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Moara Assis Alves Salzedas Crivelente

**THE MEDIATIZATION OF EU POLICY ON  
MIGRATION AND ASYLUM IN PORTUGAL:  
OLD DISCOURSES ON A NEW PACT?**

Dissertação no âmbito do Mestrado em Relações Internacionais - Estudos da Paz, Segurança e Desenvolvimento orientada pela Professora Doutora Teresa Almeida Cravo e apresentada ao Núcleo de Relações Internacionais da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra.

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Faculdade de Economia  
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FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA  
UNIVERSIDADE DE  
COIMBRA

*À minha mãe Amélia, ao meu pai Luiz Henrique e ao meu  
companheiro Luiz, pelo apoio de sempre*

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This study is the result of two commitments: one, with always engaging in debates over pressing political processes by seeking to contribute with emancipatory practices, and the other, even more “pragmatic”, as we would say, of modestly contributing inputs to a big project and a great team. I am talking here of the awesome group of women who I was fortunate to join, at the Center for Social Studies (CES) of the University of Coimbra, as a junior researcher in the research project “MEDIATIZED EU - Mediatized Discourses on Europeanization and Their Representations in Public Perceptions”, led by Professor Maria Raquel Freire. I am glad to say I found myself in a team that works in a spirit of sisterhood and comradeship, intent on making things happen. Therefore, I want to thank Professor Raquel, Dr. Sofia José Branco, Luiza Almeida Bezerra and Irina Castro, who can quite simply make everything work. If that wasn’t luck enough, I am still fortunate to be accompanied in this journey by Professor Teresa Almeida Cravo, a supervisor on a mission and a considerate friend to whom I am greatly indebted for instigating a critical view about everything, but especially on my own work. And at the origin of everything, I am grateful to my mom Amélia, whose library was my nest and whose incentives and belief in me have always made me seek to do more; to my father, Luiz Henrique, whose unwavering support on all fronts, including with nonsensical but funny jokes, have brought me back home even when I am still an Ocean and half a continent away; and to my partner, Luiz, whose care has filled even my most busy days with joy, giving meaning to the word partnership. Thank you.

## Resumo

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A Comissão Europeia (CE) apresentou um novo Pacto sobre Migração e Asilo em 23 de setembro de 2020. Este passo foi amplamente considerado catalisado pelas tragédias humanitárias e inúmeras mortes de pessoas migrantes nas fronteiras da União Europeia (UE), em terra ou no mar. Estas tragédias evidenciaram mais uma vez a necessidade urgente da União de adotar uma nova abordagem para evitar a continuação do que alguns rotularam de “crise migratória” ou “crise de refugiados” e outros de uma “catástrofe humanitária” resultante de uma “crise de política” ou, ainda, uma “crise de solidariedade”. Estas diferentes formas de retratar o desafio e mobilizar conceitos que são cruciais no próprio processo de construção da comunidade da UE, como a solidariedade, refletem perspectivas contrastantes do problema e da solução. Para líderes da UE como a presidente da CE Ursula von der Leyen (2019-) e, antes dela, Jean-Claude Juncker (2014-2019), os estados-membros da UE devem se unir em torno de uma política comum baseada na solidariedade e na partilha de responsabilidades para receber —ou afastar e deportar— migrantes e requerentes de asilo. Para outros, como muitos atores da sociedade civil e políticos engajados no debate, a UE opta persistentemente por adotar uma abordagem securitizada da migração que privilegia o fechamento das suas fronteiras externas em detrimento de um acolhimento digno de pessoas que tentam entrar por vários motivos, incluindo em busca de oportunidades socioeconômicas e de refúgio da guerra ou a perseguição. Nesse processo, os meios de comunicação social, os *media*, têm desempenhado um papel importante ao apresentar a questão e disseminar narrativas dominantes ou de oposição. Este é, fundamentalmente, o interesse de pesquisa desta dissertação. A mediatização da política fator de análise de extrema relevância na tentativa de compreender quais perspectivas, narrativas e argumentos têm sido mais difundidos, por quem e com quais impactos sobre processos políticos. Portanto, esta investigação inspira-se em diversas áreas de estudo para abordar as principais questões levantadas nas discussões sobre as políticas da UE. Situado em Relações Internacionais, o estudo tira lições dos Estudos da Comunicação, Estudos Críticos de Segurança e Estudos Europeus e adota a Teoria Crítica como abordagem ontológica e epistemológica. Escolhendo Portugal como estudo de caso, a investigação analisa as versões digitais dos três jornais mais populares: Correio da Manhã, Jornal de Notícias e Público, para examinar o papel desses meios no debate sobre o Pacto proposto pela CE em particular e sobre migração e asilo na Europa, em geral. Os resultados são discutidos por meio da análise histórico-discursiva, onde a contextualização histórica é fundamental para a compreensão dos discursos como prática social com implicações políticas.

## Abstract

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The European Commission (EC) presented a new Pact on Migration and Asylum on 23 September 2020. This step was widely deemed to have been catalyzed by the humanitarian tragedies and numerous deaths of migrant persons at the European Union's (EU) borders on land or at sea. These tragedies have once more evinced the Union's urgent need for a new approach to avoid the continuation of what some labelled a "migration" or "refugee crisis" and others, a "humanitarian catastrophe" resulting from a "crisis of policy" or, still, a "crisis of solidarity". These different ways of portraying the challenge and mobilizing concepts that are crucial in the very process of EU community-building, like solidarity, reflect contrasting perspectives of the problem and the solution. For EU leaders like de EC President Ursula von der Leyen (2019-) and, before her, Jean-Claude Juncker (2014-2019), EU member-states must unite around a common policy based on solidarity and the sharing of responsibilities for receiving —or repealing and deporting— migrants and asylum-seekers. For others, like many civil society actors and politicians engaged, the EU has persistently chosen to adopt a securitized approach to migration that favors the closure of its external borders over a dignified reception and hosting of people attempting to enter for various reasons, including in search of socioeconomic opportunities and of refuge from war or persecution. In this process, the media has played an important role by (re)presenting the issue and its subjects and disseminating both dominant and opposing narratives. This is, ultimately, the research interest of this dissertation. The mediatization of politics has been deemed of utmost relevance in attempts at understanding which perspectives, narratives, and arguments have been most disseminated, by whom and with which impacts on political processes. Therefore, this research engages with diverse fields in order to address the main questions raised in discussions over EU policies on migration and asylum. Situated in International Relations, this study draws from Communication Studies, Critical Security Studies and European Studies and adopts Critical Theory as its ontological and epistemological approach to this inquiry. It zooms in on Portugal as a case-study by analyzing the digital versions of the three most popular news outlets: *Correio da Manhã*, *Jornal de Notícias* and *Público*, to analyze these outlets' role in the debate over the EC's proposed Pact in particular and of migration and asylum in Europe, as the historical background, in general. Results are discussed through discourse-historical analysis, where historical contextualization is key for understanding discourses as social practice with political implications.

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## Introduction

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In 2020, the European Commission (EC) presented a new Pact on Migration and Asylum, as a strategic priority for the 2019-2024 period, titled “Promoting our European way of life”. For the EC, “[s]trong borders, modernisation of the [European Union’s] asylum system and cooperation with partner countries are important to achieve a fresh start on migration”, and the new Pact is an attempt to strike a “balance between responsibility and solidarity” (European Commission, 2020). That year, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), of the 82.4 million people displaced in the world, 26.4 million were refugees and only 14% of them were hosted by countries considered developed (UNHCR, 2020). Still, the rising number of people seeking asylum in Europe was drawing more attention to the phenomenon.

First-time asylum requests in EU member countries increased from 562,680 in 2014 to 1,256,580 in 2015 (Eurostat, 2020), with associated challenges labelled a “migration crisis” or “refugee crisis” by part of the media (Giuliani et al., 2019). Requests increased especially in Germany (from 172,945 to 441,085), Hungary (41,215 to 174,435), Sweden (74,980 to 156,915), Austria (25,675 to 85,505), and Italy (63,655 to 82,790). Greece saw the number of requests rising more drastically from 11,370 in 2015 to 49,875 in 2016. By contrast, in Portugal, applications went from 440 to 870 between 2014 and 2015. During the COVID-19 pandemic, they dropped from 1,735 in 2019, the highest number since 2011, to 900 in 2020 (Eurostat, 2020). In total, in 2019, 20,323,576 non-citizens lived in the EU’s current 27 member states with valid residence permits; 7,733,709 of them, for family reasons; 795,212, for education; 3,446,054 for remunerated activities; 496,905 for subsidiary protection; 6,560,257 for other reasons; and 1,291,439 holding refugee status (Eurostat, 2019). EU countries granted protection to about 280,000 people in 2020, but the rate of recognition decreased in 2021, and only 35% of the 269,000 asylum requests were granted in the first semester (European Commission, 2020).

The unequal distribution of arrivals stirred tensions between EU member states. The EU’s call for solidarity “generated uneven responses” and there were changes from a rather welcoming approach by Germany, Austria and Sweden to “a policy of closure, including border controls, tighter asylum laws and deterrence procedures”, leaving “frontier states” like Greece, Spain or Italy to deal with rising flows of people attempting to reach Europe (Bermúdez, 2020). Hungary and Poland built fences and the issue was externalized: Spain made a deal with Morocco to prevent Africans from crossing the Strait of Gibraltar, and the EU “reached a three-billion-euro agreement with Turkey to limit migration” (Jones, 2016: 23-24), as well as an agreement with Libya (Thevenin, 2021).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A wide range of proposals and declarations by the EU on tackling irregular migration flows through the Mediterranean is found in European Council of the European Union, “EU migration policy: Migration flows in the central Mediterranean route”, available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/central-mediterranean-route/>.

The opinion of part of the EU countries' citizens regarding migration and asylum policies changed from positive to negative after 2015 (European Social Survey, 2016), which in certain countries coincided with the rising influence of the extreme-right. Factors include unemployment rates, linking immigration and job losses, but other perceptions of threat and human values may have been influencing the adoption of a diverse policy approach (Hootegem et al., 2020). The EC's Pact is thus an attempt to promote a common European "asylum and migration governance", to coordinate policies and share responsibilities for an "effective solidarity", meaning that "Member States with many arrivals must be able to count on the support of others" (European Commission, 2020). It would involve legally binding processes for EU countries to develop their systems, policies, and mechanisms such as a guideline for legislators and decision-makers in the Common European Asylum System, which is also to be reformed "through a comprehensive approach [...] based on three main pillars: efficient asylum and return procedures, solidarity and fair share of responsibility and strengthened partnerships with third countries" (*Ibid*).

Several criticisms of the EU migration and asylum policies have emerged throughout the last years which are found again in relation to the Pact. Ferreira (2018: 60-61) points to the European Agenda on Security of 2015, where the EU "stresses the need to effectively implement border management to prevent cross-border crime and terrorism", linking "border management, migrations and security". Concerns about these policies' transformation of the continent into a "fortress Europe" have thus been voiced (Freire and Dias, 2020; Pérez, 2020), with some considering this a deterrence policy turning border-crossing and asylum requests difficult and riskier (Jones, 2016: 23). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), from 2004 to 2014, 23,700 people died attempting to enter the EU, whereas in 2014 and 2015 alone, over 7,200 people died in what became "the most dangerous border crossing in the world" (*Ibid*: 16). More than 120 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) jointly condemned member countries' policies and the EC for attempting to curb migration using aid, trade and other funds to engage third countries in reducing people flows to Europe, thus challenging the EU's credibility in defending human rights (Oxfam, 2016). Regarding the EC's proposed Pact, 90 NGOs also deemed it hindered by a repetition of mistakes for focusing on externalizing, deterring, retention and return (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2020).

In this debate, the concepts of solidarity and European values have been mobilized by various actors, but frequently with divergent understandings. Notably, these concepts are key in the process of building a European community and developing its policies, which so often have wider implications. Migration and asylum policies thus remain under scrutiny at the EU and national levels, and, to analyse debates over them, this dissertation zooms in Portugal as a case-study.

### **Portugal's role in the debate over EU policies on migration and asylum**

During the period of most intensified migratory movement into Europe, in 2015 and 2016, Portugal was quantitatively not as affected as other Southern EU members such as Greece, Spain,

or Italy. In 2021, its Immigration Department, the Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF – *Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras*) registered 714,123 foreigners living in Portugal —7.8% more than in 2020. The trend is of a steady increase in the number of foreign residents throughout the previous years, with immigrants mostly coming from Brazil (209,072), followed by those coming from the United Kingdom (42,071), Cape Verde (35,913), India (30,913) and Italy (30,887). Yet, the actual number of residence permits issued each year has decreased from 118,124 in 2020 to 109,000 in 2021.

From 2009 to 2015, there was a continuous decrease, from 457,306 to 397,724, in the number of resident foreigners in Portugal, including those with “legal resident” status, those having extended their residence permits, those extending their long duration visas, and those with long duration visas granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PORDATA, 2020). From 2016 until 2020, the total numbers of resident foreigners went from 407,504 to 668,516—of these, 661,607 had “legal resident” status (*Ibid*). As for requests for international protection, in 2019 Portugal received over 1,800 requests, the highest number of its history, but the country was still one of the EU member-states that received the least requests, contrasting, for instance, with Germany’s 121,000 requests, the highest number among EU member-states (Observatório das Migrações, 2021). In 2020, Portugal was in the 22<sup>nd</sup> place among the 27 EU members in the number of asylum requests, accounting for only 0.2% of all requests within the Union. Still, numbers have significantly increased in the last decade. From an average of 200 requests per year between 2000-2012, between 2013 and 2020 that number increased four times. In 2020, the number dropped 45% in relation to 2018 to 1,002 requests —in the EU, the drop was of 33%—due to movement restrictions related to the Covid-19 pandemic (*Ibid*: 76).

From January to June 2021, Portugal held the Presidency of the Council of the EU, putting great emphasis on the Union’s need to adopt a common migration and asylum pact, with stated support to the EC’s proposal in principle. The Minister of Home Affairs Eduardo Cabrita, for instance, said that Portugal sought a “goodwill coalition between the countries committed to European values” that could propitiate progress in that process, where Portugal would lead efforts to bring member-states closer in their different positions on migration and asylum (Portugal’s Presidency of CEU, 2021). When Portugal’s term ended, frustration with the EU member-states’ failure to achieve agreement in that regard was evident in the media coverage of that and other events related to migration and asylum policies and practices in Portugal and Europe.

### **Research question, goals and relevance**

This dissertation’s research question is: How has the new Pact on Migration and Asylum been discursively represented in the Portuguese public space and what are the implications? The research examines the discursive mechanisms of representation of the issue, the actors and the values mobilized to address it, and the subject persons, in this case, migrants and asylum-seekers. The aim is to identify whether and how the different conceptions of solidarity influence debates

over EU and national migration and asylum policies and practices, especially over the EC's new Pact, by analysing how migrants, including asylum-seekers, and how the EU or EU member-states' policies are framed in the Portuguese media.

The debate unfolds in a context of international concern for the increase in people's displacement, on the one hand, and on the other, amid discussions about how to promote and protect the European community and "way of life", as stated in the EC's strategic agenda.<sup>2</sup> By assessing EU migration and asylum policies and alternative proposals and examining if and how different conceptions of solidarity constrain or improve these policies, the research contributes to European Studies—on "Europeanization" as a process of social construction; with studies about discourses and policymaking; and with studies on Portugal's public opinion, political agendas, and media representations. Results can thus be used in further research, civil society discussions and advocacy for fairer policies.

### Theoretical and empirical framework

The research is developed in the framework of the project "MEDIATIZED EU — Mediatized Discourses on Europeanization and Their Representations in Public Perceptions", a consortium of seven institutions including the Centre for Social Studies (CES) of the University of Coimbra, tasked with the Portuguese case-study.<sup>3</sup> It engages with one of the project's topics of concern, labelled the "migration crisis", zooming in the presentation and discussion of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, including different related events that also inform the research of how migration and asylum in general have been discussed in the media. The theoretical framework and methodology of the project are here adopted and adapted to Portugal's case, the analysis of how discourses on migration and asylum are represented in the Portuguese media and by which actors, mobilizing which conceptions of solidarity, and for what stated aim.<sup>4</sup> Ontologically, epistemologically and empirically driven by Critical Theory (CT), the research is inspired by Horkheimer's (2002[1937]: 191) proposition that social issues must be examined from an empirical, instead of only theoretical, stance, where "general principles must be regarded as indolent and idle." Different from positivism, CT stands "apart from the prevailing order of the

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<sup>2</sup> Besides protecting and promoting justice, the rule of law, equality, social fairness and other values stated as the "EU's core values" under the rubric "Promoting our European way of life", the EC's strategic agenda for 2019-2024 also involves guaranteeing "stronger borders, modernisation of the EU's asylum system and cooperation with partner countries", in European Commission, "Strategy: Priorities 2019-2024 - Promoting our European way of life", at <[https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-of-life\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-of-life_en)>.

<sup>3</sup> MEDIATIZED EU is a consortium of seven institutions from different countries. At CES, it is coordinated by Professor Dr. Maria Raquel Freire. The dissertation's author is a research assistant in the project at CES. For an overview, see <[www.mediatized.eu](http://www.mediatized.eu)>

<sup>4</sup> In the case of MEDIATIZED EU, considering that "media framing of the European project plays a central role in constructing citizens' perceptions of the EU and European identity and attitudes towards EU enlargement", the project studies "how the media discourses are constructed to foster or hamper the European project and how they resonate among the public by focusing on the elite-media-public triangle". See Mediatized EU, *Overview*, at <<https://mediatized.eu/overview/>> [15 Oct. 2021].

world and asks how that order came about”, with the aim of transforming it (Cox, 1981: 128-9). For that the research draws from two main fields of inquiries: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Critical Security Studies (CSS). As CT is multidisciplinary, Communication Studies give this research further elements for discussions about the influence of mass media on political processes, which is crucial for the comprehension of the role played by the media in the process of elaboration of new policies on migration and asylum in the EU. Considering that the influence of media on social life has significantly increased—a process termed “mediatization”, the “mediatization of politics” expresses the influence of media on political processes and has significant effects on political communication and everyday politics (Stromback and Esser, 2014: 6; Axford, 2001: 3; Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 2011). Hence, studying how the media represents particular issues, actors, and solutions is key to understanding their *framing* of these elements of social and political reality and the assumptions mobilized for their reproduction or contestation and possibly, their change.

The research’s empirical work rests on media analysis of the digital versions of the three most read outlets in Portugal: *Correio da Manhã*, *Jornal de Notícias*, and *Público*. A corpus of analysis is built with samples of the three outlets collected through their websites’ search engines, using as keywords the main terms of the Pact’s name, which also work as the general topics of interest: migrations and asylum. Content and discourse analysis of this corpus is hence conducted using the NVIVO software for quantitative and qualitative analysis. In total, 225 items were sampled and analysed, each outlet examined as a distinct “case” in NVIVO, for comparison, but also analysed as a bulk. A codebook was elaborated based on the phase of desk research and literature review and further refined throughout media analysis. It contains categories and codes that identify the items’ genre, scope, length, authorship, subjects, the main actors mentioned or quoted, the images used, and other framing mechanisms used to represent issues and people that were considered when further analysis of those items was performed through other theoretical and methodological approaches explained ahead.

In European Studies, the European integration process includes policymaking and institutional normative stances as important parts of consolidating perceptions and building community. Notably, Checkel (1998), Christiansen et al. (1999), and Bee (2008) engage with social constructivism and the role of institutions in consolidating identities to examine the European integration process. Christiansen et al. (1999: 528), for instance, propose studying the impact of “intersubjectivity” and “social context”, stressing the relevance of “polity formation through rules and norms, the transformation of identities, the role of ideas and the uses of language” in the “social construction of Europe”.

In Critical Security Studies (CSS), “securitization” is examined as discourse and practice based in political perspectives about phenomena and people, entailing a “discursive constitution of a certain group, issue or event as a security matter, their categorization as an existential threat for a certain referential [...] and the subsequent justification of a need for exceptional measures”

(Santos et al., 2019: 103). EU migration and asylum policies have adopted a securitized perspective of the issue of migration in Europe, considering emphases on the need to control external borders (Jones, 2016; Freire and Dias, 2020; Pérez, 2020) while “protecting our citizens and our values”, as the EC’s strategy is subtitled.

In CDA, discourse-historical analysis focuses on the context of practices, social structures and the construction of identity in discourses. Language is a social practice and discourse is a moment of social practice (Fairclough, 2001); analysing it critically is done in the interest of unveiling the relation between language and power, and the expression, signalization, constitution, and legitimation of social inequality, aiming to achieve results of practical relevance (Meyer, 2001). Moreover, the discourse-historical approach “follows a complex concept of social critique” by looking at contradictions, dilemmas, and so on, in text-internal or discourse-internal structures; by demystifying exposure of the “possibly persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices” through contextual knowledge; and by contributing to “the transformation and improvement of communication” (Wodak, 2001: 64-65). For that, Wodak and Weiss (2005: 129) contribute an interdisciplinary framework that examines the interplay of an ideational dimension —“making meaning of Europe”; an organizational dimension —“organizing Europe”; and a geographical dimension —“drawing borders”. This interplay is interesting for this research as it “constitutes the specific form of the speculative talk on European identities as well as of other policy processes” and involves pondering the “essence” of Europe, its institutional forms and procedures, and definitions of who is inside or outside (*Ibid*: 131), through at least three forms of legitimization of the EU: idea, procedure, and “standardisation” (*Ibid*). In this sense, concepts used to refer to the EU in “national discourse”—in this case, in Portugal; how these concepts are reproduced “in modern fields of discourse” such as political speeches and media discourses, and so on, are elements to consider in the analysis of media representations of the EU and of the issue at hand that can unveil a “discursive relationship ‘identity-legitimization-representation’” (*Ibid*). This approach helps identifying which connections are drawn between solidarity and security, for instance, in the different discourses and representations of migration / migrants and asylum seekers in Portugal, and of the European values / way of life, inquiring into their impact in such a process of policymaking.

## Structure

Chapter One addresses the theoretical framework by overviewing the main concepts used in research through critical theoretical approaches, touching on themes such as solidarity, identity and security, and the idea of community vis-à-vis the representation of dis/mis-placed Others. Chapter Two contextualizes the discussion within the EU, addressing the main concerns with the situation of migrants and refugees in Europe and the new Pact, and in Portugal, by overviewing the main political and legislative developments in the country, as well as the positions of civil society and political parties vis-à-vis migration and asylum in general and the Pact in particular.



It thus recovers the concepts of Europeanization and European community/values, and distinctions between internal —among EU members— and external solidarity—with non-community members in the EC's strategic agenda and in practical developments in Europe and Portugal. Chapter Three presents the analysis and starts by explaining the methodology, describing how media analysis was performed. It thus the results of CA and CDA of the coverage of migration and asylum in general and the proposed EU Pact in particular by the Portuguese media. Conclusion summarizes these findings and looks at possible avenues of future research and practice.

# I. Representations and the mediatization of politics under Critical Discourse Analysis

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This research is ontologically, epistemologically and empirically driven by Critical Theory (CT). As such, it adopts CT's methodological and practical commitment to build a critique of what is "prevalent" or "given" (Horkheimer, 2002; Marcuse, 1955) and that is intent on effecting change (Habermas, 1986; Chambers, 2004). For that, this study draws from two main fields of inquiries also inspired by CT: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Critical Security Studies (CSS). This chapter explores the conceptual and empirical tools that these field contribute to the research presented in this dissertation, especially for the analysis of community building processes and representation through discourses with political intentions and consequences on society and on people's lives. As CT is multidisciplinary, this study's theoretical framework is completed by exploring Communication Studies for discussions about the influence of mass media on political processes, which is crucial for the comprehension of the role played by the media in the process of elaboration of new policies on migration and asylum in the EU.

Therefore, this chapter starts by overviewing the main inquiries in CT in section 1.1, establishing the main grounds for the ensuing conceptual explorations. Section 1.2 addresses discourses and processes of meaning production, and draws from CDA to identify dominant narratives about community and its Others, in 1.2.1; to zoom in on moral imperatives and narratives working as discursive devices mobilized in political discourse, in 1.2.2; and discuss discursive practices based on notions of security that have clear implications for policymaking, through CSS, in 1.2.3. Section 1.3 explores the role of the media by overviewing theoretical and practical considerations over the "mediatization" of political issues and processes, a crucial step to explain this study's concern with the media coverage of the topic at hand.

## 1.1. Working through some of the practical commitments of Critical Theory

The theoretical and methodological approach both inspiring and structuring this research, CT is fundamentally defined by Horkheimer's (2002[1937]: 191) distinction between critical and traditional theories and his proposition that social issues must be examined from an empirical, instead of only theoretical, stance, where "general principles must be regarded as indolent and idle." For critical theorists, traditional or orthodox, positivist doctrines have maintained "major silences and dangers inherent in the way that we ask our questions of the modern world and construct our (rational-scientific) answers" (George, 1994: 140). These dangers, it is argued, are reflected in the way that, although appearing as neutral, unbiased processes of generating knowledge, positivist doctrines are also developed in social reality, where real social struggles unfold which have an impact that cannot be disregarded (*Ibid*: 152). If they are, there is a great

risk that the character of knowledge *as* power, as put by Jürgen Habermas, is overlooked, and consequently so are the conditions for the reproduction and maintenance of power relations; hence, CT's must also be an emancipatory project (*Ibid*). Notably, struggle for emancipation is, for Habermas (1986: 198), “an attitude which is formed in the experience of suffering from something man-made, which can be abolished and should be abolished.” Hence, approaching emancipation through philosophical and scientific lenses in CT also require engagement with Karl Marx's emphatic defense of the need to transform practice itself (George, 1994; Le Baron, 1971: 560).<sup>5</sup>

As Cox (1981: 128-9) argues, different from positivism, CT stands “apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about”, with the aim of transforming it; as such, CT is essentially concerned with practice, and understanding practice requires an understanding of the assumptions informing it. Therefore, CT is also attentive to the variety of actors involved in social processes, which in international relations means moving beyond a state-centric perspective to encompass other complex dynamics and interactions (*Ibid*). Cox famously engages with this point by arguing that the separation between state and civil society happens, in the 18th and early 19th centuries, with “an emergent society of individuals based on contract and market relations which replaced a status-based relations” as separate from “a state with functions limited to maintaining internal peace, external defense and the requisite conditions for markets”, but that today “state and civil society are so interpenetrated that the concepts have become almost purely analytical” (*Ibid*:127).

This debate is thus found on the opposition between traditional and critical theories of IR, where CT made its way in the 1980s (Devetak, 2018). In addition, other epistemological approaches inspire these developments, and in the 1990s, among debates over goals and agency, Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 259) write, constructivism develops from concerns for “normative as well as material structures, the role of identity in the constitution of interests and action, and the mutual constitution of agents and structures”, contributing “crucial insights into the sociology of moral community in world politics” to critical IR theory, namely through critical constructivism (*Ibid*: 260). Concurrently, culture, as a meaning-making site, reemerges in critical security studies' (CSS) attempts to grasp other factors of conflict that had been eclipsed by big power politics during the Cold War (Weldes et al., 1999). In that sense, scholars have called for looking at the “interactions” of “global society”, such as between “financescapes”, “ethnoscapes”, “technoscapes”, “mediascapes”, and “ideoscapes”, as well as “securityscapes” (*Ibid*: 8).

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<sup>5</sup> Much of CT's agenda is clearly influenced by Karl Marx's defense of emancipatory practice, even though, for reasons and in aspects that this research cannot cover, part of CT's approach was developed as overcoming or succeeding Marxist proposals (George, 1994).

These are only some examples of the breadth and diversity of debates over social relations and political processes inspired by CT, all of which in some way or another inspiring the fields and discussions addressed in this research. In sum, as CT is concerned with practice, examining “discourses with practical ambitions” (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008: 7) is crucial in critical analyses of social and political practices and processes. According to Norman Fairclough (2001: 122), social practices combine “the perspective of structure and the perspective of action”, since practice is “a relatively permanent way of acting socially which is defined by its position within a structured network of practices, and a domain of social action and interaction which both reproduces structures and has the potential to transform them”. In a Habermasian approach to these calls, communication is vital, as language, being ideological, can both legitimize power relations and carry emancipatory potential (George, 1994: 153; Wodak, 2001: 10). Therefore, CDA sets out to examine how discourses about socio-political practices and processes are constructed and what are their possible effects. The next sections show how.

