

# Part III: Scales, Entanglements and Intersections

## 9 Transitional justice mechanisms and memory

A look into Mozambique's liberation  
war narrative<sup>1</sup>

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### Introduction

On 25 June 2022, the *Frente de Libertação Nacional* (Frelimo) celebrated 60 years of its foundation as well as 47 years of Mozambique's independence. "It was Frelimo that built the idea of a sovereign, united and indivisible Mozambican nation. The foundation of Frelimo represents the height of a nationalist consciousness, the original and genuine form of organization and union of Mozambicans [...] in the arduous struggle against colonialism"<sup>2</sup> voiced President Filipe Nyusi in one of the several ceremonies held around the country to mark such occasions. This declaration reiterates the central place Frelimo confers to the liberation war as a legitimizing episode of a continuous line connecting the Frelimo that battled against colonialism to the Frelimo that has been in power since independence.<sup>3</sup> Even though such linearity has been disputed and reconfigured as further explained later, it has become hegemonic throughout the years.

Taking a short step back, Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975 following a 10-year liberation war, from 1964 to 1974. This emblematic moment inaugurates the juxtaposition of Mozambique and Frelimo's histories since it happened on the same day Frelimo was formed, only 13 years later. The ceremony of the proclamation of independence was held at the *Machava* football stadium where Samora Machel, at the time president of Frelimo, became the president of Mozambique as well.

The question of what action to take against the *comprometidos*<sup>4</sup> or the compromised was one among the many post-independence matters. Allegedly inspired by a Chinese method of public-shaming,<sup>5</sup> Frelimo determined that the pictures of the compromised were to be placed on their workplaces together with an explanation of what they had done. The pictures remained in their respective locations for a period of nearly four years at the end of which Machel himself coordinated the Meeting of the Compromised.<sup>6</sup> These meetings were held in 1982 during the months of May and June and brought together more than a thousand people.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, they were characterised by a series of Q&As<sup>8</sup> presided by Machel during which the *comprometidos* talked about their past experiences. This look towards the past was present

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in Machel's inaugural speech for the *Reunião dos Comprometidos* on 10 May 1982, when he voiced: "it's only by reviewing the past [that] will we know the present. Only by knowing the present [that] will we have a perspective for the future".<sup>9</sup>

By comparison with the process of "leaving the past behind" that followed the post-civil war period, the process revolving around the *comprometidos* presented a certain dose of "public acknowledgement of the past" and search for "the truth".<sup>10</sup> That is, despite the lack of consensus about its causes and whether it was a civil war or not (1976–1992), the fact is that Mozambican society added 16 more years to its devastating war résumé in which 1.5 million were forcibly displaced and made refugees in the neighbouring countries due to the horrors provoked by both sides, Frelimo and the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo),<sup>11</sup> and the number of war-related deaths was close to one million.<sup>12</sup> When this armed conflict came to an end, however, neither a call for investigations nor for the punishment of those responsible for the human rights violations and war crimes committed during this fighting were made. After the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) on 4 October 1992, the Frelimo-led government passed Amnesty law 15/92 that exempted members of both sides from the crimes and abuses committed from 1979 to 1992.<sup>13</sup> To start anew became the new motto, and political leaders advised people to "replace hatred with understanding and solidarity, revenge with forgiveness and tolerance, distrust with brotherhood and friendship".<sup>14</sup>

Trying to understand the ways in which the reproduction of the liberation war memory narrative has become hegemonic, this chapter connects the fields of transitional justice and memory studies and questions the way transitional justice mechanisms (TJMs) affect memory narratives. To build this analysis, it makes use of two explanatory logics further detailed below: critical junctures and path dependence. Applying these logics to Mozambique's violent past, this work identifies two critical junctures. First, the country's independence in 1975, and, second, the end of the civil war between Frelimo and Renamo in 1992. These moments epitomise the intricate relationship between a bellicose past, the implementation of mechanisms to deal with it, and political leaders' pursuit for political legitimacy. The immediate question that arises is whether these moments of transition and their TJMs have shaped Mozambique's memory narratives across time as to explain their shifts and/or variations.

