Securitizing Climate Change: Process
and Implications

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# Contents

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1

Environment and Security Nexus: Climate Change ................................................. 2

Beyond Climate Change Securitization ..................................................................... 7

Methodological Considerations ............................................................................... 9

The Process of Securitization ............................................................................... 11

International Security Studies ............................................................................. 11

Securitization Theory ........................................................................................ 14

Critical Voices .................................................................................................... 25

Climate Change Securitization in the EU ............................................................. 29

Referent Object .................................................................................................. 30

Securitizing Actors ............................................................................................ 31

*European Union Institutions* ............................................................................ 32

*Member States Governments* ............................................................................ 36
Pressure Groups and Lobbyists ................................................................................. 47

Functional Actors ........................................................................................................ 51

Audience....................................................................................................................... 54

Media.......................................................................................................................... 55

Opinion Poll................................................................................................................ 64

Facilitating Conditions ............................................................................................... 67

The Consequences of Securitizing Climate Change................................................. 73

Securitizing Actors’ Proposals .................................................................................. 75

European Institutions ................................................................................................. 75

Member States Governments ...................................................................................... 78

Pressure groups and lobbyists .................................................................................. 84

Climate Change Securitization – Policy Change? ...................................................... 89

Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 101

References .................................................................................................................. 107
Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War the links between environment and security have been progressively explored. The emergence of the environment as a new, non-traditional, security issue was part of a larger effort for deepening and broadening security studies. The deepening of security allowed for taking into consideration actors other than the state as ‘things’ to be secured. The broadening allowed for the consideration of threats beyond those with a military nature.

In this context, climate change has emerged as a factor of exacerbation of environmental problems, with impacts that range from the aggravation of resource scarcity to the disappearance of coastal areas. These negative effects have increasingly been gaining a status of major concern at the global level, being gradually viewed as a threat to security.

The securitization of climate change has entered the international agenda generating both concerns of a militarisation of the actions regarding the management and mitigation of its negative effects as well as an expectation of effective change due to the fact that security constitutes a high politics matter par excellence. The different reactions to this process are explained
by the prediction that the securitization process will lead to a policy change regarding environmental issues, in general, and climate change, in particular.

This dissertation specifically examines the process of securitization of climate change, following the Copenhagen School, and goes on to discuss the implications of this process, namely in terms of policy changes associated to climate change. Its main argument is that although climate change is at present a securitized issue in the realm of the European Union, extraordinary measures have not been adopted to address the issue.

Environment and Security Nexus: Climate Change

According to Jon Barnett, environmental security is a product of three main interconnected developments, namely a growth in environmental awareness in developed countries since the 1960s, academic critiques of the traditional security discourse and practices as inadequate to deal with environmental security risks, and a transformation in strategic circumstances marked particularly by the end of the Cold War (2007: 184-188). Although environmental security has been an important concept in security studies since the 1990s, it is an ambiguous concept which encompasses different approaches and interpretations.

One of the most influential approaches is that which concentrates on the links between environment and conflict. This debate owes a lot to the work
of Thomas Homer-Dixon developed in the early 1990s, which explored environmental scarcities’ potential for violent conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Homer-Dixon, 1994). Working with selected case studies, the research conducted by Homer-Dixon and his team on the Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict demonstrated that the degradation and depletion of environmental resources, population growth and unequal resource distribution interact to cause violent conflict (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1998).

These findings generated a wide debate on the security implications of environmental problems, with the focus of the debate being centred on whether environmental issues should be viewed as a security threat or not, and, if so, how these could be incorporated into the security agenda\(^1\).

Gradually, climate change has become the focus of the environment and security debate as it is increasingly being viewed has the most pressing environmental issue. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines climate change as a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. (IPCC, 2008: 30)

\(^1\) For further information on these debates please see: Dabelko and Dabelko (1995), Deudney (1990), Græger (1996) and Levy (1995).
Although controversy regarding this subject exists, there is a wide consensus that greenhouse gas emissions due to human activities are a major contributor to changes in climate patterns.

In this dissertation, the expressions “climate change” and “global warming” are equally considered because they are often used to refer to the same phenomenon. Although it could be argued that global warming and climate change refer to different subjects, respectively cause and effect, they are used interchangeably by the considered actors. Moreover, there seems to have been an evolution of the concept throughout time, with the expression “climate change” replacing “global warming” as a result of an evolution from the understanding of a limited phenomenon to a more comprehensive one.

Although the security implications of climate change have now been given considerable attention there is little knowledge about the mechanisms through which climate change is being elevated to the realm of security and the resulting policy implications. The application of the Copenhagen concept of securitization to climate change is still underexplored. However, there are some authors that have used the concept of securitization as an analytical tool to examine the politics of climate change.

For further information on these debates please see: Barnett and Adger (2005), Podesta and Ogden (2007), Pumphrey (2008) and Wallace (2009).
In face of a growing conceptualisation of climate change as a security issue, some authors draw attention to the risks of securitizing climate change. Focusing on the impact of climate change on human security, Ben Buckland (2007) supports that although securitization of climate change can be an appealing option given the extraordinary measures it implies, it is inappropriate to this issue. According to the author, securitization entails a militarised approach, while climate change requires a response of political nature.

Oli Brown, Anne Hammil and Robert McLeman (2007) also identify risks in securitizing climate change. Basing their study in the African continent, the authors argue that recasting climate change as a security threat has negative implications, namely climate change fatigue, focus on military responses and the deviation of attention from existing development problems. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that, by placing climate change at the level of ‘high politics’, securitization might be able to gather convincing arguments to speed action on climate change, namely emissions reductions and adaptation measures.

Hans Günter Brauch (2008) examines the process of securitization of climate change at the international level. The author identifies two distinct securitizing actors: one that emerges from a narrow national security perspective - the nation state; and another which materialises from a wider
environmental and human security perspective – the scientific community. In Brauch’s work prominence is given to the latter as he defines the release of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 as the turning point in the process of securitizing climate change. The author concludes that the emerging securitization process has been instrumental for mobilising public and private funds for a future climate regime, although, according to him, the adoption of extraordinary measures is still needed to respond to this issue.

The securitization of climate change has also been analysed by Michael Brzoska (2008) with the aim of understanding if it fosters the adoption of traditional security policy measures, i.e. militarised responses. Based on the analysis of four studies that attempt to securitize climate change, namely by the Scientific Advisory Council on Global Environmental Change of the Federal Republic of Germany (WGBU), International Alert, the Center for Naval Analysis Corporation and the Center for a New American Security, Brzoska concludes that different conceptions of security yield different policy recommendations. According to the author, traditional security conceptions are losing their monopoly status over wider conceptions of security. The author questions if the ‘exceptionalism’ derived from securitization can assume other configurations than traditional military force, as for example the application of greater attention and financial resources.
Beyond Climate Change Securitization

This dissertation aims at understanding the implications of climate change securitization, going beyond some of the literature already mentioned above. Although it has become accepted to talk about climate change securitization, it is considered essential to explain and analyse the securitization process, developed by the Copenhagen School (Wæver, 1995; Buzan, et al., 1998). The research analyses the securitization process of climate change in the European Union as it constitutes a major player in world security and environmental politics.

The argument proceeds in two stages. First it is argued that climate change is at present a securitized issue in the realm of the European Union. In this stage, the research will seek to demonstrate that the process of securitization of climate change is confirmed in the EU by the existence of a securitizing move and by an acceptance of the audience. Consequently, the first step of this study is to examine the mechanisms that elevated climate change to the level of security, i.e., to analyse how climate change is being re-constructed as a security issue. Since the theoretical framework developed by the School of Copenhagen is the only one providing a structured analysis of the process of securitization, it becomes an essential analytical tool to
understand the mechanisms through which issues are moved to the sphere of security.

The main argument is that although securitization has taken place, extraordinary measures have not been adopted in the climate change realm. Instead, what securitization created was an increase in the character of urgency attributed to climate change which is transforming the level of the response to the issue.

In order to better understand the policy changes originated by the securitization of climate change, this dissertation will resort to Peter A. Hall model of policy change. Hall distinguishes three central variables usually involved in the policy making process, namely “the overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals, and the precise settings of these instruments” (Hall, 1993: 278). Basing on these variables, he then identifies three distinct levels of policy change.

According to Hall, a first order change occurs when the overall goals and the policy instruments are maintained, while the instrument settings or level are altered. A second order change takes place when the goals are maintained but both the policy instruments and its settings are changed. Both these changes can be seen as cases of “normal policymaking” (Hall, 1993: 279).
When all the three variables are altered a third order change occurs. This, the author claims, reflects a “paradigm shift” (Hall, 1993: 279).

Using this framework, this dissertation argues that the adoption of extraordinary measures regarding climate change would entail a paradigm shift, i.e. a third order change. Nevertheless, climate change securitization in the EU has originated a first order change in policy as both the overall goals and the policy instruments to attain those goals remained unaltered. What changed with securitization were the precise settings of the policy instruments. Hence, the security implications of climate change are being dealt within the realm of normal politics, and not extraordinary measures.

**Methodological Considerations**

Using the European Union as a case-study, the research seeks to demonstrate that a process of securitization of climate change has taken place and that this process has not led to the adoption of extraordinary measures. Hence, the research is developed in two distinct but interconnected moments. First, the dynamics of the securitization of climate change in the EU are analysed. In this phase, the securitizing move performed by the European institutions and individual member states (securitizing actors) is examined through discourse and report analysis.
Subsequently, the acceptance by the European public opinion (audience) is assessed through the analysis of opinion studies and the media here considered as able of transmitting the audience’s level of acceptance of the securitizing move. The media analysis comprehends relevant climate related news, extracted from nine newspapers with distinct political backgrounds. The selected newspapers are based in three different states, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

In the second phase of research, the measures defined for tackling climate change are analysed. In this phase, the measures proposed by the securitizing actors in their reports and resolutions are examined. Then, the main instruments regarding climate change in the EU are addressed through the analysis of reports, plans of action, political directives and legislation.

The dissertation starts by presenting and analysing theoretically the process of securitization developed by the Copenhagen authors, in order to clarify the actors, dynamics and mechanism involved in the process. It then applies the previous chapter’s framework to the process of climate change securitization in the European Union. Chapter three finally addresses the measures defined and adopted to tackle climate change, analysing them through the securitization lenses and examining the policy implications of those measures. The last chapter presents some concluding remarks and potential future questions to be researched.
The Process of Securitization

This chapter presents and discusses the conceptual framework of the Copenhagen School’s concept of ‘securitization’. It first examines the Copenhagen School’s position within International Security Studies. Then, it addresses specifically the process of securitization evidencing its actors and mechanisms. Finally, it addresses some of the critiques directed towards the concept of securitization.

International Security Studies

International Security Studies have generally been grouped along two main strands. The first group encompasses the Traditional Approaches to Security, whose main common characteristic is the focus on the state as the central security actor. Both Realism and Liberalism, the most influential traditional theoretical perspectives on security, focus on security relations among states (Morgan, 2007: 15). Despite other recognized convergences, such as the centrality of anarchy in the analysis and the positivist stance, there are cleavages between the two traditional approaches to security.

The Realist perspective’s focal point is anarchy. The anarchic character of the international system is what determines states’ actions. Therefore, the pressures and constraints of the system are major factors determining states’
security goals and relations (Morgan, 2007: 17). Another major feature of the Realist perspective is its view of the system as inherently insecure, which leads states to compete for security, through military power enhancement. This competition is seen to produce security dilemmas, a term coined by John Herz that describes the situation where an expansion in one state’s military capabilities, in order to increase its security, decreases the security of other states (Jervis, 1992: 146). In response, the latter expand their military capabilities as well, thus generating a vicious cycle (Waltz, 1979: 86).

The Liberal perspective is more flexible regarding the impact of anarchy on state behaviour, acknowledging that cooperation is possible. Thus, the security dilemma can be overcome, because cooperation can lead communities to develop high levels of security. The Liberal approach is also more flexible regarding who are the actors of security, admitting the relevance of non-state actors (Morgan, 2007: 29).

The second group, commonly labelled as Critical Security Studies, cannot be considered a coherent approach to security. Rather it refers to a set of approaches from a wide range of theoretical perspectives that have in common the challenge they pose to the traditional views of security (Mutimer, 2007: 54). These critical perspectives question the state as the only referent object for security and the focus on military security. Their focus is on people as referent objects for security and on the possibility of
non-military threats to security. Another characteristic considerably common
to these perspectives is their critique to the positivist assumption (Mutimer,
2007: 60).

Although generally included in Critical Security Studies, the Copenhagen
authors explicitly distance themselves from this approach (Buzan et al.,
1998: 34). Although Buzan et al. recognise they share theoretical premises
with Critical Security Studies, such as the social constructions of security,
they argue the two approaches are distinct. In the authors’ view, Critical
Security Studies focuses on the possibility of change while the Copenhagen
approach believes “even the socially constituted is often sedimented as
structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do
analysis on the basis that it continues (...)” (Buzan et al., 1998: 35).

