UNIVERSIDADE D
COIMBRA

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Inside the Practice Room
A Philosophical Study on Musical Performance

Tese no âmbito do Doutoramento em Filosofia orientada pelo Professor Doutor Mário Avelino Santiago de Carvalho e pelo Professor Doutor Jorge Manuel Salgado de Castro Correia e apresentada à Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra.

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Resumo

O objectivo desta investigação teórico-prática foi a busca por respostas à pergunta “Como criam os músicos música partindo da partitura?, motivada pela insuficiência que encontrámos na nossa própria prática musical e suspeitamos presente na prática de outros músicos na tradição ocidental (Western art music). O nosso foco foi na especificidade da música escrita no último século e que se destaca do cânon tonal, à qual chamámos *Mais Nova Música* (*Newer Music*). Tal especificidade, contudo, conduziu-nos a encontrar respostas mais gerais sobre o modo como a música acontece na performance.

Após descobrir as assumpções e os equívocos ontológicos sobre a obra musical, centrados na distinção entre obra e performance, quer na prática da *Mais Nova Música*, quer em estudos filosóficos, desenvolvemos uma ontologia das obras musicais preliminar que nos pudesse oferecer uma base desinteressada antes de entrar na sala de ensaio e investigar o processo de aprender uma partitura. Descobrimos que a chave para a música está na variabilidade, e a *diferença* como requisito na prática musical. Tal só poderia soar trivial se não estivéssemos cientes do *paradigma do performer invisível* que permeia a prática da *Mais Nova Música*, e da nossa cultura de ouvintes composta sobretudo por gravações de música, ambos convidando a um foco auditivo naquilo que é semelhante entre diferentes audições da mesma obra musical.

Mas a variabilidade, por si só, é uma condição insuficiente para que a música aconteça, do mesmo modo que a rigidez de realizar a partitura na perfeição também o é. Contudo, se a condição suficiente em falta existe apenas na variabilidade, nos espaços em branco da notação musical, a resposta para a música deverá encontrar-se nessa variabilidade. É através da variabilidade que os músicos criam a música. A pergunta é, então, sobre a diferença entre a variabilidade que cria música, e a variabilidade que não o faz. Rejeitámos as respostas que se focam no texto musical, tanto da musicologia, da análise musical ou da filosofia, e prosseguimos para encontrar um modelo da performance no qual a *agência musical* acontece numa relação entre *causa*, *perícia* e *intenção*, colocando a música em movimento através uma *antecipação* continuamente renovada daquilo que soará a seguir.

Desenvolvemos este modelo sobre e através da experiência e prática da *Mais Nova Música*, colocando ênfase naquilo que os músicos devem fazer para que a música aconteça, mas as questões específicas solicitadas por esta música específica dirigiram-nos a conclusões que poderão incluir outras músicas e outras práticas musicais, dentro e fora da tradição escrita. Pode, por isso, ser considerado um modelo geral para a performance musical. Esta investigação é sobretudo um estudo filosófico, informado pela prática da música, ou uma prática da música informada pelo estudo filosófico. Em qualquer dos casos, foram colocadas questões relevantes que podem motivar uma discussão filosófica continuada, bem como promover uma prática da música menos subjugada a condicionamentos históricos.

Palavras-chave: Performance Musical – *Mais Nova Música* – Ontologia Musical – Antecipação

Abstract

The aim of this theoretical and practical research was to look for answers to the question “How do musicians create music from the score?”, motivated by the insufficiency we found in our own musical practice and suspect present in the practice of other musicians within the Western art music tradition. Our focus was on the specificity of music written in the last century that stands outside the tonal canon, to which we called *Newer Music*. Such specificity, however, led us to find more general things about how music happens in performance.

After uncovering the assumptions and ontological misconceptions about the musical work, centered on the distinction between work and performance both in the practice of *Newer Music* as in philosophical studies, we developed a preliminary ontology of musical works as performance that could give us an unbiased ground to enter the practice room and investigate the process of learning a score. We found that the key to music is on variability, and *difference* to be a requisite in musical practice. This should only sound trivial if we are not aware of the *invisible performer paradigm* that permeates the practice of *Newer Music*, and of our listening culture composed mostly of recorded music, both inviting an auditory focus on what is similar between different hearings of the same musical work.

