context that there is “the risk of an exclusive Anglophone-Francophone dialogue at a point when new intercultural or transnational dynamics — between French-speaking areas, or between the Francophone and the Hispanophone or Lusophone — are increasingly in evidence” (2006, 256).

A discerning antidote to this rhetoric of specificity could be Said’s contrapuntal histories (1993, 59). Borrowing metaphors from classical music, Said called “for contrapuntal approaches to the ‘overlapping territories’ and ‘intertwined histories’ produced by imperialism” (quoted in Ingham 2003, 54). While a historically differentiated postcolonialism has been a long unheeded clarion call, contrapuntal colonial histories could be touted to correct the 19th and 20th-century focus of the Anglophone postcolonialism by including the temporally analogous colonial histories of Anglophone and non-Anglophone colonialisms. As Patricia Clare Ingham puts it, “there may . . . be ways of considering distinctions between colonialisms of the twelfth or the twentieth
centuries alongside, and in contrapuntal relation with, their similarities” (ibid.). Critically, the imperialist rhetoric of specificity can be deconstructed through inter and intra critical engagement of all anglo and non-Anglophone postcolonialisms from the standpoint of the colonized, something which the Saidian approach perhaps fails to render in an uncontentious manner.

Disavowing the colonial past as referred earlier touches upon an implicit suggestion that should well be examined in case of the other metropolitan centers of ex-colonial empires. Hence, the crucial question Why now which the non-anglophone Postcolonial scholars need to consider is too legitimate to be ignored. Is it a case of belated catching-up fast with the Anglophone centered postcolonialism? Andall et al. reiterate the debate surrounding the term postcolonial, not simply in terms of ‘squabbles over hyphenation’ but also in relation to the essence of the academic enterprise (2005, 16). The terms Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone, etc. also recenter the metropole and raise the exigency to engage rigorously with these discourses in terms of their neo-colonial register. Derek Walcott’s acerbic term Franco-phoney reflects criticism not only of the parent institution but also of France’s imperial attitude while littérature francophone [Francophone literature], refers “to all literature on which, despite the rhetoric of a civilizing mission, colonialism depended for its expansion and consolidation” (Forsdick 2003, 5). The earlier criticisms against postcolonialism have also been repeated by the non-Anglophone postcolonial scholars. The periodization of pre-colonial, colonial and
postcolonial epochs and the privileging of colonialism over studies of contemporary neo–colonial times has been pointed out by Forsdick (2003), Andall, et al. (2005).  

The non–Anglophone postcolonial turn which provincially here designates the postcolonialisms of other European empires appears to have created a new literary hegemony by subsuming literatures from the colonies and ex–colonies. The political process of decolonization left a political and cultural vacuum in European countries, each dealing with the loss of colonies in its own way, but amnesia as a defense mechanism remains a commonly shared strategy. Thus, politics of memory and imperial History are two contested discursive terrains contending with melancholia and imperial nostalgia. Instead of delineating “the porous relationship between metropolitan and colonial societies” (Kennedy 2003, 18), conventional imperial historiography has erased not only the history of the subaltern victims, denied their agency but also disavowed any impact of colonized cultures on the metropolis. The postcolonial turn challenged this Eurocentric approach to imperial History influencing and inspiring many other disciplines including, of course, literary studies. According to Leela Gandhi, it acted as a “theoretical resistance to the mystifying amnesia of the colonial aftermath. It is a disciplinary project devoted to the academic

8. Andall and Duncan also express skepticism about the usefulness of postcolonial studies for analyzing contemporary politics and society. For them, “what the term postcolonial does unquestionably evoke however, is the period that follows colonialism. This tends to endorse the idea that discrete temporal periods exist in relation to colonialism — the pre-colonial, the colonial and the post–colonial.” (2005, 16)
task of revisiting, remembering and, crucially, interrogating the colonial past” (quoted in Nayar 2010, 4).

*Imperial turn* (Antoinette Burton 2003) or the *new imperial studies* also inspired by the *postcolonial turn* informs ex-centric readings (Quayson 2003) of modern European history faithful to the Saidian dictat that the European metropolis needs to think its history *together with* and as constitutive of the history of the colonies, thus, “awakening from the cruel stupor and absurd immobility of imperial dominion” (quoted in Schwarz 1996, 13). The term ex-centric is in concordance with Ato Quayson who elaborates it as:

. . . the idea of the off-center, the view that falls outside the perspectives of sanctioned historical tellings of the nation, whether these are done from the standpoint of nationalists themselves or, as is often also the case, from literary historians who seize the already available shapes of national history to account for the direction and rates of transition of the literature itself. (2003, 76–77)

*Imperial turn* leads to such ex–centric readings of imperial history, categorically bringing the empire back home. As Burton puts it “we take ‘the imperial turn’ to mean the accelerated attention to the impact of histories of imperialism on metropolitan societies in the wake of decolonization, pre– and post–1968 racial struggle and feminism in the last quarter century” (2003, 2). Though Burton acknowledges the role of postcolonial studies in shaping debates about empire

9. Reviewing various discourses on *imperial turn*, Douglas M. Peers observes that “Rather than viewing imperialism as a political or economic process within strict temporal and spatial limits, these scholars have taken what has been termed the “imperial turn,” urging us to consider imperialism as a negotiated state of being, its priorities and logic pervading time and space in such a way as to constitute what we now commonly term modernity and globalization.” (2004, 88)
and colonial hegemony she clarifies that the imperial turn is not necessarily considered as coterminous with postcolonialism in all its academic varieties (2003, 9). In this respect, Dane Kennedy’s essay “Imperial History and Post–Colonial Theory” could help to nuance the discursive confluences:

. . . It [Post–colonial theory] has reoriented and reinvigorated imperial studies, taking it in directions that the conventional historiography of the British empire has hardly begun to consider . . . These preoccupations are in no way limited to the literary proponents of post–colonial theory; similar inquiries have arisen among anthropologists, area studies specialists, feminist scholars, and others whose methods may seem somewhat less inimical to imperial historians, but whose concerns are often no less challenging to their practices. (2003, 18)

The postcoloniality of the non–Anglophone postcolonial turn has been delineated and criticized in individual fields by some scholars. They warn of displacements of memory manifested as a renewed amnesia in the name of revising colonial History. In “Displacing the colonial event. Hybrid memories of postcolonial Italy” (2006), Alessandro Triulzi argues that the recent “reconfiguring of Italy’s colonial memory conceals displacements and dislocations which are no less pervasive or disquieting” (430). He describes colonial memory in Italy as a sort of ‘pendulum’ “oscillating between an all-out desire to forget and the nostalgic recollection of a past which is selectively remembered and re-enacted to suit Italy’s new role in the postcolonial age” as “the recent influx of African migrants trying to break into the fortified European citadel offers an example of this process” (ibid.).

Scholars have argued, for instance that Italy suffers from amnesia in
regard to the brutality and aggression of its colonial past, tending instead to
dwell on the image of itself as ‘little Italy,’ a struggling country at the margins
of Europe (Behdad et al. 2011, 344). Similarly, in the Francophone case,
Haddour and Majumdar in the editorial introduction to “Whither francophone
studies? Launching the debate” (2007) also refer to postcolonial France’s
disavowing “its colonial past and the trauma of the Algerian War as a process of
repression — or, better still, displacement . . . trauma, in the sense of an open
wound from which haemorrhaged History” (12). Triulzi rightly pinpoints that
it is delusionary to believe “that the long-standing failure of Italian public
memory to come to terms with its colonial past may soon be over” as evidenced
by “the fast-growing literature on Italian colonialism, mostly fuelled by
postmodern — and postcolonial — inspired Italian studies in the Anglophone
world and by a parallel movement in literary studies in Italy” (2006, 431). He
cites the “alleged advent of an Italian postcoloniality where the joint impact of a
more critical historiography and a newborn italophone postcolonial literature is
moulding ‘the multiethnic laboratory Italy,’ which is ‘creolizing’ the country’s
culture and exposing its colonial past, as is happening in the rest of Europe,” an
optimism that is not shared by historians and Africanists let alone Africans
living in Italy and which is far from promoting historical revisionism (ibid.).

Eurocentric imperial histories have continued to portray their respective
empires as benevolent, more humane, and more tolerant than others. In Italy’s
case, Triulzi affirms that far from being “a postcolonial country that has
reckoned with its past,” it’s “colonial past appears to be frozen rather than forgotten” (2006, 432). According to him, “By displacing the colonial event and diluting it into a hybrid haze of nostalgia for the colonial period, postcolonial Italy is embarking on a dangerous path of renewed amnesia” and therefore “in this sense, Italian postcoloniality is no less anomalous than its colonial precedent as it continues to produce, sixty years after colonialism’s end, ambiguous displacements of memory in the politically volatile and unresolved public arena of both metropoli and colonia” (ibid., 430–443). The following part examines the displacement of Lusophone imperial memory.

3. Lusophone postcolonialism: postcolonial desire/postimperial narcissism?10

Portuguese/Lusophone Postcolonialism, like its other discursive counterparts, is a post–2000 phenomenon, sharing a similar trajectory of subsuming Portuguese studies and Lusophone literatures. It’s critical paradigms have not evolved as in the case of Francophone, Italophone, etc. Hence, it can be barely considered as a discipline in its own right. Paulo de Medeiros, in the introduction to Postcolonial Theory and Lusophone Literatures (2007), poses the question — “is the current attention given to postcolonial studies in a Lusophone context more than a passing fashion, a well-intentioned but

ultimately meaningless mimicry of foreign epistemological tendencies, or a neocolonial exoticization of the cultural afterlife of empire?” (2007, 1–2). Though he answers with a resounding yes, he opines “that just five years ago it would be more difficult to imagine the vitality that characterizes current efforts to rethink historical events and cultural artifacts within a Lusophone context from a postcolonial perspective that is truly innovative and not simply borrowed” (ibid.).

Another significant volume published outside Portugal titled *Toward a Portuguese Postcolonialism* (2006), also claims to aim at displacing “the tendency to interpret the Lusophone postcolonial world through the application of theoretical concepts developed in the Anglophone context” (Soares 2006, 11). Both the volumes acknowledge the colonial baggage of terms like Lusophone, lusofonia, etc. and as Soares referring to the title term “Portuguese Postcolonialism” points out in the editorial introduction:

Its adjectivization of postcolonialism as “Portuguese” may initially appear to be a marker of possession of a field contested by many (but arguably dominated by an Anglo-Saxon theoretical perspective), whereas it is intended to underline Portugal not as a “centre” of a particular version of postcoloniality, but merely as the nation that is culpable of engaging in a long-lasting colonial project that had severe consequences for the peoples it sought to dominate (2006, 5–6).

Medeiros refers the names of Russel Hamilton, Phyllis Peres, Manuel Ferreira, Ana Mafalda Leite, Patrick Chabal amongst others who have “laid the necessary literary-historical groundwork and provided a transition to a postcolonial perspective on Lusophone literatures” (2007, 2). Conspicuously missing are a
substantial number of Portuguese historians or social science scholars from the list of Portuguese/Lusophone Postcolonial scholars. The exception is the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos whose critical work, according to Medeiros, “has also been crucial in developing postcolonial theoretical perspectives on Lusophone literatures,” particularly his essay “Entre Próspero e Caliban: Colonialismo, pós-colonialismo e inter-identidade” (2001b), translated in English as “Between Prospero and Caliban: Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Inter-identity (2002; henceforth BPC) which “signaled a decisive shift in the way in which Lusophone postcoloniality was approached” (2007, 2).

For instance, in *Postcolonial Theory and Lusophone Literatures* (Medeiros 2007), Santos’s article is cited in seven of the volume’s thirteen essays and in the introductory essay Medeiros describes the article in question as a “turning point in its own” (2007, 2), an observation shared by Ingemai Larsen who affirms that Sousa Santos’s essay BPC continues to be “the point of departure for the grand majority of Lusophone postcolonialists” (2008, 248–249). The essay BPC and its implication in Lusophone postcoloniality call for an intensive critical appreciation and therefore will be taken up in the following chapter. Besides Sousa Santos’s exceptional inclusion in the gamut of above-mentioned scholars, the following part will venture some brief reflections on the Portuguese essayist and socio-cultural critic Eduardo Lourenço.
Lourenço’s dense psychoanalytic enunciations of Portuguese national identity, and non/literary readings of imperial History find liberal inclusion in Portuguese/Lusophone postcolonialism. His Portuguese centric discourses are rarely materialist eliding references to the socio-economic bases of Portuguese colonialism, and indulging, rather, in self-flagellation, pathologizing the society’s mindset, thus, constructing a sort of national psychobiography. Ingemai Larsen points out, in the essay titled “Destino ou Futuro – sobre a interpretação académica do discurso nacional de Eduardo Lourenço” (2002), that since *O Labirinto da Saudade* [first edition in 1978] the objective of the renowned philosopher is always to rethink the Portuguese self-conception and ‘reality’ and to deconstruct as well as to propose new and more constructive images of Portugal. He uses an unalterable highly abstract style and rhetoric combined with high frequency of metaphors and intertextual references (31–32; translation mine).11

Since then to the latest revised edition of his collection of essays, he has not spared many words to be critical about the devastating consequences caused

---

11. “Lembre-se que desde *O Labirinto da Saudade* o objectivo do prestigiado filósofo é sempre o mesmo: o de repensar a autoconcepção e ‘realidade’ portuguesas e de tanto pulverizar como propor novas e mais construtivas imagens de Portugal. No entanto, o seu estilo e retórica – caracterizados por um nível de abstracção elevado, uma alta frequência de metáforas e um uso intensivo de referências intertextuais – continuaram inalteráveis . . .” (Larsen 2002, 31–32)
to the colonies. In fact, referring to East Timor’s invasion by Indonesia as the last public outcry, Lourenço declares:

And yet, being neither in Africa nor Europe in the manner we dreamed of; we all immigrated collectively to Timor. There kept shining, according to the eternal national ideology transmitted night and day through state television, the last ray of the empire that during centuries gave us the illusion of being in the center of the world. And perhaps that is true. (2009, 11; translation mine)13

As Margarida Calafate Ribeiro points out, Lourenço when dealing with the symbolic reality does not define Portuguese culture as semi-peripheral but instead speaks of a ‘nucleaire,’ ‘centrals,’ ‘plus europeenne’ continent in which Portugal is positioned as ‘peripherique’ (2002, 137). In another instance, he cites a Portuguese engineer’s words — we are poor people with the mentality of rich [“somos um povo de pobres com mentalidade de ricos” (2009, 127)].

Lourenço’s psychoanalytic interest is indeed the Portuguese soul:

From the sumptuous hour remains the orientalist ship of Belém. From an occasional adventure remains the marble of Mafra, imported from Italy. But lasting imprints on the soul of those who «had» five hundred years of empire, nothing remains, or only the lasting fiction which The Lusiadas echoes, not as makeover of his soul, but simply as an ecstatic naming of lands and places that in reality, except Goa, we never inhabited as masters. (2009, 44–45; translation mine)14

12. Ronald W. Sousa says that, “in many senses he is that figure “the public intellectual” whose absence from the American scene is often lamented.” (2003, 13)
13. “E todavía, não estando já na África, nem na Europa, onde nunca seremos o que sonhámos, emigramos todos, coletivamente, para Timor. E lá que brilha, segundo a eterna ideologia nacional veiculada noite e dia pela televisão do Estado, o último raio do império que durante séculos nos deu a ilusão de estarmos no centro do mundo. E, se calhar, é verdade.” (Lourenço 2009, 11)
14. “Da hora sumptuosa ficou a barca orientalizante de Belém. De uma aventura de acaso o mármore de Mafra importado de Itália. Mas marcas duradouras na alma de quem «teve» quinhentos anos de império nada, ou só a ficção encarecente que Os Lusíadas eca, não como mudadora da sua alma, mas como simples nomenclatura extasiada de terras e lugares que na verdade, salvo Goa nunca habitámos como senhores delas.” (Lourenço 2009, 44–45)
Besides Sousa Santos and Lourenço, who present two atypical names in the (above mentioned) lopsided gamut of scholars engaging with Portuguese/Lusophone postcolonialism with disciplinary affiliations in humanities and literary studies, we could also include the anthropologists Ricardo Roque and Miguel Vale de Almeida.

Borrowing Joseph Schumpeter’s critical insight of an ideological form of ‘imperialism as atavism,’ Ricardo Roque explains that one purpose of his book — *Headhunting and Colonialism: Anthropology and the Circulation of Human Skulls in the Portuguese Empire, 1870-1930* (2010) is “to explain how precisely the Portuguese engagement with these ‘atavisms’ made colonialism possible” focusing on the period from 1875 to 1912–13 in Timor. According to him, in the late nineteenth century, the so-called ‘pacification’ campaigns led by the Portuguese against their indigenous enemies caused enormous devastation, hundreds of people were killed and beheaded by the Timorese warriors who fought alongside the Portuguese as auxiliary troops. For him, “this suggests that ‘colonialism’ and ‘headhunting’ could form a dynamic unity,” their interdependencies enabling “colonial power and indigenous cultures to *coexist and prosper in a reciprocally significant way*, even if their distinctiveness in some manner was retained,” characterizing “this form of entanglement as ‘mutual parasitism’” (5–7; italics added).
Let us take up some fleeting examples from literary studies, the home-turf of Portuguese/Lusophone postcolonialism to understand if it fares better than its other disciplinary counterparts in decolonializing Portuguese post–imperial scholarship. Emphasizing on what she is considering under the term post–colonial in the essay “Where is the post–colonial: In-betweenness, identity and ‘Lusophonia’ in transnational contexts” (2006b), Manuela Ribeiro Sanches states that it “does not elude the colonial past and the neo-colonial present according to Homi K. Bhabha and Stuart Hall, the same applying to the ensuing struggles against former metropolitan powers, as decentered as these may be” but that this “does not amount to deny the complex links, reciprocal influences that unite former colonizers and colonized for better or worse” (118; italics added).

The flurry of deconstructive psychoanalytic Lusophone literary readings cannot be missed. By no means exhaustive, these are some titles not to mention the ongoing seminars, conferences and a whole array of essays and articles that continue to be written and published — Fantasmas e Fantasias Imperiais no Imaginário Português Contemporâneo (2003) by Margarida Calafate Ribeiro et al., Uma História de Regressos, Império, Guerra Colonial e Pós-colonialismo (2004) by Margarida Calafate Ribeiro. It is worth recalling the uneasy engagements between postcolonial theory and psychoanalysis which scholars like Mrinalini Greedharry have already well delineated. According to her, some devastating cultural and personal manifestations and effects of colonialism are
not revealed through strictly economic and political accounts of colonialism (2008, 5–6).

Greedharry goes on to delineate how psychoanalysis is connected to the colony, through direct analysis (Bhabha, Fanon), psychoanalytic histories (Nandy), and material practices (Fanon, Deleuze and Guattari) or as in the case of Mannoni whose psychoanalytic interest is “the soul of the European colonizer rather than the trauma of the colonized” (2008, 10–11). “Mannoni’s failure to attend sufficiently to what Fanon calls the colonial *socius* is, for Fanon, symptomatic of the culture-specific, if not downright ethnocentric, properties of Western psychoanalysis as a whole” (quoted in Moore-Gilbert 1997, 144). Therefore, the privileging of psychoanalytic Lusophone postcolonial literary readings neatly divorced from social history needs to be problematized.15 In what manner do Lusophone postcolonial literary readings inform Portuguese imperial histories? Is this a *déjà-vu* of the agonistic vs. antagonistic war of positions witnessed in Anglophone postcolonialism? What is the dynamics of *the postcolonial exotic* (Huggan 2001) within the Lusophone post–colonial literary space? These are some of the questions to be explored in the following pages.

15. As McClintock calls it, the “disavowed relations between psychoanalysis and social history,” and how there prevails “the disciplinary quarantine of psychoanalysis from history” (1995, 8). Spivak puts it as, “the overtly imperialist politics of psychoanalysis.”(quoted in Moore-Gilbert 1997, 141)
Laura Cavalcante Padilha, a Brazilian literary critic, specializing in Angolan literature contrapuntally reads the canonical novel *A ilustre casa de Ramires* by Eça de Queiros as “we can problematise the sudden enrichment of Gonçalo, who, with the money picked from the African shilling and pence tree, transforms his metropolitan territoriality both physically and economically” (2009, 9). As this example suggests, it is debatable how such *contrapuntal readings* can subvert the metropolitan imperial Histories. Suffice to recall here how the *contrapuntal reading* of Jane Austen’s *Mansfield Park* (1814) has become a cult example which reads how “the Mansfield Park estate is sustained by Sir Thomas Bertram’s sugar plantations in Antigua — an island where slavery was practised till the 1830s” (Boehmer 2005, 25). Thus, privileging the material sphere contrapuntally may not necessarily lead to discursive subversion of colonial status quo.

After years of being a socio-political taboo in Portugal, the recent proliferation of literature on colonial wars and accompanying literary readings, cinema/ documentaries, *testemunhos* [like Isabela Figueiredo’s *Caderno de Memórias Coloniais* (2009)] and research projects like “Children of the Colonial Wars: postmemory and representations”¹⁶ give the impression that finally the melancholic repression of war memories is fading away. Though Isabel Ferreira Gould claims that Portugal is experiencing a boom in literary

production centered on the theme of colonization (Gould 2008, 183), Medeiros provides a rather judicious perspective. According to him:

The fact that more than three decades since decolonization all kinds of books have started appearing on the subject of the colonial war should not blind us to the fact that in the long years up to now, the work of trying to process the trauma of the war was left for the most part to a handful of novelists. The first initial critical studies of the situation were undertaken by literary scholars and indeed, even today, the crucial work of historians remains in large part to be done, just as a good number of the most recent publications, rather than reflecting on the war, may be said to show more a certain nostalgia for empire and a certain view of colonial Africa that disappeared along with childhood. (2008, 4)

Thus, a critical question arises — can the extent of desanitization in reading its decolonization history be symptomatic of how much Portuguese metropole has come to terms with its imperial History? It is out of scope here to answer this question in an intensive manner, for now suffice it to mention some examples by way of problematizing the displacement of Portuguese imperial memory in the representations and narratives of the Colonial Wars. Given the traumatic intricacies between the Colonial Wars and decolonization of Portuguese Africa, it would be worth briefly delineating the latter’s narrative.

### 4. Decolonializing Lusophone/Portuguese imperial memory

As Prasenjit Duara reflects, from a historian’s point of view decolonization was one of the most important political developments of the twentieth century because it turned the world into the stage of history (2004, 1). And Eurocentric representations of this groundbreaking development continue
to ensure no dull moment on this stage. So then, if decolonization is singularly considered as the formal end of colonialism, it relegates a myopic view of particular colonization histories. A case in point is Portuguese decolonization touted more for its deviance(s) and anachronism(s) not to mention mystified lusocentrism. A quintessential version of its story generally runs along these lines — one of the great ironies in the history of European colonialism is that the small country of Portugal established one of the first colonial empires and then retained its colonial possessions well after most other European nations had lost theirs (Benjamin 2007, 916).

“Decolonisation has now assumed various meanings in different contexts, from relatively traditional anticolonial militancy and secessionist nationalism, to quests for redistribution of land and economic benefits, and cultural recognition” (Aldrich et al. 1998, 9). The usage of the term decolonization has its own short but revealing history. It was coined in 1932 by a German scholar Moritz Julius Bonn but employed by him then in a different sense. In his book The Crumbling of Empire: The Disintegration of World Economy (1938) Bonn frequently used the term ‘counter-colonization’ as a synonym for decolonization (Rothermund 2006, 1). Further, as Prasenjit Duara notes, “the timing and patterns of decolonization were extremely varied, and the goals of the movement in different countries were not always consistent with each other” (2004, 1). In The Last Colonies Robert Aldrich and John Connell seek to examine “why the processes of decolonisation have proceeded to a certain
point, and no further” by exploring the apparent paradox within the diversity of
decolonization which is “the persistence of dependent overseas territories in a
world where nationalism, in various manifestations, is pervasive and where
independence is usually taken to be the endpoint of political evolution” (1998, 9). In other words, there is a need to appreciate the various decolonization
histories critically along with their specificities.

Though decolonization “is commonly understood to mean the process by
which the peoples of the Third World gained their independence from their
colonial rulers,” because of its sanitization of the history of ‘liberation struggles’
the term “has not altogether found favor with Asians and Africans because it can
be taken to imply that the initiatives for decolonization, as for colonization,
were taken by the metropolitan powers” (Chamberlain 1985, 1). Notwithstanding this problematic implication of denying agency to the
colonized, most of the politically nuanced decolonization discourses draw on
these explanations for European withdrawal from empire: (1) nationalist or
colonial; (2) international or global; (3) metropolitan or domestic (Springhall
2001, 2), as will be evident in the following case of Portugal.

Three mega-events are said to dominate the post–political decolonization
collective memory of Portugal: 1. the end of the colonial empire which brought
about the Revolution of the 25th of April; 2. the arrival of more than half a
million “retornados” (Portuguese born in the colonies and returning from the
former African colonies) and 3. Portugal joining the European Union in 1986. A lusocentric reading of the cataclysmic dimensions of these events continues to be rendered within Portuguese academia. In Cooper’s words, decolonization privileges “the process of ending colonial rule over anything else that was happening in those years” (Gregory et al. 2009, 146). To take an example, in *The Last Empire: Thirty Years of Portuguese Decolonization* (2003) edited by Stewart Lloyd-Jones and António Costa Pinto, Lawrence Graham is right in stating — “This short volume provides a unique overview of the Portuguese empire, decolonization, and today’s Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) world hitherto unavailable in a single, comprehensive volume” (in preface). But the opportunity to present a unique and comprehensive volume on this subject appears to be a truly lost one as the following discussion reveals.

Arnaldo M.A. Gonçalves, analyzing the decolonization process of Portugal’s ‘oriental’ colonies in comparison to that of Portuguese Africa, affirms —

The process of ‘decolonization’ of those territories that were integrated into Portugal’s eastern empire (Portuguese India, Macao and Timor) was, for temporal, geopolitical and international reasons, manifestly peculiar to this logic of pre-eminence and urgency . . . Only inertia, in some cases, and the obstinacy of the dictator in others can explain their contradictory, and in the end happy unravelling.

17. White observes that that the truer figure of the * retorna dos* would be around 700,000, “and that a substantial number of “returnees,” as many as one quarter of a million, were people of varied ethnic origins who had never before lived in Portugal.” (1999, 53)
18. Jorge M. Pedreira in “The Internationalization of Portuguese Historiography and its Discontents” states that studies “on Salazar’s dictatorship and the transition to democracy by António Costa Pinto and some younger researchers have befitted the agendas of international research networks.” (2003, 2)
Attributing the formal decolonization of the Portuguese eastern empire only to “inertia, in some cases, and the obstinacy of the dictator in others” (ibid.) is akin to mirror-imaging J.R. Seeley’s infamous enunciation regarding colonization that the British “seemed to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind” (quoted in Hall et al. 2006, 2). In the case of Goa it shortchanges the anticolonial struggles during the long course of Portuguese rule. Gonçalves continues with his analysis — “in the global decolonization process, Goa, Macao and Timor were largely of secondary importance” and “none of the eastern territories were at war; there were no local liberation movements opposed to Portuguese rule . . . they were not appetising morsels for the competing superpowers . . .” (2003, 55; emphases added).

The following pages intend to extrapolate the displacements of memory in the case of Lusophone/Portuguese Postcolonial discourses. Can we identify here a similar remorse as in the case of France, that Bruckner claims is beset with an alleged “mal français” (French disease) — a unique combination of arrogance and self-hatred (quoted in Moura 2008, 269). In Portugal’s case, the specificity of its imperial past is highjacked into exceptionalism packaged in neo-lusotropicalist avatars. Lusophone/Portuguese Postcolonial Studies, a nascent discursive field, in provincializing Anglophone centered Postcolonial Theory (different from Postcolonial criticism) appears to have fallen in the trap of reinscribing Portuguese colonial exceptionalism. The agenda of decentering
Anglophone centered Postcolonial Theory, rather provides a discursive garb to manifest neo-lusotropicalism.

With one of the longest European imperial history, discourses on Portuguese national identity and its colonial past have indulged in mystification about the trauma caused by the loss of empire, especially the prolonged colonial wars. Therefore most of the post-colonial discourses within Portuguese scholarship still continue to be on this metrocentric line. Freyre’s lusotropicalist discourse has given way to neo-lusotropicalism, but the fundamentals remain the same — a paternalistic approach to colonial history with appeasing undertones that we were really not so bad colonialists. The Colonial Act (Acto colonial) of 1930 introduced by the fascist regime in Portugal had re-designated the Portuguese ‘provinces’ as colonies, but in 1951, under the growing international pressure for decolonization it renamed them as Overseas Provinces of Portugal. In November 1951, during a conference at the Instituto Vasco da Gama in Goa, the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre used the expression luso-tropicalismo (lusotropicalism) for the first time (derived from his study—Casa-grande e senzala (The masters and the slaves 1933), which later on found great favor with the Salazar regime in order to lend weight to the rhetoric of the Portuguese Empire being one large family.

Celebrating interracial mixing and cultural hybridity, “the Portuguese were described as a quintessentially hybrid people” which “predisposed them to adapt more readily to the various tropical civilizations into which they came
into contact, particularly in Brazil, but also in Africa and Asia, and to racially mix with ‘native others’” (Arenas 2003, 7). As Arenas concludes:

Thus, we observe the deployment of an anthropologically informed consciousness with strong sexual and racial components that had specific geopolitical consequences because it concluded that Portuguese colonialism was “unique” and “distinct” (read “better”) in relationship to other colonialisms. (ibid.)

For Madureira, “Lusotropicalism was to provide a ready-made and potent legitimation for an anachronistic (or “parasitic”) colonial exploitation. To represent Portuguese colonialism as a sexual conquest of the tropics was to conceal Portugal’s semiperipheral status” (1994, 164). The lusotropicalist trope continues in its modern avatars. Commenting on its contemporary garb, Madureira states, “Portugal’s ‘backwardness’ in relation to the rest of Europe is therefore presented as precisely the condition enabling the syncretic integration of its ‘civilizational complex’ in the tropics” (2006, 144). This neo–lusotropicalist approach, as the present work goes on to elaborate, continues to shape the geo-political and cultural imaginations of the Portuguese scholars, thus eliding the amnesia towards imperial History.

19. For Deventer et al., “Lusotropicalism compares Portuguese colonialism favorably to other colonialisms by positing it as a soft, natural form of cultural and racial mingling that spread as Portuguese explorers married and procreated with indigenous women. The dictator António Salazar drew on this myth of Portuguese exceptionalism in his efforts to justify ongoing imperial rule by claiming that the colonies formed part of one multi-continental and “pluriracial” Portuguese nation.” (2011, 348)
20. For Deventer et al., “Today Lusotropicalism lingers in the Portuguese imaginary in the form of a reluctance to acknowledge the brutality and the long-lasting consequences of its colonial enterprise.” (2011, 348)
Amnesiac approach to the post/colonial socio-political traumatic events is not exclusive to Portugal. In general, as Leela Gandhi rightly suggests, the “self-willed historical amnesia” needs to be countered for “the colonial aftermath calls for an ameliorative and therapeutic theory which is responsive to the task of remembering and recalling the colonial past” (1998, 7–8). Recalling here the Spanish example, its transition to democracy after 1975, according to Jorgé Semprun, was made with “a collective and willed amnesia.” For instance, on the fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, Felipe González (the Prime minister) stated that the civil war was “finally history” “no longer present and alive in the reality of the country” (quoted in Ash 2004, 267). In Portugal’s case, it has not yet reckoned with the loss of the colonies. Landeg White draws the analogy of Portugal’s departure as mass deportation, which presented an entirely different psychological experience and thus bequeaths “the illusion that history has somehow gone wrong and requires correction” (1999, 54).

In the revealingly titled essay, “Geo-politics and the representation of Portugal’s African colonial wars: examining the limits of ‘Vietnam syndrome’ ” (2001), Marcus Power examines a series of 50 collectable supplements and five accompanying videos produced by the national daily newspaper “Diário de Notícias” in 1998 and collectively entitled “Guerra Colonial.” For Power, “Guerra Colonial” “represents an interesting form of ‘popular geo-politics,’ (re)scripting the various political processes and events of colonial conflict from
a particular perspective” which he considers “as one recent, high profile example of the post–colonial resonance of the wars, and for the partial histories of its geo-politics” (2001, 461–489). The essay seeks to “develop a critical and inclusive history of the Portuguese involvement with the colonial war” focusing “on some of the neglected dimensions of conflict: the tediousness and psychological fear; contradictory relations and criminal activities; the horror and the suffering” (ibid.). Thus, according to him, Guerra Colonial epitomizes “the limitations, confusion and uncertainty that engulfs this complex politics of post–colonial representation” offering “a ‘testimonial and therapeutic literature’ of a kind, seeking to cleanse and purge the national imagination of these difficult and troubling war memories” (ibid.).

The privileging of certain authors like Lídia Jorge, Mia Couto, José Eduardo Agualusa raises critical doubts about the canonizing of Lusophone postcolonial literary studies in terms of relegating the revisiting of 500 years of Portuguese imperial memory to selective texts and authors engaging with Portuguese-African colonies and the colonial wars. Arenas points to the fact that Africa has been merely “an object of representation in contemporary Portuguese literature and cinema (more consistently so in Portuguese novels) since the April Revolution of 1974” and that “scant attention has been given to the presence of Africans and their descendents in Portugal within Portuguese literature” with the exception of Lídia Jorge’s O vento assobiando nas ruas (2002) [The Wind Blowing Against the Cranes] (2008, 11). As a literary critic
of African literature, Inocêncio Mata also wonders why certain African writers who are not so much read in the countries of their origin have a wide readership abroad, as in the case of Portugal (quoted in Sanches 2006a, 287; translation mine). The privileging of these authors can be read in the broader debate about the geo-cultural and historical dynamics between the ‘new’ literatures and the metropolitan literary canon. The term Lusophone Postcolonialism thus needs to be decolonialized by bringing into (r)iction the afrocentered and metrocentric nature of the so-called Lusophone postcolonial literary readings. Murdoch and Donadey explain a postcolonial reading as “a reinterpretation of literature and history that [accounts] for the colonial experience while insisting on its centrality” (quoted in Turner 2011). Scholars undertaking Lusophone postcolonial literary readings mainly within Portuguese academia have focused specifically on colonial war literature.

In the essay titled “Decanting the Past: Africa, Colonialism, and the New Portuguese Novel,” (2008) Isabel Ferreira Gould examines four novels by influential contemporary writers which “give new expression to the colonial contexts that shaped the representation, the perspectives, and the endeavours of

21. “Por exemplo, uma dessas questões que, como crítica literária (das literaturas africanas), sempre me ocuparam é a seguinte: por que razão alguns escritores africanos, sendo pouco lidos nos seus países de origem, têm um círculo de leitores tão alargado fora - no caso, Portugal?” (quoted in Sanches 2006a, 287). In this regards, a possible exception in cinema could be Pedro Costa.
23. Lisbon is also the primary publishing center for Lusophone African literature (as much as Paris is for Francophone writers) and authors such as Mia Couto, Pepetela, and José Eduardo Agualusa have become a fixture in the realm of Portuguese lettered culture and their books are often on best seller lists. (Arenas 2008, 11)
Portuguese colonists in Africa” (184). She traces “key thematic concerns of these recent accounts in order to investigate how the intimate, affective, and filial dimensions of colonial experience inform interpretations of contemporary Portugal” (ibid.). Using the term décantation to refer both to the process of filtering and settling memories of the past and to the space of the colony as a site for revisions of identity, she contends that “these fictional texts evoke colonial Portugal neither to celebrate the past nor to purge the nation's colonial memories” (ibid.). Further, she argues “that with its focus on the last empire this literary generation [Maria Isabel Barreno, Antonio Lobo Antunes, Miguel Sousa Tavares, Eduardo Bettencourt Pinto] is opening up a space for décantation through which Portuguese identity is re-examined,” its imperial past being decanted mostly through narratives of memory (ibid.).

According to Gould, the literature of the 1970s and 1980s, for the most part opposed the literary depictions propagated by the Estado Novo, attesting “to the transformation in the nation’s political life and imperial mentality as a result of the fall of the dictatorship and the subsequent processes of rapid decolonization and Democratization” exemplified by authors — including Manuel Alegre, António Lobo Antunes, Carlos Vale Ferraz, José Martins Garcia, Lídia Jorge, João de Melo, Álamo Oliveira, and Wanda Ramos — who
wrote extensively on the 1961–1974 colonial wars, denouncing the violence of war and investing in the catharsis of memory (ibid., 183–84).24

Beginning with the novels of the 1990s, authors have shifted their attention to the long presence of the Portuguese in the colonies and its aftermath “to the identity and worldview of colonizers (and especially the viewpoint of those born and raised overseas), to the issue of belonging to Africa, and to the disintegration of Portuguese colonial families at the end of empire” (ibid., 183). Gould rues that critics in Portuguese literary studies have not duly delineated the reasons behind this shift in novelistic focus from colonial wars to long-term colonial presence and the implications of the same (ibid.). In the seventeen years from 1990 through 2007, established authors such as António Lobo Antunes, Helder Macedo, etc. and more recently acclaimed ones such as Eduardo Bettencourt Pinto, Tiago Rebelo, Miguel Sousa Tavares, etc. as have all published major works on Portugal’s imperial projects in Africa, with each focusing in their own different and textually specific ways “not only on the nation’s difficult reconciliation with its colonial past, but also on how the colonial experience is situated at present in the national memory” (ibid., 183–184).

The following pages will attempt to decolonize the memorializing of Portuguese imperialism by bringing the history of Goan anticolonial resistances

to the fore. Portuguese empire’s paradox — “On April 25 1974, Portugal was the least developed country in Europe and at the same time the sole possessor of the largest and longest-lasting European colonial empire” (Sousa Santos 1992, 105) elides the resistant agency of the colonized and concomitant repression and violence by the colonizer. It would be worth recalling here the Portuguese geographer Orlando Ribeiro’s report published as *Goa em 1956* (1999). Ribeiro had visited Goa under the patronage of the fascist regime, just few years prior to 1961 and narrates his observations of “the influence of four and a half centuries of history of the Portuguese action” (Ribeiro 1999, 61–62; italics mine translation). Not intending to exaggerate the incredulity of the timing of Ribeiro’s visit, it is worth mentioning Geoffrey Barraclough’s estimation that between 1945 and 1960, no less than forty countries with a population of 800 millions — more than a quarter of the world’s inhabitants — revolted against colonialism and won their independence (quoted in Duara 2004, 118). Thus, Ribeiro’s report would help to foreground the Goan anticolonial agency given the transhistorical background of his study tour and also the need to consider colonialism and decolonization as dialogically constitutive processes and not just privilege the political decolonization as the end of colonial History.