## 1.2. Discourses, meaning and effective representations

Discourse is, itself, understood as “a moment of social practice”, carrying the relation between language and power, expressing, signaling, constituting, and legitimating social relations (Meyer, 2001). It constitutes “diverse representations of social life which are inherently positioned — differently positioned social actors ‘see’ and represent social life in different ways, different discourses” (Fairclough, 2001: 123). An important substance of discourses is semiosis, the “irreducible part of material social processes” that “includes all forms of meaning making”, and “social life as interconnected networks of social practices of diverse sorts (economic, political, cultural, and so on)”, each having their “semiotic element” (*Ibid*: 122). In turn,

Semiosis as part of social activity constitutes genres. Genres are diverse ways of acting, of producing social life, in the semiotic mode. Examples are: everyday conversation, meetings in various types of organization, political and other forms of interview, and book reviews. Semiosis in the representation and self-representation of social practices constitutes discourses (*Ibid*: 123).

In Wodak’s (2001: 66) words, there is a “dialectical relationship between particular discursive practices and the specific fields of action (including situations, institutional frames and social structures), in which they are embedded.” This means that “situational, institutional and social settings shape and affect discourses,” whereas “discourses influence discursive as well as non-discursive social and political processes and actions.” Hence, semiosis, as “meaning making” processes (Fairclough, 2001: 122-123), and contexts such as institutional and social settings (Wodak, 2001: 66) are identified through discourse analysis. This includes analyzing how subjects, people and situations are represented and, through CDA, by whom, with which aims and which implications on social and political reality. As the authors mentioned argue, actors in different social contexts and positions interpret and represent social reality in different ways,

reproducing, contesting or transforming social relations and structures through practices. Social structures are thus deemed “routinized discursive and physical practices that persist over an extended temporal and spatial domain”, relying on “the sociolinguistic construction of subjects and objects” (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 267-268). CDA is thus understood as a tool to analyze “the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text, and (...) the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social historical subjects, create meanings in their interaction with texts” (Fairclough and Kress, 1993 *apud* Wodak, 2001: 3). Therefore, engaging with all these levels, CDA “focuses on social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination,” Van Dijk (2001: 96) explains, stressing the “complexities of the relationships between discourse structures and social structures”. As social practices carry information of these structures and of action, as noted above, the actors of these relations are also considered. Regarding some of these actors, Wodak (2001: 64) argues that since “relationships between media, politics (all genres) and ‘people’ are very complex”, influences are not easy to identify —to grasp that complex relationship it is necessary for research to be interdisciplinary. These approaches are illustrated ahead, as the next sub-sections examine the elements considered under CDA in this research.

### 1.2.1. Discourses and hegemonic narratives about the community

A community can express an identification between members in values, principles or worldviews, and in objective, material conditions in real-life. Communities are built and constantly recast around perceived identities. In Linklater’s (1998: 1) words, modern ideas of political community “assume the existence of a high level of solidarity” and communities only subsist because “members are prepared to define their interests in the light of a more general common good.” But these communities also subsist because “the social bond between citizens and the state does not extend to aliens”; they are exclusive and mostly established upon “peculiar identities by accentuating the differences between insiders and aliens” (*Ibid*). Linklater thus sees communities as “systems of inclusion and exclusion”, examining “social bonds which unite and separate, associate and disassociate” (*Ibid*).

This view is directly related to the previous observations on discourses as social practices being co-constituted by actors and structures, considering how communities establish “systems of meaning define how actors interpret their material environment” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 266). Yet, stress is on the ideational realm “because institutionalized meaning systems are thought to define the social identities of actors, and [...] social identities are said to constitute actors’ interests and shape their actions” (*Ibid*). This, it must be added, is done through hegemony: the predominance of a set of assumptions and goals maintained by various operations and whose content is disputed, but usually defined by the ruling classes or elites – even by incorporating assumptions and goals of others, as long as they do not fundamentally challenge the primary set

and jeopardize the effectiveness of the entire system based on it, as discussed by several authors of distinct approaches, such as Anderson (2017) and Laclau and Mouffe (2014).<sup>6</sup> In practice, for instance, these operations can constitute what Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (1994: xi) call the “propaganda model” of mass communication, aimed at mobilizing support for “special interests that dominate the state and private activity”, in a process of “manufacturing consent”. One of the main formations analyzed for processes of inclusion and exclusion is the nation and its formal materialization in the nation-state. Benedict Anderson’s ([1986]2016: 28-29) famous premise is that nationality, a modern socio-cultural concept, or nation-ness and nationalism “are cultural artefacts of a particular kind” and must be analyzed by examining “how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy”. Nation is, hence, “an imagined political community”, and it is imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (*Ibid*: 30).

Furthermore, Butler and Spivak (2010: 32-33) discuss the idea that heterogeneity must be eliminated so that the state’s nation is preserved —“except in those cases where a certain pluralism allows for the reproduction of homogeneity on another basis”, whereas *community* as a cultural communion of some sort configures the nation-state “as a political formation that requires periodic expulsion and dispossession of its national minorities in order to gain a legitimating ground for itself”. This unfolds into exclusion and dispossession, by an act of power, from state protection, through the elaboration and implementation of categories that translate into “status” for the non-citizen (*Ibid*: 21). It can translate into the classification, containment, or exclusion of “outsiders”, through discourse and policymaking – the process that this dissertation explores – by presenting issues as “challenges” generating concerns for security, on the one hand, and for the community’s cohesion and solidarity, on the other.

Habermas (1990) sees social solidarity as reliant on social dialogue and necessary for establishing connections based on mutual recognition. Yet, in his critique of Habermas’ propositions, Wilde (2013: 108) questions the idea that solidarity works as a “communicative force that secures the subjective grounding of principles and processes of justice” by contrastingly arguing that some conceptualizations and related practices of solidarity, such as what is labelled “civic” solidarity —e.g., as instituted in Constitutions, as sharing citizenship and its duties, like paying taxes— may still obscure processes of social struggle and thus the fact that the actuality of social solidarity itself is questionable (*Ibid*: 115). Therefore, for Wilde,

The danger in urging support for the construction of civic solidarity and constitutional patriotism in our actually existing (stratified and exploitative) societies is that the old deceptions of nationalism are revisited, only with a less

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<sup>6</sup> Anderson (2017) offers an illuminating historical and political examination of the different conceptualizations and uses of the term *hegemony* by evincing the positions and aims of those wielding it in the course of ideological disputes and even military conflicts.

chauvinistic veneer. We are invited to identify with a civic community of equals, but the equals are not equal at all. The systemic causes of social fragmentation are set to one side while various schemes for democratic renewal and civic education become the order of the day.

Engaging with the risks of abstract conceptualizations of solidarity, Pensky (2008: 1-2) explores the differences between the concept's "normative and descriptive moments", remarking that in contemporary political theory, "solidarity can be invoked as a synonym for community, as the political value against which the freedom of individuals must be balanced and without which freedom becomes hollow". It thus "translates the eighteenth-century ideal of 'fraternity'", close to the ideals of liberty and equality, although relatively marginalized in relation to the latter two in political liberalism (*Ibid*: 1-2). Yet, "in moral philosophy and normative ethics, solidarity can refer to the concept of membership in a moral community or the collective, intersubjective bonds that hold autonomous moral agents together"; each one of these moral agents, in turn, can only exist "as one thinks of oneself as included in an abstract set of all those who count as free and equal actors; a member in a set of all equally constituted moral agents whose mutual recognition forms the interwoven fabric of a moral point of view" (*Ibid*: 2).

Moreover, Linklater (2006: 2) argues, communities "are constantly being remade, and their moral boundaries expand or contract on two separate fronts", in relation to members of other societies—outsiders, and to subaltern groups. This is a conjunctural process that attaches different meanings, for instance, to national boundaries, influenced by ethical and moral concerns (*Ibid*). Moral deficits arise between citizens and outsiders "when citizens attach more moral significance than is justified to differences", or within societies that "prevent minorities from preserving their cultural differences", or when "dominant groups appropriate the most important social resources and meaningful opportunities" (*Ibid*: 3).

Yet, based on Habermas' proposition of communicative action, Linklater argues that "[e]ngaging the systematically excluded in dialogue" about alternatives is "a key ethical commitment for any society" in a process of change (*Ibid*: 7). For instance, among frameworks for this "dialogic community", he recovers distinctions between a pluralist international society engaged in dialogue aimed at preserving order despite the differences, and a "solidarist international society" based on states' cooperation "to protect agreed moral principles such as basic human rights" (*Ibid*: 7). This is also found in this research as internal and external dimensions of solidarity whereby an "imagined community"—which has very real manifestations, such as a set of common rules and declared aims—or its representatives seek to establish and preserve one kind of solidary relation among its members and another kind with non-members, usually framed in humanitarian terms, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3.

To analyze instances of representation in hegemonized narratives about political processes, subjects, and the community, in historical context, CDA is a crucial approach, combined with and combining different tasks. In discourse-historical analysis, Wodak (2001: 64-65) defines the following: "text or discourse immanent critique", looking at contradictions, dilemmas, and so on,

in text-internal or discourse-internal structures; “socio-diagnostic critique”, demystifying exposure of the “possibly persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices” that relies on background or contextual knowledge; and “prognostic critique”, which “contributes to the transformation and improvement of communication”. Applying this approach to the analysis of discriminatory discourse, Wodak produces a table for the identification of discursive strategies that is helpful to this research:

Table 1: Wodak’s (2001: 73) table of discursive strategies.

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Referential/nomination	Construction of in-groups and out-groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• membership categorization</li> <li>• biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies</li> <li>• synecdoches (pars pro toto, totum pro pars)</li> </ul>
Predication	Labelling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits</li> <li>• implicit and explicit predicates</li> </ul>
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment</li> </ul>
Perspectivation, framing or discourse representation	Expressing involvement Positioning speaker’s point of view	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reporting, description, narration or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances</li> </ul>
Intensification, mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of (discriminatory) utterances</li> </ul>

One of these discursive strategies, included in the table, is “framing”. According to Goffman (1984), contexts inform a frame of interpretation of and reaction to reality, and that frame can be built and used in specific strategies. Hence, *framing* entails a choice of how to incorporate a certain voice into a text, how to contextualize it, how different voices are ordered in a text, and in sum, how issues are represented, which can influence how people take the information (Fairclough, 2003: 53). In the process of examining discursive strategies and devices, the project from which this research draws most of its theoretical framework and methodology, MEDIATIZED EU, as explained in the Introduction, also points at the identity and pragmatic factors mobilized in discourses, as outlined by Toshkov et al. (2014) in a study on the EU and public opinion. These are respectively factors or arguments informed by values and principles and by utilitarian logics, e.g., based on perceived interests (*Ibid*). As such, it is important to remark that these factors’ definition is always context specific and need not be mutually exclusive, yet they help support certain narratives that can also reveal patterns of argumentation, as shown in



Chapter 3.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, uncovering discursive strategies enables the research to find, in Michel Foucault's (1991: 59) framework of analysis of political discourses, 1) what is *sayable*, as the dominant discourses; 2) *conservation*, as discourses kept relevant over time or those that disappeared, and which mechanisms or devices they employ; 3) *memory*, as discourses deemed valid or invalid/foreign and by which actors; 4) *reactivation*, meaning past discourses that either persist over time or are transformed—and how; 5) *appropriation*, as which actors compete to maintain control over discourses.

The next sub-sections zoom in on some of the discursive strategies and devices relevant in this study's examination of how the issues, people, processes and actions of interest—in this case, policymaking targeting the community's "foreigners"—are represented, categorized and justified or legitimized.

### 1.2.2. Moral imperatives and narratives as discursive devices

As shown in Wodak's table, above, argumentation is a key discursive strategy for offering reasons and justifying political action. In the study of philosophy of action, ethics, political philosophy and the philosophy of law, according to Alvarez (2017: n.p.), the different types of reasons are: normative—which "favour or justify an action, as judged by a well-informed, impartial observer"; motivating—those that "the 'agent' (that is, the person acting) takes to favour and justify her action and that guides her in acting"; and explanatory—which "explain an action without necessarily justifying it and without being the reasons that motivated the agent". In this sense, Alvarez explains, "a reason justifies or makes it right for someone to act in a certain way. This is why normative reasons are also called 'justifying' reasons". In turn, a reason is "normative" because it builds on "the idea that there are norms, principles or codes that prescribe actions: they make it right or wrong to do certain things" (*Ibid*). Yet, defining these principles in narratives about political action is also a contested social process, as seen above.

Still engaging with Wodak's table, two discursive devices can be identified among *topoi*<sup>8</sup> used for justifying action, while also representing agents and issues through predication: moral imperatives, and ethical or responsabilizing narratives. The former work as "general rules or precepts", while the latter seek to influence behavior and institute norm by producing and circulating arguments (Bénabou et al., 2018: 1). Therefore, distinctions between moral narratives and imperatives are noticeable in their functions, respectively "provid[ing] reasons for what one 'should' do, or on the contrary, justifications for acting according to self-interest", or working as

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<sup>7</sup> More on the project's research focus, goals and case-studies is found in MEDIATIZED EU, *Overview*, at <<https://mediatized.eu/overview/>> [26 July 2022].

<sup>8</sup> *Topoi* is the plural of *topos*, "a traditional or conventional literary or rhetorical theme or topic", according to Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). *Topos*. In *Merriam-Webster.com dictionary*. Retrieved July 27, 2022, from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/topos>

“broad ‘fiat’ prescriptions, dictating a fixed behavior across most situations, without explaining why”—yet frequently mobilizing notions of “right” and “wrong” (*Ibid*).

In analyzing these discursive practices and strategies, Bénabou et al. (*Ibid*) further ponder the workings of narratives by asking the following questions on *viral transmission* and *moral standards*, respectively: “what types of social structures lead exculpatory versus responsabilizing rationales to spread widely, or remain clustered within subgroups?”; and “how tolerant is a society of excuses for self-interested behavior (how compelling do they have to be), how much stigma is borne by those who fail to produce one, and how hard do people search for receivable arguments?” Moreover, regarding imperatives, the authors are most concerned with “how they work: what characteristics confer someone the moral legitimacy to issue them and have (certain) others obey, and when will this be more effective than communicating specific reasons?” (*Ibid*). For instance,

By downplaying externalities, magnifying the cost of moral behavior, or suggesting not being pivotal, exculpatory narratives can allow individuals to maintain a positive image when in fact acting in a morally questionable way. Conversely, responsabilizing narratives can help sustain better social norms.

These are crucial observations to make while making use of CDA. Considering, like Habermas, that language is, among other things, “a medium of domination and social force” that can serve to “legitimize relations of organized power”, and that these legitimations make the institutionalization of power relations possible, “language is also ideological” (quoted in Wodak, 2001:10). Hence, Van Dijk (2006) operationalizes inquiries like those overviewed above in terms of manipulation, structuring them in an “ideological square” in which actors try to legitimize their actions by maximizing their own virtues and victories and minimizing the other’s, and by minimizing their own losses and wrong-doings, while maximizing the other’s. Zooming in on the *identity* mobilized in this operation of self-representation, as either gradually constructed through discourse and manipulation of history or mentally absorbed in specific events, such as wars, Van Dijk (1998: 188) argues that

people construct themselves as being a member of several groups [...]. This self-representation (or self-schema) is located in episodic (personal) memory. It is a gradually constructed abstraction from personal experiences (models) of events. Since such models usually feature representations of social interactions, as well as interpretations of discourse, both experiences and their inferred self-representations are at the same time socially (and jointly) constructed. Part of our self-representation is inferred from the way others see, define and treat us.

Next sub-section will further explore this operation by examining a specific discursive strategy that relies on the ideological use of language and on self-representations of identity and community, providing agents with resources for elaborating arguments that justify and legitimize political actions based on moral imperatives and responsabilizing narratives. This strategy is securitization.

### 1.2.3. Securitization as a discursive strategy

Representations often establish relations of identity, including by defining “differences”, and the politics of identity and difference motivating these representations often turn difference into “otherness”, in turn transformed into a source of insecurity (Weldes et al., 1999: 11; Santos and Santos, 2021). For Campbell (1998: 1-2), “[d]anger is not an objective condition” but a product of subjective creation and reproduction, of understanding and interpretation; it “bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action of event from which it is said to derive”. Moreover, the operation of interpreting danger is not rare, as there is no need for a major event: mere difference can be used to feed this dynamic (*Ibid*: 3). This is relevant because “[a]n important function of interpretation is the way that certain modes of representation crystallize around referents marked as dangers” (*Ibid*: 2). Hence, and again turning to Wodak’s table in 1.1.1, the *predication* of certain people and phenomena as security issues constitutes a practical-discursive strategy, that of *securitization*, a concept drawn from the field of CSS.

In CSS, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) identify the risks of widening the field of security studies by “securitizing” non-military issues, analytically distinguishing between military, environmental, economic, societal, and political sectors. Synthesized, these sectors illuminate different levels of analysis and practice as globalizing, regionalizing, and localizing tendencies (*Ibid*: 164). Specifically, for instance, Wæver et al. (1993) address “societal security” as the idea of preserving language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom in the face of perceptions of threat to societal identity, which they deem key to understand the European security agenda and integration process, addressed in Chapter 2. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998: 168) thus argue that “[t]o grasp political dynamics, one needs to focus on the most dynamic interactions, the loops, the vicious circles”, and to search “for constellations of interlinking securitizations”, which can operate across sectors. For that, they propose the following steps of analysis:

- 1) securitization as a phenomenon, as a distinct type of practice; 2) the security units, those units that have become established as legitimate referent objects for security action and those that are able to securitize —the securitizing actors; and 3) the pattern of mutual references among units —the security complex (*Ibid*: 169).

Building on the work of Buzan et al., Santos et al. (2019: 103) consider securitization a “discursive constitution of a certain group, issue or event as a security matter” and “their categorization as an existential threat for a certain referential”, followed by the “justification of a need for exceptional measures”. For Campbell (1998: 3), danger stems “from the calculation of a threat that objectifies events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk”, which can be integral to foreign policy. Building on Campbell’s concept of “representations of danger” as discourses of insecurity to ask what these discourses do, critical constructivism also offers analyses of insecurity as “culturally produced” (Weldes et al., 1999:

10), where culture is peoples' contexts, encompassing "the multiplicity of discourses [...] through which meaning is produced" (*Ibid*: 2). Hence, securitization relies on the essentialization of certain people and issues, in pervasive "othering processes" whose sustaining "imaginaries and hierarchies [...] can be exacerbated when security topics and agencies are discursively constructed to overlap or intersect, fueling each other and consolidating securitization processes and results" (Santos and Santos, 2021: 47).

For that, the referential of insecurity and the representations of threat appear as "given and fixed" entities, whereas "security is thus understood to mean securing these fixed entities against objective and external threats" (Weldes et al, 1999: 2). Similarly, Burke (2007: 3) argues, without foreclosing normative debates, that the "meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalized", since identity, security, or progress, among others, are often taken for fixed, constraining possibilities of other political and ethical possibilities (*Ibid*: 4). For Campbell (1998: 16), "the objectification and externalization of danger" must be seen as "the effects of political practices" in de-essentialization endeavors. Here, this means that undoing those fixed images and frames made to represent dangers and threats requires that that practice's political and non-neutral character is unveiled through an equally political engagement.

Among analyses of these political practices, those examining *securityscapes* center on "organized violence and the elaboration of security cultures" as "important facts of translocal life" that can "often work in ways that entrench the state rather than 'deterritorialize' it or disarticulate it from the imagined community of the nation" (Weldes et al., 1999: 8). For instance, discussing the interlinkages between these concerns with community, security, and national sovereignty, Soguk (1996: 27) argues that refugees can "manifest the difficulties of the sovereign state, or state sovereignty" but, at the same time, "attendant through humanitarian interventions, refugee bodies also work as resources for statecraft", as

concrete, material, and indeed, as corporeal links between the principle-the claim-of state sovereignty articulated to the citizen/nation/ state hierarchy and practices of statecraft that strive to effect the contingent realities of the hierarchy in time and space and present them as normal and necessary to peace and security in life.

This is a key topic in discussions of the effects of not only territorially and juridically but also discursively attaching nation-states and people. In a conversation with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Judith Butler argues that if the state is the force that binds people, by doing that in the name of a nation, it must continue to reproduce it, and by doing so, it "also unbinds, releases, expels, banishes" (Butler and Spivak, 2010: 4-5). That is because the state's exercise of power "depends upon barriers and prisons and, so, in the mode of a certain containment" (*Ibid*).

This exercise is evident in the process of European integration and community-building and, on the other hand, the dynamics of labor and immigration, in the light of a "Eurocentric" project of democratic politics, as she and Spivak put it (*Ibid*: 85), that has as a key pillar the promise of freedom of movement for the community members and not for outsiders—in the context of the

creation of institutions of all sorts guarding “sustainable exploitation”, as Spivak says (*Ibid*: 82), and as seen in Chapter 2. Butler (*Ibid*: 85-86) argues that by offering integration to new members, the EU is not going about “extending rights of enfranchisement; it’s about the constitution of a ‘we’ that has internally porous borders and increasingly rigid external borders that are, of course, supported by policy.”

For Soguk (1999: 207), “asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants are increasingly seen as sources of change and transformation for the places they affect”. European governments “generally share in this view, though mostly they construe refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants more as people posing various forms of risks and threats and less as people under duress,” with the hosting community’s prosperity and social cohesion at the top of concerns (*Ibid*). That perception is notably fed by seemingly unintentional mix-ups such as the interchangeable use of the terms *migrants* and *refugees*, as noted in studies on applied social psychology that find that the use of “different group labels can impact intergroup relations” (Wyszynski et al., 2020: 607). More specifically, Wyszynski et al. build on previously raised hypotheses about assistance between groups, or of “intergroup helping”, being seen as reinforcing power relations and status, to analyze, among other things, how the use of different labels effect perceptions of threat or other stereotypes vis-à-vis migrants and refugees (*Ibid*: 608). More broadly, the sociology and political economy of migration inspire a wide range of discussions over historical habits curtailed by current regulations on peoples’ movements, based on apparently contradictory geopolitical concerns for national territory and sovereignty, on the one hand, and on the other, human rights and notions of “humanism”, which are further explored in critiques of the reproduction of class relations and the racialized representations of persons, with emphasis on the question of Otherness reflected on the idea of the *alien* (see, e.g., Araújo, 2010; Almeida, 2016). This question is often attached to “fear” and security concerns (Huysmans, 2000, 2006), or even “identity crises” spurred by more material—e.g., economic, crises, leading to the regulation of peoples’ movements in terms of “legal” and “illegal” migration (Iov and Bogan, 2017), but also to a critique of “paternalism” and some sort of re-colonization in a society’s view of and attitude toward the immigrant that it allows in (Velasco, 2014; Bouamama, 2021).

Here, this inquiry is especially interesting for the exercise of further unpacking how migrants and refugees are represented during policymaking processes of which they and their movement or presence are framed as the object of concern, and with which effects on the public playing the role of the threatened “referential”, on one hand, or at times, of the helping community, on the other. As Chapters 2 and 3 will show, these concerns are clearly represented through narratives of a community structured by internal solidarity that must be protected and whose borders must be secured, especially against penetration from Others. The next section examines how these social and political processes unfold in the media.

### 1.3. The mediatization of politics and discourse-historical analysis

This section overviews some of the main theoretical discussions and concepts more specific to the broad fields of Communication and Media Studies considered in the design of the empirical phase of this research, media analysis. As noted in the previous section, understanding the different representations of social life and political processes is key to grasp the complex relationship between media, politics and the public as the actors of social reality. This triangular focus is especially relevant for unpacking practices and the way that perspectives, opinions and representations are constructed in relation to particular goals. In media studies, this relationship is emphasized in debates over the extent of media's "power" to influence or "brainwash" the audience or, on the other hand, the influence that the audience exerts in the media (Curran et al., 1982: 7).

What is ultimately concluded is that media play a central role in "consolidating and fortifying the values and attitudes of audience members" (*Ibid*: 9), and the concept developed to grasp this role and influence that media has played in society is *mediatization* (Hjarvard, 2008: 106). The concept was first used by Kent Asp in the 1980s, when he discussed processes in which political systems are highly influenced by and reliant on the media, whereby one of the issues under analysis is how politicians adapt their discourses for (and to) the media (*Ibid*; Asp, 2014), but its development is inspired by Gudmund Hernes' discussion of a "media-twisted society", regarding which we must

ask what consequences media have for institutions as well as for individuals: the ways public administration, organizations, parties, schools and business function and how they relate to one another. In what ways do media redistribute power in society? [...] In short, from an institutional point of view the key question is, how media change both the inner workings of other social entities and their mutual relationships (Hernes, 1978: 181, quoted in Hjarvard, 2008: 107).

In a recent review of his conceptualization, Asp (2014: 349) explains that his initial question was "how the media influenced politics and affected the distribution of societal power". In his initial research, in 1986, Asp concluded that the media are powerful "by influencing the audience's perceptions and beliefs, and by exercising a considerable amount of discretionary power over the content that influences the audience", but also "a more latent form of power, where the power mechanism is the adaptation of individuals and societal institutions to the media" (*Ibid*: 351.) Hence, he argues, "this invisible face of media power is of even greater importance for the distribution of societal power than the manifest power of the media" (*Ibid*). Asp then systematizes three central themes in his inquiry, "the nature of mediatization, its causes, and its effects", which themselves unfold into five key elements:

- (1) adaptation to a changing media environment,
- (2) media as constraints,
- (3) increased media power and media dependency as causes of mediatization,

- (4) shifts of power as effect, and
- (5) societal change as a consequence of mediatization (*Ibid*: 351).

Thirty years after his first theorization, Asp argues that with new technologies, the only things that they see changed in what he first detected is “pace and scope”, as the process became faster and far-reaching —both in geographical and social terms, and ponders whether this new configuration has also led us to the “mediatization of interpersonal communications” (*Ibid*: 368). All the same, he argues, “the driving forces behind the mediatization of social life are the same as those behind the mediatization of societal institutions”, evolving to become “an independent and powerful institution with a logic of its own”; and in this process, “individuals and social spheres have increasingly adapted to the rules of the game that are imposed by the new media”, with the same effects: “the media have increasingly come to dominate social life, which changes the distribution of societal power” (*Ibid*).

At the micro and medium-levels, this direct influence of the media on social and political life is exerted in various ways, and for some, two of the main ways is “framing” and “agenda-setting”, meaning that the audience is told both how and what they are informed about (McCombs, 1993: 62). For others, the process relies on that relationship between the media and the audience, whereby the former influences but is also influenced by the latter’s preferences, whereas the media’s function of a consent manufacturer —as mentioned in sub-section 1.1.1, working for the dissemination of certain assumptions supporting particular interests, especially through propaganda (Herman and Chomsky, 1994) remains crucial. With that relationship in mind, considering the process of discourse-production and reproduction, as well as the political economy of media ownership and maintenance, in CDA, those with a voice in the media and those controlling which voices and information are conveyed, and how, must be scrutinized.

Therefore, by no longer conceiving media separately from society and culture, but in combination with other social institutions, it is possible to examine how the media sustain a long-lasting and pervasive effect on social life and political processes beyond specific events, such as elections (Hjarvard, 2008: 105). This imbrication, mediatization, is also defined, therefore, as the process whereby society is increasingly “submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic” (*Ibid*: 113). “Media logic”, Altheide (2004: 294) explains, is the set of

assumptions and processes for constructing messages within a particular medium. This includes rhythm, grammar, and format. Format, while a feature of media logic, is singularly important because it refers to the rules or “codes” for defining, selecting, organizing, presenting, and recognizing information as one thing rather than another (e.g., “the evening news” and not a “situation comedy,” or a “parody of news”). This logic—or the rationale, emphasis, and orientation promoted by media production, processes, and messages—tends to be evocative, encapsulated, highly thematic, familiar to audiences, and easy to use. Media culture is produced by the widespread application of media logic. Specifically, when media logic is employed to present and interpret institutional phenomena, the form and content of those institutions are altered.