The Copenhagen authors also distance themselves from the focus on the
individual as referent object for security, characteristic of Critical Security
Studies. Rather than on individuals, the focus of the Copenhagen School is
on collectivities (Buzan et al., 1998: 35). The authors claim that “[a]lthough
[their] philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in
holding security to always be a political construction (...) in [their] purposes
they are closer to traditional security studies (...)” (Buzan et al., 1998: 35).
By this, they mean the Copenhagen focus is on existing security actors and
their actions, rather than on attempting to contest those actors.
Securitization Theory

The most important innovation brought by the Copenhagen School was the possibility to understand the mechanisms of securitization while keeping a distance from security (Buzan et al., 1998: 35). This is to say that, instead of trying to understand what should be real security or what constitute real threats, the Copenhagen authors focus on the mechanisms through which issues become security issues. This is a distinctive feature of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical proposal as neither the traditional nor the critical approaches explain this process.

The securitization approach thus aims at explaining the mechanisms through which issues are elevated to the security level and its policy implications. The idea of securitization was first articulated by Ole Wæver in the late 1980s (Wæver, 1989) and then further developed by himself in *Securitization and Desecuritization* (1995) and in collaboration with Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde in *Security: a New Framework for Analysis* (1998).

The authors propose a spectrum along which public issues can be located (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24). On one end, we find non-politicised issues, issues that states do not deal with and which are not part of the public debate and decision-making process. At the centre of the spectrum, politicized issues refer to those which are part of the public policy sphere,
requiring government decision and resource allocation. Finally, on the other end of the spectrum, we find securitized issues, which are presented as an existential threat, thus calling for emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal boundaries of political practice.

Figure 1: Securitization spectrum

Securitization occurs when an issue is successfully moved from the politicised to the securitized end of the spectrum. Thus, a case of securitization occurs when a securitizing actor uses rhetoric of an existential threat and takes an issue out of what is considered “normal politics” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Securitization is thus seen as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23).
Nevertheless, the authors warn that “a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25, italics in the original). For an issue to be securitized, it is essential that an audience accepts it as such. Buzan et al. state:

> We do not push the demand so high as to say that emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity. (Buzan et al., 1998: 25)

In fact, what they propose is a two-stage process. First, the securitizing actor/s perform/s a securitizing move and then the relevant audience accepts it, allowing extraordinary measures to be adopted or even imposed (Buzan et al., 1998: 25).

Drawing on language theory, the authors see the process of securitization as a speech act. According to the speech act perspective, a statement can be an act in itself, i.e. “by saying words something is done” (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). However, the authors call attention to the fact that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience. There will be instances in which the word security appears without this logic and other cases that
operate according to that logic with only a metaphorical security reference. (Buzan et al., 1998: 27)

This being said, the authors define what can be study: “[w]ho can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects” (Buzan et al., 1998: 27). Their claim is that it is possible to discover a characteristic pattern with an inner logic by exploring the practice connected to this concept of security (Buzan et al., 1998: 27).

Buzan et al. identify facilitating conditions, i.e. conditions under which the speech act is more likely to succeed. Such conditions fall into two categories that combine in a successful speech act: the internal, linguistic-grammatical, and the external, contextual and social (1998: 32). The authors argue that the most important internal condition to the speech act is “to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” (Buzan et al., 1998: 33).

As to the external aspect of the speech act, the authors identify two central conditions. One is the position of authority of the securitizing actor. According to this condition, the relationship of the audience with who speaks security determines the acceptance of the claims made in a securitizing effort. The other external condition identified by the authors refers the
“features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization” (Buzan et al., 1998: 33).

The authors are aware that the speech-act approach to security raises questions about the relationship between actors and analysts in the definition and understanding of the security agenda. Regarding this subject, they admit analysts unavoidably play a role in the construction or deconstruction of security issues. However, it is the political actor that designates what constitutes a security issue. The analysts’ task is to interpret political actors’ actions and verify if these fulfil the security criteria, understand whether the actor is effective in mobilising support and, consequently, assess the effects of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998: 33-34).

By saying this, the authors make clear that the decision of what should be handled as an existential threat comes from a political actor. But a role of critical assessment is reserved for the analyst. In fact, the authors argue that “one of the purposes of this [securitization] approach should be that it becomes possible to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a certain issue” (Buzan et al., 1998: 34), this is to say, whether an issue is better handled in the security realm or within normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). As the authors put it

the securitization perspective, which basically removes the objective ground from the dominant discourse, opens the possibility of problematizing both actual securitization and the
absence of securitization, but it cannot do so by proving that something “is” a security problem (...). What one can add are arguments about the likely effects. One can try to show the effects of either excessive securitization – security dilemmas – or of not securitizing – the inability to handle an issue effectively unless it is securitized. (Buzan et al., 1998: 40)

At this point it is relevant to enunciate the three types of units involved in a securitization process. Firstly, referent objects are defined as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). Secondly, securitizing actors are “actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). Finally, functional actors are defined as those who affect the dynamics of a specific sector significantly influencing security decisions (Buzan et al., 1998: 36).

The securitizing actors are those who argue for the necessity of defending referent objects, and not their own individual survival. Thus, “[a] securitizing actor is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act” (Buzan et al., 1998: 40). The authors identify common actors for this role as being political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups (Buzan et al., 1998: 40). Buzan et al. argue that identifying actors involves a level-of-analysis problem: the same event can be attributed to different levels (individual, bureaucracies, or state, for instance). Unlike the case with the referent object, a speech act is often not self-defining in terms of who or what speaks, and the designation “actor” is thus in some sense arbitrary. (Buzan et al., 1998: 40)
Regarding this subject, the authors argue that disaggregating colectivities is not helpful and assume a methodological collectivism approach, according to which “much of social life is understandable only when collectivities are seen as more than the sum of their ‘members’ and are treated as social realities” (Buzan et al., 1998: 40). Consequently, they suggest that to identify the securitizing actor, it is necessary to understand the logic that shapes the action instead of who performs the speech. Hence, “[f]ocusing on the organisational logic of the speech act is (...) the best way to identify who or what is the securitizing actor” (Buzan et al., 1998: 41).

On the subject of the referent objects, the authors argue that the securitization approach opens the possibility for considering other than the traditional state or nation. Although recognising that, in principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object, the authors stress that, in practice, the constraints of facilitating conditions influence the success of some types of referent objects over others (Buzan et al., 1998: 36).

Size or scale is a crucial variable in determining successful referent objects of security. On the one hand, the authors argue that “individuals and small groups can seldom establish wide security legitimacy in their own right” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). On the other hand, the system level also presents problems in establishing security legitimacy. For the Copenhagen authors,
the middle scale of limited collectivities has proven the most favourable to securitization. Attempting to explain this, the authors argue that limited collectivities such as states, nations and even civilisations “engage in self-reinforcing rivalries with other limited collectivities, and such interaction strengthens their ‘we’ feeling” (Buzan et al. 1998: 36-37).

Although considering the state an ideal security actor, Buzan et al. argue security is not only about the state (1998: 37). They thus constructed a wide conceptual net which allows other actors to be considered. Nevertheless, the authors stress security is not equally available to all actors. Rather, they perceive security as an arena of competing actors in which the state is still the privileged one. Hence, they recognise security is “a state-dominated field”, but refuse a state-centric approach (Buzan et al., 1998: 37).

The securitization framework proposed by the Copenhagen School allows broadening the security agenda, although it attempts to accomplish it in a specific way. In “Securitization and Desecuritization”, Wæver distanced his approach from the then ongoing redefining security debate, which in his view tended to cancel out the specific field of security (1995: 50). For Wæver, those who were attempting to radically rethink the concept of security generally reduced the concept to its everyday sense, “which is only a semantic identity, not the concept of security” (Wæver, 1995: 50, italics in the original).
Weaver then proposed working from inside the traditional approach of security in order to take the concepts of national security, threat, and sovereignty, and demonstrate how, when applied to the collective level, they assume new forms (1995:51). He argued this would make it possible to remove the excessive focus on military matters from the classical approach by applying the same logic to other sectors. Subsequently, the discussion could be detached from the state by applying similar moves to society (Weaver, 1995:51).

In *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan et al. draw attention to what they consider the distinguishing feature of securitization: a specific rhetorical structure (1998: 26). This definition, they believe, allows to finding security actors and phenomena in sectors other than the military-political one. They argue that if survival of collective units and principles is placed as the defining core of security studies, then there is a basis for applying security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of the concept (Buzan et al., 1998: 27).

They bring to light the possibility of securitization to be either *ad hoc* or institutionalised, depending on the characteristics of threats (Buzan et al., 1998: 27). Whereas the response and sense of urgency for persistent or recurrent threats usually become institutionalised, in the sectors where
threats are new or controversial regarding their urgency, institutions do not exist yet. As a result, the securitizing actors attempting to securitize the latter threats operate in a context dominated by security institutions designed for other types of threats (Buzan et al., 1998: 29).

For the Copenhagen authors, security is negative as it represents a failure to deal with issues at the political level. For this reason, issues should preferably be dealt through routine procedures without extraordinary elevation of threats (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). They believe threats are often exploited for domestic purposes under the pretext of “national security”.

According to this logic, Buzan et al. acknowledge that securitization has “tactical attractions”. Nevertheless, they argue “desecuritization is the optimal long-range option”, because it takes issues out of a threat-defence sequence and places them at the political level (1998: 29). The authors argue

[a]lthough in one sense securitization is a further intensification of politicization (thus usually making an even stronger role for the state), in another sense it is opposed to politicization. Politicization means to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore entails responsibility, in contrast to issues that either could not be different (laws of nature) or should not be put under political control (...). By contrast, securitization on the international level (although often not on the domestic one) means to present an issue as urgent and existential, and so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues. (Buzan et al., 1998: 29)
Regarding this issue, in *Securitization and Desecuritization*, Wæver argues that security and insecurity do not constitute a binary opposition, as generally believed (1995: 56). ‘Security’ refers to a situation where a security problem exists but measures are taken to respond to it. ‘Insecurity’, on the other hand, means there is a security problem to which there is no response. Consequently, both circumstances share the security *problématique*. Because of the incorrect view of security and insecurity as binary opposites, Wæver critiques the assumption that security is a goal to be maximised, “eliminat[ing] other, potentially more useful, ways of conceptualizing the problems being addressed” (Wæver, 1995: 57).

Last, but not least, another distinctive feature of the Copenhagen School is its intersubjective view of the securitization process. Confronting two possible approaches of security – an objective approach which deals with the veracity of threat and a subjective approach which addresses the perception of threats – Buzan et al. conclude that neither of them is fully adequate (1998: 30). They reject the objective approach because they find overly complex to measure whether an issue is ‘really’ a threat (Buzan et al., 1998: 30). Moreover, the authors argue

it is neither politically nor analytically helpful to try to define “real security” outside of the world of politics and to teach the actors to understand the term correctly. (...) It is more relevant to grasp the processes and dynamics of securitization, because if one knows who can “do” security on what issue and under what conditions, it
will sometimes be possible to maneuver the interaction among actors and thereby curb security dilemmas. (Buzan et al., 1998: 31)

However, the label “subjective” does not convince them as adequate either. Because individuals do not decide alone whether an issue is security, securitization should be seen as intersubjective and socially constructed (Buzan et al., 1998: 31). Since the success of securitization is not decided by the securitizing actor but by the audience, the Copenhagen authors argue that “security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects not with the subjects but among the subjects” (Buzan et al., 1998: 31, emphasis in the original).

**Critical Voices**

Although recognised as a useful framework, securitization is far from being an uncontroversial concept. Several authors have drawn attention to some of its shortcomings.

Olaf F. Knudsen, for instance, challenges what he considers a misleading conception of threat in the securitization approach. He claims that by emphasising subjectivity, securitization disregards an independent existence of what is perceived as a threat, thus treating as unimportant whether states really face dangers (Knudsen, 2001: 359). It is true that the Copenhagen authors reject an objectivist approach but they do so because they claim no
objective measure of what constitutes a real threat exists. Furthermore, Knudsen insinuates that the securitization concept has influenced research that aims at placing new issues on the political agenda (Knudsen, 2001: 360). However, this is not to blame on the securitization approach. The Copenhagen authors make it clear that the role of the analyst is not to designate what constitutes a security issue but to interpret political actors’ actions.

Holger Stritzel (2007) is yet another critic of the Copenhagen School, pointing out internal contradictions in the argument and the utilisation of vague and under-theorised terminology of securitization that hinder empirical studies. Stritzel argues that the central concepts of securitization, namely speech act, actor and audience, are not defined clearly. Furthermore, the mechanisms through which these concepts interact are also unclear (2007: 363). Thierry Balzacq, also points out that although the audience is a central feature of the securitization framework, “the nature and status of that audience remains unaccounted for” (Balzacq, 2005: 173). Although these are all relevant remarks, the fact that such concepts are not precisely defined also gives the analyst the possibility to determine the actors and interactions on a contextual basis.