Orlando Ribeiro narrates his study-assessment of the influence of four and a half centuries of Portuguese colonization, after having spent five months

25. Era de esperar que este trabalho . . . mostrasse a que profundidade chegara a acção portuguesa através de quatro séculos e meio de história. (Ribeiro 1999, 61–62)
in Goa from October 1955 until February 1956, visiting both the New and Old conquests. Contrary to the sweeping air of political decolonization, he hopes that his report would serve the Government of his country to understand the specific problems related to the colonization of Goa and enable it to take corrective actions (1999, 65). A brief historical background of his visit to Goa would help further to examine this text critically. The Colonial Act (Acto colonial) of 1930 introduced by the fascist regime in Portugal had re-designated the Portuguese ‘provinces’ as colonies, but in 1951, under the growing international pressure for decolonization it renamed them as Overseas Provinces of Portugal. Ribeiro also refers to the Portuguese equivalent of Overseas — Ultramar (1999, 75). As mentioned earlier, in November 1951 during a conference at the Instituto Vasco da Gama in Goa the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre had used the expression *luso-tropicalismo* for the first time which later on had found great favor with the Salazar regime in order to lend weight to the rhetoric of the Portuguese Empire being one large family. Thus, Ribeiro’s visit to various Portuguese colonies was intended to provide more empirical evidence to this “kith and kin” propaganda (phrase borrowed from Hall et al., 2006, 26). 26

The Portuguese geographer’s optimism regarding the utility of the report poignantly points to his *situatedness* vis-à-vis his apparently objective stand

26. Salazar’s rhetoric of the Empire being one big family was not exclusive to Portuguese colonialism. As James Epstein points out in the context of British Empire, “during the later Victorian period, the Empire was often imagined metaphorically as a family, with Queen Victoria (empress of India) as its mother.” (quoted in Hall et al. 2006, 271)
and his high reputation as a geography scholar. Ribeiro’s observations cannot be read as uninformed by Portugal’s anti-decolonization stand during the 50s and the 60s decades.27 As Ribeiro asks — “At a utilitarian and realistic time, what is the use of us being linked to Goa for more than half of our history as an independent nation? If other powerful countries and with bigger international responsibilities were obliged to abandon unsustainable locations, why does Portugal insist in over doing them?” (1999, 66; translation mine).28

And not surprisingly, he invokes Portugal’s historical destiny as the first European country to set foot in Asia and so it should be the last to leave.29 Needless to add, this is in contradiction to the Fanonian spirit of decolonization epitomized in these words — “The last shall be first and the first last” (Fanon 2004, xxix). Elaborating his competence Ribeiro states that he well knew all the adjoining Islands and had written a book on Madeira, also having visited all the Portuguese territories in Africa except Mozambique and had intensively studied Guinea and some Islands of Cape Verde, had travelled for almost four months learning something about the Muslim world, already having learnt from

27. As Alastair Pennycook observes, “however well-intentioned missionaries, colonial officers and the like may have been, their intentions cannot be removed either from the effects of their actions or from the ideologies within which they are constructed.” (1998, 41)
28. “Numa época utilitária e realista, que vale o facto de termos ligado à terra de Goa pouco mais de metade da nossa história como nação independente? Se outros países mais ponderosas e de maiores responsabilidades internacionais foram constrangidos a abandonar posições insustentáveis, por que teima Portugal em fazer mais do que eles?” (Ribeiro 1999, 66)
29. In another context, Ribeiro says “e dada a originalidade da nossa expansão no mundo . . . Portugal foi o primeiro país europeu a pôr os pés na Ásia . . . seja o último a sair (Ribeiro 1999, 66-72). Translated as “and given the originality of our expansion in the world . . . Portugal was the first European country to put foot in Asia . . . be the last to leave.
Arabic studies during his youth and through travels to Morocco, Egypt and West Africa (1999, 64; translation mine). He concludes his assessment of the extent of Portuguese colonization in Goa in the following words:

[Goa] appeared to me as the least Portuguese territory of all those I had seen so far, even less Portuguese than Guinea that was pacified in 1912! The general ignorance of our language, the persistence of a society that is alienated and indifferent, if not hostile to our influence, closed as a cyst on the resurgent Hinduism, all this made me look at Goa with great disappointment. (1999, 64–65; italics in original and translation mine)

Self-defeating his apparently objective observation of the influence of four and a half centuries of Portuguese colonization, Ribeiro observes — these people; even the Christians do not give up their racial pride (judging themselves to be superior to the Whites), or their caste prejudices . . . (1999, 126; translation mine).

In the essay “Portuguese Impact Upon Goa: Lusotopic Lusophonic Lusophilic” (2007), Teotónio R. de Souza writes — “Orlando Ribeiro’s academic credibility and relatively high degree of impartiality and critical

30. In Ribeiro’s own words:

Conhecendo razoavelmente todas as Ilhas Adjacentes e tendo escrito um livrinho sobre a Madeira, havendo visitado todos os territórios portugueses da África, excepto Moçambique, e estudado com profundidade a Guiné e algumas ilhas de Cabo Verde, tendo viajado quase quatro meses sabendo alguma coisa do mundo muçulmano, já pelos estudos árabes da minha juventude já por viagens em Marrocos, no Egipto e na África Ocidental, possuía assim uma perspectiva ampla ao iniciar as investigações na província de Goa. (Ribeiro 1999, 64)

31. “Esta apareceu aos meus olhos como a terra menos portuguesa de todos as que vira até então, menos portuguesa do que a Guiné, pacificada em 1912! O desconhecimento geral da nossa língua, a persistência de uma sociedade estranha e indiferente, quando não hostil, à nossa influência, encerrada como um quisto no flanco do hinduísmo renascente, fizeram-me olhar Goa com uma grande decepção.” (Ribeiro 1999, 64–65)

32. “esta gente, mesmo quando cristã, não se desprende do seu orgulho de raça (julgam-se superiores aos brancos), dos seus preconceitos de casta . . .” (Ribeiro 1999, 26)
perspective makes his observations about the *lusotopic, lusophonic and lusophilic* impact of the Portuguese in Goa of special significance” (236; italics in original). The overall sense of negativity in the above observation implies that the Goans have grossly missed the benefits of Portuguese colonialism by being in his opinion the territory with least Portuguese influence. The above words indirectly portray that the Portuguese colonial rule could have been beneficial for the Goans as it was in the case of Guinea, barely subjected forty-four years ago. Guinea is counterpoised concurrently here to exemplify it as a model for what Goa isn’t but should have been after nearly 445 years — a colony with at least discernible Portuguese influence. Stating the obvious, Ribeiro is disappointed because he had expected to see or find an immensely Portuguese acculturated Goa after 445 years of colonialism.

The Portuguese geographer tends to lay the maximum blame on the Goans for being incapable of reaping the benefits of the Portuguese contact. He even goes so far as to demean their sense of racial pride (1999, 126). Ribeiro is keen to lament the *different and rebellious* response given by the Goans to Portuguese colonization. It is no hidden fact that the Portuguese language never managed to replace the popular *lingua franca* Konkani in Goa and what scarce Portuguese colonial cultural legacy is apparent has been attributed more as “christianotopia romana” rather than “lusotopia” (de Souza 1997, 379). Or as Cardinal Gracias observed — “as far as the Catholics of Goa are concerned, their culture is not Portuguese but Christian” (quoted in Priolkar 1967, 40).
Unwilling to acknowledge the Goan resistance to linguistic colonization, the geographer remarks:

Definitely the local clergy endowed with a lot of influence did a lot to conserve the Konkani language and obstructed the spread of Portuguese. Contrary to the African missions which served as centres to spread our language, the Church here had a great role in the creation and maintenance of a Goan sentiment. And with deplorable results . . . (1999, 81; translation mine)33

A decisively marked feature of this Goan sentiment is a rich intermingling of various cultures that Ribeiro does not even shy away from appropriating. In what can be clearly read as a classic example of the imperial conceit of the white man’s burden he goes on:

However, the Christian Goans, in the mando songs or in the theater, entreat the protection of San Francisco Xavier but do not have a word of affection or gratefulness for those who came here to defend the integrity of their territory, the peace of their homes and the free exercise of their beliefs. They are not grateful. We will have to give a lot, but not hope to receive much in return . . . (1999, 132; translation mine)34

The Goan’s long resilience to divisive politics on religious grounds is unabashedly taken advantage of in order to cover-up the violence meted out during forced conversion and the cruelties of Inquisition (Ribeiro 1999, 101–102).

33. “Certamente que o clero local, dotado de grande influência, fez muito pela conservação do concanim e obstou à divulgação do português. Ao contrário das missões africanas, centros de difusão da nossa língua, a Igreja teve aqui largo papel na criação e manutenção de um sentimento goês. Com deploráveis consequências . . .” (Ribeiro 81, 1999)
34. “No entanto, os goês cristãos, nos mandós (canções) ou no teatro, entregam-se à protecção de São Francisco Xavier mas não têm uma palavra de simpatia ou de agradecimento por aqueles que aqui vieram defender a integridade do seu território, o sossego dos seus lares e o livre exercício das suas crenças. A gratidão não é o seu forte. Teremos de dar muito, contando receber bem pouco . . . ” (132, 1999)
Another text worth examining briefly here is \textit{Uma Viagem à Índia} (2010) by the Portuguese writer Gonçalo M. Tavares. The fiction, which won many literary awards and its translations in various languages are underway, is touted to be a contemporary rewriting of the celebrated \textit{Os Lusíadas} while also being loosely modelled on it. Readers familiar with the Camonian epic will not fail to draw parallels and comparisons.\textsuperscript{35} Needless to add that the epic \textit{Lusiadas} by Luís Vaz de Camões (1524–1580) narrates the genesis of the Portuguese empire during the sixteenth century and is still a literary cult text in Portugal. In \textit{Uma Viagem à Índia} the protagonist Harold Bloom undertakes a journey from Lisbon to India with stopovers in Paris, Prague and London. The well-known Portuguese essayist and scholar Eduardo Lourenço, eulogising the fiction in the preface says — “This repetition of the initial journey of the West, having \textit{Lusíadas} as its «model»-, is an original revisit of the cultural and literary mythology of the same West . . . (2010, 13).\textsuperscript{36} This literary sojourn to India underlines its self-furnished tagline: you do not arrive in India, you experience it (2010, 302), an opinion also shared by Lourenço (2010, 19). Is this then a fictional remapping of Vasco da Gama’s ‘discovery’ voyage in terms of a modern cartography with a neo–orientalist vision and hence its literary appeal?

\textsuperscript{35} Including some International awards, \textit{Uma Viagem à Índia} won GRANDE PRÊMIO de ROMANCE E NOVELA da Associação Portuguesa de Autores, 2011, Prémio Melhor narrativa Ficcional 2010 da Sociedade Portuguesa de Autores amongst other awards in Portugal.

\textsuperscript{36} “Esta repetição da viagem iniciática do Ocidente, tendo como «modelo» a dos \textit{Lusíadas}, é uma original revisitação da mitologia cultural e literária do mesmo Ocidente . . .” (quoted in Tavares 2010, 13)
Neo–orientalism is understood here in a reductive sense as a continuation of orientalism with the earlier colonialist motifs being revitalized to cater to contemporary readers. The neo–element in a neo–orientalist motif remains diffused to make any clear distinction between orientalist and neo–orientalist stereotype quite redundant. In *Uma Viagem à Índia* the orientalist stereotype of beggars in India is reworked thus:

The tourist who promises dinner to a beggar and if he forgets if he were to return twenty years later, he would find the same beggar in the same place awaiting the dinner. And it all would be tragic, useless and insubstantial, if strangely the beggar, did not remain with the same face and the same age as twenty years back. (Tavares 2010, 297; translation mine)³⁷

The exaggerated time period of twenty years can be accounted for by invoking what Debbie Lisle identifies as the tension between colonial and cosmopolitan visions. For her, the wider debates of global politics within contemporary travel writing structure a tension between colonial and cosmopolitan visions . . . the complex relationship between these two visions exist as “sometimes antagonistic, sometimes symbiotic, and sometimes ambiguous” (2006, 5). Thus the tension between colonial and cosmopolitan visions in this literary travel appears to be released via this exaggerated time period of twenty years during

---

³⁷. O turista que prometa um jantar a um mendigo e se esqueça, se regressar vinte anos depois, encontrará no mesmo sítio o mesmo mendigo à espera do jantar. E tudo seria trágico, inútil e material, se esse mendigo, estranhamente, não permancesse com a mesma cara e a mesma idade de há vinte anos. (Tavares 2010, 297)
which a beggar in India would keep awaiting a promised dinner. James Clifford well puts it, “travels and contacts are crucial sites for an unfinished modernity” (quoted in Hoeveler et al. 2006, 2), as the quote below from Tavares’s fiction once again reiterates this point. The protagonist Bloom stays with an Indian friend named Anish, who shows him around. The trite orientalist motifs — Ganges (it is a biography in liquid; it is the most important library of the city and the most important archive (2010, 302; translation mine), stray animals (the solitary animals at times have the most sacred gait than the whole crowd (ibid.) etc. are invoked:

Because one does not arrive in India, my dear, in India one travels. You will find uncomfortable lodging that will oblige you to wake up early . . .

And [India is this: a country that moves because you in it move. For if you remain standing, the ceiling will fall on you. The weight of the Gods on every roof is too much. And it is only in the open air that the gods are lightweight. (2010, 302)  

38. O Ganges é a biografia, em líquido; O rio Ganges é a mais importante biblioteca da cidade e o mais importante arquivo. (Tavares 2010, 302)  
39. . . . os animais solitários têm por vezes movimentos mais sagrados que uma multidão enorme. (Tavares 2010, 302)  
40. Porque à Índia não se chega, meu caro, na Índia caminha-se. Encontrarás hospedagens desconfortáveis que te obrigarão a levantar mais cedo . . .
The neo/orientalist motifs and approaches in *Uma Viagem à Índia* are symptomatic of its wide acclaim in Portugal especially for its rewriting of the famous Camões epic. Its literary success raises certain questions, not least of which is how to read it as narrating a modern version of the Portuguese voyage to India with a neo/orientalist imagery that seems surreptitiously recycled from colonialist travel writing to India? What dis/avowals, especially given the historical specificity of political decolonization of Goa, can be read from its neorientalist appeal for Portuguese readers? “Decolonisation calls for a fundamental change of outlook and attitude, of heart and mind as the phrase, ‘bush clearing’ implies” (Betts 1998, 83).

Power rightly affirms that “the process of representing Portugal’s departure itself ever really been decolonised” (2001, 489). Johannes Fabian well explicates the phrase “forgetting africa” as a performative contradiction that is pronouncing the phrase negates what it seems to state. As he says, “the idea is apparently convincing enough (rhetorically rather than logically) to make us feel that forgetting Africa is a “problem” that needs to be addressed” (2007, 65). In the Portuguese case, “forgetting africa” is a critical phrase especially due to the colonial wars which brought democracy to Portugal. As Power concludes,
“Portugal is still haunted by the ghosts of that past, it’s ‘Vietnam shadows’ and the anxieties and traumas of a humiliating defeat” (Power 2001, 489).

From the brief examples, it is apparent that the Lusophone postcolonial literary studies boom is complicit in Lusophone postcoloniality and displacement of imperial memory as has been presented in the case Italophone and Francophone is equally relevant in the present case of Lusophone. But why is the present partisanship of Lusophone postcolonial discourses towards colonial war narratives and the consequent national events in Portugal only complicit with Lusophone postcoloniality? Why are the ex-asian colonies not part of this so-called revisionary imperial History in the metropolitan academia? What could possibly explain the exclusivism of colonial narratives of Goa, Damão, Diu, Macao, East Timor (and even to a certain extent of Brazil) in the present Lusophone postcolonial discourses within Portuguese academia?

5. Spectre of Goa

Can the conspicuous absence of former Asian-Portuguese colonies be reckoned in terms of imperial nostalgia that visits the object only in the desire(d) remembered register as we saw in the earlier discourses of Lourenço, and will see more examples in the next chapter. Cristiana Bastos introducing Parts of Asia, Today: Beyond Lusotopic Nostalgia affirms:

We took the risk of mentioning the former Asian-Portuguese, or Pacific-Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Macau, and East Timor as a starting point.
Until recently, this alone would have generated a flood of colonial nostalgia, anti-colonial manifestos, lusotropical orientalism, or lusotopic post-imperial narcissism — when we only wanted research articles and essays. But times have changed. (2010, 13)

Or is it a quintessential case imperial amnesia? In “Colonial Aphasia: Race and Disabled Histories in France” (2011), Ann Laura Stoler argues that forgetting and amnesia are misleading terms to describe the guarded separation between modern France and its colonial History and the procedures that produced it. According to her, the issue is not about “stubborn ignorance nor sudden knowledge,” but rather about “the confused and clogged spaces in between” (122) on which the premise of what she proposes as colonial aphasia rests. For Stoler, aphasia, is perhaps a more appropriate term as compared to colonial amnesia or historical amnesia because it “captures not only the nature of that blockage but also the feature of loss,” thus emphasizing “both loss of access and active dissociation” (ibid., 125).

It is argued here that the conspicuous silence on colonial narratives of Goa, Damão, Diu, Macao, East Timor within Portuguese academia can be explained as, to borrow Stoler’s term, aphasic afflictions (2011, 122). The colonial history and especially the political decolonization process of these colonies invoke aph-asia (the hyphen is deliberate) — a dismembering, and a difficulty in rendering their histories in an adequate vocabulary. For example,

41. According to Stoler, “Gérard Noiriel once used the phrase ‘collective amnesia’ to refer to the studied absence of immigration from French historiography and school curriculums. Similarly, ‘colonial amnesia’ and ‘historical amnesia’ are often used pointedly to describe the public and historiographical low profile of colonial history in France.” (2011, 124)
Calafate Ribeiro proposes the term “the empire as imagination of the centre” (inspired from Sousa Santos’s *semiperipheral* discourse) which she argues that “even when it is applied to the imaginary of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, inevitably *echoes* the whole imperial experience of India, Brazil and the oceans that had to be crossed” (2002, 136; italics added). Such an enunciation cannot be critically appreciated in terms of ahistoricity or aspecificity.

Sousa Santos chooses to designate *Postcolonialism in the time-space of official Portuguese language* (2002) to render his discourses on Portuguese post–colonialism, a circumscription that cannot be dismissed as symptomatic solely of linguistic neo–colonialism, an argument that will be critically delineated in the next chapter. Suffice it here to note that the Portuguese sociologist argues that in *the space of official Portuguese language*, the decolonization processes are part of our political actuality as compared to other spaces in which colonialism as a social relation dominates postcolonial studies (2010, 240). The Lusophone circumscription of the geopolitical space of Portuguese colonialism and its complicity with Sousa Santos’s reading of the Portuguese decolonization History of the ex–Asian colonies lead to a preliminary observation (argued in detail in the following chapter) that in the sociologist’s discourses these histories are ‘disabled’ and “shorn of the capacity to make connections” (Stoler 2011, 122) with the Portuguese social memory.

The earlier mentioned *haermorrhaged* History of the Portuguese colonial wars can be denoted in terms of Portuguese Africa’s ‘Vietnam shadows.’ But
the humiliating defeat was not limited to the African colonial wars. Salazar’s infamous obstinacy not to concede to the sovereignty of Goa, Damão, and Diu has been rightly interpreted as an underside of the dictator’s rhetoric of Portuguese Empire being one large family. This rhetoric elided the transversal and rhizomatic networks of the various colonies and the potential for “transcolonial solidarities” (Lionnet and Shih 2005, 22). As Fernandes informs, on the occasion of the Belgrade Conference, in September 1961, the African leaders maintained that the events in Goa would affect and pave way for the African revolution, thus, highlighting the axiomatic dimensions of the liberation of Goa for other colonised countries of Africa and Asia (2000, 345). Not surprisingly, the Portuguese empire’s collapse in Africa was delicately tethered with Goa’s independence as an anti–colonial ‘domino effect.’

In Fanon’s words “in spite of all that colonialism can do, its frontiers remain open to new ideas and echoes from the world outside” (2004, 70). Indeed, the colonized assert their agency against colonial dominance and hegemony across imposed borders and frontiers. Salazar’s fear that if he accepted Indian sovereignty over Goa, Damão, and Diu, he would lose legitimacy to defend Portuguese sovereignty over the other overseas territories (quoted in Pinto 1998, 82)42 disavows the multidirectionality of anticolonialism.

42. In December, India, rejecting Portuguese sovereignty over Goa, and impatient with years of futile attempts to negotiate with Portugal, occupied the enclave by force. Asians and Africans viewed the move as a long overdue elimination of an imperial remnant. They considered the use of violence justifies by Portugal’s intransigence in clinging to its colonial possessions. (Minter 1972, 93 )
Even after the political decolonization of Goa, the *spectre* of Goa continued as Dieter Rothermund recounts how the most lasting effect of the liberation of Goa was on the Portuguese military leadership:

> From now on they were haunted by the spectre of Goa, a premonition of inevitable defeat. As mentioned earlier, General Spinola was deeply influenced by this thought. The course of events which led to the Portuguese revolution of 1974 started in Goa in 1961, but in a more immediate way it started in Guinea-Bissau in 1963 when the nationalists led by Amilcar Cabral managed to liberate large parts of this colony. (2006, 228)

The preceding quote well underlines how the decolonization History of Portuguese-Africa needs to be read backwards to the events in 1961. Norrie MacQueen also echoes similar words — the *spectre* of Goa continued to haunt the consciousness of the Portuguese military throughout the period of the African wars and “the humiliation of defeat in the field by a non–European power has been immensely aggravated in the armed forces by Salazar’s attempt to offer up the military as scapegoat for national dishonor” (1997, 207). It is not surprising, for the historian, that the apprehension of a similar political *betrayal* found new expression in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly in Guinea-Bissau (ibid.). The metropolitan imperial narrative continues to whitewash this historical imbrication of the decolonization processes.

The following parts explore how this *spectre* of Goa is construed as “colonial aphasia” (Stoler 2011), a political disorder and a troubled psychic space manifested in the present partisanship of Lusophone postcolonial
discourses towards colonial war narratives and the consequent national events in Portugal. Robin Pickering-Iazzi while supporting the repatriation of the Axum obelisk from the Piazza Porta Capena in Rome (inaugurated in 1937 as a symbol of fascist Italy’s victory and the foundation of the new colonial empire) to Ethiopia, also draws attention to the two dilemmatic consequences of such a move — “one the one hand, then, the manipulation of the visual culture in Piazza Capena performs an epistemological reorganization that unburdens Italians of a daily reminder of fascist imperial conquest; on the other hand, the ‘empty space’ may invite a form of colonial nostalgia for lost ‘possessions’ ” (2003, 199). Such a politics of discursive disappearance can be transposed in the case of former Portuguese-Asian colonies. Drawing on Pickering-Iazzi, Triulzi points out, the “postcolonial politics of disappearance” designed “to erase memories of injustice and aggression” from a troubled past constitutes displacing the colonial event (2006, 432). This “postcolonial politics of disappearance” can help to address the spectre of Goa that lags in an “ambiguous distancing and closing-up” (ibid.) within Portuguese scholarship.

The present chapter proposes *Goa syndrome* to “unravel some of the folds” (Stoler 2011, 139) of Portuguese imperial hi-story. *Goa syndrome* is a hetero-characterization of the “aphasic afflictions” (ibid., 122) with regards to colonial narratives of Goa, Damão, Diu, Macao, East Timor within Portuguese academia. It engages with the disremembering that alternates with imperial nostalgia about the Portuguese-asian imperial histories, thus, reckoning the
“countermnemonic innocence” (Radhakrishnan 1996, 56) within the folds of metropolitan History. The proposed term challenges the *memoropolitics* (Crews 1995) of imperial History as evidenced in the argument of the Portuguese sociologist — in the space of official Portuguese language the decolonization processes are part of our political actuality (Sousa Santos 2010, 240). Notwithstanding the valence of his argument, in what manner do Portuguese scholars engage in decolonializing the imperial Histories, and the decolonization narratives with regards to Asian colonies? If decolonization processes are part of Portuguese political actuality, why is the socio-politics of immigration and racism met with such an estranged approach and eluded in neo–lusotropicalism?

The *aphasic afflictions* (Stoler 2011, 122) could be attributed to the stadial approach to Portuguese imperial History with its three distinct imperial cycles (Goa–Brazil–Africa) which obliterate a comprehensive view of the empire. Further, the presence of an influential corpus of literary history indulging in substitutionary readings of the imperial cycles reinforces imperial lusocentrism as the following example reveals:

Thus an indecipherable paradox can be explained. How could a decadent Portugal at the height of national self-flagellation, a process encouraged by the Generation of 1870 and by intellectuals who considered Brazil to be a “colonia spiritual”, construct, in spite of everything, the empire in Africa? As Valentim Alexandre argues, one cannot simply conceal the complexity of the Luso-Brazilian Empire by taking a gigantic but half-blind step into the past in the hope of seeing in the African empire the expression of a simple desire to maintain former glories grounded in a mythical India . . . (Calafate Ribeiro 2002, 149)
To take a literary example, Manuel Lisboa discussing the character Ascolino do Perpétuo Socorro from the short story ‘De como se vazou a vida de Ascolino do Perpétuo Socorro’ included in Mia Couto’s short stories from his volume *Vozes Anoitecidas* [Voices Made Night], argues that Ascolino’s precarious sense of self might be construed as twentieth-century Portugal’s nostalgic revisit of its sea-faring past, “the shipwreck of one imperial possession (India), stranded in the ruins of another (Mozambique)” (Manuel Lisboa 2000, 207).

In fact, there is no dearth of either historical or literary narratives reiterating the vinculum of the different empires within Portuguese imperial mapping. Lourenço in his quintessential psychoanalytic manner enunciates:

Suddenly we, who, with the natural independence of Brazil, had had neither a real empire nor an imaginary one from the beginnings of the century on, awoke to the previously — deprecated African empire, and there we sought an image of ourselves that would compensate for our slight or non–existent European image. (2003, 56)\(^\text{43}\)

Highlighting the marginalized position of East Timor during the *scramble for Africa* “which lingered on the margins of old imperial maps,” Roque affirms that the dream of the ‘Third Portuguese Empire’ “centred on the exploration of the imagined, nearly mythical, wealth of the African colonies — primarily Angola and Mozambique” (2010, 2–3). The preceding lineup of examples can

\(^{43}\) In another instance he pronounces — “Pobres, saímos de casa para ser ou tentar ser senhores: em Goa ou Malaca, onde era fácil, para muitos, o acesso à asiática riqueza; no Brasil, onde era necessário inventá-la. . .” (Lourenço 2009, 123-124). [Translated as – We left home as poor in order to be or try to be masters: in Goa or Malacca where it was easy, for many, to access the Asian wealth; in Brazil where it was necessary to invent it . . . ]
be best concluded in the words of the Portuguese literary scholar:

The ghost of the break with Brazil haunted Portugal’s relationship with its African colonies. It was a spectre that ran through the whole century and came to be reflected both in the conception of the African empire, from a practical and symbolic point of view, and in the Portuguese political presence in Europe. This is one of the aspects most peculiar to Portuguese imperialism. . . . But precisely what was that land where a new empire, overshadowed by the ghosts of the old, was to be proclaimed? (Calafate Ribeiro 2002, 149–150).

Thus, *Goa syndrome* problematizes such spectre within the folds of Portuguese history with regards to former Portuguese colonies in Asia. Imperial nostalgia and amnesia are implicated here in “both loss of access and active dissociation” (Stoler 2011, 122–125) in the imperial memory of Portuguese Asian Empire. To borrow Paul Ricoeur’s words, “buried under the footprints of memory and history then opens the empire of forgetting, an empire divided against itself, torn between the threat of the definitive effacement of traces and the assurance that the resources of anamnesias are placed in reserve (2004, xvi; italics added). The above mentioned discourses of Portuguese scholars have already underlined how memory of Portuguese Asian ex–colonies is visited on “the site of the ‘aphasic’ afflictions” (Stoler 2011, 122). This haemorrhaged imperial memorializing falls short of the explicative purchase of nostalgia and amnesia. The uncanniness, the spectral manner of this imperial memory better informs the nature of the remembering and dis-remembering of ex–colonies like Damão e Diu, etc., in general, and of Goa in particular.
The nostalgic mood with regards to Goa does make, to borrow Rosaldo’s words, “racial domination appear innocent and pure” (1989, 108). As Stam and Shohat similarly put it, nations can “develop a resentful discourse of victimization that remains narcissistic because the aggrieved victim nation retains the psychic capital of its own professed innocence” (2009, 477). Thus the so-called unprecedented Portuguese mass protest against East Timor’s invasion by Indonesia might help the Portuguese colonizer to escape its guilt through sympathy with the invaded object but it falters with adequate expressions to address the spectre of Goa the Portuguese-Asian colonial histories and the political decolonization process of these colonies. Appropriating Iyob’s words in Italo-phone context, the transformation of this empty discursive space (on Portuguese–Asian colonies) into a nostalgic whitewashing of the colonial past in the ex–metropolis invites dreams of frail co-existence and pacification between the ex–colonial masters and “the disenchanted and disenfranchised postcolonial citizens” (quoted in Triulzi 2006, 432). Goa syndrome underlines this aph-asia — alternating with dismembering and a difficulty in rendering their histories in an adequate vocabulary. Certainly, the imperial dissolution has not followed a decolonializing of imperial memories. (*E agora, José?*)
II – The curious case of Portuguese subaltern colonialism
1. Portuguese Prospero’s exceptionalism behind Caliban’s mask

The present chapter contests the Portuguese colonialism subaltern hypotheses proposed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos arguing against its lusocentric and imperial narcissist standpoint. Agreeing with Walter Mignolo’s criticism that Sousa Santos’s critique of modernity is an internal critique, I aim to contend that the Portuguese sociologist’s scholarship is far from being a decolonial one. The following pages will problematize the sociologist’s proposition that the geopolitical space of Portuguese colonialism can act as counter-hegemonic globalization in its opposition to dominant version of postcolonialism (2010, 236). For the sake of simplicity, the arguments will be presented in two parts: the first part engages in reading Sousa Santos’s subaltern hypotheses of Portuguese colonialism presented in various publications. In continuation, the second part aims to delineate his “proposal for the reconstruction of social emancipation from the South and by learning from the South” (2010, 232). Thus, the overall aim of this chapter is to foreground the subaltern hypotheses as epitomizing Lusophone postcoloniality, in an attempt to answer Ana Margarida Dias Martins’s concern that “little has been done to discern the extent to which oppositional intellectual work in Lusophone postcolonial studies relates to ‘postcoloniality’ ” (2009, 25).

Sousa Santos’s essay was entitled “Entre Próspero e Caliban: Colonialismo, póscolonialismo e inter-identidade” and published in abridged form in English as “Between Prospero and Caliban: Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Inter-identity” in the Winter 2002 volume of the *Luso Brazilian Review*, a volume dedicated to “Portuguese Cultural Studies,” and edited by Paulo de Medeiros and Hilary Owen. As befits an article that really challenged prior conceptions, it went through various versions, beginning at the International Congress of Lusitanists, held in Rio in 1999, and then, in the version that would become the LBR article, at a presentation before the Institute of Romance Studies in London on “New Perspectives on Cultural Studies in Portuguese” held in 2000. It finally settled down, in 2001, as the first text in the ground breaking collection of essays edited by Maria Irene Ramalho and António Sousa Ribeiro, entitled *Entre Ser e Éstar: Raízes, Percursos e Discursos da Identidade* – which we might translate as “Between Being and Being: Roots, Routes and Discourses of Identity.”

Un/fortunately, the essay has not really settled down to a final version for there

are crucial variations in some of the versions which need to be mentioned not as a hair splitting task, but to foreground some of the critical arguments being presented here.

In view of the space constraints, it is understandable that the English translation in the journal *Luso-Brazilian Review* had to be abbreviated but certain words and parts minor in length yet crucial for comprehension have been either deleted or edited. In 2006, another revised and abbreviated version of the essay in Portuguese (bearing the original title and hereafter referred as EPC 2006) appeared in the book titled *A Gramática do Tempo: para uma nova cultura política* (A Grammar of time: towards a new political culture). This revised essay does not include the final important part regarding the proposition of situated Portuguese postcolonialism. An English monolingual reader without taking recourse to the Portuguese versions of the essay would be unfairly disadvantaged as the following examples demonstrate:

In this chapter, I intend to define a research program in a specific analytical field: the practices and the discourses that characterize Portuguese colonialism and the manner in which they pervaded the identity framework of the societies with whom they engaged with during the colonial period as well as after the independence of the colonies, with special emphasis on Africa and America. This research program is reflected in the analytic unraveling of a series of propositions that I present below. (EPC 2006, 213; translation mine and italics added)

45. In Sousa Santos’s own words:
Neste capítulo, pretendo definir um programa de investigação num campo analítico específico: as práticas e os discursos que caracterizam o colonialismo português e o modo como eles impregnam os regimes identitários nas sociedades que dele participaram, tanto durante o período colonial como depois da independência das colônias, com especial incidência na África e na América⁴. Este programa de investigação traduz-se no deslindar analítico de uma série de proposições que
The entire preceding quote defining the geographical framework of Portuguese colonialism that Sousa Santos intends to focus on is surreptitiously absent in the English translation. Further, the following footnote in the above quote has been introduced in the latest Portuguese version (2006):

The so called <<Portuguese India>> (Goa, Damão e Diu) were incorporated in India in 1962. East Timor was occupied by Indonesia in 1975 when the decolonization process was just beginning and only became independent in 2002. Macau, where the Portuguese settled in 1557, was returned to China on 31 December 1999. (213; translation mine)46

In another instance, he argues that while in other spaces colonialism as a social relation dominates postcolonial studies, in the space of official Portuguese language, at least as concerns Africa and East Timor, political colonialism is still crucial for understanding and explaining contemporaneity. In other words, “in this space, the decolonization processes are part of our political actuality” and include specificities that might be elided within the canon of hegemonic postcolonialism (i.e. British) (2010, 240). He provides two cases waiting for social scientists in this space — one is of Goa which “was subjected to effective colonial occupation for the longest, between 1510 and 1962,47 and also the only one that did not give way to independence (even if India thinks


47. Goan political decolonization concluded in December 1961.
otherwise)” (2010, 240–241). The second case is of East Timor, which according to the sociologist, after having been colonized for long time witnessed semi-decolonization following the April 1974 Revolution and then recolonization by Indonesia. He further recounts that it gained “independence by the sheer will of its people and with the help of an unprecedented international solidarity, in which must be highlighted the extraordinary solidarity, first of the people and then of the government of the former multisecular colonial power” (ibid.; italics added). The ironical usurping of colonized’s agency in terms of extraordinary solidarity of the government of the former multisecular colonial power should not be lost upon the readers.

While the phrase “with special emphasis on Africa and America” (EPC 2006, 213; translation mine) provides some idea that the above three ex-Asian Portuguese colonies might be included in Sousa Santos’s hypotheses, his chosen designation —Postcolonialism in the time-space of official Portuguese language, which includes only the former Portuguese colonies in Africa and America, leaves no room for doubt. Ana Paula Ferreira poignantly observes:

One would surmise that “official” does not simply acknowledge the post-independence, state-abiding convention resulting from the founding colonial imposition of the language and, complementarily, national borders over native speakers of several African languages, as with the African Countries of Official Portuguese Expression or PALOPS (sic) . . . Even if retrospectively, Brazil is of course part of the mix. But only by a leap of imperialist fantasy, considering that Portuguese never became a dominant language in the former colonies in Asia, can these come to mind when thinking of a “postcolonialism in the time-space of official Portuguese language.” (2007, 28; italics added)
Besides of course Portugal, there are six other countries with Portuguese as their official language: Angola, Brasil, Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau, Moçambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. The essay only refers to Asia and India (BPC 24; 36) just once and curiously, “for the sake of convenience and parallelism with the designation Anglo-saxon colonialism” has been omitted in this English version (2001b; 40 translation mine).48

Ferreira convincingly reads that Sousa Santos’s preferring Postcolonialism in the time-space of official Portuguese language to the more restrictive ‘Portuguese Postcolonialism’ is “virtually contemporary with the critical interventions of the Latinamericanists” (2007, 25). She interprets the Portuguese sociologist’s articulation “as a sly riposte to the Spanish-centrism typical of postcolonial discourses identified as Latin American — or ‘Peninsular,’ by that matter” (ibid.). Sousa Santos’s affirmation — “dominant postcolonialism universalizes colonial experience on the basis of British colonialism, and the emergent Latin-american postcolonialism somehow does the same, this time on the basis of Iberian colonialism” (2010, 235–236) — lends weight to Ferreira’s observation. The Lusophone circumscription of the geopolitical space of Portuguese colonialism and Sousa Santos’s above reading of the Portuguese decolonization History of the ex-Asian colonies belie the sociologist’s aim at reprovincializing the dominant Anglophone and the

48. “Por comodidade e por paralelismo com a designação colonialismo anglo-saxónico” (2001b, 40)
emergent Latin-american postcolonialism. In other words, the chosen designation *Postcolonialism in the time-space of official Portuguese* language exceptionalizes Portuguese colonialism.

The preceding identified Lusophone circumscription of the geopolitical space of Portuguese colonialism is also critical in the light of Sousa Santos’s argument that as opposed to other dominant postcolonial studies, political colonialism is still crucial for understanding and explaining contemporaneity in the space of official Portuguese language and that “in this space, the decolonization processes are part of our political actuality” (2010, 240). Arguably, CPLP (a post–colonial association of Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries — Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa which includes Portugal) and *Lusofonia* also form part of neo–imperial actuality as is evident from Sousa Santos’s following words —

> Unlike the English and French Prosperos in their respective commonwealths, the Portuguese Prospero has not been able to impose his hegemony. Not only has he contended for hegemony with his former colony–Brazil; he has also been unable to prevent some of the new countries from integrating “rival” language communities, as is the case of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Since the hegemony of the latter communities has amounted to the legitimation of neo–colonialism . . . (BPC 35; italics added)

Some scholars suggest replacing *Lusofonia* with *Lusotopia*, that is, “places, spaces and paths of identity produced by a multitude of factors, including the Portuguese factor” (Cahen et al. 2000, 146). Notwithstanding the instant purchase of the *subaltern* hypothesis, scholars such as Luís Madureira, Ana
Paula Ferreira and Ana Margarida Dias Martins, to name a few, have criticized the essay “BPC” and Sousa Santos’s scholarship on Portuguese post/colonial discourses. It is out of the scope of the present chapter to engage with the entire critical appreciation by these scholars, therefore only some significant points by Madureira, Ferreira and Martins shall be briefly included as and when relevant in the following pages.

