

RESILIO Country Report Portugal



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1. Introduction

Portugal is a stable liberal democracy with strong checks and balances and well-functioning institutions. Since the revolution of 24 April 1974 which overturned the dictatorship (1926-1974),¹ Portugal has made a swift and soft transition to a democratic system, marked by the approval of the new Constitution on 2 April 1976.² Forty-eight years of dictatorship demanded a transition period until the country could stabilise and erase the old political, economic, civic and cultural legacies (Rosas et al., 2020), building a new legal framework to enhance political and judicial institutions.³

According to Article 2 of the Portuguese Constitution, “the Portuguese Republic is a democratic State grounded on the rule of law, based on popular sovereignty, pluralism of expression and democratic political organisation, respect and the guarantee of the realisation of fundamental rights and freedoms and the separation and interdependence of powers, aiming at the realisation of economic, social and cultural democracy and the deepening of participatory democracy.” While Portugal operates under a parliamentary model of government, the President plays an important role, often described as a “magistracy influence.” The President exercises their powers by influencing other political actors and intervening in social problems.

The government is led by a Prime Minister who is nominated by the President based on the election results for the

Parliament (the other members of the Government are selected and proposed by the Prime Minister to the President, without the interference of the latter). The President also has the power to dismiss the Government and dissolve Parliament under certain circumstances.⁴

During the dictatorship, the judicial branch was used for political control and repression. In the democratic period, determined efforts to reform the judicial system included democratising the courts, eliminating political courts, implementing rule of law principles, and promoting gender diversity.⁵

However, Portuguese justice still faces challenges such as slow proceedings, workload, opacity, bureaucracy, and insufficient resources and facilities.⁶ The financing of the judiciary was affected by austerity measures during the Euro crisis. Portugal's ranking in justice indicators is average within the European Union⁷ and in CEPEJ reports.⁸

The Portuguese judicial system consists of various courts: the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Justice, judicial courts of first and second instance, Administrative Supreme Court, administrative and fiscal courts of first and second instance, and Court of Auditors. It also allows for the creation of arbitration courts (either institutional or ad hoc), as well as justices of the peace.

The system comprises two jurisdictions: judicial/ordinary and administrative/fiscal jurisdictions. Ordinary criminal and civil matters are handled by judicial courts, while administrative and fiscal matters are addressed by a separa-

te administrative court system. The Constitutional Court plays a crucial role in upholding the rule of law by ruling on the constitutionality of laws.

The oversight of judges and public prosecutors is carried out by their respective councils: the High Council of Judges, High Council of Administrative and Fiscal Courts, and High Council of Public Prosecutors. These councils are responsible for appointments, evaluations, and disciplinary action. Judges and public prosecutors undergo a selection process that includes a national exam and a two-year training period at the Judicial School. The presidents of higher courts are elected by the court judges, while judge-presidents of judicial county courts are nominated, based on established criteria and an application process.

The Portuguese judicial system has not received significant financial investment from recent governments, with spending averaging 0.35% of GDP.⁹ In 2020, according to the [Commission for the Efficiency of Justice](#) of the Council of Europe, public funding for courts accounted for 0.28 percent of GDP,¹⁰ while Public Prosecution received only 0.07 percent.¹¹ Nevertheless, according to the Rule of Law Index 2022, Portugal ranks 27th in the world,¹² with a slightly decreasing performance in the majority of the criteria evaluated in comparison with 2019, when it ranked 22nd.¹³ At the European level, as observed on the [European Justice Scoreboard](#), Portugal often appears below the average concerning the perception of judicial independence.¹⁴ More recently, the [Democracy Perception Index 2023](#)¹⁵ indicates that the fight against corruption is one of the major concerns of the Portuguese population: 81 percent of respondents felt that increasing economic inequalities and the fight against corruption were the main threats to the democratic regime.

2. Analysis of the country case along RESILIO model

On 13 July 2022, the European Commission released the [2022 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Portugal](#)¹⁶, describing the major concerns related to the rule of law context in Portugal. The report highlighted several recommendations to improve the functioning of some relevant institutions to strengthen the rule of law in Portugal, despite a few positive developments in recent years. In particular, the EC highlighted the need to: (1) ensure adequate human resources in the justice system and to improve its efficiency, in particular the Administrative and Tax Courts; (2) strengthen the transparency of allocation of cases; (3) guarantee sufficient re-

sources for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting corruption, including the operationalisation of the New Anti-Corruption Mechanism; (4) start operations of the Transparency Entity for effective monitoring and verification of asset declarations; and (5) improve the transparency of law-making, mainly through by implementing impact assessment tools.

