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Hegemony, Resistance and Gradations of Memory: The Politics of Remembering Angola's Liberation Struggle

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This article explores the political uses of the memory of the Angolan liberation war. It argues that the MPLA's rise to power in post-independence Angola led to the formation of an official state narrative based upon this movement's own memory, which gradually developed a script that follows specific rules. The article explores the politicization of the history of the Angolan liberation struggle by comparing official memories with the counter-memories presented by other liberation movements to ascertain narrative boundaries. It then examines the shifts and nuances, or what I term gradations of memory, that can be discerned in the narratives offered by a number of prominent MPLA figures later in their lives, which deviate to a certain extent from the "liberation script" supported by the state.

Keywords: politics of memory; liberation struggle; liberation script; counter-memories; Angola

INTRODUCTION

The Angolan liberation war was fought by the UPA/FNLA (Union of Populations of Angola/National Front for the Liberation of Angola), the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) against the Portuguese colonial state between 1961 and 1975, an anticolonial war that lasted thirteen years. These years were also tainted by a relentless conflict between the three liberation movements, all seeking to gain military operational space inside Angola in order to claim the status of sole liberator from colonialism. Ever since the first anticolonial actions in 1961, a fierce competition took place between the UPA/FNLA and the MPLA. UNITA had little strength and, as the

result of a collaboration pact with the Portuguese army, fought the other two movements on and off for much of its participation in the war. This period of Angolan history left relations between the liberation movements tarnished by brutal military conflict, political intrigue and dispute over legitimacy. After independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola quickly fell into a protracted civil war that lasted twenty- seven years. With the FNLA spent as a military force already in 1975, the civil war was fought between the MPLA and UNITA until 2002.

The memory of decades of violence between the liberation movements became a key factor in the establishment of the official recent history of Angola. Christine Messiant has explained how the historical experience of the MPLA and the start of the civil war in 1975 radicalized political narratives and installed a dictatorial regime that established historical discourse as a powerful weapon in the defense of the MPLA's Angolan state.¹ When it assumed state power in 1975, one of the MPLA's primary goals was to establish and disseminate its own narratives, which entailed the mnemonic removal of contenders in attempts to shape public memory about the liberation struggle. That is why it embarked upon "a process of partisan nation- building" in order to secure its hegemony. "School syllabuses, the media and the political education carried out by the MPLA presented the party as the embodiment of the Angolan nation. This was achieved through a history in which the MPLA was Angola's sole liberator from colonial rule."²

There is vast agreement among scholars who study Angola that the postcolonial period has been characterized by authoritarian rule, a form of government that has a particular impact on how the memory of the liberation struggle is invoked.³ Several works in the field of memory studies also acknowledge the specificities of memory in authoritarian settings. Richard Ned Lebow asserts that in these types of regime "the victors almost invariably attempt to enforce their own self- serving interpretations of the past," a type of hegemony that Berthold Molden notes "is built by prioritizing some memories over others according to the specific power constellations of a given society." Nancy Wood unpacks the notion of power constellations by asserting that public memory testifies to a desire of a group or disposition of power to select and organize representations of the past, which are then embraced by individuals as their own, a process, as Wulf Kansteiner emphasizes, that is only available to groups that command the means to express their visions in order

to have a chance to shape memory.⁴ These theoretical predicates are informative of how the MPLA's politics of memory were constituted and became official history in Angola, sustained by a disposition of power in command of specific technologies that allowed the dissemination of selective interpretations of the liberation war through official state channels.

This article examines the period of time from the start of the Angolan liberation war in 1961 to the present. The first section considers the emergence of a politics of memory rooted in the historical experience of the MPLA and how it came to inform and define official state memory and the production of a script that follows mnemonic rules. It analyzes the dynamics of the MPLA's politics of memory by exploring its historical and political narratives and how these shaped the guidelines of what Borges Coelho calls, with reference to Mozambique, the "liberation script," that is, a "concept that originated in the political sphere that regards a *total historical explanation* ... with fixed steps and a fixed conclusion."⁵ It is a mechanism that dictates what politicians and memory producers must abide by, what Foucault terms a *dispositif* that informs a system of official memory, aiming to homogenize different readings of the past into a common script.⁶ In Angola, the liberation script dictates rules to mnemonic practice and political discourse that endow a particular frame of memory with coercive power, so that an act of remembrance that does not conform to these mnemonic rules can entail sanctions, from the denial of promotions to complete socio-economic disbarment from the state and marginalization from political life.⁷ The second section presents several products and practices of memory from different political periods to trace the intersections and controversies between official memory and other non-state memories.⁸ It does so by analyzing the complex games of memory in Angola that result from the interaction between the mnemonic hegemony of the MPLA and the countermemories of the FNLA and other members of the opposition as a politics of resistance.⁹ This reading reveals points of contention, diversity and nuance. The final section considers shifts in the political context over time which gave rise to what I term gradations of memory that diverge in subtle ways from the logic of the liberation script. Building upon this analysis, the article shows that even in authoritarian regimes with clear liberation scripts in place, narratives shift and the passage of time produces nuance and divergence, demonstrating that memory politics are intimately linked to the oscillating political capital of its producers.

The article is based on original empirical data collected during my fieldwork in Luanda between October and November 2017 and in 2018. The Angolan National Library and the archive of the ATD—Associação Tchiveka de Documentação (the archival association that holds the documents and assets of Lúcio Lara, a founding member of the MPLA) were consulted to collect interviews, speeches, official statements, memoirs, minutes of conferences, written testimonials and film documentaries, besides secondary sources. A collection of speeches, in audio format, by Angola's first president, António Agostinho Neto, alongside an assortment of various other materials about Neto produced by the FAAN (Fundação António Agostinho Neto), were also used during research for the article. It is important to add a note on availability, access and use of empirical materials. I have made significant use of speeches by MPLA leaders as they constitute a format of political memory that is broadcast by radio, still the prime vehicle for communication in Angola today. They represent political memory in direct speech. The materials available about the FNLA pale in comparison. To identify the political counter-memories of this movement I resorted to any format of data I could find such as legislation, television and film documentaries, and books of testimonials edited by third parties, from where narratives could be read and speeches taken. Although these legitimately constitute products and practices of memory, they differ from the MPLA materials presented here as they provide only a snapshot of what could be an entire speech, recollection or conversation. Nevertheless, such use of empirical data produced by the very actors who contributed to shape memory in Angola is innovative and brings a type of data that to my knowledge has remained unexplored in Angolan studies.