In “From the Postmodern to the Postcolonial – and Beyond Both” included as a chapter in Decolonizing European Sociology: Transdisciplinary Approaches (2010), Sousa Santos reformulates and revises some of his earlier arguments made in BPC (2002). In keeping with the book’s theme of “Decolonizing European sociology,” the sociologist recalls and revises his major propositions — *oppositional postmodernism, oppositional postcolonialism*. According to the sociologist, given the fact that “the immense variety of movements and actions that integrate counter-hegemonic globalization are not contained in the decentering forms proposed by postmodernism *vis-à-vis* western modernity, or by postcolonialism *vis-à-vis* western colonialism,” (2010, 237) he calls for going beyond both postmodernism and postcolonialism. He affirms that in order to counterpose the conception of postmodernity to celebratory postmodernism he designated it *oppositional postmodernism* which “was grounded on the idea that we live in societies confronted with modern problems . . . for which there are no modern solutions available;” hence the need to reinvent social emancipation (2010, 226;
Sousa Santos’s undifferentiation of *modern problems* and *modern solutions* invokes the debate of multiple modernities. Lawrence Grossberg rightly corrects his above statement as “we are facing *(euro-)* modern problems for which the dominant existing modernities have no solution” (2010, 320; emphasis mine). Stating how the great promises of *modernity* remain unfulfilled or how their fulfilment has turned out to have perverse effects, Sousa Santos compares yet conflates the example of textile or electronic workers in the Third World who earn twenty times less than workers in Europe and North America doing the same jobs with the same productivity.\(^50\) For unfulfilled promise of liberty he selects *notorious* examples of fifteen million children who work in bondage in India alone, the inordinate police and prison violence in Brazil and Venezuela, the trials of citizens by faceless judges in Colombia and Peru . . . (1999, 30).

Thus, in order to critically cite the unfulfilled promises of *Euro/Western* modernity, why does the Portuguese sociologist cast away the discursive net as

\(^{49}\) Arturo Escobar puts the same as “modernity’s ability to provide solutions to modern problems has been increasingly compromised” and “in fact, it can be argued that there are no modern solutions to many of today’s problems.” (2004, 209)

\(^{50}\) Mignolo similarly points out:

. . . and at this point it may be a little bit difficult to make a Bolivian Indian, whose ‘space of experience’ is filled with 500 years of oppression, racialization, de-humanization with the experience of a peasant in the Black Forest or in the wonderland of Norway. I am not saying that it is not important to think of the peasant of southern Germany or central Norway . . . I am just saying that we cannot take for granted that what happens in Munich, and it is felt and thought by Germany, happens more or less similarly in other places and people will think more or less similarly. (2007, 469)
far as to catch in more examples from the Third World? Sousa Santos affirms that earlier he had drawn “on ideas and conceptions, which, while modern, had been marginalized by the dominant conceptions of modernity” (2010, 226). As he continues, by the mid-1990s, however, it was clear to him “that such reconstruction could only be completed from the vantage point of the experiences of the victims” and his “appeal for learning from the South — the South understood as a metaphor of the human suffering caused by capitalism — indicated precisely the aim to reinvent social emancipation by going beyond the critical theory produced in the north and the social and political praxis to which it subscribed” (2010, 227).

After oppositional postmodernism, Sousa Santos proposes the term oppositional postcolonialism, delineating the oppositional nature of Portuguese postcolonialism in conflicting dialogue with the dominant versions of postcolonialism. The first point of opposition concerns the culturalist bias of postcolonial studies, the second point is with regards to the articulation between capitalism and colonialism wherein the dominant conceptions tend to privilege colonialism and coloniality as explanatory factors of social relations, while the third point of conflict concerns the reprovincialization of Europe (2010, 234–236). These delineations have already and continue to be intensively criticized within and outside the wide umbrella of what has come to be known as

51. Diana Brydon asserts how “Brazilian colleagues remain wary of the word “emancipation,” which can carry paternalistic and evangelizing Christian overtones to their ears.” (http://myuminfo.umanitoba.ca/Documents/4739/BrydonMontrealHumanities.pdf)
postcolonial studies. Various scholars have echoed Parry’s criticism — the disengagement of colonialism from historical capitalism led to the abandonment of historical and social explanation and was re-presented for study as a cultural event (2004, 4).52

The literary turn of dominant postcolonialism has already been discussed in the previous chapter. Suffice it to observe here the irony that the category Portuguese/Lusophone postcolonialism that Sousa Santos is belabouring to elaborate betrays this culturalist bias as already argued earlier. Literary studies scholars like Maria Irene Ramalho (see Sousa Santos 1993), Margarida Calafate Ribeiro (2004), Maria Alzira Seixo (2002) et al. have dedicated his subaltern hypothesis to Portuguese Post/colonial discourses and literary readings of so-called Lusophone literatures. Of late, his concept Global/South has caught on. For example, in an interview with Ana Paula Tavares, titled “Um Desafio a partir do Sul – reescrever as histórias da literatura?” (2008), Calafate Ribeiro affirms that when she asked the Angolan poet what is her literary heritage, what she would consider to be her autobiographical literary memory; the poet looking at her from the South, speaking from the South, answered . . . (translation mine).53 To take another example, “Dislocating Europe: Post–Colonial

52. The spring 2012 43(2) issue of New Literary History includes a section titled “The State of Postcolonial Studies continued” and includes discourses that revisit old and new debates. 53. “Numa entrevista que tive o privilégio de fazer à poeta angolana Ana Paula Tavares perguntei-lhe a certa altura quais eram as suas heranças, qual era a sua memória literária autobiográfica. Olhando-me a partir do Sul, falando-me a partir do Sul, disse-me . . .” (2008, 117). Curiously, the English version of this interview titled as “A Heritage of One’s Own: A Conversation with Ana Paula Tavares” (2007), does not contain the preceding quote.
Perspectives in Literary, Anthropological and Historical Studies” is a research project coordinated by Manuela Ribeiro Sanches at the Arts faculty, University of Lisbon. Elucidating the objectives, the project’s website mentions:

The intention of the Department of Fine Arts of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation that the project Dislocating “Europe” be the proper setting for transferring the Artafrica website is an important indicator of the effective reasons to maintain and further develop the research done until now. Artafrica has as main objective the linking of art practices, and related initiatives, in local/global contexts, thus *adding to the visibility of “peripheral” places* thanks to the possibilities offered by the Internet. [italics added]54

The immediate pressing question comes up: “visibility of “peripheral” places” for whom and how? The website artafrica announces an exposition entitled “South is the New North–African Contemporary Art” (17 September–29 October 2011). This instantiation of uncritical circulation of Global North/South lends weight to the argument against misappropriation of these already obfuscated discursive terms.

Madureira opines that one of the vital tasks of a *situated postcolonialism* would thus be the restoration of the history of the “concurrence between the emergence of new empires in the seventeenth century and the demotion of Portugal and Spain to the subordinate status that Santos classifies as the semiperiphery of the world system” (2006b, 7). This attempt of co-evalness of history assumes critical importance for Luso-Brazilianists and which might explain why Sousa Santos’s essay is so well subscribed within Portuguese

literary and cultural studies (ibid.) For Madureira, it is no exaggeration to claim that the sociologist’s proposal has well-laid down the agenda for the nascent field of Portuguese or Lusophone postcolonial studies (ibid.). Another interesting self-revelation against Sousa Santos’s charge of cultural bias within dominant postcolonialism lies in Phillip Rothwell’s poignant query — “why indeed should Sousa Santos lurch headlong into psychoanalysis given that his preeminent social-science framework disavows such terrain by default?”

Initially, the sociologist had enunciated the case of Portuguese semiperipherality in the essay titled “Estado e sociedade na semiperiferia do sistema mundial: o caso português” (1985) (State and society in the semiperiphery of the world system: the Portuguese case), which later provided the basis for some of the subaltern hypotheses in BPC (2002) and its earlier Portuguese original version (2001b).

Notwithstanding the absence of the elaboration of the term semiperipheral within the World-system proposed by Wallerstein, Sousa Santos had argued initially that the social indicators (social classes and social stratification; etc.) which are usually employed to contrast the first and third

As Gregor McLennan affirms:

it is now routinely observed that sociology has come rather late to embrace issues around postcoloniality, at least when compared with anthropology, cultural and literary studies, and history. Yet it is not often explained why this should be the case, and the question arises even more sharply now, given the extent to which, once caught up in the postcolonial, de-colonial maelstrom, sociologists appear, if anything, even more engulfed by conceptual and ethical dilemmas than scholars in those other fields of study.
(http://www.bristol.ac.uk/spais/research/workingpapers/wpspaisfiles/mclennan-02-12.pdf)
worlds reveal that if Portugal shares some indicators of the first world, in others it resembles the third accounting for its ambiguity (1985, 869). And, therefore, according to the sociologist, “it becomes imperative to characterize the Portuguese society as an intermediate society, semiperipheral society, although the parameters of this characterization are rarely explained” (ibid.). The sociologist had then called for conferring theoretical consistency to semiperiphery concept so that it could have an explicative value and affirms that especially from the eighteenth-century, Portugal was a central country in relation to its colonies and a peripheral country compared to the centers of capitalist accumulation. In order to avoid that Portugal be reduced sociologically to its empire, he had suggested that it is necessary that the concept of semiperiphery refer to a social material specificity . . . (ibid., 870–871). This brief presentation of the basic tenets of “Estado e sociedade” essay helps to map out the discursive trajectory of the semiperipherality proposition and how from a strictly social-science framework the same discourse has been explicated in psychoanalytic terms with its own concomitant contestations as the following pages reveal.

The second point of conflict that Sousa Santos points out is with regards to the articulation between capitalism and colonialism wherein the dominant conceptions tend to privilege colonialism and coloniality as explanatory factors of social relations. Briefly recalling the working hypotheses formulated in previous work (1994, 49–67 and 119–137), he argues — “Portugal is and has
been since the seventeenth century a semiperipheral country in the modern capitalist world system, characterizing best the modern long duration of Portuguese society” (BPC 9). According to him, it has kept its basic features though this condition has evolved across centuries — an intermediate economic development and a position of intermediation between the center and the periphery of the world economy (ibid.). His working hypothesis is that “this complex semiperipheral condition reproduced itself until quite recently on the basis of the colonial system and, for the past fifteen years, has continued to reproduce itself in the way in which Portugal has become part of the European Union” (ibid.) and from which the sociologist proposes three sub–hypotheses. Explicating the subaltern hypothesis, Sousa Santos argues:

First, Portuguese colonialism, featuring a semiperipheral country, was also semiperipheral itself. It was, in other words, a subaltern colonialism. Portuguese colonialism was the result both of a deficit of colonization—Portugal’s incapacity to colonize efficiently—and an excess of colonization—the fact that the Portuguese colonies were submitted to a double colonization: Portugal’s colonization and, indirectly, the colonization of the core countries (particularly England) of which Portugal was dependent (often in a near colonial way). (BPC 9–10)

His second working hypothesis is that “While modern capitalist power has always been colonial, in Portugal and its colonies it was always more colonial than capitalist. This condition, far from coming to an end with the end of colonialism, is still being reproduced” (ibid., 10). The third sub-hypothesis is that though the meaning and content of Portugal’s integration in the European Union is still an open question, “as of now, it seems to lean towards
reproducing, in new terms, the semiperipheral condition” (ibid., 10). The above introduction of Sousa Santos’s hypotheses and arguments intended to prepare us to appreciate them critically as will be undertaken below.

2. Oito-oitentismo between subalternity and peripherality

Sousa Santos’s term *subaltern colonialism* is not exclusive to Portuguese/Lusophone studies. The uncritical circulation of the term subaltern in and outside Postcolonial Studies continues to surpass to such an extent that someone once jokingly remarked — “These days, having a bad hair day is subaltern” (quoted in Didur et al. 2003, 2). In Postcolonial Studies, the term subaltern has acquired a near jargon status, referring to “Third World” subjects, and without exaggerating, has been popularized by the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group. The term *subaltern*, as it has been developed by theorists such as Bhabha and Spivak in postcolonial studies, has its origins in a particular reading of the Italian social theorist Antonio Gramsci to describe “the general attribute of subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office or in any other way” (quoted in McLeod 2007, 167–168). This preliminary clarification reveals that Sousa Santos’s employment of the term *subaltern* deviates from its common usage within

56. The term *Oito-oitentismo* is slyly misappropriated from Sousa Santos’s explication of the same in BPC to express the absence of a pattern as in the “oscillation between a Prospero in Caliban’s shoes and a Caliban longing for Prospero, consolidated to give rise to one of the characteristics of Portuguese identity, perchance the most intrinsically semiperipheral of them all. We might call it, after sports newsmen commenting on the uneven performance of the national soccer team, “oito-oitentismo” (up-and-downism).” (35)
Postcolonialism. Madureira also observes that this notion of subalternity bears little or no resemblance to Santos’s definition of Portugal’s ‘differential’ colonial rule as a ‘subaltern colonialism’ (2008, 222).

In BPC (2002) the sociologist uses the term *subalternity* but in a later Portuguese version of the same essay (EPC 2006) replaces it with *peripherality* and *subaltern colonialism* with *peripheral colonialism*:

In this case, the norm is British colonialism, in relation to which the contours of Portuguese colonialism get defined as a *subaltern colonialism*. The *subalternity* of Portuguese colonialism is twofold: it occurs both at the level of colonial practices and at the level of discourses. Concerning practices, *subalternity* consists in the fact that Portugal, as semiperipheral country . . . As regards colonial discourses, the *subalternity* of Portuguese colonialism . . . (BPC 11 italics mine)57

In this case, the norm is given by British colonialism, in relation to which the contours of Portuguese colonialism get defined as a *peripheral colonialism*, that is, subaltern colonialism in relation to England’s hegemonic colonialism. The *peripherality* of Portuguese colonialism is twofold: it occurs both at the level of colonial practices and at the level of discourses. Concerning practices, the *peripherality* consists in the fact that Portugal, as semiperipheral country . . . As regards colonial discourses, the *peripheral nature* of Portuguese colonialism . . . (translation and emphases mine EPC 214)58

57. As Ronald F. Horvath puts it, “to stereotype colonialism on the basis of one or two particular cases or to assume that colonialism is characteristic of a particular civilization (Western civilization) is simply to ignore the full range of reality to which human history testifies” and insufficient cross-cultural perspective is one of the leading reasons (1972, 46).

58. In the Portuguese sociologist’s words:

Neste caso, a norma é dada pelo colonialismo britânico e é em relação a ele que se define o perfil do colonialismo português, enquanto colonialismo periférico, isto é, enquanto colonialismo subalterno em relação ao colonialismo hegemônico da Inglaterra. A perifericidade do colonialismo português é dupla, porque ocorre tanto no domínio das práticas coloniais, como no dos discursos coloniais. No domínio das práticas, a perifericidade está no facto de Portugal, enquanto país semiperiférico . . . No domínio dos discursos coloniais, o carácter periférico do colonialismo português . . . (EPC 214)
These neat replacements lead to the obvious question whether peripheral/semi-
peripheral, marginal is synonymous with subaltern. In general, the obfuscated
employment of these terms prevails in Postcolonial theory. Mignolo,
differentiating the use of the term subaltern as used by Antonio Gramsci and
later by Ranajit Guha, states — “At the same time, the ‘colonial differential’
introduced by the South-Asian historian helped highlight the fact that for
Gramsci ‘subalternity’ could also have been a geopolitical category: Italy was in
a subaltern position in relation to the North” (2005, 381).

On the analogous use of peripheral and subaltern, Mignolo clarifies that
“the meaning of ‘peripheral’ is analogous to the meaning of ‘subaltern,’ if we
allow the term to refer to ‘cultures’ and languages and not just to social classes
or communities — that is, everything that lies in a relational space will be
located in ‘an inferior rank’ ” (2000, 196). In this sense, Sousa Santos’s
invocation of subaltern differs from the Gramscian jargon. Morton defines the
term marginality as follows:

Marginality is one of the privileged metaphors of postcolonial studies. It
is from the margins of colonial subordination and oppression on the
grounds of race, class, gender or religion that postcolonial writers and
theorists claim political and moral authority to contest or oppose the
claims of a dominant European imperial culture. (2010, 62)

While both these definitions help to clarify to a certain extent the use of these
terms in Postcolonialism, this clarity is immediately lost if we refer to Santos’s
affirmation that the specificity of Portuguese colonialism resides mainly in
reasons of political economy (BPC 11).
Through his essays like “Nation, Identity and Loss of Footing: Mia Couto’s *O Outro Pé da Sereia* and the Question of Lusophone Postcolonialism” (2008), “Is the Difference in Portuguese Colonialism the Difference in Lusophone Postcolonialism?” (2006), Luís Madureira has been upfront in his criticism of Sousa Santos’s Portuguese *subaltern* hypothesis. In his essays, Madureira has astutely pointed out, most importantly, “the postcolonial return of the rhetoric of colonial difference” (2008b, 202). Drawing on the genealogy of anti-colonial activists — Amílcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel — whose observations had already underlined Portuguese colonizer’s semiperipherality, he argues that “with the exception of the trademark world-system terminology,” Sousa Santos’s “fashionable hypothesis reproduces a familiar account of Portugal’s colonial domination, one that dates back to the onset of the anticolonial struggle in the former Portuguese colonies” (2008b, 202). For Amílcar Cabral, the leader of the anti-colonial struggle in Guinea-Bissau, Portuguese colonial rule was the most retrograde on earth and Portugal itself was a “rotten appendage of imperialism . . . a semi-colony of Britain” (quoted in Madureira 2006b, 3).

Madureira also points out Mondlane’s and Machel’s views that Portugal was “a colony of foreign capitalist interests” and that it had been, since the 17th century, a “semi-colony of Britain” (ibid.). There is a plethora of such readings underlining the asymmetrical balance of trade equation between England and Portugal. Branwen Gruffydd Jones also echoes the same — “Neto, Cabral,
Mondlane and Machel shared a clear understanding of Portuguese colonialism as a structured system of oppressive social relations rooted in and sustained by global imperial relations and the structures of global capitalism” (2010, 58). He continues, the activist’s analysis was based on direct and keen awareness of Portuguese colonialism’s long historical dependence on the imperial power of Britain, France, Germany and America, “a dependence that was both financial and military and took on new forms and heightened significance in the context of NATO support for Portugal’s colonial wars . . .” (ibid.). Interestingly, Glynn Stone cites the Portuguese dictator Salazar who mentioned that “by the Treaty of Windsor of 1899 the British government had undertaken to protect Portugal’s colonial possessions and he hoped they would realise that ‘there had never been a more Anglophilic government in power in Portugal than the present one’ ” (1994, 91).

2.1. When did Portuguese marginality take a sub-alturn?

Portugal’s marginality discourse has a long literary, philosophical and psychoanalytic tradition. From literary analyses of Os Lusíadas to the Portuguese critic Eduardo Lourenço’s discourses on Portuguese identity, the marginal discourse continues to be constantly invoked. Calafate Ribeiro delineates thus:

This intermediate condition, resulting from a complex organic tension between the nation and its empire on one hand and, on the other hand, from a multifaceted tension between Portugal and Europe, led to the
coexistence of two types of discourse in the collective Portuguese imagination: an <<epic discourse>> and a <<discourse of ruin>> (Rebelo 1994, 22). Thus, in the Camonian epopeia, Portugal is the head of Europe…, in Vieira, the Portuguese are <<the Kafirs of Europe>> . . . , in Fernando Pessoa <<We are>>, speaking of his time, <<a drop of dried ink from the hand that wrote Empire, and from the left to the right of geography>> . . . (2004, 29–30; translation mine)59

Interestingly, in the book Portugal: Um retrato singular (1993), edited by Sousa Santos et al.; Maria Irene Ramalho de Sousa Santos calls Fernando Pessoa the inventor of semi-periphery, affirming — “in the first half of the twentieth century it was Fernando Pessoa who best understood . . . this Portuguese specificity, which for the first time justifiably identified what today is designated as semi-peripheral societies. For this reason, I consider him as ‘the inventor of semiperiphery’ ” (96; translation mine).60 In the preface of the above-mentioned book, the sociologist substitutes the designation “the inventor of semiperiphery” attributed to Pessoa as:

The theoretical framework (partial) underlying these subprojects was subsequently extended by Maria Irene Ramalho (Chapter 3), to transform the concept of semiperiphery and related concepts in metaphors of the Portuguese society with which she later analysed work of Fernando Pessoa, to conclude that he is the inventor of the characterization of

59. In the Portuguese literary scholar’s words:
Esta condição intermédia, resultante de uma complexa tensão orgânica entre a nação e o seu império por um lado e, por outro lado, de uma multifacetada tensão entre Portugal e a Europa, levou à coexistência de dois tipos de discurso no imaginário coletivo português: um <<discurso épico>> e um <<discurso de perdição>> (Rebelo, 1994:22). “Assim, na epopeia camoniana, Portugal é a cabeça da Europa>>, … em Vieira, os portugueses são <<os cafres da Europa>> …, em Fernando Pessoa, <<Somos hoje>>, falando do seu tempo, <<um pingo de tinta seca da mão que escreveu Império, da esquerda à direita da geografia>>… (Calafate Ribeiro 2004, 29–30)

60. “Na primeira metade do século XX foi Fernando Pessoa quem melhor entendeu . . . esta especificidade portuguesa, nesse entendimento pela primeira vez identificando justamente aquilo que hoje alguns designam por sociedades semiperiféricas. Por isso lhe chamo aqui ‘o inventor da semiperiferia.’” (Sousa Santos et al. 1993, 96)
Portugal as a intermediate and intermediary society. (1993, 10; italics and translation mine)\(^61\)

Clearly, “o inventor da semiperiferia” [the inventor of semiperiphery] and “o inventor da caraterização de Portugal como sociedade intermédia e intermédiaria” [the inventor of the characterization of Portugal as intermediate and intermediary] are not (exactly) the same. And interestingly, Calafate Ribeiro calls *Lusitânia Transformada* (1781) by Fernão Álvares do Oriente, as an original discourse on Portugal as an imperial periphery (2002, 142).

2.2. Where/Can the subaltern hide?

Sousa Santos’s proposition of Portuguese colonizer’s semi-peripheral position or the Portuguese colonialism as *subaltern* differs from the colonial fetish with Portugal’s marginality in its *metropolitan* discursive garb of subalternism. Calafate Ribeiro puts it in more subtle words:

This change of Portugal as a mediator of culture and commerce, in the nostalgic image of Camões, as simply the <<power transmission belt>> between the colonies and the European nations, represents, in the words of Sousa Santos (1996:130), the Portuguese historical dimension which the sociologist *defines in contemporary terms* as Portugal being a <<semiperiphery>>. (2004, 51; italics and translation mine)\(^62\)

---

\(^{61}\) “O quadro teórico parcelar que subjazeu a estes subprojectos foi subsequentemente ampliado por Maria Irene Ramalho (capítulo 3), ao transformar o conceito de semiperiferia e conceitos conexos em metáforas da sociedade portuguesa com que depois analisou a obra Fernando Pessoa, para concluir ser este o inventor da caraterização de Portugal como sociedade intermédia e intermédiaria.” (Sousa Santos et al. 1993, 10)

\(^{62}\) “Esta passagem de Portugal de mediador de cultura e comércio, na saudosa imagem de Camões, a simples <<correia de transmissão>> entre as suas colónias e as nações europeias, nas palavras de Sousa Santos (1996, 130), representa a dimensão histórica portuguesa do que o sociólogo define, em termos contemporâneos, de Portugal como uma <<semiperiferia>>.” (Calafate Ribeiro 2004, 51)
As Huggan explains, “marginality represents a challenge to the defining imperial ‘centre’ . . . The embrace of marginality is, above all, an oppositional discursive strategy that flies in the face of hierarchical social structures and hegemonic cultural codes” (quoted in Morton 2010, 162). In her (in)famous essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988), Spivak insists on the analytic value of the subaltern as a term to describe historic relations between India’s subordinate and elite classes. At the same time, she highlights the need to put the economic ‘under erasure’ in order to attend to the discursive and cultural constitution of the subaltern subject (quoted in McLeod 2007, 175).

BPC’s argument of the Portuguese colonizer’s subalternity is specifically based on the economic dependency (capitalism) on England since the seventeenth century. As the sociologist affirms — “the specificity of Portuguese colonialism resides, therefore, mainly in reasons of political economy — the country’s semiperipheral condition (11)” though he adds that it also manifests itself at the social, political, juridical, and cultural levels, etc.63 The second objection to the subaltern term is in accordance with Spivak’s caveat — “the subaltern cannot be the subject of the discourse or no one can say “I am a subaltern in whatever language” (2005, 476). Instead, the essay’s approach to Portuguese colonialism’s subaltern-specificity is very colonizer-centered,

63. The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance dates from 1373, and, with many ups and downs, has survived through all the subsequent changes in the European political scene. (Minter 1972, 132)
echoing bell hooks’s words, “I am still colonizer, the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk . . .” (1990a, 151), as exemplified by Sousa Santos’s following words:

A particularly complex research topic consists in assessing to what extent this problem of the Portuguese colonizer reverberates in the Portuguese colonized. Could it be that the Portuguese colonized have a double problem of self-representation: vis-à-vis the colonizer that, not having colonized them, has nonetheless written the history of their colonial subjugation? . . . The question here is to determine whether the colonized by a subaltern colonialism are under-colonized or over-colonized. (BPC 11; italics mine)

The colonizer’s gaze has turned inwards, but it is still from colonial pedestal. hooks’s poetic words are again relevant here — “I was made ‘other’ there in that space . . . they did not meet me there in that space. They meet me at the center” (1990b, 342). The sociologist’s invocation of Prospero and Caliban further exemplifies this non ex-centric approach.

Deploying the trope of Prospero and Caliban, the Portuguese colonizer’s inter-identity is the main focus of Sousa Santos’s hypotheses. For him, the identity of the Portuguese colonizer [Portuguese Prospero] is not merely inclusive of the identity of the colonized other as it also includes the identity of the colonizer himself colonized [Calibanized Prospero] in turn (BPC 17). He adds, from the viewpoint of the European super-Prosperos the Portuguese Prospero is a very Caliban, thus, rendering the identity of the Portuguese colonizer as doubly double (ibid.). Sousa Santos’s “untheorized identification of Shakespeare’s well-traveled figure with ‘semiperipheral’ Portugal” is criticised
by Madureira as “the most conspicuous index of this’re-colonization’ ” (2008a, 138). In fact, the employment of this Shakespearean trope which is central to Anglophone postcolonialism belies Sousa Santos’s aim to oppose the dominant postcolonialism.64

In its general arc, Postcolonial studies “involves collecting and disseminating information, formulating arguments, or explaining concepts with the end of achieving emancipation for minority, marginal, or formerly colonized peoples” (Brennan 2006, 138) In the last few decades there have been many studies focusing on the British Empire but armed with a Postcolonial attitude and sensibility. For example, the following words from the Introduction of At Home with the Empire (2006) well proves the point here:

We are all too well aware of the dangers of focusing yet again on the British, to the neglect of the lives of colonial peoples across the Empire. Yet our object here is the metropole and the ways in which it was constituted in part by the Empire. Thus our focus in this book is on the period when the Empire existed and was a presence in metropolitan life: not on the equally important topic of the effect of empire after decolonisation. It is British history which is our object of study. (C. Hall 2006, 5)

Abigail Ward issues a caveat that merely focusing on the colonized is not sufficient; instead, the psychological problems experienced by the colonized specifically in the context of their relationship with the colonizers need to be examined (2007, 193). Some of the British new imperial studies have been

64. Medeiros argues that Adamastor as compared to Prospero and Caliban, stands as a more appropriate trope personifying the otherness of the colonized. This shift would also signify an innovative summoning of Portuguese literature than mere borrowing and transmitting of Anglophone discursive trope, an oblivious point in Sousa Santos’s enunciation of the same.(2006, 46)
reviewed in the cheekily titled essay — “Reading Empire, Chasing Tikka Masala: The Contested State of Imperial History” by Douglas M. Peers. The underlying common agenda in most of these revisionary histories is well-put by one of Salman Rushdie’s character — “the trouble with the English is that their history happened overseas, so they don’t know what it means” (1992, 343). The focus is definitely the post-colonial metropolitan but as constitutive of its imperial past. In general, as Bart Moore-Gilbert well points out, there is violent disagreement over whether the proper object of postcolonial analysis as a reading practice should be postcolonial culture alone or if and to what degree it is legitimate to focus on the culture of the colonizer (1997, 11).

The debate whether or not the colonizer, peripheral or non-peripheral can be included as an object of study within Postcolonial Studies is too broad to be taken up here, so suffice here to present just one example of quintessential colonizer-centric approach from BPC:

The informal colonialism of an incompetent Prospero saved large sectors of the colonized peoples for a long period of time from living Caliban's experience daily, and let some of them (and not just in India) conceive of themselves as the true Prospero and act as such in their domains. They were often allowed to negotiate the administration of the territories and its rules with the European Prospero almost on an equal footing. (BPC 36; emphases mine)

Sousa Santos’s preceding words deprive the colonized’s agency, and in fact, unabashedly privilege the colonizer’s subject position. Madureira astutely points out that “this incipient Lusophone postcolonialism is not only located unequivocally in the former metropolis but that it reproduces in a postcolonial
register and epoch the estadonovista rhetoric of colonial difference” (2006b, 2–3). Thus, both the discursive and geographical situatedness of Lusophone postcolonialism is brought under scanner. Martins’s comments regarding the Sousa Santos’s *epistemology of the South* (2009) is equally relevant here. As she points out how the project “is in part problematic because it rests on a theoretical yielding to what is perceived to be the ‘genuine’ innovation of semiperipheral countries — as if inhabiting the semiperiphery were a ‘good’ in itself, or a passport to being (or feeling) ‘oppressed’ ” (2009, 181). The ongoing argument here intends to denounce what it reads as Sousa Santos’s fetishization of marginocentrism.

Thus, given the general obfuscation regarding the term *subaltern* and its critical importance in the sociologist’s hypotheses, the lacuna left by the absence of any explanation of the term is resounding. Added to this is the metro-centered approach to the discourses and their ahistorical specificity. Arif Dirlik, with the clarion call ‘Bringing history back in’ (2001), and other scholars like Aijaz Ahmad, Benita Parry, et al., had severely criticized the ahistorical discourses circulating within Postcolonial studies. Sousa Santos’s discourses on Portuguese colonialism well exemplify four of the modes of writing which Frederick Cooper calls *ahistorical history*, a term, which according to him, purports to address the relationship of past to present but without interrogating the way processes unfold over time: story plucking, leapfrogging legacies, doing history backward, and the epochal fallacy (2005, 17). Each particular
question posed by Madureira in the following quote is pertinent:

. . . given the long duration and multifarious character of Portuguese colonialism, what precisely is the temporality of this Prospero–Caliban relation? Does it play itself out in the same way in the seventeenth century as it does in the second half of the twentieth? Is it akin in Macau, Goa, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Brazil? In brief, is this identitarian ‘duplicity’ a metaphysical structure or is it, like Portugal’s semipheripheral position in the world system, a product of a particular historical process? (2008a, 139)

Madureira also raises relevant questions regarding the ahistorical “Calibanized Prospero,” asking, is s/he “the metropolitan capitalist, the colonial administrator, the rich colonial estate owner, the poor emigrant-settler,” whether the emigrant-settlers and those who ‘owned’ and administered the colonies are the same and “would not the impoverished colono be as much a Caliban from the perspective of high colonial officials” (2006b, 10). Having delineated some of the points on Sousa Santos’s subaltern/semiperiphery hypotheses with regards to Portuguese colonialism, the following parts tend to engage with the other points he makes in his oppositional postcolonialism.

3. Self-denial of co-evalness with other European colonizers?

The second point that the Portuguese sociologist foregrounds in oppositional postcolonialism is with regards to the articulation between capitalism and colonialism. As according to the sociologist, the “dominant conceptions tend to privilege colonialism and coloniality as explanatory factors of social relations” (2010, 234). He revises his earlier characterization in which
he had emphasized the relations of capitalism with western modernity, but not paid attention to the latter’s relations with colonialism (ibid., 233). He reviews — “although mutually constitutive, capitalism and colonialism are not to be confused” for “capitalism may develop without colonialism as a political relation, as history shows, but not without colonialism as a social relation” (ibid.), choosing to call it, after Anibal Quijano (2000), as *coloniality of power and knowledge*.

In BPC, the sociologist had stated “Portugal is and has been since the seventeenth century a semiperipheral country in the modern capitalist world system” and “Portuguese colonialism, featuring a semiperipheral country, was also semiperipheral itself, in other words, a subaltern colonialism” (9). This time-frame was debatable especially with Sousa Santos’s claim that Goa “suffered the longest period of effective colonization of the modern era” and was the only colony that earned independence through integration in a vaster geopolitical space, the Indian state (2011a, 433; italics mine). To say that Goa “earned independence through integration in a vaster geopolitical space” conveys a different standpoint from Sousa Santos’s earlier statement that “Goa is the region in the world that was subjected to effective colonial occupation for the longest . . . and also the only one that did not give way to independence (even if India thinks otherwise)” (2010, 240–241; italics added); with the word *effective* intact. On the eve of Goa’s 50th year of liberation from the Portuguese rule, the sociologist affirmed, during a conference in Goa in December 2011,
“Goa has experienced the worst kind of colonialism as it was ruled by a weak power — the Portuguese. No other territory has lived under such long and effective domination as Goa” (2011).65

The revisionary social history of scholars like K. N. Chaudhuri, Samir Amin, Janet Abu-Lughod, James Blaut, Jack Goody, to use the words of Andre Gunder Frank, turns received Eurocentric historiography and social theory upside down (1998, xv). Frank has belaboured to point out that the Asian maritime trade was a rich trading zone, and the Portuguese could never manage to hegemonize it. In his words, “the so-called European hegemony in the modern world system was very late in developing and was quite incomplete and never unipolar” (1998, 166). He continues, during the period 1400–1800 (sometimes regarded as one of ‘European expansion’ and ‘primitive accumulation’), the world economy was still under Asian dominance (ibid.). It is imperative to recall here the historical narrative of Goa dourada [Golden Goa] whose nostalgia prevails in Portuguese post-colonial discourses. In fact, João de Melo astutely observes, as a result of the Discoveries and the overseas expansion, Portuguese colonization “concentrated its position mainly on a rhetorical and doubtlessly euphemistic explication, which rapidly mistook

mercantilism with the implementation of an ideology — the dissemination of faith and Empire” (quoted in Overhoff Ferreira 2005, 232).66

Portugal could never attain hegemony in the flourishing maritime trade is a consistent argument by the scholars of so-called California school of social history. It is out of scope to take up their points of contention here. Suffice it highlight Frank’s affirmation, who clarifies that in spite of the ‘strong-arm attempts’ to monopolize trade, Portugal could boast of a very small share of inter–Asian trade of around 80 percent of their profits, and only 20 percent came from their trade around the Cape of Good Hope, which they had pioneered (1998, 179–180).67 Further, even during the height of their sixteenth-century ‘penetration’ of Asia, Frank argues, the Portuguese handled only some 5 percent of Gujarati trade and despite their base at Goa, Portuguese procurement was less than 10 percent of southwestern Indian pepper production. In fact, the maintenance of Portugal’s Estado da Índia overtook direct earnings from India, although the private merchants did profit from it and at last the small Portuguese trade in East and Southeast Asia was later replaced by the Dutch (ibid.).68

66. During the sixteenth century, there were probably never more than 10,000 Portuguese in the overseas empire.
67. Derek S. Linton informs while the “voyages brought the concessionaires much wealth and the intra–Asian trade enriched Portuguese merchants and officials in the East” the decline came easy. (1997, 72)
68. Frank categorically asserts it was certainly not possible for the Iberian Peninsula or little Portugal with one million inhabitants in the sixteenth century, nor for the small Netherlands in the seventeenth century, nor even for “Great” Britain in the eighteenth-century to have exercised any hegemonic power or even economic leadership in or over the world. In his
Prasenjit Duara’s question whether an effective *antidote to Eurocentrism* is more Eurocentrism or not (2004, 112) is a moot point here, what concerns is the metro-centered nature of the sociologist’s affirmation that “regardless of the originality of Portugal’s participation” in the project of European expansion, it *could not sustain a discourse of originality* about itself from the moment that industrial capitalism created a closer and more direct link with colonialism” (BPC 12; emphasis added). In BPC, the sociologist had argued that “while modern capitalist power has always been colonial, in Portugal and its colonies it was always more colonial than capitalist” (10), which he has revised by stating “although mutually constitutive, capitalism and colonialism are not to be confused. Capitalism may develop without colonialism as a political relation, as history shows, but not without colonialism as a social relation” (2010, 233). Although the ‘modern capitalism’ marker in BPC has been replaced by colonialism as social relation it is not very enlightening because of the chiasmic logic of his enunciations — “As a social formation, capitalism does not have to overexploit every worker and cannot, by definition, exclude and discard every population, but, by the same token, it cannot exist without overexploited and discardable populations” (2010, 233–234). In another instance, he affirms, “in 

words — “The very notion of such economic leadership or political power or even balance of power (as for example after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) is itself only the effect of an optical illusion from the myopic perspective of a “European world-economy/system.” It is just plain Eurocentrism.” (1998, 333)

69. Sousa Santos’s affirmation echoes the Portuguese geographer Orlando Ribeiro’s words — “. . . e dada a originalidade da nossa expansão no mundo” (1999, 72). [. . . and given the originality of our expansion around the world]
the past there has been colonialism, as a political relation, without capitalism, but since the fifteenth-century capitalism is not thinkable without colonialism, nor is colonialism thinkable without capitalism (ibid., 233).70

In the revisionary mode, Sousa Santos has shifted the time line from seventeenth century to fifteenth century and makes a distinction between colonialism as a political relation and colonialism as a social relation. In BPC he affirmed:

As with Spanish colonialism, the convergence of Portuguese colonialism with capitalism was far less direct than in British colonialism. In many cases, this convergence occurred by delegation, that is to say, by the impact of England's pressure on Portugal through mechanisms such as unequal credit conditions and international treaties. Thus, while the British Empire was based on a dynamic balance between colonialism and capitalism, the Portuguese Empire was based on an equally dynamic imbalance between an excess and a deficit of colonialism. (11)

The enunciation of Portuguese Empire being based on an equally dynamic imbalance between an excess and a deficit of colonialism (11) is not accompanied by any delineation of the constitutive nature of Portuguese colonialism and capitalism. Industrial capitalism had foundations in American slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, as Newitt points out how slavery was a major economic resource for the Portuguese empire and slaves continued to be shipped from Portugal’s African ports to Brazil until 1851 and then to the Indian Ocean islands until the early twentieth century (2005, 254).71 Sousa

70. “To live in the frontier,” I concluded, “is to live in the margins without living a marginal life.” (Santos 1995, 496; 2000, 327; 2002, 16)
71. In the fifteenth century slaves were imported from Black Africa, which the Portuguese were actively exploring at the time. From the Algarve, sugar production and its related
Santos’s description of “more colonial than capitalist” elides Portugal’s resorting “to slavery and the slave trade as means of delaying impending collapse” in the event of declining and threatened economic interests (Solow 2012, 149). Such a sanitization of imperial history is not exclusive to Portuguese scholarship. Stam et al. similarly point out how French exceptionalism eschews its participation in the Caribbean slave trade. (2009, 476). They also affirm how exceptionalist discourses are complicit with cultural essentialism and national characterologies which can be either mobilized to celebrate (or on occasion denounce) one’s own nation or denounce (or celebrate) another nation (ibid.).