The evaluations produced 2000-2002 by the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) of the Council of Europe concerning Portugal (5 [Evaluation Rounds](#) with a total of 17 documents), reached three main conclusions on the implementation of measures to fight corruption and increase transparency:¹⁷ (1) measures were implemented slowly, either at the legislative level or in their operationalization; (2) certain measures had only been partially implemented and thus fell short of the recommendations; and (3) the Portuguese authorities refused to implement some measures on the grounds that existing legislation already safeguarded compliance. GRECO found that Portugal had implemented only three recommendations out of 15, partially complied with ten recommendations, and not yet implemented two recommendations.¹⁸

In general, the European Union and the Council of Europe regard Portugal as a country that follows the main principles of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the reports produced by these institutions emphasise the need to implement minor improvements in several areas of governance. The nature and detail of the recommendations concerns the level of operationalisation of the laws, and the functioning of institutions, and especially concerning the resources made available to promote good institutional performance.

2.1 Most important systemic factors: institutional and judicial resilience

In Portugal, the institutional, judicial, and constitutional resilience is considered generally high. Despite multiple difficulties, the legal and institutional framework is adequate to ensure a good balance of powers (legislative, executive, and judicial). The difficulties include the increasing challenge to the political and judicial branches by the growing number of court investigations into corruption cases, mainly involving political actors. Therefore, the prevention and fight against corruption poses many challenges to the rule of law in Portugal, which is why this topic is featured in this section.

The prevention and fight against corruption is one of the main ways to evaluate the robustness of the rule of law in one country. In Portugal, this fight is mainly carried out through the operationalisation of several institutions, namely judicial institutions (Public Prosecution) and police forces (Judicial Police), while prevention was a competence of the Council of the Prevention of Corruption (CP-C).¹⁹ In recent years, the Government launched a new strategy reshaping the institutional framework, focusing especially on the prevention of corruption and the promotion of transparency in public administration.

On 6 April 2021, after a period of public consultation, the Portuguese government approved the National Anticorruption Strategy 2020-2024 (ENAC).²⁰ This Resolution was followed by the approval of three laws on various topics raised by the ENAC. In November 2021, Parliament approved the laws on the protection of whistle-blowers²¹ (following the European Union's [Directive 2019/1937](#)), and changes to the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code,²² related to criminal actions by holders of political offices. The third law, approved by the Government on 9 December 2021, created the Mecanismo Nacional Anticorrupção (MENAC – National Anticorruption Mechanism), whose mission is to promote transparency and integrity in public actions, and ensure the effectiveness of policies to prevent corruption and related offences.²³ However, the legal creation and regulation of MENAC, including the human resources map, was only approved one year later on 9 December 2022.²⁴ Given this one-year gap, MENAC – which is to replace the existing CPC – will come into existence in 2023.

Notwithstanding the relevance of anti-corruption measures, present and past governments have not provided the resources necessary for new or existing institutions to prevent (MENAC) or fight (Judicial Police and Public Prosecution) corruption. Governments also failed to assess these institutions' functions. While the institutional and legal frameworks may be regarded as promising, the operationalisation lacks the necessary resources to achieve its goals. Given the transition period from CPC to MENAC, there is a lack of capacity to fully implement the new strategy of promoting transparency and integrity in public action and ensuring the effectiveness of corruption prevention policies and related infractions. In this regard, only future evaluations will provide the necessary assessment of the recently adopted strategy.

Transparency International's [2021 Corruption Perception Index](#) shows that Portugal rose in the corruption perception index and now occupies 32nd place with 62 points, the same figure as in 2019, and below the EU average (64 points). The report highlights failures in the fight against corruption, namely the fact that the National Anticorruption Strategy (ENAC) did not include in its scope the main political bodies, sovereignty organs, or the Bank of Portugal.