THE MPLA'S MNEMONIC HEGEMONY IN THE NATIONAL NARRATIVE

In waging war against Portuguese colonialism Angolan liberation movements built guerrilla bases along the borders of countries contiguous with the territory. None other was better located than Congo-Kinshasa (at the time Congo-Leopoldville), which not only shares an extremely long border with Angola but, more importantly, by the start of the Angolan liberation war was already independent and available to host independence movements. The MPLA's presence in Léopoldville would be brief,

as when the Organization of African Unity recognized the UPA/FNLA's governmental body GRAE (the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile) in October 1963, the MPLA was expelled from the country by the Congolese government, which was friendly toward the UPA/FNLA. The MPLA leadership was able to relocate in Congo-Brazzaville in November 1963, a country that shares no contiguous border with mainland Angola apart from the Cabinda enclave. With the objective of introducing guerrillas into the north of Angola and the hinterland region of Luanda, MPLA combatants had to cross the terrain that separated Brazzaville and Angola, heavily controlled by the Congolese army and the UPA/FNLA, which was openly hostile toward the MPLA. MPLA squadrons were frequently attacked before entering Angola, where they would ultimately fight the Portuguese army. These crossings triggered much of the political enmity and controversy that would characterize the relationship between Angolan nationalist movements and were still visible when attempts were made to consolidate national memory on the topic of liberation.

The politicization of the memory of the liberation struggle became instrumental in positing the MPLA as the only power with legitimacy to govern Angola. As Christine Messiant argues, historical discourse became a weapon in the defense of MPLA rule. Its historical viewpoints acquired the status of official state history in which the truths of the party became state truths and the official version of the history of Angolan nationalism became untouchable.¹⁰ The history of this period was then constructed as that of the MPLA's struggle against the other two organizations, by resorting to the villainization of the role of the UPA in Luanda; the stigmatization of the other movements as lackeys and puppets of imperialism; the suppression of any sign of dissidence within the MPLA; and the expurgation of the controversial aspects of the MPLA's history.¹¹ In accordance with Messiant's work, I propose reading the liberation script assembled by the MPLA through four main points: (1) the role of the MPLA as the only liberator of Angola from colonialism; (2) the war against internal and external enemies, namely imperialism and its Angolan so-called lackeys and puppets, the UPA/FNLA and UNITA; (3) the repression of all dissent within the MPLA; and (4) the silencing of the history of purges that occurred within the movement.¹² According to this script, faithful proponents of the MPLA must defend its prime role as the only liberator of Angola and oppose all those who defy the

movement's hegemony, whether internally or externally, or challenge Neto's leadership.

These premises enable a nuanced comprehension of the historical trajectory of the movement, the narratives of dominance it built around the wars it was involved in, and the ways in which it sought to legitimize its rule in the country. They reflect some of the thorniest issues in the movement's history discussed above, particularly the supremacy of the UPA/FNLA and the Congolese army over the border between Congo-Kinshasa and Angola. The weight of those initial years in the formation of the movement's political character and in its subsequent establishment of official lines of memory once in power is patent in numerous products and practices of memory produced by actors within state institutions.¹³ A speech made in 1976 by Carlos Rocha "Dilolwa," at the time second vice-prime minister of Angola, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the MPLA reveals how the liberation script informs official state memory:

During our long struggle, in each of our advances, imperialism responded with maneuvers of division, creating tribal groups to undermine the efforts of the MPLA. Thus, in the First [Military] Region [comprising a region in the hinterland of Luanda] in 1961, they created the UPA. When in 1964 the MPLA opens the Cabinda Front, they made the minister of war of Holden [FNLA leader Holden Roberto], the traitor [Alexandre] Taty, join the Portuguese and create the TE [special troops], while at the same time they were establishing the FLEC [Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda] outside the country. When in 1964 and 1965 the MPLA was preparing to open the Eastern Front, they made Holden's minister of foreign affairs, the traitor [Jonas] Savimbi, abandon his government and form UNITA, which was merely an armed group of the Portuguese colonialists.¹⁴

This discourse is consistent with Messiant's premises cited above. Relevant to this article is the continuous delegitimization of the other liberation movements, depicted as puppets in the hands of imperialist forces, an accusation that truly became a political mantra. Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali agrees that, along with the use of the anticolonial armed struggle as the criterion for legitimation, the key element that

allowed the MPLA to curtail political competition was the discourse on the exclusion of the other movements' claims to legitimately represent Angola. Mabeko-Tali identifies two phases after the April 25 coup in Portugal, which toppled the fascist New State regime and created conditions for initiating the process of independence of Portuguese colonies in Africa.¹⁵ During the first, the MPLA maintained a double discourse: internally it sustained the narrative of its exclusive legitimacy as the only liberation movement, while publicly professing to support the unity of all the movements, as demonstrated in a speech made by Neto on February 4, 1975, upon his arrival from exile at the airport in Luanda:

The MPLA has simply one wish, that from now on we harmonize our efforts. All the liberation movements are here represented, the FNLA, UNITA, the MPLA. We all have the duty to overcome our individual pretensions and those of our organizations, and united build the Angola we all desire.¹⁶

Neto was referring to the Alvor Accords, the power-sharing agreement signed between the liberation movements and the Portuguese government in January 1975, which among other elements instituted a transitional government that included all three liberation movements. This speech is important insofar as it represents a specific political moment in time, a public rupture with the narrative accusing the other movements of being puppets and lackeys of imperialist forces by presenting them as legitimate liberation movements. Nevertheless, it is a position that contrasts heavily with Neto's discourse during the proclamation of Angola's independence only a few months later. This marks the second phase Mabeko-Tali refers to, when the MPLA openly reaffirmed its unique and uncontested legitimacy and consequently the illegitimacy of the claims of the other two movements for a place in Angola's political life. During the proclamation of independence on November 11, 1975, Neto asserted:

The lackeys of imperialism, whom we ceased to recognize as liberation movements long ago ... those puppet organizations in collusion with foreign armies, which have long been denounced by the Angolan people and all the progressive forces of the world and which the Portuguese government insisted

on considering liberation movements, tried to push the MPLA to a solution that would signify high treason against the Angolan people.¹⁷

Both statements, which already implied a leaning toward Marxist-Leninist ideology in contrast to the other movements, were made during two important phases of the Angolan independence process: the Alvor Accords of January 1975 and the start of the civil war in November of the same year. They show how political memories and narratives can be shaped, silenced or adapted to fit a particular occasion. Nonetheless, due to the failure of the Alvor Accords, only the hostility between the movements became imprinted in public consciousness, not the memory of construction and reconciliation as professed by Neto during that initial moment.