In this sense, the “mediatization of politics”, according to Strömbäck and Esser (2014a: 6), is “a long-term process through which the importance of the media and their spill-over effects on political processes, institutions, organizations and actors have increased” in the last few decades. This period, the authors argue, has seen an increase in the number of countries adhering to political democratic process —by which they refer to electoral processes— but “the preconditions for political decision-making, public deliberation and political legitimacy have at the same time weakened” (*Ibid*: 3). Hence, for them, in combination with “other large-scale processes such as individualization and globalization, the role of the media is key to understanding the transformation of established democracies” (*Ibid*). Comprehending this process requires examining four related dimensions, with the first three together contributing to the fourth: 1) “the degree to which media constitute the most important source of information about politics and society, and hence also the channel of communication between political institutions and actors on the one hand and the public on the other”; 2) “the degree to which media have become differentiated and independent from other political and social institutions”; 3) “the degree to which media content and the coverage of politics and society is guided by media logic as opposed to political logic”; and 4) “the degree to which political institutions, organizations, and actors are guided by media logic as opposed to political logic” (Strömbäck and Esser, 2014b: 377-378).

Hence, to grasp the complex relationship between media, politics and the public as the actors of these dynamics, Wodak’s (2001: 64-65) discourse-historical approach to CDA engages in text/discourse immanent critique; socio-diagnostic critique; and prognostic critique, by analyzing texts and contexts, and proposing alternative ways of communicating. With that, it is possible to identify discursive strategies, aims, and devices that are crucial in studies of how mediatized discourses represent and constitute social life and political processes, who does that, and for what reason/with which effect.

In the study of the media’s role in these dynamics, key strategies, according to Hooghe and Marks (2005: 13), are priming—determining the topics and parameters of debate; framing—the choice of mechanisms or devices to present and represent issues; and cueing—instilling information with bias. These can be found throughout discourse-historical analysis in connection to the other strategies and devices, to outline and examine dominant discourses, and oppositional and silenced discourses, the actors promoting them, and with which goals and impacts, in order to best act upon and transform social and political processes, including through the media. More specifically, in this research, these tools are used in the examination of the mediatization of an ongoing political process, the discussion and elaboration of common EU policies on migration and asylum, with the aim of analyzing how the media and involved actors appearing in them have used these discursive strategies and devices for conveying their perspectives on migration and asylum within the EU and justifying their actions, and how these strategies have or can impact on the policymaking process that they are covering.



## Conclusion

This chapter outlined the theoretical framework used in this research, inspired by critical epistemological approaches to social practices and political action. By discussing the main conceptual pillars sustaining this discussion and that guide this research, this chapter showed that discourses, as social practices, are made of and influence social and political processes in fundamental ways. Therefore, to understand these processes in historical context and apprehend how they affect the social construction of community research must uncover the discursive and institutional practices defining the communities' idealized principles and boundaries and its structural materialization, especially in relation to non-member others, to then discuss the main discursive devices and strategies deployed in that exercise. Here, these are identified as the elaboration and reiteration of moral imperatives and narratives establishing what are necessary actions and justifications for these actions, and securitization as the discursive strategy representing issues and people as security concerns in order to justify specific actions. These key elements are thus central to the analysis of the different strategies applied in the media, considering their pervasive presence and influence in social life, namely, in the mediatization of politics.

The aim of this theoretical exercise was to set the scene for the discussion of how the EU and its leaders self-represent, how they frame "European challenges" and justify their proposed solutions, and which discursive strategies and devices they employ in all these dimensions of action, and with which effects. Before that, however, a historical-contextual analysis is necessary, so that this study can uncover, track and identify the main relations, actors and arguments driving these discursive practices and clearly define their aims and implications. Hence, the next chapter sets the historical context under analysis, a key step in this proposed discourse-historical analysis of the debate and policymaking of a new common, European policy for migration and asylum.

## 2. The EU and migration: a crisis of solidarity?

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The increasing arrival of migrants and asylum-seekers, and the high numbers of tragedies on European shores, raised concerns for what has been labelled a “migration crisis” or a “refugee crisis” by part of the media (Giuliani et al., 2019) and in EU documents. Attempting to address it collectively, the EC issued a strategic document in 2015 titled “A European Agenda on Migration” and proposed a Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2020. This process led members to discuss the organization’s own principles and values of human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity (Buckel et al., 2017; Hess and Kasperek, 2019), described in its Charter of Fundamental Rights, and spurred live debates among diverse actors, such as Parliamentary Groups in the European Parliament (EP), civil society organizations (CSOs), academia, and the media. Therefore, considering how this dynamic was mediatized, the chapter analyzes these issues to then zoom in on the case of one member-state, Portugal. Portugal has sought to contribute to the Union’s policy- and decision-making processes by putting the EU at the center of its foreign policy (Brito, 2005; Teixeira, 2010), and it is under this light that the chapter examines its approach to migration and asylum on the international and European dimensions, especially during its Presidency of the Council of the EU (CEU) in the first half of 2021.

The aim of this chapter is to set the necessary historical contextualization and further explore the concepts deployed in the recent debate over EU policies on migration and asylum, by focusing on the period between 2014 and 2021. Section 2.1 starts by exploring key conceptualizations of an “European community”, in which solidarity works as a founding normative principle and a guiding thread of debates over policy and practice. Section 2.2 tackles migration dynamics and the policies promoted in the context of this discussion over the Union’s challenges, values, and future, critically examining current practices and policies, namely securitization and externalization, as the EU strategy for dealing with migration and asylum. Section 2.3 presents the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, outlining the main issues of contention over it. Finally, section 2.4 zooms in on the context and state of debates in Portugal.

### 2.1. Building a European community: solidarity as a normative principle

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity. [...] By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace. (Schuman Declaration, 1950, paras. 3 and 8)

As discussed in Chapter 1, different conceptualizations of solidarity in community building carry different aims and effects. This section focuses on its normative conceptualization, in the context of constructing the EU as a European community. Soon after World War II, appeals for peace

inspired the declaration of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of 1950, above —the Schuman Declaration, a historical landmark of an endeavor materialized in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first of several European institutions that became the EU.<sup>9</sup> Building a European community based on solidarity among its members is deemed the cornerstone of plans for binding European nations, with the aim of securing cooperation and peace; solidarity is, therefore, a founding principle of the European Union (EU) (Vignon, 2011; Sangiovani, 2013). But this notion also acquires a strong normative dimension stemming from political reasonings and legal concerns, as it “appears in the constitutional treaties of the EU in various connections” (Koeck, 2019: 85). For instance, “‘solidarity’ appeared alongside ‘cohesion’ in both the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992)”, whereas the Treaty of Lisbon (2006) “expands [this commitment], mentioning it both as a value binding together member states and as a value binding together the citizens of each and every member state” (Sangiovani, 2013: 2). Hence, the institutionalization of solidarity, thus in its normative dimension, is deemed crucial in the consolidation of the EU as a European community, an endeavor in which EU institutions, especially the European Commission (EC), the Council of the European Union (CEU), and the European Parliament (EP), play prominent roles.<sup>10</sup>

According to Pornschlege (2021: 15), solidarity appears as a value, a principle and a clause in EU treaties, with a definition that remains vague and is open to interpretation. For Czuczai (2017: 145-146), although it is not a legal principle in EU law, solidarity has been increasingly important in decision-making processes, “when there is an obvious need to demonstrate solidarity among Member States”. The author cites the Treaty of the EU’s (TEU) articles 2 and 3, respectively, on the EU’s values and on its aims and tasks, where the principle of solidarity appears as the driving force of member-states’ domestic processes of society-building and in the commitment that the Union “shall promote economic, social, and territorial cohesion and solidarity among the Member States”. This, Czuczai argues, translates into an obligation imposed on the EU (*Ibid*: 146). Moreover, solidarity has both a horizontal and vertical nature as well as internal and external dimensions: it applies horizontally, between EU institutions and member-states, and vertically, i.e., regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), when members are called on to support it “in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” and to “comply with the Union’s action in this area”, preserving its “effectiveness as a cohesive force” internationally (*Ibid*: 148).

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9 This historical account is found on the EU’s website in celebration of “70 years of solidarity”, in European Union, Schuman Declaration May 1950, at <[https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950_en)> [20 May 2022].

10 The EC is the executive branch of the EU, functioning as a college of commissioners whose President is elected by the EP, and it proposes political guidelines and legislation; the EP is directly elected by EU citizens and works as co-legislator with the CEU, which in turn is composed of the ministers of national governments assisted by permanent representatives, who negotiate and adopt EU legislation and coordinate policies in different areas, among other tasks. Additionally, the European Council, composed of Heads of State or Government of member-states, the EC’s President and the European Council’s President — currently, Charles Michel from Belgium— sets the EU’s political agenda and priorities.

Specifically, the internal dimension of solidarity is defined in terms of a shared “peaceful future” and “common values”, as the Preamble of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU, 2012/C 326/02, 26 October 2012) states:

The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever-closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values. Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.

As for the external dimension of solidarity, Czuczai (2017: 150) continues, examples are found in clauses that provide that the EU “shall contribute to [...] solidarity and mutual respect among peoples”, in Article 3(5) of TEU, or that the EU’s “action on the international scene shall be guided by the principle (...) [of] solidarity”, in Article 21(1). Therefore, this dimension guides the EU’s projection as a global actor that promotes liberal-democratic principles—listed in the Preamble of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, above—through norm diffusion or intervention in its neighborhood and beyond, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s (Dias, 2014). Proposals to strengthen unity are thus presented as agendas to deepen the EU’s role not only in its citizens’ lives but in the world as, among other conceptualizations, a normative power (Manners, 2006); an international actor, namely in its action on external crises (Rieker and Gjierde, 2021); or as a global actor aiming to “promote and reform the rules-based, multilateral global order” (European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the EU, 2020, para. 7).

Internally, the principle of solidarity interlinks with that of responsibility vis-à-vis the community and its challenges, as “member states are increasingly called to share responsibility and handle issues with a solidarity-inspired approach when dealing with economic, financial, social, and humanitarian challenges affecting Europe since early 2008” (Di Napoli and Russo, 2018: 195). Yet, the years of 2007-2008 are deemed important indicators of the disconnect between different views of solidarity because if, for some, the economic crisis seemed to catalyze the integration process (Vignon, 2011), it also stirred questions about the effects of particular conceptualizations, notably in the socioeconomic impacts of the austerity policies implemented as the only way to face it (Di Napoli and Russo, 2018). During that type of crisis, it becomes clearer how neoliberal precepts of austerity instead of social solidarity hegemonize this process, supporting a geopolitical worldview and the political economy of European integration, in a dynamic that also highlights the prominence of nation-states in political decision-making, working as the guarantors of the interests of ruling (Pureza and Mortágua, 2016).<sup>11</sup> Hence, “regional blocs like the EU/EMU

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<sup>11</sup> As Pureza and Mortágua (2016: 365) note, one of the narratives on the economic crisis “is centred in the non-innocent anachronism ‘PIIGS’ (refers to Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). This explanation suggests that the problems of the euro can be found in the fiscal profligacy and indiscipline of the south.

[European Monetary Union] act now as privileged tools of the neoliberal strategies of exposition to global competition” (*Ibid*: 364).

By contrast, the current period of crisis framed by the Covid-19 pandemic, declared as such by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March 2020,<sup>12</sup> has been exemplary of different measures of solidarity, especially materialized in the collective issuance of debt in order to fund national recovery plans lasting from 2021 through 2026 (EC, 2021). Pornschlegle (2021), for instance, argues that while the previous crisis did not stir as much solidarity between EU members states, which were more concerned with holding others accountable, the difference in approach stems from the fact that the “Covid-19 crisis” was deemed none of the members-countries’ fault and all were affected by it. However, strong criticism emerged, as seen in a motion by the Left Group in the EP, during discussions over measures to curb the effects of this crisis, which although not based on austerity, still retain a fundamentally problematic approach: they are “limited and temporary, determined according to a logic of indebtedness that adds further debt to already unsustainable debts and according to conditionalities that neither guarantee workers’ and the peoples’ rights nor respond to the needs of the Member States, deepening asymmetries, inequalities and relations of dependency within the EU”, including by “making concessions to the interests of the major European powers and the big economic and financial groups” (2020/2631(RSP), para. M). These different instances and perspectives show that if, as Pornschlegle (2021: 15) puts it, the emergence of solidarity is a political process that depends on context and on the governments’ willingness to share responsibilities through solidarity mechanisms, it is also informed and to an extent constrained by the ideological assumptions and political underpinnings of the measures proposed, be them of financial and economic characteristics, as seen above, or of social and even humanitarian concern, as discussed ahead. What these observations show, therefore, is that while solidarity is a value that can also be interpreted as a legal obligation, its content and effects will be defined by the political agenda of those mobilizing the concept for promoting or justifying certain policies and action.

As mentioned, this community-building process has a strong institutionalized character, where a few of the EU’s institutions play key roles in normalizing values and principles. They are not alone, though, as other actors participate, including civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media. Remarkably, engaging in the process of integration and community-building, EU citizens have demanded more space for engagement, not only by casting their votes for the EP and also other EU leadership roles, but also in permanent, rather than *ad hoc*, consultation processes (Alemanno, 2020; Hierlemann et al., 2022). The latter was recently translated into calls on citizens

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PIIGS, or the peripheral countries of the Eurozone, are charged with having allowed for excessive nominal wage growth (that exceeded productivity), relatively to the core countries.”

<sup>12</sup> Since the coronavirus outbreak spreading Covid-19 was declared a pandemic, up until 22 July 2022, the WHO estimates that over 6,373,739 people died of the disease and its consequences, 2,041,618 of them in the European region. See more in World Health Organization, *Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic*, 22 Jul. 2022, at <<https://www.who.int/europe/emergencies/situations/covid-19>> [23 July 2022].

to engage in the Conference on the Future of Europe, lasting throughout the years of 2021 and 2022, in a series of events. This initiative was conceptually elaborated in the EC, CEU and EP's (2021: 6) joint declaration as a "citizens-focused, bottom-up exercise for Europeans to have their say on what they expect from the European Union", with the goal of "engaging citizens for democracy" and "building a more resilient Europe". It ushers debate on health, climate change and environment, economy, social fairness, equality and intergenerational solidarity, digital transformation, "European rights and values including the Rule of Law", and "challenges" like migration, followed by security, "the EU's role in the world" and its "democratic foundations" (*Ibid*).

In this sense, Cristiano Bee (2008: 432) adopts a social constructivist approach to European integration to examine how an identity is built and "developed by the European institutions, the Commission in particular", considering the EU as a "multi-level structure" where "different publics with different sources of power interact and develop practices" (*Ibid*). Bee (*Ibid*: 433) cites various proposals for comprehending this process, from the view of a collectivity of European cultures instead of one identity (Smith, 1992) to that of identity as "the result of political manipulation, reinvention and the selection of certain patterns of values", mentioning Anderson's (1983) work on "imagined communities", where education, symbols and communication tools have been deployed for the formation of national identities (Gellner 1984; Deutsch, 1994).

Remarkably, as Bee (2008: 433) argues, while "the EU is self-representing [...] by referring explicitly to concepts such as the public sphere and European citizenship, as well as to a broad set of policies", the EC has played a key role in developing its own idea of European identity to legitimize a system by infusing it with a democratic basis. The author mentions, for instance, the EC's 2006 White Paper on Communication Policy, which advocates the "necessity of creating a European public sphere, through the activation of a real media policy, and the realization of measures aimed at enhancing dialogue and debate for improving democracy," with "a set of initiatives and specific programmes in order to gain visibility with the public opinion" and a "new and broader conception of citizenship", proposing ways to enhance an "Active European Citizenship" (*Ibid*: 446). To illustrate this point, in a recent joint declaration on legislative priorities, the EC, EP and CEU (2022, paras. 5-6) listed, among others, measures for "promoting our European way of life, including when facing health crises" and "protecting and strengthening our democracy and defending common European values".

In effect, in this process of "Europeanization" (Bee, 2008: 446), this conceptual identity-building entwines with a political-economic liberal framework to be implemented in EU member-states or candidates in the accession phase, in a "unilateral institutional assimilation" (Richmond et al., 2021: 31), and in foreign policy, through which the EU promotes "a particular [liberal] universality in the international realm" (Dias, 2014: 76). Hence, in this complex, bidimensional process —imagined/subjective and institutional/objective— of community-building,

polymaking is a key component in developing subjective and objective elements; it involves communication, confirmation, and reiteration in efforts to keep the project going while facing crises of apparently different natures —economic, political, security or health crises and challenges (Di Nappoli and Russo, 2018; Rieker and Gjierde, 2021). Therefore, these discussions illuminate the role of EU institutions in setting policy agendas, especially the EC, through political guidelines and plans for tackling issues that represent opportunities or challenges to the European integration process and community-building (Bee, 2008). While this role is shared with member-states as the agents promoting the interests of governing classes (Pureza and Mortágua, 2016) and political groups holding major representative positions, by zooming in on the EC it is possible to identify which conceptualizations inform and justify its set of priorities and policy goals, which is the goal of this analysis.

It is worth remarking that the former and current Presidents of the EC are members of the conservative center-right, majoritarian group in the EP, the European People’s Party (EPP): Jean-Claude Juncker (2014-2019) and Ursula von der Leyen (2020-2024).<sup>13</sup> Juncker’s (2014: 8) political guidelines sought to tackle the consequences of the economic and financial crisis by proposing ten policy areas that appealed to European unity as an advantage for the EU’s competitiveness, the internal market as “Europe’s best asset”, and “labour mobility” and “free movement as an economic opportunity, and not as a threat”. Stating concern for avoiding social dumping by preventing wage disparities for similar work, and for the “democratization” of the EMU to establish a more “legitimate and more accountable structure”, Juncker’s overarching goal was to contribute to an EU “that is bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on small things” (*Ibid*: 4). His priorities relied on statements such as:

Our European Union is more than a big common market. It is also a *Union of shared values*, which are spelled out in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Citizens expect their governments to provide justice, protection and fairness with full respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law. This also requires joint European action, based on *our shared values* [emphases added] (*Ibid*: 9).

EC President Ursula von der Leyen’s political program states, as a general commitment, the aim to “strengthen the links” between people, nations and institutions, expectations and delivery, words and deeds (Von der Leyen, 2019: 3). With a global ambition, she argues, “Europe must lead the transition to a healthy planet and a new digital world. But it can only do so by bringing people together and upgrading our unique social market economy to fit today’s new ambitions” (*Ibid*). Citing debates with the EP’s political groups and CEU’s Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024 as instances of her coordination with these institutions, she listed as her term’s priorities to work for 1) A European Green Deal, 2) An economy that works for people, 3) A Europe fit for the

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<sup>13</sup> As well as the previous EC President José Manuel Durão Barroso (2004-2014), whose political party, the Social-Democratic Party (PSD), from Portugal, is also affiliated with the EPP group in the EP.

digital age, 4) Protecting our European way of life, 5) A stronger Europe in the world, 6) A new push for European democracy (*Ibid*: 4). Point (4) is particularly relevant for this research, since this is the framework where the EC inserted proposals for a new common policy on migration and asylum—which already hints at her approach to the issue, as discussed ahead.

As mentioned, the conceptualization of “solidarity” as a function of the process of community-building, European integration and Europeanization reflects directly on EU foreign policy. In this respect, a final note must be made on what David Chandler (2006: 8) called “empire in denial”—when “[p]ower is exercised in a way which is transforming international relations and the relations between non-Western states and their societies”, and “the actors who wield this power seek to deny accountability for its exercise”. In practice, this includes mobilizing the idea of an “ethical foreign policy” as the drivers of interventions other than military, especially through financial assistance and development programs (*Ibid*:72). Notably, Chandler (*Ibid*: 73) argues more generally that “Western denial of responsibility and accountability in relation to the non-Western world is resulting in the development of new mechanisms of intervention and regulation which separate policy-making power from political discussion and debate”, whereas the Other, non-Western states and societies are increasingly held responsible, in a “context of denial and evasion” in which Western states and institutions claim to be acting on behalf of the Other’s interests instead of their own. This, Chandler argues, seems to be based on an “Other-regarding ethics” defined by Emmanuel Lévinas, according to which “legitimacy should be derived from our ‘fear for the Other’” (*Ibid*: 78).

This type of ethics, which works as a sort of narrative for the purpose of this study, is at play in debates over policies on migration and asylum as they appear in EU strategic documents, seen above; yet there is no absence of claims regarding “our interests” to legitimize foreign policy goals. They are admittedly the horizon of the EU leaders’ elaborations, as the strategic formulation “Protecting our European way of life”, among others, demonstrates. The Other may be and is—as Chapter 3 further demonstrates—“defined on the basis of needs”, the object whose security and development serve Us too (*Ibid*: 73), but this Other still has an alien outlook and a foreign, displaced status, unless the community allows them in. This is how this research approaches discussions over migration and asylum in contexts framed as periods of crisis, starting with what was labelled the “migration/refugee crisis” by part of the media (Giuliani et al., 2017) and in EU documents, where solutions include more interventions abroad while promoting the community’s enclosure (Pinos, 2009; Andersson, 2014). Despite attempts at discursively concealing this distinction, the principle of solidarity still has been employed differently in its internal and external dimensions —between Us and the Other— as discussed ahead.

## **2.2. Solidarity in “fortress Europe”: the securitization of people in EU policies of migration and asylum**

As noted in Chapter 1 and illustrated in Chapter 3, there is sometimes a conceptual mix-up in terms, but also a rhetorical and oftentimes practical distinction of treatment of persons categorized



as either *migrants* or *asylum-seekers / refugees* in general debates and in media coverage, when choices for one term or the other can be deliberate but not always correct. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the term *migrant* is not a legal status and is not consensually defined, but describes

a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally-defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students (IOM, n.d.).

On the other hand, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol do establish a legal status and the responsibilities of protection of the person granted asylum, having also “helped inspire important regional instruments”, including the 1969 Refugee Convention in Africa, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration in Latin America, and a common asylum system in the EU (UNHCR, 2011: 1).<sup>14</sup> Bestowing on these persons a set of rights for their protection (see Figure 2.1), the Convention defines as a refugee a person outside his or her country of nationality or residence, who “has a well-founded fear of being persecuted” for several reasons and is “unable or unwilling to avail him—or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution” (*Ibid*).

Figure 2.1. Rights contained in the 1951 Convention (UNHCR, 2011: 4).

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The right not to be expelled, except under certain, strictly defined conditions (Article 32);</li> <li>● The right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory of a contracting State (Article 31);</li> <li>● The right to work (Articles 17 to 19);</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The right to housing (Article 21);</li> <li>● The right to education (Article 22);</li> <li>● The right to public relief and assistance (Article 23);</li> <li>● The right to freedom of religion (Article 4);</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The right to access the courts (Article 16);</li> <li>● The right to freedom of movement within the territory (Article 26); and</li> <li>● The right to be issued identity and travel documents (Articles 27 and 28).</li> </ul> |
|---|--|---|

But more than assessing the formal adequacy of the uses of these terms, what discussions of the mix-up emphasize is their intent and effects. While both terms reflect people’s perceived or real circumstances and goals, use of the term asylum-seeker or refugee distinguishes this group from that of “migrants” in that the latter is usually associated with economic concerns and the former with humanitarian concerns; still, their categories are similarly framed in terms of security and legality in the media and in political discourses. For instance, considering the securitization of

<sup>14</sup> But differently from the practice of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which considers a refugee every person fleeing war, violence, conflict or persecution and who crossed an international border in search for protection, regardless of their formal status, the EU’s statistical services Eurostat only considers “refugees” people who have been formally granted this status (EASO, 2021).

people's movements across borders, of which the referential, in this case, is the EU and its citizenry, the concern here addressed is with how this practice effectively translates not only into a hierarchization of citizenship and the marginalization of the immigrant person in so-called cosmopolitan societies, of which the EU claims to be representative (Almeida, 2016: 124), but also into the more evident containment, control and banishment of the foreigner's presence or movement on this land or even its edges.

Therefore, these distinctions also reflect on how the concepts of solidarity and security are mobilized in the representation of the community and of its others, the foreigners, including in the institutional discourse. As noted in the previous section, the principle of solidarity is prominent in EU treaties and in a variety of areas, notably in proposals for a common EU policy on migration and asylum as "sector-specific" instances (Czuczai, 2017: 146). In this case, too, the principle is used in its internal dimension, whereas the EU's "humanitarian" duties towards people dying on its borders are framed in terms of moral/ethical imperatives and narratives, as this research shows. What is more striking, however, is how the concept of solidarity is articulated with that of security, both predominantly used in reference to the community and its members, in a way that reinforces its self-centrism.

The apparatus with which the EU counts for dealing with migration and asylum has been constantly scrutinized by those calling for reforms. Its Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was established since 1999 as a combination of legislative instruments for harmonizing the treatment of requests and one agency: the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualification Directive, the European Dactyloscopy database (EURODAC) Regulation and the Dublin Regulation, capped with the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).<sup>15</sup> Notably, for member-states "faced with specific and disproportionate pressures on their asylum and reception systems, due in particular to their geographical or demographic situation", EASO was tasked with "support[ing] the development of solidarity within the Union to promote a better relocation of beneficiaries of international protection between Member States, while ensuring that asylum and reception systems are not abused" (Regulation (EU) 439/2010, 19 May 2010, para. 7). In 2021, the office was replaced by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), mandated with supporting member-states in applying the package of EU laws that governs asylum and international protection (ECRE, 2022).

Criticisms have notably converged in the Dublin Regulation—made of the Dublin Convention (1990), subsequently turned into the Dublin II Regulation (2003) and Dublin III (2013), which was negotiated to tackle perceived "challenges" for the Schengen Area of free movement posed by the reception of asylum-seekers in its members' territories.<sup>16</sup> According to Garcés-Mascareñas

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<sup>15</sup> More on the system's structure in European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs: "Common European Asylum System", at <[https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system_en)> [25 July 2022].

<sup>16</sup> The EC's website summarizes: "The border-free Schengen Area guarantees free movement to more than 400 million EU citizens, along with non-EU nationals living in the EU or visiting the EU as tourists,

(2015: 1-2), instead of distributing responsibility for refugees between the member-states, this regulation's aim is "to establish the state responsible for processing each application quickly, based on some pre-established criteria", especially "to avoid someone seeking asylum in the country of their choice (so-called 'asylum shopping') or being present in Europe without any country taking responsibility for examining their request ('orbiting')."<sup>17</sup> A package of reforms of the CEAS was launched in 2016, with legislative proposals pushed through the EP in the following years,<sup>18</sup> but for Maiani (2016: 6), the Regulation's persistent shortcomings "inflict hardship on protection seekers and damag[ing] the efficiency of the CEAS", such as imposing destinations to asylum-seekers through relocation schemes, preventing them from evaluating conditions of integration and choosing where to move; member-states' "defensive rather than cooperative behavior" in the absence of "solidarity mechanisms"; and relying on heavily bureaucratic procedures that cause delays.

Conceptually and practically, critics of the many regulations and practices usually point at the contradiction between the ideals of European principles such as solidarity, based on freedom and human rights, and its migration and asylum policies—etched in the concept of "fortress Europe". As that is not a novel trend, this is also not a new metaphor: for instance, in the early 1990s, Shada Islam (1994: 38) writes that "as political, ethnic and economic problems multiply across their borders, EU countries which once stuck adamantly to their national competence in the area of immigration are coming to the conclusion they can no longer go it alone"; hence, whereas the concept of "fortress Europe" was reserved for the EU's protectionist strategy to keep foreign goods and services out, it was employed against foreign people too. As Huysmans (2000: 754) puts it, a number of regulations have established the foundations of "fortress Europe", and in the process of development of the internal market and the conditions for the free flow of goods and services, Council Regulation 1612/68 of 1968 emerges as the source of distinction between the right of free movement of citizens from member-states and those of third countries —namely, concerning workers (Ugur, 1995: 967 apud Huysmans, 2000: 754).<sup>19</sup>

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exchange students or for business purposes (anyone legally present in the EU)." In its origin, "the concept of free movement was to enable the European working population to freely travel and settle in any EU State", and in 1985, in Schengen, Luxembourg, the Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at common borders was signed, followed by the Convention for its implementation in 1990, in effect since 1995. In European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs: "Schengen Area", at <[https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-area\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-area_en)> [25 July 2022].