The prevention and fight against corruption is a permanent hot topic in political and social debates and a quality indicator of the rule of law. In Portugal, it raises multidimensional issues related to the performance of police forces and courts on the one hand, and the effectiveness of the legal framework on the other. The indictment and conviction of suspected or accused persons is very difficult, especially when those individuals are political actors or have substantial economic resources. This contributes to increasing suspicion on the part of the public concerning the effectiveness of the police and courts.

Therefore, and despite judicial resilience, judicial independence, and an average capacity of the judicial system to reduce the workload in the last years, the lack of human and financial resources obstructs better results. The political will and decisions of the last three decades fell far short of what was required for. The judge of the Court of Auditors, Mouraz Lopes, denounces several failures in the control of public funds, especially by municipalities. This lack of control is all the more serious as most corruption cases tried in court concern municipal political actors.²⁵

2.2. Most important subsidiary factor: political resilience

Portugal has a stable civic, media, and political resilience built up since the 1970s, after the change of political regime. Civic society organisations and (public and private) media have a great degree of independence, with a legal framework that enables a broad range of actors to operate freely. Entities in charge of regulating and guaranteeing their functions operate without constraints. Political resilience is also stable and consolidated, based on a robust political system that has been pluralistic, ensuring free and fair elections. In this section, the Portuguese party system will be analysed as an important factor of a stable and democratic rule of law.

The 2023 [Eurobarometer](#)²⁶ found that the trust of the Portuguese citizens in their Parliament is only 41 percent, compared with 62 percent trust in the European Parliament. Although this percentage is low, it is also the average result since 2007. It is also higher than the trust levels of the other European citizens in their own national Parliaments.

Article 51 of the [Constitution of the Portuguese Republic](#) provides for the existence of associations and political parties. Paragraph 1 of the Constitution states that “freedom of association comprises the right to constitute or participate in political associations and parties and through them to compete democratically for training of popular will and the organization of political power.”²⁷ The Constitution also details the organization and functioning of political parties in the Law of Political Parties,²⁸ whose latest changes date from 2018.²⁹

The rules that constitute the electoral system of the Portuguese Parliament are essentially those which, according to Lobo, Pinto & Magalhães,³⁰ were designed for the Constituent Assembly elections in 1975, the first post-dictatorship democratic elections in Portugal after the 1974 revolution. Since the first elections in 1975, Portugal adopted a proportional representation system for parliamentary elections (Hondt method), implemented through closed lists, in which voters choose among lists presented by political parties.³¹

Portugal thus instituted a multiparty system in which a minimum of five political parties has won parliamentary representation since 1975. Lobo, Pinto & Magalhães refer to two fundamental reasons behind the mitigation of party system proportionality: 1) the contribution of the Hondt method to greater representation of the major parties; and 2) the existence of 22 administrative units (including two for emigrants) following the country's organization into “districts,” an administrative unit that remained stable for decades and favoured the largest parties due to the existence of district closed lists.³² Nevertheless, the territorial distribution of “districts” has remained to the present, according to the latest official map, published in December 2021 by the National Elections Commission.³³ The map shows that minor amendments were introduced in the number of mandates due to population change at district level. The differences range from two deputies elected by the district of Portalegre, to 48 in Lisbon, from a total of 230 parliamentary deputies. The ratio between the number of voters and deputies elected by district requires

a larger number of voters in the smaller districts to elect a deputy, compared to the largest electoral circles where fewer voters elect a deputy.³⁴

The results of the last elections in 2022 dictated a significant change to parliamentary representation compared to 2019. In 2023, 24 political parties are legally registered with the National Elections Commission, eight of whom have Parliamentary representation. The Socialist Party (PS – Partido Socialista) obtained an absolute majority in the last elections in 2022 with 120 elected deputies, followed by the Social Democratic Party (PSD – Partido Social Democrata) with 77. The remaining parties in parliament are: CHEGA with 12, Liberal Initiative (IL – Iniciativa Liberal) with eight, Portuguese Communist Party (PCP – Partido Comunista Português) with six, Left Block (BE – Bloco de Esquerda) with five, and both Livre and Animal People Nature (PAN – Pessoas Animais Natureza) with one deputy. In 2019, PS also won the most votes but was unable to form a government alone, which then led to an agreement with the remaining parties on a case-to-case basis. In 2022, and after a political crisis that lasted almost until the end of the legislative Term, PS snatched an absolute majority, something that has only happened five times in 49 years of democracy (four times by the PSD, either alone or in alliance with other smaller parties).