Neto's speeches after independence in November, and particularly those of his successor, José Eduardo dos Santos—in power between 1979 and 2017—continued to underline the MPLA's liberation script very clearly.¹⁸ Neto reiterated the argument that the MPLA was “the only movement governing Angola that really fought for the independence of our country, as well as for the unity of the nation,” and that the South African army “jointly with armies and bands of mercenaries and puppets, invaded and penetrated deep into Angolan territory, committing massacres, robberies and enormous destructions, with the objective of liquidating the MPLA and installing in Angola the docile puppets of neocolonial politics.”¹⁹ But it was during dos Santos's long presidency that the script was more thoroughly applied, as demonstrated by a speech he gave in Benguela on December 10, 1979, three months after Neto's death, on the occasion of the twenty-third anniversary of the establishment of the MPLA:

Throughout the entire trajectory of the revolutionary struggle ... it was possible to politically neutralize the reactionary and nefarious activity of organizations, tribal in character, such as the UPA/FNLA, UNITA and FLEC, created by puppets and subsidized by imperialism and its lackeys to stop the process of national liberation and divide our country and our people.²⁰

This mantra was repeated eight years later in a speech he gave in Luanda on December 10, 1987, to mark the thirty-first anniversary of the MPLA, at a time when the battle of Cuito Cuanavale was raging in southeastern Angola. In this battle, which

was one of the largest battles fought on the African continent after World War II, the forces of South Africa's apartheid government, in support of UNITA, confronted a coalition of MPLA and Cuban forces supported by the Soviet Union. Dos Santos declared: "It was also in that phase that the MPLA saw itself forced to fight two other puppet organizations, like the FNLA and UNITA, incited by imperialism to divide the people on a tribal basis."²¹

The battle of Cuito Cuanavale, seen as an important step in the downfall of apartheid in South Africa and the achievement of Namibian independence, demonstrated that no one force had the ability to defeat the other and drove the Angolan belligerents to the negotiating table, producing the New York Accords of 1988 which stipulated the withdrawal of both South African and Cuban forces from Angola. After this historical resolution the narrative began to alter, especially in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War, the transition from one-party to multiparty politics and a peace agreement waiting in the wings, in the form of the Bicesse Accords of 1991, which brought the MPLA and UNITA to negotiate Angola's first elections after a ceasefire. The elections of 1992 allowed both parties to have a public say on historical episodes, but communication remained charged with violent undertones. The elections were never concluded and the country returned to war later that same year. Yet, in November 1995, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Angolan independence, José Eduardo dos Santos simply noted that independence had been proclaimed amidst an ongoing war but did not mention either the UPA/FNLA or UNITA. This silence was connected with another peace agreement, the Lusaka Protocol of 1994, which included a peace treaty, demobilization of military forces and the formation of a government of national unity. But the same is true for a variety of other speeches given by dos Santos in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as those on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate from the People's Friendship University of Russia, in Moscow on June 22, 1998, and from the University of the State of Paraná, Curitiba, Brazil, in August 1998; and during the twenty-fifth anniversary of independence, in Luanda on November 11, 2000.²² In fact, it was only in a speech that he made in Luanda on May 2, 2001, at the opening of a conference entitled "Angola: Law, Democracy, Peace and Development," that dos Santos mentioned UNITA with accusatory undertones, pointing to Savimbi's reliance upon imperialist actors, but omitting any reference to the FNLA.²³ At this point, the

sensitive phase of the peace talks in the mid-1990s had already passed and UNITA had mostly been defeated and was in constant retreat.

By 2013 the civil war was long over and UNITA in shambles, particularly after a decade of almost undisputed MPLA hegemony since 2002. Still, in a rare interview granted by dos Santos, the former president stated that “Savimbi was an Angolan who, in order to fight his own government, joined the apartheid regime, which was the most condemned regime in the entire world,” again referring to Savimbi not as a contributor to the liberation struggle but as a lackey of apartheid.²⁴ This was part of a continuous attempt to adapt history to current political needs that was conducted on an almost daily basis. Indeed, as Ricardo Soares de Oliveira has argued, while the MPLA “does not want to give the other major nationalist organization of the time (UPA/FNLA) the credit for having jump-started anti-colonial politics or the liberation war in 1961,” with regard to UNITA it likes to “remind Angolans of that movement’s brutality and Savimbi’s responsibility for the [civil] war.”²⁵ In essence, the contributions of the other liberation movements to Angolan independence were deliberately silenced, especially since only one movement had governed the Angolan state since 1975.

There is no denying that the continuous construction of a dominant narrative, supported by the production of several products and practices of memory—in particular public speeches—is a significant factor in buttressing political power. Shaping the memory of the struggle for independence was one of the MPLA’s preferred instruments for gaining political dominance, legitimacy and identity. But as Stuart Hall asserts, the mere dissemination of a certain message does not assure its acceptance without a work of signification, that is, a struggle over the production of meaning, which may nonetheless not correspond to what is being promoted.²⁶

FNLA COUNTERMEMORIES AND THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE

In countries that fought colonialism, memory of the struggle tends to be invoked to provide the legitimacy to represent the people and claim political space, particularly by those parties that have become—or made themselves—the embodiment of the struggle and the new nation.²⁷ This phenomenon underscores the inflexibility of the

liberation script and leads to politically complex games of memory, be they the counter-memories upheld by the opposition to the MPLA—particularly the FNLA—or the different gradations of memory within the MPLA that deviate from the official narrative of the liberation struggle (which will be discussed in the following section).