Elizabeth Jelin reminds us that the emergence of multiple narratives results from the agency of "memory entrepreneurs", i.e., those "who seek social recognition and political legitimacy of one (their own) interpretation or narrative of the past".<sup>15</sup> During and in the aftermath of violent episodes such as dictatorships and war, "it is impossible to find one memory, or a single vision and interpretation of the past shared throughout society".<sup>16</sup> This does mean, however, that they acquire the same level of relevance and acceptance within a society. On the contrary, more often than not "a single script of the past [becomes] widely accepted, or even hegemonic"<sup>17</sup> in spite of the existence of counter-memories.

The analysis of the Mozambican case shows that whether opening up about the past or seeking to leave it behind, the result has been the same: the remembering of the liberation war narrative. As any other memory narrative, Frelimo's celebratory account of the liberation war has undergone small variations every time it was retold. Yet these dynamics of change did not preclude it from becoming the official,

hegemonic memory narrative about Mozambique's struggle against colonialism for the last forty years. This analysis is relevant not only to the case of Mozambique, but to the literatures on TJ and memory more broadly. Much as critical junctures (and their respective TJMs) might favour change, one must not underestimate path dependence's capacity to overpower it with its inertia or self-reinforcing nature.


### **Path dependence, TJ and memory**

The goal of the present chapter is to analyse how the Meeting of the Compromised and the Amnesty Law 15/92 have functioned as channels of memory by outlining which stories were told (and concomitantly which were silenced) and how they should be interpreted. More broadly, the idea is to pay attention to the ways in which different and subsequent TJMs, namely a quasi-truth commission and an amnesty, have shaped memory narratives (MNs) across time.

In examining these mechanisms and their impact on MNs, it is also important to understand the context in which they have emerged. Critical junctures come to the picture at this point. Ruth Collier and David Collier define critical junctures as "transitions [that] establish certain directions of change and foreclose others in a way that shapes politics for years to come".<sup>18</sup> In a simpler way, one could argue that critical junctures are moments of change that take place within certain windows of opportunity. In this sense, moments such as those experienced in Mozambique – independence and end of civil war – can easily be considered as critical junctures. In the country's postcolonial history, no other periods were characterised by major changes in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres that shaped Mozambican society for years to come like the ones experienced during those singular times.

Earlier works used critical junctures in the attempt to understand MNs shifts. Francesca Lessa, for instance, utilises critical junctures to explain both the alterations of TJ policies and MNs across time in Argentina and Uruguay. According to her, critical junctures help to identify the moments of change in what she understands as a mutually shaping constitutive relationship between memory and transitional justice policies.<sup>19</sup> While reinforcing the relevance of critical junctures to understand the interrelations between TJ and memory, the present analysis adds a twist by calling attention to an equally important element: path dependence, or more broadly, to the fact that "history matters".

The past is a malleable narrative as it is revisited and rewritten every now and then. This, of course, is different from saying it can be freely manipulated and reconstructed.<sup>20</sup> Attentive to this understanding, one must also consider the ways in which they are reproduced. If critical junctures are seen as windows of opportunities for change, path dependence, in contrast, is understood as "historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties".<sup>21</sup> To this matter, two observations follow. First, these historical sequences are causal, that is, they lead to a particular ending (in this case the reproduction of the liberation war narrative). Second, they launch specific institutional patterns that can have a self-reinforcing nature or inertia, replicating themselves across time. Together these aspects help to explain how MNs are conceived and reproduced across time.



CJ: Critical juncture  
 MNs: Memory narrative(s)  
 PD: Path dependence  
 TJMs: Transitional justice mechanisms  
 → : Short-time effect  
 ↔ : Competing MNs

Figure 9.1 Critical junctures, path dependence, and time.

Figure by the author.