<sup>17</sup> This, Garcés-Masareñas (2015: 2) continues, draws on three principles: asylum-seekers can only apply once in the EU and if the request is denied, all member-states recognize this result; the member-state responsible for examining the application is established not by the applicants' preference but by the Regulation's criteria; and "asylum-seekers may be 'transferred' to the member-state to which they have been assigned."

<sup>18</sup> For an overview of the CEAS' reforms as a precedent of the new Pact discussed in the next section, in a study ordered by the EP's Directorate for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, see Brouer et al. (2022).

<sup>19</sup> More examples include interventions from the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group in the EP, campaigning in 2005 against this process by tackling the situation on "the Southern frontier of fortress Europe", and correspondent Mathew Carr's (2016) use of the term for his book's title, subtitled "Dispatches from a Gated Continent".

Therefore, the concept also translates into more or less concerted efforts to keep people out, either by erecting physical barriers or implementing deterrence procedures of various sorts, including ostensive practices such as pushbacks—which the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR, n.d.) defines as “state measures aimed at forcing refugees and migrants out of their territory while obstructing access to applicable legal and procedural frameworks”, thus “circumvent[ing] safeguards governing international protection (including minors), detention or custody, expulsion, and the use of force”— or diplomatic agreements with third countries in order to prevent peoples’ crossings, based on measures as diverse as outsourced border patrolling or other interventions through financial aid and development programs (Pinos, 2009; Jones, 2016). These are some of the practices compounding what critics have termed the EU’s externalization of its migration and asylum policies, or its “war on immigration” (Rekacewicz, 2013).

Meanwhile, as old and new “humanitarian catastrophes” unfold, such as shipwrecks off the Italian coast around the Lampedusa Island and the Spanish enclaves in Africa such as Ceuta and Melilla, or huge fires in camps in the Greek Islands of Lesbos and Samos, sheltering thousands of migrants, media coverage of these tragedies stirs commotion and human rights advocacy holds the EU accountable for the way migration and asylum have been dealt with. Notably, the so-called migration crisis of 2014-2015, better named a “reception and solidarity crisis” (Karangeorgieou and Noll, 2022), was marked by “a humanitarian catastrophe at the EU border”, with about 18,000 people having died in the attempt to reach the continent between 2015 and 2019 (Martins and Strange, 2019: 195). These numbers, Martins and Strange argue, “expose a failure of the EU and its Member-states to live up to the principles that it is founded upon: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights” (*Ibid*).

In response to this reality, EU leaders have adopted at least two approaches in their calls for policy changes and coordination—for stricter and/or for fairer common policies, mobilizing moral imperatives and ethical narratives that to some extent combine identity and pragmatic reasonings, as explained in Chapter 1 and illustrated in Chapter 3. For instance, former EC President Juncker (2014a: 9) considered that the “terrible events in the Mediterranean have shown us that Europe needs to manage migration better, in all aspects. This is, first of all, a humanitarian imperative” which demands “a spirit of solidarity to ensure that situations such as the one in Lampedusa never arise again”; for him, based on “our shared values, we need to protect those in need through a strong common asylum policy.” Part of the plan was using EASO “to assist third countries and Member States authorities in dealing with refugees and asylum requests in emergency situations, where appropriate on the ground in a third country”, and also promoting “a new European policy on legal migration” that could “help us to address *shortages of specific skills* and attract talent to better cope with the *demographic challenges* of the European Union [emphases added]” (*Ibid*).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Despite the promotion of “legal migration” and the “attraction of talent” to overcome European shortages, most of the migrant labor-force in the EU is still made of “essential workers”. Accommodation / food service activities (11.4%) and construction (8.6%) were the top two lines of work for non-EU citizens in 2020. This means that immigrant workers are still mostly employed as cleaners and helpers (11.9%),

Meanwhile, he continues, “we need to secure Europe’s borders”, because “common asylum and migration policies will only work if we can prevent an uncontrolled influx of *illegal migrants*. We therefore need to step up the operational capacities of the European border agency FRONTEX”; this, he says, turning to the agency’s budget and operation, “is the *joint responsibility* of all EU Member States, North and South, which needs to be taken up in a *spirit of solidarity*” (*Ibid*) (emphases added). Before the EP, he emphasizes this point:

Let us protect our external borders. Let us combat the criminal groups who make money off of other people’s misery. Let us help would-be immigrants in their own countries, before they get on a boat to cross the Mediterranean. And let us establish better solidarity between Northern and Southern Europe. Illegal immigration and the refugee crisis are not the problems of Malta, Cyprus, Italy or Greece, they are the problems of Europe as a whole (Juncker, 2014b, n.p.).

Next, in 2015, the EC sent the Parliament a communication on *A European Agenda on Migration* (COM(2015)240) that called on the adoption of a common approach to avoid continue dealing with the challenge through emergency measures, and highlighted a view that action had to be taken in the face of the tragic news coming from the Mediterranean in a period of crisis. Besides saving people at sea, immediate action included relocation in the EU of those that managed to arrive, as well as enlisting third countries in preventing people from attempting to reach Europe. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) found the EC’s plan to implement a common understanding and approach necessary, as the “immediate challenge for the EU is to bring the current chaotic situation under control and to ensure that people seeking international protection are treated properly” (COM(2015) 240 final, para. 1.2). The Committee favored “the immediate setting up of ‘hotspots’ to support countries faced with a large influx of migrants and insist[ed] they are given the necessary resources and support” (*Ibid*); and recommended the adoption of “*a truly common European* asylum system based on harmonised procedures throughout the EU” (*Ibid*, para. 1.3) relying on a “robust, *solidarity-based systems of burden-sharing*, especially a permanent, fair and binding system for allocating those seeking protection between all EU countries”, and on “long-term solutions for the event that mass migrations continue or occur again” (*Ibid*) (emphases added).

Still, as the unequal distribution of arrivals and applications continued stirring tensions between EU member-states, “many consider the situation a crisis of politics rather than a crisis of numbers”, since the initial call for solidarity “generated uneven responses”, including changes from a rather welcoming approach by Germany, Austria and Sweden to “a policy of closure, including border controls, tighter asylum laws and deterrence procedures” (Bermúdez, 2020). Yet, contrary to expectations, according to Lutz (2021), migration and the securitization of

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personal service workers (9.0%) and building workers (5.8%) or mining, construction, manufacturing and transport workers (5.6%). On the other hand, among those considered skilled workers, at most, about 2.5% of non-EU citizens were teaching professionals and another 2.5% were business and administration professionals (EC, 2021b).

people's movements did not challenge the EU border arrangements internally —only externally. The focus was thus to remain on “securing” the EU's external borders, as Juncker's stress on the need to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) showed. Next section examines whether any substantial changes unfolded in the following period.

### 2.3. The EU Pact for Migration and Asylum: a “fresh start” or a “repetition of past mistakes”?

The EC's President Ursula von der Leyen presented her proposal for a New Pact on Migration and Asylum on 23 September 2020, during Germany's Presidency of CEU, on a program that prioritized the promotion of changes in this matter. That was also weeks after huge fires in overcrowded camps on the Greek Lesbos Island, on 9 September, evinced once more the poor conditions of travel and reception of migrant and asylum-seeking persons, thus generating significant impetus for change, as the Commissioners themselves put it (EC, 2020a).<sup>21</sup> Illustratively, in anticipation, Von der Leyen announced in her State of the Union address to the EP what she deemed to be an opportunity for the EU to heal the “scars” of division among member-states, mentioning the need for a more “humane approach” whereby “saving lives at sea is not optional”, as well as for “a closer link between asylum and return”, for instance (EC, 2020b). In Germany's program, under the chapter “A Europe of security and common values”, next to the section “Strengthening security for our citizens”, a familiar set of concerns is raised in “Updating European migration and asylum policy” (Germany's Presidency of CEU, 2020: 19). Based on “European values, rule-of-law and humanitarian standards”, it cites the EC's proposal to call for “a fair, operational, efficient and crisis-proof system” that “updates the regulations on responsibilities and solidarity”, thus implementing “mandatory procedures on the EU's external borders” to “categorise and assess asylum applications in preliminary proceedings at an early stage and to refuse entry into the EU where it is evident that no need for protection exists”; to “strengthen and expand the [EU's] capacities for resettlement”; implement “common standards for cooperation” and “effective procedures for the efficient and humane repatriation of those required to leave”; expand “cooperation with countries of origin, receiving and transit states” to “mitigate the causes of displacement and irregular migration and to stabilise” these regions, as well as establish an “early-warning mechanisms” based on the EU's capacity of analyzing migration situations; to “tackle irregular migration and successfully combat people smuggling” by making “protection of our external borders” more effective —for which implementing a new Frontex mandate is deemed “vital”; and to protect the Schengen system, “an indispensable pillar of European cooperation and integration” that “can only work if our citizens' security and controlled management of immigration are guaranteed” (*Ibid*: 20). Finally —after everything else

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<sup>21</sup> Fires in the Mória Reception and Identification Center, in Lesbos, destroyed the shelters of about 13,000 people, and Vice-President for “Promoting our European Way of Life”, Margaritis Schinas, said: “Moria is a stark reminder that the clock has run out on how long we can live in a house half-built. The time has come to rally around a common, European migration policy” (EC, 2020).

is “secured”, the program adds: “Europe needs better legal migration opportunities. To tackle the shortage of skilled workers, legal migration opportunities for workers from third countries should be used and accessed more effectively” (*Ibid*).

This summary is faithful to the EC’s proposal and coherent with its own framing of the issue, not the least for the choice of words and structure in both documents. Von der Leyen’s announced proposal appears in her program for the Presidency of the EC, worked out as political guidelines incorporated into the Commission’s Strategic priorities for 2019-2024, under the chapter “Promoting our European way of Life: Protecting our citizens and our values” (EC, 2019). Notably, the two main claims regarding a new pact are functions of the urge to protect the EU’s gates: “We need strong external borders”, for which the main step is to reinforce Frontex; and “We have to modernise our asylum system”, for which CEAS must be indeed common, since “We can only have stable external borders if we give enough help to Member States facing the most pressure because of their place on the map” (*Ibid*: 15). Therefore, she states, if the EU is to protect and expand the Schengen Area, “We need a new way of burden sharing. We need a fresh start” (*Ibid*). Hence, one of the Pact’s main novelties, as advertised, was the creation of a mechanism of “flexible yet mandatory” solidarity and sharing of responsibility through which member-states could opt between hosting /relocating or sponsoring the return of asylum-seekers whose requests were denied at the border. Clearly, this is a call for internal solidarity and shared responsibility for managing migration, asylum, and return/deportation.

Key to the Pact’s aims, in 2021, the EC also presented a new “Strategy on the Future of Schengen” (EC, 2021), aiming “to ensure that reintroducing internal border controls remains a measure of last resort” and to introduce “common tools to manage the external borders more efficiently in case of a public health crisis”, while condemning the “instrumentalisation of migrants” by third states for political reasons. This is a reference, for instance, to the situation on the border between Poland, Lithuania and Belarus, where the latter is accused of leading people towards the EU in retaliation for the Union’s sanctions, whereas the former two claim to be holding them off at all costs—including by repressing and pushing people back, as denounced in a joint statement of over 100 NGOs calling on the EU to “restore rights and values at Europe’s borders” (ECCHR, 2021).



Figure 2.2. The Schengen Area. Source: European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, 2021.

Consequently, the two main and entwined focus of criticism of the EU migration and asylum practices, externalization and securitization of migrant movement and people, resurface as concerns with the presentation of the proposed Pact. Numerous human rights organizations, political parties and parliamentary groups, scholars and migrants and refugees themselves promptly identified the repetition of mistakes in this new attempt. For Human Rights Watch (2020), “[i]nstead of breaking with the fallacies of the EU’s previous approach and offering a fresh start, the Pact risks exacerbating the focus on externalisation, deterrence, containment and return”. For instance, Janna Wessels (2021, n.p.) writes, so-called “border procedures”, a key element of the EC’s Pact, constitute a hostile policy measure that “allow for asylum applications that are made by persons who arrive without a valid visa to be processed directly at the border or in transit zones”. More specifically, these “procedures will have to rely on restrictions of movement of asylum seekers at border or transit zones, which may [...] amount to detention.” For all that matters, these are persons seeking refuge and international protection, and thus procedures like these may constitute flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (Kmak and Phillips, 2022). Similarly, Oxfam’s EU migration policy advisor, Raphael Shilhav says:

The EU has acknowledged the failure of its old policies. While the new migration pact aims to balance responsibility-sharing across the EU, it is copying many of the previous flawed policies with member states already questioning its purpose. Reworked policies and member state inaction are at best leaving people in limbo, at worst sending them back to the dangers they are trying to escape (Oxfam, 2021, n.p.).

Fundamentally, as noted in a study on the Pact’s legal bases and implications requested by the EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), the notion of solidarity, which has actually inhabited debates over a common European asylum system since the 1990s,



developed along with the Schengen rules' development and abolition of internal borders in a logic "faithful to the market" (Brouwer et al., 2021: 153). This way, "[t]hrough the exclusion of refugees from free movement, solidarity was directed towards the core of Member States' populations who were seen as threatened by irregular movements" (*Ibid*). Fundamentally, the study's authors argue,

In EU debates, this notion has adopted a predominant inter-state focus alienated or dissociated from individuals. It has been mainly nurtured by a state-centric understanding and framing of responsibility in relation to international protection, side-lining states accountability in cases of human rights and refugee protection violations and refugee agency. Solidarity is wrongly framed as something voluntary and as a charity-based option, as opposed to an obligatory EU legal principle to be equally shared among all EU Member States with due regard to its human and fundamental rights dimension (*Ibid*: 154-155).

Moreover, this combines with the EU's attempts to transfer responsibilities for migration and asylum requests to third countries, materialized in agreements signed with countries like Turkey, Morocco, and Libya, aimed at preventing and controlling movement into the EU even before people reached its doors (Jones, 2016; Frelick et al., 2016; Kmak and Phillips, 2022). EU institutions present externalization as "an instrument [...] to avoid migrants taking very dangerous journeys", but it is also deemed a result of "the failure to develop a common migration policy" (Vara and Matellán, 2021: 316), whereas infringement upon these people's human rights in third countries and the persistence of EU responsibilities under international humanitarian law have also been emphasized (European Parliament, 2020). Hence, there is no lack of systematic analysis of a continued process of fortification of the EU, considering its physical form, but especially the institutional and juridical forms, as Reynolds (2020: 342-343) strongly argues:

Perceptions of migration from the South as existential emergency for European states have prompted more ruthlessly restrictive border regimes. Migrants drown in their thousands. Their rescue is criminalized. The European Union enters international arrangements—most notoriously with Turkey and Libya—to offshore the border and outsource enforcement. On the longer historical arc of human mobility, the border regimes currently imposed by rich, white-majority jurisdictions are an absurd, morbid anomaly. But they are effectively facilitated and legitimated by the international legal system. Under current international law, border sovereignty over immigration is almost absolute. The sovereign right to exclude non-citizens has only limited exceptions for distinct categories of refuge-seekers, and even those are rendered notional by Global North states.

Meanwhile, in 2020, IOM, in collaboration with EASO—now EUAA, the UNHCR and UNICEF created a voluntary relocation scheme to prepare and resettle 5,200 vulnerable asylum-seekers and beneficiaries of international protection, including Unaccompanied Migrant Children (UMC), from Greece to other EU member-countries. Planned to last between 1 April 2020 and 30 October 2021, the scheme's goal is to both "support vulnerable groups and enhance solidarity among European Union (EU) Member States and associated countries" (IOM, 2020). Two years later, or eight months after the program's envisioned end, by June 2022, the target number of relocations

still was not reached, as 4,908 persons were resettled: 1,233 UMC, 1,796 applicants and 1,879 beneficiaries of international protection (UNHCR, 2022). For a group of 31 NGOs, like Action for Migration and Development, Save the Children and Equal Rights Beyond Borders, relocation programs must continue in place, as the “lack of adequate support means that those who do receive refugee status or subsidiary protection are at risk of homelessness, remain trapped in the camps or do not have access to education or financial support” (Action for Migration and Development et al., 2021: 2). However,

European countries and the European Commission have the resources and ability to offer these vulnerable individuals a brighter future, offering a demonstration of solidarity both with asylum seekers and the government of Greece. This solidarity should not be considered solely humanitarian or a gesture of political support, but the respect of [a] core legal principle of the EU (*Ibid*).

Hence, practices continue contradicting even the most “humanitarian” of pledges. In its World Report, Human Rights Watch (2021) deemed the EC’s Pact a confirmation of “the focus on sealing borders and boosting returns, [which] included proposals that could undermine safeguards and increase detention, and failed to present innovative proposals for rights-respecting migration management.” It noted that over 73,000 people had arrived at the EU’s southern borders in 2020 and 726 persons “died or went missing at sea”, but still, in the context of pandemic restrictions, contrary to the EC’s guidance, “some member states de jure or de facto suspended asylum procedures” —and the report informs of cases of pushbacks and denials of access to asylum in Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia— while others like Italy, Spain, and Portugal “took measures to protect and in some cases extend access to public health care and other rights during the pandemic” (*Ibid*).




Figure 2.3. Breakdown of voluntary relocation from Greece until June 2022. Source: UNHCR, 2022.

In this respect, distinctions between internal and external solidarity remain clear, as approaches aiming at “stricter” and/or “fairer” policies, informed by a set of assumptions that the Strategic Agenda for the EU (2019-2024) demonstrates. These approaches are sometimes combined, as in the EC’s calls for “efficiency” and “effectiveness” in common policies aiming to improve and speed up procedures of granting asylum to people right on the EU borders or deporting them right away, in order to avoid keeping them in overcrowded camps and burdening “frontline countries”. All things combined, EU leaders kept their mind set on securitization and externalization. Next section overviews Portugal’s recent records in migration and asylum trends and how it has fared in the debate over the EC Pact.

## 2.4. Portugal's migration and asylum records and the EC's Pact

Contrary to previous periods of “distancing from European matters”, when Portugal sought to expand and sustain a colonial empire across the Atlantic and avoided any political integration (Teixeira, 2010: 52), Portugal's foreign action in the democratic period, after the Carnation Revolution of the 25<sup>th</sup> of April of 1974 that overthrew a long-lasting, fascist dictatorship, according to Brito (2005), relies on building “national consensus”. Hence, integration into the EU seemingly becoming one of such consensus, he argues that Portugal, as a modestly-sized country in economic, territorial and demographic terms, must weight its European role in terms of “what of the extra-European it can bring to Europe and what it can offer to other parts of the world from Europe” (*Ibid*: 151). In Brito's view, this is because Portugal's “best hope of development” is in the EU, since as a political project, the EU has “granted the European space some peace that successive imperial manifestations of power had never been able to implant”; hence why, according to the author, Portugal “has tried to always participate in processes of deepening the European construction”, in a “vanguardist” position, which Brito exemplifies with the country's role of founding member of the Euro and its adoption of the Schengen agreement, and other instances (*Ibid*: 151).<sup>22</sup> In Portugal's latest round in the Presidency of CEU, between January and June 2021, it was evident how the country's governing forces support, engage and promote European integration and seek to assure the country's prominent role in the most pressing of EU affairs, as Chapter 3 demonstrates.

Taking over from Germany and in a context of global crisis —less than a year after the outbreak of the coronavirus was declared a pandemic by WHO, Portugal's motto for the Presidency of CEU was “Time to deliver: a fair, green and digital recovery”, as it set three major priorities for the EU:

- To promote a recovery leveraged by the climate and digital transitions;
- To implement the European Pillar of Social Rights of the European Union as a distinctive element for ensuring a fair and inclusive climate and digital transition;
- To strengthen Europe's autonomy whilst remaining open to the world, taking a leading role in climate action and promoting a digital transformation in the service of people.<sup>23</sup>

A country traditionally marked by emigration but which became an important destination in the 1980s and 1990s, debate over migration and asylum and related EU policies is not new in Portugal (Pinho, 2013; Padilla and França, 2020). More recently, from 2009 to 2015, there was a

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<sup>22</sup> For a broader discussion of Portugal's foreign policy, including its process of Europeanization, see, among others, Royo, Sebastián, ed. (2012) *Portugal in the Twenty-First Century Politics, Society, and Economics*. Lanham: Lexington Books; and Cravo, Teresa; Rogério Leitão, Augusto; Amado Mendes, Carmen; Freire, Maria Raquel (2008) ‘A presidência portuguesa da União Europeia: um passo em frente ou o reflexo de um impasse?’, *Europe - The Journal of the Polish Institute of International Affairs*, 8, 1(26), 7-34.

<sup>23</sup> “At a moment when the COVID-19 pandemic poses difficult and significant challenges to the EU, Portugal's Presidency will do everything to ensure that these six months mark the start of a new cycle in Europe”, the program states (Portugal's Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2021).

continuous decrease, from 457,306 to 397,724, in the number of foreign residents, including those with “legal resident” status, those having extended their residence permits, those extending their long duration visas, and those with long duration visas granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PORDATA, 2021). From 2016 until 2020, the total numbers of resident foreigners went from 407,504 to 668,516 —of these, 661.607 had “legal resident” status (*Ibid*), and in 2021, Portugal’s Immigration Department, the Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF – *Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras*) registered 714,123 foreigners living in the country—7.8% more than the previous year. The trend is of a steady increase in the number of foreign residents throughout the previous years, with immigrants mostly coming from Brazil (209,072), followed by those coming from the United Kingdom (42,071), Cape Verde (35,913), India (30,913) and Italy (30,887). Yet, the actual number of residence permits issued each year has decreased from 118,124 in 2020 to 109,000 in 2021.

Arguments for the continued intake of immigrants in the country have focused on related concerns for lacking labor power and for the demographic deficit, with reports emphasizing the fact that birth rates have been consistently decreasing, but that immigration helps mitigate this trend, especially due to higher birth rates by foreign mothers (PORDATA, 2022). This point is found, for instance, on the website of the Observatory for Migrations of the Portuguese High Commissariat for Migrations (ACM), and in the media, quoting expert opinions, as in Luz (2022). Arguments against it have mainly focused on prejudicious and racist —and often contradictory— beliefs that immigrants do not like to work but come into the country to rob the Portuguese of their jobs and drain the national social security system, a myth that ACM was also ready to try and debunk by giving numbers showing how immigrant workers contribute significantly more than they take (OM, 2022).<sup>24</sup>

As for requests for international protection, ACM’s Observatory of Migrations points to important directions regarding recent trends within the European context. From an average of 200 requests per year between 2000-2012, from then on, that number increased four times, reaching 1,800 requests in 2019 but decreasing to 1,002 requests in 2020 (OM, 2021). This represented a drop of 45% from 2019 to 2020, in a period when in the EU, the decrease was of 33%, due to movement restrictions related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet, although in 2019 Portugal received the highest number of requests for protection in its history, the country was one of the EU member-states that received the least —by comparison, Germany received 121,000 requests that year. In 2020, Portugal was in the 22<sup>nd</sup> place among the 27 EU members in the number of asylum requests, accounting for only 0.2% of all requests within the Union (*Ibid*: 76).

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<sup>24</sup> An example of the institute’s initiative was a course on “Intercultural Dialogue” that the researcher took in 2021, and one topic and activity involved the discussion and reflection about the challenges of communication and procedures for migrants at SEF, for instance. Participants included researchers, students, and volunteers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). See, for instance, Alto Comissariado para as Migrações, “Oferta Formativa para entidades públicas e privadas”, at <<https://www.acm.gov.pt/ru/-/oferta-formativa>>.

Significant changes affected the way in which people reached Portugal for international protection: besides procedures implemented when people are already in national territory, from 2015 onwards, five other mechanisms were put in place: 1) relocation, from December 2015 to April 2018, when Portugal committed to receiving 2,951 asylum-seekers—receiving just over half, 1,550 people; the UE-Turkey agreement for resettlement functioning from June 2016 to December 2017, when Portugal committed to receive 200 people, but only 142 arrived; 3) the relocation mechanism in place in 2018 and 2019 for Portugal to receive 1,010 asylum-seekers relocated from Turkey and Egypt; 4) the voluntary relocation mechanism for unaccompanied minors, in place since 2020, through which Portugal committed to receive up to 500 children and youth, of whom 72 arrived that year; 5) the relocation mechanism established in a bilateral agreement between Portugal and Greece for Portugal to receive, initially, 100 people, having received three in 2020 (*Ibid*:76). Portugal also receives “ad hoc” relocations of people rescued by humanitarian boats in Italy and Malta—meaning that Portugal takes this step voluntarily and not under any agreement; and those relocating from other countries with already-granted refugee status are not counted among others requesting international protection when in Portugal (*Ibid*). Furthermore, spontaneous requests for international protection directed at Portugal have consistently increased from 703 in 2016 to 1,002 in 2017, 1,157 in 2018 —partly from over 100 entries from relocation— and 1,750 in 2019 —again excluding 99 relocations from humanitarian ships, while in 2020, the number decreased to 894, added to over 100 normal, ad hoc and exceptional relocations (*Ibid*).

Meanwhile, following the tragedies in the Mediterranean, on Greek, Spanish and Italian coasts, concerns turned to Portugal’s own coast, in Algarve, the mainland’s southernmost region, which some argue can become another important “entry point” to Europe (Revez, 2020). At NOVA Refugee Clinic – Legal Clinic (NRC) of NOVA School of Law, Luís Calle y Bonaccorso (2022) writes that in 2007 a first crossing was registered, with 23 Moroccan migrants accidentally reaching the shore when sailing towards the Spanish port city Cádiz —a “discovery” of sorts. The feat was promptly registered in that year’s Annual Security Report of the Security Coordinator Office —a consultative body working directly under the Prime-Minister— as a concern for further attempts, and a decade later, a new route between the Moroccan port El-Jadida and Algarve may be slowly forming (*Ibid*). New arrivals were registered in 2019 and 2020: 97 persons, mostly Moroccan nationals, reached the Algarvian shore; of the 67 requests for international protection, only 11 were accepted, while others are in unknown locations or in other EU member states, voluntarily returned or were deported by Portuguese authorities (*Ibid*).

Related incidents and tragedies are noteworthy, such as the arrest of smugglers by Moroccan authorities in El-Jadida, a sinking in 2020 that caused the deaths of all 24 migrants on board, including children, and the finding of other empty vessels by the Portuguese authorities, as well as rescue operations at sea (*Ibid*; Silva and Revez, 2020). Bonaccorso (2022) mentions the view of the President of SEF’s workers union Acácio Pereira listing as enablers of the establishment of this new route the lacking capacity of the Portuguese surveillance systems to

detect the vessels or criminal activities on the coast, and human trafficking networks associated with criminal organizations with contacts within the EU member states. On the other hand, Minister of Home Affairs Eduardo Cabrita argued in 2020 that it was too soon to speak of an illegal network operating in the Portuguese coast, where numbers are still relatively irrelevant when contrasting that year's 48 arrivals to Portugal and the 7,700 arrivals to Spain (Silva and Revez, 2020; Revez, 2020).