Counter-memories, according to Miguel Cardina, are “memories that are not only defined as different and subaltern in relation to dominant memories, but capable of challenging the topics through which particular readings have become hegemonic.”²⁸ In light of the decline in the FNLA’s political importance in Angolan society, one of its most vocal points of contestation has been against the MPLA’s marginalization and at times exclusion of its role in national liberation. This is the founding premise that informs the FNLA’s mnemonic challenges during commemorative events. A good example of this ongoing struggle for legitimacy between the MPLA and the FNLA—and of the MPLA’s dominance through the control of the state apparatus—was the 2010–11 debate on the new law on national holidays. As Jon Schubert explains,

The draft Bill, presented by the MPLA parliamentary group in December 2010, “downgraded” 15 March 1961—the date of the FNLA’s northern rebellion, which for Portugal marked the start of the colonial war—from “national holiday” to “day of celebration,” to remember only the “expansion of the armed national liberation struggle”; and enshrined the earlier date of 4 February 1961, the day of the attack on São Paulo prison, allegedly authored by the MPLA as the beginning of the armed struggle.²⁹

Accordingly, anniversaries and other commemorative events are frequently used by the FNLA to express their opposition to the narrative promoted by the MPLA. Thus, on November 17, 2004, in reaction to the celebrations of national independence six days previously, the FNLA issued a communiqué that stated:

The FNLA followed with concern the celebrations of the 29th anniversary of national independence. In effect, the pronouncements made, the peremptory tone that characterized the essentially aggressive speeches, do not accord with the tendency toward national reconciliation, with the patriotic vision of

reconstructing the country. The monuments the MPLA ordered to be built seek to perpetuate hatred, bitterness and division among the sons of Angola.

The party then provided a mnemonic readjustment in line with its own narrative: “Independence was proclaimed in Luanda on November 11, 1975, by Dr. Agostinho Neto, not in the name of all patriots, nationalists, guerrilla combatants and all of the populace who fought the colonial yoke, but exclusively in the name of his movement, the MPLA.” The communiqué ended by reiterating that “the FNLA was undeniably the precursor of the national liberation struggle.”³⁰

To underline its legitimacy as the precursor of national liberation, the FNLA frequently points to what it sees as the MPLA’s exaggerated claims regarding the extent of its social mobilization and military capability during the liberation war. For example, in the documentary *A Guerra*, directed by Joaquim Furtado and screened between 2007 and 2011 on Portuguese national television, Ngola Kabango, a high-ranking FNLA politician, affirmed that “the MPLA wanted to create a space, wanted to prove to the world that it was fighting” and ended up “penetrating military zones they did not know, did not dominate. And these confrontations [between the movements] happened.”³¹ This is a predominant theme in the book *O Pai do Nacionalismo Angolano* (The father of Angolan nationalism) published in 2008, a collection of Holden Roberto’s memoirs edited by João Paulo N’Ganga, which is one of the very few books about the FNLA. For example, Roberto recalls that “the border zones were dominated by the UPA, and during the ‘war of recognition’ that the movements conducted in order to acquire political-diplomatic-military space, many MPLA militants ended up losing their lives when attempting to enter UPA-dominated territory.”³² Arguing that these infiltrations into the territories of other movements could precipitate confrontation, Ngola Kabangu stated that “the MPLA did not have large guerrilla areas in the north of Angola, it is a lie.”³³ These statements show that the critique advanced by the FNLA serves a broader political rationale: if the MPLA’s military operational capabilities inside Angola during the liberation struggle are contested, the UPA/FNLA’s contribution to liberation will appear considerably greater, which allows the party to reassert, as Kabangu did, its status as co-founder of the Angolan nation.

The same claim can be found in N’Ganga’s book, in which there is often no clear distinction between Holden Roberto’s words and the author’s. Indeed, N’Ganga’ seems to adopt the FNLA’s institutional countermemory even more forcefully than Roberto himself in the effort to reclaim the movement’s status as the precursor of national liberation. While stating that the book is an “epistemological rupture with the modern history of Angola and of Angolan nationalism, in a serene voice, free of speculation,” N’Ganga places his narrative in a clearly political context:

What we must objectively and unequivocally understand, without taboos, is that Holden Roberto is a main pillar of Angolan nationalism.... Holden Roberto was the first to understand the imperative of war in the equation of freedom for Angolans. The first to raise, incessantly, his voice in the international arena on behalf of Angolan independence. The first to accept peacefully that the nation should surpass the tribe without destroying it. The first Angolan leader legitimately recognized by international instances and the world. The first...

He concludes by insisting: “If we do not recognize Holden’s work, we forget the peoples of Africa, the personalities and culture, diminish the homeland and cast a shadow on our nationality. If we do not recognize the importance of March 15, 1961, we betray our own collective memory, imprisoned by the memory of others.”³⁴

Indeed, the commemoration of liberation heroes is one of the most important issues for advocates of mnemonic diversity. The construction of monuments and statues to honor the memory of other nationalist leaders, mostly Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, in an attempt to include them as fathers of Angolan nationalism alongside Neto, is a recurrent demand, constantly ending in outcries of political exclusion.³⁵ But the pattern repeats itself: the MPLA denies the celebration of other nationalist leaders while the other parties strive to have their leaders recognized by the state. A case in point was a demand by UNITA and the FNLA to promote posthumously its historical leaders Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto as Generals of the Armed Forces of Angola. FNLA President Lucas Ngonda stated that it was a historical error not to promote the two figures who were “brave combatants and commanders of the liberation struggle of Angola. To forget these men is a grave error in the history of Angola.”³⁶ Indeed, whenever memories of the liberation struggle

become salient in Angolan society, whether as a result of commemorative events or political polemics, the debate reverts to issues of political legitimacy, marginalization and manipulation, framing the boundary between official and counter-memories in very clear terms. This again occurred when the FNLA and UNITA complained about a state-led interministerial commission established in 2013 by the Presidency of the Republic to write the history of the liberation struggle of Angola.³⁷ Commenting on the newly created commission, Ngola Kabangu asked,

How will his excellency the President of the Republic encourage [without including the FNLA] those who have the responsibility to write the [official] history of the process of the armed struggle of national liberation?... The FNLA is an integral part not only of the process of national liberation but also the co-founder of the Angolan nation. We must simply be heard and be respected....³⁸

It is on the very essential issues of recognition of heroes, deeds, dates, events and overall contribution to Angolan nationalism and independence that the institutional mnemonic boundary between the two group narratives becomes inflexible and contested. However, not all mnemonic narratives follow this mutually exclusive binary pattern. Since memory is porous to interpretation and deduction, the historical memories of people in positions of power with the capacity to shape the ways in which the public perceives its history (through speeches, autobiographies, interviews, films, and so forth) can contain nuance and divergence. Lorraine Ryan calls this mnemonic resistance, arguing that meaning can be constructed in different ways that do not always accord with the hegemonic narrative.³⁹ This can be perceived not only in counter-memories but in many and varied non-official products and practices of memory created by people within the dominant disposition of power, as will be demonstrated in the following section.