These major changes in parliamentary representation have produced the following: a) two majorities of centre-left or left parties, with more than 50 percent of the votes; 2) the fragmentation of centre-right and right parties, with the emergence of two new parties; 3) the emergence of an extreme right party (CHEGA), which managed gain the third highest number of deputies (12/230); and 4) the increased diversity in number and political positioning of parties. In the Portuguese parliament, there are currently three left parties (PCP, BE and Livre), two centre-left parties (PS and PAN), one centre-right party (PSD), one right party (IL) and one extreme right party (CHEGA).³⁵

Although the fragmentation of parliamentary representation has enabled government action through parliamentary agreement or absolute majority in the last two elections, it does not preclude the high probability an even greater dispersion of votes in the upcoming elections. This would make process of building a government more difficult and complex. According to recent polls, elections held in 2023 would probably see a majority of votes for the right, including CHEGA, rather than a leftist majority. The next legislative elections are planned for 2026, so the poli-

tical landscape can still undergo many changes.

Elections since 1975 have produced more alliances between right-wing parties than between leftist parties. The major recent electoral change is the growth of the extreme right, which may play a key role in the formation of a right-wing coalition government. At present, the three right-wing parties in parliament (PSD, IL, and CDS-PP) intend to exclude CHEGA from any agreement. However, such claims do not always hold, as other European countries have seen.

Between 1975 and 2023, Portugal held 15 legislative elections resulting in 21 constitutional governments. The two main political parties since 1975 have been PS and PSD, which alternated in government with or without alliances with like-minded parties. These two parties have maintained governance within a political centre in line with social liberal democracy. The Portuguese party system has remained relatively stable, with only minor changes in the parliamentary representation of small parties.³⁶ In addition to PS and PSD, only PCP succeeded in having deputies elected in all elections. Of the eight parties currently represented in Parliament, four were founded in the past ten years (Livre, CHEGA, IL and PAN), while BE was founded in 1999.

According to Lobo, Pinto and Magalhães (2009), Portugal has managed to consolidate “a functional political system that, while preserving a multiparty system, was able to produce stable governments. However, the fact that institutional reform remains a recurring theme in Portuguese politics is an indicator of latent tensions that persists, referring to its adequacy and effectiveness and perhaps even to the support of the political system as it exists.”³⁷

2.3. Most important contextual factor: social resilience

Annual reports by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on the legal environment for civil society organisations (CSOs)³⁸ have found that Portugal’s public and legal framework allows CSOs to operate freely without major constraints, although a lack of financial and human resources limits better service provision in some cases. But these limitations are a result of the fragility of the Portuguese Welfare State, demanding to civil society complementary social responses to the State, provided not only by CSO but also from other social institutions, such as private institutions for social solidarity or cooperatives.³⁹

Most CSOs in Portugal are private non-profit legal persons (associations, foundations, or cooperatives) that pursue purposes of general interest and do not aim to make a profit from their members. The constitution of associations is regulated by Articles 167 and 184 of the Portuguese Civil Code.⁴⁰ The main type of Portuguese CSO is a non-profit association, also regulated by the Civil Code. Additionally, there are several other non-profit legal persons governed by specific legislation. The most numerous are: Non-Governmental Environmental Organisations (ONGA), Non-Governmental Cooperation and Development Organisations (ONGD), Associations of Immigrants, Private Social Solidarity Institutions (IPSS), Foundations of Public Interest, Foundations of Religious Nature, and Cooperatives.

The Portuguese legal framework for CSO has remained favourable and without political or civic restrictions, contributing to a more robust and resilient rule of law. Only the rise of the extreme right party CHEGA has contributed to a more polarised public debate and a rise in hate speech, mainly in relation to immigrants and LGBTI+ people. Yet a consensus exists from right to left parties and a majority of media actors that immediately condemns hate speech narratives. But CHEGA’s 7.12 percent share of votes in the 2022 elections – compared to 1.29 percent in 2019 – raises the question of whether or not they will continue to increase their vote share, and if so, whether they can form part of a right-wing coalition government.