Applying the logics of critical junctures and path dependence to the study of TJ and memory, whereas the former facilitates the identification of moments in which institutional elements are eased, favouring transformations, the latter helps to pin down the institutional elements that remain in place, hindering those transformations. These elements are central when examining the question of how TJMs shape MNs in each society. Figure 9.1 graphically illustrates this understanding. In t1, critical juncture 1 unlocks the first window of opportunity for change. The TJMs implemented during this period help(s) to generate specific institutional patterns (in this case MNs) that, due to their inertia, are replicated across time, conforming a path-dependent sequence. In t2, the critical juncture 2 opens another window of opportunity for change. Identically to the first critical juncture, the TJMs implemented during this period also have the potential to generate specific institutional patterns. This time, however, one needs to consider the institutional patterns already in place and whether they are overpowered or able to overpower any attempts of change. If the current institutional patterns are overpowered, a different path-dependent sequence is created. If they overpower, the earlier sequence is maintained. In case of a critical juncture 3, the same reasoning applies, and so forth.

**Setting the stage**

With independence in 1975 came the first critical juncture. It gained special contours when, following the national campaign for the restructuring of Frelimo in November 1978, its high-ranking leaders opted for the public-shaming strategy. The process of identifying and revisiting the *comprometidos*’ past lasted for nearly

four years ending with the meetings held in 1982. “Our power is not revengeful or vindictive”<sup>22</sup> claimed Machel when giving the reasons why Frelimo had decided for such strategies. “In other countries, you [the compromised] would had been tried or shot”<sup>23</sup> said Machel as to emphasise Frelimo’s practices of clemency towards the compromised.

The *comprometidos*’ connection with their own past was another crucial element. In the view of Machel, their reintegration and transformation into full Mozambicans implied the public acknowledgement of their past actions. Such an exercise would be the first step towards breaking them away from the burden weighing on their consciences.<sup>24</sup> In contrast to the ex-political prisoners – clandestine Frelimo members who allegedly collaborated with the Portuguese after being imprisoned and tortured – the compromised included those who had voluntarily worked for the Portuguese. For this reason, to expose the *comprometidos*’ past was seen as essential. The understanding was that “the enemy” would have no way to get back to them as blackmailing, for instance, since their secrets were already brought to the open.

Moreover, the process also required a dose of willingness. “Compromised or compatriots?”<sup>25</sup> questioned Machel once and again during the meetings as to distinguish those who had reflected on their “unpatriotic” past deeds from those who were still subjects of the enemy and in need of “mental decolonization” in order to become full Mozambicans.<sup>26</sup> In addition to its use as a rhetorical instrument, the question repeatedly voiced by Machel also mirrored two foundational logics of Frelimo’s discourse: the idea of the enemy and of the new man.

As José Luís Cabaço observed,

[...] the experience of the politico-military struggle of the Mozambique Liberation Front in the 1960s was essential in forming the thought of Frelimo and of Samora Machel. In this period, divergent positions arose on several questions [...] but in the final analysis, it was always the definition of the enemy the central problem that was under discussion.<sup>27</sup>

Not only the central issue of endless debates and fratricidal conflicts, the idea of the enemy has also functioned as a guiding principle of the “main direction of the struggle”<sup>28</sup> since Frelimo’s early stages. One of Machel’s catchphrases “the struggle continues” was a clear reminder of that. After defeating colonialism, it was also essential “to wage a constant battle against all divisive situations and tendencies”.<sup>29</sup> The nostalgia of the colonial times, characteristic of those who still had not accepted that independence was irreversible, was a good example of the latter.<sup>30</sup>

Since Frelimo had defeated the external enemy, the “main direction of the struggle” became the internal one as more attention was given to the (mis)deeds of Mozambicans. Under this logic, the Meeting of the Compromised helped Frelimo to separate the wheat from the chaff. This meant that whoever was considered as a non-Frelimo supporter, was automatically labelled as an enemy.<sup>31</sup>

While new “enemies” were being identified, Machel was also giving emphasis to people’s capacity for transforming themselves and becoming active agents,<sup>32</sup>

that is, of becoming “new men”. The notion of what meant to be a Mozambican followed suit and adapted to the new realities of post-independence Mozambique like the notion of the enemy. As Machel said,

Politico-military training was the forging of national unity, of common thinking, and of patriotic and class awareness. We came in as Macondes, Macuas, Nyanjas, Nhungues, Manicas, Changanas, Ajauas, Rongas or Senas, but we came out of it as Mozambicans. We came in as blacks, whites, mulattoes or Indians, but we came out of it as Mozambicans. When we arrived, we brought with us vices, defects, greed, liberalism, and elitism. We destroyed the negative values, the reactionary values. We learnt to carry with us the habits and behavior of a Frelimo militant.<sup>33</sup>

This meant that the transformation into a full Mozambican required the abandonment of his/her old self – which beyond his/her ethnic origins also included any colonialist, bourgeois, and individualist values, among others – as well as the adoption of the nationalist and popular values proposed by Frelimo.