GRADATIONS OF MEMORY

So far I have delineated the mnemonic dominance of the MPLA and the attempts by the FNLA and other members of the political opposition to challenge this hegemony

by means of counter-memories. However, concepts such as dominant or hegemonic versus counter or subaltern memories assume an inescapable binary analysis that may not cohere with the reality of the political field. In order to enable a more nuanced understanding, I propose the notion of gradations of memory, that is, memories that deviate in certain respects from the hegemonic narrative without contradicting, negating or colliding with it entirely, but mostly assuming a less politicized stance.

Different gradations of memory can be found in the MPLA's own interpretations of its history. For example, while the work produced by the FAAN is popularly understood as a by-product of MPLA hegemony, it is essentially a response to what the foundation considers a blatant lack of interest in promoting the memory of Angola's first president at the state level. The FAAN has organized several projects to keep Neto's memory alive in the public sphere. These include visits to schools to talk about him (a project known as "Sábado nos musseques"—Saturdays in the shantytowns) and numerous publications, from Neto's PIDE (Portuguese International and State Defense Police) records to a biography published in 2005 on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his death and the thirtieth anniversary of Angolan independence, volumes of his poetry, four volumes of comic books relating his life, published in 2016, a series of DVDs containing diverse testimonies about Neto and a book of his awards and distinctions.⁴⁰ Two documentaries, *Independência* (2015) and *Langidila* (2015), produced by a younger generation of Angolans connected in varying degrees to the MPLA, also reveal gradations in the official memory. Although they constitute attempts to formalize that memory in texts and films to ensure continuous transmission, they include elements that deviate from it. *Independência* is the most comprehensive product of memory ever produced about the Angolan liberation struggle. It provides an overview of the struggle for independence based on the personal testimonies of people who fought in all three liberation movements, without exclusion or marginalization.⁴¹ In contrast, *Langidila* contains various scenes and sequences that not only describe the climate of war between the movements but also end up demonizing the UPA/FNLA and Holden Roberto.⁴² During my fieldwork informants spoke of former MPLA vice-president Roberto de Almeida's indecision and discomfort about screening the film, as it portrays the FNLA and Holden Roberto in a negative light by recalling the tragic fate of Deolinda Rodrigues, an important MPLA leader today considered one of the heroines of Angola, who was assassinated

at a FNLA base. This shows how people who are popularly believed to belong to the same constellation of power may remember their history in different ways.

The key element in allowing nuanced readings of memory appears to be the specificities of the political context of the time. The ways in which events were portrayed in the 1980s, a time when the future of Angola was yet unknown and civil war ever more present, is profoundly different from how they were remembered in the 2000s, when the civil war was over and the MPLA was established as the dominant force in Angola. A case in point is that of Benigno Vieira Lopes “Ingo,” former guerrilla fighter, political commissar and army general. In an interview to the magazine *Novembro* in 1983 Ingo explained that the Camy Squadron, a group of two hundred combatants who left Congo-Brazzaville and lost most of its members to hunger and FNLA bullets, was still capable of attacking the FNLA base at Kissala with only nineteen members left, a combat that lasted four consecutive hours, completely destroying the enemy and taking its base. After this ordeal the squadron was still allegedly able to reach its destination, the Dembos-Nambuanguo region. In 2015, however, thirteen years after the end of the civil war that left MPLA rule uncontested, Ingo changed his narrative dramatically when referring to the fate of the Camy Squadron during testimony to the documentary *Langidila* and refrained from invoking military supremacy and heroism:

We knew where we were going! They knew where they were going! It was synonymous with death. Starting in Congo-Léopoldville. The other [MPLA] squadrons were all decimated, this was what always happened. And when they created Camy, it was the UPA, the Portuguese themselves, the Portuguese army [fighting the Camy squadron]. Again they [Camy] were alerted. But we were motivated and dedicated to the struggle.

The changing political context encouraged gradations of memory that differed from the official version. For example, as Marcelo Bittencourt has pointed out, César Augusto “Kiluanji,” a well-known MPLA combatant and leader of the First Political and Military Region of the MPLA, attempts in his memoir to preserve the memory of the First Region’s heroic acts and contribution to Angolan independence, which became problematic after some of its leaders became involved in an alleged coup-

d'état in May 1977 against President Neto. Bittencourt states that contemporary politics are present on diverse occasions throughout the book, specifically pointing to a process of changing of cadres and political promotions and nominations within the MPLA party-state after the turn to multiparty democracy that Kiluanji had an interest in.⁴³ It is important to note that in the period when Kiluanji's memoir was written— probably at the end of the 1980s, around the time of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale— and when Ingo gave his interview to the magazine *Novembro* in 1983, MPLA hegemony was not yet certain but intensely disputed in a civil war against UNITA that it was not able to win, which made them inflate the heroism of their contribution and of the MPLA's struggle so as not to diminish its legitimacy.

Around 2003, only one year after the end of the civil war, when the country was enjoying an unprecedented period of peace, memoirs and testimonies about the liberation war began to be published and were received with great interest and expectation. Enjoying the hindsight only time provides, some of these works indicate the possibility of making amends and reconciling the three liberation movements, something that was rarely tried before by any actor, group or institution in Angola.⁴⁴ Most of them express gradations of memory and nuance that the official state narrative and memory do not. This is clear in the memoirs of three highly visible and important MPLA leaders that were written in the 2000s. Iko Carreira, a MPLA military commander and Angola's first minister of defense, writing in 2005, during a less troubled period of the life of the country, avoids the expression "puppet" or "lackey" and acknowledges the MPLA and the FNLA (and also UNITA) as "two pro-independence organizations of the same country."⁴⁵ The well-known writer Costa Andrade, a former press secretary to Neto, also refrains from passing judgment on the other movements in his memoir published in 2002, apart from recounting a few cases of physical abuse and assassination. Nor does he posit the MPLA as the single legitimate liberation movement, but even exposes some of the weaknesses and internal problems that scarred the movement during the liberation war. A good example of this aspect in Andrade's narrative can be found when he discusses the early problems of the MPLA's implementation of a health campaign for Angolan refugees in Congo-Kinshasa:

The doctors of the CVAAR were distributed through our posts along the border. The militants of the MPLA were, in the end, the MPLA itself. At first they were welcomed with stones and insults: “mestizos, get out of here!” But after, with patience, they became Politicians, Commissars, Mobilisers and even Commanders. They were the visible face of the dangerous clandestine activities of our comrades in Congo-Léo, which was imposed by the UPA and the forces of the Congolese Government.⁴⁶

Dino Matrosse, an MPLA militant and member of its Political Bureau, also provides a somewhat balanced testimony in his memoir of 2014, in which he devotes more space to the problems and difficulties within the MPLA than to assertions about the other movements or the divisions within Angolan nationalism in general.⁴⁷ Even though these writers are affiliated with the MPLA, they do not completely adhere to the liberation script, perhaps because they were already well positioned politically, like Iko Carreira and Dino Matrosse, still influential and therefore beyond political reprimand, or because the circumstances of war and political conflict that had required following that particular script were no longer relevant. Numerous figures who worked in the high echelons of the party-state and did not collide politically—for example, through public criticism—with either Neto or dos Santos can be viewed as being beyond political reprimand. Costa Andrade is an exception here, as even though he clashed with President dos Santos following a satirical play he wrote and was arrested for six months in 1982, he remains an important figure in MPLA history and mnemonic canon.