Regionally and internationally, attitudes on migration and asylum in Portugal can be glimpsed over not only through opinion polls and media analyses, but also the political programs of political parties, the action of civil society associations, the formal establishment of mechanisms and regulations, and the country's foreign policy and engagement, including through personalities holding important offices, whose roles are highlighted in the media, as Chapter 3 shows. Recently, for instance, former Prime Minister António Guterres (1995-2002) was the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2005-2015) and as of 2017 is the current UN Secretary General; and since 2018, the Portuguese jurist and former European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs (1999 to 2004) António Vitorino is the Director General of IOM. Both were praised for their roles or interviewed, in the latter case, in the period of this research. The country has also promoted negotiations and joined the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration—or “the Global Compact for Migration”, an agreement inter-governmentally negotiated and adopted in 2018 under the UN auspices (A/RES/73/195) “to cover all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner” (IOM, 2018). The country's diplomatic services state that

Portugal has engaged in the process that led to the creation of the Compact, from its launch in September 2016 until its conclusion two years later. In August 2019, Portugal became one of the first countries to approve its National Implementation Plan, conceived as an operational document, oriented to practical and accurate results and following the 23 objectives of the Compact (XXII Government, 2019).

Bilaterally, for instance, Portugal has recently signed agreements with India and Morocco, in September 2021 and January 2022, respectively, stating the aim of curbing illegal migration, for instance, by combating human trafficking networks and recruiting workers from these countries under “dignified conditions”, with labor rights equal to those of Portuguese nationals, through channels of “legal”, “regulated” and “safe” migration (XXII Government, 2021; XXII Government, 2022). In the latter case, the agreement was also defined as an attempt to prevent the establishment of the route of irregular migration toward Algarve, as one of the reports analyzed for this research states (CM20201023).

At the national level, Portugal has public, state and civil society departments, offices, mechanisms, organizations and associations dedicated to migration and asylum. For instance, ACM is a public institute aimed at intervening in the implementation of public policies in migration matters, according to its website, by acting for hosting and social integration and

fighting discrimination, cooperating with other institutions and civil society. Its Observatory of Migrations (*Observatório das Migrações*) was established in 2016 with the task of “studying and scientifically following migrations and the production, archiving, analyzing and disseminating statistical information on migrations” (Deliberation nº 1243/2016, 8 August). There are also diverse civil society initiatives and associations exclusively dedicated to welcoming or advocating for the rights of migrant and asylum-seeking persons, from secular and religious associations and platforms to the Portuguese Council for Refugees (CPR - *Conselho Português para os Refugiados*), an NGO established in 1991, and the Association of Refugees in Portugal (ARP), established in 2010, for instance.

In terms of police, judicial and administrative affairs, a national debate has unfolded over the attributions of Portugal’s Immigration and Borders Service —*Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras* (SEF), as seen in Chapter 3. Although it was not a new debate, it was particularly pushed forward, with practical implications, after a Ukrainian citizen, Ihor Homeniuk, was assaulted and killed by SEF inspectors while held in detention at the Lisbon airport, in March 2020. For the Executive Director of Amnesty International Portugal Pedro Neto, Homeniuk’s killing was “a tragic event that involves every worst thing in Portugal: discrimination, violence and the lack of protection of people” (Fonseca, 2021). Media reports explicitly linked the killing with ongoing debate on SEF’s restructuration, as proposed by the Government, or its extinction and replacement for a new agency, as proposed by the Left Bloc (*Bloco de Esquerda*), with the aim of separating administrative from police functions and thus contribute to, among other things, “decriminalize” migration.

More broadly, explaining Portugal’s support to the new Pact, the Secretary of State for Integration and Migration Cláudia Pereira says in an interview that Portugal’s Presidency of the Council of the EU would be guided by an effort to reach an understanding between EU member-states and that Portugal has “a progressive attitude in relation to immigrants” and the will to integrate them well, as it wishes that Portuguese citizens emigrated are also well integrated in societies abroad (Lusa, 2020, in CM20201218). Still, one of the main accomplishments of the Portuguese Presidency of CEU towards the negotiation and adoption of the Pact was building a consensus regarding the “external dimension” of migration, which had been emphasized in Portugal’s interventions on the debate, as well as the formula for “balancing responsibility and solidarity” (Portugal’s Presidency of CEU, 2021). Yet, by the end of the term, agreement on the Pact remained elusive.

## Conclusion

Despite urges for a change in approaches, “a fresh start”, as Von der Leyen put it, apparently, the EU remains an “empire in denial” when mobilizing the concepts of solidarity and responsibility, as well as moral narratives and humanitarian imperatives, to tackle the Union’s policy shortcomings regarding migration and asylum. This chapter showed, by covering the main aspects



of the most recent proposals of reform and the main criticisms of the fundamental “repetition of past mistakes”, that migration and asylum have still been securitized even if often under the cover of rhetorical promises for a “more humane” approach to avoid more tragedies. This approach has still translated into efforts to reinforce borders and rationalize procedures through a neoliberal and utilitarian framework to sort through those allowed in —those whose requests for asylum are granted or whose immigration is regularized/legalized through “orderly procedures”, preferably of people with contributions to make, namely, to labor markets and demographic policies— and those destined for return and deportation.

The chapter thus discussed how the concept of solidarity, a pillar of the EU as a community, has been operationalized in its enclosure and “protection”, virtually always framed as a protection of values and principles, including in the form of rescue operations. It overviewed physical, institutional and rhetorical / discursive mechanisms employed by EU leaders to justify these measures, even when admitting that the system needs reforming, it needs “a fresh start”. Yet, the Chapter also showed that little changed with the new Pact, as the many human rights advocates and scholars cited show, and which this dissertation briefly explores. Building on this exercise of historical contextualization, the next Chapter analyzes how the media have engaged in this process, which narratives they favor, and with which political implications, by zooming in Portugal’s case.

### **3. Tragedy on Europe's borders: narrating moral duties and security concerns for migration and asylum**

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This chapter presents the results of the research's media analysis, which examined a corpus of 225 items of all genres, published in the digital versions of the three most read Portuguese daily newspapers, *Correio da Manhã* (CM), *Jornal de Notícias* (JN) and *Público* (PUB), between 1 September 2020 and 31 October 2021. This period encompasses the weeks prior to the EC's announcement of the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, on 23 September 2020, and after the EC issued the first yearly report on related developments, on 29 September 2021. As this research adopts a discourse-historical approach to CDA, explained in Chapter 1, by looking at textual and discursive structures, identifying and contesting narratives that compound discursive practices, it proceeds through contextual knowledge of processes and events of world, European, and national scope that attract media coverage.

The analysis is divided into three parts. Section 3.1 overviews the Portuguese mediascape to explain the criteria used for selecting outlets and sampling in the process of building a corpus of analysis. Section 3.2 characterizes the more immediate context analyzed, listing the main events covered, and the samples' content, by identifying the items' most frequent genres, authorship, scope, subjects, terms, and images representing issues and the people involved. Section 3.3 uses the theoretical framework explained in Chapter 1 to analyze the main discursive factors and propositions advanced, as well as the actors behind these discourses, to unpack the most frequent narratives and associations made, by whom and for what, in the representation of the issue and the proposed solutions. The results of the critical discourse analysis are thus organized in a broader discussion of social and political implications for migration and asylum at national and European levels.

#### **3.1. Portugal's mediascape, selection criteria and samples**

Television is still the main source of news for 57.7% of the Portuguese, followed by the Internet (17.7%, excluding social media), social media (13.3%), print press (7.3%) and radio (4.2%) (OberCom, 2021: 27). This makes "new media" significant platforms, as the Portuguese audience of digital news has continuously increased, from 54.6% of mainland residents over 15 years old in 2013 to 67.3% in 2020 and 70% in 2021 (Marktest, 2021a). Specifically, this audience is mostly comprised of men between the ages of 25 and 34 residing in a big urban center, Lisbon, and of higher social classes, with lower classes reported to be less adept to this reading

habit (*Ibid*), especially due to access limitations. Notwithstanding, the discrepancy is verified in relation to habits of reading news in general, as a study found that men between 35 and 54 years old of higher social classes are the most familiarized with print newspapers (Marktest, 2021b). Yet, readers are concerned with representativity, diversity and credibility: 56% and 61% said they trusted news contents in 2020 and 2021, respectively; notably, 22% of the less trusting believed to have been exposed to disinformation about immigration (OberCom, 2021: 20).

The first and second digital versions of daily newspapers most read in 2020 were CM (26,1%) and JN (24%), closely followed by PUB (23,2%), in third (Marktest, 2020) —equally ranked in their print versions (ERC, 2020). In 2021, JN surpassed CM as the most read news outlet in both versions, with a total reach of 49% (Jornal de Notícias, 2022), whereas PUB was the digital news outlet with the most paying subscribers (Muscketat, 2022). Of those selected, JN was the most trusted news brand for 78.8%, followed by PUB, 75.9%, whereas CM, with 51.5%, is actually the least trusted among 13 brands (OberCom, 2021: 48). That CM was concomitantly the least trusted, deemed sensationalist, but also the first or second most read, is remarkable and raises questions about the quality of the information that readers get.

A final note must be made on media ownership. JN is a part of Global Media Group, which also owns other relevant outlets such as Diário de Notícias, ranked in fourth in terms of reach in both print and digital versions in 2021 (Jornal de Notícias, 2022). Cofina, the biggest media group in Portugal, owns CM and other titles such as Jornal de Negócios, and Sonaecom owns PUB. These groups also hold shares in the Portuguese news agency Lusa, a frequent source of news reports in all three outlets, but the agency itself is public: the state owns 50,15% of its shares, Global Media Group owns 23,36% and Impresa owned 22.35% until 2021, when it sold them, in a broader transaction, to Páginas Civilizadas, of Grupo Bel, itself owned by Marco Galinha, who also holds shares in Global Media (Forbes Portugal, 2022).

Hence, the main criteria for the selection of items for this analysis were their topic and period of publication. A search was conducted in the search engines of the three selected outlets, using as keywords the main terms of the Pact's name in Portuguese —and thus the actual topic under consideration, *migrações* and *asilo* (migrations and asylum), removing prepositions and articles *para*, *as*, *das* or *e* and the word “pact” itself. This way, the researcher avoided missing items that use different formulations or translations of the pact's name, while also detecting items about migration and asylum in Europe and Portugal that do not mention the pact, to consider representations of the issue more broadly, in that period.<sup>25</sup> As it turns out, there were very few items dedicated to the pact —which is itself an interesting finding—, and focusing only on those would have hindered the research or even made it unworkable.

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<sup>25</sup> The pact's title or reference to it appear in different forms in official communication and the media as *Pacto para as Migrações e Asilo*, *Pacto das Migrações e Asilo*, or *Pacto em matéria de Migração e Asilo*, and variations of the instrument's name include *Pacto*, *Plano*, or *Política* (Pact, Plan or Policy).

In term of search results, the outlets' search engines do not return the entire bulk of items published in the period. For this reason, another search was made on LexisNexis' Nexis Uni database, but results were even scarcer than those individually obtained from the outlets' search engines. Therefore, all items appearing in each of the outlets' list of result were collected, but as different items may appear in different hits, and it was not possible to ascertain the total number of items actually published, this makes for some sampling randomness. Still, randomness is a sound method that minimizes risks such as sampling bias while creating a representative pool of texts (Lacy and Riffe, 1993; Parking and Green, 2016).

Using this method, the corpus of analysis reached a sufficient size to be representative, and its temporal reach and thematic coverage fit the research's empirical analysis.<sup>26</sup> It has 225 items listed in Annex I, with identification tags (ID) made of the outlets' initials and the items' dates, used as references. Of those items, 92 are from PUB, 67 from CM, and 65 from JN. They were introduced into the NVIVO software of quantitative and qualitative analysis, for which a codebook was developed based on the literature review and on an overview of the items, and were codified by outlet, genre, scope, authorship, subject, agency, semiotic elements, discursive factors and narratives, as shown in Annex II.<sup>27</sup> Resulting patterns were examined by considering each outlet a case, for comparative purposes, and by generalizations. The next sections describe and then discuss these results through CDA.

### 3.2. Context and content: the main topics attracting media coverage and the parameters of discussion

After overviewing the wider context, in Chapter 2, this section zooms in the period under analysis and the Portuguese media, by identifying the main events triggering coverage in that context. There were at least five events prompting discussion of migration and asylum in general and of the EC's proposed Pact in particular that generated extensive direct coverage or were referenced as a cause of or as related to the new subject covered. Examples of that are the first and second events identified:

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<sup>26</sup> In CM, results included irrelevant items such as US policies and had also to be further sampled. JN was searched twice, one for each year, because results appearing in the general search did not extend back to 2020. Search in *Público* was multi-staged: the first hit showed items and two links leading to pages with related news, including irrelevant pieces purposefully excluded from the sample.

<sup>27</sup> Using a software for this empirical phase of research is crucial for guaranteeing a clearer, quantified and visual perspective of patterns and associations, as well as the consistency, coherence, and transparency of the process of interpretation by the researcher, as data can be verified in sets and through graphs or other tools organized and generated in the software.

9 September 2020: Fires in the Moria Reception and Identification Center, known as the Moria refugee camp, in Greece's Lesbos island, destroyed the shelters of about 13,000 people who had been held in under poor living conditions, many for long periods, while waiting for asylum to be granted or for deportation, as several reports emphasized. The event was framed by commotion and some dissatisfaction with how the issue of migration and asylum had been handled and was deemed a catalyst for the proposal of a European Pact.

23 September 2020: EC President Ursula von der Leyen presents the New Pact on Migration and Asylum as an attempt to outline “a comprehensive European approach to migration” and strike a balance between “the principles of fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity” (EC, 2020). Vice-President for “Promoting our European Way of Life”, Margaritis Schinas, said: “Moria is a stark reminder that the clock has run out on how long we can live in a house half-built. The time has come to rally around a common, European migration policy” (*Ibid*).

1 January – 30 June 2021: Portugal held the Presidency of the Council of the EU (CEU), defining the negotiation and adoption of the Pact as a priority. Minister of Home Affairs (MHA) Eduardo Cabrita calls for a “good-will coalition” to guarantee progress in the matter (Portugal Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2021).

9 July – 22 October 2021: The Portuguese Parliament debated the Government's proposal to re-structure SEF.<sup>28</sup> Urges for reviewing procedures or for extinguishing the service intensified after SEF inspectors killed Ukrainian citizen Ihor Homeniuk, in March 2020, while holding him in detention at the Lisbon airport. The BE's proposal of creating the Portuguese Agency for Migrations and Asylum (APMA) for policy-related, support and administrative functions —while police and judicial functions would be transferred to existing institutions— was approved by the Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees on October 20 and by the Plenary on the 22<sup>nd</sup> (Morais, 2022). This restructuring has, however, been repeatedly postponed, with, so far, no solution in sight.

August 2021: With the withdrawal of US and other NATO troops and personnel, including Portuguese, from Afghanistan, and the return of the Taliban to power, thousands of civilians and former collaborators with the foreign operation attempted to flee. EU Ministers of Home Affairs met in an extraordinary Council to discuss the events'

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<sup>28</sup> As explained in Chapter 2, this immigration and borders service covered administrative, security and criminal policing functions and was allocated under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

implications and plan their response to the foreseen increase in asylum requests, stating that “the EU and its Member States stand determined to act jointly to prevent the recurrence of uncontrolled large-scale illegal migration movements faced in the past, by preparing a coordinated and orderly response” (Council of the EU, 2021).

Sorting through the genres, prominence/size, authorship, and the actors most often appearing on these items offers hints about news production processes—the professionals involved, reporting conditions, and so forth; and which voices are most heard, which subjects get more attention, in which genres and in what prominence, and so on. Semiotic elements analyzed are mainly text and audiovisual images—photographs and videos, but other types such as audio and infographics are also codified. Text’s sizes are defined as short (up to 200 words), medium (between 200 and 400); and large (over 400 words). The main parts of an item, apart from the main text and images, are information on the section / scope (for instance, “World” or “European Union”), the headline or title, followed by the deck (a subheading sentence summarizing the piece), the byline (authorship), date and time of publication.



Figure 3.1. Items’ elements of identification.

Finally, it is important to draw some notes on the use of terms and translation: there are terms used both interchangeably and purposefully to mean formal and informal practices and peoples’ status. For instance, *receber* is translated as “to receive”, while *acolher* is translated as “to host”, even though at times it can mean “to welcome”, depending on the semiotic context. For the most part, however, the latter translation is reserved for instances when the meaning is to willingly host *and* socially integrate foreign people into Portugal or the EU—as narrated, regardless of how this is actually done. The terms (im)migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers (*i-migrantes*, *refugiados*, *requerentes de asilo*) are often used as general characterizations of peoples’ situation. The most frequently used term is *refugiados* regardless of peoples’ actual status, sometimes clearly replacing the word *migrantes*, especially in stories on humanitarian tragedies, when there is no way of knowing what their actual situation is, since these subjects’ background is omitted.

## Samples’ genres, authorship, semiotics and clues on production processes



“JN and Agencies”, which amounted to 54 items, including one bearing the Lusa Agency’s name —most of the others may also come from the same agency since very similar reports were found in the other outlets credited to Lusa. The other reports’ bylines credited journalists Alexandre Panda, Tiago Rodrigues Alves, João Francisco Guerreiro, João Vasconcelos e Sousa, Rita Nogueira, Roberto Bessa Moreira, Sofia Cristino, and Tomás Guerreiro. The two interviews are attributed to Lusa’s journalists Célia Paulo, who interviewed Minister Cabrita, and Patrícia Cunha, interviewing António Vitorino, the Portuguese Jurist serving as Director General of the International Organization for Migrations (IOM).<sup>29</sup>

As the word cloud below illustrates, the main words used in titles were immigrants, migrants, refugees, people, SEF, extinction, Portugal, received, to host/welcome and hosting (*acolher* and *acolhimento*), minors and children; names of places—Moria, Lesbos, Greece, Turkey, Europe, Lithuania, Hungary, Belarus, Spain, and Poland; again, the name of Minister Cabrita; and terms like terrorists, control, clandestine, expulsions, controlled, and borders are frequent, often associated with securitized themes, as discussed in Chapter 1. Most of these terms also suggest the items’ subject, such as “SEF’s extinction” and “Portugal received x refugees”. One main addition to CM’s results is the term “immigrants”, appearing in four titles on 1) the European Council’s condemnation of conditions of the reception of immigrants in Spain (JN20200903), 2) Portugal’s “regularization of immigrants with pending processes” (JN20201109), 3) Greece’s use of “sound cannons” against immigrants (JN20210609), 4) the increasing adherence to a program for immigrants’ “voluntary return” (JN20210623B).



Figure 3.3. NVIVO-generated word cloud of titles (JN).

<sup>29</sup> Vitorino was also European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs (1999-2004), a former MP of the Socialist Party and former MEP.





(14 items), followed by Rita Siza, a Brussels correspondent (five).<sup>31</sup> Three of the opinion articles are authored by civil society actors, including immigrants —Iorgos Karagiannis, of Doctors without Borders (MSF), Miguel Duarte, of Humans Before Borders (HuBB), and Carlos Vianna and Timóteo Macedo, respectively the Representative of the Brazilian Community in the Migrations Council and the co-founder of Brazil’s House (*Casa do Brasil*) in Lisbon, and the coordinator of the Association for the Defense of Immigrants’ Rights “Immigrant Solidarity” (*Solidariedade Imigrante*); three are authored by scholars —Historian and University Professor Manuel Loff, Afonso Braga, MA in Development Studies and Manager of Social Responsibility Projects, and Bruno Fonseca, a researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI); and three are authored by politicians: Rui Tavares, a historian, who is also the leader of the political party *Livre*; Minister Eduardo Cabrita; and MEP Isabel Santos of PS.

One photo gallery is sourced from Reuters, titled “‘We want peace in the world’, Afghans protest in Athens” (PUB20210828B). Images feature Afghans and Greeks demonstrators, children and people holding pictures of other people, including of children wounded, with written calls such as “Stop Killing Afghans!”, and Afghan and Greek flags. A medium-sized text (227 words) gives context and quotes Afghan demonstrators presented by name, age and some background and describes the demonstration as peaceful. It concludes with information on a planned meeting between Ministers of Home Affairs of EU member-states “to discuss the latest developments in Afghanistan and the consequences for security and migration”, illustrating how security and migration are entwined by EU leaders that contrasts with the Afghan refugees’ action on their plight.

The second photo gallery, by Carolina Amado, is titled “The gazes of refugee people have occupied the streets so that we don’t avert ours” and categorized as “Causes” (PUB20210721).<sup>32</sup> It shows pictures of activists spreading portraits over Portuguese cities, with a medium-sized text informing of the initiative, held in several countries: titled “Europe, look me in the eyes”, the initiative is promoted by activists from Lesbos “who demand change in the European migration policies”, seeking to “alert citizens through art and appeal to empathy”. Its coordinator Villy Tentoma is quoted saying: “To seek protection and asylum in Europe is even more difficult because the countries delegate control of their borders to other countries, such as Turkey, Libya, and Morocco”, and “Europe and the rest of the world cannot continue to close their eyes to this humanitarian crisis, nor try to evade their responsibilities, giving charity aid to these countries”.

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<sup>31</sup> Besides Lorena and Siza, other journalists authoring one to three reports are Maria João Guimarães, Diana Baptista Vicente, Teresa Abecasis, Inês Moura Pinto, Ana Dias Cordeiro, Pedro Bastos Reis, Nuno Ribeiro, Natália Faria, André Borges Vieira, João Pedro Pincha, Rui Gaudêncio, Nelson Garrido, António Saraiva Lima, Maria Lopes, Joana Gorjão Henriques, Sónia Trigueirão, Rui Pedro Paiva, Luísa Pinto, and Robyn Dixon, who appears in a joint report of Público and The Washington Post.

<sup>32</sup> This is a category in the “P3” section of *Público*, which is dedicated to themes such as culture, addictions, social causes, current trends, and an open space for the audience to publish their views: *Megafone*. It is described as “A site for millennials and generation Z. Because of you.” —the latter sentence can also be read as “For your cause” or “on your behalf” (*Por tua causa*), located at <<https://www.publico.pt/p3>>.

The text has embedded links leading readers to the project’s website and to the actual portraits, concluding with the provocation: “These are people like you and me. Europe, can you look me in the eye?”

In *Estado da União*, one item is a podcast interview with MEPs Marisa Matias of the Left Bloc (BE) and Paulo Rangel of the Social-Democrat Party (PSD) by Sofia Lorena (PUB20210329B). The second is a report on how the EU receives migrants, mostly made of infographics, with a visual reference to peoples’ drownings in the Mediterranean (Figure 4, below), by Cátia Mendonça, José Alves and Rui Pedro Paiva (PUB20210329D). The third, by Rui Pedro Paiva, addresses Matias’ and Rangel’s views, adding that of MEP Isabel Santos, of the governing PS, on EU migration and asylum policies, the reception of Afghan asylum-seekers and the policy of sending aid or negotiating with the new Afghan Government headed by the Taliban “without letting go of our principles and values”, as Rangel is quoted saying (PUB20210913).



Figure 3.5. Screenshot of PUB20210329D, “How is the European Union hosting those in need?”. Deck: “Asylum requests have decreased in Europe, but humanitarian dramas, which lead thousands of migrants and refugees to try and find shelter in Europe, have not. How welcoming is the European Union?”

Of reportages, one is authored by special envoys André Borges Vieira and Teresa Abecassis, titled “Leaving Sub-Saharan Africa on foot and waiting, with nothing, for Ceuta to fulfil the European dream” (PUB20210524). It has pictures of people waiting to cross the Strait of Gibraltar toward Europe and a short video (1:51) with migrants’ and asylum-seekers’ images and statements, beginning with 18-year-old Diallo Ramadan saying: “I do not know how to swim very well, but because it is my dream to come here, I am risking my life [...]. Not for the good life: because I want to save my life.” Other images show the conditions in which the persons waiting find themselves, unsheltered, hungry and ill, and another young man, Djalou Mamadou, who lists these issues, saying that they need “human rights [defenders] to come and help us”. The second is titled “Before going up in flames, Moria’s refugee camp was already hell” (PUB20201122), by Stavros Malichudis and Iliana Papangeli of “Investigate Europe”, a

consortium of journalists from eleven European countries, including Portugal.<sup>33</sup> Images portray children running from the fires, wired fences, tents falling apart, and so on. The deck is long and tough, summarizing the reporters' discontent with EU "failures" and testimonies found in a diary kept by IOM staff, who logged their troubles and their own revolt:

A small notebook was found in the ashes of Europe's most known refugee camp, Moria [...]. It shows the horrors that the unaccompanied minors suffered, documented by the people who were there to protect them. It is a documentation, written in the first person, of Europe's failure to protect the most vulnerable group among asylum-seekers. Since the fires in Moria in September, the situation of under-aged migrants in Lesbos has only worsened.

The third reportage, by Ana Dias Cordeiro, João Pedro Pincha, Rui Gaudêncio and Nelson Garrido, is titled "We depend on you to survive", which is a quote from a letter sent by an asylum-seeking woman, Lida Ahmad, to Portugal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PUB20210828C). It has close-up pictures of the Afghan refugees heard: Nasir Ahmad, who shows the reporters his sister Lida's appeal; Mohammad Yusuf Taheri and his sons Omed and Hamid Tahiri. Plenty of context is given on why the family fled Afghanistan and the risks for those still there, difficulties in reaching Europe then Portugal, and their general frustration with lengthy bureaucratic procedures.

In all, PUB's items engage more of its own professional staff, including correspondents and special envoys, develops more genres, shows more images of and quotes migrant and asylum-seeking people and informs of their backgrounds, and presents a more complex and sometimes critical approach of EU migration practices and policies than the others. However, remarkably, the Pact appears in only five of the titles in PUB's sample, four titles in CM's, and two in JN's, which means that these outlets' reports gave more prominence, for instance, to the poor conditions of reception and tragedies elsewhere and to Portugal's a) willingness to receive refugees and b) dealings with domestic issues, policies and procedures, such as SEF's restructuring.

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<sup>33</sup> The consortium seeks to "point out responsible transnational structures and actors in issues of European-wide relevance to make it possible to hold them accountable", according to its website. In Portugal it is joined by Paulo Pena and supported by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. See Investigate Europe, "About Us: Investigating a Changing Europe", at <<https://investigate-europe.eu/en/about-us>>.

### 3.3 Between security and humanitarian concerns: pragmatic and moral narratives about the problem and the solution

This section overviews how migration and asylum in general are framed and which and how actors were represented as part of the problems or the solutions, to then zoom into the presentation of the Pact and its reception. The main discursive factors found are pragmatic reasons for changing policies and practices, but identity factors can also be found in those reasons. An example of the relation between both types of factors is the characterization of a moral/ethical imperative to act and “save lives” and “human dignity” of “desperate” asylum-seekers that are either dying at sea or being pushed back on the borders, which are said to be practices that contradict EU values and principles, while also creating more problems at the border, for which “more efficient” solutions are needed. In this case, there is also some relativization of community membership, as direct mistreatment, including pushback, but also defense of harsh policy solutions, is generally attributed to “ultranationalist” governments of irreducible or extreme stances, i.e., Hungary and Poland, portrayed as fringe countries due to their geographical position but also their marginal position vis-à-vis this community of principles,<sup>34</sup> as demonstrated ahead. Officials’ representation of a European community overwhelmed by a “migration / refugee crisis”, whose frontier is held by countries that have had too much to bear—hence why tragedies happen—frame their narratives about the issue and these narratives are generally appropriated by journalists, even when some criticism appears. Meanwhile, some journalists and CSO representatives scarcely quoted promptly point at those countries’ authorities and EU leaders as responsible for humanitarian tragedies, also by mobilizing moral/ethical reasons of humanitarianism, e.g., for rescuing asylum-seekers at sea or from “hellish” conditions in the camps (CM20211018; PUB20200910B; PUB20201122; JN20200911). Even then, however, in news reports, assumptions such as the need to secure borders, sometimes associated with the need to improve reception and return conditions and procedures themselves, are not questioned; instead, when criticism appears, what is mainly criticized is the ineffectiveness of the EU leaders’ promises, and only to a lesser extent, their unwillingness to change policies.

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<sup>34</sup> Hungary, Poland and Lithuania are characterized in the literature on the region as “post-Soviet” spaces subjected to the universalization of liberal democracy, but whose governing elites fail to understand its value (Göncz and Lengyel, 2021), different from Baltic states that, because they do, have higher development and GDP rates (Plochy, 2021). Fierce debate surrounded the formers’ entrance into the EU in 2004, with some seeing EU enlargement as a “soft-power” tool of foreign policy and others as an “imperial policy” (Brunet, 2013; Dias, 2014).