The social role of CSOs in Portugal, especially in social protection, is mainly operated by the so called *Instituição Particular de Solidariedade Social (IPSS)*⁴¹, which is dominated by the Catholic church. The IPSS predates the Portuguese welfare state, built after the 1974 revolution, and contributed to the growth of social care institutions that are funded by the state. In other words, the Portuguese welfare system depends heavily on CSOs. The dimension of the totality of social economy, as an example, is very important, reaching more than 3 percent of the gross added value in Portugal.⁴² These entities are thus crucial to implementing social policies, not only in social protection, but also on the defence of fundamental rights and the rule of law. This CSO network also has an important role in political negotiation and public debate on the definition of legislation and mechanisms to support fundamental rights.

Consequently, Portugal has a wide diversity of public entities with competencies in fundamental rights, which help guarantee the existence of a positive legal framework and a dynamic and efficient associative environment. These public entities also develop constructive cooperation to complement the role of the state through delegating competencies to CSOs, whether through the establishment of protocols to implement public policies or by funding their activities within framework programmes, call for tenders or call for proposals. The Portuguese state develops its constitutional social obligations in several areas through civil society, instead of assuming direct responsibility. This indirect responsibility impacts both positively and negatively on implementation.

Several public entities ensure the fulfilment of the Portuguese constitution and a resilient rule of law, delegated by the state. These include the [Commission for Gender Equality](#) (on citizenship, promotion and defence of gender equality, fight against domestic and gender violence and human trafficking), [National Institute for Rehabilitation](#) (on the rights of people with disabilities), [Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination](#) (on the fight against racial discrimination), [National Commission for the Promotion of Rights and Protection of Children](#) (on children's rights), [High Commission for Migrations](#) (on migrant's rights), [Institute for Housing and Urban Rehabilitation](#) (on the rights to housing) or [National Commission for Human Rights](#) (a transversal commission for all the Government to promote human rights). These public entities either execute public policies directly or can promote public policies through CSOs, municipalities, or other public and private legal entities, according to their missions.

In a recent report on national human rights bodies to the FRA, the Permanent Observatory for Justice (OPJ) at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) at the University of Coimbra highlighted the fact that these public entities have serious capacity problems, including a lack of qualified staff in the implementation and management of EU funds. This impacts negatively on the management structures of the funding programmes, the national human rights bodies themselves, and the beneficiaries (CSOs). This staff shortage reflects a lack of specialized knowledge, low salaries, and precarity, which makes the training and retaining of these professionals more difficult. The consequences are enormous for public entities' capacity to promote fundamental rights and for CSOs to execute programmes.⁴³

A dynamic and diverse civil society contributes to a resilient rule of law in Portugal. Notwithstanding their financial dependence on the state, CSOs can perform their legal and functional roles autonomously and free from any civic and political restraints. This constitutes a very positive indicator of the strength of civil society.

3. Impact of crises on the rule of law: the Eurozone crisis, Covid-19, and the Russian war against Ukraine

Portugal has faced three major crises over the past 15 years: the Eurozone crisis (2008-2013), the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2023), and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine (since 2022). In each case, the government responded to mitigate the social and economic consequences. Despite their global nature, these crises raised concerns about the rule of law in Portugal, summarised as follows:

On 17 May 2011, Portugal signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Troika: the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund. In exchange for a EUR 78 billion loan, the government implemented austerity measures across various sectors, including public sector salary cuts. The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the cuts, considering the exceptional context.⁴⁴ However, in 2014, the court opposed further salary cuts.⁴⁵ These decisions sparked debates about the rule of law and the interpretation of labour laws.

The COVID-19 pandemic impacted Portugal not only in terms of public health, but also economically and socially. The Portuguese government implemented many measures to tackle the impacts of the pandemic, which included restrictions on freedom and liberties.⁴⁶ Although the majority of the population accepted the restrictions, many opposed them, and heated debates took place on the necessity and limits of restrictions. Simultaneously, the government took steps to protect the most vulnerable, such as adopting flexible measures for prisoners. Through its balanced adoption of restriction measures and vaccinations, Portugal was considered able to implement best practices, later followed by other countries.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the crisis and its management proved a continuous challenge to the rule of law, with the Portuguese government attempting to balance its response and not introduce too draconian restrictions.

In line with the strategy adopted by the European Union (Temporary Protection Directive approved by the European Union), the Portuguese government has approved multiple measures to welcome people fleeing the conflict in Ukraine, in the areas of housing, health, education, and employment. Despite the challenges of accommodating a large influx of people, the measures received national consensus as a humanitarian response. The financial impact was managed through the mobilisation of public entities and CSOs.