Different gradations of memory can also be discerned among militants and former FNLA fighters with regard to their party’s official narrative. For example, conciliatory undertones, perhaps even a sense of resignation, could be discerned in the testimonies presented at a conference organized by the National Archive of Angola in 2007, titled “From the Clandestine Struggle to the Proclamation of National Independence: Memories of a Past That Has Become Present.” Thus, one of these fighters, Paulo Nkunsevo, stated:

The ELNA [National Army of the Liberation of Angola, the military branch of the FNLA], as I said, was a big army with around eighty thousand men ... and

in all that, the greatest sadness I have, who recognizes us? Nobody. Today in Angola nobody recognizes us.... It is sad my brothers, it is sad my compatriots. We are in a phase of construction, of the project of building the nation, some inside, others outside.⁴⁸

In 2016 Fernando N'Dombele, another FNLA member, commenting in a radio interview on a book written by former FNLA politician Emanuel N'Kunzika, noted that both of them had opted to remain silent and accept the humiliation to which they were subjected:

[T]he person that should [be celebrated] humiliates himself. I am one of those persons, so is Mr. N'Kunzika. We also humiliated ourselves. Only today is it understood that in fact there existed people who worked toward this revolution and remain unknown. So we opted, myself and N'Kunzika, for humiliation, so as not to create more useless problems.⁴⁹

Nonetheless, the fact that public figures refrain from mentioning the other movements in a negative light certainly enables the beginning of a conversation that may challenge official ossified narratives. It is this conversation that the opposition to the MPLA is keen on having, as demonstrated during a Conference on Peace, National Reconciliation and Democracy in Angola organized by the deanship of the Agostinho Neto University on April 10, 2013. Reporting on the conference the weekly newspaper *Novo Jornal* wrote that

national reconstruction continues to be blocked due to the lack of political dialogue, as demonstrated by the absence of the MPLA at the conference.... Even though the party in power was invited to analyze the origins of the conflict that devastated the country during 27 years of fighting [civil war], the discussion was limited to the other two movements that participated in the liberation struggle: FNLA and UNITA.⁵⁰

The MPLA's absence is symbolically indicative of the limited space available for discussing these matters. Interviewed during the conference, Jaka Jamba, one of

UNITA's most prominent representatives, argued that "history cannot be an appendix of power," and stated that "we still have remnants of the attempts to inculcate a single thought [referring to the single party]," the regime in power "still tries to puppeteer History, projecting only that which should be projected."⁵¹

These products and practices of memory represent a much needed critical confrontation with the MPLA's heroic past, its official history and the mnemonic narratives it invokes and draws political power from. Most importantly, they show that the MPLA is not the hegemonic force that it attempts to portray itself as or that it is claimed to be by its opponents. Although compliance with its politics of memory and liberation script often seem compulsory, the MPLA's apparent hegemony is, if not directly challenged and questioned, then certainly not reinforced by many close to it. This endows the liberation script with a certain flexibility, dependent on political context. As an instrument of political control and mobilization employed to promote specific historical versions of a struggle for power, the liberation script becomes less relevant after that struggle is over, even if the same power disposition that used it is still in place. In this sense, gradations of memory, which make public not only the MPLA's successes but also its failures and the vicissitudes it faced, show that the MPLA does not have absolute mnemonic hegemony over Angolan society and that there is space for other voices to participate in the mnemonic discourse in Angola.

CONCLUSION

This article has explored the politics of the memory of the liberation struggle at play in Angola. It focused on how the MPLA actively uses memory as an instrument— among many others—to legitimize its power, by highlighting a liberation script that posits the movement as the only liberator of Angola from colonialism and as the defender of the people against internal and external imperialist forces. The article then considered the counter-memories of the other movements to ascertain the boundaries of contestation between official and subaltern narratives. It became clear that the *modus operandi* of the FNLA is the same as that of the MPLA, yet from a position of contestation and subaltern marginalization. The points of conflict between official and counter-memories become salient when the latter are silenced or marginalized,

particularly during commemorative events and official celebrations. This binary pattern was then questioned by examining different gradations of memory within the MPLA and the FNLA that serve to defy any simple understanding of Angola's politics of memory. In the process, it included UNITA's mnemonic contestations, showing how it came to occupy a similar position with the FNLA in the MPLA's cannon for much of the civil war period.

The Angolan case highlights a number of elements in the field of memory studies with regard to public memory in authoritarian contexts. First, memory narratives feed political power at various levels, as organized groups use their own interpretations of the memory of an event or historical process to shape public perception. This exposes the link between memory and political dominance. Yet, a close reading of various mnemonic products and practices showed that memory, regardless of form of government, is never binary and exclusive but always comprises multiple locations along a spectrum, creating gradations that do not entirely challenge ossified narratives but may not accord with them either. Whether there is a risk that such deviations from imposed scripts will entail sanctions depends on the political circumstances of the time and the person's political and social capital. In this case, it became clear that the MPLA's memory is not the hegemonic behemoth often depicted by its detractors, as memory is not a monolith but rather an organic body, always prone to challenges, shifts and renewed interpretations.

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NOTES

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¹ Christine Messiant, “‘Chez nous, même le passé est imprévisible’: L’expérience d’une recherche sur le nationalisme anglais,” *Lusotopie* 5 (1998): 165–94.

² Justin Pearce, *Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola 1975–2002* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 107–8. Exploring the music scene in Angola, Marissa Moorman also shows how it “suddenly became a partisan and highly politicized affair.” See Marissa Moorman, *Intonations: A Social History of Music and Nation in Luanda, Angola, from 1945 to Recent Times* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008), 165–70.