In addition, Matt McDonald has stressed that securitization’s narrow focus on the discursive positioning of threats disregards the historical and social
contexts in which designations of threat become possible, and the question of how particular voices are empowered or marginalised in speaking security (McDonald, 2008: 580). Clearly the Copenhagen School gives emphasis to the discursive feature of the construction of threats. However it can be argued that the historical and social contexts that make possible the designations of threats are not fully disregarded by the framework. These contexts are linked to the external facilitating conditions of securitization. Both historical and social contexts have an influence in the perception of threats and in determining who holds the authority to speak security.

Yet another critic, Michael C. Williams (2003), has argued that the Copenhagen School’s narrow focus on speech-acts is being increasingly challenged by the impact of images in security relations. Williams considers that concentrating on strictly linguistic-discursive forms discounts other kinds of acts and contexts that contribute to securitization (2003: 525). Although the securitization framework could benefit from a reformulation to account for these developments in a more explicit manner, one can argue that the framework is flexible enough to account for these forms of communication. The Copenhagen authors clearly state that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security. They admit that the reference to security can be only metaphorical (Buzan et al., 1998: 27). This could well include the role of images.
As any other theory, the securitization approach is not exempt from contestation. Nevertheless, the securitization framework constitutes an essential tool in the understanding of how issues become security issues, or as Wæver puts it, “[w]hat really makes something a security problem” (Wæver, 1995: 54). Particularly when one is dealing with non-traditional security issues, as is the case of climate change, the securitization framework is essential to understand the mechanisms through which these issues reached the security agenda.
Climate Change Securitization in the EU

Although the global objective of this dissertation is to examine the consequences of climate change securitization in the European Union (EU), it is considered fundamental to demonstrate how this process is taking place. Consequently, this chapter focuses exactly on the EU securitization process of climate change. A language of security has pervaded the speech on climate change as a number of actors from the political, academic and public spheres are classifying climate change as a threat to security.

Moreover, the term securitization has become a constant in everyday language, without any concern for the scientific or theoretical meaning of the term or of its implications. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to understand if the language of security used in the EU to address climate change indicates an actual securitization of the issue, à la Copenhagen, or if it is merely an appropriation of this language and its use has become banal and non-purposeful, in the Copenhagen sense.

The chapter starts by defining the referent object and goes on to analysing the securitizing move, performed by the securitizing actors with the objective of securing the referent object. The referent object is the European people standards of living and the stability of the EU itself which is being threatened by climate change. The securitizing actors here considered are the European
institutions and its member states, at the bureaucratic and governmental levels, as well as pressure groups and lobbyists, at the non-governmental level. In a second moment, the acceptance by the relevant audience, the European public opinion, is examined.

**Referent Object**

As discussed previously, referent objects are things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival. The environment-security debate might suggest that environment is the referent object of security, after all, disruption of ecosystems, loss of biodiversity, desertification, deforestation, disruption of the global water cycle, pollution and depletion of the ozone layer, all represent threats to the natural environment. Nevertheless, these threats to the environment are only perceived as important as they pose a risk to human existence on the planet.

With respect to this, Buzan et al. stress that the preservation of existing levels of civilisation is the predominant concern in much of the debate around environment and security (1998: 75). This is because the above identified threats to the environment also constitute a threat to human living standards. This leads Buzan et al. to conclude that “the ultimate referent object of environmental security is the risk of losing achieved levels of civilization (...) while apparently being able to prevent doing so” (1998: 75, italics in the original).
Although the EU recognises the environment, or the global ecosystem, as something to be protected, it is reasonable to say that most securitizing moves aim at securing the standards of living of the European people and the stability of the EU itself. As it is explained below, the EU’s main concern are climate change impacts in international stability, world economy, energy security and migratory pressures. In the EU’s perspective, European interests are affected by climate change, which will not only affect the natural environment but also sections of European society and economy (European Commission, 2008: 3).

**Securitizing Actors**

In order to understand how climate change is increasingly being identified as a threat to European security and stability (referent object), it is necessary to study the two-stage process of securitization proposed by Buzan et al.. The first stage of the process, the securitizing move, is characterised by the use of existential threat rhetoric by a securitizing actor. They define 'securitizing actor’ as someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act, with common players in this role being political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups (Buzan et al., 1998: 40).

In the case of the EU, the main securitizing actors, at the bureaucratic and governmental levels, are the European institutions, namely the European
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, also some member states, specifically the United Kingdom, Germany and France. At the non-governmental level, pressure groups have also acted as securitizing actors, most prominently the Oxford Research Group, the Royal United Services Institute, International Alert and Oxfam International. These institutions have been increasingly using rhetoric of security to address climate change.

**European Union Institutions**

In 2003, the European Council, held in Brussels, approved *A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy*, which was drafted under the auspices of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. Although it does not include climate change in its key security threats, the document already identifies global warming as an alarming element: “competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions” (European Council, 2003: 3). The document states that “it is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming” (European Council, 2003: 10).

> [n]atural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible. (European Council, 2008: 5)

The report identifies effective multilateralism as essential to respond to the changing security environment. In this context, it identifies climate change as a key priority in international multilateral negotiations, with the objective of reaching a new and ambitious international agreement on climate change (European Council, 2008: 12).

This evolution in the significance of climate change in the European Security Strategy was stimulated by the joint report of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission to the European Council, entitled *Climate Change and International Security*. This report, published in March 2008, addresses the impact of climate
change on international security, arguing that it “is not a problem of the future but already of today and one which will stay with us” (European Commission, 2008a: 8).

It depicts climate change as “a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability” (European Commission, 2008: 2). For both the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission, the risks posed by climate change are not merely of a humanitarian nature, “they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests” (European Commission, 2008: 2).

These risks are clearly identified in the report as conflicts over resources, negative economic impacts, risks to coastal cities and infrastructures, loss of territory and border disputes, environmentally-induced migratory movements, political and social fragility, tensions over energy supplies and pressures on international governance (European Commission, 2008: 3-5). Moreover, the Climate Change and International Security Report argues that addressing climate change entails a preventive security policy. It states that

[investment in mitigation (...) as well as ways to adapt to the unavoidable should go hand in hand with addressing the international security threats created by climate change; both should be viewed as part of preventive security policy. (European Commission, 2008: 1)
According to the conclusions of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commission, “it is in Europe’s self interest to address the security implications of climate change with a series of measures: at the level of the EU, in bilateral relations and at the multilateral level, in mutually supportive ways” (Commission, 2008: 3). The joint Report recommends that different dimensions should be addressed in order to build a comprehensive and effective response to the impact of climate change on international security.

Drawing on the conclusions of the joint Report, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Newsletter, published by the Council of the European Union, dedicated a section to climate change in its Issue of July 6, 2008. Under the headline “Creating a climate of security”, the section addresses the security implications of climate change, warning that climate change is not purely an environmental issue, “it also poses significant global security challenges which are of major concern to the EU” (Council of the European Union, 2008b: 21). It is argued that “global warming is already having a profound impact on international security, as individuals and states scramble for diminishing resources” (Council of the European Union, 2008b: 21) and suggested that “it is imperative that Europe and the world adopt a preventive approach to the climate-related security challenge” (Council of the European Union, 2008b: 22).
Finally, the resolution *On Building a Global Climate Change Alliance between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change*, approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament in September 2008, reiterates the conclusions of the joint report on *Climate Change and International Security* (March, 2008). In the Committee's view, “climate change is becoming the biggest security threat in today's world” (European Parliament, 2008: 3). The Committee argues “climate change should be central to Europe's preventive security policy” (European Parliament, 2008: 3).

The discourse in these documents clearly presents climate change as an existential threat to European standards of living and stability. Although the focus of the documents is not on the risks climate change poses directly to Europe, they are still convincing in terms of the threat climate change represents to the European. Distant conflicts over resources and territory, tensions over energy supplies and climate-induced migratory movements are very likely to have consequences that will reach Europe and endanger its security. This discourse demonstrates how the European institutions are performing a securitizing move regarding climate change.

**Member States Governments**

Some individual member states have also had an important role in elevating the profile of climate change in Europe. Notably the United Kingdom,
Germany and France have pushed climate change to the realm of security, at the national, European and international levels. This dissertation will focus on these three member states because of their distinguished role as climate securitizers and also for the reason that they included climate change in their respective national security strategies.

**British Government**

The United Kingdom (UK) presents itself as being in the frontline of the battle against climate change, pursuing an “ambitious [climate] agenda” (UK Prime Minister’s Office, 2007). Remarkably, the UK government played a crucial role in taking climate change to the United Nations Security Council. During its Presidency of the Security Council, and despite the reluctance of the United States, Russia and China, the UK called the Council’s first-ever meeting on the impact of climate change on April 2007.

The former-British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, who chaired the Security Council session, argued that climate change was a security issue although not one of narrow national security (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2007). She asserted climate change was about “our collective security in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world” (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2007). The former-Foreign Secretary stated
The Security Council is the forum to discuss issues that threaten the peace and security of the international community. What makes wars start? Fights over water. Changing patterns of rainfall. Fights over food production, land use... There are few greater potential threats to our economies too... but also to peace and security itself. (BBC News, 2007)

Previously, on June 2006, Beckett had demonstrated her commitment to climate change issues when she appointed a Special Representative on Climate Change. John Ashton, the first UK’s Foreign Secretary's Special Representative on Climate Change, has been an active voice in framing climate change as a security issue. In an opinion article to BBC News he states “we need to treat climate change not as a long-term threat to our environment but as an immediate threat to our security and prosperity” (Ashton, 2007). And then he adds,

violent conflict always has multiple causes, but a changing climate amplifies all the other factors. Katrina and Darfur illustrate how an unstable climate will make it harder to deliver security unless we act more effectively now to neutralise the threat. (Ashton, 2007)

According to Ashton, the security risks posed by climate change can be prevented, if this issue is given the same type of attention and amount of resources that traditional security issues receive. He argues that

the technologies to avoid an even more unstable climate are already available. Deploying them rapidly is well within what we can afford. What is needed is an investment internationally of political imagination backed up by public resources on the scale that publics routinely expect for the more traditional aspects of national security. (BBC News, 2007)

Climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security. Tackling its causes, mitigating its risks and preparing for and dealing with its consequences are critical to our future security (...). (Cabinet Office, 2008: 18)

Besides being acknowledged as a “driver of insecurity” in itself, climate change is also viewed as an important element in exacerbating other “global challenges”, such as competition for energy resources, demographic pressures, and food and water insecurity. It is worth noting that in the first UK National Security Strategy, one can find the term ‘climate change’ mentioned 43 times. At the same time, ‘terrorism’ (‘counter-terrorism’ included) is mentioned 52 times, ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (‘wmd’ included) appears 10 times and the word ‘nuclear’ is mentioned 25 times. These numbers are significant as they indicate the relevance climate change is gaining in comparison to more traditional security threats, as is the case of nuclear, or more recent but widely recognised threats, such as terrorism.
Although the document includes climate change in the category of “factors which are not in themselves direct security threats to the United Kingdom” (Cabinet Office, 2008: 16), a vocabulary of security is clearly used to address climate change, including the need for urgent action and defensive measures. It reads:

Climate change is likely to have serious consequences for international stability and security, and an integrated and international response is urgently needed to tackle cause and effect. That includes defensive measures (...). (Cabinet Office, 2008: 5)

The use of this vocabulary of security constitutes clearly a security speech act. The British government has thus acted as a securitizing actor at the domestic level, directing the securitizing move at its own citizens, but also at the international level, directing the securitizing move at other governmental leaders. At both levels, the British government has presented climate change as an existential threat to the standards of living and stability of the UK, the EU and the world as a whole.

**German Government**

Along with the United Kingdom, and among EU-members, Germany is one of the most active voices on climate protection. The programme of the German Presidency of the European Union – January 1 to June 30, 2007 – had a significant focus on environmental and climate protection (German Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2007).
In a Government Policy Statement that followed the March 2007 European Council, the German Federal Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel stated that “[a]bove all, investment in climate protection means security from the destruction associated with unfettered climate change” (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2007). The German Environmental Minister believes “[g]lobal security in the 21st century will be determined to a large extent by energy supply security and the conservation of the natural resources that are vital for life” (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2007).

Chancellor Angela Markel, speaking at the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Event on Climate Change in September 2007, said that “the impact [of climate change] will be dramatic, unless we take resolute action” (The Federal Chancelor, 2007). Merkel went on to ask “[d]o we want to live in a world where our coastal cities may be inundated while in other regions people are desperate for water? Or do we want to live in a world that offers us a secure and bright future?” (The Federal Chancelor, 2007).