Sousa Santos’s abovementioned affirmation — “always more colonial than capitalist” (BPC 10) — links the relation between industrial capitalism and colonialism in a roughly proportional cause and effect dyad. Despite the interconnection between capitalism and colonialism being commonplace, the sociologist’s proposition is chaotic.72 Though he clarifies that he conceives “of the colonial relation as one of the unequal power relations on which modern capitalism is grounded, but not the only one” (BPC 16), it is not clear in what way Portuguese colonialism “was always more colonial than capitalist” (ibid, 10; italics mine) and in such a case how can it be (apologetically represented as)

organization moved to Madeira and other Atlantic Islands, and later to colonial America. (Goody 2006, 115)

72. E. H. Miélan, for exemple, asserts how systematic policies of capital accumulation were derived from core countries’ continuous processes of colonization, exploitation, and domination of the periphery. (2007, ix)
a *subaltern colonialism*? As Cooper puts it, Portugal, being economically weaker, “fell back on its empire and sought to extract more from it, exacerbating conflict even as the international climate turned Portugal from a laggard but acceptable colonial partner to a pariah” (1994, 1537).

Sousa Santos’s affirmation — “If ever Prospero disguised himself as Caliban, it was with the mask of the Portuguese” (BPC 35), reminds of Levi Strauss’s caveat — “a mask is chiefly not what it represents but what it transforms, that is, what it chooses not to represent” (quoted in Merquior 1986, 78). Thus the sociologist’s preceding enunciation — “more colonial than capitalist” (BPC 10) elides, to borrow Joseph Conrad’s words — “the criminality of inefficiency” (quoted in Parry 2004, 134) of Portuguese imperialism. Besides, it purports a singularly economic approach to imperialism, an unsustainable point as Ashcroft holds:

Empirical studies reveal that the flow of profit from colony to metropolis was not as great as had often been supposed during this period. Such was Prime Minister Disraeli’s reluctance about maintaining costly colonies that Britain’s involvement in the post–1880s scramble is better explained by political strategy and competitive nationalism than by economic considerations. (2007, 114)

Drawing up a profit and loss balance sheet of imperialism is undoubtedly a conceptual paradox. As Moore-Gilbert astutely observes that while the differences of histories of colonization must always be respected, “it seems invidious and distasteful to insist on a kind of beauty parade” in order to press claims to have been the most oppressed colonial subjects or to be the most
‘truly’ postcolonial subjects” (1997, 12). The enunciation *more colonial than capitalist* performs a similar parade albeit on the colonizers’ side. On the one hand, Portugal’s marginocentrism is presented in neo–lusotropical terms, on the other hand, Portugal as sharing some indicators of the first world and some of the third world (Sousa Santos 1985, 869) essentializes both the core and the periphery.

Thus, Sousa Santos’s *semi-periphery/subaltern* hypothesis, which he draws from Wallerstein, is Eurocentric and, to borrow Frank’s phrase, proposed “under the European street light” (1998, 30). The semiperipherality premise exceptionalizes capitalism as essentially a Western phenomenon which later diffused outwards towards the rest of the world. The reformulations of Sousa Santos’s arguments do not render it less Eurocentric as compared to the ones in BPC. As Wood points out, “to mount an effective challenge to Eurocentric neglect of Western imperialism requires us to take into account the very specific conditions in which traditional forms of colonialism were transformed into capitalist types of imperialism” (Wood 2002, 32–33; emphasis mine). If Sousa Santos is implying colonialism as a social relation in terms of imperialism that survives colonialism as a political relation (2010, 231), then in what manner
“political colonialism is still crucial for understanding and explaining contemporaneity” (ibid., 240) in the space of official Portuguese language?73

In BPC Portugal’s semiperipheral condition was inscribed in the modern capitalist world system beginning from seventeenth century, privileging the exogenous factors while endogenous factors like undecidability and lack of pattern were mentioned as well:

Portuguese colonialism carries with itself the stigma of an undecidability that must be the main object of Portuguese postcolonialism. Has colonization by an incompetent, reluctant, originally hybrid Prospero resulted in undercolonization or overcolonization? A colonization that was particularly empowering or disempowering for the colonized? (19; emphasis added)

Describing the duration of Portuguese colonialism until the twentieth century as a historical anachronism (2010, 240) the sociologist’s working hypothesis was “that the other colonizer also played a crucial role in this regard, with both during the Berlin Conference and at the end of World War II, the conflicts and mutual conveniences of core capitalist countries dictating the continuity of the Portuguese colonial empire” (BPC 19–20; italics added). Interestingly Calafate Ribeiro, who otherwise draws on the sociologist’s “semi-peripheral imperialism,” perhaps unwittingly contradicts him on the raison d’etre of Portuguese imperialism. Eric Hobsbawm argues “that the Portuguese African Empire was merely the result of a failure of the great European powers to reach

73. For Osterhammel (2005), Imperialism is “a more comprehensive concept” as compared to colonialism and empires often treat colonies “not just as ends in themselves, but also [as] pawns in global power games.” (quoted in Steinmetz 2013, 10).
an agreement between themselves” (quoted in Calafate Ribeiro 2002, 149), an argument shared by Sousa Santos (BPC 20) as well. Rather, Calafate Ribeiro claims that the other European powers “did not simply leave a disputed territory in Portuguese hands” (2002, 149). “Portugal was not part of the conflicts and mutual conveniences” (BPC 20) can be read as an attempt to sanitize Portuguese imperial history as the following words by David Murphy reveal:

The fragmented map of contemporary Africa bears witness to the frenzied ‘scramble for Africa’, which saw the major — and even some of the minor — European powers colonize much of the continent in the late nineteenth century: Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain all possessed African colonies at one time. (2007, 63)

The Portuguese sociologist identifies this moment of Prospero after the Berlin Conference which set the effective occupation of the territories as a condition to maintain dominion itself. According to him, once the partition of Africa was accomplished and in order to “secure its presence in Africa, Portugal feels compelled to act as the other European powers” (BPC 30). 75

MacQueen recounts how with the Ultimatum, Portugal had been forced to abandon its own transcontinental plans to link its two southern African colonies,

74. This populist tendency is not exclusive in BPC, another example goes:
But my description of Portugal’s ‘metaphysical colonialism’ was not only an allusion to the spiritualist and religious claims of Portuguese expansion, blessed by the Catholic Church, but an ironic title for a chapter devoted to the vicissitudes of the Portuguese rule. Portugal could be said to belong to that group of small nations that feeling themselves threatened by extinction, (in the Portuguese case absorption by Spain), turn into oppressors and exploiters of other peoples. (Llyod-Jones et al. 1993, 138)

75. On the contrary, Rothermund claims — “early contacts with some African colonies, however, enabled the Portuguese to participate in the Scramble for Africa in a manner quite out of proportion to its actual position in the concert of European powers.” (2006, 222–223)
Mozambique and Angola, to give it possession of a single band of Africa from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic which was however incompatible with Britain’s north-south axis. He also draws attention how it also wrought long-term damage to diplomacy inside Europe for far from translating its grudge into war in Europe, Portugal, like France, would eventually ally itself with Britain in the First World War (2007, 47–48). Eliding this imperial dream Sousa Santos states:

the Portuguese colonial cycle was, amongst all European colonialisms, the longest, having preceded by three centuries the nineteenth-century capitalist colonialism of core countries. The latter, once consolidated, defined the rules of colonial practice — dramatically stated in the Berlin Conference (1884) and the Ultimatum (1890) as well as the rules of colonial discourse — racist science, progress, the “white man’s burden,” and so on. Portuguese colonialism adopted these rules in ways and degrees that are still largely to be assessed. (BPC 12)

In fact, as Richard Hall narrated, a former foreign minister, João de Andrade Corvo, told the Lisbon parliament that in his opinion only through the development of the colonies Portugal would “be able to take the place she

76. Lourenço renders a psychoanalytic reading:
When, in 1890, England, seat of empire and of science and democracy, sent us its ultimatum about territorial relations in the south of Africa, the cultural psychodrama provoked by our intelligentsia collapsed like a house of cards . . . It was in the cultural and symbolic area that it constituted a trauma. The first reaction of a humiliated Portugal, after desperate and pathetic protests to England, was to go to that part of Africa that remained ours. ‘To occupy it,’ since, all of a sudden, it was not there the way we had imagined it to be. (2003, 56)

77. The oppression that results for the Africans under Portuguese rule cannot be concealed even by the overdeveloped mythology of the ‘White Man’s Burden, Portuguese-style’ (Minter 1972, 18). Pointing to the discrepancy between Portuguese imperial dream in Africa and domestic reality, Calafate Ribeiro says — “The concept of a Brazil in Africa articulated in the Rose-Coloured Map was a Portuguese idea that conformed to the European imperialist impulses of the time. It failed because it disregarded the reality of the metropolis — a decadence and dependency in a peripheral Portugal.” (2002, 150)
deserves in the concert of nations; only on their preservation and prosperity does her future greatness depend” (quoted in Hall 1996, 473). The British Ultimatum to Portugal was part of the effective occupation as defined by the Berlin Conference but Sousa Santos eschews Portugal’s own imperial dream and renders a Eurocentric reading of this moment of Portuguese Prospero.

4. Subverting the Portuguese de-colonization (hi)story

In BPC, Sousa Santos had argued that “situated postcolonialism presupposes careful historical and comparative analyses of the different colonialisms and their aftermaths,” one of the crucial questions being “who decolonizes what and why” (20). This situated postcolonialism is same as what he later rephrases as “the provincialization, or decentering, of Europe,” which must take into account not only the different colonialisms, but also the different processes of decolonization (2010, 236). In BPC, the sociologist had stated that the moment of the decolonizing Portuguese Prospero is distinct from the equivalent moment of the European Prospero:

First, the two historical decolonization processes, the independence of Brazil and the independence of the African colonies, occurred concomitantly with profound progressive transformations in Portuguese society, the liberal revolution in the first case, and the April revolution in

78. As Fine observes, if France’s psychological commitment to assimilating colonies, and its fear of losing international political importance, is an explanation for delayed decolonization, a similar phenomenon may have occurred in Portugal. (2007, 5)
79. In other words, most of Africa remained outside the jurisdiction of international law, and was at best only indirectly integrated into the operations of the concert of Europe. The Berlin Conference aimed to end this situation and to shape a basis for a legally regulated occupation of Africa. (Ames 2005, 98)
As a result, in both decolonization processes there is a shared sense of liberation, both for the colonizer and the colonized. This shared sense created a certain complicity between the Portuguese political class and the political class of the new countries, particularly in the case of the African independences. (34; emphasis added)

Sousa Santos repeats the preceding argument in another instance as — “in the space of official Portuguese language, at least as concerns Africa and East Timor, the decolonization processes form part of the political actuality” (2010, 240). The sociologist continues, for centuries in many regions of the Portuguese empire “the relations between the Portuguese and the local populations could not, in practical terms, claim any juridico-political link external to themselves or to the encounters that originated them or resulted from them” (BPC 12). Such ahistorical enunciations by the sociologist not only deny agency to the colonized but also sanitize Portuguese imperial History.

Ali Mazrui points out how Eurocentrism shortchanges the achievements of other people and cultures providing the following relevant example:

Finally, the impact of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau on the recent history of Portugal. A Eurocentric approach to the story may claim that Portugal moved rapidly towards giving independence to its colonies as soon as the fascist political order in Lisbon collapsed in April 1974. An alternative approach is to see the collapse of the fascist political order in Lisbon as being itself caused by anti-colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. By fighting for their independence, the Africans in Portuguese colonies prepared the ground for the democratization and modernization of Portugal in the last quarter of the twentieth century. (2009, xv)

Sousa Santos’s description of this process as a “historical anachronism” is problematic because not only does it disavow the specificity of various colonial
histories within the Portuguese empire, it also betrays a lusocentric reading of imperial History as evident in his words — “why did it last so long, much longer than hegemonic colonialism, and why, in the case of the more important colonies, did its end require such a prolonged liberation war?” (BPC 19). Not only is the collapse of the fascist political order in Lisbon shortchanged for the end of the colonial wars, but as Power rightly points out — “very little attention has been paid to the crucial contributions made in the defence of Portugal’s African colonies by African defence forces” (2001, 470), especially in the second half of Portugal’s 13-year war, when many more African soldiers in comparison to Portuguese soldiers lost their lives defending the empire. (ibid.).

Thus turning Sousa Santos’s preceding question, how can we comprehend the decolonization specificity of the not so important colonies whose end did not require such a prolonged liberation war. Again Mazrui provides the anti-Eurocentric reading to the sociologist’s discourse of historical anachronism and the extra-longevity of Portuguese empire:

Portugal had until then turned its back on every progressive force and movement in European history — the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Reformation, the French and American revolutions, the industrial revolution. By the last third of the twentieth century Portugal had become the most backward European nation after Albania. It took African liberation fighters struggling for their independence to shock Portugal out of its historic lethargy at last. The anti–colonial wars ended the old order and inaugurated at length the modernization, democratization and re-Europeanization of Portugal. Once again Africans had helped to make European history. (Mazrui 2009, xv–xvi)
Sousa Santos’s reading also lends weight to Cooper’s argument that one of the problems in the decolonization story is that it “lends itself to be read backwards and to privilege the process of ending colonial rule over anything else that was happening in those years” (1997, 6). Decolonization histories call in for privileging the colonized’s agency. On the contrary, Sousa Santos’s enunciation—“the Portuguese were unable to govern their colonies efficaciously, and were therefore unable as well to prepare their emancipation orderly” (BPC 35; italics added) deprives the colonized’s agency. White renders an ex-centric reading of the same by foregrounding Africa’s central role in the ‘Carnation Revolution’ of April 1974. According to him, following the defeat in Guinea-Bissau and in order to escape the blame game (as their seniors had been blamed for the loss of Goa in 1961), the mutiny of the captains in the Portuguese army was termed a revolution (1999, 50).

Besides rendering a Eurocentric reading of the decolonization History of Portuguese-Africa, the sociologist claims “no other colonial power transferred the capital of the Empire to its own colony, nor was ever in any other country such anxiety about the ascendancy of the colony” (BPC 35). In fact, for him, the fleeing of the Portuguese crown to Brazil “was an act of representational rupture without parallel in western modernity” (ibid., 18). This elides the role of England which supported the Portuguese Royal family’s flee to Brazil in 1808 and the temporary occupation of Goa from 1799–1813, rendering it as a British Protectorate undertaken under the pretext to ward off the onward march of
Napoleon. Also, Rio’s colonial underdevelopment is conveniently erased as in the consideration of moving the capital to the hinterlands due to its “urban inadequacies to be the capital of the Portuguese Empire: its climate and its lack of adequate infrastructure, for instance” hence promoting its cosmetic Europeanization (Lins Ribeiro 2011, 292). The following part problematizes *reprovincialization of Europe* as proposed by the Portuguese sociologist.

5. *Reprovincialization of Europe or intercolonial narcissism?*

Elaborating the third dimension of *oppositional postcolonialism*, Sousa Santos proposes — “a reprovincialization of Europe that pays attention to the inequalities inside Europe and the ways in which they affected the different European colonialisms” (2010, 236). Not missing the antonymic resemblance with Dipesh Chakrabarty’s “provincializing Europe” (2000) and more importantly, the Eurocentric nature of both of the discourses; 80 it remains unclear how the Portuguese sociologist intends to delineate “the specificities of Portuguese or Spanish colonialism *vis-à-vis* British or French colonialism” (2010, 236) from the vantage point of “‘postcolonial’ return of rhetoric of colonial difference” (Madureira 2008b, 202). In fact, Aijaz Ahmad puts forth a different picture:

80. Sanjay Seth argues that “‘Provincializing Europe’ is thus neither a matter of rejecting Europe or European thought, nor principally of developing historical accounts that show Europe to be less unique and central than the conventional historical accounts would have it.” For Chakrabarty, it is meant “to explore the capacities and limitations of certain European social and political categories . . . in the context of non-European life-worlds.” (2009, 335)
Now, countries of Western Europe and North America have been deeply tied together over roughly the last two hundred years; capitalism itself is so much older in these countries; the cultural logic of late capitalism is so strongly operative in these metropolitan formations . . . Historically, these countries were never so closely tied together; Peru and India simply do not have a common history of the sort that Germany and France, or Britain and the United States, have . . . (1992, 104)

The Portuguese sociologist does not elaborate the register on which “inequalities inside Europe” (2010, 236) shall be explicated. As Stam et al. point out that asymmetries of power influence the discourse and rhetoric of comparison and “the structure of the amnesiac denials of commonalities between various empire-nations recalls of the ‘denegations’ (‘je sais mais quand même’ or ‘I know, but still . . .’) theorized by psychoanalysis” (2012b, 26–27). Thus, Sousa Santos’s silence on how to elaborate inequalities inside Europe is resounding, similar to the problem already pointed earlier with regards to the term subaltern.

One of the underlining arguments of Portuguese colonizer’s subalternity is the complex identity games in the Portuguese time-space — “Portuguese were always on both sides of the mirror as Prospero reflected in Caliban’s mirror, and as Caliban reflected in Prospero’s mirror” (BPC 21). Regarding the first case, the sociologist argues — “the features invoked by the Portuguese to construct the image of the primitive and savage peoples in their colonies from the fifteenth century onwards are quite similar to those ascribed to themselves at
the time by North European travellers, traders, and monks . . .” (ibid.). Unlike the Spanish case, the Portuguese ‘Black Legend’ is less familiar, and its foundational moment is traced to the late sixteenth century, when a Dutchman named Jan Huygen van Linschoten published an account of his travels through the Estado da Índia. “The ‘Black Legend’ of Portuguese India turns out to be a story not so much of decadence and corruption as of Portuguese ‘blackness’ — a way of explaining imperial decline by means of racial inferiority” (Nocentelli 2007, 206).

Imperialism involved dominance and hegemony not just between the colonizer and the colonized but also amongst the colonizers themselves. From the first French colony which was a case ‘preventive’ conquest, to ‘the scramble for Africa’ the history of colonization is one long story of power play. As Brown puts it:

Manichean dichotomies and their entrenchment in collective memories and ideologies build the foundations of imperialism, colonialism, racism, slavery, military aggression, exploitation of minorities, and propaganda wars. Debate is often silenced through redirection of public attention to other topics. The construction of the ‘black legend’ of Spanish atrocities in the New World became a way for English imperialists to distinguish their supposedly benign project of colonialism from the destructive one of the Spanish. (quoted in Meusburger et al. 2011, 55)

Overall, the Portuguese Black Legend did not become as widespread as the Spanish one because the English already were in a dominant position with

81. As once Gramsci remarked in another case that is was poetic justice for Europeans to be looked down on as they so often looked down on others. (quoted in Kiernan 1995, 175)
82. For most of the nineteenth century, mainstream Anglo-Saxonists considered the Irish to be racially inferior — indeed, closely akin to Africans and high in the “index of nigrescence.” (quoted in Hogan 2004, 93)
But in the case of Goa, travellers like Richard Burton made sure that the Portuguese Black Legend kept proliferating. With over twenty travel books to his credit, *Goa, and the Blue Mountains; or Six Months of Sick Leave* (1851) received the least attention. Burton had been ordered to convalesce from a severe case of cholera for six months when he was in the British Army Regiment stationed in Sind. Instead of going to the more popular destinations amongst his fellow countrymen, he decided to go to Goa in 1847.

Burton’s biographer, Dane Kennedy commenting on the traveller’s understanding of race, observes — “yet his most sustained comments on race as a physical or biological category appear in his reflections on the Portuguese in India” (Kennedy 2007, 50). For Burton, the cause of the Portuguese imperial decay lay in the short-sighted policy of the Portuguese intermarrying and identifying themselves with Hindoos of the lowest castes (ibid.). The defaming discourses of Spanish and Portuguese colonialism have been so strong that they continue well into post–colonial discourses. Ashis Nandy identifying two types of colonialism, chooses to call the first as the rapacious banditry who robbed without a civilizing mission, and the second as more insidious colonists who were hard-working, middle-class missionaries (quoted in Gillen and Ghosh 2007, 144). Edward Said has also been cited as following this classification of colonialism. For him, “. . . the major distinguishing characteristic of Western Empires (Roman, Spanish and Portuguese) was that the earlier empires were bent on loot, as Conrad puts it, on the transport of treasure from the colonies to
Europe, with very little attention to development, organization, or system within the colonies themselves” (quoted in Greer et al. 2007, 347).

In order to better understand the above enunciations, let us refer to Mignolo who argues in the afterword to the book *Rereading the Black Legend*:

The Black Legend is, first and foremost, an internal conflict in Europe and for that reason I will describe it as an *imperial internal difference*. But the narrators of the Black Legend, initiated and propelled by England, shared with the Spaniards the Christian cosmology that distinguished itself from the Muslims, the Turks, and the Russian Orthodox. . . . Thus, calling the Turks and the Moors barbarians was a way to construct the *external imperial difference*. By external I mean that the difference was with non–Western non–Christians and, therefore, non–Europeans. (2007, 316–320)

Sousa Santos’s argument conflates the stereotypical binaries “invoked by the Portuguese to construct the image of the primitive and savage peoples in their colonies” with those by the North European travelers, traders, and monks to describe the Portuguese (BPC 21). What is conveniently elided in these discourses of *imperial internal difference*, for obvious reasons, is well put by Robert Stam and Ella Shohat — “the ground for colonialist racism was prepared by the *limpieza de sangre*, by the expulsion edicts against Jews and Muslims, by the Portuguese expansion into West Africa, and by the transatlantic

---

83. It would be of interest to read *imperial internal difference* alongside Robert Young’s trope of ‘colonialism as a desiring machine’ (2005, 93); the concept of colonial grafting and the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s term “interior frontiers.” Grafting has been explained “as a fitting metaphor for the colonial fact; all the more so as colonialism has been a long story of borrowing and appropriation.” (Acherāiōu 2008, 5) As Fichte deployed it, an interior frontier entails two dilemmas: the purity of the community is prone to penetration on its interior and exterior borders . . . (quoted in Cooper and Stoler 1997, 199)
slave trade” (2012b, 373). Linking “the various 1492s, that of the Inquisition, the expulsion of the Moors, the ‘discovery’ i.e. the conquest of the Americas, and the beginnings of TransAtlantic slavery, first of Indians and then of Africans,” they both demonstrate in Unthinking Eurocentrism (1994) how the limpieza de sangre which was a part of the Reconquista discourse was deployed in the Americas where “the anti-Semitic ‘blood libel’ discourse was transformed into to an anti-cannibalist discourse” (ibid., 16–17).

Fernando Cabo Aseguinolaza (2010) rightly identifies the propagandist dimension to the change in the European geopolitical and geo-cultural equilibrium exemplified by the so-called Spanish black legend appearing first in Italy in the sixteenth century, which then continued its development in the Netherlands, and was accepted by the French and English in the eighteenth-century. “The black legend started as the reactive propaganda of those who viewed themselves as objects of occupation, but evolved into an instrument in the hands of the emerging powers — claiming for themselves the prestige of rationality and modernity — against the declining Iberia” (Aseguinolaza et al. 2010, 11). Though Sousa Santos belabours so much on the specificity of

84. Newitt contrasts the hostility towards Jews and New Christians, amounting on occasions to a kind of mass paranoia, with the attitude towards Portugal’s black population. According to him, by the middle years of the sixteenth century estimates suggested that the slave population of Lisbon may have been somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of the total population of the city, with significant slave populations in other regions. (2005, 253)
85. Also, crucially, “The Portuguese were the first to get rid of their criminals and their delinquent offenders by sending them away to serve their sentence elsewhere . . . From 1415 on, following the first conquest of Ceuta, every ship which left to explore the coasts of Africa carried its quota of degredados. In fact, the first law related to this practice was passed in 1434.” (Ferro 2005, 138)
Portuguese colonialism, he misses a critical differentiation between the stereotypes associated with the various colonies across the span of Portuguese empire. Rendering a possible distinction between a ‘religiously coded racism’ and a ‘color-coded racism,’ the editors of *Rereading the Black Legend* clarify that for the western European Renaissance empires “it was a racism that was subtended by religious differences.” (2007, 1). The sociologist’s ‘cafrealization’ argument remains oblivious to such geo-historical specificity. Luis Adão da Fonseca offers the following interesting observations worth quoting at length:

. . . I believe it is not too far from the truth to say that it was probably as a result of the cultural experience in the Pacific, namely in China and Japan, and during the second half of the sixteenth century, that the Portuguese developed, in the words of Peter Burke, the ‘repertoire of concepts available to express their [group] identity as Europeans’ for the first time. As a matter of fact, their previous contacts in Africa and India, partly due to the importance of the medieval inheritance of a certain idea of the Africans and the Indians, partly due to the endurance of the legacy of the crusades, would not have made it possible for Portuguese culture to free itself from pre-existing concepts of intercivilizational dialectics. . . . Thus, for the Portuguese of the 1500s Europe represents a framework of cultural references that extends beyond the geographical boundaries of the continent and encompasses the history of all cultures. (1998, 38–42)

It is out of scope here to delineate the debate of configuration of *race as racism* (Mignolo 2007), suffice it to present the contestation that Sousa Santos elides the historical materiality and specificity of how “in the course of centuries, Portugal was pictured by the countries of northern Europe as a country with
similar social and cultural characteristics to those attributed by the European countries, including Portugal, to the overseas colonized peoples” (2010, 236).

When transposing ‘the images of periphery’ onto Portuguese subaltern/semiperipheral discourses, it is rather crucial to understand that these images were “a topos, a set of references, a congeries of characteristics” (Said 1979, 177), which as Said has argued were deployed for ‘Orientalizing’ purposes, representing the ‘other’ in an ‘essentialized’ form in order to emphasise the difference and distance between the familiar (Europe, We, Us) and the strange (Orient, East, Them) (quoted in Bush 2006, 157). Thus, it is arguable what Sousa Santos implies by claiming that while the Portuguese claimed miscegenation as a humanistic triumph or a clever colonialist device, the European Prospero’s gaze inscribed on their skin miscegenation itself as a burden (BPC 22).

Also placing Portuguese semiperipheral colonialism in a consequential dyadic bind with the country’s semiperipherality (whether due to endogenous or exogenous reasons), in/advertently subscribes to Eurocentrism that the European colonizers were inherently superior and strong enough to undertake colonization. Also, by subtly extricating Portugal’s active participation in “the

86. Mignolo also affirms, “the imperial difference works by using some of the features of the colonial difference and applying them to regions, languages, people, states, etc., that cannot be colonized. A degree of inferiority is attributed to the “imperial other” that has not been colonized in that it is considered (because of language, religion, history, etc.) somewhat behind (time) in history or, if its present is being considered, marginal (space).” (2007, 474) 87. Jack Goldstone explicates this paradox in another manner:
West’s oppressive practices — colonialism, slave trading, imperialism” (ibid.),
its colonial history is rendered as a contingent ‘accident’ in terms of a deviant
colonialism, an ‘incompetent colonialism’ (to use another Portuguese scholar
Ricardo Roque’s words 2010, 20)88 and therefore by default a colonisateur de
bonne volonté (well-meaning colonialist, term associated with Albert Camus).
Having argued above that reprovincialization of Europe as proposed by Sousa
Santos rests more in intercolonial narcissism, the following part critically
appreciates his Global/South discourse.

6. Global /South of nowhere

Demarcating from the dominant postmodern and poststructuralist
thought, the Portuguese sociologist places the relations North/South at the core
of the reinvention of social emancipation through the metaphor of South and as
an epistemological, political and cultural orientation proposes that “we
defamiliarize ourselves from the imperial north in order to learn from the
South” (2010, 231). He adds the caveat “that the South itself is a product of
empire, and thus learning from the South requires as well defamiliarization vis-

the richest European nations did not become rich because they took more treasure
from other parts of the world or because they had empires or slavery— as we have
seen, the European countries with the largest empires, the most treasure, and slavery
(namely Spain and Portugal) generally fared poorly after 1800. Rather, it was because
workers in the richer countries — especially England, but also the Netherlands and
Belgium — became more productive than workers elsewhere in Europe and more
productive than workers anywhere in the world. (2009, 95)

88. Sousa Santos refers to how the Portuguese society emerges as an ‘anomalous’ social
entity in comparison to the First World and the Third World. (1985, 869)
à-vis the imperial South, which is to say, vis-à-vis all that in the South is the result of the colonial capitalist relation” (ibid.). Further, according to him “you only learn from the South to the extent that the South is conceived of as resistance to the domination of the north, and what you look for in the South is what has not been totally destroyed or disfigured by such domination” (ibid.). It is not quite comprehensible how to conceive the South, itself a product of empire, essentially in its resistance to the domination of the north or look for in the South what has not been totally destroyed or disfigured by colonial capitalist relation. Noor Al-Abbood’s caution is quite relevant here — “that the view that colonialism completely destroyed native pre-colonial culture must not be simply replaced by another affirming an unproblematic survival of this culture” (2012, 125).

Also, these two terms do not demystify the discourse on South — imperial South (which reproduces in the South the logic of the North taken as universal) and the anti-imperial South (2008, 258), for as the sociologist affirms — “at the farthest margins it is even more difficult to distinguish between what is inside and outside the margin, and even if that were possible, it is doubtful that such a distinction would make any difference” (2010, 232–233). If indeed such a distinction does not make any difference then what shall be the nature of “an intercultural dialogue and translation among different critical knowledges and practices: South-centric and North-centric, popular and scientific, religious and secular, female and male, urban and rural and so forth” (2008, 259) which
Sousa Santos terms as the *ecology of knowledges*. The sociologist raises the issue of externality by posing that what needs to be decided is whether the radical critique of western modernity can be made from inside or if it presupposes the externality of the victims, highlighting the example of Enrique Dussel who proposes *transmodernity* to designate the alternative the victims present to western modernity by way of resistance. Not agreeing completely with Dussel’s view about that the necessity of being outside western modernity in order to formulate the concept of postcolonialism, Sousa Santos submits “that counterposing the postmodern and the postcolonial absolutely is a mistake, but also, by the same token, that the postmodern is far from responding to the concerns and sensibilities generated by postcolonialism” (2010, 227).89

On the occasion of the conference “Global South, Global North” Sousa Santos was asked in an interview that a recurring phrase in his work — “there will be no global justice without global cognitive justice” — is related to the fact that Western modernity has been built by eclipsing and destroying other knowledge and so how can knowledge be democratised without lapsing into relativism (Sousa Santos 2011b).90 He responds that while living in a slum in

89. In fact, Hartley Dean observes that an *epistemology of the South* premised on an ethical dimension which Sousa Santos calls an ‘axiology of care’ “might be construed as a eudaimonic ethic that resonates, on the one hand, with the feminist ethic of care and on the other with Marxist conceptions of radical need.” He continues, the Portuguese sociologist suggests in “a characteristically obtuse way” “that clues to the future lie in the present and this might be taken to imply more pragmatic and strategic approaches to human need and social development.” (2010, 176).

90. The interview took place in Barcelona at the beginning of 2011, addressed at the CIDOB foundation in the ambit of the IV Training Seminar on Intercultural Dynamics. Interview
Rio de Janeiro he saw “those marginalised people living in squatter communities had a great deal of life’s wisdom” (2013, 728). 91 For him, an alternative to not recognising other knowledge lies in the understanding that “if we retain not only the superiority, but also exclusiveness in terms of the rigour and validity of scientific knowledge,” (Sousa Santos 2011b) a large part of the world’s population shall be left in a state of dispossession. The reason he attributes is — “many of them, like us, are not used to dealing with scientific, philosophical or theological knowledge — that is the three major branches of knowledge that have emerged from modernity” (ibid.; italics added).

The sociologist continues — “if we claim a monopoly of true knowledge, it is because it really is the knowledge that we handle better than anyone else in the world, which is why it usually favours our positions” (2011b; italics added) and the marginalized population continue to suffer the consequences of the application of this knowledge either in the form of policies or agencies of the global North or in the case of the South through local elites who act in the interests of the global North (ibid.). Sousa Santos touches upon the contentious hierarchical division of academic labour, which he repeats in the following published in the Revista Metropolis with his quote highlighted — “The South is here next door.”

91. As he shares in an interview how in 1970 when he went to Brazil to do field work for his doctoral dissertation on “the social organization and construction of parallel legality in ‘illegal’ communities, the favelas or squatter settlements” he decided to do participant observation and lived for several months in one of the largest favelas in Rio. (Sousa Santos 2013, 728)
enunciation—“if I want to go to the moon, I cannot go by using indigenous or peasant knowledge, I need the scientific and technological knowledge of the West,” but in order to preserve the biodiversity of the planet, indigenous knowledge is needed because biodiversity might be destroyed with scientific knowledge (ibid.)⁹²

The preceding example clearly betrays a seduction of, to use the words of Marcelo C. Rosa, the kind of traditional vision of the social sciences which posited the superiority of the colonizer as a generic and civilized being (2014, 5). According to the Brazilian sociologist, in following Sousa Santos’s *ecology of knowledges* “wouldn’t the search for a non-hierarchical point in common between scientific knowledge (of the North) and tradition knowledge (of the South)” be precisely the driver of the ‘liberal-democratic-Western’ project?” (2014, 4–5).⁹³ The following excerpt from the mentioned interview exemplifies the mystification of the Portuguese sociologist’s use of the term *South* —

---

⁹² In Marcelo C. Rosa’s words through such “exemplary terms coined by the epistemology of the North, aren’t we, in fact, grouping them in the categories that the colonizer-capitalist-globalizer subject created to fit them into a hierarchical order for forms of knowledge?” (2014, 5)

Or to appropriate Bush’s words, “there is also a backlash against what some see as the politically correct romanticization of the “primitive.” (2006, 208)

⁹³ In another instance, Sousa Santos enunciates:

> From what perspective can the different knowledges be identified? How can scientific knowledge be distinguished from non–scientific knowledge? How can we distinguish between the various non–scientific knowledges? How can we distinguish non–Western knowledge from Western knowledge? If there are various Western knowledges and various non–Western knowledges, how do we distinguish between them? What do hybrid knowledges, mixing Western and non–Western components, look like? (2007, 18)
Alvarez: These days, you don’t even have to travel to the South to gain access to other knowledge, and in fact the South is a kind of metaphor. In cities like this one...
- Sousa Santos: The South is here, right next door.
- Alvarez: In impassable ghettos, in various types and spaces of exclusion.
- Sousa Santos: Of course, the South is that. They are other cultures that live with us and for which there is often a situation that I call an “abyssal line”, or in other words a social apartheid in which we can live with people from other cultures but we are scared of them; we want them to do their work or provide us with their services, but we don’t want them to bother us, which is something that happens a great deal in Europe. In other words, that is the terrible idea of tolerance, an extremely arrogant concept because it does not really allow you to enrich yourself with the knowledge of the South, of the South in that sense, as a metaphor for oppressed and excluded classes and groups, for the minorities in our cities who live within their communities and who have great difficulty in joining official society, going to university, sharing knowledge . . . That is the South, the metaphor of exclusion. (2011b)

In this interview, Sousa Santos uses the phrase *many of them, like us* (italicized above as well), which by presumption can be said to include Portugal and Spain (the interview took place in Barcelona).

A critical question arises, what kind of *an intercultural dialogue and translation* can be understood in this situation of migrant-workers facing racism designated here as social apartheid and the sociologist’s repudiating tone towards the Global North for losing the opportunity to enrich itself with the knowledge of the South due to its schizophrenic attitude? If, as according to the Portuguese sociologist, the double premise of the *Alice project* is that the

94. ALICE is a research project (began in July 2011 and will continue for five years), coordinated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos and financed by the European Research Council (ERC), seeking to re-think and renovate socio-scientific knowledge by drawing upon the sociologist’s “Epistemologies of the South.”
Eurocentric world has not much to teach to the wider world anymore and is almost incapable of learning from the experience of such a wider world, given the colonialist arrogance that still survives (2013, 735–736), then what/how can an intercultural dialogue and translation be realized? And can such a dialogue be even initiated without an adequate decolonializing of the lopsided power equations?

Elaborating an international research project, Reinventing Social Emancipation, the sociologist terms the five selected countries as semiperipheral — Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, India and Portugal (Mozambique added as peripheral ‘control’ case) — as occupying “an intermediate position within the world system in terms of levels of development as measured by conventional standards such as those used by the UN, and located in different regions of the world” (Sousa Santos and Nunes 2004, 2). In another instance, the sociologist opines that in spite of the most recent transformations of the world economy there are countries of intermediary development which perform the role of intermediation between the core and the periphery of the world system, in particular countries like Brazil, Mexico and India, adding that “the first two countries only came to recognize their multicultural and pluri–ethnic characters at the end of the 20th century” (2001a, 214).

If, according to Sousa Santos, Global South refers “to the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions and countries of the modern World system, which were
to be called, alter the Second World War, *the Third World*’ (Sousa Santos 1995, 506-519; 2007, 14; italics mine), what is the geopolitics in placing Brazil, Portugal, and India in the same semi-peripheral category? If Sousa Santos’s *epistemologies of the south* aims to highlight alternate forms of knowledge and ways of knowing in the above mentioned and other semiperipheral countries, how do we read the geopolitical space of Portuguese colonialism and its post-coloniality? Significantly, as he observes “how Southern is southern European, even when considering that for a long time Portugal was both the centre of an empire and an informal colony of England?” (2013, 732). Notwithstanding the salutary, encapsulated as catchy sloganeering and doctrinal mannerism underlying the three guidelines — to learn that there is the South; to learn to go to the South; to learn from the South and with the South (Sousa Santos 1995, 508) — the preceding arguments have attempted to show that Global/South, as employed by the Portuguese sociologist, has come to signify a free-floating signifier for the human suffering caused by global capitalism.

The metaphor of South as “the key repository of a radical and subversive political standpoint” (Darby et al. 1994, 379) has been invoked across various geopolitical discourses. The Italian writer Franco Cassano’s *Il Pensiero Meridiano* (1996) does not invariably differ from Sousa Santos’s “epistemologies of the South” (first proposed in 1995). In self-explicatory sub/titled “South of Every North” and “Inequality: South of Every Centre,” Franco Cassano concludes that the task of decolonizing European sociology and
provincializing Europe is a long, complex process and requires other voices, particularly those from the South to be heard, citing scholarship of Mignolo, De Sousa Santos, Connell, including his own. He affirms that in spite of the unequal delineation of power between North and South, which exacerbates the struggle for independence while also undermining solidarity and leading to political divisiveness and cultural prostitution, one perceives a new consciousness growing in the South (2010, 223).