## **The EU as a community of principles to protect**

As noted, a few of the items sampled reiterated concerns for a shortage of substantive changes in EU policies, especially due to the member-states' lack of will and agreement for adopting a common approach. In opinion pieces, especially, grave problems with reception, shelters or pushbacks are said to have been reiterated by journalists and civil society actors for years, to no avail, as the EU is more concerned with its own interests or incapacitated by a lack of consensus. People were dying or subjected to degrading conditions on Europe's borders whereas some of the EU members disputed the number of asylum-seekers they could receive, relocate or deport, which was denounced in the different outlets (CM20200928; CM20210620; JN20200916A; JN20200920; PUB20200901; PUB20201005). However, news reports, the bigger portion of the samples, in general, reproduced the EU officials' explanations of the challenges and steps ahead and their calls for the members' commitment (CM20210602; CM20210624; JN20200916B; JN20211022A; PUB20200923A) —including by assisting “frontline countries” (PUB20200923B). EU leaders are generally represented as offering solutions or pleading for a concerted action, which are not pondered nor further explained, whereas responsibility for lack of action is credited especially to Hungary and Poland (JN20200925; PUB20211015). Little to no space is given, in the samples analyzed, for a more nuanced examination of the causes of disagreements or of the shortcomings of the proposed solutions themselves.

Remarkably, the issue's framing as a humanitarian emergency that requires moral responses eclipses debate over migration in general, including for economic reasons, which demand more complex reflections and approaches than its treatment as security concerns allows. Of CM's 68 items, 21 cover or represent issues as related to “immigrants”, namely by covering migrants' arrivals to the EU and Portugal. For instance, even when reporting on Minister Cabrita's defence of “the EU migration pact”, a news item sourced from Lusa has in the deck his statement that it is necessary “to save lives and save ever more lives”, extracted from a speech made in representation of CEU in a conference on the deaths of migrants in “illegal routes” in the Mediterranean (CM20210518). Even then, Cabrita is quoted at length saying that besides working to implement “mechanisms of responsibility for the relocation of people saved, [...] we must fight human trafficking networks, which are highly organized criminals and, for all purposes, murderers”; and that “to face the root causes of migrations and refugee flows” it is necessary to work “on various dimensions”, namely, “strengthening the protection and management of the EU's external borders, balancing between the responsibility of states in the frontline and solidarity of all others with them”, and reaching agreements with countries of origin and transit to establish “legal, safe and organized routes of migration to Europe”.

A brief observation must be made regarding Lusa's items, because they appeared in great numbers in all samples, although mostly on JN and CM. Besides extensively covering official actions and policies and quoting authorities at length, often making it difficult to discern its observations from that of its sources, the agency also covers civil society initiatives and uses

terms and semantic formulations that indicate some concern for how it portrays the persons involved, notably by referring to them not merely by their condition or status —e.g., “asylum-seekers” and “refugees”, but as “refugee persons”, for instance. An example is a lengthy report on initiatives held on the World Refugee Day by Amnesty International and other Portuguese organizations that are quoted in highly critical statements regarding the EU policies and “indifference” (CM20210620). These actors demand that the Portuguese Government and Parliamentary groups exert their influence, in order to promote fairer and safer migration policies and integration, reminding them of those who remain “at the EU’s doorstep”. Others organize a public memorial “for the thousands of persons who die trying to reach Europe” and a film exhibition on human rights violations described in a communiqué quoted in the report.

In all, the EU is represented as both an actor capable of overcoming crises—as the migration flows are framed, but also interrelated economic, climate and health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic— and a group of countries concerned with protecting their Union and its borders but cannot agree on the necessary steps to fulfill the EU’s moral/ethical promises, as further examined ahead. As for agency, in CM’s and JN’s samples, sourcing much of its items from Lusa, the main view is generally attributed to or appropriated from EU leaders and Government officials, who are extensively quoted or indirectly cited. PUB also does that but, additionally, often quotes from CSOs and migrant and asylum-seeking people as well, offering more critical views on EU and member-states’ practices, sometimes also formulated by staff journalists, as analyzed below.

### **European failures and humanitarian emergencies in Público’s sample**

PUB’s sample is more diverse in terms of genre, authorship, subject, sources and agency, as section 3.2 shows. In one news report (PUB20200901), journalist Sofia Lorena quotes outraged CSOs and lists the number of people who died at sea or were pushed back by EU members even after the commotion for the appearance of the dead body of three-year-old Alan Kurdi on a beach in 2015. She writes: “The reality of the situation of asylum seekers who have never stopped trying to reach the coasts of Europe does not leave much room for optimism”, because “not only a lot of the promises made then remain unfulfilled, but there are also countries that, in addition to closing their ports to those who arrive, are returning, by land and sea, those who do”. Yet, she quotes Hassiba Hadj-Sahraoui, a humanitarian advisor to MSF, saying: “It is easy to blame the border countries, Italy, Greece, Malta. But the problem is wider”, and the journalist continues, paraphrasing the advisor: “the EU has abdicated rescuing people for not being able to receive them, with many countries (‘except Portugal’, notes the activist) refusing to do so”. Quoting Hadj-Sahraoui again, Lorena adds that these countries implement instead a “sophisticated scheme to organize returns without Europeans doing them directly, mainly through Libyans”. The item’s

feature picture shows migrant persons rescued by MSF and the deck accuses Greece of having abandoned over 1,000 people that shipwrecked.<sup>35</sup>




Figure 3.6. Screenshot of PUB20200901.

Another report covers reactions to the fires in Moria, where “disaster is total” (PUB20200909B). Featuring the picture of a woman engulfed by smoke, it shows social media posts by civil society actors and TV stations with videos and photos of people amid the fires that consume tents and other structures. It informs of the action of Greek anti-riot police—and locals—preventing people from fleeing to other regions in Lesbos, quoting NGO representatives saying that tensions had intensified: after “the Greek government used the pandemic (of Covid-19) as a pretext to close camps all over Greece, people could not take it anymore”. The report also shows Commissioner Johansson’s post on Twitter promising EU funds for the transfer of “at least 400 unaccompanied children and teens”, and she is quoted saying that “security and shelter for all people in Moria are the priority”. Finally, after information that Moria’s camp sheltered about 13,000 people, four times its capacity, in what human rights organizations had been alerting “for several years” to be “precarious conditions” now making it impossible to keep physical distancing or hygiene, MSF coordinator Marco Sandrone is quoted saying that that was “a time-bomb that finally exploded”, and the NGO Aegean Boat Report is quoted saying that confirmation of 35 cases of Covid finally “broke people in the worst refugee camp in Europe”.

In a follow-up report (PUB20200910), Lorena quotes NGO representatives and people left unsheltered describing the camp’s situation and how families were sleeping “out in the open”, with no food, water or milk for the children of a Congolese woman featuring as the report’s protagonist, Natzy Malala. The deck states that “the Greek government insists in a securitized approach and sends ten more police and private security units to the Aegean Island”. The top

<sup>35</sup> Público’s items are sometimes also published in English, which is the case of this item.



picture features Natzy and her children sleeping on the roadside, whereas the text argues that circumstances of the temporary reception arrangements have not changed since 2015 in “the largest refugee camp in Europe, a symbol of everything that has failed in migration policies over the last years.” The EC is again cited offering to assist in relocating 400 unaccompanied children, and Germany’s government is cited offering support to rescue 1,000 of the over 12,000 people in Moria. German Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas is quoted calling it a “humanitarian catastrophe” to which the EC and the EU member-states must answer by clarifying “how we can help Greece”. Yet, the journalist follows these quotes with her argument that until the other countries or Brussels—the EC—“seem decided to contribute to finding a lasting solution, as foreseen, Athens apparently intends to replace the burnt center for a closed facility” and continues to send police reinforcement to the island.

GRÉCIA

## “O desastre em Moria é total.” Campo de refugiados em Lesbos consumido pelas chamas

Governo declara estado de emergência na ilha onde quase 13 mil pessoas viviam em condições precárias, num espaço sobrelotado. Campo estava em confinamento, depois de ter sido detectado o primeiro caso de covid-19.

Sofia Lorena e Pedro Bastos Reis

9 de Setembro de 2020, 9:15 (atualizado a 9 de Setembro de 2020, 13:50)

Read in english

Receber alertas



### "Esta noite rebentaram"

“O Governo grego usou a pandemia [de covid-19] como pretexto para encerrar os campos por toda a Grécia, as pessoas não aguentavam mais”, nota a ONG na sua página de Facebook. “O campo está há meses em confinamento, as tensões têm vindo a aumentar. “Esta noite rebentaram.”

Figure 3.7. Screenshot of PUB20200909B.

More critical stances extricating the reasons for the EU’s and its members’ persistent failures appear in three opinion articles by civil society actors and scholars, one investigative reportage done by a network of journalists, and an interview with two Portuguese MEPs showing in two items. Humanitarian tragedies are the focus, evidences of that failure with serious implications for the migrants’ and asylum-seekers human rights and dignity. For instance, a reportage by Investigate Europe shows why “Before burning, the Moria refugee camp was already hell” (PUB20201122), charging Europe—or the EU—for “failing to protect the most vulnerable group of asylum-seekers”: unaccompanied children. In “European policies of deterrence and containment degrade human life” (PUB20201005), the MSF’s chief of mission in the Samos Island Iorgos Karagiannis writes that “asylum-seekers and refugees kept in Greek islands remain

excluded and invisible because this is what works best for EU migration policies”, and that “these people are only visible when shown as troublemakers, hazards to public health or the beneficiaries of EU assistance.” He charges:

Europe consciously chooses that this continued tragedy exists in its territory. To stop peoples’ migration movements and satisfy an ill-conceived need to ‘protect’ its borders, the EU uses and abuses of senses of urgency and disaster to justify imposing more restrictions to human freedoms. Europe is institutionalizing human degradation, systematizing containment and deterrence. By doing so, it creates a pattern of destruction and despair.

Similarly, International Relations scholar Bruno Santos Fonseca (PUB20211031) argues that the EU’s new mechanisms and agency must implement its principles and promises, but “human dignity has not been respected in the reception of those fleeing conflicts and violence of persecution for political and religious [motives] and/or sexual orientation—as if EU values and principles were only *of* and *for* Europeans.” Still, mobilizing idealized European principles and commitments for a critique of persistent practices, for him,

we cannot build ‘walls’ while advocating for the refugees’ rights, since they see Europe as the defense of these rights, nor accept that they are met with false moralism and draconian senses of belonging that are not the ideal of democracy and human rights that we, Europeans, must defend.

Still, in “Maintaining European values and negotiating with the Devil: What can the EU do regarding the crisis in Afghanistan” (PUB20210913)—in this case the “devil” being the Taliban, which returned to power after 20 years of a foreign military operation led by the US and NATO/EU members—journalist Rui Paiva selects quotes from Portuguese MEPs’ answers to an interview in *Estado da União*. MEP Marisa Matias (BE) is quoted saying that the EU’s inertia towards the situation in Afghanistan contradicts “responsibilities that we have under international law and our obligations” to assist not only the “European forces in the country”, but also the Afghans, namely, by creating humanitarian corridors to receive refugees, in “a common European strategy”. The opposite was being done, she argues, recovering some crucial historical factors: the European countries’ connivance with the (US) illegal intervention in Afghanistan, and that Taliban was not reformed, but was still led by people listed as terrorists. Yet, the EU can now only adopt “a strategy for hosting people in need and support the resistance forces the best we can and know how to”, Matias is quoted saying.

After citing the EU’s “five conditions for establishing ‘an operational relationship’” with the new Afghan government —“preventing the export of terrorism; respect for human rights; forming an inclusive government; authorizing humanitarian aid to flow; and allowing Afghans and European

civilians to leave the country”—the journalist quotes MEP Paulo Rangel (PSD): “having a dialogue with the new authorities cannot mean that we give up our principles and values”, and “[e]vidently, there cannot be a normal relationship, but given the exceptional and grave circumstances from a humanitarian point of view, some realism may be needed in order to prevent greater damage.”

Regarding the reception of migrants, or asylum-seekers, the EU needs to find humanitarian ways out, which is “complex”, the journalist cites Rangel saying, and since some EU countries oppose it, the EU must have a “decisive role” in funding countries neighboring Afghanistan to guarantee “conditions” for that. MEP Isabel Santos (PS) agrees: the EU must “create a mechanism of solidarity for sharing the responsibility”, the “obligation”. The Pact “remains stalled and we still do not have a common and solidary answer to this problem. With the absence of this answer, we are in the eminence of having another human disaster and must take responsibility for this disaster”, Santos is quoted saying.

### **Presenting the Pact: “a truly European policy” to protect “our way of life” and deal with a crisis of consciousness?**

In all samples, the EC’s presentation of the Pact is reportedly rushed due to the situation in Moria, and only to a lesser extent, as a result of Germany’s prioritization of the issue, as it then held CEU’s Presidency. For instance, a report sourced from Lusa (PUB20200923; JN20200923) informs that “the proposal’s adoption gained traction recently because it is a priority for Germany” and “due to the fire that devastated the refugee camp in Moria, Greece, an incident that again exposed the need for a truly European policy for migrants and refugees”. Notwithstanding, “two young migrants” accused of setting the fire were criminally prosecuted (JN20210310); if that was indeed an act of protest led by people in those conditions, these reports have lessened or omitted that, instead depoliticizing the event as an “incident”.

Hence, the imminent Pact first appears both as a chance for Europe to “heal its wounds” after the so-called “migration crisis”, as one report puts it, quoting Von der Leyen (JN20200916B), and as “a European solution to rebuild trust among member-states and restore the citizens’ confidence in our ability to manage migration as a Union”, she is quoted saying in another (PUB20200923A). The pact’s potentially problematic approach informed in the title—“stress on repatriations”—is not further questioned in the text. The deck explains that “Under the new ‘mechanism of solidarity’, member-states may both receive money to host refugees and pay to sponsor the return of migrants to their countries of origin”. The main text gives further hints: “The European Commission will try once more, and again using generous financial incentives, to overcome resistances and objections of member-states like Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia to hosting refugees in the European Union”, whereas the mechanism summarized in the deck is called a “‘flexible’ scheme”—which in the EC’s press release appears as “a system of flexible

contributions” to deal with the member-states “different situations” and “fluctuating migratory pressures” (EC, 2020), again in the news report presented as an attempt “to alleviate pressure and answer the needs of frontline countries”.

The sole report whose title mentions the Pact in CM’s sample informs that the EU proposed it (CM20200924) and features a picture of black people on a boat, subtitled “EU wants to speed up deportations”. It has a very short text (98 words) informing that the “new immigration policy [...] replaces the contentious distribution of refugees by quotas for a new concept of ‘mandatory solidarity’ whereby each country will be able to choose how to participate”, either by “hosting refugees or guaranteeing their deportation in eight months, should their asylum requests be rejected”. It ends with the information that “the EU will also pay 10,000 euros by each adult hosted and 12,000 euros for hosting minors,” the phrase in the story’s deck. Besides the demeaning approach to the issue as a financial matter, racism is evident in its association with the picture of black people on a boat, seen from a distance, in this context.

As in PUB, in JN’s first sampled report on the Pact, Von der Leyen is quoted in her first State of the Union speech before the EP promising a new policy to “heal wounds” through a “humanitarian view” with which it is “no longer a mere option to save lives at sea”, recalling on the divisive impact of the 2015 “migration crisis” (JN20200916). She stresses that “the most exposed (European) countries must be able to count on full solidarity from the EU”, since “Europe must act together”, whereas the report explains that “the EC wants a clear distinction between asylum and return”, “secure judicial avenues” and “stricter measures against [human] trafficking”. It again quotes Von der Leyen saying that “those that have the right to stay must integrate and feel welcomed”, and that the fires in Moria were “a painful example”. Hence why the EC was working with the Greek government to build a new camp and improve conditions for the refugees, whereas it was also necessary to work with Africa, as “neighbors and natural partners”.

When reporting on the EC’s presentation of the Pact itself, in “Brussels proposes a new pact on migrations for the 27 ‘without exceptions’” (JN20200923) and “European Commission wants all member-states signing new pact for migrations” (PUB20200923A), the items, which are similar and respectively credited to “JN and Agencies” and Lusa, quote Von der Leyen saying that “the current system does not work”, and that all member-states must take up responsibilities and show solidarity, in a new approach of which the report highlights the “system of flexible contributions” through which member-states can opt between hosting relocated asylum-seekers or ensuring their return in case their requests are denied. Von der Leyen features in the top picture with the EU flag in both items (see Figure 3.8 below) and is extensively quoted listing the need to adopt such a common approach and what the Union had accomplished thus far —“a complex internal market, a common currency and an unprecedented recovery plan to rebuild our economies”, saying that “it is now time to face the challenge and manage migration together, with the appropriate balance between solidarity and responsibility”.

Most of these reports quote EU officials at length and often appropriate much of their narratives.<sup>36</sup> Although in “The EU’s new Pact for Migrations emphasizes on repatriations” (PUB20200923B) the deck informs on the “mechanism of solidarity” that funds member-states that host refugees or return asylum-seekers to their countries of origin, followed by the picture of a child leaning on a fence in the Lesbos’ camp (see Figure 8 below)—which could mean some criticism toward the measure and humanization of their subjects, this long report is mostly made of reproductions and quotations from the Commissioners’ explanations of the different mechanisms. They include the creation of a post of Coordinator of Repatriations that will work with national governments, as announced by the Commissioner for the Promotion of the European Way of Life, Margaritis Schinas, and the mechanism of “sponsored repatriation”, aiming to guarantee faster procedures and avoid overloading reception centers such as Moria, where people “waited in unacceptable conditions for their being returned to their countries”. The report informs that:

Solidarity with responsibility is, in all, the ‘concept’ on which the Commission bases its proposal. ‘All member States share the benefits and thus must share the effort on migrations’, Ursula von der Leyen emphasized, saying that the question, for the 27, is not ‘knowing whether they should support, but how they can help’.

The item’s own introduction states that the Pact was formulated as to “alleviate pressure for frontline countries”, apparently referring to countries holding the EU borders, and informs, towards the end, that “solidarity with responsibility is not the only new paradigm of the Commission’s management of migration flows”, as new technologies and procedures will be implemented on border crossings to take peoples’ biometric information and speed up procedures of screening and examination of asylum requests, or peoples’ return to their countries. Yet, the foreseen problem for the process, according to this report, is the EU members’ lack of agreement on unspecified recommendations and pieces of legislation to be negotiated, and not that despite the apparently “modernized” procedure, with the use of technology for the effects of vigilance, the approach and the paradigm of the Pact are actually not new, since what they seem to do is escalate the persistent securitization of the whole issue.

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<sup>36</sup> As explained in Chapter 1, appropriation is the reproduction of official narratives and particular discourses for particular audiences (Foucault, 1991: 59-60).

UNIÃO EUROPEIA

## Comissão Europeia quer todos os Estados-membros a assinarem novo pacto para as migrações

Bruxelas reconhece que “sistema actual não funciona” e pede compromisso e solidariedade a todos os países da União. “Sistema de contribuições flexíveis dos Estados-membros” é uma das novidades.

Lusa

23 de Setembro de 2020, 13:08

Receber alertas



Ursula von der Leyen apresentou o novo pacto para as migrações da Comissão Europeia REUTERS/POOL

MIGRAÇÕES

## Novo Pacto para as Migrações da UE põe a tónica nos repatriamentos

Ao abrigo do novo “mecanismo de solidariedade”, os Estados-membros tanto podem receber dinheiro para acolher refugiados, como pagar para patrocinar o regresso de migrantes aos países de origem.

Rita Siza

23 de Setembro de 2020, 18:20

Read in english

Receber alertas



Criança no campo temporário de refugiados e migrantes em Lesbos, Grécia YARA NARDI/REUTERS

Figure 3.8. Screenshot of PUB20200923A (left) and PUB20200923B (right).

News reports sourced from Lusa can also make analytical statements but reiterate the official line through quotations and citation, as in “European Commission wants all Member-States signing the new pact on migrations” (PUB20200923A). Besides the title’s imposing tone and the picture of the EC President gesturing (Figure 3.8, above), the text concludes with an argument made by Von der Leyen herself but appropriated in the story:

Adoption of the proposal [of the Pact] recently gained force for being a priority for Germany, exercising the rotating Presidency of the Council until the end of the year —before turning it over to Portugal— and due to the fire that devastated the refugee camp of Moria, in Greece, an incident that exposed once more the need for a truly European policy for migrants and refugees.

CM also has reports by staff journalists expressing analytical and opinionative formulations, with more complexity than other items. One is “Refugees: A stone in Europe’s shoe”, with the following deck: “Fire in the camp of Moria, in Greece, has reminded the urgency of solving a problem that continues to divide the EU” (CM20200928). Despite the very de-humanizing title and the deck phrasing the issue as a persistent inconvenience causing the EU’s division, the images, the infographic and the text actually work to emphasize the people and the risks or poor conditions that they face in their travels or in camps. Usually, graphs can work to de-humanize the persons subject of the report by omitting their representation in their context and instead treating them and their plight as numbers in a chart. However, in this item, as shown in Figure 3.9, below, the infographic is used in combination with three images of people in their context of suffering, on the top of the story, and the charts reveal the number of “dead and

disappeared in the Mediterranean” (in black) and “Arrivals to Europe” (in red). The journalist, Ricardo Ramos, writes introductorily that

Although we are very far from the numbers reached during the 2015 migration crisis, thousands of people continue to risk their lives in the Mediterranean in search of a better future. Most end up confined in unfit camps and detention centers, waiting for an asylum procedure that may take years.

Infographic augmented from the item




Figure 3.9. Screenshot of CM20200928.

Ramos also states that the EC’s presentation of the Pact was rushed by “the drama in the Moria camps, which left 12,000 people to sleep in the open for weeks and originated an unprecedented humanitarian and health crisis in Lesbos Island”, but that one of the things that the Pact introduced was “solidarity *à la carte*”. Still, he expresses pessimism regarding the proposal’s adoption in face of some EU members’ negative reactions, “making [us] doubt that this is when the EU finds a way to solve a problem that continues to generate big divisions among the 27”. Yet, the two final paragraphs give a quantitative context of how many “illegal immigrants” the EU has received and which are the new routes used by “the illegals” to reach European countries. Notably, therefore, the use of derogatory forms of representing people as “illegal”, as discussed in Chapter 2, persists.

In some reports, responsibility for the lack of agreement on the EU Pact was often attributed to certain governments deemed extremists. For instance, in “Hungary calls the flexible solidarity with refugees ‘a linguistic trick’” (JN20200925), the report shows a picture of the Hungarian

Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Szijjarto gesturing, in a neutral context, and refers to his protest over expected “obligatory quotas of reception” by informing that he “insisted on his ultranationalist government’s stance that to defend the EU borders is ‘also a form of solidarity’” —supposedly what Hungary has been doing by preventing migrants from crossing to other EU countries. By contrast, Von der Leyen appears in an earlier report with a stern face expression, against the background of an EU flag, quoted saying that the Pact introduces “faster and more efficient procedures” through which “all member-states, ‘with no exception’”, must “take responsibility and show solidarity” (JN20200923).



Figure 10. Screenshot of items JN20200923 (left) and JN20200923 (right).

The label of “ultranationalist” attached to the Hungarian government (a discussion which is outside the scope of this dissertation) is interesting in terms of framing. The emphasis on it frames Hungary’s concerns with EU borders accordingly—in contrast with altruistic reasons or a notion of the European common good. Similarly, reporting on Poland’s announced construction of a fence on the border with Belarus—following Polish (and also Lithuanian and EU institutions’) accusations of the Belarussian government using migrants against them, as noted above—an item informs that “Polish human rights NGOs and the liberal opposition accused the nationalist-conservative government of refusing to help people”, whereas the European Court of Human Rights’ demanded that Poland and Lithuania assist migrants on the border, as the title anticipates (JN20210826). Hence, the analysis of the three samples showed there is scarce contestation of what the main elements of the Pact, such as border procedures, agreements with third countries, or “mandatory solidarity” between EU members entail, with the exception of a few items. Next sub-section examines how Portugal, in particular, is represented in this context.



## **Portugal: sharing the responsibility for refugees in Europe and promoting a common view of the problem's external dimensions**

By contrast with countries such as Hungary, Poland, and even Greece or Italy, as noted above, besides repeatedly reported for its willingness to receive refugees, Portugal appears as a protective host, including in relation to other EU countries—e.g., “Portugal is among the EU countries with measures of protection of migrants, report says” (CM20210113). There are numerous reports that reproduce the Government’s account of Portugal’s records in hosting refugees, signing bilateral agreements with third countries seen as partners in managing migrations or joining regional and international programs of voluntary relocation.

As mentioned, Portugal is reported as continuously receiving refugees and committed to “sharing the responsibility”, especially through extensive reproduction and quotation of the Government’s accounts and communiqués. Few items add more substantial content. For instance, Lusa portrays Portugal as “in the frontline in welcoming refugees” (CM20210629B) and lists the country’s commitments and track records in relation to other EU countries, citing a communiqué, but subsequently remarking that “behind numbers are people and life stories”. It hence describes the trajectories of refugee persons integrated in particular municipalities and their engagement with the Portuguese society. The report features pictures Ghalia Taki, a Syrian woman, serving Syrian food in a school’s cultural fair, but who also works with the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) as a coordinator of the interpretations staff. Yet, while these reports do remark that particular procedures may be improved, they do not offer deeper examination of the approach adopted in the Government’s policies or the reasons for protraction in the adoption of a EU Pact other than the lack of agreement between member-states, lacking in detail beyond restating that there is no consensus.

During its Presidency of CEU, Portugal, or its representatives, emphasized the endeavor to instill the view of an “external dimension” of migration, a “common challenge for Europe that should include dialogue with third countries of origin and transit” for adopting steps to prevent irregular crossings and risky journeys, stepping up controls of the EU’s external borders, and striking the “balance between the principles of responsibility and solidarity” (Portugal’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2021). An article authored by MHA Cabrita (PUB20210315B) himself describes this “hard balance” as “the greatest challenge of our Presidency in the area of Home Affairs, one which we will face with the political capital of our coherence, allowing us to have a constructive dialogue” with the various groups of countries in the EU, and another quotes Minister of Foreign Affairs Augusto Santos Silva on that and on Portugal’s disposition to “fight until the last minute” for the Pact’s adoption (CM20210518). In Minister Cabrita’s piece, he says that three main points guided Portugal’s action to promote the Pact: “the migrations external dimensions, shared responsibility for managing the external borders, and solidarity with the countries of the Mediterranean most hit by the migration pressures.” He explains that by emphasizing on external dimensions Portugal is promoting an approach that links those concerns

with the borders' security and with regular migration flows in agreements with third countries that not only engage them in regulating these flows but also support them through development programs as well as in “control[lin] irregular migration at the origin”, for instance, with operations to fight human trafficking, in a “broadband” approach to this externalization. His assessment is later cited in a news report, with numerous quotations from Cabrita, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell, and Commissioner Johansson, on Portugal having managed to achieve consensus on a hard topic for the EU Council: the issue’s “external dimension” and the need for partnerships with third countries to manage migration flows and secure the borders, to assure legal and orderly movements, preventing irregular transit, and even promote development in countries of origin (PUB20210315A). Still, a more substantial discussion was necessary on how this approach may not only perpetuates but intensify the securitization of migration and transfers responsibilities abroad by tying them to other European interventions, especially in Africa and Asia, such as development aid and counter-terrorism programs, as noted by Oliveira and Strange (2019), while defining societal security at home in terms of the control of migration flows in general and of its socioeconomic effects in particular, as Iov and Bogda (2017) put it, in discussions covered in Chapter 2.