A month before, the German Chancellor hosted the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, under its Presidency, which included climate protection issues in the agenda. The Summit’s Chair summary states
Combating climate change is one of the major challenges for mankind and it has the potential to seriously damage our natural environment and the global economy (...). We are convinced that urgent and concerted action is needed and accept our responsibility to show leadership in tackling climate change. (The Federal Chancellor, 2007b)

The 2006 German White Paper on Security Policy, Germany’s most recent National Security Strategy, refers to environmental risks as issues that can intensify other risks, reason for which the Federal Office of Defence Administration also addresses environmental protection (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 107). Although it does not focus on climate change as a security threat specifically, it identifies the issue’s potential for exacerbating other security problems (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 19).

More recently, in May 2008, the German CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group approved a security strategy paper entitled A Security Strategy for Germany. The document outlines the parliamentary group’s vision for a new German national security strategy. In the paper, climate change figures among the key challenges and strategic objectives. It reads:

Climate change is not only an environmental or energy issue – it also presents a security threat. The first effects of climate change are already visible and flooding, heat waves, food crises, droughts, forest fires and rising sea levels are all on the increase and if we are unable to counteract these developments the number of conflicts will multiply. (CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 2008: 6)
The Parliamentary Group argues that “Germany’s security policy must be in a position to address the impact of climate change and contribute to managing the consequences this has for [Germany’s] security” (CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 2008: 6).

The adoption of the CDU/CSU security strategy paper is relevant as a securitizing move being performed by the political group in power that aims at raising climate change’s profile as a security issue within Germany. To sustain this position, the German government has subsidised reports that address the security implications of climate change.

In 2008, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ), the German Federal Government’s development aid agency, published *Climate Change and Security: Challenges for German Development Cooperation*. The study explores the links between climate change, its effects and the resulting potentials for violent conflict and security risks (GTZ, 2008: 5). It warns that “climate change will lead over the long term to additional resource scarcity and environmental degradation, and may thus amplify or trigger social and political tensions, conflicts and security problems” (GTZ, 2008: 12). The study identifies sectoral trends created by climate change that pose risks to security, such as decline in water availability and food production, energy problems, and additional overstretch of governance structures (GTZ, 2008: 7).
But the study with most impact in the elevation of climate change to the security realm was *World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk* by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), a scientific advisory body set up by the German Federal Government. The 2007 study clearly identifies climate change as a threat to security, arguing that “without resolute counteraction, climate change will overstretch many societies’ adaptive capacities within the coming decades (...) jeopardizing national and international security to a new degree” (WBGU, 2007: 1).

According to the WBGU study climate change “amplifies mechanisms which lead to insecurity and violence” thus creating “climate-induced conflict constellations” (WBGU, 2007: 2). The study identifies regional hotspots for security risks associated with climate change, namely Central Asia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, China, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico and the Andean region and Amazonia (WBGU, 2007: 3). The study further identifies a number of threats to international stability and security posed by climate change. These include a growth in the number of weak and fragile states, an increase in international distributional conflicts and the overstretching of classic security policy. Climate change is also predicted to trigger and intensify migration, increasing the potential for violent conflict (WBGU, 2007: 5-6).
The WBGU study became a reference in the approach to climate change security consequences. Its findings have been widely cited at the political and academic levels, serving also as a basis for other studies on the subject. The content of the WGBU study is a speech act which clearly presents climate change as a security threat, thus contributing strongly to the German government securitizing move.

French Government

The third European government that has shown a high commitment to climate change issues is France. One of the main objectives of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union – from July 1 to December 31, 2008 – was working towards a leadership role for Europe in the fight against climate change. In its Work Programme, climate change was identified as one of the main challenges confronting the EU (French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2008).

In June 2008, the French Government published The French White Paper on Defence and National Security. Although climate change is not so prominent in the French strategy as it is in the British and German strategies, the document does not neglect the issue. Climate change is portrayed as a new risk that needs to be addressed on a global scale and whose security impacts need to be calculated rapidly (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 25). According to the document, global warming, along with other damage to the biosphere,
constitutes a type of disorder caused by rising energy consumption and a growing demand for natural resources (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 25).

The White Paper argues that violent climate accidents can cause widespread social disruptions, representing a new scale of risks to which the French community is subjected (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 53). Hence, besides focusing on defence against external aggression, the strategy also focuses on the need to protect both population and national territory “unintentional risks such as (...) natural disasters made more intense by environmental and climate changes” (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 66). Moreover, the strategy recognises climate change’s potential contribution to violent conflict.

Foreseeable tensions over strategic resources such as energy, water, and strategic commodities – notably food and energy – can also directly fuel major crises across one or more of the world’s regions. The same is true of the long-term effects of climate warming if they are not prevented soon enough. (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 55)

When addressing the role of collective and regional security organisations, the White Paper argues these institutions should deal with climate change.

Collective security also implies concerted action and regulation in the fields of international public health, conflict prevention, development assistance and the fight against poverty, preserving the environment and combating the consequences of climate change (...). (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 113)

The document also envisages an evolution in civil defence and protection capabilities in order to take greater account of the projected change in the
scale of risks, including those posed by climate change (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 220).

By including climate change in its security strategy, the French government is arguing that climate change should be dealt at the security level. Thus, the French government is also calling for a securitization of the issue, acting as a securitizing actor.

**Pressure Groups and Lobbyists**

Non-governmental actors have also been increasingly calling for the securitization of climate change. A significant number of studies and reports by these actors have contributed to elevate climate change to the security realm. This dissertation addresses reports from four independent European institutions, two of them connected to security, the Oxford Research Group and the Royal United Services Institute, and the other two having a more humanitarian and development character, International Alert and Oxfam International.

Independent research institutions connected to security and defence are increasingly calling for the inclusion of climate change in the security agenda. In June 2006, the Oxford Research Group, a British think tank,

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3 For examples outside Europe see CNA Corporation (2007) and CSIS (2007)
published a report that clearly identifies climate change as one of “the root causes of conflict and insecurity in today’s world and the likely determinants of future conflict” (Abbott, et al., 2006: 4). In *Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century*, Chris Abbott, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda argue that the long-term security implications of climate change “are far more serious, lasting and destructive than those of international terrorism” (Abbott, et al., 2006: 7), and add that “climate change will undoubtedly overshadow every other issue of international security in the coming decades” (Abbott, et al., 2006: 27).


> Climate change can no longer be considered solely as an environmental issue. The well-documented physical effects of climate change (...) will have knock-on socio-economic impacts (...). These in turn could produce serious security consequences (civil unrest, intercommunal violence, and international instability) that will present new challenges to governments trying to maintain domestic stability (Abbott, 2008: 3).

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), also an independent British *think tank*, published *Delivering Climate Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World* in December 2007. According to Nick Mabey,
author of the report, “climate change is already creating hard security threats, but it has no hard security solutions” (Mabey, 2007: 1). The author argues that

[i]n the next decades, climate change will drive as significant a change in the strategic security environment as the end of the Cold War. If uncontrolled, climate change will have security implications of similar magnitude to the World Wars, but which will last for centuries. The past will provide no guide to this coming future. (Mabey, 2007: 2)

The focus of the report is on security sector actors’ responsibility on dealing with the threat of climate change, whose impact, the author believes, can be minimised through security measures (Mabey, 2007: 2).

Humanitarian non-governmental organisations have also increasingly used a language of security to address climate change. Although the focus is on human security, and thus somewhat different from that of the security research institutions, these organisations still have an important role as securitizing actors.

In November 2007, International Alert, an independent peacebuilding organisation based in London, published A Climate of Conflict: The Links Between Climate Change, Peace and War. The report, by Dan Smith and Janani Vivekananda, addresses the social and human consequences of climate change, particularly the risks of conflict and instability. The report warns that “there is a real risk that climate change will compound the
propensity for violent conflict, which in turn will leave communities poorer, less resilient and less able to cope with the consequences of climate change” (Smith and Vivekananda, 2007: 3). In the report the authors identify 46 states with high-risk of climate induced armed conflict and a further group of 56 states with risk of violent climate induced conflict over the longer term (Smith and Vivekananda, 2007: 17).

In April 2009, Oxfam International published *The Right to Survive: The Humanitarian Challenge for the Twenty-First Century*, a report that addresses environmental changes’ impact on international humanitarian assistance. The Report supports that expected increase in climate-related disasters, traditional humanitarian response will be ineffective (Oxfam International, 2009: 28-29). The report also assesses climate change’s potential for conflict and suggests that

> The impact of climate change will not just be confined to natural disasters and gradual shifts in weather patterns or sea levels. Globally, traditional drivers of violent conflict will be made all the more potent by the impact of climate change. (Oxfam International, 2009: 29)

The report argues that climate change is already having a large impact “undermining millions of people’s fundamental human rights: rights to life, security, food, water, health and shelter” (Oxfam International, 2009: 49).
Despite focusing on distinct aspects, these non-governmental actors are securitizing actors because they are declaring a referent object, be it the state, international stability or human security, to be existentially threatened by climate change. The securitizing move being carried out by these non-governmental actors is simultaneously influencing and being influenced by the political actors’ securitizing move. In fact, regarding climate change’s security implications, there is mutual influence between both types of actors. The speech acts of governmental actors are used by non-governmental actors as evidence of the existence of a security problem, and vice-versa. This thus reinforces the securitizing move.

**Functional Actors**

Functional actors are defined by the Copenhagen authors as actors who affect the dynamics of a specific sector and significantly influence decisions in the field of security, without attempting to securitize any issue. Buzan et al. (1998: 79) consider that in respect to the environmental sector, governments and their agencies are functional actors, for they set environmental rules and determine how these are enforced. In light of this, it is possible to say that if the member states have an indisputable role as securitizing actors, they also have a role as functional actors.

The Copenhagen authors do not address the possibility of the same actor assuming the roles of both securitizing and functional actors in the same
process of securitization. However, the process of climate change
securitization in the EU suggests that this can occur. The observation of the
here considered member states governments’ conduct on climate change
suggests that these have a dual behaviour regarding the issue. On the one
hand they push for climate change securitization, but on the other hand their
actions on climate change seem disconnected from security concerns.

As it has been demonstrated, in specific occasions the UK, Germany and
France have assumed the role of securitizing actors, calling for security on
behalf of climate. When, for example, they include climate change in their
security strategies, the goal is clearly to securitize the issue, and they thus
act as securitizing actors. The same is true when, for instance, the UK called
for a Security Council meeting on Climate Change. The aim was to elevate
climate change to the security realm.

However, member states have also operated as functional actors at given
times. They clearly play a functional actor’s role when they adopt policies or
legislation that aims to mitigate climate change. Also when in their
presidencies of the EU they commit to push for more ambitious climate
policies they are acting as functional actors. It could be argued that security
concerns are behind these efforts. However they constitute neither attempts
to securitize climate change, nor explicit efforts to address its security
consequences.
Indeed, climate change has been a declared priority in the EU presidencies of the UK, Germany and France. The British Presidency in 2005 had among its goals ensuring an active role for Europe at the United Nations Climate Change negotiations to achieve a post-2012 strategy, pursuing an international engagement with the growing economies of China and India and also addressing the impact of aviation on climate change (UK Prime Minister’s Office, 2005).

The 2007 German Presidency of the EU had a significant focus on climate protection as well. The European Council held in March 2007 under the German aegis included a noticeable attempt to integrate energy policy and climate protection (German Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2007). Also during the French Presidency climate change was identified as one of the main challenges confronting the EU (French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2008). The set of proposals put forward by the French presidency materialised in the adoption of the climate action and renewable energy package.

These examples show the member states commitment to address climate change, but with these actions they are clearly not operating as securitizing actors. Even if this behaviour affects climate policies, these actions do not intend to securitize climate change. Hence, the addressed member states
present a dual behaviour in the process of securitization of climate change. If at given times they push for climate change securitization, in other moments their actions on climate change fall in the role of functional actors.

**Audience**

It has been demonstrated that in relation to climate change, the discourse from the EU institutions and individual Member states as well as other non-governmental actors (securitizing actors) has transformed climate change into the form of existential threat to the standards of living of the European people and the stability of the EU. The securitization of an issue is not, however, concluded, unless it is accepted by the relevant audience. For an issue to be securitized, it is essential that an audience accepts it as such, i.e., that an audience accepts the need/possibility of adopting exceptional measures to deal with the existential threat. This corresponds to the second stage of the process of securitization.

According to Buzan, et al. (1998: 25), for an issue to become securitized it is not necessary that emergency measures *have* been adopted, only that the existential threat has been argued and gained enough resonance, making it possible to legitimise emergency measures, if needs be (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). Consequently, it becomes necessary to evaluate to what extent the European public opinion accepts moving climate change into the security
realm. For this, *media* and public opinion will be analysed as actors able of transmitting the audience’s level of acceptance of the securitizing move.