Therefore, the ideas of the enemy and of the new man functioned as complementing-but-opposing sides in Frelimo’s pursuit of creating a “Mozambican nation”. In other words, “the building of national unity and the transformation of mentalities arose as two sides of the same coin, linked indissociably to the consolidation to what Machel and Frelimo called ‘our area’ in opposition to the ‘enemy area’”.<sup>34</sup> In this process, Frelimo managed to secure its role as the sole power in Mozambique by claiming to be “the heirs of the tradition of resistance and the legitimate representatives of the Mozambican people from Rovuma to Maputo”.<sup>35</sup>

In light of this, the Meeting of the Compromised helped to materialise those logics in different ways. It allowed Frelimo to identify who was with them and who was not by exposing people’s past misdeeds. At the same time, this event also reinforced the logic of transformation required by Frelimo in their attempt to mentally decolonise the compromised. All in all, by allegedly separating the wheat from the chaff and guiding people’s transformation, the Meeting helped Frelimo to build on the ideas of saviours and founders of Mozambique, cornerstones of what was later known as the “liberation script” – the hegemonic tale that narrates how Frelimo freed the country from Portugal’s colonial grip.<sup>36</sup>

### **Keeping the script on rolling**

Frelimo had a new “enemy” to fight as early as 1976, only a few months after independence.<sup>37</sup> Renamo or the “armed bandits”, as Frelimo commonly characterised them, initially enjoyed the support of former Rhodesia and later of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, which was used by Frelimo to portray the armed conflict as an extension of the war of external aggression, and, as such, a war of destabilisation.<sup>38</sup> In contrast, by calling attention to the authoritarian regime and repressive policies undertaken by Frelimo, Renamo labelled it a war for democracy.

Whether a war of destabilisation, a war for democracy, or both, the fact is that the war pitted Mozambicans against Mozambicans,<sup>39</sup> and its termination, in 1992, unlocked another window of opportunity for change. In contemporaneous cases such as El Salvador and Rwanda, the international community pushed for the implementation of mechanisms to investigate and bring to justice the responsible for the violations of international humanitarian law. In Mozambique, however, such demand was not on the table. The discourse that prevailed in the country was that of forgiveness and of leaving the past behind.<sup>40</sup> In unison, political leaders from both sides, Frelimo and Renamo, expressed their hopes of a harmonious and inclusive future. The following declaration of Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo at the time, serves as an example:

Renamo wants a genuine negotiation conducive to national reconciliation without victors or vanquished and without recrimination followed by constitutional reform; to unite efforts in order to form a new Mozambique where **brotherhood will be affirmed by free debate of ideas and decision of consensus**; a new Mozambique where armed struggle need never be the last and only resort for the solution of our problems (emphasis added by the author).<sup>41</sup>

According to Mozambican political leaders, amnesty was the TJM that would materialise national reconciliation. “Amnesty transforms them [referring to Renamo] into normal people and considers them free from guilt”<sup>42</sup> justified Joaquim Chissano in favour of this mechanism. The understanding then was that amnesty would allow old enemies to become normal people and that together they would form a new Mozambique. Therefore, the Frelimo-led government enacted Amnesty Law 15/92 on 14 October 1992, ten days after the signing of the GPA between both sides. This meant that this law exempted members of both sides from the crimes and abuses committed from 1979 to 1992 “within the principle of national reconciliation and harmonization of the life of the Mozambican people”.<sup>43</sup> In compliance with the principles of the GPA, Renamo became a political party and participated in the general elections in 1994. Concomitantly, the majority of ex-combatants were demobilised and reintegrated into Mozambican society under the auspices of the UN.<sup>44</sup>