³ See Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola since the Civil War* (London: Hurst, 2015); Paulo Faria, *The Post-War Angola: Public Sphere, Political Regime and Democracy* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015); Christine Messiant, “Eduardo dos Santos Foundation: or, How Angola’s Regime Is Taking over Civil Society,” *African Affairs* 1000, no. 399 (2001): 287–309; Vasco Martins, “Politics of Power and Hierarchies of Citizenship in Angola,” *Citizenship Studies* 21, no. 1 (2017): 100–115.

⁴ Richard Ned Lebow, “The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe,” in Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu, eds., *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe* (London: Duke University Press, 2006), 14; Berthold Molden, “Resistant Pasts versus Mnemonic Hegemony: On the Power Relations of Collective Memory,” *Memory Studies* 9, no. 2 (2016): 128; Nancy Wood, *Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 2; Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” *History and Theory* 41, no. 2 (2002): 187.

⁵ João Paulo Borges Coelho, “Politics and Contemporary History in Mozambique: A Set of Epistemological Notes,” *Kronos* 39, no. 1 (2013): 21 n. 5. Emphasis by the author.

⁶ For the use of the concept of *dispositif*, see Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 194–98.

⁷ Gregor Feindt, Félix Krawatzek, Daniela Mehler, Friedemann Pestel and Rieke Trimçev, “Entangled Memory: Toward a Third Wave in Memory Studies,” *History and Theory* 53 (2014): 33–34.

⁸ On products and practices of memory, see Jeffrey Olick, “From Collective Memory to the Sociology of Mnemonic Practices and Products,” in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, eds., *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 158.

⁹ The analysis will focus on the disputes of memory between the MPLA and the FNLA, only including UNITA later when addressing the period of civil war, when it became a central actor in the political life of the country.

¹⁰ Messiant, “Chez nous,” 159.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 161–62.

¹² For the silencing of factions within the MPLA that challenged Neto, the then president of the movement, such as Viriato da Cruz (one of Angola’s most famous poets, founding member of the MPLA and its former secretary-general), Chipenda’s Revolta de Leste and the Revolta Activa (two splinter movements within the MPLA that contested Neto’s politics and presidency), see Jean Michel Mabeko-Tali, *Guerrilhas e lutas sociais: O MPLA perante si próprio, 1960–1977* [Guerrillas and social struggles: The MPLA before itself, 1960–1977] (Lisbon: Mercado das Letras, 2018). Examples of purges are those following the 1965 assassination of MPLA founding member and Vice President Matias Miguéis or the May 1977 revolt or alleged coup d’état by a segment of the MPLA led by Nito Alves against Neto. See Lara Pawson, *In the Name of the People: Angola’s Forgotten Massacre* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014); and Dalila and Álvaro Mateus, *Purga em Angola, o 27 de Maio de 1977* [Purge in Angola: The 27th of May 1977], 3rd ed. (Alfragide: Texto Editores, 2009).

¹³ Peter Verovšek argues that to discern the substantive content of collective memory one must look at what is expressed by actors within state institutions. The assumption is that the state cannot speak for itself but is spoken for by individuals in

the higher echelons of power, even when they speak within the private sphere (i.e., in autobiographies, testimonies, interviews, memoirs, etc.). See Peter Verovšek, “Memory, Narrative, and Rupture: The Power of the Past as a Resource for Political Change,” *Memory Studies* 13, no. 2 (2007): 3.

¹⁴ *Novembro—A Revista Angolana* 1, no. 3 (Jan. 1977): xix; available at the Lúcio Lara Archive, ATD. (All translations from Portuguese to English are mine.)

¹⁵ Mabeko-Tali, *Guerrilhas e lutas sociais*, 454–55.

¹⁶ Collection of Neto’s speeches in audio format: *António Agostinho Neto, Discursos, Presidente da República de Angola, 1975–1979* [António Agostinho Neto, Speeches, President of the Republic of Angola, 1975–1979], directed and produced by Fundação António Agostinho Neto, CD 1, “A chegada triunfal a Luanda” [Triumphal arrival in Luanda].

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, CD 1, “Proclamação da Independência Nacional” [Proclamation of National Independence].

¹⁸ José Eduardo dos Santos became the second president of the Popular Republic of Angola following Neto’s death in 1979. Taking over a party unified around its president and the president of the republic, his terms would nevertheless be marked by one of the most protracted civil wars on the African continent.

¹⁹ *António Agostinho Neto, Discursos*, CD 7, “Festejos do 20º Aniversário da fundação do MPLA” [Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the creation of the MPLA]; and “Primeiro Aniversário da Independência Nacional” [First anniversary of national Independence].

²⁰ José Mena Abrantes, ed., *José Eduardo dos Santos e os desafios do seu tempo: Palavras de um estadista, 1979–2004* [José Eduardo dos Santos and the challenges of his time: Words of a statesman, 1979–2004], vol. 1, *Primeira República—1979–1992* (Luanda: Edições Maianga, 2004), 137.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 141.

²² *Ibid.*, 115–23. Dos Santos rarely made speeches or gave interviews. These examples constitute an accurate representation of the contents of his public interventions.

²³ *Ibid.*, 123–27.

²⁴ Interview with José Eduardo dos Santos conducted by Henrique Zimmerman, *SIC Notícias*, June 6, 2013.

²⁵ Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land*, 102.

²⁶ Stuart Hall, “The Rediscovery of Ideology: The Return of the Repressed in Media Studies,” in Tony Bennett, James Curran, Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woollacott, eds., *Culture, Society and the Media* (London: Routledge, 1982) (e-book edition, 2005), 73.

²⁷ See for example Terence Ranger, “Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 215–34; Sarah Rich Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism* (Oxford University Press, 2016); Richard Webner, “Beyond Oblivion: Confronting Memory Crisis,” in Richard Webner, ed., *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power* (London: Zed Books, 1998), 1–17.

²⁸ Miguel Cardina, “Deserção de antigos oficiais alunos da academia militar” [Desertion of former student officers at the military academy], in Miguel Cardina and Bruno Sena Martins, eds., *As Voltas do Passado: A guerra colonial e as lutas de libertação* [The turns of the past: The colonial war and the liberation struggles] (Lisbon: Tinta-da-China, 2018), 203. On countermemories see also José Medina, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” *Foucault Studies* 12 (2011): 9–35.

²⁹ Jon Schubert, “2002, Year Zero: History as Anti-Politics in the ‘New Angola,’” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41, no. 4 (2015): 6.

³⁰ FNLA communiqué of November 17, 2004, partially reproduced by the newspaper *Folha 8*, November 20, 2004, 9.

³¹ *A Guerra* [The war], episode 8, produced for Portuguese national television RTP1.