The Russian war on Ukraine has also impacted Portuguese economic performance with a rapid jump in inflation. This inflationary trend affected the purchasing power of the population, particularly vulnerable groups. To address this, the government approved measures in 2022 to support the economy and families,⁴⁸ targeting the most vulnerable. These measures included tax deductions, increased social benefits, and reduced taxes in energy costs.

Overall, Portugal faced significant challenges during these crises, and the government's responses aimed to mitigate the consequences while taking into consideration both the rule of law and balancing the needs of different populations.

4. Conclusion

The rule of law has been a stable principle in Portugal since 1974, which marked the start of the transition from dictatorship to a plural democracy. While Portugal faces challenges and the need for institutional improvement, it has upheld democratic principles through free elections, democratic governance, and a welfare state for the vulnerable. The Portuguese context shows that there is a good fulfilment of the rule of law in all the dimensions, proving that the resilience factors have been working adequately.

We can offer three main conclusions on Portuguese rule of law, concerning effectivity, quality, and monitoring. On effectivity - the capacity of public institutions to implement the social welfare measures and support to the most vulnerable - Portugal has the necessary institutional framework, while many areas struggle to fully support those in need. Civil society organisations still depend heavily on state resources to fulfil their role effectively.

The quality of the rule of law suffers due to insufficient financial and human resources in both central and local in-

stitutions. Courts and social security services operate under precarious conditions, limiting their ability to meet societal needs. Civil society organisations also lack the resources to increase the capacity and quality of their services.

Lastly, there is a pressing need for monitoring mechanisms to evaluate the rule of law and provide necessary changes for more effective responses. Although the Portuguese state has introduced monitoring measures for public policies, there is a lack of evaluation culture and subsequent policy changes, whenever evaluations suggest to be done.

These limitations extend to various areas, including the fight against corruption and support for people fleeing the war in Ukraine. During the Eurozone and pandemic crises for example, legal implications arose from implemented measures and restrictions, challenging the existing rule of law. However, these actions are generally accepted as exceptional circumstances.

Other factors not covered in this report, such as media independence, diversity, and inclusion, contribute to the strength of the rule of law. There is a growing awareness of hate speech, fuelled by the rise of extreme-right parties in Parliament. Political positions and the media have condemned intolerance, sexism, anti-immigration rhetoric, and racism. However, this remains a significant concern, especially if the recent crises' impacts on poverty and social vulnerability are not counteracted by strong public policies and economic recovery that increase the earnings and employment of the Portuguese population.

The Portuguese Constitution has served as an unshakable foundation in preserving a resilient rule of law. However, it is crucial to ensure that existing mechanisms in Portuguese democracy effectively prevent the disproportionate growth of the extreme right, as nothing is immutable.

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
About the project

RESILIO aims to identify institutional and societal factors that make the rule of law more resilient, thus adding a constructive contribution to academic and policy debates. It draws on a “thick” definition of the rule of law, understood as closely connected to democracy and fundamental rights. The resilience of the rule of law means that the rule of law can experience hazardous events or incremental threats without losing its core function, structure and purpose.

About the paper

This paper is part of the **RESILIO Country Report series**. It is a collection of compact analyses that assess the source of rule of law resilience in each EU member state by examining the most prominent resilience factors, using the analytical framework of the RESILIO model.

RESILIENCE FACTORS



RESILIO offers a multi-layered model of the rule of law resilience. Systemic dimension (orange) reflects upon the resilience of the legal setup; subsidiary dimension (green) looks at the phenomena and tendencies present in societies as possible facilitators; and contextual dimension (blue) analyses the broader habitat, determined by structural and systemic variables like economic growth, social cohesion, and general political climate. RESILIO also takes into account the horizontal effects of unpredicted and unprecedented crises that can affect all dimensions of rule of law resilience with different intensity.

While each factor is necessary for a resilient rule of law, they are only sufficient in combination.

The considerations in this paper are compatible with the developed conceptual model of the resilience of the rule of law. They focus on **social resilience** as a contextual factor strengthening the rule of law.

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For more information, visit the project website: www.iep-berlin.de/en/projects/future-of-european-integration/resilio/