In terms of memory, the first post-civil war decade saw the emergence of new versions about Mozambique’s past that either added nuances or directly challenged the official narrative reproduced by Frelimo.<sup>45</sup> By contradicting Frelimo’s narrative of the past, these counter-memories brought to light the life stories of figures deemed traitors by Frelimo.<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile, Frelimo “quieted down” the memories of its heroic past and gave prominence to the need to reshape the party’s ideological and economic discourse in light of Mozambique’s new realities, multiparty and capitalist systems.<sup>47</sup>

Yet, this process was far from a full reformulation of MNs. From time to time, Frelimo still resorts to old pejorative labels – such as “armed bandits” – as well as to memories of the armed conflict to discredit and accuse Renamo.<sup>48</sup> From its side, Renamo has not acted differently. More than ten years after the end of the armed

conflict, Dhlakama still recalled the ill-treatment received during the peace negotiations as well as blamed Frelimo for the crimes of the civil war.

According to Dhlakama, Frelimo has always denied implementing democracy, ‘that is why the war lasted 16 years.’ ‘Samora Machel [...] and Joaquim Chissano, then Foreign Minister, told the invited bishops that they did not want to negotiate with bandits and wild boars.’ Dhlakama [also] accused Frelimo of being responsible for the massacre of about one million people during the armed conflict.<sup>49</sup>

After all, despite all calls for reconciliation, Frelimo and Renamo have continued to rely on their own (competing) versions of the past. Frelimo’s authorities still characterise the civil war as a war of destabilisation, whereas Renamo still portrays it as a war for democracy. The following examples illustrate how Frelimo and Renamo have relied on their competing narratives of the civil war over the years:

Although [...] Joaquim Chissano tries to identify himself as the best democrat in the country, he has never known, and neither could hide from his eyes that he still remains the president of the Frelimo Marxist-Leninist fanatics. It constitutes a major threat to peace and **democracy**, which must be vigorously denounced by all citizens at all levels [...].<sup>50</sup>

According to Guebuza, this was a “**war of destabilization**” since, in his words, a civil war arises when citizens of the same country go to war after failing to reach consensus on a particular matter.<sup>51</sup>

They say they were opposing communism, dictatorship, but this **war of destabilization** begins just six months after independence, and [they] had not seen how Frelimo was going to rule.<sup>52</sup>

According to Ivone Soares, the **war for democracy**, which began in 1977, was imposed on us by Frelimo because it left no alternative to the Mozambican people. Any attempt of opposition to the system imposed by the Front was violently repressed [...] <sup>53</sup> (all emphases added by the author).

Whether the implementation of other TJMs – such as a truth commission or a tribunal – would have led to a different result remains to be seen. Concretely, what one observes is that in the presence of amnesty, Frelimo and Renamo have continued to wage their war with memories as weapons.<sup>54</sup> But, as argued by Luis Brito, Renamo has never managed to question Frelimo’s legitimacy – regarding the liberation war – nor its nationalist foundation.<sup>55</sup> As such, a “memory deadlock” never took place. Meanwhile, Frelimo managed to keep the old logic of “the enemy” alive with Renamo taking over from the Portuguese colonialism, the Rhodesian racism, and the South African racism as the main character.

Frelimo has also revived the liberation war narrative through the revitalisation of Mozambique’s memoryscape. The celebration of the 40th anniversary of the deaths of the liberation war heroes who had died in 1968<sup>56</sup> during the government of the former President Armando Guebuza serves as an example of this revitalisation process. Referring to this celebration, Guebuza said: “Mozambique is a true



Homeland of Heroes. We all should be proud of this fact, in the present and in the future”.<sup>57</sup> In his speech, he also listed the names of all heroes that had already been honoured during 2008. The list was made up of names of former Frelimo combatants who had participated in the liberation war.<sup>58</sup> In the coming years, other ceremonies were also held.<sup>59</sup> In particular, these ceremonies were organised in different localities, usually in the birthplaces of those ex-combatants, which has allowed Frelimo to continuously reactivate the memories of the liberation war throughout the country and in somewhat isolated zones.