While the above three names mentioned by Cassano could be selective, we are back to what is by now the quintessential definitional politics of marginal voice(s). Sousa Santos mentions Gandhi now and then, even presenting a paper titled “The Hind Swaraj as an Epistemology of the South,” but, in general, apart from tokenism and sparse references, what is the ratio of literature by marginalized across the world within the academic discourses, and pedagogy of these so-called “Southern centers of the North.” Elaborating upon the important influences in his work, in the Western academic tradition, Sousa Santos specifically mentions amongst others Marx, Ernst Bloch, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard. But in the case of influences “beyond both academic or Western tradition,” he perhaps couldn’t come up with any specific

Margaret Kohn and Keally McBride affirm that Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj so obviously draws on European ideas and authors. For them, it is obvious that the works by Tolstoy, Thoreau, Mazzini, Plato, Maine, and Ruskin were not included in the bibliography of the mentioned book merely in an attempt to gain scholarly legitimacy or cultural legibility, rather the impact of these authors is very pronounced in the Gandhian text.(2011, 147)
names and clubs in generically Eastern philosophies with Gandhi along with the favela dwellers in Rio, the indigenous movements in the Andes . . . (2013, 736).

Another example is the reading list of the seminar “New literary histories: a challenge from the South” (the chair coordinated by Roberto Vecchi and Margarida Calafate Ribeiro responsible for supervision), included in The Eduardo Lourenço Chair, University of Bologna/Camões Institute (inaugurated in December 2007), which does not include any scholars from, say, Asian countries.96 Introducing the book *Epistemologies of the South* (2009), the editors Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Maria Paula Meneses state — “Almost all of the authors included here come from geographical South — Africa, Latin America, and Asia — and inside each one of these regions they stand on the side of the metaphorical South or, in other words, on the side of those oppressed under various forms of colonial and capitalist domination” (13; translation mine).97 The point being made here is the missing *situadedness* of the Portuguese metropolitan scholars despite the fact that three of the chapters are by the mentioned editors.


97. “Quase totalidade deles provém do Sul geográfico, da África, da América Latina e da Ásia e, dentro de cada uma destas regiões, posicionam-se do lado do Sul metafórico, ou seja, do lado dos oprimidos pelas diferentes formas de dominação colonial e capitalista.” (Sousa Santos et al. 2009,13)
models of modernization derived from Eurocentric and North Atlantic paradigms” with an alternative viewpoint to claim “the right for autonomous paths to modernity for the Mediterranean and the Souths of the worlds, the so-called Global Souths” (Bouchard et al. 2012, ix). As an another point of view on the world, a “Southern” standpoint to think about the world it is a voice that today, more than ever, we must learn to hear (ibid., ix–xxvii). The inextricability between Sousa Santos and Cassano’s “South” discourse is difficult to miss. For Cassano, not only is a degree of equality for the South merely an idle, Jacobin fancy, there is more need for the South and mankind will make real progress only when the North realizes that to be saved from its pathological self, it must become more like the South (2010, 223).

Interestingly, a special issue of the journal *The Global South*, published by Indiana University Press, raises some other critical points regarding this new catch all term. In *The Global South and World Dis/Order* (2011). Levander et al. (guest editors) propose a more grounded definition of Global South as a term that “has been invented in the struggle and conflicts between imperial global domination and emancipatory and decolonial forces that do not acquiesce with global designs” (2011, 4), not in the sense of “an existing entity” as implied by Sousa Santos’s enunciation — “you only learn from the South to the extent that

98. As the Portuguese sociologist affirms — “Can the anti-imperialist South teach anything to the global North? Can the global North teach anything that is not defined by centuries of colonialism and neo-colonialism, imperialism and ethno-racial supremacy? Can both learn in such a way that one day there will be no South or North?”
(http://www.southernperspectives.net/tag/boaventura-sousa-santos)
the South is conceived of as resistance to the domination of the north, and what you look for in the South is what has not been totally destroyed or disfigured by such domination” (2010, 231). Further, the guest editors make it amply clear:

‘Global South’ is the geopolitical concept replacing ‘Third World’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union . . . A third trajectory is the force with which the global south is stepping in the very heart of the global north — the ‘South of the US’ (as Claudia Milian describes it), the ‘South of Europe’ (outlined in Dainotto’s essay) and the South East of Europe (interrogated by Grzinic). Interestingly enough, as Grzinic observes, the ‘Global South within the North’ (EU and the US) merges with the increasing presence of the South in the North enacted by massive migration from Africa, Asia, South-Central America, the Caribbean, and, alas, the ‘former Eastern Europe.’ (2011, 4–5)

They also critically “consider those aspects of Global South (locations within it or constituencies comprising it) that seem to explore re–existence (a term coined by Colombian cultural critic and activist Adolfo Albán Achinte)” (2011, 16). They prefer re–existence over resistance because it includes “aspects that invent or imagine new rules of the game imposed by the global north or that connect to epistemic political disobedience” (ibid.). Re–existence definitely assigns more agency than in Sousa Santos’s enunciation — “the South is conceived of as resistance to the domination of the north” (2010, 231). 99 Also, Achinte’s term implies that the South is not always trapped in its resistance mode to the North. Similarly, Gerald Vizenor’s concept of survivance (1994) also “goes beyond survival, endurance, and resistance to colonial domination, calling for the

99. ‘Resistance’ means that those within the grasp of the meaning-making apparatus designating Global South have already accepted the rules of the game — that there is an imperial plan with which they must comply or against which they can choose to resist. (Levander et al. 2011, 16)
colonizers and the colonized to learn from each other” (quoted in Chilisa 2012, 50). In the light of more politically nuanced terms like re–existence, and survivance, what is the valence of Global South and how can its uncritical employment be problematized?100

In fact Comaroff et al. opine not only has the term Global South become a shorthand to denote the world of non–European, postcolonial peoples and even become “synonymous with uncertain development, unorthodox economies, failed states, and nations fraught with corruption, poverty, incivility, and strife” (2012, 113). Hence, we can discern a déjà vu of the earlier academic hegemony symbolized in the west and the rest. It would be relevant here to indicate as Rahul Rao informs that in 1980, the Brandt Commission which had been charged with studying international development issues, replaced the very term ‘Third World’ by the anodyne and apolitical ‘South’ and how “the shift in terminology seemed to obscure the hierarchical relationship between rich and poor by re-presenting it in apparently egalitarian spatial terms” (2010, 26). This delineation helps to underline why and how the term Global South has acquired such instant academic purchase.

Rao rightly opines that the political and cognitive implications of the shift in discourse from Third World to “South” also point out “much of the

100. As Chilisa puts it, “for colonized, historically oppressed, and marginalized groups, intellectual imperialism speaks to the tendency to exclude and dismiss as irrelevant knowledge embedded in the cultural experiences of the people and the tendency to appropriate indigenous knowledge systems in these societies without acknowledging copyrights of the producers of this knowledge.” (2012, 55)
unfinished Third World agenda is also pushed forcefully by non-state actors . . .” (2010, 27). Referring to the protests at World Social Forum and similar platforms, he observes that much of this rhetoric though “sounds like the unfinished business of tiersmondisme, made more urgent by the preponderance of a single superpower and the interconnectedness forged by capitalist globalization (ibid.). Sousa Santos affirms that the South emerges as “protagonizing counter-hegemonic globalization, whose most consistent manifestation is the World Social Forum, which I have been following very closely” (2010, 231). Held annually since 2001, the WSF grew out of the opposition to neoliberalism from Brazilian activists and now draws well over 100,000 participants from all over the globe. The notion of epistemology of the south was adopted by the First World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre in 2001. Various criticisms have been raised regarding the political valence of this forum. While Kevin Funk talks about the tyranny of distance wherein many activists in the South are unable to travel to other continents in order to participate (2012, 22), Sidney Tarrow (2005) coins “rooted cosmopolitans” (i.e. locally based activists working on ‘global’ issues).

Underlining the lack of substantial participation of marginalized voices, Rolando Munck’s questions—“Is the WSF a little bit too Western, too ‘white’ to understand the majority world where social, religious, and ethnic conflict is quite raw, immediate, and overwhelming?” (quoted in Lindholm et al. 2010, 95). As an example, the local participants at the Kenya summit in 2007 were
asked to pay registration fee that was dropped after much protest.\textsuperscript{101} Other criticisms are related to the inability to talk about race (Conway 2013, 61), or inadequate foregrounding of South-South dynamics. For Dean, “emerging from organisations such as the anti-globalisation movement and the World Social Forum there is now also what some have characterised as a resurgent global Left (de Sousa Santos, 2006) and though “clear policy prescriptions are seldom advanced within this movement” there is resistance to social development models that originate in the global North (2013, 176).

Janet Conway observes “persistent power relations related to the legacies of coloniality within the WSF remain largely unproblematised in Santos’s work” (2011, 217–229).\textsuperscript{102} Comparing Sousa Santos’s and Mary Louise Pratt’s distinct usages of the \textit{contact zone}, she concludes that “Santos does not sufficiently recognise or problematise the coloniality of power and knowledge that remain operative in encounters (within and) between progressive movements, both across the North–South axis and within and among movements of the South” (ibid., 219–233). The political antagonism is blunted in Sousa Santos’s employment of terms like \textit{multi-secular contact zone} (BPC 10). As he puts it, “in the Portuguese case, the problem of the diagnosis is

\textsuperscript{101} After protests by poor Kenyans, the registration fee of seven dollars was dropped and the organizers said 46,000 people registered officially and another 10,000 attended after the fee was waived. http://rawstory.com/news/2006/World_Social_Forum_excluded_Kenyans_01242007.html

\textsuperscript{102} Rosa argues that “by placing his hopes in the societal forms that he recognizes in the South,” Sousa Santos “leaves aside local forms of knowledge and places excessive emphasis on the problems violently created by colonizing societies.” (2014, 5)
particularly important because it involves other societies that shared with it, under unequal conditions, a vast, multisecular contact zone — the colonial zone (2009, 4; italics mine).

Along with the enunciation of a Portuguese colonial zone, Sousa Santos also discusses its dynamics with the European zone — “since the fifteenth century, Portugal has existed, as a bundle of social representations, in two zones or time-spaces simultaneously — the European zone and the colonial zone,” and through Portugal and Spain, the European zone created the colonial zone (2011a, 403–404). Reflecting upon the question — How much does the past weigh in on the present and future of Portugal —, Sousa Santos defines the problem of the past “as the set of representations of the historical conditions that in a given society explain the deficiencies of the present, formulated as backwardness vis-à-vis the present of the more developed countries” (ibid.). Crucially, Akhil Gupta identifies that terms like ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ do not merely indicate the position of nation states in an objective matrix defined by quantitative indicators; rather and far more importantly, they are forms of identity in the post–colonial world (quoted in Nanda 2001, 182).

The Portuguese sociologist continues that “... only in core countries is the past not problematic, for it justifies and ratifies the success of the present” (2011a, 399). The socio-historical materiality of Portugal as “one of the first protagonists of the process — European expansion — that led to the
development of developed countries today,” and that of the European zone, is elided with Portugal’s tale of Being and not Being (to borrow Sousa Santos’s essay’s title) confined to the distance that has separated Portugal from these ‘developed’ countries for the past three centuries (ibid., 400). Also, the Portuguese sociologist perhaps misreads that in core countries the past is not problematic, as some scholars point out how the current mood identified in France, in particular, and in other countries in general, is one of déclinisme or sinistrose, that is pessimism about the future and a sinister sense of an irreversible decline unfolding in the present (Mathy 2011, 3). Or as Gilroy identifies how Britain ‘is in the grip of melancholia’ described as a morbid obsession with its own long gone days of glory; a ‘pathological formation’ which is “contrasted with the vibrant, ordinary multiculture emerging within the convivial metropolitan cultures of the country’s young people” (quoted in Bonnett 2010, 115).

Though the sociologist touches upon the issue of immigration in Europe while explicating the South, the elision of coloniality and socio-politics immigration within Portugal remains a disturbing blind spot. Recall the news about the Jacinto Cândido corvette deployed off the West African coast by Portuguese Navy under the EU’s FRONTEX programme which intercepted a vessel with 90 would-be African immigrants headed to the Spanish Canary
islands in August 2007. As Gilroy warns, the revisionist accounts of imperial history that have proliferated in recent years may salve the national conscience the cost of the marginality of colonial history, spurning “its substantive lessons, and obstruct the development of multiculturalism by making the formative experience of empire less profound and less potent in shaping the life of colonizing powers than it actually was” (2005, 2). Neo–lusotropicalist tenets subsume such discourses of multiculturalism within Portugal. Woollacot rightly suggests that making empire visible in metropolitan histories can be a relatively safe and easy process but making colonialism and its historical import and legacies visible as part of the metropolitan past; on the other hand, it can be quite a different undertaking, with much higher stakes (2009, 156). Thus, the present arguments reckon the obliviousness towards the imperial legacies within Portuguese past and present.

In the case of Italy, Triulzi affirms that far from being “a postcolonial country that has reckoned with its past . . . its colonial past appears to be ‘frozen’ rather than forgotten; no longer silenced, its memory is now openly exhibited in hybrid displacements and dislocations which continue to have a deep influence on both Italy and ‘Italian Africa’ ” (2006, 431–432). The present day socio-politics of immigration within Europe tends to revisit the earlier geo-
cultural divisions with Portugal, Spain, and Italy’s proximity and mediating role between Europe and Africa sanctifying them as being non-racist. But according to Daniela Flesler (2008), this “myth of cultural tolerance” prevails alongside the EU pressure (particularly from France) to strictly abide the migration and asylum policies and enact restrictive immigration and citizenship policies (quoted in Deventer et al. 2011, 350).\textsuperscript{104}

Therefore, agreeing with Rao (2010), it would be premature to announce the end of the Third World as a political project. In the light of this and given the present socio-economic crises looming over the so-called Global North, how can we appreciate critically Sousa Santos’s enunciation — “now that Portugal has \textit{earned} the periphery of Europe as its \textit{rightful place}. A periphery, in fact, \textit{entitled} to the imagination of the center” (2002, 20; italics mine). It undermines his proposal “to defamiliarize ourselves from the imperial north in order to learn from the South,” a learning that requires defamiliarization \textit{vis-à-vis} the imperial South as well (2010, 231).\textsuperscript{105} Thus, \textit{defamiliarization} appears to be misleading and underscores the criticality of deprivileging from the Global North.

\textsuperscript{104} Hansen rightly affirms—

\begin{quote}
For the sole purpose of preventing African refugees and immigrants from entering mainland Spain and the rest of the EU, the Spanish government, with support from the EU, has invested some 120 million dollars in the building of a radar system in the Strait of Gibraltar, which, as Daley (2001) puts it, is designed to serve as ‘a sort of electronic wall across the strait’ and so provide vital assistance in Spain’s and the EU’s fight against ‘illegals’ and ‘clandestine asylum seekers’. Furthermore, in Ceuta the EU has spent over 40 million dollars to erect an 8-kilometre-long perimeter wall, consisting of two parallel fences, hedged off by barbed wire entanglements and equipped with electronic sensors; all for the purpose of staving off such immigration. (Hansen 2002, 488)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{105} Giaccaria et al. affirm —
Martins observes similarly, that the mystification of Portuguese cultural ‘difference’ in Sousa Santos’s discourse is vulnerable to recuperation, “since the process of exoticisation, although negotiated in the semiperiphery, is not conducted from there, but from the mainstream centres/margins (the global north/global south)” which “limits the potential for anti-colonial resistance within Lusophone postcolonial studies” (2009, 40; italics added). This refutes the sociologist’s claim that “postcolonialism in the Portuguese space is very little post- and very much anticolonialism” (BPC 37). According to her, Sousa Santos’s proposed epistemology of the South and “his utopian emancipation project based on the metaphor of the global South, seem to have ‘absolved’ the critic from his focus on the specificities of Portugal as a ‘Calibanised Prospero’ in southern Europe” (2009, 40).

Martins affirms that Sousa Santos is “increasingly less known as a Portuguese sociologist and thinker of Portuguese ‘semiperiphery’ than as a thinker of the ‘global south’ ” and rightly observes that “the skill with which Santos is able to manipulate the theoretical codes of both the ‘south’ and the

it is important to note, however, that the process of European integration has served to ‘shift’ the internal boundaries of the Mediterranean yet again: Greece, Italy and Spain are now, for all extents and purposes, accepted as full members of the ‘Western’ club and are no longer the object — if not marginally, such as in the Anglo-American anthropological literature focused on the concepts of ‘shame and honour’ — of Orientalist imaginations. The ‘shadow line’ of alterity and (sub)alterity has clearly shifted towards the South, and is increasingly marked by the (presumed) confrontation between the West and the Islamic world. (2010, 352)
‘north’ of the postcolonial world” determines his success within and beyond Portugal:

The double displacement (geographical and epistemological) of Lusophone postcolonial discourse makes it increasingly harder to pin down, but also easier to sell (to both the global north and global south), as a marginal discourse malleable enough to be strategically complicit with both the ‘postcolonialities’ of the north and the ‘postcolonialisms’ of the south. (2009, 36–164)

For her, the logic of this double displacement is very marketable (2009, 38), but her enunciation needs to be problematized keeping in mind that with “the margins” being commodified for metropolitan consumption, the present academic geopolitics becomes complicit with what Leslie Sklair calls the transnational ideology of capitalist consumerism (1991). Thus, it is difficult to concede to Martins’s point that “there is nothing intrinsically wrong about being ‘marketable’ (2009, 38), given the present era of neoliberal academia.

Sousa Santos’s assuming phrases, like “Another knowledge is possible” (2007a), do not address with the same gusto the omnipresent nexus of knowledge and power. To borrow Mignolo’s questions — “what is the ratio between geo-historical location and knowledge production? Who is producing what kind of knowledge when and where?” (1999, 1) — such issues remain adequately unproblematized. As Mignolo puts it, “the planetary distribution of epistemology in the modern/colonial world system (since approximately 1500) has been such that some local histories have the conditions to produce global

epistemological designs and other local histories have been their recipients” (1999, 1). Sousa Santos affirms that if the criterion is political, “there is no relativism because we have to find out what we want our knowledge for, for what purposes we are going to integrate the different bodies of knowledge.”

Consider Sousa Santos’s following words:

And should we not be amazed by the wealth of knowledges that have been preserved, the ways of life, symbolic universes, and wisdoms for survival in hostile conditions that are based entirely on oral tradition? Doesn’t the fact that none of this would have been possible through science tell us something about science? (2007, 14)

Thus, agreeing with Rosa’s point, the critical question arises — isn’t such a rhetoric “more of a way of conceding the diversities of the South to the North’s need to simplify them?” (2014, 4). In his view, “this ecumenical perspective represents a sort of Northern Other, not a configuration based on own specificities that would go beyond the vague notion of traditional used throughout the work” (ibid., 4–5).107

Delineating the postcolonial face of postmodernity, Castro-Gómez argues “the ‘recognition’ that is given to non-occidental systems of knowledge is pragmatic rather than epistemical” for “the categorical distinction between ‘traditional knowledge’ and ‘science’, elaborated in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, is still in force” (Castro-Gómez 2007, 441).108 Underlining

107. Akhil Gupta employs ‘post–colonial modernity’ to critique romantic admirers of indigenous knowledge who are mirror images of modernists celebrating the purity of non-Western knowledge and who read into it all that all that modernity lacks. (quoted in Nanda 2001, 174–175)
108. Castro-Gómez succinctly puts it:
the agenda of neo–imperialism, Indian environmental activist — Vandana Shiva and other anti-globalization protesters raise vocal concern regarding the threat to so-called non-occidental knowledge from capitalization. As Castro-Gómez puts its, the tolerance of cultural diversity becoming a ‘politically correct’ value in Empire, “but only in the sense that diversity is useful for the reproduction of capital” (ibid.).

Raising questions whether “is there only one world, or are there various possible worlds,” Castro-Gómez answers that “the conditions generated by Empire, the colonial hierarchies of knowledge established by modernity persist and make it difficult to think of a world in which epistemic plurality is recognized and appreciated” for “capitalism is a machine that captures the proliferation of possible worlds and expropriates the production of ‘other’ knowledges” (2007, 444). The blind spots in Sousa Santos’s proposition of epistemologies of South become glaring as well put in Nanda words —“in their own emancipation, the people — the colonized, the marginal, the minorities, the dissidents — are expected to emancipate us all into an “alternative modernity”

‘Coloniality of power’ is the category used by some social scientists and philosophers of Latin America to describe the phenomenon by which a rigid hierarchy between different knowledge systems exists in the world. This hierarchization is not new: its roots are based in the European colonial experience, and specifically in the idea that the colonizer possesses an ethnic and cognitive superiority over the colonized. It is for this reason that our question about the coexistence of diverse legitimate ways of producing knowledge should necessarily involve an analysis of the coloniality of power in the contemporary world. Our question would then be: Do we live in a word where the old epistemological hierarchies made rigid by modern colonialism have disappeared, or on the contrary, are we witnessing a postmodern reorganization of coloniality? (2007, 428)
which is free from the tyrannical teleologies derived from Western history, the Enlightenment and all the other ills associated with them” (2001, 163).

By way of concluding the present chapter, the following pages intend to explore the valence of Sousa Santos’s question whether “the work of a social scientist from a colonizer country contribute to postcolonialism other than being the object of postcolonial studies?” (2010, 240; 2006, 41). He rejects essentialism in any version not hesitating “to say that biography and bibliography are incommensurate, even though they may influence each other” and that “all knowledge is contextual, but context is a social, dynamic construction, the product of a history that has nothing to do with the arbitrary determinism of origin” (2010, 240). Also he doubts if there can “be essential differences between the theorizing of post–colonial, anti-capitalist, progressive thinkers” who write in colonial languages, “some of whom are descendants of the colonizer born in a metropolitan society and others are descendants of the colonizer, even though born in a colony” (2013, 732)? The Eurocentric locus of his enunciations as argued in the above pages and his situatedness can be deployed to address his affirmation that “if it is hard to answer the question ‘can the victim speak?’ it is even harder to answer the question, ‘Who can speak for...”

109. As Castro-Gómez informs, “it is estimated that more than 4/5 of the biological diversity of the planet is found in regions that used to be called ‘Third World’. Colombia, surpassed only by Brazil, is the second most biodiverse country in the world.” (2007, 442)
110. Gustavo Lins Ribeiro underscores “the locus of enunciation on academic subjects is geopolitically marked.” In this connection, he states that “it is impossible not to recognize a strong Andean (and secondarily Mexican) accent in the decoloniality of power cosmopolitics.” (2011, 289)
the victim?’ ” (ibid.). As Doris Sommer puts it, “the pertinent question is whether the other party can listen” (quoted in Castillo 2001, 286). To this we can add — in which language, given the geopolitics of Portuguese language involved. David Punter also affirms — we are now in an era of so-called ‘competitive postcolonialisms,’ and the critical question “who dominates the field of victimhood will not necessarily be who has suffered most but he who can speak most loudly, and that in turn will depend on ownership of a certain language” (2000, 76).111

In such a case, the Portuguese sociologist’s retracing the first western modernity to the Iberian modernity of the Coimbra scholars in the sixteenth century from which, according to him, developed the dominant second version of western modernity, also fails to convincingly dispute Mignolo’s criticism that the former’s critique of modernity is not an internal critique.112 In fact Sousa Santos argues that the differences between his criticism of Western universalism and that of Mignolo and Dussel “do not lie in internal versus external critique” of modernity because according to him “after centuries of modern Western hegemony, it is very difficult, if viable at all, to develop an external critique of modernity in conceptual, political and even linguistic terms” (2013, 731). Though the Portuguese sociologist affirms that the centrality of the Old World

111. In an interview with Sneja Gunew, Gayatri Spivak affirms—“for me, the question ‘Who should speak?’ is less crucial than ‘Who will listen?’ ” (Harasym 1990, 59)
112. “Simultaneously, in the eighteenth century, Spain lost its former imperial clout, became the South of Europe, and originated the ‘internal imperial difference’ (Tlostanova et al. 2012, 4). For Mignolo, the second and secular modernity of Western Europe comprises mainly England, France, and Germany after the reformation. (2002, 936)
is not to be replaced by the centrality of the New World, the American continent (ibid.), most of his discourses are relegated to endogenous factors and situations. Alternative version(s) displace such conventional narrative of development of capitalism and modernity as a tale of endogenous development in Europe, with that of “structural interconnections between different parts of the world that long predated Europe’s ascendance and, moreover, provided the conditions for that ascendance” (Seth 2009, 334). If “keeping distance vis-à-vis the dominant versions of Western modernity” entails “getting closer to subaltern, silenced, marginalised versions of modernity and rationality, both Western and non-Western,” as Sousa Santos prescribes (2012a, 46–47), how can the dominant discursive codes be subverted and how does it differ in western and non-western cases?113 Martins also raises the issue whether Santos’s strategic exoticism actually contributes to subvert the codes of the European core abroad or not (2009, 39). In BPC, Sousa Santos had circumscribed Portugal’s semiperipherality to the seventeenth century (9) which he pushes back to the fifteenth century (2010, 233). Whichever the case be, the critical question remains in what manner does such redrawing the lines of geohistories critique Eurocentrism.114

113. “Trinh develops a strategy of displacement (as opposed to a strategy of reversal), which adds significantly to hooks’ reconceptualization of marginality — “Without a certain work of displacement,” she writes, “the margins can easily recomfort the center in goodwill and liberalism.” (quoted in Soja et al. 2005, 190)
114. In Sousa Santos’s words:
Boaventura Sousa de Santos’s essay [BPC] is a decolonial intervention within the Portuguese imperial world. He shows the crucial contribution of decolonial thinkers and perspectives emerging from the Portuguese-speaking world to global decolonial processes. He theorizes the particular location of Portugal from postcolonial debates. The Portuguese-speaking world has also been ignored in the “English-centered Postcolonial literature.” It is important to say that Boaventura de Sousa is the leading scholar of the Coimbra school of thought in Portugal that has replaced Paris as the center of critical theory in Europe today. He is a leading organizer and intellectual of the World Social Forum. Santos himself is a perfect example of how being European does not automatically translate into being Eurocentric. Following the spirit of other European decolonial thinkers from de las Casas to Sartre, Santos is one of the most important decolonial thinkers today. Santos embodies a real possibility that gives us hope for the future of humanity: the possibility of decolonization for European man. (2006, 141)

The Coimbra school of thought in Portugal replacing Paris as the center of critical theory in Europe today validates Stam’s observation that there are “two versions of Eurocentrism, the Northern European version and the South European version of European superiority” (2012a, 14). This relates to the earlier argument that Sousa Santos’s “defamiliarization vis-à-vis the imperial South” (2010, 231) is not concomitant with deprivileging of the Global North, and mere displacements and replacements of geohistories, geopolitics and

Both Portugal and Spain entered modernity in a relatively subordinate position and at a later period. Although they did make pioneering and crucial contributions to the early phases of modernity (the overseas discoveries), they receded to the margins as the project unfolded. The case of Portugal is even more striking. It continued to be a colonial power until 1975, despite (or because of?) its semi-peripheral position in the world system, having acted as an intermediary between the periphery (the colonies) and the centre (England) for more than two centuries. (2002a, 207)
academic centers do not signify decolonial scholarship. Notwithstanding Grosfoguel’s eulogizing words above, his distinction between *epistemic location* and *social location* is critical here, for “the fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location” (2011, 5). Mignolo enunciates the same in terms of geo- and body-politics of knowledge which not only foregrounds the familiar notions of ‘situated knowledges’ but also raises questions like who, when, why is constructing knowledges (2009, 2)?

A brief comparison of the Portuguese sociologist and Lourenço would further nuance the imperative of decolonializing Portuguese post-imperial scholarship. In *Utopias of Otherness: Nationhood and Subjectivity in Portugal and Brazil* (2003), Fernando Arenas succinctly draws comparison between Sousa Santos and Lourenço’s discourses. Lourenço’s profuse corpus does not formally partake in postcolonialism, and there is no explicit disciplinary affiliation except for psychoanalytic literary readings of Portuguese cultural history. Yet both Lourenço and Sousa Santos “ultimately arrive at similar conclusions regarding Portugal’s geopolitical and geocultural location in the world,” in spite of their divergent theoretical and disciplinary frameworks (Arenas 2003, 11). While Lourenço privileges the ideological or mythical registers of Portuguese identity as a nation, Santos “short-circuits the canonical narratives of nationhood, creating an alternative narrative that focuses on
concrete sociological and geopolitical variables that inform and shape Portugal as a national reality today” (ibid., 11). Sousa Santos’s *subaltern colonialism* partakes the prolonged repertoire of discourses of marginality from geographical to post–colonial, a phenomenon which scholars like Sara Ahmed or Wendy Brown refer to as “the fetishisation of the wound in subaltern politics” and is related “to the contemporary ‘culture of compensation’ and ‘transformation of injury into an entitlement that secures forms of privilege’ ” (quoted in Behdad 2011, 219).

On the other hand, Eduardo Lourenço’s discourses, though also primarily on Portuguese society and colonialism, indulge in self-flagellation, pathologizing the society’s mindset, in short constructing a sort of national psychobiography. According to Fernando Arenas, Eduardo Lourenço relies on the narratives of Portuguese ‘decline’ that have proliferated within literature and historiography and therefore unavoidably results in a negative dialectic vis-à-vis the nation (2003, 11). He compares Lourenço’s approach with Sousa Santos in this manner:

The pessimistic aura that surrounds many of Lourenço’s writings on Portugal—in relationship to itself or to Europe — stands in stark contrast to that surrounding Santos’s sociological approach, which appears more ‘pragmatic’ and ‘optimistic.’ Santos relies less on a pathology of the nation and more on a therapy regimen of what needs to be done to transcend the metanarrative of Portuguese ‘decline.’ (2003, 11)

Larsen on the other hand claims (also mentioned in the first chapter) that Lourenço’s objective since *O Labirinto da Saudade* is always to rethink the
Portuguese self-conception and ‘reality’ and to deconstruct as well as to propose new and more constructive images of Portugal (Larsen 2002, 31; translation mine). Moving beyond the salutary adjectives of pessimism and optimism what is crucial is to underscore the imperial centric standpoint of both the Portuguese scholars under discussion here. Without intending to undermine the academic labour of these scholars, and to put it briefly and simply, their discourses are predominantly concerned with the cultural pathology of the Portuguese colonizer.

Also, there are critical observations regarding the sociologist’s penchant for coining terms (see as example Sousa Santos 2010, 228), creating a, so to say, marketplace of ideas. Heidi Libesman comments in the context of the review of Toward a New Legal Common Sense (2002) are pertinent to Sousa Santos’s scholarship as well. According to him, the sociologist’s density of writing manifests itself “in a profusion of ideas crammed into shorthand formulations that say too little relative to the ambitious claims and controversial theses they are meant to sustain” (Libesman 2004, 421). The chiasmic quality of his argument, as mentioned in the earlier pages, combined with unattributed already coined terms (too similar to be coincidental), undermine the good faith of his scholarship. Ferreira subtly points out that Sousa Santos’s preference for ‘postcolonialism in the time-space of official Portuguese language’ over the

115. “Lembre-se que desde O Labirinto da Saudade o objectivo do prestigiado filósofo é sempre o mesmo: o de repensar a autoconcepção e ‘realidade’ portuguesas e de tanto pulverizar como propor novas e mais construtivas imagens de Portugal.” (Larsen 2002, 31)
more restrictive ‘Portuguese postcolonialism’ is virtually contemporary with the critical interventions of the Latinamericanists (2007, 25). Though she clarifies that her “point is not to suggest either influence or originality; what matters is the ostensible confluence among what are generally thought to be very diverse, geographically and culturally distant voices” (ibid.). As she observes (in footnotes), Sousa Santos does not refer to the theoretical source(s) of his “situated postcolonialism” nor does he mention the name of António Vieira while elaborating the term ‘Kaffir of Europe,’ who according to her, was allegedly, “the first to use the phrase ‘cafres da Europa’ to refer to his countrymen” (ibid., 27).

Sousa Santos’s call to go not only beyond postmodernism, but beyond postcolonialism as well does not render “a nonwestern understanding of the world in all its complexity” nor does the geopolitical space of Portuguese colonialism convincingly act as counter-hegemonic globalization in its opposition to dominant version of postcolonialism (2010, 236). The assumed Portuguese marginality as the locus of enunciation of oppositional postcolonialism, along with the surreptitious inclusion of Portugal in Global South, mystify his present discourses between anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism at best and intercolonial narcissism at worst. Sousa Santos’s interventions in Lusophone postcolonial studies is thus complicit with postcoloniality in the academic geopolitics.
III- Towards bebincaized Goan history
1. Colonial elites’ alienation

The present chapter partakes in decolonial literary studies by reading Tivolem, a narrative set in 1933, Goa. In keeping with the principal objective of the thesis, a “literary view from below” (Mohanty 2011, 2) of Tivolem (the village) is read against the grain of Portuguese subaltern colonialism as proposed by the sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos. This chapter problematizes in particular the following psychoanalytic reading of Portuguese colonial history:

The difficult calibration of Prospero’s dimension and real stature and identity made Caliban run the risk of being colonialist in his eagerness to be anti–colonialist, and at the same time allowed him more than anyone else to be pre– postcolonialist within the formal constancy of colonialism. The informal colonialism of an incompetent Prospero saved large sectors of the colonized peoples for a long period of time from living Caliban’s experience daily, and let some of them (and not just in India) conceive of themselves as the true Prospero and act as such in their domains. They were often allowed to negotiate the administration of the territories and its rules with the European Prospero almost on an equal footing. (BPC 36)

By presupposition only, it can be understood that Sousa Santos is referring to the native colonial elites. Also, “Sousa Santos is quite vague about what pre–postcolonialism might imply, beyond a chronological condition made possible by Portugal’s weak colonial hegemony” (Melo e Castro 2012, 48). Paul Melo e Castro suggests that “pre–postcolonialism might be seen as a curious prescience, in that it goes beyond simple anti–colonialism to gesture to a balanced but no less critical appraisal of the colonial condition that can come
only after colonialism,” in other words “suggesting a pathway out of colonialism without formulating any clear vision of decolonization” (2012, 48).

The following reading of Tivolem (1998) authored by a diasporic Goan Victor Rangel-Ribeiro, contests Sousa Santos’s preceding pre–postcolonialism by highlighting the counter-memory of Goa’s colonial migration. It highlights how far from running the risk of being colonialist in his eagerness to be anti–colonialist (BPC 36), the socio-economically alienated colonial elite takes recourse to anti–colonial nativism. The involuntary nature of most of the cases of migration provoked due to economic stagnation is well-put by the character Tobias in Sorrowing Lies my land (1999) by Lambert Mascarenhas:

Yes, son, it is awful. It has been like this, these past years, young people packing up their kit and quitting their homes and their loved ones a perpetual exodus. That’s the tragedy of Goa, son. Neither the freedom to write or speak, nor the opportunity to earn a living. Husbands and sons must roam the world over in search of work so that they can send money home to keep their families alive. Roaming is our birth right, roaming, roaming and roaming, son, and so long as the Portuguese are here, we shall remain a tribe of vagabonds! (100)

The counter-memory of Goa’s colonial migration undermines the colonial rhetoric of Goa Dourada (Quem viu Goa, excusa de ver Lisboa – Who has seen Goa need not see Lisbon) and the justification that religious conversions gave the Goan Catholics a “modern” outlook to migrate not only overseas but to neighboring parts of British India as well. The stereotypical characters of Goan cook and ayah is a case in point as Maria Aurora Couto in her semi-autobiography Goa-a daughter’s story (2004) states, “the vast mass lived on
watered rice, salt fish or remittances from husbands and sons who toiled in British India” (332).

The present reading argues that the author deploys Goan return–migration in order to invoke the dialectic of colonial versus indigenous modernity albeit from the colonial elites’ standpoint. While the performative part of return migration and the socio-dynamics between the four returnees and stayee villagers is represented at the diegetic level, the fictional village as a microcosmic Goa at an extra diegetic level serves to revisit the pre/colonial past as *reflective nostalgia* (Svetlana Boym 2008). The socio-dynamics between the four returnees and stayee villagers also betrays the colonial elites’ socio-economic alienation and their nostalgic reflection not only provides them an opportunity to reclaim their past but also mourn the imagined lost future.

Commenting on the novel, Jason Keith Fernandes remarks that it “is a nostalgic tract written by a Goan settled in New York and clearly yearning for an era that has passed and will never return,” also observing that “it is unfairly skewed towards the characters that are rooted in the feudal order of the Goan Catholic world” obviously reflecting the author’s connection to this same order which for better or worse has captured the ‘right’ to define Catholic Goanness (2008). Rangel-Ribeiro does privilege Catholic elite characters in his debut novel — the four Returnees and other main characters belong to this class,

while the *mundkars* and other marginalized characters are mainly incidental to the whole story. But there is a clear class differentiation of the Catholic characters — three wealthy bachelor returnees alongside impoverishing elites like the female returnee protagonist Marie-Santana and Dona Esmeralda and various non–elites like Annabel, Josephine not to forget the petty thief Lazar. In reality, the category colonial elite is slightly ambiguous. For example, according to the Subaltern Studies School (1988), the concept *subaltern* designates “non–elite sectors of Indian society, primarily the rural constituencies which range from impoverished gentry to the ‘upper-middle’ ranks of the peasantry” (quoted in Moore-Gilbert 1997, 79–80).

As well be evident later, in its anti–colonial register *Tivolem* does not resort to what Aijaz Ahmad criticizes as “the tendency to render the entire colonial archive as a ‘realm of pure untruth’, conveniently allowing all of modern India’s problems (for example, nationalism, communalism, casteism) to be placed at the foot of British colonial rule (quoted in King 2001, 192–193). On the contrary, as a corrective balance Richard King rightly suggests:

While there is no doubting the necessity of attempts to redress the balance in historical accounts and emphasize the cultural and material violence carried out in the name of European imperial expansion, it is also important to acknowledge the existence of precolonial forms of oppression within India and the agency of indigenous subjects (both élite and subaltern) during the colonial period itself. (2001, 192–193)

Therefore the present reading duly acknowledges the elite narratorial standpoint in *Tivolem* but highlights the literary agency of the colonial elites in the
narrative not in their ambivalent role as accomplices and victims but as discursive agents of anti-colonialism and indigenous modernity.

The present reading tends to balance some of the offhand, dismissive reviews of *Tivolem* in a space clearing gesture to welcome further critical readings and debates. Arguing from the ideological vantage point of anticolonial nativism, the foregrounding of Goan Catholic elitism in *Tivolem* is viewed as a surreptitious attempt to reclaim colonial elites’ past, choosing to read this as *reflective nostalgia* (Svetlana Boym 2008). This narrative manoeuvre deploys the parent/child familial trope in order to reclaim the traditional and historical past and provisionally recenter the Goan Catholic elites’ subjectivity. In giving vent to nostalgia, the narrative’s anti-colonial register reveals espousal of Gandhian philosophy of moral authority and his ideals of village community life. To paraphrase Fanon and Cabral, an intrinsically dynamic native culture is claimed and proclaimed in this elite revisiting of Goan past (quoted in Chrisman 2004, 192), one that reiterates communitarian ties based on moral duty, civility and humanism. The present reading, for the sake of simplicity, schematically discusses the narrative dynamics, dilemmas and psychic alienation in socio-political, economic and religious registers and at times some narrative examples might seem to overlap.