**Media**

One of the most efficient vehicles of spreading leaders’ discourses is the mass media. The media play a crucial role both in forming and in reflecting public opinion. In relation to climate change and security, European media have increasingly published news on climate change, reflecting the governmental speech on climate change, i.e., the securitizing move.

**British Written Media**

In the UK, the written media has been progressively exhibiting alarming climate change related headlines: “Climate change ’our greatest threat’” (Guardian.co.uk, 2004); “Climate change and pollution are killing millions, says study” (The Guardian, 2005); “Climate change a bigger security threat than terrorism, says report” (The Guardian, 2006a); “Climate change could lead to global conflict, says Beckett” (The Guardian, 2007a); “Climate change ‘will lead to warfare over food and water’” (The Times, 2008); “Climate change may spark conflict with Russia, EU told” (The Guardian, 2008a); “Climate ‘threatens’ European security” (Financial Times, 2008).

A significant number of articles actually compared the threat of climate change to that of global terrorism. In September 2004, *The Guardian* online
said that the “delegates [of the British Liberal Democrat Party] voted overwhelmingly to back the party's position that climate change was now a bigger threat to mankind than global terrorism” (Guardian.co.uk, 2004). In June 2006, *The Guardian* covered a report which claimed that “the effects of climate change – displacement of peoples, food shortages, social unrest – have long-term security implications far greater than those of terrorism” (The Guardian, 2006a). And in April 2007, the *Financial Times* reported the CNA Corporation study, a United States of America military report, which “lays out strong support for a link between climate change and terrorism” (Financial Times, 2007a).

Other articles made a comparison between climate change and weapons of mass destruction. In September 2004, *The Guardian*, citing Norman Baker, the environment spokesman of the British Liberal Democrat Party, wrote that “climate change is a weapon of mass destruction and far more real than the ones [the government has] been vainly combing Iraq for” (Guardian.co.uk, 2004). On the Security Council meeting on climate change in April 2007, *The Guardian* wrote “Council debates 'weather of mass destruction’” (The Guardian, 2007b).

A substantial number of news predicted climate change to be a widespread cause for violent conflict. In June 2006, *The Guardian* citing the Oxford Research Group stated that “the most likely causes of future conflict are
climate change, competition for natural resources, social and economic marginalisation and militarisation” (The Guardian, 2006a). Reporting a study by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the *Financial Times* Online wrote:

Governments must invest more in preventing climate change-related conflict or else face myriad crises around the world as global warming triggers disputes and exacerbates existing insecurity (...). Water scarcity, falling crop yields, rising sea levels, more frequent extreme weather events and mass migration are just some of the potential sources of tension if governments do not develop and implement a credible strategy to combat climate change. (Financial Times, 2007b)

Citing the British Foreign-Secretary Margaret Beckett, *The Guardian* wrote that “climate change could spawn a new era of conflicts around the world over water and other scarce resources” (The Guardian, 2007a). Reporting a subsequent study by the Oxford Research Group, in January 2008, *The Times* wrote that “climate change will have a long-term impact on the nation’s security as wars break out over food and water supplies around the world” (The Times, 2008).

Some news already suggested that existing conflicts were climate-related. Citing a study by UNEP, *The Guardian* wrote on June 2007 that “the conflict in Darfur has been driven by climate change and environmental degradation, which threaten to trigger a succession of new wars across Africa” (The Guardian, 2007c). In May 2007, *The Guardian* quoted British Foreign
Secretary Margaret Beckett who claimed “climate-driven conflicts were already under way in Africa” (The Guardian 2007a).

There were also news that warned of the likelihood of climate change originating mass migration and climate refugees, posing a subsequent threat to national security. On January 2008, The Times wrote: “Hundreds of millions of environmental refugees will seek new places to live, with many of them heading for Britain (...) security services [will] be challenged increasingly by the number of refugees” (The Times, 2008). On March of the same year, The Guardian wrote

Europe needs to brace itself for a new wave of migration with a very different cause – global warming. The ravages already being inflicted on parts of the developing world by climate change are engendering a new type of refugee, the “environmental migrant”. (The Guardian, 2008b)

Climate change was thus presented as an existential threat in the British media, functioning as a vehicle of the securitizing move being performed by both governmental and non-governmental securitizing actors. By comparing the dimension of the security threat posed by climate change to that posed by weapons of mass destruction or global terrorism, the latter still so present in the public imaginary, the British media is diffusing the message that climate is an urgent threat. The same is true for evidencing the likelihood of climate creating a migratory flux with Europe, and the UK in particular, as
destiny, since migration is already perceived as a potential security problem itself.

**German Written Media**

The German media also gave substantial coverage to the developments which, at the EU and international levels, aimed at framing climate change as a security issue. In the German media one can also find news that compare climate change to terrorism regarding the magnitude of the threat. In February 2004, citing United States experts, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* wrote that “the dangers of climate change for world-wide stability ‘would exceed by far those of terrorism’”\(^4\) (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2004).

Attention was also given to the likelihood of climate change causing violent conflict and thus endangering world peace. Reporting on the Security Council meeting in April 2007, *Die Zeit* announced: “Climate change: Threat for the world peace”\(^5\) (Die Zeit, 2007a). In May 2007, also *Die Zeit* published an article on “The Climate Wars”\(^6\), where it stated that

since all conflicts are always also conflicts over resources, raw materials and living space, in the future climate change will cut

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\(^4\) Author’s free translation: “die Gefahren des Klimawandels für die weltweite Stabilität übertrafen „bei weitem die des Terrorismus“.

\(^5\) Author’s free translation: “Klimawandel Gefahr für den Weltfrieden”

\(^6\) Author’s free translation: “Die Klima-Kriege”
these commodities in addition. The result: with climate change, tensions on the globe will intensify.\(^7\) (Die Zeit, 2007b)

Reporting on the publication of the WBGU study, \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} wrote that “with climate change the danger of crises, wars and migrations will increase (...); there is danger of distributive conflicts over water and food which will become even scarcer in some regions due to global warming”\(^8\) (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2007a).

The German media also focused on the issue of climate-related migratory movements. Citing UN officials, in April 2007 the \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} wrote that “according to estimations the consequences of the climate change will already bring about 50 million environmental refugees in the year 2010”\(^9\) (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2007b). In September 2007, the \textit{Spiegel} asked “What Will Become of Tuvalu’s Climate Refugees?” and noted that it is “unprecedented (...) for a country to completely lose its territory without the use of military force (...) Tuvalu is now regarded as a prime example of just how much damage climate change can do to a country” (Spiegel Online: 2007).

\(^7\) Author’s free translation: “Denn alle Konflikte sind immer auch Konflikte um Ressourcen, Rohstoffe und Lebensraum; in Zukunft wird der Klimawandel diese Güter zusätzlich verknappen. Die Folge: Mit dem Klimawandel verschärfen sich die Spannungen auf dem Globus.”

\(^8\) Author’s free translation: Mit dem Klimawandel wird die Gefahr von Krisen, Kriegen und Flucht (...) Zu befürchten seien Verteilungskonflikte um Wasser und Nahrung, die in einigen Regionen wegen der Erderwärmung noch knapper würden”

\(^9\) Author’s free translation: “berichtet von Schätzungen, nach denen die Folgen des Klimawandels schon im Jahr 2010 etwa 50 Millionen Umweltflüchtlinge hervorbringen warden”
Although the German media is less sensationalist in relation to climate change’s impacts on international security than the British media, this issue still had a large coverage in its main newspapers. These news indicate that the perspective of climate change intensifying resource wars and endangering world peace has reached German citizens. Also, there is a visible concern with climate-related migratory movements. This suggests that the securitizing move has reached the relevant audience, i.e. German public opinion.

**French Written Media**

The French media was also attentive to the implications of climate change at the security level. In April 2008, *Le Figaro* quoting Nick Mabey, author of the report of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), wrote that “global warming will lead to a change in the domain of strategic security as important as the end of the Cold War”\(^\text{10}\) (Le Figaro, 2008a).

One of the central issues in French reporting of climate change was its potential for intensifying conflict over resources. In April 2007, *Le Monde* quoted the British Foreign Secretary who argued in the Security Council meeting on climate change that “an unstable climate will exacerbate some of

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\(^\text{10}\) Author’s free translation: “le réchauffement climatique va entraîner une modification dans le domaine de la sécurité stratégique aussi importante qu’à la fin de la guerre froide”

the central causes of conflict, such as migratory pressures and competition for natural resources”\textsuperscript{11} (Le Monde, 2007a).

A significant number of articles even suggested the possibility of climate change triggering violent conflict at a global scale. Referring to the WBGU Report, \textit{Le Monde} wrote in December 2007 that “global warming could cause a ‘global civil war’ by exacerbating latent tensions between populations”\textsuperscript{12} (Le Monde, 2007b). Also referring to the WBGU study, \textit{Le Figaro} asked “Towards a Climate World War?”\textsuperscript{13} (Le Figaro, 2007). In April 2008, quoting Nick Mabey, \textit{Le Monde} wrote that "if left unchecked, global warming will have implications for the security of a similar magnitude to the two world wars but lasting for centuries”\textsuperscript{14} (Le Monde, 2008).

A substantial amount of attention was also devoted to the issue of climate refugees in the French media. In March 2008, \textit{L’Express} wrote that “in ten years, climate refugees will count in the millions, most victims of global

\textsuperscript{11} Author’s free translation: “un climat instable exacerbera certaines des causes centrales des conflits, comme les pressions migratoires et la compétition pour les ressources naturelles”

\textsuperscript{12} Author’s free translation: “Le réchauffement climatique pourrait provoquer une ‘guerre civile mondiale’ en exacerbant des tensions latentes entre des populations”

\textsuperscript{13} Author’s free translation: “Vers une guerre mondiale du climat?”

\textsuperscript{14} Author’s free translation: “S’il n’est pas maîtrisé, le réchauffement climatique aura des implications dans le domaine de la sécurité d’une ampleur similaire aux deux conflits mondiaux, mais qui dureront pendant des siècles ’”
warming”\textsuperscript{15} (L’Express.fr, 2008). Referring to the impacts of climate-related migrations in Europe, Le Figaro wrote in January 2008 that “the massive influx of refugees can reduce the capacity of developed countries to govern. According to experts, a refugee in two will be a climate refugee in thirty years”\textsuperscript{16} (Le Figaro, 2008b).

In the French media there is also a focus on climate related conflicts, including the possibility of such conflicts occurring on a global scale. Another focal point refers to climate induced migrations. Since there is already an immigration-security nexus in Europe, climate related migratory pressures appeals to the securitization of climate change. The diffusion of such information suggests that the speech act that depicts climate change as an existential threat is reaching the audience.

It should be added that the diffusion of this information by the selected media does not confine itself to the British, German and French citizens. Many of these newspapers are read throughout Europe, thus reaching a wider European audience.

\textsuperscript{15} Author’s free translation: ”D’ici une dizaine d’années, "les réfugiés climatiques se compteront par millions, la plupart victimes du réchauffement de la planète"

\textsuperscript{16} Author’s free translation: ”l’arrivée massive de réfugiés peut entraîner une baisse des capacités des pays développés à gouverner. Selon les experts, un réfugié sur deux sera un réfugié climatique dans trente ans"
Opinion Poll

On the specific issue of climate change as a security threat, no study has yet been conducted to survey European public opinion. However, there are some studies which are useful to understand the evolution of European perceptions on the relation between climate change and security.

Special Eurobarometer 300, requested by the European Commission and the European Parliament, surveyed Europeans' attitudes towards climate change. The study was carried out from March to May 2008, with interviews made to 30,170 citizens in the 27 Member States of the EU, in the three candidate countries for accession (Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and in the Turkish Cypriot Community (European Commission, 2008b: 2).

When asked what they considered to be the most serious problem currently facing the world as a whole, 62% of Europeans identified “climate change/global warming” as it. Climate change ranked second after “poverty, the lack of food and drinking water”, which 68% of Europeans considered being a major problem. “International terrorism” ranked below climate change, with 53% of the respondents recognising it as one of the world’s most serious problems (European Commission, 2008b: 7). When only respondents’ first answers are considered, “global warming/climate change” becomes the first on the list of serious problems in the world, with 30%.
“Poverty, the lack of food and drinking water” falls to the second position with 29% and “international terrorism” comes in third with 17% (European Commission, 2008b: 11).

The survey shows that “[a]t the country level, absolute majorities in nearly all countries regard "global warming/climate change" as a serious problem” (European Commission, 2008b: 9). In France, for example, a poll conducted by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (Ifop) for Le Monde in July 2008, concluded that the French believe global warming is far riskier than nuclear power. When asked about the risks they see as the greatest concern, 53% of respondents cited those related to climate change, against the 27% who referred to nuclear risks. In a similar poll conducted in April 2002, only 20% of respondents had identified climate change as a risk, while 33% were concerned with the risks of nuclear power (Ifop, 2008: 4).