The revitalisation of the liberation war narrative also included the publication of ex-combatants’ biographies by the *Instituto de Investigação Sócio-Cultural* (ARPAC). ARPAC is a public institution under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and is responsible for promoting activities to preserve the national cultural heritage and conduct research about Mozambique’s history and cultural diversity. They published dozens of books about the life stories and deeds of liberation war combatants. Such a task has been “one of the highest impact projects developed by ARPAC” (ARPAC) at the request of the Frelimo-led government.<sup>60</sup>

Mozambique’s memoryspace is also a mirror image of who and what is to be remembered in the country. The 40th anniversary of the death of the “architect of the national unity”, as Eduardo Mondlane is characterised by allegedly bringing together the minor movements that formed Frelimo, was celebrated in 2009, and, to honour his memory, Frelimo declared 2009 the year of Mondlane. The Frelimo government also built a museum in Nwadjahane, Gaza province, Mondlane’s birthplace.<sup>61</sup> The memorialisation of Samora Machel was also part of this process. To mark the 25th anniversary of his death in an airplane crash in Mbuzini, South Africa, the party declared 2011 as Machel’s year. The “father of Mozambique”, as he is known, also gained a 9 meters tall statue, which was laid in the main square of the capital Maputo, *Praça da Independência*. “This statue was built by the Mansudae Overseas Project, in Pyongyang, North Korea, and weighs 4.8 tons”.<sup>62</sup> Even if smaller, Armando Guebuza ordered the production of additional 11 statues to be placed in the provincial capitals of the country.<sup>63</sup>

Concomitantly to the celebratory remembering of the liberation war, Frelimo has also tried to prevent the memorialisation of its counterparts. The episode regarding the nomination of a square in memory of André Matadi Matsangaïssa<sup>64</sup> in one of Beira’s neighbourhoods serves as an example. Following Renamo’s proposal to the Municipal Assembly to attribute the name of Matsangaïssa to the square, Frelimo reacted accusing Renamo of abuse of power and made several attempts to overrule the process.<sup>65</sup> At the end, however, Renamo managed to secure the naming of the square, but only because it had the majority in the Assembly.

Figure 9.2 summarises this analysis. Mozambique’s first critical juncture happened in 1975, when a quasi-truth commission helped to shape the liberation war memory narrative. In 1992, there was the second critical juncture with the end of the civil war. As the figure graphically illustrates, in the context of amnesty the transformation of MNs did not materialise. Instead, what one observes is that the inertia of the liberation war narrative and its inherent legitimizing power – set in motion decades before – triumphed, overpowering any alteration of direction.




Figure 9.2 Mozambique's memory narratives across time.

Figure by the author.

## Conclusion

As the opening of this chapter showed, Frelimo still relays on its historical role as the major player on the front line against Portuguese colonialism to legitimate its place as the sole ruler since Mozambique's independence, rendering its memory war narrative both official and hegemonic. In trying to understand the ways in which TJMs have shaped MNs in Mozambican society, this study drew upon the explanatory logics of critical junctures and path dependence. It results that two major conclusions can be gathered from this analysis.

First, the review of the Mozambican case shows that even though top political figures opted for the implementation of distinct mechanisms with different purposes – a quasi-truth commission and an amnesty and its great emphasis on revealing past misdeeds and its focus on leaving past wrongs behind, respectively – the same result was achieved: the celebratory remembering of the liberation war. A narrative that has become hegemonic, helping Frelimo to legitimate its dominant status for more than four decades. For better or worse, Frelimo remains the “saviours and founders of Mozambique” while those who oppose them take the risk of swelling the ranks of “the enemy”.

Second, this analysis advances the study of the Mozambican case as well as of other cases that experienced anti-colonial wars. This study shows that for understanding the role of TJMs and memory is crucial to consider the elements that favour narratives shifts, but also the ones that condition their continuities, that is, critical junctures and path dependence. That said, this theoretical framework could inform new research in different ways. One way would be by helping researchers to identify the variations memory narratives that assume path-dependent trajectories experience as a result of memory entrepreneurs' struggles within moments

of critical junctures. Another way would be by allowing scholars to determine how memory narratives develop across time whether assuming a path-dependent trajectory like in the present analysis or not. Regardless of the chosen research topic, this chapter could inspire the development of new research agendas by helping to uncover continuities and/or changes in those different levels of analysis, and by fostering the debate about TJ and memory in societies with violent pasts more broadly.