Moreover, in an interview (PUB20210104), Prime Minister António Costa stresses the country’s commitment on key issues of the EU’s agenda and its geostrategic interests, with principled stances on the defense of the rule of law as a democratic value for which Portugal joined the EU in the first place, as well as the EU’s “social role”. Here, too, the concern for fostering the citizens’ confidence in the Union and the democratic system is prominent, and the goal is said to be “emptying populism out”. Yet, Costa is quoted on the Pact’s actual implementation, admitting pessimistically: “as it is more or less implied that there will only be an agreement on everything when everything is agreed on, there probably won’t be any final agreement on anything”. In contrast, a news report informs of the visit to Portugal of then-President of the French extreme-right party National Rally, Marine Le Pen, when she praised the Portuguese party *Chega*, led by André Ventura, as both cadres also turn to “European values” and defense of the “European project” to call on citizens to mobilize against immigration and the EU’s “imposition” of the Pact (PUB20210108).

From the center-right to the left, at least one premise is shared in criticism of the Pact itself and related developments in items already mentioned, like the interview with MEPs Rangel and Matias, from center-right and left political parties, respectively (PUB20210329A), and Fonseca’s opinion article (PUB20211031): there is a lack of political will to implement necessary changes to the migration and asylum system. Still, the EU’s role and values are deemed crucial. Fonseca, for instance, focuses on a seemingly bureaucratic makeover, and the expectation of real changes in procedures that observe “human dignity”, as mentioned. Moreover, his appeal is built on the notion of *European* ethics and ideal: “the sense of European belonging is ever bigger. I no longer, we no longer are indifferent towards what happens in Greece, the Baltic countries, or even France. We must act.” For that, he calls on “everyone”—“member States, civil society, politicians, me

and you”, to defend human rights “above any (dis)interest”. He argues that “real actions” are what constitute “a closer society”, and concludes by returning to the EU in the expectation for an effective “defense of values and principles for all”.

Notwithstanding, Portugal appears as highly supportive of the EC’s proposed Pact and attempts to bridge a consensus for its adoption, but ponderation of the actual implications in practice is notably missing from these items, which may be explained by their reliance on Government and other officials appearing as sources and actors.<sup>37</sup> More relevant than discussing the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum appears to be Portugal’s records in the reception of refugees specifically, mostly associated with how it commits to this measure through its voluntary initiative, bilateral agreements with EU and non-EU members, and EU or international relocation programs in which it participates. It thus fulfils its share of “responsibility and solidarity” in a palliative, however urgent and important, type of engagement, as transpired from this sample, which presents an overall very positive view of the country’s track record.

Yet, among items tackling the Pact, the migrations’ “external dimension” is repeatedly emphasized by the Government and uncritically reproduced in reports. In PUB, one even lauds the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU for managing to promote this view as a consensus among other EU members in order to overcome the stalemate in the reform of the European system of border management and refugee reception (PUB20210315A). The “Portuguese approach” is said to have been supportively commented by Commissioner Johansson, as it goes beyond border management to argue for the need to cooperate with third countries in controlling as well as regularizing migration, in order to remove incentives for people to seek dangerous ways of entering the EU. These reports’ over-reliance on quotations and reiterations of EU and Government officials’ narratives may explain the lack of complexity and criticism of the assumptions and consequences of their propositions.

In general, Portugal emerges as a righteous member of the community by not only owning its share of the responsibility when it comes to voluntarily relocating and receiving refugees but also intervening in the high political debate on future European policies in a central position. For instance, Costa is extensively quoted in a large report (1,043 words, only 82 of which are dedicated to migration and the EU Pact, in the final paragraphs) defending a “Social Europe” to “fight ‘populisms’”, in an address to the EP (JN20210120). He calls on members to unitedly face the various impacts of the pandemic while advancing projects such as the Ecological European Pact and reaching a consensus for the adoption of the Pact for Migration and Asylum, thus supporting a “common European action” towards managing migrations in an “adequate balance between their internal and external dimensions”, despite “different existing sensitivities”. Neither the “dimensions” nor the “sensitivities” are explained, let alone pondered. The top picture features

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<sup>37</sup> Remarkably, in CM’s sample, which as noted reproduces many reports from Lusa, Government officials appear as actors in 47 items, and EU bodies or officials, in 32 items. Among the least mentioned actors are Parliamentarians (8), Migrants (4), Refugees (3), and citizens or the general public (1)—although civil society actors, but mainly the Union of SEF’s inspectors, appear in 12.

Costa speaking on the EP’s floor, surrounded by EU and national flags. Hence, besides appearing as supportive of the EC’s initiatives, Portugal is also portrayed as proactively attempting to help the EU member-states to achieve the necessary consensus for adopting a common approach.

**JN** JN Direto Nacional Local Justiça Mundo Economia Desporto Pessoas Inovação Cultura Opinião NM

**Presidência da UE**

## Costa defende Europa Social para combater "populismos"

João Francisco Guerreiro, em Bruxelas  
20 Janeiro 2021 às 11:01

f t +

COMENTAR

TÓPICOS

Mundo  
Presidência da UE  
António Costa  
Bruxelas

António Costa apresentou esta quarta-feira as prioridades da presidência portuguesa da União Europeia  
Foto: Francisco Seco / POOL / AFP

Figure 3.11. Screenshot of JN20210120.

Domestic and regional issues are entwined. More specifically, as mentioned, two grave events of both dimensions are portrayed as the reasons for national and EU authorities to step up their responses to bad practices in migration and asylum: the killing of Homeniuk in Portugal by SEF agents and the fires in Moria camp, in Greece. In terms of intertextuality, abundant reports on drownings and rescues at sea, the camps’ conditions, or repression and pushback practices on the borders, for instance, provided for a continuous framing of moral outrage at how refugees/asylum-seekers were being treated. As noted, the term “migrants” appear significantly less associated with these concerns, with a misleading semantic operation of omitting them or “immigrants” from reports, in favour of the use of the term “refugees”.

Covering Commissioner Johansson’s visit to the country, a report quotes her statements on the killing of Homenyuk in the title: “Death at SEF: Commissioner speaks of ‘terrible human rights violation’ and says, ‘there will be changes in leadership’” (PUB20201204). “Portugal is addressing the situation appropriately”, she is quoted saying, vaguely mentioning changes and

oddly remarking that “human rights violations are bound to happen. What shows who we are is the way we deal with them”, followed by the journalist’s brief observation that according to the Justice Ombudsman “Portugal was the only one of 17 European countries detaining migrants in airports for over 48 hours, in places flagged as presenting ‘factors of risks of torture and ill-treatment’”. The story moves on to quote the Commissioner addressing the Pact and expressing confidence in Portugal’s action for implementation during its Presidency of the Council: “Portugal is very well positioned to have a leading role because it has a very pragmatic approach to immigration that I esteem.” Hence, the country is represented positively within the context of a major European debate in which it would take an active, leading role.

As for immigration, the Government’s narrative is that it sees it as positive and beneficial to the country and the Portuguese society, as immigrants contribute to economic development and a demographic balance; hence why it promotes their social integration, e.g., by directing financial assistance to “unfavoured communities”, (PUB20201106). Yet, this utilitarian approach to immigration, as Huysmans (2006) puts it, remains unquestioned, nor is it pondered which and why immigrants fall into that “unfavoured” category. As Velasco (2014: 30) puts it, “the immigrant represents a failure in the national order. To them the only thing that is left is to be faithful to that order with their labour, discretely and obediently repaying the generosity offered by the society into which they immigrate.” Yet, in context, this narrative comes out as a counterpoint to right-wing allegations that immigrants drain social security and the state for benefits and do not contribute, a myth that the ACM also felt the need to debunk, as discussed in Chapter 2.

Further zooming into the domestic dimension, debate over the future of SEF and over Portugal’s own migration and asylum policies are simplified, and JN’s and CM’s samples tackle the former extensively. As previously noted, discussion over SEF was mostly referred to the killing of Homenyuk by its inspectors, Portugal’s own tragedy. Hence, a “fresh start” for Portugal’s internal policies seemingly revolved around reforming or extinguishing SEF. The Government, the Parliament and political parties engaged in debating and formulating measures, as well as the president of the Union of SEF’s inspectors, Acácio Pereira, were the main sources and actors, whereas much less space is given to scholars, NGOs, or immigrants.

Illustrating Pereira’s prominence, apart from signing articles as a columnist in CM, he also appears in news reports in the latter’s samples and in JN’s. He is quoted for highly critical statements on the “politicized” nature of the decision, which he deems “an example of how not to rush legislation on areas of sovereignty and national interest”, as this is an issue that “requires a broad consensus and cannot depend on circumstantial conjunctures” (CM20211023).<sup>38</sup> He is

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<sup>38</sup> The first report is sourced from Lusa and the second is authored by CM’s journalist Sérgio Vitorino. The former explains that the novelty in the adoption of a new text was, for instance, the creation of APMA, by suggestion of BE. In the second report, Pereira de-legitimizes BE’s proposal by alleging that its adoption was enabled by a “circumstantial” agreement with the Government for the former’s support of the latter’s budget proposal.

also quoted saying that the move would “severely increase the risk of terrorist attacks launched from Portugal”, whereas what was necessary was that SEF gets the necessary means to answer to the country’s and the EU needs, since it contributes with making Portugal “an oasis of security in Europe and the world” and, paraphrasing him, that SEF is “the only police born from democracy and which came out of the revolution of 25 April 1975” (JN20210319). Later, he is quoted saying that ending SEF is “harmful” to the country, the EU and the immigrants themselves, because Portugal will regress to the “militarization of borders and criminalization of immigration” (CM20211020C). Notwithstanding, his view is representative of SEF’s inspectors and other staff workers, which is indeed an important inclusion, but other critical voices and more complex analyses are not as represented.

Hence, although the discussion brought up important considerations about migration and asylum policies at national and regional levels, they were not sufficiently explicated, and crucial points about the State’s institutions and procedures were relegated to the background of more immediate polemics, however critical to the process, as the killing of Homeniuk. Notably, the process of adopting a proposal worked out between PS and BE that centered on ending SEF and creating APMA, in alternative to the Government’s proposal of SEF’s restructuration, was covered with some emphasis on the need to stop dealing with immigration as a matter for the police—*caso de polícia*, meaning that it should not be criminalized—and hence removing it from SEF’s hands in one way or another. However, this was not the point for some of those opposing the move, such as PCP, but whose positions were overall omitted or simplified.<sup>39</sup> Stances of opposition parties, namely PCP and PSD, standing in different poles of the political spectrum, appear only in passing and often conflated in simple lists of those who voted against the proposal.

One lengthy report (620 words) aimed at clarifying what APMA would be, for instance, merely states in the last two lines that “PCP has already announced that it will maintain its vote against the proposal. Final voting will be held next Friday in the plenary” (CM20211020E); another report ends with two short paragraphs saying that the SEF workers’ Union and a few parties like PSD and CDS oppose the move, and that the proposal had gotten 13 negative opinions in the Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees—without mentioning reasons (CM20211022E; JN20211022B). Only after the vote in Plenary, a report sourced from agencies, including Lusa, found in CM and JN, finally explains why PCP and PSD opposed the proposal. It quotes MP João Oliveira’s explanations of the view, that the need for separating administrative from police functions and creating another service to support

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<sup>39</sup> The Communists’ view was that the entire Homeland Security Law needed a fundamental restructuring and that separating administrative from policing functions vis-à-vis immigration was an imperative, so that foreigners are not treated as “potential criminals”; however, the party deemed the move ill-conceived and poorly timed, a political “escape” in reaction to the killing of Homeniuk that would only “cover the son with a sieve”—meaning that the problem was more complex than the solution proposed (Filipe, 2021). The PCP later deemed— the proposal actually created more problems, hence why the restructuring was postponed (Rivera, 2022).

immigrants and asylum-seekers does not require the extinction of SEF, along with others by PSD's André Coelho Lima, who says this is a matter of sovereignty addressed with "shocking levity" and based on "prejudice" by "entirely hanging on the unfortunate developments" in SEF's facilities—an "unfortunate" characterization of what was in fact the killing of a person as the consequence of abusive practices. The piece is then followed by quotes of those in favour: BE's MP Beatriz Gomes Dias, defending the proposal because migrating "is not a crime", but "a right to be protected"; and PS' MP José Magalhães, for whom the new law was "a historical mark and a step forward"—but did not add to the understanding of complex propositions (CM20211022; JN20211022).

Hence, while the proposal was debated in Parliament, from the sample analysed, the readers could not get a clear explanation of the reasons in favour or against this important measure, seen as spurred by the commotion for as grave an event as Homeniuk's killing—and thus apparently based on justified moral/ethical reasons for changing migration-related procedures, which makes the process itself virtually unquestioned in these samples. Although numerous items covered this process and even highlighted the protest of the Union of SEF inspectors, overall they failed to contribute to a deeper appreciation and discussion of proposals on the table and their consequences, which would have required a more complex and critical view.

## Conclusion

This chapter presented the empirical analysis of the Portuguese media's coverage of EU and Portuguese practices and policies on migration and asylum in the context of discussions over a new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, by examining samples from the digital versions of the three most newspapers. The analysis found that these samples did not give enough space to critical perspectives of wider policies beyond immediate concerns like rescuing / helping refugees. It also did not engage in issues such as (de)securitization, by, for instance, reviewing EU and Portuguese security laws or agreements with third countries when these issues were emphasized, but not explored, in numerous reports. Overall, the items analysed were not pondered enough as to propitiate an informed public debate, choosing instead to mostly convey the dominant actors' views. Regarding the Pact, reasons for the impasse were insufficiently explored beyond the usual remark that EU member-states continue to be divided / cannot reach a consensus—which seems to speak more of the EU incapacitating and non-participatory decision-making process than of the different perspectives on migration and asylum, and even less so of the citizens' engagement

with the issue, or, conceptually and practically, of the difference between outward and inward “solidarity”.

These lacunae were clear in reports covering the Portuguese Government’s engagement with the promotion of the Pact. In addition to insufficiently exploring what insistence in the “external dimension” actually meant, items sampled do not ponder if and how this approach reinforces the externalization and securitization of the issue, as discussed in Chapter 2. This is significant at least because a) there is concern with the situation of refugees on EU borders, as the high numbers of reports on that demonstrate, b) it is a period of discussion over what the EU should do about it, and c) Portugal holds the CEU’s Presidency and aimed to make decisive contributions to this policymaking process. Most remarkably, the few instances in which the Pact was actually the main topic of the items analyzed left little room for informing the Portuguese public of this process under debate, and the superficiality of most of the reports tackling it could not have illuminated the many issues that evince that the Pact is not, as Von der Leyen said, “a fresh start”, but instead, as the few dissenting voices analyzing it and appearing in the samples put it, a repetition of past mistakes.



## Conclusion: Mediatizing solidarity and humanitarian concerns regarding the EU migration and asylum conundrum

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The new Pact on Migration and Asylum presented by the European Commission on 23 September 2020 was framed as a “fresh start”, based on three main pillars: “efficient asylum and return procedures, solidarity and fair share of responsibility, and strengthened partnerships with third countries”. But, in reality, it does not shift paradigm, as it remains focused on externalizing, deterring, retention and return, as argued by civil society actors and political parties represented in the European Parliament. Yet, throughout media analysis, this research found that, in the samples analyzed, there is an absence of a deeper exploration of the system—in all its implications—and openly critical propositions are rare, appearing more frequently in opinion pieces or interviews. News reports, with few but remarkable exceptions, make brief, implicit or indirect observations, including through recourse to impactful and contrasting pictures. The items sampled have little to ponder regarding systemic problems beyond a manifest moral/ethical outrage for their humanitarian consequences, with simplistic observations on their causes, seldom adopting a perspective wider than procedures or political contests between certain EU members. Quotations and indirect reiteration of official perspectives are very frequent, making for a habit of appropriation, by the media, of these narratives, especially those promoting normative solutions.

As noted in Chapter 1, the analysis confirms that the distinction between pragmatic and identity factors need not be strict. The most frequent associations between actors, subjects and narratives in the corpus analyzed rest on the mobilization of moral/ethical concerns informed by “European principles and values”, coupled with administrative considerations for the need to “organize”, “regularize” and “manage” reception or deportations procedures more effectively and efficiently. Both are mobilized to demonstrate the need to protect borders and “share the burden” among member-states, as well as to improve conditions for people waiting—contained—in camps on the EU’s borders or moving through dangerous routes towards Europe, for instance. In this sense, moral, ethical, and identity representations of both the EU’s and Portugal’s availability or duty and failure to act are enmeshed with pragmatic political and security concerns for its members’ need to protect their community and its values, citizens and borders.

This analysis concludes that “solidarity” still appears mainly in relation to EU members, with emphasis on the need to share responsibilities so that the European space is protected and European policies are harmonized and effective. Solidarity with migrants and refugees are, therefore, left to comments on the need to improve retention camps in Europe, where people held are admittedly suffering. Yet, this problem is not highlighted as evidence of the need for a whole new perspective of migration as a human right, a historical habit and a potentially enriching experience for immigrants and hosting societies alike, instead of risks amidst other “hybrid threats”. Solidarity with asylum-seeking persons with real reasons to seek refuge and security themselves is trumped by the aim to prevent—e.g., through agreement with third countries on deterring procedures—that the situation escalates to humanitarian tragedies on Europe’s doorstep, by orderly receiving or keeping them away.

This analysis finds that media coverage of the debate was overly simplistic and that even criticism or discussion of the EU’s failures focused more on moral grounds than on complex interpellations of official accounts of the issue and the solution. The Pact itself was poorly covered, with surprisingly few items directly engaging with it, and its mechanisms were overly summarized and glimpsed over, often through quotations of their own promoters. Critical alternatives were scarcely covered even though they are profuse within the broader debate on this topic. Indeed, when there was criticism, it focused on the outrage for humanitarian tragedies represented as events, even if symptomatically correlated to policy failures but for reasons insufficiently investigated or pondered, and seldom as consequences of a more systemic problem of perspective and practice.

It is still necessary to remark, however, that most of the items analyzed convey the narrative that asylum-seeking persons, due to the humanitarian nature of their plight and the dire conditions of their travels and shelter/containment—and who “need help” or “rescue”, one of the main narratives found—as well as immigrants with concrete contributions to society—as narratives like “Immigration is beneficial or advantageous” demonstrate—may be screened and admitted into “fortress Europe”. Despite anti-immigration discourses proliferating within the European context, these media outlets were careful to give voice to the humanitarian concerns—even if only this idea and the practice it enacted needed to “protect” the European citizens, community and “way of life”, as defined in the European Council’s and the EC’s 2019-2024 strategies.

However, little concern was raised for how sorting through and containing migrant movement into Europe is yet another way idealized to control entries even though conjunctures in peoples' origins do not always enable such a pondered and necessarily well-informed and administratively assisted procedure—which functions precisely as a gatekeeping measure. Progressive endeavors and projects for consolidating the freedom of movement as a human right to be promoted and as a potentially enriching opportunity for all societies are disregarded in favor of apparently more urgent and pragmatic considerations, as portrayed by those actors whose arguments are most accessible and voices are louder —including by being more frequently quoted and reproduced through the media's appropriation of their discourses, as well as due to the effectiveness of their institutional power in peoples' lives.

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**Corpus of Analysis**  
**Correio da Manhã (CM), Jornal de Notícias (JN) and Público (PUB)**

Results of a search for items published between 1 September 2020 and 31 October 2021, using the terms "migrações" and "asilo". Search was done in the outlets' own search engines by the researcher registered as a subscriber. Results are non-exhaustive and random, for each time a search is conducted using the same parameters, different results may appear. The corpus is made of all results appearing in single searches.

ID	Medium	Date	Title	Genre	Author / Interviewee
CM20200915	Correio da Manhã	2020-09-15	<a href="#">Portugal confirma disponibilidade para acolher até 100 refugiados do campo de Moria</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20200916	Correio da Manhã	2020-09-16	<a href="#">Eurodeputado Nuno Melo questiona Comissão Europeia sobre possível "rota de migração ilegal no Algarve"</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20200924	Correio da Manhã	2020-09-24	<a href="#">União Europeia propõe pacto migratório</a>	News Report	Correio da Manhã
CM20200928	Correio da Manhã	2020-09-28	<a href="#">Refugiados: Uma pedra no sapato da Europa</a>	News Report	Ricardo Ramos (journalist)
CM20201023	Correio da Manhã	2020-10-23	<a href="#">MAI remete acordo de migração legal com Marrocos para impedir a rota de imigração ilegal na costa algarvia</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20201120	Correio da Manhã	2020-11-20	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu mais 27 refugiados ao abrigo de um programa de voluntariado</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20201130	Correio da Manhã	2020-11-30	<a href="#">Maior controlo nas fronteiras não foi eficaz para conter Covid-19, diz ministro da Administração Interna</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20201209	Correio da Manhã	2020-12-09	<a href="#">Diretora do SEF demite-se 9 meses depois da polémica morte de ucraniano no Aeroporto de Lisboa</a>	News Report	Correio da Manhã
CM20201211	Correio da Manhã	2020-12-11	<a href="#">Portugal já acolheu 620 refugiados, 42 chegaram ontem da Turquia</a>	News Report	Correio da Manhã & Lusa
CM20201217	Correio da Manhã	2020-12-17	<a href="#">Organização para as Migrações assistiu 219 refugiados em Portugal neste ano</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20201218A	Correio da Manhã	2020-12-18	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu esta semana refugiados do Egito, cidadãos resgatados e menores</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20201218B	Correio da Manhã	2020-12-18	<a href="#">Governo quer refugiados empregados, a falar português e com habitação dentro de ano e meio</a>	Interview	Lusa / Secretary of State for Integration and Migration Cristina Pereira
CM20201218C	Correio da Manhã	2020-12-18	<a href="#">Secretária de Estado para as Migrações ficou "completamente chocada" com morte de Ihor Homeniuk</a>	Interview	Lusa / Secretary of State for Integration and Migration Cristina Pereira

**Corpus of Analysis**  
**Correio da Manhã (CM), Jornal de Notícias (JN) and Público (PUB)**

CM20201228	Correio da Manhã	2020-12-28	<a href="#">Governo anuncia que Portugal acolheu mais três refugiados totalizando 631</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210111	Correio da Manhã	2021-01-11	<a href="#">Presidente da Assembleia da República espera futura relação "frutuosa" com Reino Unido</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210113	Correio da Manhã	2021-01-13	<a href="#">Portugal entre os países da União Europeia com medidas de proteção dos migrantes, diz relatório</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210120	Correio da Manhã	2021-01-20	<a href="#">António Costa defende pacto para migrações e asilo no Conselho da UE em Bruxelas</a>	News Report	Correio da Manhã
CM20210126	Correio da Manhã	2021-01-26	<a href="#">Ao sabor da maré</a>	Opinion	<a href="#">Manuel Maria Rodrigues (columnist, public functionaire)</a>
CM20210128	Correio da Manhã	2021-01-28	<a href="#">Pandemia mobiliza para "defesa" dos valores europeus, diz ministro da Administração Interna</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210204	Correio da Manhã	2021-02-04	<a href="#">Estudo revela mais meninas em risco de mutilação genital na Europa</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210312	Correio da Manhã	2021-03-12	<a href="#">Ministros de Administração Interna da UE reúnem-se para discutir resiliência de infraestruturas críticas</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210313	Correio da Manhã	2021-03-13	<a href="#">Portugal acolheu mais 23 refugiados e cinco migrantes durante esta semana</a>	News Report	Correio da Manhã
CM20210319	Correio da Manhã	2021-03-19	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu hoje oito migrantes resgatados na costa italiana</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210331	Correio da Manhã	2021-03-31	<a href="#">Redes de droga ligadas a chegada de imigrantes ilegais no Algarve</a>	News Report	Tiago Griff, Ana Palma & Rui Pando Gomes (journalists)
CM20210414	Correio da Manhã	2021-04-14	<a href="#">Conselho de Ministros publicou em Diário da República plano de reestruturação do SEF</a>	News Report	Correio da Manhã
CM20210518	Correio da Manhã	2021-05-18	<a href="#">Portugal "lutará até ao último minuto" pelo pacto migratório, diz ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210522	Correio da Manhã	2021-05-22	<a href="#">Ministro francês do Interior diz que Espanha e Itália "controlam mal" a imigração</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210527	Correio da Manhã	2021-05-27	<a href="#">Maioria dos partidos quer reestruturação do SEF discutida na Assembleia da República, mas Governo refuta</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210529	Correio da Manhã	2021-05-29	<a href="#">Portugal acolhe mais 22 refugiados menores não acompanhados</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210602	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-02	<a href="#">Bruxelas quer reforçar eficácia de controlos externos da zona Schengen</a>	News Report	Lusa

**Corpus of Analysis**  
**Correio da Manhã (CM), Jornal de Notícias (JN) and Público (PUB)**

CM20210604	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-04	<a href="#">Políticas</a>	Opinion	F. Falcão-Machado (columnist, analyst, former Ambassador)
CM20210610	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-10	<a href="#">Portugal recebe 18 refugiados sírios vindos da Turquia na quarta-feira</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210612	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-12	<a href="#">Parlamentos europeu e português promovem debate sobre migrações</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210614	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-14	<a href="#">Parlamentos europeu e português promovem hoje debate sobre migrações</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210618	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-18	<a href="#">Portugal com 1.834 pedidos de asilo em 2019, o valor mais alto de sempre</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210620	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-20	<a href="#">Amnistia Internacional faz vigília à beira Tejo pelos refugiados que ficam às portas da Europa</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210623	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-23	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu esta semana 38 refugiados da Turquia e Grécia</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210624	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-24	<a href="#">Eslovénia admite que pacto migratório deverá continuar sem acordo no próximo semestre</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210628	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-28	<a href="#">O SEF não pode acabar</a>	Opinion	Acácio Pereira (columnist, President of the Union of Investigators and Auditors of the Foreigners and Borders Service SCIF-SEF)
CM20210629	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-29	<a href="#">Eurodeputados destacam ratificação sobre recursos próprios como conquista de Portugal</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210629B	Correio da Manhã	2021-06-29	<a href="#">Portugal na linha da frente do acolhimento a refugiados</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210709	Correio da Manhã	2021-07-09	<a href="#">Aprovada na generalidade proposta do Governo sobre transferência de competências policiais do SEF</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210709B	Correio da Manhã	2021-07-09	<a href="#">Não se justifica "polícia para estrangeiros" em Portugal, diz Eduardo Cabrita</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210716	Correio da Manhã	2021-07-16	<a href="#">Portugal acolhe oito cidadãos africanos requerentes de asilo</a>	News Report	Lusa

**Corpus of Analysis**  
**Correio da Manhã (CM), Jornal de Notícias (JN) and Público (PUB)**

CM20210826	Correio da Manhã	2021-08-26	<a href="#">Ministros da UE em reunião extraordinária para discutir situação de refugiados afegãos</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210831	Correio da Manhã	2021-08-31	<a href="#">Cabrita diz que Portugal tem recursos que permitem apoiar centenas de afegãos</a>	News Report	Correio da Manhã
CM20210902	Correio da Manhã	2021-09-02	<a href="#">Irmãos terroristas detidos em Lisboa ficam em prisão preventiva na cadeia de alta segurança de Monsanto</a>	News Report	Tânia Laranjo (journalist)
CM20210909	Correio da Manhã	2021-09-09	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu 12 refugiados sírios, aumentando para 830 o total de pessoas acolhidas</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210909B	Correio da Manhã	2021-09-09	<a href="#">Migrantes obrigados a trabalhar na Dinamarca para receberem ajudas do estado</a>	News Report	Correio da Manhã
CM20210910	Correio da Manhã	2021-09-10	<a href="#">SEF diz que pagou 10 mil euros a todos os refugiados acolhidos em Portugal</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210914	Correio da Manhã	2021-09-14	<a href="#">SEF desvia milhões de euros da Europa destinados a apoiar refugiados</a>	News Report	Tânia Laranjo (journalist)
CM20210920	Correio da Manhã	2021-09-20	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu no domingo grupo de 80 refugiados afegãos</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20210927	Correio da Manhã	2021-09-27	<a href="#">Processos de refugiados têm "aumentado substancialmente" nos tribunais administrativos</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211001	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-01	<a href="#">Sindicato diz que Governo deve assumir responsabilidades das dívidas do SEF</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211006	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-06	<a href="#">Parlamento aprova audição de Eduardo Cabrita sobre dívidas do SEF ao acolhimento de refugiados</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211012	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-12	<a href="#">Portugal acolheu hoje oito crianças e jovens não acompanhados vindos da Grécia</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211018	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-18	<a href="#">26 organizações não-governamentais acusam Grécia de deixar migrantes sem alimentos</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211020	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-20	<a href="#">Portugal vai defender em Bruxelas vantagens da aquisição conjunta de combustíveis</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211020B	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-20	<a href="#">Transferência de competências do SEF será acompanhada da transferência de meios, diz a ministra da justiça</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211020C	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-20	<a href="#">Sindicato dos inspetores alega que extinção do SEF representa "uma ala política"</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211020D	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-20	<a href="#">Passagem dos inspetores do SEF para PSP, GNR e PJ terá em conta funções nos últimos três anos</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211020E	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-20	<a href="#">Após extinção do SEF nascerá a APMA: Saiba o que fará esta nova agência</a>	News Report	Correio da Manhã & Lusa