Criticizing postcolonial studies for downplaying nativism as reverse discourse, Benita Parry rightly asks, whether “revisiting the repositories of memory and cultural survivals in the cause of postcolonial refashioning have a
fixed retrograde valency” (2004, 38). The critical question in this case undoubtedly is — “who is doing the remembering and why” (ibid.). Cultural identity differentiated as a process of becoming rather than an essentialized being can be critically deployed for collective remembering. Stuart Hall’s concept of cultural identity also espouses remembering “in terms of one, shared culture, a sort of collective ‘one true self’ . . . which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common” (1990, 223). For him, this conception “continues to be a very powerful and creative force in emergent forms of representation amongst hitherto marginalized” (ibid.) and therefore:

We should not, for a moment, underestimate or neglect the importance of the act of imaginative rediscovery which this conception of a rediscovered, essential identity entails. 'Hidden histories' have played a critical role in the emergence of many of the most important social movements of our time — feminist, anti–colonial and anti–racist. (ibid., 224)

Amilcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon have also underlined the indispensability of anticolonial nativism for genuine decolonization. As Sivanandan points out,“while they [Cabral and Fanon] saw the necessity of rediscovering and reasserting the universal value of native cultures, they were not arguing for a

117.Cultural identity is quite an ambiguous term and therefore it is imperative to clarify it here. Identity is not used here in an essentialist sense, rather, it is implied as identification as Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper put it — “As a processual, active term, derived from a verb, ‘identification’ lacks the reifying connotations of ‘identity’ ” (2000, 14). Cultural identity connotes the realm of ‘categories of practice’ ” which Brubaker et al. define, following Bourdieu, as categories of everyday social experience, developed and deployed by ordinary social actors, as distinguished from the experience — distant categories used by social analysts (ibid., 4).
reductive vision of culture which would trap it in some utopian and mummified version of a traditional past” (2004, 64).

_Tivolem_ (1998)\(^{118}\) published by Milkweed editions in US and by Penguin Books in India is Victor Rangel Ribeiro’s debut novel at the age of 72. The novel won the Milkweed National Fiction Prize and the journal of the American Library Association — Booklist, enlisted it as “one of the twenty notable first novels” of 1997–98. He also wrote a collection of short stories _Loving Ayesha and Other Tales from Near and Far_ published in 2002. Ribeiro is a diasporic Goan, born in Goa in 1925, later moved to Bombay at the age of 13, then to Calcutta, and to New York in 1956 where he currently resides, being one of the co-founders of the Goan Association in New York. He worked as a writer and editor with several newspapers, being also credited as the first Indian to break through the racial barrier and become copy chief at J. Walter Thompson (Rangel-Ribeiro 2001).

Rangel-Ribeiro, earlier a music critic with the _Times_ and the _Express_ in Bombay and _The New York Times_, also served as Music Director of the Beethoven Society of New York in the late 1970s. He served as the coordinator of the largest adult literacy site in New York City and is a member of American Mensa. Derek Alger once asked the writer on the latter’s affirmation about the possibility of being misunderstood in eight languages (Rangel-Ribeiro 2001).

119. In the fall of 2003, Sewanee University in Tennessee assigned _Tivolem_ as required reading for a course in international literature. (http://www.victorrangel-ribeiro.com/index.htm)
Rangel-Ribeiro explained that having been born in Goa, he grew up trilingual: Konkani, Portuguese (because Goa was then a Portuguese colony), and English (because his parents were cultured and belonged to a certain strata of society) were all his mother tongues. He adds, “When we migrated to Bombay, I added Hindustani (which is a bazaar version of Hindi), and a smattering of Hindi itself” (ibid.). At present he is working on another novel based on Goa.

2. *Tivolem: routes and roots*

*Tivolem*, set in 1933 in the Portuguese colony of Goa on the west coast of India, unfolds in a small, quiet, fictional three hundred year old village comprising of 1500 inhabitants. A layout of the village has been provided by the author and other geographical markers mentioned are real and existing. The symbolism should not be lost upon the reader that by inference the village seems to be located in North-East Goa in the *Velhas conquistas*. The *Velhas Conquistas* (Old Conquests) territories of Salcette, Bardez and Tiswadi and Mormugao were the first to withstand the brunt of Portuguese proselytism following the “conquest” of Goa in 1510. Not surprisingly it is here that the Catholic community has a more dominating presence. The *Novas Conquistas* (New Conquests) would come under Portuguese empire only 200 years later.  

120. As Newman informs:

They [Old Conquests] are also more fertile, have a more pleasant climate, and were generally more beloved and favored by the Portuguese. Even today, the Old Conquests receive greater attention: the bulk of industry is located there, as are most of the educational, medical, banking, and other facilities. Well over 50 per cent of the
Providing a layout of the village not only confers spatio-temporal verisimilitude to the narrative but performs a politics of location in line with other rural microcosmic fictional places like Macondo (in Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s *One Hundred Years of Solitude*), Malgudi (in R.K. Narayan’s novels), etc.

Rather than sharing the mythical genealogy of Macondo’s Buendia family, Tivolem summons more affinity with Malgudi. Though in stylistic terms, Gita Rajan finds *Tivolem* closer to Mulk Raj Anand’s or Anita Desai’s style, both of whom she says as per Rangel-Ribeiro’s own admission have had an impact on the Goan writer thus contradicting some reviewers who have likened Rangel-Ribeiro’s style to R. K. Narayan’s realist mode (2003, 208). An unnuanced reading of *Tivolem* would construe that its rural microcosm reconstructs everyday provincial reality manifested through bull fight, beating up a ruffian thief, praying for the due monsoon, gossip, superstition, etc. that form a prominent part of village life bestowing it a mesmerizing idyllic timelessness. On the contrary, Rajan has well delineated how:

Rangel-Ribeiro tackles various, complex themes in the novel. Some of these are the meaning of diaspora, as articulated through the language of rootedness and rootlessness; strategies of colonial insurgence, elaborated through satirical exchanges between characters; feminine subjectivity, illustrated through strong matriarchal figures such as Dona Elena and Dona Esmeralda and through the courageous heroine, Marie-Santana; and population lives there; and the total rises to 68 per cent when we include the one agriculturally rich district of the New Conquests, Ponda. The New Conquests, by contrast, are sparsely populated, overwhelmingly Hindu, and have the mines and forests that keep the coastal districts prospering. The unevenness of change and development between Old and New Conquests is a continuing problem. (1984, 437)
the role and status of Christianity as a disciplinary mechanism in the colony . . . (2003, 208)

Though *Tivolem* engages with themes like return/migration, rootedness/rootlessness, it does not partake in what Revathi Krishnaswamy terms as *mythologies of migrancy* (1995). She delineates it as “a whole mythology of migrancy and a concomitant oppositional politics” as formulated by Rushdie, who according to her, sees the development of the “migrant sensibility” to be “one of the central themes of this century of displaced persons” (1995, 130). Thus, according to her:

> any mythology of migrancy that fails to differentiate rigorously between diverse modalities of postcolonial diaspora, such as migrant intellectuals, migrant labour, economic refugees, political exiles, and self-exiles, exploits the subordinate position of the “Third World,” suppresses the class/gender differentiated histories of immigration, robs the oppressed of the vocabulary of protest, and blunts the edges of much-needed oppositional discourse. (ibid.)

Krishnaswamy criticizes how writers like Rushdie not only “endow the migrant sensibility with the freedom and facility to construct its own (contingent) truths” they also make “it a singular repository of experience and resistance as well” (ibid., 126–127). The following reading of *Tivolem* diverges to reveal that though a return/migrant might represent “a fractured yet autonomous individual segregated from the collective sites of history” (ibid.), collective reclaiming of the past can be regenerative and can overcome alienation.

The present reading engages with these preceding themes to argue that they are interrelated, thus allowing “the narrative to strike a sound balance
between nostalgia for an idyllic village and the evolving lives and predicaments of its inhabitants” (Almeida 2004, 331). It is this sound balance which renders a humorous self-critique in a *facile stereotyping* of elite class characters, “much in the form of a medieval morality play” representing the vice or virtue of human nature in some of the characters (ibid.). For Rochelle Almeida, “considering that Rangel-Ribeiro was born in Goa in 1925, migrated to Bombay in 1939, and has lived in the United States since 1956, it is surprising that he would choose as the bucolic fictional setting of his tiny novel, the tiny, nondescript village of Tivolem, in Portuguese India” (ibid., 329). Almeida finds answer in Rangel-Ribeiro’s own admission in an interview — “the pull of the mother country is very strong” (quoted in 2004, 329). This could be read at an extra-diegetic level — the diasporic author personifies his inevitable return (unlike the returnee characters Simon and Marie-Santana in *Tivolem*), through stories and narratives on Goa and its villages.

In *Tivolem* the female protagonist Marie-Santana’s (formal name Marie-Santan’ Pereira) family had migrated to Mozambique when she was twelve years old leaving her paternal grandmother behind. Simon Fernandes, another returnee back from Kuala Lumpur, Malay Peninsula is a retiree from British civil service who even plays violin. He had migrated with his parents at the age of five, had an Anglo-looking brother born there who later migrated to Mozambique. Both Marie-Santana and Simon’s past lives criss-cross and threaten their relationship, the novel ending with the announcement of their
marriage. Eusebio Pinto back from the Persian Gulf after 13 years where he worked as a low-salaried clerk with a British oil company is a parvenu, constantly rebuked as *nouveau riche* and Anglophile by the villagers. Teodisio Rodrigues had spent ten years in Mozambique and another ten in Tanganyika, entering it when it was a German colony and stayed on when it became British East Africa, finally retiring in 1931 at the age of forty-five.

Besides these four returnees, Tivolem’s inhabitants can be categorized in socio-economic hierarchies with religion as a prominent marker. Dona Esmeralda is the “model of propriety” whether in trying to cling to her position of *bhatkarni* and to not let herself be supplanted by the *nouveau riche* and Anglophile returnee — Eusebio Pinto or “drawing on the tradition of *bhatkars and bhatkans*” (71). Dona Elena, her family comprising of Senhor Marcelo and their daughter, is another Catholic elite “engaged in rivalry of sorts” (220) with the latest *bhatkar* — Eusebio Pinto. Marie-Santana finds the latter not fitting in the popular caricature of a village *bhatkar* — she had imagined a stout, indolent, ill-kempt man instead she saw a thin, wiry, well-groomed individual, whose very walk conveyed a sense of purpose (34). There is the vicar with his penchant for Latin phrases to suit every occasion; other civic functionaries comprise of the Postmaster Braganza, Prakash Tendulkar the principal of the local English high school and regarded as an intellectual Gandhian (245).

Thus, a gamut of characters expected in any rural set up is well-represented not to forget the trouble maker and thief Lazarinaho. Robert S.
Newman draws the link between religion and division of labour in Goa:

Hindus and Catholics are both divided on a caste basis. The Brahmins and the Chardos (Kshatriya) of both religions are commonly the dominant castes of their villages; as members of village associations, landowners, and shopkeepers, they predominate among the modern, urban middle and upper classes. The Shudras make up most the village population—farmers, tenant-cultivators, laborers, fishermen, toddy-tappers, and craftsmen- and the bulk of wage labourers in the towns. Among the lower castes is a large group who, while Catholic or Hindu, particularly resemble the tribal populations of other areas of Western India. Known as “Ganvda” or “Kunbi”, they share much the same appearance, folk culture, and socio-economic position, despite their different religious affiliations. Because of this, they may be said to form the solid base of Goan regional culture: Konkani-speaking, having a common world-view of a syncretic Hindu-Catholic variety, with a shared livelihood based on agriculture, fishing, and liquor-distilling. (1984, 436)

In Tivolem, the mundkars, trades people, craftsman, boatmen, carpenter, are all Hindu, many of them having large families with children. The stayee Catholic class is in decline with the rich returnees attempting to wield power through their newly acquired wealth.

Let us take a brief glance at the linguistic structure in the novel. In general, literary code mixing and code switching (well theorized by Braj B. Kachru 1983) has been addressed by different names — Rushdification of Indian English, pigeon Indian-English, etc. While the earlier Indian-English fictions provided explanations of cultural terms in footnotes or in appendix, this has been disregarded by many writers now. As Rushdie explains, in an interview to T. Vijay Kumar, “to do footnotes or to do notes at the end was a kind of defeat. The story has to tell itself, it must not rely on explanations. If it needs footnotes, it’s a failure” (quoted in Mukherjee 1999, 217). In Tivolem,
Goan Portuguese, Konkani, Indian-English, and Portuguese words like *ghor-zaoim, tornaboda, bai*, etc. along with literary code mixing and code switching have been liberally used throughout the narrative thus antagonistically engaging with the politics of linguistic colonialism. Linguistic syncretism has been relied on in the narrative by weaving and interspersing cultural lexicality with perceptible “trust that the native words have power enough to bear the burden of effectively conveying experience” (Chatterjee 2004, 153). The author-narrator does away with any glossary of local words as a linguistic decolonizing tool.

2.1. *Calibrations and regenerative criticism*

The present reading follows Ato Quayson’s practice of close reading termed *calibrations* (2003) and Niyi Afolabi’s *regenerative criticism* (2001). In Quayson’s words, *calibrations* is about a practice of close reading that oscillates rapidly between domains — the literary-aesthetic, the social, the cultural, and the political — in order to explore the mutually illuminating heterogeneity of these domains when taken together (2003, xi). He explains how the word’s etymology besides being related to scientific texts of the nineteenth century in terms of perfection of instruments of measurement, also invoke two other senses that shadow this dominant scientific one — the sense of graduations or markings, and the sense of identifying the value of a phenomenon (ibid., xv). According to him, this second sense is implicit in one of the meanings of the word *caliber*, from which *calibrate* and *calibrations* derive, intending it to
mean:

that situated procedure of attempting to wrest something from the aesthetic domain for the analysis and better understanding of the social. In my view the social is coded as an articulated encapsulation of transformation, processes, and contradictions analogous to what we find in the literary domain... Furthermore, I use the term *calibrations* to point toward the activity of the calibrator, the degree to which this fine-tuning procedure is dependent on a particular interpretative and subjective perspective... I suggest that literature be seen as a variegated series of thresholds and levels, all of which determine the production of the social as *a dimension within the interaction of the constitutive thresholds of literary structure*. It is in the dedication to identifying how the relations among these variegated thresholds encapsulate the social that calibrations makes sense as a method of reading. (ibid., xvi)

Equating Quayson’s methodology with Arjun Appadurai, Huggan observes that both scholars insist “on the transformative power of the imagination — its capacity to envision alternative identities, alternative societies, alternative histories — and on the more specific potential of imaginative literature to produce representations of reality (itself structured by representation) that have a profound effect on our interpretation of social facts” (2008, 13).

Borrowing the trope of degeneration and regeneration as explicated by Niyi Afolabi (2001) with reference to Lusophone African narrative, the present literary reading draws upon regenerative criticism in its attempt to engage with the anticolonial and decolonial register in *Tivolem*. In *Golden cage: regeneration in Lusophone African literature and culture* (2001), Afolabi states “by juxtaposing the discourse of the colonial master with the discourse of the colonized African subject, a creative tension emerges through which degenerative acts are called into question while a proposition for regeneration
through resistance is put forth” (2001, 30). Afolabi criticizing the Euro-American “frame of reference” with which Lusophone African literature have been explicated to date proposes a “regenerative frame of reference” (ibid., xv). In Afolabi’s words:

The notion of regeneration in the post–colonial context redefines the term while drawing connections between its usage in both the colonial and post–colonial contexts. In this reconfigured ideological context, the regenerative paradigm offers a possibility for a reversible reading given the duality it shares with post–colonial theory. On the one hand, by juxtaposing the discourse of the colonial master with the discourse of the colonized African subject, a creative tension emerges through which degenerative acts are called into question while a proposition for regeneration through resistance is put forth. On the other hand, post–colonial realities such as ethnic rivalries, civil wars, deprivation, hunger, corruption and mismanagement equally reflect acts of degeneration once debunked. (ibid., 30)

He thus defines regeneration “as the process of revisiting and questioning a painful past in order to heal the wound and hurt of colonialism toward a post–colonial reconstruction” thus rendering it both a politico-economic construct and a literary re-construction (ibid., xvi).

2.2 **Counter-memory**

The present reading employs terms from across various disciplines like gender studies, postcolonial studies, memory studies, migration studies, etc. The first term that needs to be explicated is nostalgia. Nostalgia derives from the Greek *nostos* — return home and *algia* — longing. According to the New Oxford English Dictionary, it is “a sentimental longing, or wishful affection for
the past typically for a period or place with happy personal associations” (quoted in Walder 2010, 7). The term has had its own semantic trajectory, from denoting a psychopathological condition it has now been employed as a sociopolitical category. As Dennis Walder points out, “There is a long history of colonial and postcolonial writing that invokes nostalgia as a means of resuscitating the forgotten or obscured histories of both colonised and coloniser, for a variety of reasons” (2010, 16).

In *The Future of Nostalgia* (2008) Svetlana Boym distinguishes two kinds of nostalgia — *restorative nostalgia* and *reflective nostalgia* which “might overlap in their frames of reference, but they do not coincide in their narratives and plots of identity” (2008, 49). “Restorative nostalgia evokes national past and future” and “ends up reconstructing emblems and rituals of home and homeland in an attempt to conquer and spatialize time” (ibid.). On the other hand, “reflective nostalgia is more about individual and cultural memory” and “reveals that longing and critical thinking are not opposed to one another” (ibid.). Thus, “restorative nostalgia stresses *nostos* and attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home. Reflective nostalgia thrives in *algia*, the longing itself, and delays the homecoming — wistfully, ironically, desperately” (ibid., xviii–49). The present reading of *Tivolem* underlines this *reflective*
nostalgia of the social interactions in the village defined by quotidian civility and humanism that is not implied in a geographically deterministic sense.\textsuperscript{120}

The nostalgia for communitarian ties mediated by quotidian civility in the wake of socio-economic transformations due to colonial materiality in Tivolem invokes the politics of who re-members what, and why but as Derek Hook highlights, “it is not nostalgia itself which is alternatively progressive or reactionary, but the uses to which it is put” (2012, 227). He points out that Boym’s “rudimentary typology may be said to under-estimate the difficulties of extracting” one type of nostalgia from the other and so there could be a prospect of ostensibly regressive nostalgia holding out progressive potential and the related prospect of progressive nostalgia concealing a set of reactionary investments (ibid.). Also, this collective nostalgia is not, to borrow Hook’s words, a “defeatist retreat from the present” (ibid.). The ‘transposition’ of the above-mentioned quotidian civility and humanism in Tivolem ensures an intergenerational transmission and “the backward glance of nostalgia serves as a means of mediating the present and the prospective future” (ibid.). This “witness by adoption” (Jeffrey Wolin’s term)\textsuperscript{121} distinguishes “between the

\textsuperscript{120} Walder points out Boehmer’s observation how from W. B. Yeats’ evocations of an ancestral ‘romantic Ireland’ to Claude McKay’s ‘jungle jazzing’, the ‘artifice of nostalgia’ has been valued by writers taking the initiative in aiming to shape the future by recalling the past in terms of nativist pastoral or romance.” (quoted in Walder 2010, 16)

\textsuperscript{121} Marianne Hirsch (1997) coined postmemory as an articulation of the psychological legacies of the Holocaust on later generations akin to Toni Morrison’s term rememory (1998, 36).
desire to return to an earlier state or idealized past and the desire not to return “but recognize aspects of the past as the basis for renewal and satisfaction in the future” (quoted in Hook 2012, 228).

The concept of *counter-memory* is crucial to decolonize imperial history in order to remember what the dominant History deliberately chooses to forget. Restoring memory through a critical gaze towards a “contested past” in order to achieve an awareness of the present, “not as commemoration, and still less a sanctifying one but rather a memory which wants to bring to light traumatic, repressed, and censored memories and again questions dangerous stereotypes which have been lurking over some historical events” (Fortunati et al. 2008, 129). Such an imbrication of imperial history and memory privileges the marginalized historical narratives within the imperial folds of History. Thus, memory becomes an “act of survival, of consciousness and creativity, fundamental to the formation and rewriting of identity as both an individual and a political act (ibid.). In *counter-memory*, the term ‘counter’ emphasizes the fact that these are *other* memories belonging to minority groups marginalized by the dominant cultures (ibid.). And if *counter-memory* becomes codified in the form of a traditional story or even in a work of written historiography, it corresponds to what Amos Funkenstein and David Biale have proposed to call “counterhistory” (quoted in Assmann 1997, 12).

Postcolonial literary readings have well-delineated the psycho-social and historical trajectories of displacements and relocations in narratives engaging
with colonial migration. Return migration critically nuances these displacements and relocations not only spatially but also temporally. “Return migration cannot be viewed as a one-way process but as a dynamic process of (be)longing with fluid boundaries ascribed and chosen by migrants in differing social contexts” with belonging being constructed within these contexts through channels of lived experience, memory, nostalgia and imagining (Christou 2006, 227). Depending on the nature of migration — voluntary or involuntary, the returnee might experience double emotional upheaval, make a complete start by breaking off from the past or continue to reinvent the present by revisiting the past. Marieke Van Houte and Tine Davids relabel re(turn) migration as a process of mixed embeddedness, borrowing the concept of re–embeddedness as used mainly within the context of institutional economics. According to them, when translated to remigration research, (re–) embeddedness “entails a multidimensional concept that refers to an individual finding his or her own position in society and feeling a sense of belonging to and participating in that society” (2009, 173–174).

Another term intricately connected to return/migration is alienation. According to Quayson, alienation as a concept may be schematically divided into sociological and psychological approaches (2003, 4). He elaborates, expressed conceptually in terms of either estrangement or reification, sociological approaches tend to emphasize alienation as the separation of individuals from themselves and from the object of their activity; their
deprivation or renunciation of real claims of identity. Psychological theories of alienation focus on the symptoms that point toward a condition of alienation, which include madness and disorientation at the extreme, and more mildly, boredom, discomfort, nostalgia, and even disgust. “The scale and intensity of these feelings are critical in defining a sense of alienation, any of them arising out of the systemic disorder inherent in a rapidly changing society, the collapse of traditional vectors of self-validation, the persistent” (ibid.). The following reading of Tivolem, as we shall see, further nuances these tenets of psychosocial alienation.

2.3 vegdench munxaponn

The term vegdench munxaponn mentioned in the following pages also needs to be explained. Coined by the poet Bakibab Borkar, it refers to the Goan’s unique humanism in his words:

The virility and vitality of this, quiet, soft-mannered and peace-loving society’s culture were tested and proved beyond doubt when in the sixteenth century the Portuguese conquerors of Goa tried fanatically to uproot completely. Though partially impaired under their onslaught of superior arms and administrative machinery it not only outlived it but even absorbed some good and progressive features of their Latin culture. Besides, it turned every difficulty they thrust upon it into a new opportunity to revitalize and enrich itself. It adopted some fine modes of Western living and grafted on its ethos and aesthetics the good sense and good taste peculiar to Latin culture brought by the Portuguese. (1971, 61)
The suggestion is not of an essentialist Goan personality trait, but as part of both its traditional and historical past. The Goan Catholic elites’ reclaiming of this past in *Tivolem* is not about an essentialized, mummified past. Rather, it highlights the ‘significant past,’ the socio-paradigms of which are not essentialist in any manner. It is an attempt to engage with the colonized’s rhetorical question about her/his own identity which “cannot be answered without reconstructing individual as well as collective pasts, and the relationship between them, a process that is always complex and incomplete” (Walder 2010, 117). This process involves many different levels, practices and experiences, but one in which memory is the key, for “we do not know who we are without memory” (ibid.). Thus, many scholars share Radhakrishnan’s view that “the return does not have to be based on either notions of ontological or epistemological purity,” and that there is nothing regressive or atavistic about people revisiting the past with the intention of reclaiming it since it “is a matter of political choice by a people on behalf of their own authenticity” (1996, 166). In agreement with Radhakrishnan, the contentious issue is rather the upholding of revisionist identities as primordial and transcendentally sanctioned and not as historically produced (ibid.). The following reading attempts to delineate the process of identity formation as part of anti–colonial *regenerative criticism* (Afolabi 2001).

122. Couto referring to Borkar’s term also says that “Goan society, once traumatized by colonialism, survived with traditional resilience and spirit and forged a unique identity” (2004, xiv; 141; 410), it is in this sense that a traditional and historical past is implied.
3. Homecoming

_Tivolem_ begins with Marie-Santana returning without her parents from Quelimane (Mozambique) in January 1933 after 23 years to spend the rest of her life in Tivolem.¹²³ On her re-turn to her _native_ village sans her parents to an ailing grandmother, Marie-Santana feels:

> Coming home like this, even coming home to Granny, was itself a wrench; it was she who was leaving them behind, abandoning them. The thought that she could no longer visit their graves, bringing flowers and prayers and love, filled her eyes with tears. (7)

In the taxi, the scene outside brings back childhood memories, and she recalls the now old granny who then used to climb up trees. As Edward Casey has noted, there is a strong affiliation between memory and place, for place is “well suited to contain memories — to hold and preserve them,” while memory is itself “a place where in the past can revive and survive” (quoted in Whitehead 2008, 10). Significantly, the first person to recognize Marie-Santana on her arrival after 23 years is none other than the Hindu boatman Shankar, who remembers her because he had known her family and due to gratitude towards her father, he refuses to take money for the boat ride.

¹²³ It is crucial to note the Colonial Act (Acto colonial) of 1930 introduced by the fascist regime in Portugal had re-designated the Portuguese ‘provinces’ as colonies, which later in 1951, under the growing international pressure for decolonization were renamed as Overseas Provinces of Portugal. Also, Gilberto Freyre’s _Casa-grande e senzala_ (The masters and the slaves) was published in 1933.
A few days after her arrival, Marie-Santana sitting on the hilltop just before sunset, *distantly* observes her village, the changes that had come about in contrast with her own memories of the village. She reminisces about her childhood friend Mottu who is now married but whose love she had not reciprocated just before leaving for Africa so many years back:

. . . but it was true, as some philosophers and scientists so stoutly maintained, that nothing is ever lost in the universe, then surely those tremulous words he had spoken were pulsing there, somewhere around her, swirling in the evening breeze. All she had to do was reach out into the air, and they would settle as softly as butterflies in the palm of her hand. How sweet, she thought, do one’s childhood memories grow as one grows older. Even some memories of Quelimane . . . (50)

The childhood memories of Quelimane remind her how “with the very first *fado* her heart ached suddenly for Mottu” (51) and even the teenage affair with her classmate’s elder brother from Lisbon breaks midway as he goes back. Recalling how she fell prey to John Fernshaw (who later turns out to be Simon’s brother), she finds it strange that even though she had placed an ocean between herself and the dark clouds of her final years in Quelimane, on coming home the first man she had been introduced to in Tivolem, the retiree Simon Fernandes, had also, like John Fernshaw, been with the British Civil Service in Kuala Lumpur. She decides to pretend she didn’t know Fernshaw in case Simon happens to mention his name or ask about him as she finds these memories too bitter to recall — “brusquely she erased Quelimane from her mind, focusing instead on the new phase of her life — this sheltering village below her, older than remembered time” (28; 56).
This *brusque erasing* is significant because contrary to a sense of displacement commonly observed amongst returnees in general, both Marie-Santana and Simon recall their pasts with a sense of detachment and distance. “The culturally displaced person constructs her identity in relation to two distinct, if not also antithetical, sites in time, space, and memory” (Rubenstein 2001, 65), with the sense of displacement being nuanced by gender and social materialities. Initially, Marie-Santana tries to fall “easily once again into the conventions of time and place; elsewhere, one began a conversation by commenting on the weather; here, one began by asking whether people were doing whatever it was one saw them doing” (34). Her effortless ease not only distracts the reader away from her deliberate amnesia about her past in Quelimane, but also surreptitiously leads into believing that she is *rooted* here in some manner, as if she always belonged here, unaffected by the geo-cultural displacements she had undergone.124

In *Tivolem*, the cultural displacement does not lead to a proportional sense of alienation; as a single female returnee Marie-Santana’s sense of cultural displacement is definitely not incisive in comparison with Simon’s or Eusebio’s. A month after her arrival and in spite of her effortless ease of having

124. It is interesting to note that Marie-Santana remembers the nitty-gritty of social customs and hospitality though she had left the village as a young girl, as the narrator claims the she “knew the process well, having witnessed it from childhood: The rituals of politeness held meanings beyond meanings, and one worked one’s way through each ritual as carefully as though peeling an onion” (72). The narrative makes it more than obvious that such observances amongst the returnees smoothens, to borrow terms, the processes of “resocialization” and “desocialization.” (Bar-Yosef 1968, 29)
“fallen easily once again into the conventions of time and place” (34) in her native village, she cannot stop wondering why the first person to have recognized her on her return after 23 years, the Hindu boatman Shankar continues to remember her father out of gratitude.125 Thus begins her quest to know more about her father, how he is remembered amongst the villagers. She does not seek the memories of her past life, the time she had spent with him in Mozambique but tries to reconstruct that man who had left his village 23 years ago, the man as he is remembered amongst his people in Tivolem. She experiences his loss as a presence of absence:

The river was like the past, slipping away between her fingers, leaving little behind but seaweed and traces—of what? She was seeking to fill the gaps in what she knew of herself, her childhood, her family. Her parents—what had they really been like? After having lived with them for twenty-seven years, why did she feel, looking back, that she hardly knew them? (115)

As Rubenstein explains it, “most individuals experience such loss not merely as separation from someone or something but as an absence that continues to occupy a palpable emotional space — what I term the presence of absence” (2001, 5).

Though the closest and only family member — Marie-Santana’s grandmother — with her failing memory is incapable of satisfying her

125. For Rubenstein, “In a number of the narratives, the (usually female) central character finds herself at a significant crossroad between home and a problematic ‘elsewhere,’ a place/space that is figuratively located at the intersection of different geographies, cultures, languages, life stages, or spiritual conditions. At the imaginary intersection of time and place, the characters discover, as their authors narratively render — the multiple ways in which home matters.” (2001, 9)
granddaughter’s quest to know about her father’s past (95). As Marie-Santana reveals to Dona Esmeralda, “She has grown old” . . . “and remembers very little. Stray facts here and there, odd pieces of a fragmented jigsaw puzzle, when, I’m looking for a life. I find it sad and frustrating” (75; 115). Marie-Santana pays courtesy call to Dona Esmeralda and asks her whether she remembers any specific stories about her father but unfortunately the old bhatkarni reveals what Marie-Santana already knew — “that he treated the poor with respect; he had a rare gift for making even the lowliest person feel important. He listened to them, actually listened, and cared about their lives . . .” (75). Marie-Santana insists with her grandmother that she needs to meet the boatman because she has been thinking about him a lot lately and one early morning she goes out to meet him because she had a bad time sleeping (96).

Marie-Santana crosses the river several times with Shankar in the narrative; each crossing turns revelatory for her in different ways, the river crossings being connected to her childhood memories (16; 113). The boatman was certainly one of those whom her father, in her neighbor’s words, had made feel important. She recalled Dona Esmeralda leaning toward her, saying:

Everything is irrelevant when one holds precious memories in one’s heart.” Memories! A gull screeched overhead. The boat rocked. The spray in her face, her cheeks already wet with tears, she was a child again, hearing her father’s voice, above the slosh of the oars and the liquid lap-lap-lapping of the waves, urging Shankar, boatman, protégé, and friend, to buck the incoming tide. (115)
Shankar reveals to Marie-Santana that her father had bailed him out once despite having known the boatman for a short time and only by talking on the boat rides (113-114). The boatman also continues to follow her father’s advice of first rowing the boat against the tide, then turning it around and then with the tide behind the boat would “swoop to the landing place like a gull to a fish” (16). Marie-Santana’s father had explained to him that “in life, as in crossing a river, one sometimes has to row against the tide, turn a hardship into an advantage” (17). Later when Marie-Santana is in a dilemma how to get rid of her past shadows (John Fernshaw’s cheating), Shankar consoles her by explaining the philosophy behind her father’s advice given to him:

- Surely what he meant was, use the tide, don’t just fight it or go along with it. Even a flood has currents in it, he said; one can choose a current as one can choose a sliver of one’s past; or one can use even the weakest of eddies to turn one’s canoes completely around.
- A complete turnaround, she exclaimed. My father said that? Use even the weakest of eddies to turn completely around?
- The very words your father used, he said very gently, when we were having a similar conversation in this same boat, all those years ago. Only, then, I was the one who was troubled and he was asking the questions and supplying by far the better answers.
- I hear him as you speak, she said at last, her voice tremulous. In your voice and in your words, I hear him quite clearly. Someone told me, when I told her about you, that surely you carry his memory in your heart. (331–332)

Shankar narrates another incident when he had been helping a man get off the canoe and the man tripped and fell into the water. He got up screaming curses and rushed forward to hit Shankar. Marie-Santana’s father stopped Shankar from retaliating to the man’s abuses, by advising him that the abuses
didn’t apply to him since “an insult is only an insult if you accept it, and I’m glad you didn’t.” To the man he said, “You see, you were mistaken about Shankar. You must have been thinking of someone else. Why don’t you go now?” Shankar tells Marie-Santana that the man went away, without another word and never took his canoe again but he would have welcomed him back if the man had tried (114–115). Shankar also tells Marie-Santana that his father had faith in all people:

- . . . He would talk to others in my boat, my passengers, and no matter who they were — they might be the lowest laborers in the fields — he spoke to them with respect. If only for that moment, the moment he was talking to them, he made them feel important.
- Someone else said that about him, Marie-Santana said. And I saw that happen myself, in Mozambique; I can vouch for it firsthand. As for his faith in people, he had that too . . . (114)

Indeed Marie-Santana “was grateful for the boatman. In a minute Shankar had made her father real, given him a dimension in a new and different world, beyond family and friends” (115). Significantly, a Hindu boatman assumes the form of Marie-Santana’s father’s in what Rubenstein describes as, “The felt absence of a person or place assumes form and occupies imaginative space as a presence that may come to possess an individual” (2001, 5).

As a returnee, Marie-Santana represses the bitter memories of her migration past (55; 59). Besides the cheating and the shame attached to it (65; 332), she does not wish to generally talk about her past, inventing a tale about a magic goldfish in an enchanted lake told to her by an imaginary old Makwa chief in Africa to keep off curious, prodding questions about her past (98–99).
Looking to redeem the past, she begins learn about her father who had to leave his village and where still a boatman fondly remembers him even after 23 years or more. Through reclaiming this past, this re–membering (term borrowed from Rubenstein 2001, 108), she searches for her past (330), becoming her father’s voice from the past (29).

When Forttu asks her what had given her the courage to rush out to save Little Arnold from the charging bull during the bull-fight she replies: “I saw a child in terrible danger,” she said. “And — maybe — at the back of my mind I thought of my father, and what he would have done. I’ve always wanted to be like him, wanted him to be proud of me” (291). She also adopts the “Christian way” as her father would have done by forgiving John Fernshaw instead of avering him as she ruminates about his father’s philosophy of life (282; 314) — “some vicissitudes of life, she had learned from observing her father are best borne silently and with fortitude, for “what cannot be cured must be endured” (167). Simon had found it difficult to communicate with his father when he was alive but now throughout the story he dreams of him in times of trouble and dilemma. When Simon is hesitant about marrying Marie-Santana because she had not returned rich enough like him, he is embarrassed by the tenor of his thoughts. “He reminded himself that their world had been his father’s world, had been his world as a child, was his world now” and his father

126. Though Marie-Santana is warned about the village’s petty thief Lazarinho, she still believes he could be honest and kind enough to lend a helping hand. In fact she finds him mild-mannered, slender, neatly dressed and not at all a villainous-looking type. (122–123)
would have chided him for his snobbishness (133–134). Also when he is baffled whether the person who cheated Marie-Santana in Quelimane could be his brother John, he dreams of his father who spells out clearly what Simon had really feared to be the truth and advises him to tell Marie-Santana as well.

There are certain similarities between both the returnees’ fathers’ characters. Both are portrayed as keen to pass on certain values to their children — respect for all irrespective of class (75; 95; 114; 134), and dignity of human labour (280). While these qualities are not exclusive to any society, the kind of humanism invoked echoes the poet Bakibab Borkar’s term vegdench munxaponn which he described as the Goan’s unique humanism (1971). Marie-Santana’s father reposes unconditional faith and trust in human beings around. Sitting on top of the hill in Tivolem, she recalls how even though regaled by John Fernshaw’s stories and knowing them to be false, her father did not say that Fernshaw was lying. Instead he preferred to look at it in another manner and said — “He’s inventing the truth to amuse us. Well, sometimes he does it to impress us” (54). Even Fernshaw’s passing off as British though he believes him to be an Anglo does not bother him because he is a good employee worthy of being promoted as assistant manager in the firm (ibid.). Marie-Santana’s father hums the first lines of the Portuguese national anthem while tacking a large map of southern Africa to the wall when the Portuguese army parades in the town, symbolically marking its positions and losses on the map with green flags. As the Portuguese begin to lose out to the Germans he hums some more
lines of the anthem. When Marie-Santana’s mother fears the worst and starts to pack (she is even ready to return to Goa), her father hums again but this time his voice has an edge to it (52–53).

It is also not coincidental that Dona Esmeralda advises Marie-Santana that the latter would never find the answers she is seeking because as the old bhatkarni reveals:

. . . remember, Maria-Santana, the history of one’s parents is the precious memory one carries in one’s heart. The boatman treasures your father’s memory as well. Everything else — reputation, the ‘facts,’ or how the world perceives them — becomes irrelevant, when the heart recalls its memories. No one can take them from you except age, and that too, thank God! only sometimes. (75)

While waiting for Dona Esmeralda during her courtesy call, Marie-Santana “found herself drawn to a large daguerreotype of a strikingly beautiful young woman portrayed from the waist up, dressed in the Victorian style, with a ruffled, high-collared blouse . . .” intently looking at the portrait oblivious to Dona Esmeralda’s presence who had also been as intently regarding her visitor (72). Later Marie-Santana tells her that she is not sure when the portrait was taken “but it’s still very much you” (74).

Their standing in front of the daguerreotype talking about their parents is quite poignant summoning the reader to a starker reality of their present impoverished economic state than a reassuring nostalgia for the past high and
comfortable lifestyle. This poignancy is further nuanced in its cyclical irony because we are told earlier that this is Marie-Santana’s first visit inside the house about whose opulence she had heard from her grandmother but now far from vying with a governor’s place, the drawing room was sparsely furnished (71). While one of the standing figure represents a matriarchal bhatkarni engaged in power struggle with the nouveau riche returnee Senhor Eusebio as well as trying to be protective about her tenants (38–39); the other represents a single female returnee back with, as the gossip goes, just a steamer trunk and a bedroll which is no more than a college student brings home after ten months in Bombay (59) and who wards off Senhor Eusebio’s (the new bhatkar) advances, agreeing to manage his garden but not for money (124;140;189).