These findings demonstrate that the European public is increasingly aware of the seriousness of climate change, identifying it as a severe problem facing Europe and the World. Nevertheless, the fact that climate change is acknowledged as a risk does not by itself allows us to conclude that the Europeans public accepts the climate change securitizing move. Therefore, it is necessary to connect these findings to other indicators in order to understand the level of acceptance of the move.
The Special Eurobarometer 300, previously mentioned, concluded that 65% of Europeans did not agree that the seriousness of climate change had been exaggerated as opposed to 26% that believed it had (European Commission, 2008b: 24). This is very significant if one takes into account that climate change has been increasingly presented to European citizens as a security threat. Acknowledging that climate change’s seriousness has not been exaggerated suggests that Europeans accept the securitizing move.

Another interesting indicator is the willingness of Europeans to pay higher costs for green energy as a means to contribute to climate change’s reduction. The Eurobarometer poll indicates that 44% of Europeans affirm they would be ready to pay between 1% and 30% more for green energy, against 30% who would not (European Commission, 2008b: 68). These values, combined with the 65% of Europeans who believed climate change’s seriousness had not been blown out of proportion, suggest Europeans may be ready to accept extraordinary measures to tackle climate change.

Furthermore, the Eurobarometer number 70, published on December 2008, shows that 23% of Europeans would like most of EU’s budget to be spent on climate change and environmental protection, whereas only 17% would like it to be spent in defence and security (European Commission, 2008c: 68). These values reflect an inverse evolution concerning European perceptions towards security and environment, since in the Eurobarometer 68, published
on December 2007, 33% of Europeans believed European institutions should focus in environmental issues, whereas the biggest percentage of the respondents, 36%, considered the focus should be on security (European Commission, 2007a: 38). Again, this in and of itself does not prove a general acceptance of the securitizing move of climate change, but it clearly suggests a change in European perceptions concerning the importance and resources that should be allocated to deal with this issue.

Moreover, when compared with security issues importance and the share of resources that should be channelled to this sector, environmental issues and climate change seem to have become a higher priority for European citizens. This shift, associated with the rest of the information on opinion polls, but also with the analysis on the audience reaction discussed above, indicates a growing willingness of Europeans to accept the adoption of exceptional measures towards climate change, namely concerning resource allocation and policy prioritisation.

**Facilitating Conditions**

All of these actors’ actions and perceptions do not occur in a vacuum and Buzan et al. (1998: 32) identify facilitating conditions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act does not succeed. Such conditions fall into two categories, as discussed in Chapter I, that combine...
for a successful speech act: the internal, linguistic-grammatical, and the external, contextual and social.

The authors argue the most important internal condition of the speech act “is to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). The attempt of constructing climate change as a security threat has followed these conditions. Climate change has been presented by the securitizing actors as an existential threat: “climate change is becoming the biggest security threat in today’s world” (European Parliament, 2008: 3, emphasis added); “we need to treat climate (...) as an immediate threat to our security and prosperity” (Ashton, 2007, emphasis added).

Also, climate change has been presented as an issue which if not addressed may reach a point of no return. In the European Commission’s website’s section on climate action one can read that “unless global action is taken quickly to stabilise the rising temperature of the earth’s surface, there is likely to be irreversible and catastrophic damage” (European Commission, 2009a). For the EU this is materialised in the goal to limit the increase in the average global temperature by 2ºC. According to the Commission,

[t]he EU’s objective is to limit global average temperature increase to less than 2ºC compared to pre-industrial levels. This will limit the impacts of climate change and the likelihood of massive and
irreversible disruptions of the global ecosystem. (European Commission, 2007c: 3)

Furthermore, climate change is presented as a threat to which a possible way out exists. In other words, although there is still no scientific consensus on whether climate change is anthropogenic, the securitizing actors have presented it as being so and, consequently, stoppable through human action. According to the European Commission, “[g]lobal warming is happening because of large amounts of energy that humans produce and use” (European Commission, 2009a). As a result, mitigation action is presented as the tool to decelerate global warming. The claim that there is a possible way out from climate change has been accepted by the audience, as 60% of Europeans agree that climate change is a problem which can be solved, whereas only 31% believe that the process of climate change is unstoppable (European Commission, 2008b: 24).

Regarding the external aspect of the speech act, the authors identify two main conditions. The first is the social capital of the enunciator. According to this condition, securitization is successful when the securitizing actor is in a position of authority. Hence, the relationship between speaker and audience determines the likelihood of the audience to accept the claims made in a securitizing attempt (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). Regarding this condition, both groups of securitizing actors can be said to be in a position of authority. The non-governmental securitizing actors are reputable research institutions
which gives them a position of “intellectual authority”. As to the bureaucratic and governmental securitizing actors, these are in a position of formal leadership, whether it is the European institutions or the national governments.

The second external condition identified by Buzan et al. (1998: 33) refers to the features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization. With respect to climate change, securitization has been facilitated by the recurrence of extreme weather events and the diffusion of a scientific discourse that links those events to climate change (IPCC, 2008). A paradigmatic case was Hurricane Katrina on August 2005, one of the strongest and most devastating hurricanes to hit the United States of America. The devastation caused by Katrina spurred international debate over climate change’s potential to cause natural disasters. Besides large-scale loss of life, such natural disasters can create refugees, lead to social tensions and even violence.

In the specific case of Europe, extreme weather events have also raised public awareness. The summer of 2003 registered record heat waves across Europe causing a high number of related deaths (UNEP, 2004). In subsequent summers many European countries have registered high temperatures with major impacts on public health (Directorate – General for Health and Consumers, 2007). The contribution of unusually high
temperatures to the proliferation of severe summer fires across Europe has led Greek authorities to argue that these are a consequence of climate change (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

In recent years, many European countries have also experienced severe flooding, notably in the summer of 2002, with the catastrophic floods along the Danube and Elbe rivers (BBC News, 2002), and again in 2005 (BBC News, 2005). These life-threatening events have also been linked to climate change, supporting the notion that climate change is a “real” threat to people’s security.

In addition, the academic discourse that links climate change to violent conflict has also contributed to the securitization of climate change. In 1994, in an article for the journal *International Security*, Thomas Homer-Dixon identified climate change as a plausible cause of violent inter-group conflict (1994:6). Although his focus was on resource depletion, Homer-Dixon acknowledged global warming would interact with the existing scarcities, additionally contributing to violence (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 40). The work further developed by Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Team ignited the academic debate on the links between climate change and conflict. In August 2007, the journal *Political Geography* published a special issue on *Climate Change and Conflict*, edited by Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch.
(2007), where the links between climate change and conflict were explored from various perspectives.

The conditions enunciated are thus contributing to the success of climate change securitization initiated by two distinct groups of securitizing actors identified. As it has been shown, at the bureaucratic and governmental levels, the European institutions and the EU member states are performing a security speech act regarding climate change. At the non-governmental level, pressure groups and lobbyists are also calling for an elevation of climate change to the security level. Both these groups aim at securing European standards of living and the stability of the EU, referent objects that are seen to be threatened by climate change.

Regarding the second step of the process of securitization, it has been argued that wide media coverage of climate change security implications, as well as opinion indicators, reveals an acceptance by the European public, i.e. the relevant audience. Hence, extraordinary measures are legitimised by the audience in the realm of the EU.
The Consequences of Securitizing Climate Change

The dissertation has so far demonstrated how climate change is a securitized issue in the European Union. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, extraordinary measures have not yet been adopted to address climate change. This chapter presents the strategies defined to tackle climate change and their implementation, discussing whether they constitute extraordinary measures or normal politics.

The Copenhagen authors support that one of the purposes of the securitization approach is to enable an evaluation of whether an issue is better handled at the security level (with the adoption of extraordinary measures) or within normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). However, they do not define clearly what constitute extraordinary measures, stating only that these are “outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24).

In face of this limited definition, Gramsci’s distinction between grand or extraordinary politics and petty or small politics can be very useful. According to Gramsci, small politics deals with problems, issues, conflicts and power struggles within an already established structure (Gramsci, 1975 apud Fontana, 2002: 170). Extraordinary politics however is the politics that establishes or creates entirely new structures as it deals with “the founding
of new States, the struggle for the destruction, the defence, and the preservation of determinate organic socio-economic structures” (Gramsci, 1975 *apud* Fontana, 2002: 170).

Halls’ reasoning is also very useful here. Drawing on his three subtypes of policy change presented previously, Hall argues that

[f]irst and second order change can be seen as cases of “normal policymaking”, namely of a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given policy paradigm, much like normal science. Third order change, by contrast, is likely to reflect a very different process, marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a “paradigm shift”. If first and second order changes preserve the broad continuities usually found in patterns of policy, third order change is often a more disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy (Hall, 1993: 279).

In relation to climate change, the adoption of extraordinary measures would imply a significant transformation in climate change policies: the creation of a new structure, in Gramsci’s logic, or a paradigm shift, in Hall’s interpretation.

Consequently, the adoption of extraordinary measures on climate change would entail the application of a much higher degree of rigor and control in environmental policies. This would mean, for example, international emission reductions targets surveilled by the United Nations Security Council, with the imposition of sanctions for non-compliant states, or the closing of all polluting companies by states.
Securitizing Actors’ Proposals

The chapter now analyses the strategies recommended during the securitizing move in order to understand the securitizing actor’s intention with securitization, i.e. if they argue for the creation of a new structure to deal with climate change or if, on the other hand, they prefer that the issue is dealt within the realm of normal politics.

European Institutions

In the Joint Report *Climate Change and International Security*, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission make recommendations on how the EU should address climate change. These are divided in three main categories: “enhancing capacities at the EU level” (European Commission, 2008a: 9), “EU multilateral leadership to promote global climate security” (European Commission, 2008a: 10), and “Cooperation with third countries” (European Commission, 2008: 11).

In the first category of measures the focus is on EU's own capacities. Hence, an enhancement in research, analysis, monitoring and early warning mechanisms is proposed. The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission argue for the need of further building up EU and member states’ planning and capabilities,
including civil protection, crisis management and disaster response instruments both civilian and military (European Commission, 2008a: 10). What is proposed here is the development of existing instruments, rather than the adoption of any exceptional measure. Nevertheless, a sense of urgency is added in addressing climate change, creating the need for an enhancement of EU instruments and capacities.

Regarding the EU multilateral leadership, it is proposed that the EU strengthens its leadership towards an ambitious post-2012 agreement, within the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, that includes the implementation of mitigation and adaptation action plans by all countries. Again this shows that, although climate change’s urgency pushes for more ambitious goals, these are pursued through the existing framework of negotiations and not through exceptional measures.

The report also argues for the need to “consider environmentally-triggered additional migratory stress in the further development of a comprehensive European migration policy” (European Commission, 2008: 10). Moreover, it recommends that attention is given to climate change security risks in the multilateral arena, namely within the UN Security Council, the G8 and the relevant UN specialised bodies (European Commission, 2008a: 10). Although it refers to the Security Council, the report does not claim for extraordinary
measures to be taken, only that attention is given to the issue in that organism.

As to cooperation with third countries, the report argues for a reinforcement of EU’s cooperation and political dialogue instruments, including further integration of adaptation and resilience to climate change in EU regional strategies and the consolidation of the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) between the EU and the most vulnerable developing countries (European Commission, 2008: 11). The GCCA is a development cooperation mechanism through which the EU intends to work jointly with developing countries to integrate climate change into poverty reduction strategies (Directorate General for Communication, 2007). For this reason, the creation of such alliance is not an extraordinary measure but rather an expected development within normal politics, since development strategies already include environmental sustainability criteria.

The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, *Providing Security in a Changing World* (December 2008), is much vaguer in terms of specific strategies to address the security implications of climate change. It stresses, nevertheless, the need to improve analysis and early warning capabilities. Cooperation is defined as a crucial strategy in tackling climate change, both with countries most at risk, the UN and regional organisations (European Council, 2008: 6). The document also emphasises
the importance of an effective multilateralism, with a new international agreement on climate change being defined as a key priority (European Council, 2008: 12).

As in the Joint Report *Climate Change and International Security*, the measures proposed by the *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* fall within the existing structure of climate change policies, namely international cooperation and multilateral negotiations. Hence, what these securitizing actors are proposing is for the security implications of climate change to be addressed at the level of normal politics, rather than through exceptional measures.

**Member States Governments**

*British Government*

Chapter four of the UK’s National Security Strategy, dedicated to the United Kingdom’s response to its key threats, includes a section on “Tackling Climate Change” where the UK government acknowledges the need for an integrated international response to tackle both causes and effects of climate change. The document argues for a need for defensive measures against extreme weather events such as flooding and sea level surges. It also identifies modifications on development plans and in the management of resources as crucial strategies to mitigate water stress and food insecurity.
The document also advocates for changes in energy policies, to achieve reductions in global carbon emissions and meeting rising global energy demand in a sustainable way. According to the document, the UK is making efforts towards a technological and behavioural transition to a low-carbon economy.