**Corpus of Analysis**  
**Correio da Manhã (CM), Jornal de Notícias (JN) and Público (PUB)**

CM20211022A	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-22	<a href="#">PCP e PSD criticam extinção do SEF, enquanto PS e BE destacam avanços nas migrações</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211022B	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-22	<a href="#">ONU pede ação urgente da União Europeia e da Bielorrússia na questão da migração</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211022C	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-22	<a href="#">Parlamento aprova extinção do Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211022D	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-22	<a href="#">Saiba o que muda com a extinção do SEF</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211022E	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-22	<a href="#">Extinção do SEF votada hoje na Assembleia da República</a>	News Report	Lusa
CM20211023	Correio da Manhã	2021-10-23	<a href="#">Extinção do SEF é “pouco transparente”, acusa Sindicato da Carreira de Investigação e Fiscalização</a>	News Report	Sérgio A. Vitorino (journalist)
JN20200903	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-03	<a href="#">Conselho da Europa critica Espanha por acolher 500 imigrantes em praça de touros</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20200911	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-11	<a href="#">"Há crianças a dormir em campas do cemitério" na ilha grega de Lesbos</a>	News report	Tomás Guerreiro (journalist)
JN20200913	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-13	<a href="#">Governo grego assegura novo campo para refugiados de Lesbos "dentro de cinco dias"</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20200916A	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-16	<a href="#">Lisboa insta Governo a acolher mais refugiados do campo de Moria</a>	News report	Sofia Cristino (journalist)
JN20200916B	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-16	<a href="#">Von der Leyen anuncia pacto migratório para "saran feridas"</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20200920	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-20	<a href="#">Milhares em Berlim pedem ajuda à UE para os refugiados de Moria</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20200921	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-21	<a href="#">Mais de 200 refugiados na ilha de Lesbos infetados com covid-19</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20200923	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-23	<a href="#">Bruxelas propõe novo pacto sobre migrações para os 27 "sem exceção"</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20200925	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-25	<a href="#">Hungria chama "truque linguístico" à solidariedade flexível com os refugiados</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20200930	Jornal de Notícias	2020-09-30	<a href="#">António Vitorino diz que covid-19 bloqueou 2 a 3 milhões de pessoas nas fronteiras</a>	Interview	Patrícia Cunha, Lusa (journalist)
JN20201005	Jornal de Notícias	2020-10-05	<a href="#">Navio com tripulantes clandestinos atracou em Leixões</a>	News report	Roberto Bessa Moreira (journalist)
JN20201109	Jornal de Notícias	2020-11-09	<a href="#">Governo volta a regularizar imigrantes com processos pendentes</a>	News report	JN & Agencies

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**Correio da Manhã (CM), Jornal de Notícias (JN) and Público (PUB)**

JN20201111	Jornal de Notícias	2020-11-11	<a href="#">Incêndio no campo de refugiados na ilha grega de Samos</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20201210	Jornal de Notícias	2020-12-10	<a href="#">Ministro não se demite e volta a lamentar morte de ucraniano no SEF</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20201215	Jornal de Notícias	2020-12-15	<a href="#">Eduardo Cabrita: Reforma do SEF arranca em janeiro</a>	News report / live blog	João Vasconcelos e Sousa com Rita Neves Costa (journalists)
JN20201217	Jornal de Notícias	2020-12-17	<a href="#">Hungria condenada pela União Europeia por violar direito de asilo</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20201218	Jornal de Notícias	2020-12-18	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu mais duas famílias refugiadas e 21 menores</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20201223	Jornal de Notícias	2020-12-23	<a href="#">MAI diz que é alheio a atrasos de centro de acolhimento</a>	News report	T.R.A.
JN20210120	Jornal de Notícias	2021-01-20	<a href="#">Costa defende Europa Social para combater "populismos"</a>	News report	João Francisco Guerreiro (journalist, Brussels correspondent)
JN20210310	Jornal de Notícias	2021-03-10	<a href="#">Dois jovens migrantes condenados a prisão por incêndios de Moria</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210318	Jornal de Notícias	2021-03-18	<a href="#">Pandemia provocou "retrocesso geral" dos direitos na Europa</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210319	Jornal de Notícias	2021-03-19	<a href="#">Inspetores do SEF passam para a PSP, GNR ou PJ após reestruturação</a>	Interview	Célia Paulo, Lusa / with Eduardo Cabrita, Minister of Home Affairs
JN20210319B	Jornal de Notícias	2021-03-19	<a href="#">Extinguir o SEF fará disparar risco de ataques terroristas, diz o sindicato</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210322	Jornal de Notícias	2021-03-22	<a href="#">Reino Unido quer enviar migrantes que cheguem ao país para o estrangeiro</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210330	Jornal de Notícias	2021-03-30	<a href="#">Grupo que desembarcou em praia no Algarve pode ter 16 pessoas</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210517	Jornal de Notícias	2021-05-17	<a href="#">Pelo menos 2.700 migrantes marroquinos entram em Ceuta. Mil são menores</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210529	Jornal de Notícias	2021-05-29	<a href="#">Portugal acolhe mais 22 refugiados menores não acompanhados</a>	News report	JN & Agencies

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**Correio da Manhã (CM), Jornal de Notícias (JN) and Público (PUB)**

JN20210609	Jornal de Notícias	2021-06-09	<a href="#">Grécia defende utilização de "canhões sonoros" contra imigrantes</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210614	Jornal de Notícias	2021-06-14	<a href="#">"Incrivelmente positivo". Biden e Erdogan falam em encontro "produtivo e sincero"</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210618	Jornal de Notícias	2021-06-18	<a href="#">Lituânia abre campo de refugiados na fronteira com Bielorrússia</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210620	Jornal de Notícias	2021-06-20	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu quase três mil refugiados nos últimos anos</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210623	Jornal de Notícias	2021-06-23	<a href="#">Bielorrússia "não impedirá" migrantes de entrarem na União Europeia</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210623B	Jornal de Notícias	2021-06-23	<a href="#">Programa de retorno voluntário de imigrantes aumentou 111,2%</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210709	Jornal de Notícias	2021-07-09	<a href="#">Cabrita diz que não se justifica "uma polícia para estrangeiros" em Portugal</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210802	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-02	<a href="#">A nova "identidade nacional"</a>	Opinion	João Gonçalves (Expert, Jurist)
JN20210805	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-05	<a href="#">Bielorrússia reage às expulsões pela Lituânia e aperta controlo fronteiriço</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210805B	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-05	<a href="#">Novo recorde diário no Canal da Mancha com a travessia de 482 pessoas</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210806	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-06	<a href="#">Itália autoriza desembarque dos 257 migrantes a bordo do "Sea-Watch"</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210807	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-07	<a href="#">"Ocean Viking" autorizado a desembarcar 549 migrantes</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210817	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-17	<a href="#">Merkel aberta ao acolhimento "controlado" de refugiados afegãos vulneráveis</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210818	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-18	<a href="#">Portugal vai disponibilizar apoio material para a fronteira com a Lituânia</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210821	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-21	<a href="#">Turquia já recusou este ano mais de 280 mil migrantes e refugiados</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210821B	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-21	<a href="#">A queda de Cabul: principais acontecimentos desde a tomada de poder pelos talibãs</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210826	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-26	<a href="#">Portugal acolheu esta semana 14 refugiados provenientes da Turquia</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210826B	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-26	<a href="#">Tribunal dos Direitos Humanos exige que Polónia e Letónia ajudem migrantes</a>	News report	JN & Agencies

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JN20210831	Jornal de Notícias	2021-08-31	<a href="#">Portugal tem capacidade financeira para acolher centenas de afegãos</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210901	Jornal de Notícias	2021-09-01	<a href="#">Hungria diz que refugiados podem trazer "terrorismo" e destruir identidade europeia</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210902	Jornal de Notícias	2021-09-02	<a href="#">Detidos dois terroristas do Estado Islâmico em Lisboa</a>	News report	Alexandre Panda & Tiago Rodrigues Alves (journalists)
JN20210902B	Jornal de Notícias	2021-09-02	<a href="#">Ex-ministra dinamarquesa julgada por separar casais de refugiados em 2016</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210902C	Jornal de Notícias	2021-09-02	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu sete refugiados oriundos da Turquia. Total ascende já a 818</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210902D	Jornal de Notícias	2021-09-02	<a href="#">Suspeitos de terrorismo trabalharam em call center e restaurante</a>	News report	Alexandre Panda
JN20210909	Jornal de Notícias	2021-09-09	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu 12 refugiados sírios. Total ascende a 830 pessoas acolhidas</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210914	Jornal de Notícias	2021-09-14	<a href="#">Portugal assina acordo com Índia para o recrutamento de trabalhadores indianos</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20210918	Jornal de Notícias	2021-09-18	<a href="#">Arame farpado e raio-x: Grécia inaugura campo "fechado" para migrantes</a>	News report / Photo gallery	JN & Agencies
JN20210927	Jornal de Notícias	2021-09-27	<a href="#">Processos de refugiados têm "aumentado substancialmente" nos tribunais</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20211007	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-07	<a href="#">Croácia vai investigar denúncias de violência e de reenvios ilegais de migrantes</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20211017	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-17	<a href="#">Manifestantes na Polónia protestam contra rejeição de migrantes nas fronteiras</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20211018	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-18	<a href="#">Grécia acusada de deixar 36 mil migrantes sem alimentos</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20211020	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-20	<a href="#">PS, Bloco e Joacine aprovam extinção do SEF</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20211020B	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-20	<a href="#">Passagem dos inspetores do SEF para PSP, GNR e PJ terá em conta funções nos últimos três anos</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20211022A	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-22	<a href="#">Von der Leyen promete que UE não financiará muros para travar migrantes</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20211022B	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-22	<a href="#">Parlamento aprovou a extinção do SEF</a>	News report	RP/Lusa
JN20211022C	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-22	<a href="#">Extinção do SEF nas mãos de Marcelo</a>	News report	Alexandre Panda



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**Correio da Manhã (CM), Jornal de Notícias (JN) and Público (PUB)**

JN20211022D	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-22	<a href="#">PCP e PSD criticam extinção do SEF, enquanto PS e BE destacam avanços nas migrações</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
JN20211025	Jornal de Notícias	2021-10-25	<a href="#">Refugiados ocupam estação ferroviária em França após interrupção de acolhimento</a>	News report	JN & Agencies
PUB20200901	Público	2020-09-01	<a href="#">Há requerentes de asilo a serem abandonados à deriva no Mediterrâneo</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20200902	Público	2020-09-02	<a href="#">Covid-19: primeiro caso confirmado em campo de refugiados de Moria, na Grécia</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20200909B	Público	2020-09-09	<a href="#">"O desastre em Moria é total." Campo de refugiados em Lesbos consumido pelas chamas</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena & Pedro Bastos Reis (journalists)
PUB20200910B	Público	2020-09-10	<a href="#">Moria: Natzy dormiu com os dois filhos ao relento, como milhares de refugiados</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20200915B	Público	2020-09-15	<a href="#">"Campo da vergonha" de Moria será esvaziado até à Páscoa</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20200923A	Público	2020-09-23	<a href="#">Comissão Europeia quer todos os Estados-membros a assinarem novo pacto para as migrações</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20200923B	Público	2020-09-23	<a href="#">Novo Pacto para as Migrações da UE põe a tónica nos repatriamentos</a>	News report	Rita Siza (journalist, Brussels correspondent)
PUB20201005	Público	2020-10-05	<a href="#">Políticas europeias de dissuasão e contenção degradam a vida humana</a>	Opinion	Iorgos Karagiannis (Civil society rep. - Doctors without Borders)
PUB20201106	Público	2020-11-06	<a href="#">Bolsa de Alojamento Urgente terá resposta habitacional para migrantes e refugiados</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20201109	Público	2020-11-09	<a href="#">Só no fim-de-semana chegaram quase 2000 migrantes e refugiados às Canárias</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20201116	Público	2020-11-16	<a href="#">Afegão acusado pela morte do filho, afogado a tentar chegar de barco à Grécia</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20201118	Público	2020-11-18	<a href="#">Morreu um homem às nossas mãos. E agora?</a>	Opinion	Rui Tavares (Historian and Politician, Livre)
PUB20201122	Público	2020-11-22	<a href="#">Antes de arder, o campo de refugiados de Moria já era um inferno</a>	Reportage - Investigate Europe	Stavros Malichudis & Iliana Papangeli (journalists)

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PUB20201124	Público	2020-11-24	<a href="#">Imagens da polícia a dismantelar campo de refugiados são “chocantes”, diz ministro francês</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20201202	Público	2020-12-02	<a href="#">Migrações e desemprego jovem passam a ser critérios para distribuição de fundos comunitários</a>	News report	Luísa Pinto (journalist)
PUB20201204	Público	2020-12-04	<a href="#">Morte no SEF: Comissária fala de “violação horrível dos direitos humanos” e diz que “haverá mudanças na liderança”</a>	News report	Teresa Abecasis (journalist)
PUB20201215	Público	2020-12-15	<a href="#">Cabrita conhece a ONU?</a>	Opinion	Manuel Loff (Scholar - Historian)
PUB20201218	Público	2020-12-18	<a href="#">Governo quer refugiados empregados, a falar português e com habitação dentro de ano e meio</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20201218B	Público	2020-12-18	<a href="#">Tens milhas acumuladas? Podes doá-las e ajudar migrantes a encontrar uma nova casa</a>	News report	P3 - PÚBLICO
PUB20201218C	Público	2020-12-18	<a href="#">Secretária de Estado para as Migrações ficou “completamente chocada” com morte de Ihor</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20201229	Público	2020-12-29	<a href="#">Portugal acolhe três iraquianos, que se juntam aos mais de 600 refugiados já reinstalados</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20210108	Público	2021-01-08	<a href="#">Ventura e Le Pen juntos contra o islamismo e o fluxo de imigrantes</a>	News report (Presidential Elections Special)	Maria Lopes (journalist)
PUB20210117	Público	2021-01-17	<a href="#">O novo pacto europeu para as migrações e asilo é “a última oportunidade” para a EU</a>	News report	Rita Siza (journalist, Brussels correspondent)
PUB20210120	Público	2021-01-20	<a href="#">António Costa insiste que “é tempo de agir” na Europa para responder à crise pandémica</a>	News report	Rita Siza (journalist, Brussels correspondent)
PUB20210120B	Público	2021-01-20	<a href="#">Mediterrâneo: pelo menos 43 migrantes africanos morreram no primeiro naufrágio de 2021</a>	News report	Inês Moura Pinto & Reuters
PUB20210123A	Público	2021-01-23	<a href="#">Schengen em tempo de pandemia e migrações na presidência do Conselho da EU</a>	News report	Nuno Ribeiro (journalist)
PUB20210125	Público	2021-01-25	<a href="#">Número de refugiados reinstalados é o mais baixo em 20 anos. ACNUR pede mais acolhimento</a>	News report	Reuters e Inês Moura Pinto
PUB20210127	Público	2021-01-27	<a href="#">GNR auxiliou cerca de mil migrantes em 2020 no âmbito da missão FRONTEX</a>	News report	Lusa

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PUB20210129	Público	2021-01-29	<a href="#">Desumana, desnecessária, dispendiosa: há que abolir a detenção de migrantes</a>	Opinion	Miguel Duarte (Rep. Civil society - HuBB – Humans Before Borders)
PUB20210223	Público	2021-02-23	<a href="#">A maioria dos 97 marroquinos que desembarcaram no Algarve desapareceu</a>	News report	Sónia Trigueirão (journalist)
PUB20210309B	Público	2021-03-09	<a href="#">Ferro Rodrigues: dos “perigos do extremismo” ao recado a Cavaco sobre a “democracia sem mordças</a>	News report	Maria Lopes (journalist)
PUB20210315A	Público	2021-03-15	<a href="#">Presidência portuguesa obtém consenso sobre dimensão externa do Pacto das Migrações</a>	News report	Rita Siza (journalist, Brussels)
PUB20210315B	Público	2021-03-15	<a href="#">Migrações – o maior desafio da dimensão externa da política europeia</a>	Opinion	Eduardo Cabrita (Portugal's Minister of Home Affairs)
PUB20210326	Público	2021-03-26	<a href="#">Mortes de migrantes a tentar chegar à Europa aumentaram em 2020</a>	News report	PÚBLICO
PUB20210329A	Público	2021-03-29	<a href="#">Os problemas que o novo Pacto para as Migrações e Asilo deixa por resolver</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20210329B	Público	2021-03-29	<a href="#">As escolhas impossíveis da UE na questão dos refugiados, com Marisa Matias e Paulo Rangel</a>	Intreview - Series - Estado da União (podcast and text)	Sofia Lorena & Aline Flor / MEPs Marisa Matias (Bloco de Esquerda) and Paulo Rangel (PSD)
PUB20210329C	Público	2021-03-29	<a href="#">Em nome do futuro e da decência</a>	Opinion	Isabel Santos (MEP - PS)
PUB20210329D	Público	2021-03-29	<a href="#">Como está a União Europeia a acolher quem precisa?</a>	Series Report - Estado da União (infographics)	Cátia Mendonça, José Alves & Rui Pedro Paiva (journalists and designers)

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PUB20210401A	Público	2021-04-01	<a href="#">Quatro propostas para a reforma do SEF: o ponto de vista dos imigrantes</a>	Opinion	Carlos Vianna & Timóteo Macedo (Civil society reps.: Representante da comunidade brasileira no Conselho de Migrações; co-fundador da Casa do Brasil de Lisboa Coordenador da Solidariedade Imigrante)
PUB20210401B	Público	2021-04-01	<a href="#">Ser Voluntário... na Meeru</a>	Opinion	Afonso Borga (Scholar - Mestre em Estudos de Desenvolvimento e Gestor de Projetos de Responsabilidade Social)
PUB20210407	Público	2021-04-07	<a href="#">Morte de Ihor Homeniuk assinalada em relatório da Amnistia Internacional</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20210408	Público	2021-04-08	<a href="#">Reino Unido concede asilo político a conhecido activista pró-democracia de Hong Kong</a>	News report	Diana Baptista Vicente (journalist)
PUB20210417	Público	2021-04-17	<a href="#">Gravações de contactos com a guarda costeira líbia mostram falta de ajuda a náufragos</a>	News report	Maria João Guimarães (journalist)
PUB20210417B	Público	2021-04-17	<a href="#">Salvini vai mesmo ser julgado por sequestro de 147 migrantes</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20210426	Público	2021-04-26	<a href="#">Grécia acusada de violência “chocante” em abandono de requerentes de asilo no mar</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20210504	Público	2021-05-04	<a href="#">Maioria de imigrantes da Ásia paga 10 mil euros para chegar ao Alentejo, diz estudo</a>	News report	Joana Gorjão Henriques (journalist)
PUB20210504B	Público	2021-05-04	<a href="#">São várias as Índias que moram em Portugal</a>	News report	Lusa

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PUB20210519D	Público	2021-05-19	<a href="#">“A Europa não se vai deixar chantagear”, diz UE a Marrocos</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20210520A	Público	2021-05-20	<a href="#">Portugal foi porta de entrada para 97 migrantes marroquinos num ano</a>	News report	Natália Faria (journalist)
PUB20210521B	Público	2021-05-21	<a href="#">#GraciasLuna: a Internet agradece à voluntária que confortou migrante senegalês em Ceuta</a>	News report	Carolina Amado (journalist)
PUB20210522	Público	2021-05-22	<a href="#">Ministro francês do Interior diz que Espanha e Itália “controlam mal” a imigração</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20210524	Público	2021-05-24	<a href="#">Sair da África subsariana a pé e esperar sem nada que Ceuta concretize o sonho europeu</a>	Reportage (from Ceuta)	André Borges Vieira & Teresa Abecasis (journalists)
PUB20210526B	Público	2021-05-26	<a href="#">“Prefiro morrer a voltar”, disse o jovem marroquino que chegou a Ceuta a flutuar em garrafas de plástico</a>	News report	Reuters
PUB20210526C	Público	2021-05-26	<a href="#">UE tem responsabilidades nas mortes no Mediterrâneo, diz ONU</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20210529	Público	2021-05-29	<a href="#">Portugal acolhe mais 22 refugiados menores não acompanhados</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20210603A	Público	2021-06-03	<a href="#">Dinamarca vai transferir requerentes de asilo para fora da Europa</a>	News report	Sofia Lorena (journalist)
PUB20210610	Público	2021-06-10	<a href="#">Portugal recebeu 18 refugiados sírios vindos da Turquia na quarta-feira</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20210613	Público	2021-06-13	<a href="#">Afegãos condenados a dez anos de prisão por incêndio no campo de Moria, em Lesbos</a>	News report	PÚBLICO e Reuters
PUB20210619	Público	2021-06-19	<a href="#">Ser humano. Estar refugiado</a>	News report	Pedro A. Neto (Civil society rep. - Exec. Director Amnesty International Portugal)
PUB20210709	Público	2021-07-09	<a href="#">Extinção do SEF aprovada no Parlamento pelo PS com ajuda do Bloco e PAN</a>	News report	Maria Lopes (journalist)
PUB20210711	Público	2021-07-11	<a href="#">Fronteira com a UE é a nova arma de Lukashenko contra as sanções</a>	News report	Robyn Dixon (journalist - Público & Washington Post)
PUB20210715	Público	2021-07-15	<a href="#">Frontex falhou na protecção dos direitos de migrantes, diz relatório do Parlamento Europeu</a>	News report	Diana Baptista Vicente (journalist)

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**Correio da Manhã (CM), Jornal de Notícias (JN) and Público (PUB)**

PUB20210721	Público	2021-07-21	<a href="#">Os olhares de pessoas refugiadas ocuparam as ruas, para que não desviemos os nossos</a>	Photo gallery	Carolina Amado (journalist)
PUB20210810A	Público	2021-08-10	<a href="#">Seis países da UE querem continuar a deportar afegãos, apesar do avanço dos taliban</a>	News report	PÚBLICO
PUB20210810B	Público	2021-08-10	<a href="#">Parlamento da Lituânia debate construção de barreira na fronteira com a Bielorrússia</a>	News report	Reuters
PUB20210811B	Público	2021-08-11	<a href="#">Países Baixos e Alemanha anunciam suspensão de deportações para o Afeganistão</a>	News report	PÚBLICO e Reuters
PUB20210818B	Público	2021-08-18	<a href="#">UE promete apoio à Lituânia por “ataque directo” da Bielorrússia usando migrantes</a>	News report	Maria João Guimarães (journalist)
PUB20210826	Público	2021-08-26	<a href="#">Tribunal europeu pede à Polónia e à Letónia para ajudar migrantes presos na fronteira bielorrussa</a>	News report	Diana Baptista Vicente (journalist)
PUB20210827	Público	2021-08-27	<a href="#">Sayed Sadaat, o ministro afegão que se tornou num estafeta de bicicleta na Alemanha</a>	News report	Reuters
PUB20210828A	Público	2021-08-28	<a href="#">Barco com 539 migrantes a bordo chega a Lampedusa, num dos maiores desembarques de sempre</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20210828B	Público	2021-08-28	<a href="#">"Queremos paz no mundo", protestam afegãos em Atenas</a>	Photo gallery	Reuters
PUB20210828C	Público	2021-08-28	<a href="#">“Nós dependemos de vocês para sobreviver”</a>	Reportage	Ana Dias Cordeiro, João Pedro Pincha, Rui Gaudêncio & Nelson Garrido (journalists)
PUB20210904	Público	2021-09-04	<a href="#">Grécia endurece legislação sobre migração pela terceira vez em dois anos</a>	News report	Lusa e PÚBLICO
PUB20210908	Público	2021-09-08	<a href="#">Conselho de Estado pede respeito por direitos humanos e gestão solidária de migrações</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20210911	Público	2021-09-11	<a href="#">Tribunal de Contas ainda aguarda esclarecimento cabal do SEF sobre destino das verbas para os refugiados</a>	News report	Ana Dias Cordeiro (journalist)
PUB20210913	Público	2021-09-13	<a href="#">Manter os valores europeus e negociar com o Diabo. O que pode fazer a UE perante a crise no Afeganistão?</a>	Series Report - Estado da União	Rui Pedro Paiva (journalist)
PUB20210916	Público	2021-09-16	<a href="#">Eurodeputados do PSD questionam Comissão Europeia sobre verbas para refugiados ocultadas pelo SEF</a>	News report	PÚBLICO e Lusa
PUB20210920	Público	2021-09-20	<a href="#">Polónia responsabiliza Bielorrússia e Rússia por onda migratória</a>	News report	PÚBLICO

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PUB20210927	Público	2021-09-27	<a href="#">Provedora da Justiça: “Há demasiados” imigrantes que não se regularizam “por deficiência” do sistema</a>	News report	Joana Gorjão Henriques (journalist)
PUB20211006	Público	2021-10-06	<a href="#">Parlamento aprova audição de Cabrita sobre dívidas do SEF ao acolhimento de refugiados</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20211007	Público	2021-10-07	<a href="#">Polícia agride requerentes de asilo nas fronteiras da UE para não os deixar entrar</a>	News report	Maria João Guimarães and Rita Siza (journalists, Brussels correspondents)
PUB20211015	Público	2021-10-15	<a href="#">Polónia legaliza expulsão de migrantes nas suas fronteiras</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20211020	Público	2021-10-20	<a href="#">PSD perde na batalha do SEF: PS e Bloco aprovam distribuição de competências e nova agência para as migrações</a>	News report	Maria Lopes (journalist)
PUB20211021	Público	2021-10-21	<a href="#">Amnistia Internacional pede que países cumpram “obrigação de proteger” afegãos em risco</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20211022	Público	2021-10-22	<a href="#">PCP e PSD criticam extinção do SEF, enquanto PS e BE destacam avanços nas migrações</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20211023	Público	2021-10-23	<a href="#">Salvini começou a ser julgado por ter impedido o desembarque de migrantes do Open Arms em 2019</a>	News report	PÚBLICO
PUB20211024	Público	2021-10-24	<a href="#">Polícia alemã impede “vigilantes” de extrema-direita que queriam “patrulhar” fronteira com a Polónia</a>	News report	PÚBLICO
PUB20211025	Público	2021-10-25	<a href="#">Migrações: a pressa de atravessar o Canal da Mancha enquanto não se transforma em fosso</a>	News report	António Saraiva Lima (journalist)
PUB20211028A	Público	2021-10-28	<a href="#">Pandemia levou à queda acentuada de pedidos de asilo nos países da OCDE</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20211028B	Público	2021-10-28	<a href="#">Pandemia faz cair fluxos migratórios para o nível mais baixo desde 2003, segundo OCDE</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20211029	Público	2021-10-29	<a href="#">Parlamento polaco aprova muro de 100 km para impedir passagem de migrantes</a>	News report	Lusa
PUB20211031	Público	2021-10-31	<a href="#">De gabinete a agência: mudam-se os tempos, mudam-se as vontades?</a>	Opinion	Bruno Santos Fonseca (Scholar - PhD candidate and researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations - IPRI)