Re-membering, thus, becomes a crucial means because “collective memories, then, are representations of the past in the minds of members of a community that contribute to the community’s sense of identity” (Erll 2008, 253). Dona Esmeralda advises Marie-Santana — . . . To understand your father— which is what I think you are trying to do, in every way you can — try to understand yourself. Look inward, Marie-Santana, and you will find him (77) echoes “We are what we remember” we are the stories that we are able to tell about ourselves (Assmann 1997, 15). The Returnees — Marie-Santana and

127. Luisa Passerini eloquently puts it, “. . . another way of saying that there can be memory within silence and memory through silence. But it is also a reminder that memory is gendered, and women’s memories and silences offer different continuities and repetitions, through the specificities of their experiences in different times and spaces.(2006, 248)
Simon reconstruct their identities by critically *re-membering* their past. As Jan Assmann poignantly puts it, “Memory is knowledge with an identity-index, it is knowledge about oneself, that is, one’s own diachronic identity, be it as an individual or as a member of a family, a generation, a community, a nation, or a cultural and religious tradition” (2008, 114). The above discussion highlighted that return-migration is *not* employed as a thematic concern in the sense of a linear narrative of homecoming, but as we shall see below, a homecoming fraught with socio-cultural dis/identifications.

### 3.1 Cultural dis/identification

Caroline B. Plüss et al. define *cultural disidentification* as when returnees discover “in shock that they have become ‘strangers in their own home’ ” (2012, 32). In other words, when home is no longer home for the returnees as they remember it. Marie-Santana expresses her initial sense of cultural dis/identification as — It’s the outside world from where the changes were coming, “changes that would alter, for better or worse, her beloved Tivolem” (56). As she poignantly observes:

On one side, the Eusebios, the Teodosios, the Simons of the world, returning with a car, a gun, an expensive violin, and above all, with money; on the other, the Esmeraldas and the Elenas, the vicars and curates and regedores, clinging to stability; she herself, who could have returned comfortably off but hadn’t, somewhere in the middle. But are they the village, she asked herself, these people who already have and are struggling to hold or struggling to gain what power there is? After the Eusebios supplant the Esmeraldas, will they not be supplanted in turn and in time? But by whom? (57)
The *re–membering* of this past is not a mere nostalgic revisit, an essentialized past meant to provide refuge to the returnees.\(^{128}\) The present relocation to their native village is fraught with quotidian socio-economic materialities against which they assert their returnee agency. In the narrative, Marie-Santana’s trajectory is the most elaborate for she not only looks death in the eye and survives it, “in seconds she had gone from local undesirable to village heroine” and finds love (293). Simon faces a similar charging bull episode which had turned Marie-Santana into a “village heroine,” though the circumstances and the outcome are entirely different.

An evening Simon goes for one of his protracted walks and finds himself standing in front of his childhood home (151). After some reminiscing on his way home he realizes that a lone bull is lumbering behind him, and he fears that it might start charging at him. “He found himself speaking out loud again, words that had been alien to him until this moment—“God help me.” And he knew he meant it. To have come back to Tivolem to be gored by a passing bull would strip his life of all meaning” (151). “His fear gave way to elation as he strode down that long winding lane, sensing now that the bull, that symbol of strength and power, had run to him, Simon Fernandes, the lonely one-for comfort and company. They were no longer each alone in their universe, two

\(^{128}\) Colonial acculturation is discursively challenged here through the sense of a *root*. As M. E. Derrett puts it in terms of ‘contra acculturation,’ how the ‘root’ “is all the more appreciated very often after a return maybe from the West, or to one’s home from the experiences in the outer world. (1966, 59)
beings at odds with one another, but allies, each protecting the other” (152–153). Through this bull incident, Simon realizes the abyss of loneliness and monotony of his returnee life (107).

Though reclusive by nature he finds it difficult to communicate with others because of the language problem. He had migrated with his parents at the age of five and had forgotten much of the Konkani and the Portuguese he had spoken as a child. Now he could speak only English and Malay and only remembered the social greetings in Konkani and Portuguese and thus managed to move around. Feeling lonely, “he had not realized how much he had come to depend on the occasional concerts of the Philharmonic, and the monthly stamp-swapping sessions of the FMSPS, to provide him with some measure of human interaction. While, in Kuala Lumpur, his stamp collection had helped provide him with companionship, in Tivolem it could no longer fulfil that function” (106). His dead father’s wish of seeing him married and with a family further sting his loneliness. He feels frustrated:

What use was his magnificent collection if he could not show it to admiring and even covetous eyes? Adding to his sense of isolation was the fact that his agnosticism made him even more of a misfit in a village in which the population — whether Catholic or Hindu — consisted of various shades of believers. (107)

Critically, Tivolem is portrayed as a predominantly Catholic village with ageing spinsters and bachelors to nuance the socio-cultural disidentification both amongst the Catholic returnees and stayees. As Dona Elena remarks about the lack of company for her 16-year-old daughter: Our youngsters, they finish
their schooling and off they go to college in Bombay. We’ve kept her home and babied her, our only child. Perhaps that was a mistake. Time will tell (45). Besides feeling tormented recalling his father’s last words about the lineage not continuing (104), Simon approaching fifty is frustrated:

. . . His thoughts turned to long walks he had taken past all those houses, all that domesticity . . . Sometimes just couples, older couples, whose children and grandchildren had grown and married and migrated to far-off countries to earn a living and send some money home. Family gatherings . . . And he? Alone, out there by himself, standing at the gate. (132)

He tries to imagine his parents as a young couple, doting on him, but the picture he carried in his mind was the picture of his parents in his adulthood; an older, even elderly couple and that image would not change (151). Sharing his bachelor situation are two other returnees well past marriage age and of course Marie-Santana aged thirty-five (189). Amongst the stayees there is Pedro Saldanha, a very religious man, living with his spinster sister. He is so overwhelmed by the vicar’s sermon regarding the death of a boy who had fallen from the jambool tree that he stages his own fake funeral (184–186). His sister also bemoans this situation — we’re stuck, unmarried — last of the family (182).

The ethical and personal dilemma caused by the lack of security of continuity and lineage amongst the Catholics is in stark contrast to the marginalized Hindu community teeming with children and overall large families. The narrative chooses to address this as social pathology that alienates
the sense of continuity, belongingness and even social identity. But in keeping with the overall humorous tone and mood of the novel, Tendulkar makes fun of it by saying that “from now on, we should only accept into our group those bachelors who promise to remain bachelors” (342) and also discuss the news about Hitler taxing bachelors out of concern for Germany’s low birthrate and what if Salazar influenced by this idea were to levy bachelor tax (204).

When Simon asks Marie-Santana if he could walk to the church with her, “she is taken aback; she had not expected this response. Men and women did not normally walk to church together; everybody knew that” (172). The proffered sagacity is that “by unspoken tradition the walk to the church was a prelude to the Mass itself; some prayed, as though on a pilgrimage” and any talking was done in hushed tones, the same in the case of men and women sitting apart in the church (ibid., italics added). She contemplates that they had both grown up overseas, in less restrictive societies; if they could have walked to church together in Kuala Lumpur or in Quelimane, why not here? Emboldened by his willingness to transgress she agrees (172–173). On another occasion in order to encourage Little Arnold to swim, she joins the men in the well when on the occasion of the feast of Saint John the Baptist, the villagers would “go in neighborly groups from house to house, singing hymns in the saint’s honor, jumping into each family well and swimming around in it with joyous abandon as though they had just been baptized in the River Jordan?” (235). Later people would criticize her for swimming in public — what do you
expect? She has been corrupted by living overseas — overseas being understood to be ever den of iniquity — and others saying, she was born over here, she should have known better . . . ” (237). She also overcomes caste barrier by deciding to marry Simon, who is a non–Brahmin, not to mention the male intelligentsia applauding both of them for their courage (343).

The author being a music connoisseur; sound and music are gently interspersed in the story. As Rajan remarks, “the novel’s use of music as a metaphor of hope and despair, in the hands of the hero Simon Fernandes, is also worthy of attention” (2003, 209). But his conceit of music skills also provokes a temporary spate of words. He wanted to prove the point that “in Kuala Lumpur, his violinistic skills had helped to fill the concert hall” and that he was a violinist of the finest caliber, good enough to be concertmaster of the Kuala Lumpur Philharmonic, and therefore good enough to be heard at Mass and other services at the Church of Saint Cornelius the Contrite, no matter what the curate or anyone else thought. Finally, he realizes the pleasure of playing for oneself while serenading Marie-Santana and his craving to share his art with a wider public fades away (60–63). The spat of words is not due to the lack of music sense on the part of the villagers but is a satirical take on High art — . . . a sound that reminded the villagers not of music as they understood it . . . but of the time when Rukmini’s she-buffalo was trying to deliver herself an oversized calf (63).
In the light of above reading it is clear that *Tivolem* does not privilege returnee agency and this accounts for Almeida’s remark that Marie-Santana and Simon “maintain a balcony view of the proceedings” and “look upon the action as if it is being played out upon one’s life great cultural stages. This detachedness makes them bond with the reader while isolating them from the goings-on of the mainstream” (2004, 330). Perhaps “this detachedness” could be better understood as socio-cultural dis/identification with the ‘traditional ways of life’ of the village to which they have returned to as adults (49; 56; 22) but which they now need to reclaim as their own past (134 etc.). While Simon finds the village as straightlaced (199), Marie-Santana feels that she cannot talk with him at leisure about his music due to the constraints of the village (79) and on the decision to walk to the church with him she self-contemplates that they both had grown up overseas in less restrictive societies (172).

### 3.2 Colonial modernity vs. *Critical traditionalism*129

It is critical to note here that Marie-Santana’s *re–membering* is mediated by two characters — Dona Esmeralda and Shankar — who represent a polarized milieu of the village’s socio-economic hierarchy, the only commonality between them are memories of Marie-Santana’s father’s egalitarian humanism. In the essay, “Cultural syncretism, civility, and religious Diversity in Goa,

129. I borrow this term from Bhikhu Parekh’s (1989) critical appreciation of Gandhian political philosophy.
India” (2007) Alberto Gomes discusses “the role of cultural syncretism in the creation and fostering of quotidian and organic civility among Goans of different religious backgrounds” and how this civility is instituted, fostered and maintained, what are the foundations and bases for this purported civility which “is said to be the bedrock of peaceful and harmonious co-existence in the Goan ‘community’, a common and pervasive image of Goa” (12). Crucially, contemplating on who would “supplant the Eusebios and the Esmeraldas,” Marie-Santana murmurs softly to the shepherd boy’s retreating back as he faded into the dusk — “You and Amita — you are the heart of the village, and its future. You will outlast us all” (58).

The short story ‘Ocaso’ [Sunset] in Monção (2003) by Vimala Devi makes an interesting comparison here when the mundkars dare to sit on the chairs while visiting the bhatkar household to pay their last respects to the deceased matriarch (Melo e Castro 2009, 60). The bhatkarni’s daughter in law’s angst is further provoked by the realization that “she does not have the grandmother’s authority and strength and that, with the passing of the matriarch, the family’s control over its mundkars is almost extinct” (ibid.). She tells the eldest son that one day he would understand but that it’s going to take time, and then the mundkars won’t be sitting down in the chairs in this house anymore, a point at which the story ends with the narrator rhetorically pronouncing — but all of us, including my brother, felt that our mother didn’t really believe it. And
in order to keep going you have to believe (Devi 2003, 54–57; translation mine).  

Interestingly, the episode of the power struggle between old bhatkarni Dona Esmeralda and the nouveau riche returnee Senhor Eusebio was earlier published as a short story in “Senhor Eusebio builds his dream house” in the compilation Ferry Crossing: Short Stories from Goa (1998) by Manohar Shetty. In Tivolem, on his return Senhor Eusebio wants to build a big house but is short of land and has his eyes set on Dona Esmeralda’s land on which her various tenants live. He approaches Dona Esmeralda’s friend Dona Elena, also an elite, to convince the former in selling part of the ancestral land. Dona Esmeralda negotiates not to sell part of the land citing the mundkars’s especially Govind and Amita’s plight who have five young children and some goats:

. . . Govind and Amita depend on me for everything. They came to see me yesterday, bringing their little ones, pleading that the land they were on not be sold . . . Eusebio’s right — I need the money, and if I don’t get it today I’ll need twice as much tomorrow. But those children! I hugged them, and they cried and clung to me, not knowing why they were crying . . . (39)

Senhor Eusebio expresses his resentment at this exclusionary treatment saying, “I’m from this village too . . . I feel for the people here. What makes her think I’ll be rough with her tenants? Does she think I’m an ogre? . . . (39–40).
In a potent “view from above” of *ganvkari* system, Dona Elena explains to Senhor Eusebio —

- She [Dona Esmeralda] has known their parents and their grandparents; has celebrated their weddings, rejoined at their births, mourned each passing. She has been their protectress and their benefactress far longer than you and I have lived.
- He would not be mollified. And probably spoils them rotten, while they rob her blind. . . (40)

These are allusions to the disrupted state of what once had been a relatively equitable system of socio-economic organization — agricultural associations known as *ganvkari* or *comunidades* (in Portuguese), the undergird of Goa’s village life was demolished in 1649 and the State became the owner of all community lands with the village councils as tenants.131 The reader is informed that Dona Esmeralda and been their landlady since the 1890s, as her husband’s family had been for generations before that; with the Great Depression, however, the old widow had fallen on hard times, and it did not help that, like their ancestors before them, her tenants paid no rent, but gave payment in kind— in produce, in loyalty, and in services (36). Not surprisingly, the high lifestyle of the elite Catholic Goans is mentioned in flashbacks contrasting it with the present impoverished state (37, 71). Marie-Santana’s more than comfortable childhood is particularly contrasted with her present state, amongst some of the depictions there is one where she protests mildly when her grandmother does

131. Newman (2001) describes a Goan post-1961 society in which “[f]or the mass of agricultural and maritime producers and laborers, the end of Portuguese rule meant an end to the system whose social structures kept them permanently in a subordinate position” (quoted in Melo e Castro 2014, 279)
not allow her to light a second lamp, telling her that they are “not totally destitute” and that she has enough saving to be able to afford oil for the lamp (78). Also, her parents had maintained a staff of three, but now most of the furniture had been donated, and the childhood game of drawing water from the broad, deep well had now turned into an arduous chore (47–48).

In an astute reading of the documentary *A Dama de Chandor* (1998) by Portuguese filmmaker Catarina Mourão about the life of Aida de Menezes Bragança and her struggle to preserve the 300-year-old Indo-Portuguese mansion home at Chandor, Paul Melo e Castro observes that there seems to be “a clear identification with and sympathy for Aida” who “despite her privileged origins, is shown now as an underdog, besieged and beset by a gaudy modern world that has supplanted a refined past” (2010, 167). Dona Esmeralda’s matriarchal behavior towards her **mundkar** tenants, otherwise pretentious enough to scold her servant Graciela (75), combined with Marie-Santana’s words to her “. . . Like you, I have questions and am groping for answers” (74–75) further validate their memorializing of a past weaved around the benevolent **bhatkar-mundkar** socio dynamics which is incomprehensible for a rich returnee like Senhor Eusebio (38). In a generalized comparison of the land labour Couto states—

. . . this class did not suffer from exploitation which the factory type of capitalism and cash crop plantation cultivation was engendering in British India. The laissez-faire economy of Goa did not disrupt the paternalistic relations between the ruling classes and those who served them; materialism and the exploitation of labour as a dehumanized factor of
production had not entered the economic and cultural relations of Goan society. (2004, 328)

It is not the space here to delineate this comparison, but it is clear that the narrative is suggestive of the moral economy of ganvkari system.

The narrative subtly underlines how “the role and status of Christianity as a disciplinary mechanism in the colony” (Rajan 2003, 208). Though Marie-Santana attends the mass and is a practising Catholic, she seeks Shankar (in order to evoke her father’s calming presence) instead of going to the vicar:

The strangeness of the situation got to her; here she was, alone in a canoe, talking to Shankar as she might to a priest in the confessional, except that she was not confessing to any sins. She could have talked to the vicar just as easily, not in the confessional but still in private, and he would have been understanding, of that she was sure; yet she had not done so. Like Granny, he was too close to her; and he might, in an unguarded moment, have mentioned it to the curate; priests were human, after all. And if the curate? While Shankar . . . (330)

Sharing personal problems with familiar strangers has its own psycho-social dynamics but in the present case, Marie-Santana had already interacted a lot with him on other instances — Shankar, the boatman had become her protégé, and friend (115). Her uncanny feeling this time follows an inter-religious discussion about the linear vs. cyclical order in Christianity and Hinduism respectively—

- In my religion, Marie-Santana interposed, “once you have reached the other bank, that’s where you’ll find Heaven — or a far less pleasant place.
- Hinduism then is somewhat kinder, bai, he said, smiling. We Hindus are given more chances than one.
- I like your notion of life as crossing and recrossing a river, she said, but I have always thought of my life as being itself a river. Where the river
melts into the ocean, that ocean itself could be the All-Pervasive One; the crossings would then be over.
- He laughed. Perhaps. But think carefully: that blending of sea and river is not an end, but part of cycle . . . (329)\textsuperscript{132}

Marie-Santana is not the only one to feel insecure to confess in church. During middle of Lent, “when the vicar in all his sermons was calling attention to sin and the need for repentance,” Mottu wants to confess because he had committed adultery, had even killed off his wife in his thoughts but realizes that either the vicar or curate would recognize him by his voice (129). “At last the solution came to him: he would simply receive Communion without first going to confession; each priest would think he had confessed to the other . . . And no sooner had he crossed himself than a far better solution suggested itself – he did not need to go to the vicar at all, nor even to the curate” (ibid.) Finally, he decides to take up the very long and tiring walk up that steep and unforgiving hill to a faraway church because “the vicar there was so new and so old and so troubled by cataracts that he could not recognize his own parishioners,” let alone a stranger from Tivolem (130).

\textsuperscript{132} Explicating the cover design of the recently launched book \textit{Goa outgrowing Postcolonialism} (2014), Teotonio R. de Souza states:

> The past and the future need not be seen exclusively as descending or ascending for all concerned. In the land which created the chess, the moves of the knight provide an understanding of historical process that is not linear and thus differs significantly from the Judeo-Christian tradition of the West. The swastika at the intersection of the stairs, is an ancient Indian cultural symbol of “welfare” as the deep driving force, symbolising linkage of self (swa) and individual welfare as intimately linked with vasudhaiv kutumbakam or one world family. The meaning of swastika is reflected in the “outgrowth”, and the refusal to submit the Indian cultural values to any colonial and imperial manipulations from outsider.

(\url{http://www.heraldgoa.in/newpage.php?month=4&day=9&year=2014&catid=14})
The village gossip monger Josephine aunty spreads word around that Marie-Santana has an evil eye and some villagers begin to believe it due to a series of coincidences. Though the evil eye episode leaves her quite angry and anguished, she realizes that she had more friends in the village than she thought just as Angelinh’ Granny had advised her, “Trouble, child, is the sieve through which false friends fall . . . (168). Dona Elena comes to forewarn her of the rumours spreading around and to empathize with her (266–267). This evil eye episode also reveals the class difference as Marie-Santana feels that Dona Elena, Dona Esmeralda, Simon, vicar, Senhor Teodosio would never shun or fear her nor believe she had the evil eye while the common villagers are shown to be vulnerable to such superstitions. Dona Elena makes a passing comment on Annabel’s background while trying to convince Marie-Santana about the vulnerability and susceptibility of superstitious believers (267).

Marie-Santana seeks the vicar’s advice, but he expresses his helplessness in not being able to do much to put a stop to the stories and rumors of the evil eye. For, according to him, the superstition of evil eye is hard to shake. And “the system that focuses on the integrity of all human beings; on compassion; above all, on charity in our personal dealings and judgments” is hard to acquire (263). He advises her to acknowledge people’s faith that she has both the power to harm and to heal, but when she professes her ignorance about it, he tells her to recall her childhood or to ask about it from her grandmother. The vicar avoids her question on how superstition conforms to the teachings of the church
Dona Elena also gives a similar advice to Marie-Santana, who reluctantly follows it, and realizes that the vicar had been right after all (270). The colonizer’s superiority of Christianity and his stereotyping of indigenous belief systems as comprising of superstition are flipped here, boldly invoking the dichotomy between colonial modernity and native social modernity.

Symptomatic of the colonial economic decline, the upper-class Catholic Goan’s high lifestyle and mimicry is mainly depicted in flashbacks. Marie-Santana recalls the sumptuous riches inside Dona Esmeralda’s mid-sixteen hundreds built house with carved furniture far finer even than could be found in the Portuguese governor’s palace in Panjim and about which she had only heard from her grandmother when the latter had been to the house to help during the now widow bhatkarni’s marriage (69). Dona Elena’s marriage is also recalled in all its lavishness with a toast also “to the health of His Majesty the King, the young and vulnerable Dom Manuel II, tethering on his throne in far-off Lisbon” followed immediately by dance on the traditional Goan mandó, and a lavish tornaboda or counter-reception with the bridegroom being declared a ghorzaoim so that the bride’s parents’ line could continue (88–89). In an amusing

133. Melo e Castro views the former Lusophone elites’ specificity in terms of ‘entrelugar’ (Helder Garmes’s term 2004, 13) between East and West. In his words:

Given that an ‘entrelugar’ is a position applicable in some degree to all colonial elites, and many other groups besides, perhaps it is possible here to endow this term with more specific content. We can say that, in the twentieth century, this inbetweenness derived from its location on two peripheries: the margin of the Indian mainstream (issuing from British colonialism and explicitly or implicitly Hindu in orientation) and the margin of the third Portuguese Empire (focused on the control and economic exploitation of Portugal’s southern-African possessions). (2014, 274)
semantic twist, Marcelo is exhausted trying to explicate his inexpressible emotion to his bride recalling how her mother used to wrongly equate the Portuguese term *tristeza* with a strain of melancholy (90). Eusebio’s mimicry as an Anglophile returnee is more socially visible, and a source of scorn and derision (12–13), and he also makes a passing comparison of British and Portuguese colonialism (273).

Melo e Castro in “Small Bursts of Sharp Laughter: The Form and Content of Satire in *Jacob e Dulce*” (2012) affirms that the satirist-author — Francisco João da Costa (also known as Gip) depicts the Goan Catholic elite as “both victim and agent in the vicious circle of a decadent colonial situation,” thus ridiculing both the colonized for emulating the colonizer’s values and the colonizers whose values the colonized are emulating (33). Melo e Castro continues, “It is their falling victim to European fashions rather than the idea of adopting elements of European culture that Gip attacks” (ibid., 41). As he explicates, “in the Goan context, a too vigorous defence of the autochthonous in Goa carries the danger of rhetorically ceding authenticity to the Hindu community, an unwelcome and problematic move, then as much as now” (ibid.). In comparison, in *Tivolem*, the mimicked cultural habits amongst the upper class are mocked at and derided not only because they act as divisive class markers but also because they do not connect to the native cultural identity (12–13; 59).
Marie-Santana returns to the village in a dress but switches to sari something that did not go unnoticed by other women of the village especially Annabel and Josephine Aunty:

- She came back from Africa wearing dress, but has switched to a sari, Josephine Aunty said. Don’t you find that strange? We single women here wear dresses until we marry—Hindus and Christians both! Then we wear a sari. That’s the custom. Look at me! Do I wear a sari? If I did, it would confuse everybody.
- Her wearing a sari, that bothers you? Annabel asked. You follow custom, that’s fine; she has chosen to break it. And if married women must wear saris, as you say, why are Dona Elena and Dona Esmeralda still wearing dresses?
- It’s different with the gentlefolk, Josephine Aunty said. They have the land and the money, they can do as they please. They speak Portuguese and dress Western-style. (59–60)

Marie-Santana’s adapting the local clothing and culture brings her acceptability and love amongst the stayees because it reaffirms her belongingness (60; 240), a quality that is appreciated in the context of other returnees as well not in the sense of claiming an essentialist identity but reinstating that the traditional ways of living are not inferior in colonialist terms. To draw another comparison with Vimala Devi’s story “Regresso” (in Monção 2003), Chandracanta’s colonial mimicry makes an interesting example here. A male Hindu protagonist’s mimicry of the social habits picked up during his study-stay in the metropole becomes the raison d’être of scorn and derision amongst his family members and there is no significant attempt to materially or socio-historically nuance his alienation on return. Rather “a simplistic resolution is proffered by valorizing
traditional indigenity at the expense of an unproblematized colonizer’s model of modernity, thus rendering the latter sanctified” (Gupta 2014, 306).\textsuperscript{134}

In the light of this discussion, Marie-Santana’s contemplation that Amita and the shepherd boy would outlast them all (58) almost bears a prophetic undertone. Almeida affirms that “toward the end of the novel the fortunes of the main protagonists revert, in the manner of conservative Roman Catholic Indians in the 1930s, to an expected form of grief resolution” (2004, 331). Another critical review calls it “trove of stories (naive fairy tales at best, facile mysticism at worst)” which “never quite justify the novel’s conservative Catholic conclusion” (Publishers Weekly).\textsuperscript{135} Almeida justifies “it is the most authentic of the endings that Rangel-Ribeiro might have written” and “this denouement is most natural in the circumstances, and hardly a reason to denounce the entire work” (2004, 331).

As per the present reading, the ending of the novel with the lovebirds sauntering as if they were in no great hurry to join the bridge group (343) might leave the reader with an apologetic sense of relief for the closure or healing of their pasts and also not meeting the same fate like the other bachelors/spinsters in the story. Expressed in vicar’s habitual Latin phrases — *Amor omnia vincit*, which he says is “not always true, but in their case at least, we hope that love

\textsuperscript{134} I have argued this in detail in my paper titled “Monção: calibrations and decolonializing mode” published as conference proceedings of the Colóquio Internacional ACT 27: “Goa Portuguesa e Pós Colonial – Literatura, Cultura e Sociedade” organized by Centro de Estudos Comparatistas FLUL/University of Lisbon on 24–25 May, 2012.

\textsuperscript{135} http://www.publishersweekly.com/978-1-57131-019-4
will conquer all” (343). Interestingly, the above phrase is uttered in between two other Latin phrases, one for Josephine — do not sing your victory song before you’ve gained the victory and another for the rest — Do not hunger too much after power and glory, for in time those, too, shall pass” (344). As the vicar adds, the phrase meant for the rest also includes “those in the outside world who are mighty and now rule over our destinies” (ibid.) which is clearly a caveat against imperialistic tendencies.

Shankar does not occupy a central space in the narrative but is invisibly present throughout as a protégé, friend whose functionalist role is to fulfil Marie-Santana’s father’s presence of absence and to guide her to resolve her personal crisis — “At best, she would find Shankar, the boatman . . . And what would that produce? Her father’s voice, yielding sane counsel in her fragmenting world? She had evoked her father’s calming presence once before; who was to say it could not happen again?” (326). Thus, his shadowy presence and critically meditative role is in sharp contrast to Jacob e Dulce in which, according to Melo e Castro, the non-lusitanized lower classes is to be seen in fleeting glimpses (2012, 44).

Shankar’s character can be nuanced through what Satya P. Mohanty terms as the “narrative politics of silence” which provides an alternative reading to conventional narrative accounts “that see social critique only in the representation of characters who overcome the silence forced upon them” (2011, 154). He points out — “. . . voice — whether in dialogue or as revealed
through narrative interiority — has often been considered the feature of the novel allowing most access to underrepresented subjectivities” (ibid.). In the final boat ride, Shankar acts as more than a “voice agent” for Marie-Santana’s father, the conversation on Hinduism’s cyclical philosophy provides her moral strength to confront the truth (339) and she tells him that the debt he felt he owed to her father has now been more than fully repaid (333). Thus, his philosophical intellect (compared to other characters like Govind facing economic insecurity) is performative of the ethics of silence of the Catholic elites’ social alienation.

4. Politico-cultural mourning

In Home Matters: Longing and Belonging, Nostalgia and Mourning in Women’s Fiction (2001), Roberta Rubenstein employs the phrase cultural mourning to signify an individual’s response to the loss of something with collective or communal associations: a way of life, a cultural homeland, a place or geographical location with significance for a larger cultural group (5). In relation to the returnees’ socio-cultural dis/identification, the stayee villagers appear to be well in communication with each other, at least the men. Rajan rightly points out, “One theme — of human connectivity — is dramatized through a bridge on the edge of town as a crucial trope — both literally and figuratively — for informing the reader of some of the major debates and controversies of the day” (2003, 209). The men who used to meet at the bridge
subscribed to one or more of the Portuguese dailies being published in Panjim, Eusebio even subscribed to the *Times of India*. According to Rajan, “such a narrative strategy allows readers to glimpse another side of the nation, wherein the stresses and strains of Portuguese rule, a lesser-known colonial force, impacts the lives of its subjects” (2003, 209). For her, “the bridge also serves as the platform ground for the author to engage the reader in conversations about postcolonial discourse and ideology” like the hierarchy of colonized nations in the race for modernity, without belaboring the point (ibid.). As the Principal Tendulkar asks:

- What news of the London talks?
- Independence for India is not in the cards. There’s much talk of England’s civilizing mission — of the white man’s burden.
- The only white man’s burden I can see is the sacks of loot they go home with, said Tendulkar. Poor fellows — it bends them quite in half. And that goes not just for the British but for another nation I need not name... (83)

Such conversations besides revealing the “post–postcolonial slant of the novel” are “... symptomatic of the characters’ sense of political acumen” (Rajan 2003, 209). But Rajan’s observation that they provide “a feeling of safety in Tivolem amid the revolutionary goings-on in the world around them” (ibid.) seems to be misplaced. These are not mere idle conversations by the men aimlessly hanging around to pass the time. In conversational flows, many of the happenings *out there* are juxtaposed with the home situation in a challenging mode in keeping with the novel’s standpoint of elitist self-appraisal and criticism. In fact, the *reedor* finds tidbits like bad case of mumps in neighboring Margao more...
interesting than what’s happening in Manchuria (146) for it is the immediate human problems rather than the futility of grand wars that concern him. If the world upheavals are discussed with comic evasiveness (which cannot be construed here as protective retreat), home affairs are also astutely deliberated. They socially castigate Josephine’s role in spreading the rumour that Marie-Santana has an evil eye (247), self-consciously realize the absence of women in their group (272–273) and cynically comment on Eusebio’s Anglophilia (12; 63).

The “cabal of Catholics” or the local male intelligentsia (10) who meet daily for an hour at 5 pm on the parapets of the bridge express socio-political despair and self-indict the lack of anti-colonial insurgency (246; 273) in the character Teodosio’s following words —

- But what about the calm in Goa? . . . Do we really have political peace here, or is it apathy? The Portuguese have ruled us now for four centuries. For the first hundred years they had their moments of glory, but since then? Perhaps by association we too have now become sheeplike and lethargic and indifferent to progress. (273–274)

They also recall the Ranés revolt,136 compare the pre-/post–Salazar colonial situation, Tendulkar regards the colonial classification nothing short of racism feeling infuriated why they should be praised for being assimilated into a lesser

136. Tobias, the main protagonist of Sorrowing Lies my land narrates the pre-Portuguese history of Goa to his children who are so indoctrinated in the colonial education and its dominant History that they can hardly believe it, for them it turns out to be a bed-time story, fit only to regale. He mentions the Ranes who had revolted no less than six times against the Portuguese from 1852 to 1913, but the childrens’ reaction is not totally unexpected. (Mascarenhas 1999, 41).
culture (246; 273). Simon’s poignant response here is a synthesis of the stayees’ and the returnees’ socio-dynamics and their political consciousness —

The times will change. Those of us who go abroad, we always come back, like the pebbles that children hurl into the sky. Some pebbles fall on soft ground and make a tiny dent, and others fall on hard rock and knock off a little chip. But we make a difference, we do. It may just take longer in Goa. (274)

Teodosio’s earlier mentioned words “sheeplike and lethargic and indifferent to progress” rue the lack of anti–colonial space and invoke the debate of colonial modernity complexified in the narrative due to the history of religious conversion. Prakash Tendulkar, the principal of the local English high school and the lone Hindu in this male “cabal of Catholics” explains to Teodosio the rationale behind burning foreign cloth as part of Gandhi’s Non-cooperation movement (165). Tendulkar, a Gandhian intellectual, also corrects Simon that anti–colonialism need not depend on guns — “How many guns does Gandhi have? He wouldn’t touch a gun if you handed it to him. Yet, he’s shaking the British Empire to its foundations. Moral authority is what unarmed people have, and the Mahatma is showing us how to use it” (247). In another conversation Gandhi’s fasts, writing articles and books on social issues are termed as part of national purification by Tendulkar in an ironic comparison with Hitler’s purification of Germany by burning books especially those dealing with social issues (166).

Raja Rao’s novel Kanthapura (1938) is another example that complexifies Gandhian tenet of passive resistance and anti–colonialism.
Examining *Kanthapura* (1938) and Gillo Pontecorvo’s film *Burn!* (1969), Neelam Srivastava observes that violence in the case of Gandhi is directed against the self, “because the act of resistance does not include returning blows” while in the case of Fanon, it is a cleansing force for it frees the native from his despair and inaction making him fearless and restoring his self-respect; thus rendering both violence and non–violence as forms of restored agency (2010, 305). As Srivastava identifies, the Gandhian “control over the mind” implies sacrifice of self, that is, an extreme degree of self-control and how *Kanthapura* tells of the coming of Gandhian nationalism to a small village, Kanthapura, on the Malabar coast reminisced by an old woman (ibid., 315). Thus, “the liberation struggle is at one with a radical transformation of the villagers’ way of life and way of conceiving social relationships in accordance with Gandhian principles,” (ibid.) a narrative methodology attempted in *Tivolem* as well.

The issue of moral conscientiousness so belabored through the returnees’s father is also subtly represented through character Lazarinho, the village ruffian who at the age of fifteen had terrorized Pedro Saldanha’s chicks, but this time it is extended onto the social plane to register the idea of healthy village community life. “Even in retrospect, years later, discussing Lazarinh’, they would hark back to that chicken incident. There, it was agreed, in that one episode one could see the incipient seeds of badness, because one cannot grow up in a place such as Tivolem without knowing that on the care and love bestowed on helpless creatures depends the life and well-being of the village”
When Marie-Santana asks whether the police cannot do anything about Lazarinho, she is told that things haven’t changed in the years she has been away, and the nearest police station is still five miles away. The village people have their own way of coping with him with sound thrashing (ibid.). Lazarinho’s petty thefts and their unfolding bring a pícaro like comic relief in sharp contrast to the serious money fraud by John Fernshaw in a distant place which yet haunts the returnees — Marie-Santana and Simon. The news of Lazarinh’s death evokes such a complete turnaround of emotions that “in the context of death, so final, so terrible, and so utterly irrevocable,” even all the thefts “were construed as harmless escapades that had been vastly misunderstood at the time of their occurrence.” The people of the other village were roundly and properly condemned for their heartlessness, their savagery, their inhuman cruelty in killing (211).

5. Reflective nostalgia

While the returnees bring about both good and bad changes into the village, it is upon the stayees’ deliberations to accept or reject them, as well put in Dona Elena’s words — “Ours is a sleepy village, and change comes slowly, when it comes at all; sometimes, as you can well imagine, it’s change of the sort we’d rather not have” (45–46), referring here clearly to the crash materialism. This does not demonstrate parochialism, on the contrary; their
acceptance/rejection of the social capital embodied by the returnees exemplifies their social modernity (12; 59; 210). The returnees’ fathers personify the ideals of moral duty, truth, compassion in contrast to the *nouveau riche* returnees whose materialistic lifestyles created by capitalist colonial economy are looked down upon as a source of conceited individualism and moral degeneration that needs to be socially castigated.

Economic self-sufficiency combined with strong social ties is upheld as in the following conversation about the American economic depression and its repercussions forcing people to commit suicide. Senhor Eusebio says, “Too many of our old land rich-families are in real money trouble” to which Tendulkar responds—

That may be true, but we’ll never see suicides. And I’ll give you three reasons why: One as a society, we’ve never been money-mad, thank God! We lose our money, so what? Life goes on. Two, economically we’re down so low, we can’t go any lower. Three, even if things got worse, we’ve got no windows high enough to be worth jumping out of it. (117)

Lazar’s petty theft are forgiven and forgotten as mischievous conducts and the violence of it is not condoned by the villagers while John Fernshaw’s cheat in a distant colony is portrayed as a source of social shame for both Marie-Santana and Simon. There is a moral and ethical critique of loss of honesty, social degeneration along with the message that one who forgives, does not avenge, stands tall in his/her moral strength and moral responsibility is manifested through what Marie-Santana affirms that shame to her family can only come if she performs shameful actions (339). Both Lazar and Fernshaw’s case are
treated in the realm of social and moral order rather than institutionalized law and justice. Alcohol abuse as a social and moral vice is also referred to while religion in its formal, ritualistic and esoteric aspect is shown as inadequate in tackling and resolving practical, mundane affairs. Political affairs are not seen as divorced from social philosophy and true to the Gandhian dictum of non-violence, the power of love and moral authority is believed to be all conquering above the power of sword as exemplified in the vicar’s closing words of the novel (343–344).

The poignant scene (described earlier) of Marie-Santana and Dona Esmeralda standing together and admiring the latter’s mother daguerreotype (72) symbolizes the courageous heroine as the transgenerational carrier of cultural identity and Dona Esmeralda stands with her in a gesture of maternal-solidarity. Many scholars have well delineated how the female subaltern is further marginalized in terms of the colonial economy as well as colonial and native patriarchy. Through the father/daughter familial trope, Tivolem invokes one of the “five fundamental (and patriarchally restrictive) functions” that women serve in terms of gender and nationalism — “participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture” (Chrisman 2004, 190). There is a straight reference in the novel— “In Gandhi’s vision of India, Marie-Santana would be here by our side, and some of the others, too, speaking and being listened to as equals” (273). But Marie-Santana is not a submissive agent of the mentioned patriarchal function and breaks
certain retrogressive socio-cultural customs and practices, thus defying the objectification of women as passive recipient and transmitters of culture and of the men as sole agents of social and political change.

In fact, the overall narrative self-consciously invokes this role-reversal with the male intelligentsia conversing about anti-colonial struggle, women emancipation, overcoming caste and class consciousness while strong women characters like Marie-Santana, Amita struggling against the odds (272). With the self-assurance that the village had reclaimed her more than they had Simon, Marie-Santana decides to transgress the convention of men and women walking separately to attend church mass (172–173). This reclaiming reposes Marie-Santana as the communal voice of the village (a voice from the past) who’s overcoming caste consciousness, as already mentioned earlier, is well-lauded by the male intelligentsia (343). What is ironical is that these very men had discussed the rigidity of caste and class barriers during one of their daily meetings and had dared each other’s liberal mindedness to overcome it (164).

The issue of secularism (253), respect for all religion (204), equality of all before God [the well-to-do sit on benches that were placed at the rear of the church echoing a former vicar’s patent saying that wealth is what separates us from Christ] mentioned in the narrative (170) bear too strong an affinity with Gandhian ideals to be ignored.