At the international level, the UK declares to be committed to a leading role in multilateral efforts to tackle climate change, which entails binding ambitious emission reductions, a global carbon market and clean energy frameworks (Cabinet Office, 2008: 50). These measures are not extraordinary in any sense. First, it is clear in the document that changes in energy policies should not hinder the meeting of energy demands. Second, the measures are not new: the current climate policies entail emission reductions, the development of a global carbon market and clean energy frameworks.

With specific reference to the security implications of climate change, the document says that the UK is undertaking a thorough analysis of the likely impact of climate change on its territory and also of water and food security issues to ensure sustainable and secure supplies. It announces an increase in climate change research investment to £100 million to investigate the dynamics of long-term climate change, its links to international poverty and its impact on conflict (Cabinet Office, 2008: 51). The investment certainly
demonstrates the urgency attributed by the UK government to climate change. Nevertheless, research is not an extraordinary measure, consequently, policy recommendations in the UK remain in the realm of normal politics.

**German Government**

The CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group security strategy paper makes a number of recommendations for German action on climate change. The measures for dealing with the security implications of climate change proposed in the document are mainly normal policy measures as they fall into the existing framework. These include, emission reduction, support for adaptation in developing countries, development of effective financial instruments to manage the cost of adjustment and coordination at the EU level for emergency services to deal with environmental disasters (CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 2008: 6-7).

However, the CDU/CSU paper also proposes the adoption of exceptional measures on climate change when they argue for an intervention of the Security Council in cases of environmental misconduct. According to the CDU/CSU paper,

> The United Nations must find a more efficient, and more importantly, more pre-emptive approach to the security risks presented by climate change. In addition, international law must be extended so that the Security Council of the United Nations is authorized to act in instances of considerable environmental
destruction or major breaches of environmental legislation. (CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 2008: 7)

Such action by the Security Council would fall clearly in the realm of extraordinary measures, signifying a shift in current international climate policies.

The report by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) makes extensive recommendations to German and EU policy-makers, within the framework of climate policy as preventive security policy. Within this framework, three sets of initiatives are proposed in the study. The first group aims at fostering cooperation. Hence it recommends that Germany and the EU promote a multilateral order which engages emerging powers, such as China and India, and intensify efforts to achieve international cooperation in the field of climate protection.

Yet within the first group of initiatives, the study argues for a United Nations reform, with a strengthening of its development capacities and an appropriate adaptation of the Security Council’s mandate, based on the principle “responsibility to protect” (WBGU, 2007: 7).

In WBGU’s view, the impacts of unabated climate change, severe environmental degradation and environmentally-induced conflicts can be regarded as a threat to international security and world peace. Presumably, therefore, the Security Council is authorized to take action in cases of widespread destruction of natural environmental goods and grave violations of international
environmental law, and can apply appropriate sanctions against
the states responsible. (WBGU, 2007: 7)

Such understanding of the Security Council’s role clearly demonstrates that
the WBGU is calling for the adoption of extraordinary measures in climate
policy.

The second group of initiatives aims to prevent conflict by avoiding
dangerous climate change. Hence, the WBGU recommends that Germany
and the EU ambitiously pursue international climate policy within the
framework of the Kyoto Protocol. Also, the study calls for the implementation
of an energy turnaround in the EU, which includes more ambitious reduction
targets, increased energy efficiency and the expanded use of renewable
energies. The development of mitigation strategies through partnerships with
developing and newly industrialised countries is also proposed (WBGU, 2007:
8-9). This set of initiatives is in line with what have been the usual
instruments to deal with climate change.

A third set of proposals aims at preventing conflict by implementing
adaptation strategies. On this topic, the WBGU recommends that Germany
and the EU support adaptation strategies in developing countries and
contribute to the stabilisation of fragile and weak states additionally
threatened by climate change. What is proposed here is that a climate
component is added to development aid, which falls within the dynamics of
normal politics. Regarding environmental migration, the WGBU proposes its management through cooperation and calls for the development of international law that protects these migrants (WBGU, 2007: 9-11). Again, no extraordinary measures are being called upon, as these would imply strong measures at the borders, such as closing them, in order to prevent climate refugees from entering into the EU.

In the WGBU study it is reflected the perception that although climate change poses risks to security, and should therefore be handled as a security issue, the mechanisms to address it should not be classic security mechanisms. According to the study, “[c]limate change (...) poses a challenge to international security, but classic, military-based security policy will be unable to make any major contributions to resolving the impending climate crises” (WBGU, 2007:6).

**French Government**

The French White Paper on Defence and National Security is quite vague in terms of strategies to address climate change. In the paper, the French government announces to have requested the creation of a multilateral body for prevention and concerted action for combating the effects of global warming (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 113). Also, the government declares its support for the creation of a regional tsunami warning centre that will include tsunami detection, as part of the efforts of preventing the
risks posed by climate change (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 220). Although the configuration of these institutions is not defined, it is clear that they do not fall under the label of extraordinary measures.

Another reference to action on climate change refers to concerns with migratory pressures. The document states that

“Security in Africa will suffer in the first place from poor living conditions due to urban growth, the lack of adequate health structures and increasingly scarce local food resources. Climate warming is aggravating the situation. France and Europe must contribute to the fight against worsening conditions in order to curb migratory trends driven by economic and social distress (…).” (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 43)

What is being envisaged here is investing in development aid to prevent climate-related migration to Europe. This is not of course new. The same strategy has been long time used to prevent other types of migration, namely economic. Hence, although there is a change in focus, from economic migrants to environmental migrants, the measures to address the issue remain unaltered.

**Pressure groups and lobbyists**

In the 2006 Report *Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century*, the Oxford Research Group’s main proposal for addressing the security impacts of climate change is the stabilisation of carbon dioxide levels. According to the Report this should be done by
resorting to the development of local renewable energy sources and comprehensive energy conservation practices, rather than through the development of nuclear energy which would involve security risks (Abbott et al., 2006: 11). The report, more than arguing for measures that fall within standard energy-climate policies, namely renewables, opposes categorically a change in the current energy paradigm: a turn to nuclear energy.

The 2008 Oxford Research Group *An Uncertain Future: Law Enforcement, National Security and Climate Change* advises prevention, mitigation and adaptation actions to curb the consequences of climate change. The report recommends that climate policies comprise natural disaster protection measures and the development of local renewable energy sources and resource conservation projects. It also recommends the development of protection and management of environmental refugees and likely migratory flows. Lastly, the report suggests that conflict prevention, sustainable development and foreign aid programmes take into account the likely effects of climate change (Abbott, 2008: 11).

Again, this Report does not envisage the adoption of extraordinary measures to address climate change. Moreover, the report warns that in case extraordinary measures are considered, such as traditional military strategies, these are not adequate to handle climate change.
While there are clear operational concerns, it must also be understood that if governments simply respond with traditional attempts to maintain the status quo and control insecurity they will ultimately fail. In today’s globalised world, using military force to secure resources overseas, while attempting to create a fortress state at home, will not work – despite the potential attraction of such policies for governments faced with such an uncertain future (...). In the long-term, the risks of climate change demand a rethink of current approaches to security and the development of cooperative and sustainable ways of achieving that security, with an emphasis on preventative rather than reactive strategies. (Abbott, 2008: 12)

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Report, *Delivering Climate Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World*, focuses on the role of security actors in addressing climate change. According to the Report, security actors have a responsibility in “reducing the climate impact of their operations and activities” (Mabey, 2007: 2). Furthermore, it suggests that security actors should also have a responsibility in the development of technology to address climate change.

The security sector has the vital – and expensively acquired – experience of how government can drive technological development and infrastructure deployment at a similar scale to that needed to respond to climate change. Security actors should promote dramatically increased investment in the development and deployment of technologies critical for energy and climate security. (Mabey, 2007: 2-3)

The Report also argues for a transformation of the security sector to deal with instability in strategic regions highly vulnerable to climate change and marked by weak governance. What is proposes is the implementation of a
broad conflict prevention agenda and, more importantly, a focus on the management of tensions over resources (Mabey, 2007: 5-6).

Despite this focus on the security sector, the Report does not call for the adoption of exceptional measures. What is proposed is an adaptation of the sector to deal with the security consequences of climate change, as well as to contribute to curb climate change by lowering the environmental impact of security activities.

Apart from this reflection on the security sector, the Report also argues for a transformation in the international industrial policies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. According to the Report this entails sharing advanced energy technologies and funding large scale investment in countries such as China and India (Mabey, 2007: 3). Moreover it calls for modifications in the management of climate adaptation in the international climate change regime (Mabey, 2007: 6). These measures are inserted in normal climate policy making.

International Alert’s 2007 Report A Climate of Conflict: The Links Between Climate Change, Peace and War recommends the integration of climate change considerations into development and peacebuilding activities. According to the Report, the established principles of conflict-sensitive development practices should be applied to climate change policies and
practice as a way of preventing climate-related violent conflict (Smith and Vivekananda, 2007: 37).

Regarding the impact of climate change on fragile states, the Report argues that adaptation should take priority over mitigation, as the former is the most pressing need. Moreover, the majority of fragile states have subsistence economies, contributing very little to carbon emissions. According to the Report, donor governments have the responsibility to integrate adaptation and other competences on climate change in development cooperation, in the framework of good governance (Smith and Vivekananda, 2007: 40).

Rather than arguing for exceptional measures, the Report focuses on development aid cooperation and peacebuilding activities as measures to curb climate change contributions to violent conflict. What is proposed is that climate change considerations are integrated in existing policies, which means climate change would be dealt within the current policy framework.

Oxfam International’s 2009 *The Right to Survive: The Humanitarian Challenge for the Twenty-First Century*, focuses on rich governments’ responsibility as major contributors to climate change. Accordingly, it urges these governments to increase their donations to humanitarian aid, take the lead in mitigation action by cutting global emissions and provide financial
assistance for poor countries adaptation to climate change (Oxfam International, 2009: 3).

The Report identifies priorities for international action in dealing with the humanitarian consequences of climate change. These include strengthening the links between relief and development, working towards reducing vulnerability by using long-term instruments, investment in disaster risk-reduction capacity and programming by international development agencies and the creation of a UN adaptation finance mechanism responsible for the oversight and delivery of funds (Oxfam International, 2009: 118).

What Oxfam is arguing is that climate change adds pressure to humanitarian needs and therefore humanitarian assistance must take it into account. Corresponding transformations in humanitarian mechanisms are of course implied but these do not alter the established structure.

**Climate Change Securitization – Policy Change?**

EU action on climate change is now addressed in order to identify what changes securitization produced in concrete policies. EU’s action against climate change is based on two main strategies:

Addressing climate change requires two types of response. Firstly, and importantly, we [EU] must reduce our greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (i.e. take mitigation action) and secondly we
must take adaptation action to deal with the unavoidable impacts. (European Commission, 2009: 3)

Since the publication of *Climate Change and International Security* these strategies were invested with a security feature. As the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, puts it: “Both mitigation and adaptation should go hand in hand with addressing the international security threats of climate change. Both should also be seen as preventive security policy” (Solana, 2008).

European adaptation policies’ main guidelines are found in two documents: the 2007 *Green Paper on Adaptation to Climate Change* and the 2009 *White Paper on Adapting to Climate Change*. The first, resulting from the findings of the European Climate Change Programme, was presented by the European Commission in June 2007. The document instructs EU action on adaptation to climate change under four main pillars, namely integrating adaptation in legislation, policies, and Community funding programmes (European Commission, 2007b: 14); integrating adaptation in EU external relations with developing, neighbouring and industrialised countries (European Commission, 2007b: 21); climate research for uncertainty reduction (European Commission, 2007b: 24); and participation of European society, business and public sector in the preparation of adaptation strategies (European Commission, 2007b: 26).
A security dimension is integrated in the third pillar of EU external relations. The Green paper places adaptation to climate change in third countries at the level of conflict prevention.

EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has an important role to play in enhancing the EU's capacity to prevent and deal with conflicts such as border disputes and tensions over access to natural resources and natural disasters accentuated by climate change as well as their potential consequences such as forced migration and internal displacements of persons. (European Commission, 2007b: 21)

EU’s investment in climate change adaptation in third countries becomes a means to avoid violent conflict, and thus maintain security.