³² João Paulo N’Ganga, *O pai do nacionalismo Angolano: As memórias de Holden Roberto* [The father of Angolan nationalism: The memoirs of Holden Roberto], vol. 1, 1923–1974) (São Paulo: Editora Parma, 2008), 135.

³³ *A Guerra*, episode 8.

³⁴ N’Ganga, *O pai do nacionalismo Angolano*, 23, 27.

³⁵ “FNLA e o país que Holden queria, mas que não existe” [The FNLA and the country Holden wanted but does not exist], *Folha 8*, June 20, 2017; “Líder FNLA morreu sem o reconhecimento devido” [FNLA leader died without the deserved recognition], *RTP Notícias*, August 3, 2007. On contemporary uses of the memory of Jonas Savimbi, see Vasco Martins, “‘A nossa lâmpada não se apaga’: The Mnemonic Return of Angola’s Jonas Savimbi,” *African Studies Review, First View* (2020): 1–24, <https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2020.23>

³⁶ “UNITA e a FNLA exigem promoção ao grau de general de Exército a Jonas Savimbi e Holden Roberto” [UNITA and FNLA demand the promotion of Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto to the rank of army general], *Novo Jornal*, July 21, 2018. For the exclusion of nationalist leaders, see also “Não vejo como erguer estátuas de Holden e Savimbi ao lado do Presidente Neto—Adelino de Almeida” [I don’t see how to build statues to Holden and Savimbi side by side with President Neto—Adelino de Almeida], *Jornal de Angola*, December 15, 2015.

³⁷ The Comissão Interministerial para a Recolha de Fontes Orais e Escritas sobre a luta de libertação nacional (Interministerial Commission for gathering oral and written sources about the national liberation struggle) was established in 2013 by presidential decree, changed into a workgroup in 2016 and has been silent ever since.

³⁸ “UNITA e FNLA protestam exclusão de comissão de história de Angola” [UNITA and FNLA protest exclusion from the commission of the history of Angola], *Voice of America—Português*, May 6, 2013, <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/unita-e-fnla-protestam-afastamento/1655595.html>.

³⁹ Lorraine Ryan, “Memory, Power and Resistance: The Anatomy of a Tripartite Relationship,” *Memory Studies* 4, no. 2 (2010): 159.

⁴⁰ Neto’s PIDE records can be found in *Agostinho Neto e a libertação de Angola 1949–1974* [Agostinho Neto and the liberation of Angola, 1949–1974], 5 vols. (Luanda: FAAN, 2012); see also Acácio Barradas, ed., *Agostinho Neto: An Unremitting Life, 1922–1979*, trans. Michael Wolfers (Luanda: FAAN, 2005); *Agostinho Neto: Obra poética completa: Sagrada esperança; Renúncia impossível; Amanhecer* [Agostinho Neto: Complete poetic works: Sacred Hope; Impossible Renunciation; Dawning], compiled by Irene Alexandra Neto (Luanda: FAAN, 2016); *António Agostinho Neto, uma vida por Angola: Condecorações e títulos honoríficos*

[Agostinho Neto, a life for Angola: Distinctions and honorific titles] (Luanda: FAAN, 2018).

⁴¹ *Independência* (Independence) was produced by Paulo Lara and Jorge Cohen in association with ATD—Associação Tchiveka de Documentação. ATD is administered by, among others, Paulo and Wanda Lara, relatives of Lúcio Lara, who have worked toward constructing a more complete history of the Angolan liberation struggle. See, for example, Paulo Lara, “O esquadrão Camy e a rede clandestina no Congo- Kinshasa” [The Camy squadron and the clandestine network in Congo-Kinshasa], *Angolense*, March 20–27, 2004 (part 1), and April 3–10, 2004 (part 2); and a report by ATD titled “Bernó: base guerrilheira” [Bernó: A guerrilla base], *Novo Jornal*, April 19, 2013.

⁴² *Langidila, Diário de um Exílio sem Regresso* [Langidila, Diary of an exile with no return], dir. Nguxi dos Santos and José Rodrigues, 2015.

⁴³ Marcelo Bittencourt, “Memórias da guerrilha: A disputa de um valioso capital” [Memoirs of the guerrilla: The dispute over valuable capital], *História Oral* 2 (1999): 91–110; César Augusto “Kiluanji”, *Trajectória de Vida de um Guerrilheiro* [Trajectory of the life of a guerrilla fighter] (Lisbon: Editorial Caminho, 1990).

⁴⁴ Apart from the memoirs discussed below, these include two books published posthumously in the name of Deolinda Rodrigues (2003; 2004), and memoirs by well-known MPLA, FNLA and UNITA militants and politicians such as Jorge Valentim (2005), João Hailonda (2006), Pedro Benga Lima “Foguetão” (2007), Manuel Pedro Pacavira (2003; 2008), Samuel Chiwale (2008), Miguel Maria N’Zau Puna (2011); Ernesto Mulato (2014), Emanuel Nkuzika (2016) and Garcia Bires (2016). For the memoir as a tool for the production of memory, which “provides insights into how history is experienced today,” see Paula Fass, “The Memoir Problem,” *Reviews in American History* 34, no.1 (2006): 108.

⁴⁵ Iko Carreira, *Memórias* [Memoirs] (Luanda: Editorial Nzila, 2005), 91–92.

⁴⁶ Costa Andrade, *Adobes de Memória: Tukayana* [Adobes of memory: Tukayana], vol. 1 (Luanda: Edições Chá de Caxinde, 2002), 144.

⁴⁷ Dino Matrosse, *Memórias, Volume 1 (1961–1971)* [Memoirs, volume 1 (1961–1971)] (Luanda: Texto Editores, 2014).

⁴⁸ Testimony by Paulo Nkunsevo, *Actas do Colóquio, Da Luta Clandestina à Proclamação da Independência Nacional: Memórias de um passado que se faz presente* [Minutes of the colloquium, From the clandestine struggle to the proclamation of national Independence: Memories of a past that becomes present] (Luanda: Arquivo Nacional de Angola, 2012), 324–28.

⁴⁹ “Livro de Emanuel Kunzika aborda contexto da luta de libertação em Angola” [Book by Emanuel Kunzika analyzes the context of the liberation struggle of Angola], *Voice of America—Português*, February 7, 2016, <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/livro-de-emanuel-kunzika-aborda-contexto-da-luta-de-libertacao/3178725.html>

⁵⁰ *Novo Jornal*, October 3, 2014, 8.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

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