According to Rochelle Pinto, at the end of the nineteenth century the hybrid Goan elite “found themselves caught between a fading discourse of
Portuguese patriotism and the discourses of British India” (quoted in Melo e Castro 2012, 48). For Pinto, the Goan society was:

being variously implicated by British high imperial discourse on the one hand, which dismissed Portuguese imperialism as retrograde — a gesture which partially implicated the Goan elite — and a nascent Indian anti–colonial discourse on the other, which, drawing on ideas of authenticity and essentialism, often connected to Hinduism, also only partially appealed to the Christian upper echelons recognizing the need for regeneration. (ibid.)

Contrary to Pinto’s preceding affirmation, the Gandhian discourse directly interpellates Goan Catholic characters in Rangel-Ribeiro’s debut novel. In Tivolem, this “nascent Indian anti–colonial discourse” more than “impinges on their consciousness” (ibid.). Instead of “drawing on ideas of authenticity and essentialism, often connected to Hinduism” (ibid.), the narrative reveals its alignment with Gandhian ideals (embodied in the returnees’ fathers), the not so unconditional fight to maintain traditional ways of village life, and most importantly the espousal of a non-violent struggle against Portuguese colonialism based on moral authority with decolonization supplanting even the colonial elites. The word “supplant” (57) lacks the sense of insurgency but it is evident that the narrative formulates a clearer vision of decolonization compared to Jacob e Dulce and also Monção as Melo e Castro rightly puts it in the context of the latter — “whilst the decline of the bhatkar is setting in and thereby beginning to free the mundkar from feudal obeisance, it does not necessarily follow that this decline will automatically entail the rise of the mundkar” (2009, 62).
“Both thinkers [Cabral and Fanon] analyze the “return to the source” as an impulse of an élite that has become alienated from its community through its assimilation of European cultural and intellectual values” (Chrisman 2004, 192). In Tivolem, this alienation is represented as reflective nostalgia (Boym), as a re–visit of the old glory, not in order to self-pathologize but to provisionally recenter its élite subjectivity and agency in a self-critical mode. Invoking the father/child familial trope, the narrative reclaims the élites’ past in the event of the nouveau riche returnees usurping their status but this impoverished class does not take the defeatist way. Rather, the other élites also self-criticize the lack of anticolonial spirit and also support Marie-Santana when she shows courage to break the caste barrier. It would be rather untenable, in light of the present reading, to offhand proclaim Tivolem as a politico-literary opportunism in its discursive return to the source. As Cabral said, “The return to the source is of no historical importance unless it brings complete . . . identification with the hopes of the mass of the people . . . Otherwise, [it] is nothing more than . . . a kind of political opportunism” (quoted in Chrisman 2004, 193).

Thus the politico-cultural mourning and reflective nostalgia, as read in the present chapter, is of both psychological and political value. It provides an anti–colonial space to reckon with socio-political alienation brought upon by colonialism. The socio-economic dynamics between the stayee villagers and the returnees is regenerative against the materialities of colonialism and colonial migration. The need to be reclaimed by the villagers (172), the symbolism of
choosing eddies to make a complete turnaround (333) reinforces this regeneration. The nuanced socio-economic alienation of the elites in *Tivolem* reiterates its anti-colonial rather than its *pre-postcolonial* (BPC 36) register. Cabral argued, “Our cultural resistance [to colonialism] consists in the following — while we scrap colonial culture and negative aspects of our own culture, whether in our character or in our environment, we have to create a new culture, also based on our traditions . . .” (quoted in Sivanandan 2004, 64).

In its *reflective nostalgia*, the narrative reiterates the social capital of communitarian ties. The Narayanesque idyllic rusticism of *Tivolem* that even the worst review has not failed to acknowledge is an eventual conjoining of the social capital and modernity of the stayee-villagers that prevent the returnees from an irreversible fragmentation and psychic alienation. Even gossip in terms of local knowledge (59),\(^{137}\) as opposed to slandering, carries valence in order to strengthen the social ties, providing security and belongingness not only to the *orphaned* returnees but also to the villagers. Such portrayal of village-life renders this “novel of place” (Banker)\(^{138}\) with a quaintness that has not failed to charm most of the readers and critics. *Tivolem’s* sincerity appeals because it endeavors towards “a sense of discipline, a feeling of brotherhood, a thirst for

---

137. Josephine Aunty’s gossipping is subtly treated as social capital in terms of local knowledge about the villagers. In a conversation with Annabel, she shows genuine concern why Marie-Santana is not willing to share about her past life (59). Also, when all the villagers laud Marie-Santana for having saved Arnold’s life, in a change of heart Josephine addresses her as “Mariemana — Marie my sister” and exaggerates about her courage that she had even stroked the bull’s face (291).

ethical values . . .” qualities that the author identified when asked what would be the three things that he would like to leave for Goa and her people (Rangel-Ribeiro 2006).\(^ {139}\) Perhaps these are the qualities that we need more than ever in the present neo–colonized world.

6. Alterna(rra)tives of/from Goa

In continuation with the discursive aim of decolonializing Portuguese imperial History, I propose the term *bebincaized* to be employed as a literary allegory for Goan history.\(^ {140}\) Emphasizing upon the fictive nature of history, Hayden White claimed in the latter decades of the twentieth century “History cannot escape literature” (quoted in Curthoys et al. 2006, 11) an enunciation that foregrounds Linda Hutcheon’s *historiographic metafiction* term. Rendering decrepit the distinction between historical fact and fiction, *historiographic metafiction* deprivileges history’s truth claim, “both by questioning the ground of that claim in historiography and by asserting that both history and fiction are discourses, human constructs, signifying systems, and both derive their major claim to truth from that identity” (Hutcheon 2001, 93).

139. https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.indian.goa/vdqB7bE4HsY
140. I had proposed this term, and some of the related enunciations, earlier in a paper titled “Fictionalizing History: *bebincaized* Goan History” presented at the International Colloquium *PEN-INSULARITIES: WRITING EAST AND WEST IN PORTUGUESE* held at University of Bristol, 15–16 April, 2011.
Salman Rushdie’s *Midnight’s Children* (1980), Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s *Cien años de soledad* (1967) are two examples that epitomize this mode of fictionalizing history. As the Canadian scholar Linda Hutcheon remarks—

a novel like *Midnight’s Children* works to foreground the totalising impulse of western–imperialistic–modes of history-writing by confronting it with indigenous models of history’. … Rushdie explicitly challenges Western concepts of historical narrative by introducing the metaphor of ‘chutnification’, suggesting that the contents will always be flavoured in a particular way by particular cooks or authors in the pickling or preservation process, and also that the different bits selected for preservation will blend and mingle to create new flavours. (quoted in Innes 2007, 39)

Like ‘chutnification,’ the trope *bebincaized* Goan history can be suitably employed to invoke alterna(rra)tives to the received Histories about Goa and its

141. I agree with Graham Huggan’s premises that the margins continue to be exoticized; sharing K. Satchidanandan—the Malayalam poet’s assertion regarding an obvious disparity between the publicity Indian literature in English attracts and its literary quality and that there is some grain of truth that it is suffering from a condition’ what Pankaj Mishra calls ‘Rushdieitis’, or what Padmini Mongia terms the ‘Roy phenomenon’ (quoted in Huggan 2001, 64–67). Rushdie’s “wild assertion” (as Ania Loomba puts it, quoted in Huggan 2001, 63) that appeared in the infamous *The New Yorker* article, (23–30 June, 1997) is also insupportable:

the prose writing—both fiction and non-fiction—created in this period by Indian writers working in English is proving to be a stronger and more important body of work than most of what has been produced in the eighteen “recognized” languages of India. . . . “Indo-Anglian” literature represents perhaps the most valuable contribution India has yet made to the world of books. (quoted in Gopal 2009, 1–2)

142. Another of Rushdie’s literary culinary metaphor is pickles as Vijay Mishra puts it:

Is this the postcolonial metaphor? A metaphor also for diaspora? The pickled version of history—“to pickle is to give immortality”—gives shape and meaning—a form, to be precise (as Rushdie says)—to the ingredients if history. History gets written down or in encoded as a grand Indian conceit based on its cuisine, its smells, its tastes: ‘the intricacies of turmeric and cumin, the subtlety of fenugreek...cardamoms...garlic, garam masala, stick cinnamon . . . (2008, 216).

And not surprisingly, these metaphors have been regarded as “Orientalist displays”—Rushdie’s parody of the reader-as-consumer is reinforced by gastronomic metaphors: people, places and events—the country itself—become an edible; Indian history is ‘chutnified’ and preserved for future use (quoted in Huggan 2001, 72). Further making a poignant comment on the novel *Midnight’s Children*, K. Raghavendra Rao declares, What we get in the novel, then, is the ‘chutney’ but not the history of the ‘chutney’. . . What he gives is a brilliant re-
colonial past. Bebinca is a 15-16 layered sweet dish, and each layer is baked separately to its proper colour on a very slow fire, before they are joined to make a whole (Souza 1994, 105). Goan history has a long story of *transculturation* but generally a linear periodization is adopted with pre–Portuguese history, the colonial period (450 years) and the post–1961 period. The usage of the word *transculturation* is quite deliberate here, employed to refer to Goa’s colonial past as well as to its other historical experiences. Mary Louise Pratt employs the term *transculturation* to describe how subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture (2003, 6). But the term refers back to the Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz (1940) who in a pioneering description of Afro-Cuban culture (*Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y del azúcar*) coined the term ‘*transculturación*’ introducing two complementary neologisms — acculturación and deculturación as part of the sociocultural process. Later, the Uruguayan critic Ángel Rama incorporated the same term into literary studies developing it further in his article “Los procesos de transculturación en la narrativa latinoamericana” (1971).

The Portuguese colonialism in Goa spanned around 450 years, officially ending with political decolonization in 1961 after many years of diplomatic tug-of-war between the then newly independent India and the adamant regime of telling of historical episodes, but no history (1985, 157–159).
Salazar. But the Goan history of *transculturation* does not begin with Portuguese colonialism. With a history generally believed to be dating back to Middle Stone Age, Goa was invaded and ruled by many other historical players as well, and its cultural identity ensues in a long *transculturative* process. Putting it differently, João da Veiga Coutinho in *A Kind of Absence: Life in the Shadow of History* (1997) states, “We must learn to live without roots. Roots have been replaced by horizons. India is not the soil in which we have or can have roots. We have been severed, disconnected from the soil and its presences. India is an arc of our horizon . . .” (quoted in Couto 2004, 265). Differing a little from the preceding affirmation, Maria Couto in *Goa — a daughter’s story* (2004) believes “that Goans in their own way have developed a composite and rooted culture, with the vibrancy of survival and adaptation. It is a culture that has both roots and horizons” (265). I would suggest experimenting with a layered approach to Goan cultural identity in order to nuance its *transculturative* register. In the words of Seyla Benhabib, cultures are “not holistic but . . . multilayered, decentered and fractured systems of action and signification” (quoted in Kraidy 2005, 54).

Literature from/on Goa continues to explore Goan history and cultural identity, reappropriating and reclaiming colonial History. Thus, following are some possible designatory labels to demarginalize literary narratives within the
metropolitan corpus of Lusophone literatures.\textsuperscript{144} For example, the label \textit{Indo-Portuguese literature} is not very self-explicatory. As Melo e Castro informs, “there is currently some debate about whether the term ‘Indo-Portuguese’ literature should be abandoned for a designation such as ‘Goan Literature in Portuguese’, along the model of the shift that took place in the nomenclature of Anglophone Indian writing” (2014, 288). Incidentally, the first magnus anthology on Goan literature in Portuguese running into two volumes by Vimala Devi and Manuel Seabra is titled as \textit{Literatura Indo-Portuguesa} (1971). And the latest anthology by Aleixo Manuel da Costa is titled \textit{Dicionário de literatura goesa} (3 vols. 1998).

\textit{Indo-Portuguese literature} label would be restrictive if we consider Peter Nazareth’s fictions \textit{The General is Up} (1991) and \textit{In a Brown Mantle} (1972) which engage with the expulsion of 120,000 East Indians during Idi Amin’s despotic regime in Uganda in 1972 which included 5,000 Goans. These narratives critically address the hyphenated and fragmented identities of the East African-Goan, \textit{re-trailing} the ‘\textit{twice borne}’ trajectory of Goan colonial migration to East Africa and again further on. Like \textit{Tivolem, Angela’s Goan Identity} (1994) by Carmo D’ Souza, and \textit{Sorrowing lies my land} (1999) by Lambert Mascarenhas make constant references to the Indian Independence Movement and the state of affairs pre/post-1947 neighbouring India. In

\textsuperscript{144} The novel \textit{Skin} (2001) by U.S. based Goan writer Margaret Mascarenhas is available in Portuguese as \textit{A cőr da pele} (2006), \textit{Angela's Goan Identity} (1994) by Carmo D’Souza as \textit{A Identidade Goesa de Angela} (2000).
Sorrowing lies my land, the protagonist Tobias’s exasperation at the deteriorating state of affairs in his village and the lack of any popular anti–colonial movement (hence the title) has been critically read by M. E. Derrett as written for political propaganda (1966, 152). Similarly, many fictions under the label Indian Writing in English continue to make references to Goan past and its social problems.145

Salman Rushdie’s The Moor’s Last Sigh (1995) opens with its take on Vasco da Gama’s voyage:

for if it had not been for peppercorns, then what is ending now in East and West might never had begun . . . English and French sailed in the wake of that first-arrived Portugee, so that in the period called Discovery-of-India — but how could we be discovered when we were not covered before? — we were “not so much sub-continent as sub-condiment,” as my distinguished mother had it . . . (1995, 1)

The historian Teotónio R. de Souza is surprised that “despite an early Portuguese edition of the novel” titled as O último suspiro do mouro (1995), “there has been no serious Portuguese reaction to Rushdie’s darts of ridicule at the Portuguese cultural vestiges represented by the Gama-Zogoiby family of the novel. The family has a member whose name the author helps to pronounce as ‘Camonsh,’ passing it through the nose!” (1997, 386). With regards to another novel Ravan and Eddie (1995) by Kiran Nagarkar, Priyamvada Gopal affirms:

Nagarkar’s take on communal differences and conflict [in Bombay] is often Swiftian in its satirical thrust: Hindus bathe in the morning, Goan

145. Interestingly, Os Brahamanes by Francisco Luis Gomes, considered to be the first Goan fiction (in Portuguese) dates back to 1866, two years after what is believed to be the first Indian novel written in English — Rajmohan’s Wife (1864) by Bankim Chatterjee.
Catholics in the evening. . . . Hindus didn’t think that spitting was peeing through the mouth. Catholics did . . . Hindu women wore saris, Catholic women dresses except on special occasions when they switched to saris. (2009, 136–137)

These kind of cross references can be read in terms of what Walter D. Mignolo calls a “pluritopic hermeneutics,” that is a comparativist study of temporalities and geographies (quoted in Ingham 2003, 48).

As for the terms, Lusophone literature of Goa and Lusophone Indian Literature, the term Lusophone is itself problematic and is loaded with colonial and neocolonial connotations. On the contrary, both these terms can serve as a counter-discourse to de-privilege the canonization of the works of few celebrated authors from Lusophone Africa as discussed in Chapter one. Melo e Castro opines that Lusophone literature of Goa though defunct now, still holds interest for two main reasons —

Firstly, it bears testimony to the worldview of the former Indo-Portuguese elite, the variety of subject-positions found within its archive in relation to Portuguese culture and colonialism, native hierarchies and Goa’s belonging to the wider Indian nation. It is notable that, at least insofar as prose fiction goes, this literature was often more autocritical or intracritical than invested in “writing back to the empire”. Secondly, the specific conditions of Goa and its cultural production in Portuguese might help complexify or problematize postcolonial thought and challenge universalized presumptions concerning the poetics and evolution of postcolonial literatures (2014, 273)

The preceding example of the disjunction between ‘autocritical or intracritical’ and ‘writing back to the empire’ literary standpoints can be complexified by what Kumkum Sangari’s calls “double-coding” (1987, 176), a term which nuances the dialogic mediations of literary narratives that are informed with two
(or more) cultural codes. Literary narratives of “two parent traditions” (Singh 2005, 137) or as Meenakshi Mukherjee (1971) terms it, “twice-born fiction” to define the Indo-Anglian novel, have a complicated involved dialectic. Therefore, Sangari rightly points out the necessity to delineate “how the double-coding is operated, what is the nature of the relationship between the two codes: even or uneven, hierarchic, dialogic, or symbiotic? (quoted in Radhakrishnan 1996, xviii). Such interventions also need to be addressed in the case of Lusophone literature of Goa and Lusophone Indian Literature.

‘Colonialism in reverse’ is another critical approach that linguistically challenges the writing back paradigm. Gordon Lewis uses the expression ‘colonialism in reverse’ to refer to this “new phenomenon whereby writers belonging to the erstwhile colonies make inroads into the ex–coloniser’s language. The ex–coloniser in turn is brought under increasing pressure to grant, willy-nilly, recognition to the new literatures” (quoted in Raveendran 2000, 97). Goan writing in English linguistically complexifies this ‘colonialism in reverse.’ Of lately, Indian Writing in English (IWE) has become trademarked by Indianisation of English and Goan writing in English besides of course appropriating Indianisation of English, presents further a case of Konkanisation of English and many a times Portugaization of English. A good example of code switching from English to Konkani from Sorrowing lies my land:

- Aniceto made a sign to Leonardo, and both of them stood up.
- “Borem, puroh, bass,” said the old man, gulping his last drink. (1999, 96)
To cite two examples of Portugaization of English from *Angela’s Goan Identity*:

- Senhor Naik knew something of palmistry, astrology, star and other vedic sciences and hence his decisions were considered as *acertadas*. (1994, 81)
- Suppose it was an accomplished *facto* continued Senhor Naik, his voice lowered to a whisper. The narrator clarifies, “The word facto softly whispered had the desired effect. It was Senhor Naik’s speciality, to include Portuguese words for emphasis.” (Souza 1994, 83)

Observing this “linguistic contamination,” M. E. Derrett affirms:

Lambert Mascarenhas, author of *Sorrowing Lies my Land*, an Indian Goan, is influenced by Portuguese and writes in a dialect whose most obvious feature is an inversion of the subject and verb, e.g. «Small shacks of palm leaves would our people build» and «sweet she was my mother». But in general his style has much in common with that of Indian writers in English elsewhere. (1966, 115)

*Goan Postcolonial literature* as a broad label would appear to avoid most of the problematic connotations discussed above, provided it is not offhandedly dismissed as a mere academic fad. In this case, the unhyphenated term postcolonial can be used both in chronological and critical sense. Another possibility is — *Goan transcultural narratives*, thus privileging its *transculturative* past and present.
This cursory discussion of some of the terms attempted to draw attention to the lack of academic discussions on the theoretical framework(s) and considerations of proposing a designatory label for the growing genre of Goan fictions. As the brief examples mentioned of Konkanisation and Portugaization of English from selective novels point out, bebincaized Goan history can be employed not only to symbolize the Goan identity layering, but also the linguistic mixture that has come to enrich the oral and written expressions in Goa. Also, acknowledging the problems of a wide readership, it is still hoped that more discussions and research would follow the expanding corpus of Goan literature to nuance our critical understanding of multi-layering of Goan history and identity formation. As the narrator in Angela’s Goan Identity says, “That delicious layered dish. Just like the Goan community” (1994, 106).
Conclusion
The present thesis attempted to highlight that the ongoing Lusophone postcolonial scholarship is intricately bound up with postcoloniality in terms of the marginocentric purchase value that the former discourse has misappropriated. It also sought to highlight how it recycles the previous discourses on Portugal’s marginality in neo–lusotropicalist and neo–imperial terms. I intensively engaged with some of Sousa Santos’s interventions, touted as seminal and groundbreaking, in order to undermine its complicity with Lusophone postcoloniality. Thus, the present work traced the commonality of displacements of memory which Lusophone postcolonial scholarship shares with, for example, Italophone (Triulzi 2006), Francophone (Haddour and Majumdar 2007) postcolonial scholarships. It also, reckoned with the conspicuous discursive silence on ex-Asian colonies within Lusophone postcolonialism, reading it in terms of countermnemonic innocence (Radhakrishnan 1996, 156) and colonial aphasia (Stoler 2011).

Delineating some of the primary debates of postcolonialism in the first chapter revealed that most of the points that the non–anglophone postcolonialisms contest had already been either intensively or extensively debated. For example the criticism of undifferentiated discourse to include the colonial histories of other European empires well encapsulated in Harish Trivedi’s quip —“the postcolonial has ears only for English” (1999, 272) already pinpointed the privileged British imperial history. Touching upon the major areas of postcolonial studies also revealed what scholars like Aijaz
Ahmad, Arif Dirlik, Benita Parry, Laura Chrisman, to name just a few, had been reiterating as the disciplines’s complicity with metropolitan academic consumption in the present global capitalism with its blunt politics and discursive fetish. Thus counter-discourses like During’s critical postcolonialisms as opposed to reconciliatory postcolonialisms (1998, 31), to take one example, highlighted the urgency of a ‘war of manoeuvre’ vs. a ‘war of position’ in Gramscian terms. Undoubtedly, the present challenge to global capitalism calls for no less than antagonistic and contestative politics and ethics.

This mapping out of the politics of postcolonialism helped to draw its connecting contours with what I provisionally termed as the non–anglophone turn as a wide umbrella to denote the emergence of postcolonialisms of various European empires. I also highlighted how in provincializing the anglocentric focus of postcolonial studies, most of these non–anglophone postcolonialisms indulge in exceptionalism in a bid to reinforce their specificity not only in terms of their imperial histories but also the discursive and thematic contributions to anglocentered postcolonialism. The maître à penser reclamation, whether as franglais mixture (Young (2001, 18) or as the appropriation of Italian radical philosophers like Antonio Gramsci, Antonio Negri and Giorgio Agamben elides the imperial amnesia as well as disavowal of the colonial past on the part of the European metropolitan centers. In fact, Dirlik’s acerbic riposte—“when Third World intellectuals have arrived in First World academe” (1994, 328–329) underlines the belatedness of these nouveau non–anglophone postcolonial
discourses and their predominantly metropole centered academic formation. What emerged was an abyss between the shift in *anglocentric* postcolonial field’s centre of gravity and the eschewed clarion call for comparative postcolonialisms.

The *belatedness* of these *nouveau* non–anglophone postcolonial discourses also sheds light on the specificities of imperial amnesia. If, for example, in Francophone it was Algeria’s war of Independence, in Italophone the Axeum obelisk exemplified the postcolonial politics of disappearance. Thus, the *why now* tag question to this non–anglophone turn invokes “memoropolitics” (Crews 1995) of European imperial Histories and the disavowal of *imperial turn* (Burton 2003). Brief enunciation of the non–anglophone postcolonial *turn* also facilitated in delineating the critical geopolitics behind the post–2000 proliferation keeping in mind Huggan’s distinction between postcolonialism and postcoloniality. This in turn underscored the complicity of *coloniality of power* (Quijano 2000) and the politics of memory while also underlining the criticality of exorcizing past memories by memorializing from ex–centric standpoint.

Besides problematizing the centric readings and the Eurocentric standpoint of imperial history within metropolitan scholarship, the disavowal of *Imperial turn* also highlighted the oblivious point that many of the policies towards the colonies travelled first from the metropolitan center like the *limpieza de sangre* discourse during the *Reconquista*. Thus Woollacot’s
differentiation between “making empire visible in metropolitan histories” and “making colonialism and its historical import and legacies visible as part of the metropolitan past” (2009, 156) acquires critical dimensions. The belatedness of the non–anglophone turn also points to the disconnected histories within imperial centers and the need for comparative imperialisms keeping in mind the preceding distinction. Thus the exceptionalism of these non–anglophone postcolonialisms can also be problematized from an excentric standpoint by underlining that internal imperial differences also thrived on grafting and mis/appropriations amongst various European imperialisms. The belatedness of the non–anglophone turn also revealed a critical dynamics between coloniality of power (Quijano 2000) and the sociology of immigration as present day politics of immigration are mediated by colonial intricacies and imbrications. This socio-literary amnesia with regards to immigrants reiterates the complicity of postcoloniality and postcolonialism.

Subscribing to Huggan’s distinction between postcolonialism and postcoloniality, the first chapter outlined some of the discursive intricacies between Anglophone centered postcolonialism and the recent postcolonial scholarships engaging with other European empires. It also mapped the genealogical and discursive contours of Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism with other fields like Francophone, Italophone, etc. in order to problematize not only their belatedness as symptomatic of imperial amnesia but also how “they
perpetuate neocolonial geopolitics in the form of linguistic fields” (Eagleton 2003, 40).

The mapping of *non–anglophone turn* also provided the ground to appreciate critically how Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism shares commonalities with its other discursive counterparts. Medeiros’s rhetoric question (2007, 1–2) and Soares’s (2006, 5–11) concerns about the valence of this nascent field is quite revealing along with the conspicuous absence of non-literary scholars especially historians. The exceptional example of Lourenço’s predominantly dense psychoanalytic enunciations not only made for a contrastive and revealing discourse along with other cursory examples of non-literary Portuguese scholarship but also problematized Sousa Santos’s opposition of the culturalist bias of *dominant* postcolonial studies through his discourse of *oppositional postcolonialism* (2010). Akin to other postcolonialisms, Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism as a post-2000 *phenomenon* shares similar contours like subsuming Lusophone literatures with Portuguese literary studies.

The commonality of *displacements of memory* as in other European metropolitan postcolonialisms underlined the complicity of Lusophone postcolonial studies with postcoloniality. As in the case of postcolonial France’s disavowal of its imperial past and the *haemorrhaged* History of the Algerian War or marginocentric discourses of Italophone in terms of “little Italy” (Behdad et al. 2011, 344) — just to point some examples — a similar situation
is evident in the case of nascent Lusophone/Portuguese postcolonialism. After years of being a socio-political taboo, the recent proliferation of literature on colonial wars and accompanying literary readings do not appear to qualify as if Portuguese scholars are confronting the imperial past. As the discussion in the initial chapter revealed the recent prolific non/literary remediations of colonial war events betray their *situadedness* from imperialist standpoint. The politics of literary postcoloniality (Ahmad 1995) foreground not only the *displacements* of Portuguese imperial memories but also how Lusophone literatures have become complicit in global commodity culture and academic imperialism.

The attempt to comprehend the imperial geopolitics behind the afrocentered approach to Lusophone postcolonialism problematized the selective amnesia about the imperial histories of Goa, Daman and Diu, East-Timor and Macau. The privileging of colonial wars not only accounted for the consequential neglect of these Asian colonies but also revealed how the afrocentered approach was from a centric standpoint. The Eurocentric narrative of the colonial wars and the political decolonization of African colonies as well as the imperial language basis of Lusophone postcolonialism or even in Sousa Santos’s phrase *postcolonialism in the time-space of official Portuguese language* (BPC 16) exemplified the imperial standpoint. The examples of the scant mention on Goa, Macau and East-Timor also lent weight to the argument that the imperial History of these Asian colonies is sanitized and lusotalgic.
Also, their political decolonization history serving as exclusionary marker for Portuguese postcolonialism (footnote in EPC 2006, 213) is not quite tenable.

This clearly belies Sousa Santos’s affirmation of a *situated postcolonialism* which “presupposes careful historical and comparative analyses of the different colonialisms and their aftermaths,” and the crucial question he raises “who decolonizes what and why” (BPC 20). Taking seriously the Portuguese sociologist’s motivation for more “competent rebel”\(^{146}\) I have tried with the best of my efforts to go beyond his *maître à penser* stature, a task daunted by his profuse scholarship on discourses ranging from law, social justice, economy to sociology which is undoubtedly beyond my own humble competence. Not to mention the appalling eulogy by Ramón Grosfoguel—“Boaventura de Sousa is the leading scholar of the Coimbra school of thought in Portugal that has replaced Paris as the center of critical theory in Europe today” (2006, 141), especially given the fact that the Portuguese sociologist wonders “Why have some major reform efforts outside Europe chosen the slogan: ‘Neither Bologna nor Harvard’ ” (2012b, 10).

The arguments in the second chapter exposed the apparent cracks in Sousa Santos’s *situadedness*. Whether it’s his question if the work of a social scientist from a colonizer country can contribute to postcolonialism other than being the object of postcolonial studies (2010, 240) or his unease at being

condemned as an oppositionist, going from the oppositional postmodern to the oppositional postcolonial (2010, 233), his overall scholarship seems increasingly distanced from an antagonistic ethics that necessitates subversive agency. In the endnotes to BPC (2002), the sociologist though agreeing with Mignolo’s (2000) argument that postmodernism is a critical discourse within “hegemonic cosmologies” had wondered whether the same could be said about his *oppositional postmodernism* (38). Continuing this, in 2010, Sousa Santos again concedes that to a certain extent, the excavating process that he proposes justifies Mignolo’s view (2000) of the former’s critique of modernity as an internal critique but this time he bases his critical disagreement on four arguments some of which have been delineated in the second chapter.

In the light of this, I tend to agree with Heidi Libesman that “there is more room for reconciliation than Santos concedes between his own work and the work of critical modern theorists (such as Jürgen Habermas) and pluralist liberal political philosophers (such as Will Kymlicka and John Rawls)” (2013, 422). In fact McLennan rubs in well stating that Sousa Santos’s postcolonial agenda though coincident with many other scholars differs “not least in the subtlety of Santos’s discourse, even while the headlines remain unapologetically bold” (20). He cites the example of the way the Portuguese sociologist “distances himself from Mignolo’s project, slightly stung, perhaps, by Mignolo’s suggestion (2000) that Santos’s critique of modernity is basically an ‘internal’ rather than truly confrontation alone” (ibid.). Thus Sousa Santos’s
defense — after 500 years of western global domination, it is difficult to perceive what is external to it, beyond what resists to it . . . (2010, 232–233); his lopsided invocation of Lucian of Samosata, Nicholas of Cusa and Blaise Pascal in terms of non-Occidentalist West (2009), and call for post-abyssal thinking (2007b), appear to confound the antagonistic ethics of his scholarship. As he puts it, he “was able to see in it [The first Frankfurt School] the seeds of the historical dead end to which the Eurocentric modernity was leading us” (2013, 736) and goes on that within their frame of reference, only tragic pessimism would be possible, so he gradually coined tragic optimism. Thus in Sousa Santos’s case, as well as in the case of other Portuguese scholars like Lourenço, Calafate Ribeiro, et al. with their predominantly psychoanalytic centric literary readings of Portuguese imperial past, there is an inherent disavowal of constant examination of “own complicity with the colonial imagination” (Jolly 1995, 22).

Sousa Santos’s undifferentiated defamiliarizing vis-à-vis the imperial South, deprivileging vis-à-vis the north and conflating modern problems with (euro-) modern problems, as discussed in the second chapter, problematize his situadedness as an elite scholar. He, along with other mentioned Portuguese scholars, do not well reckon what Ajit Maan calls the preliminary deconstruction of what one has been taught about who one is or in other words unenculturated autobiography (2007, 411–417). The marginocentric essentialist discourse of Portuguese colonialism does not subvert the several layers of
attitudes which shield the Northern “chauvinism of prosperity” (Pieterse 2005, vii). The learning from South that Sousa Santos so belabours upon evades such questions —“who is talking about the global south — when, why, where” and instead asks what the global south is rather than for whom and under what conditions the global south becomes relevant (Levander et al. 2011, 4). In fact, he uncritically employs terms like indigenous or peasant knowledge, scientific and technological knowledge of the West, etc.\textsuperscript{147} without delinking it with the politics of representations of the other validating Castro-Gómez’s distinction between pragmatic and epistemical recognition (2007, 441).

I tend to employ here Rosa’s term \textit{Northern Other} to underline this misappropriation of Global/South in Portuguese academia which appears to be a recycling of the earlier reified Portuguese marginocentrism of being relegated to peripheral Europe. This is evident not only in Sousa Santo’s case but also scholars like Calafate Ribeiro, Roberto Vecchi, et al. with new dis/courses \textit{marketing} the term. The paratactic manner of the sociologist’s disquisitions which often juxtapose historical colonialism along with present (euro-) modern problems and proposed solutions without ever delineating the historical specificity and continuity or its negotiation in neocolonial times lend weight to his imperialist \textit{situatedness}. Portugal’s surreptitious inclusion/exclusion within the South as already delineated is from a pathological standpoint, its modern tale of resembling the South is a crisis in its

\textsuperscript{147} http://w2.bcn.cat/bcnmetropolis/arxiu/en/page0b1a.html?id=22&ui=518.
self-perception vis-à-vis the North. This time around Portugal could see itself in a self-assumed role earmarked in terms of a “periphery informant” (borrowed from native informant) — a neo-imperial meditative protagonism for Portugal, placed alongside Brazil, Mexico, India, Colombia, South Africa, Mozambique.

Sousa Santos’s clarification of South as “anti–imperial South” has already been criticized. Suffice here to recall Madureira’s words — “it is the commonalities that Portugal’s peculiarly brutal colonial enterprise shares with those of the so-called Super-Prosperos that should underpin the elaboration of a Lusophone postcolonial theory positioned in and oriented toward the South” (2006b, 16). Thus in this case, the marginalized standpoint would essentially include “transversal and rhizomatic networks of minority subjects,” (Lionnet and Shih 2005, 22) which Sousa Santos’s discourses neglect. Recalling Grosfoguel’s eulogy of Sousa Santos as a decolonial thinker, it is imperative that decolonial thought should not become another discourse of intellectual imperialism for merely rendering visibility of marginalized knowledges, definitely not equivalent to ascribing agency to the subjugated.

The reading of Tivolem performed a counter-discourse to the Portuguese imperial centric discourses as delineated in the first two chapters. Neologism like bebincaized as a literary allegory for Goan history aimed to pronounce the afrocentric nature of Lusophone postcolonialism and its complicity with literary postcoloniality. The literary discussion of Tivolem and references to other Goan literary texts like Monção, Jacob e Dulce not only rendered visibility to this
marginalized literary corpus but was also critically indicative of the exclusivity of Lusophone literatures. The inclusion of such a reading problematized many of the theoretical discourses dealt with in the context of Lusophone/Portuguese Postcolonialism.

The third chapter foregrounded the decolonial register of literary return and reclaiming the past in order to rewrite non–metropolitan hi/stories. As Radhakrishnan points out, there are two possible kinds of postcolonial returns: the subaltern route that revisits colonialist-nationalist historiographies oppositionally and non-identically, and the indigenous path with its strong countermemory or forgetfulness of matters colonialist and nationalist . . . (1996, 759). The reading invoked the geoliterary cognitive politics of colonial migration from a “literary view from below” (Mohanty 2011, 2). The social epistemologies of everyday life of the returnees and their socio-dynamics with the stayee villagers also added to distinguish it from other literary texts which Krishnaswamy earmarks in terms of “mythologies of migrancy” (1995).

The elite stayees and returnees’ need to reclaim the past posits not as personal nostalgic re–membering but as a challenge to colonial power in their capacity as discursive agents of anti–colonialism and indigenous modernity. Also, Monção’s brief comparison reference showed that unlike its foregrounding of an indigenous versus unproblematized colonial modernity, Tivolem aims to provide a rather dialectical account of the same, thus providing “a ‘vertical’ account, so to speak, of the disruptions of empire from within and
‘below’” (Doyle 2010, 199). The interwined past lives of the migrant returnees from various parts of the Portuguese empire in *Tivolem* foreground what Mignolo calls a “pluritopic hermeneutics,” that is a comparativist study of temporalities and geographies (quoted in Ingham 2003, 48).

The anti–colonial register that this reading underlined in *Tivolem* without disavowing its elite narratorial standpoint exemplified what can be called as *Saidian tightrope* (akin to Ania Loomba’s (1991) Fanonian *tightrope*), that is, finding a valence between anticolonial nativism and an alternative to the “rhetoric of blame” (Said 1993, 18). Investing in the agency of colonial elites to nuance how the colonizer mediated and grafted the pre–colonial oppression is also compelling in the wake of metropolitan non/literary discourses like Catarina Mourão’s “A Dama de Chandor” (The Lady of Chandor) which continue to nostalgically search the *Goa Dourada*. *Tivolem* not only mocks or satirizes Goan elites’ colonial mimicry but also subverts socio-cultural fetishes like *fado* and *tristeza* (51; 90). The elites’ *re-membering* exemplifies what Allan Megill (1998) explains as the valorization of memory when identity is threatened (quoted in Bell 2006, 6). It is true that political identities are constructed over time through the meditation of memory, but in crisis people do take refuge in their past (ibid.).

While the growing disenchantment, in general, with the failed promises of the anticolonial struggles have definitely put the post–colonial role of the indigenous elites in the dock but that should not, in the words of Parry, “blind
critics to the import of liberation struggles conducted in the name of nationalism” (2004, 10). The delineations of the failure of the postcolonial nation-states to put into practice the Fanonian politics of decolonization and the concomitant coloniality of power need not turn into an uncritical valorizing of a free floating diasporic subject-position unmediated by race or class.

With Lusophony Games being held in Goa and instances like the listing of 7 wonders of Portuguese origin in the world which includes the Basilica of Bom Jesus not to mention the originally shortlisted 27 chosen monuments being situated in 16 countries world over in Portuguese ex–colonies; there is an urgency to challenge this selective amnesia and the points enunciating the Goa syndrome in chapter one. The alarming disjunction of what Mignolo calls, “the politics of enacting and constructing loci of enunciation” (1995, 15) as observed in the scholarship of Sousa Santos and other Portuguese scholars needs to be further addressed. The present thesis hopes that such an undermining of Lusophone scholarship and postcoloniality will pave the way for more responsible research that is conscientious and sensitive towards its own geopolitics.
Bibliography


Daly, Brenda O.. 1996. Lavish self-divisions the novels of Joyce Carol Oates. Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi.


doi: 1080/0950238032000050788

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343914


doi:10.1080/13688799989724.


doi: 10.1080/13688799890228.


Gonçalves, Arnaldo M.A.. 2003. “Macao, Timor and Portuguese India in the context of Portugal’s recent decolonization.” In *The last empire thirty years of Portuguese decolonization*, edited by Stewart Llyod-Jones and


Hall, Catherine and Sonya Rose, eds. 2006. *At home with the empire: metropolitan culture and the imperial world*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


Hoeveler, Diane Long and Jeffrey Cass. 2006. *Interrogating orientalism: contextual approaches and pedagogical practices*. Columbus: Ohio State
University Press.


http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol16/iss2/5.


Oxon: Routledge.


Bibliography:


Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses.


2010. “From the Postmodern to the Postcolonial – and Beyond Both.” In *Decolonizing European Sociology Transdisciplinary*


Trivedi, Harish. 1999. “The Postcolonial or the Transcolonial? Location and
inquire.streetmag.org/articles/14
doi: 10.1080/03064229908536504


Towards a decolonial reading of Tivolem:

E ainda há mais mundo chega lá