In the sequence of the consultation launched by the Green Paper, the Commission published in April 2009 a White Paper on adapting to climate change, a policy paper that launches EU’s Adaptation Framework. The paper previews a phased approach, in which phase 1 will lay the ground work for a comprehensive EU adaptation strategy from 2009 to 2012 and phase 2, initiating in 2013, will implement the strategy. Phase 1 comprehends four lines of action, namely building a solid knowledge base on the impact and consequences of climate change, integrating adaptation into EU key policy areas, employing a combination of policy instruments to ensure effective delivery of adaptation and stepping up international cooperation on adaptation (European Commission, 2009: 7).
As in the Green Paper, the security dimension is included in the external action of the EU. Regarding EU’s relations with third countries the document says:

Failure to adapt could have security implications. The EU is therefore strengthening its analysis and early warning systems and integrating climate change into existing tools such as conflict prevention mechanisms and security sector reform. The effects of climate change on migratory flows should also be considered in the broader EU reflection on security, development and migration policies. (European Commission, 2009: 15-16)

The Security dimension is more evident in the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the White Paper, entitled Impact Assessment (2009). Again, in the section dedicated to the external dimension of EU’s adaptation measures, the security implications of climate change are addressed, through the inclusion of a sub-section dedicated to climate change’s impacts on global security (European Commission, 2009c: 112). The Commission recommends that adaptation is “mainstreamed” in, i.e. becomes a customary component of, EU’s external policies, particularly development cooperation, security and migration (European Commission, 2009b: 128).

Despite these documents recognising of a security dimension in adaptation, no extraordinary measures are envisaged in any of them. There are no military measures defined to deal with the security implications of climate change, nor any radical instruments to address climate change, such as, for
instance, the criminalisation of greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, adaptation is transformed into a security strategy, raising the urgency of its implementation. Furthermore, it is perceptible from the documents that the security implications of climate change will be dealt within the realm of normal politics, more precisely through development aid cooperation policies.

With respect to mitigation it is also important to understand the impacts generated by the application of a mind-set of security to climate change. In an opinion article for *The Guardian*, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, argued that “saying that climate change poses security risks reinforces the need to stick to our [EU’s] commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (Solana, 2008). Hence, mitigation policies can be seen as making part of a strategy to attain security.

In this context, the EU declares to be committed to obtain a 2°C target in international negotiations. The 2007 communication from the European Commission entitled precisely *Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius* frames this target within a security concern. According to the document “strong scientific evidence shows that urgent action to tackle climate change is imperative (…) a failure to act will have serious local and global security implications” (European Commission, 2007b:3).
In order to limit climate change, the EU intends to reduce its overall emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020. To achieve this target, the EU adopted a *Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package* in 2008. The four pillars of this package of measures are promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (European Commission, 2008c), member states reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s commitments up to 2020 (European Commission, 2008d), improvement and extending of the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community (European Commission, 2008e) and the development of geological storage of carbon dioxide (European Commission, 2008f).

As with adaptation, mitigation strategies were thus transformed into security strategies, based on the premise that reducing emissions will reduce climate change and, as a consequence, reduce its security impacts. This security framing raises the urgency of mitigation actions, taking the EU from an 8% reduction target by 2012 under Kyoto to a voluntary 20% reduction target to be attained by 2020.

Nevertheless this urgency does not translate into extraordinary measures. The *Climate action and renewable energy package* argues the proposed reduction target has to be attained in a “cost-effective” manner, with different targets between member states to guarantee fairness (European Commission, 2008d). Moreover, member states continue to rely on the
Community’s greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system. Hence, although a more ambitious emissions target is proposed, the mechanisms to accomplish it are framed within existing policies.

As demonstrated previously, the EU institutions give significant importance to the security impacts of climate change in third countries, particularly developing countries. As a consequence, climate change is a declared intervention area in EU’s development aid cooperation policy. The EU Action Plan on Climate Change and Development shaped in 2003 aims at incorporating climate change into all aspects of EU development aid policy. Focusing on the links between poverty and environment, the document outlines four strategic priorities: raising the policy profile of climate change in developing countries, supporting adaptation, supporting mitigation, and developing capacities (European Commission, 2003: 13-19).

With the objective of renewing the commitment of the Action Plan to systematically integrate climate change into development aid cooperation, the European Commission launched in 2007 the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change. Although security concerns are not included in the initial Commission proposal (European Commission, 2007b), a subsequent communication from the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament to the Committee on Development recommends the
incorporation of a security dimension in the GCCA. The Committee of Foreign Affairs

[considers that international cooperation must be stepped up as regards the detection and monitoring of climate-change-related security threats and in respect of prevention capability, preparedness, alleviation and response, and that the development of regional security situations at the various levels of climate change (taking into account the implications thereof for international security) must be promoted. (European Parliament, 2008: 4)

Moreover, *Climate Change and International Security*, the joint report of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission, envisages a role for the GCCA in addressing the security implications of climate change in EU’s relations with third countries (European Commission, 2008: 11). However, the creation of such a mechanism as the GCCA is not an exceptional measure. Although the GCCA could serve security interests, it is a development aid cooperation framework developed and adopted as a part of normal politics.

What becomes evident from the analysis of the previous documents is that although a discourse of security and urgency is used to address climate change, the strategies developed to tackle this issue and the policies adopted are not traditional security or exceptional environmental policy measures. In fact, the actions defined are adaptation and mitigation measures, with a commitment to climate research, along the lines of normal politics.
There is however a role envisaged for the military. The joint report by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commission on Climate Change and International Security recommends the development of military instruments for crisis management and disaster response (European Commission, 2008: 10). And although no major policy change or action plan has been implemented at the EU or the member state level on this matter, some military organisations have recognised the need to incorporate climate change in their strategies.

The British Ministry of Defence, for instance, adopted in 2008 a Climate Change Strategy which recognises that climate change may transform “the way in which military personnel operate, are sustained, and have to respond to humanitarian needs” (MOD, 2008: 10) thus imposing a need for adaptation. The document acknowledges a role for the British military in understanding the impact that Climate Change will have on Global Security and factoring it into our [MOD] planning of force structure and training, as well as taking an active role in cross-Government and International Climate Security planning. (MOD, 2008:30)

In this context, the Strategy announces that the Ministry of Defence will work to identify “the regions most at risk from the impacts of climate change and put into place measures to preserve peace and stability in these regions” (MOD, 2008: 10). But, while affirming its role in addressing the security
causes of climate change, a substantial part of the Strategy is also devoted to MOD’s actions to reduce its contribution to the causes of climate change.

MOD is a significant contributor to the causes of climate change, creating about 70% of emissions from the government estate and about 1% of UK Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emissions. Therefore, reducing our emissions from our estate, our use of aviation, marine and ground fuels, and our business administrative travel will contribute to wider mitigation activities. (MOD, 2008: 4)

It is also clear that institutions designed to deal with security issues are being called upon to deal with climate change. The joint report of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commission envisions a role in research, analysis, monitoring and early warning for the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the latter an intelligence centre designed to monitor crisis, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation (European Commission, 2008: 9). But the main work on climate change still relies on environmental institutions.

From the previous analysis, it becomes evident that the securitization of climate change did not lead to the adoption of extraordinary measures. Neither the securitizing actors propose such measures to address climate change (with exception to a couple of references to an extension of the Security Council mandate to include environmental issues), nor have they been implemented. Consequently, the securitization of climate change did
not create a new structure or a paradigm shift, to use Gramsci’s and Hall’s reasonings respectively.

Although climate change is increasingly being framed as a security issue, both causes and effects are being dealt within the realm of normal environmental politics. This is to say that the mechanisms used to address climate change are international negotiations and international agreements. Emissions are not drastically cut as the Polluter Pays principle still applies, allowing those who can afford it to continue polluting. Moreover, the European greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system also permits that some countries continue with their level of emissions, or even increase it.

But, even if climate change is not being dealt with extraordinary measures, this does not hinder its securitization. As Ralf Emmers so eloquently puts it,

> according to the securitization model, transforming an issue into security question only requires the audience acknowledgement that it is indeed a threat. The adoption of extraordinary measures is not a requirement (…) This means that a securitizing actor can make successful speech acts while still deciding to address the existential threat through standard political procedure rather than extraordinary measures. (Emmers, 2007: 114)

At this point, it is clear that the EU and its member states have decided to manage climate change through standard political procedure. This suggests that in the EU, rather than calling for extraordinary measures, the
securitization of climate change had the objective of raising awareness and invest climate change with a greater sense of urgency. Buzan et al. argue that “textual analysis suggests that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other and should take absolute priority” (1998: 24). The goal of the securitizing actors was to give climate change this priority in the international agenda.
Conclusion

With the deepening and broadening of security studies, the environment has emerged as new security issue. In this context, climate change has increasingly been gaining the status of major concern at the global level, being gradually viewed as a threat to security. The securitization of climate change has entered the international agenda generating both concerns of a militarisation of the response to the issue and expectation of effective change in climate policies.

In this context, this dissertation aimed at understanding the implications of elevating climate change to the security realm through the analysis of the process of securitization of climate change in the European Union. The Copenhagen securitization framework constitutes an essential tool in the understanding of how issues become security issues by putting into evidence the mechanisms through which issues reach the security agenda as well as the actors involved in the process.

In the EU, two groups of securitizing actors were identified. At the bureaucratic and governmental levels, the European institutions, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union were found to be performing a security speech act regarding climate change. Additionally, France, Germany and the UK were identified as
member states pushing for the securitization of the issue. Most notably, climate change was pushed to the realm of security in the EU when it was included in the European Security Strategy and also in some member states national security strategies.

At the non-governmental level, pressure groups and lobbyists were also identified as securitizing actors. Both humanitarian non-governmental organisations and independent research institutions connected to security and defence are calling for the inclusion of climate change in the security agenda, in spite of their different perspectives.

Both the considered groups aim at securing European standards of living and the stability of the EU itself, referent objects that are considered to be threatened by the effects of climate change. The language of security used by these securitizing actors to frame climate change thus constitutes a conscious securitizing move.

To evaluate the success of this securitizing move, European public opinion was assessed through the analysis of opinion studies and the media as actors capable of transmitting the audience’s level of acceptance of the securitizing move. Media analysis indicates that the speech act that depicts climate change as an existential threat has reached the European audience. The
media have been extensively framing climate change as a cause for violent conflict and insecurity, contributing to the diffusion of the securitizing move.

Opinion poll indicators suggest that the European public is increasingly aware of the seriousness of climate change, identifying it as a severe problem facing Europe and the World. It also suggests a change in European perceptions concerning the importance and resources that should be allocated to deal with this issue. These findings indicate a growing willingness of Europeans to accept the adoption of exceptional measures regarding climate change, namely concerning resource allocation and policy prioritisation.

Although climate change was considered to be a securitized issue in the EU, the research found that no extraordinary measures have been adopted to address the issue. The analysis of the major lines of climate change policy in the EU demonstrates that the securitization of climate change did not create a new structure or a paradigm shift that such measures would entail. Although climate change is increasingly being framed as a security issue, both causes and effects are being dealt within the realm of normal environmental politics.

Using Peter A. Hall’s model of policy change, one can argue that climate change securitization originated a first order change in European
environmental policies. The overall goals were maintained, namely to reduce climate change, and so were the policy instruments to attain these goals. Only the levels of the policy instruments were modified. The framing of climate change as a security threat led, for instance, to higher targets for emission reductions and to an integration of mitigation and adaptation measures into development aid policies. Moreover, whereas mitigation and adaptation measures remain the basic policy instruments to address climate change, they were invested with a security feature, thus acquiring a level of urgency in their implementation.

Hence, according to Hall, this first order change in climate policy corresponds to normal policymaking (Hall, 1993: 279). Therefore, extraordinary measures were not adopted as these would entail a paradigm shift in policymaking and implementation.

But, even if climate change is not being dealt with extraordinary measures, it is argued that this does not hinder the securitization of the issue. In the securitization framework the adoption of extraordinary measures is not a requirement. What is considered essential is the audience’s approval of those measures. This allows the securitizing actor to decide whether to address the existential threat through standard political procedure or extraordinary measures.
It is clear that the EU and its member states have decided to manage climate change through standard political procedure. This suggests that in the EU, rather than calling for extraordinary measures, the securitization of climate change had the objective of raising awareness and invest climate change with a greater sense of urgency. The goal of the securitizing actors was to give climate change priority in the international agenda.

Further research is needed to examine the reasons for which extraordinary measures have not been adopted. Possible explanations have to do with the institutional path-dependency of environmental institutions that resist this shift. The role of powerful economic actors also hinders the adoption of extraordinary measures on climate change as emission reductions would entail economic sacrifices.

Another possible explanation has to do with the environmental resolution tradition of non-binding negotiations. Moreover, although the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report clearly shows climate change has an anthropogenic origin, a high degree of uncertainty and controversy still exists regarding this subject, delaying strong measures to deal with it.

An also plausible explanation for the absence of extraordinary measures has to do with inadequacy of such measures for dealing with climate change
issues, particularly if one takes into consideration that the notion of extraordinary measure is still highly connoted with military measures.

However, as this research puts into evidence, the issue of climate change challenges the established understanding that securitization inevitably leads to the adoption of traditional security policy measures. Hence, it is argued that as the securitization concept opens the possibility for non-traditional issues to become security issues, it is possible to say that this broadening of security also allows for non-traditional security measures to be adopted as a mean to enhance security.


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