## Notes

- 1 Parts of the argument presented in this chapter was developed in Bueno, Natália, “Different Mechanisms, Same Result: Remembering the Liberation War in Mozambique,” *Memory Studies* 14, no. 5 (2021): 1018–34.
- 2 Felipe J. Nyusi, “Lançadas em Maputo celebrações dos 60 anos da fundação da FRELIMO,” *Rádio Moçambique*, June 25, 2021.
- 3 The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) resulted from the merger of “UDENAMO (*União Nacional Democrática de Moçambique*) formed in 1960 in Salisbury; MANU (Mozambique African National Union) formed in 1961 from a number of smaller groups already existing among Mozambicans working in Tanganyika and Kenya, one of the largest being the Mozambique Makonde Union; UNAMI (*União Africana de Moçambique Independente*) started by exiles from the Tete region living in Malawi.” Eduardo C. Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (Penguin: Baltimore, 1969), 118–9.
- 4 “Mozambicans who during the colonial period belonged to or were linked to political, ideological, administrative, military, and police organizations of the Portuguese colonial system,” such as PIDE (International Police for the Defense of the State) and the Portuguese colonial army. “Reintegração de moçambicanos comprometidos. Direcção do Partido promove reunião,” *Notícias*, June 4, 1982, 1.
- 5 “Chinese-Style Public Shaming. Subtle Mozambican Force Used on Ex-collaborators,” *International Herald Tribune*, March 9, 1979.
- 6 On the subject see e.g., Victor Igreja, “Frelimo’s Political Ruling through Violence and Memory in Postcolonial Mozambique,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 36, no. 4 (2010): 781–99; Maria Paula Meneses, “Hidden Processes of Reconciliation in Mozambique: The Entangled Histories of Truth-Seeking Commissions Held between 1975 and 1982,” *Africa Development* 41, no. 4 (2016): 153–80.
- 7 António Sopa, ed., *Samora, man of the people* (Maputo: Maguezo, 2001).
- 8 These meetings are understood as a quasi-truth commission for it does not fulfil all required elements of a truth commission. For a definition of truth commission, see Priscilla B. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).
- 9 Samora Machel. “Descolonização mental: o nosso problema actual,” *Revista Tempo*, no. 608, May 23, 1982, 29.
- 10 Igreja, “Frelimo’s Political Ruling”; Meneses, “Hidden Processes.”
- 11 Jessica Schafer, *Soldiers at Peace: Veterans of the Civil War in Mozambique* (New York: Macmillan, 2007); Nikkie Wiegink, “The Forgotten Sons of the State: The Social and Political Positions of Former Government Soldiers in Post-war Mozambique,” *Colombia International* 77, no. 316 (2013): 43–72.
- 12 Joseph Hanlon, *Who Call the Shots?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).
- 13 *Boletim da República* I Série – no. 42, October 14, 1992.
- 14 “Reconciliação nacional é tarefa de todos os moçambicanos,” *Notícias*, October 5, 1992, 1.
- 15 Elizabeth Jelin, *State Repression and the Labors of Memory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 33–34.

- 16 Jelin, *State Repression*, xviii.
- 17 Jelin, *State Repression*, xviii.
- 18 Ruth Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 27.
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- 57 Matusse, Malique and Issufo, *Moçambique – Pátria de Heróis*, 14.
- 58 The names listed were the following: John Issa, Tomás Nduda, Mateus Sansão Muthemba, and João Macamo. Moreover, during 2008, Frelimo also held ceremonies to honor Josina Machel, Paulo Samuel Kankhomba, as well as to mark the 75th birthday of Samora Machel had him been alive, see Matusse, Malique and Issufo, *Moçambique – Pátria de Heróis*, 14.
- 59 The inauguration of the monument to honor Eduardo Mondlane in Nwadjahane in June 2009, the celebration of the 75<sup>th</sup> birthday of Samora Machel in Chilembene in September 2008, the inauguration of the Samora Machel statue in Nampula in 2011, among other events.
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### **Legislation**

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