But variability, on its own, is an insufficient condition for music to happen, in the same way as the strictness of complying perfectly to the score. However, if the missing sufficient condition exists only within variability, in the blanks left by musical notation, the answer to music must be in such variability. It is through variability that musicians create music. The question is, then, about the difference between a variability that creates music, and a variability that does not. We rejected the answers that focus on the musical text, whether from musicology, musical analyses, or philosophy, and went on to find a model of musical performance in which *musical agency* happens within a relation between *causation*, *skill*, and *intention*, setting music in motion through a constantly renewing *anticipation* of what will sound next.

We assembled this model through the experience and practice of *Newer Music*, laying emphasis on what musicians must do to make it happen, but the specific questions prompted by this specific music led us to conclusions that might broadly include different music and different musical practices, within and outside the written tradition.

It might, thus, be considered a model for musical performance in general. This investigation is mainly a philosophical study, informed by musical practice, or musical practice informed by a philosophical study. In any case, relevant questions, that can motivate a continued philosophical discussion, as well as promote a musical practice less crushed by historical conditioning, were laid.

Key words: Musical Performance – *Newer Music* – Musical Ontology – Anticipation

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«Simply put, knowledge corresponds to the past. It is technology. Wisdom is the future. It is philosophy. It is people's hearts that move the age. While knowledge may provide useful point of reference, it cannot become a force to guide the future. By contrast, wisdom captivates people's hearts, and has the power to open a new age. Wisdom is the key to understanding the age. Creating the time.» Herbie Hancock, "Wisdom" in *Future to Future* (2001), Columbia Records.

«18-7-1916 Nenhum problema tem solução. Nenhum de nós desata o nó górdio; todos nós ou desistimos ou o cortamos. Resolvemos bruscamente, com o sentimento, os problemas da inteligência, e fazemo-lo ou por cansaço de pensar, ou por timidez de tirar conclusões, ou pela necessidade absurda de encontrar um apoio, ou pelo impulso gregário de regressar aos outros e à vida.
Como nunca podemos conhecer todos os elementos de uma questão, nunca a podemos resolver.
Para atingir a verdade, faltam-nos dados que bastem, e processos intelectuais que esgotem a interpretação desses dados.»
Vicente Guedes, Nenhum Problema Tem Solução (173), in *Livro do Desassossego*, Teresa Sobral Cunha (ed.), in LdoD, https://ldod.uc.pt/fragments/fragment/Fr553/inter/Fr553_WIT_ED_CRIT_C, accessed on July 1, 2021.

Introduction Without Words

We would like to make an introduction to this thesis with no words. With music only. If such was possible, we would listen to the debut album of Jocy de Oliveira, *Estórias Para Voz, Instrumentos Acústicos e Eletrônicos*[1]. This choice would be contradictory from the start, since the first story in this album (*Estória II*) starts precisely with words. Beyond the many gripping curiosities in the history of this album, the choice of listening to it as an introductory essay to the investigation we carried out in the last five years is a tease for the reader, who we invite to become a listener while reading the introductory words, which cannot be avoided, and throughout the reading, whenever a reference to a musical composition is made.

Even though we are suggesting listening to recorded music as an introduction, the study that will follow is focused on live music only, when it is performed by musicians. We are excluding, thus, further considerations and questions on the case of technological reproducibility, whether in recordings or in electronic music. We also abstained from questioning the relationship established between musician and machine. Such important inquiries are beyond our specific concernments with musical practice, since we are focused on finding how do musicians make music happen in live performance.

This thesis is about musical performance, and our major finding was that *difference* is what keeps music alive. It might be, thus, that it is about the biology of music, instead of the philosophical study on music from the perspective of the performer the title suggests it to be. But we come to this introduction with certainties about music which we did not have before the research, even if our writing does not untie all the philosophical knots appearing along the way. As such, we are inviting the reader to become a listener, attentive to music and its inherent performativity, attentive also to the absence of music, if that is the case. In summary, this thesis is a search for a way to decide between what is music

[1] Jocy de Oliveira, *Estórias Para Voz, Instrumentos Acústicos e Eletrônicos* (Fermata Indústria Fonográfica, 1981).

and what is not music. However general, we studied this fundamental question for musicians within a very specific and narrow context in which music happens. Such context, that of Western art written music, is even more narrowed by the specific written music we chose to address in practice and to which we called *Newer Music*.

The choice of such a restricted repertoire answers both to a personal curiosity when practicing it and feeling that something is missing for music to happen, and to a scarceness we found in philosophical thought, mostly leaning over the canonical repertoire of Western art music. The main question for addressing the specificities of *Newer Music* and the context in which it happens is, however, our concern with its practice and performance. We are thinking about music from the perspective of those who make it happen, playing, singing or conducting, deviating, thus, from the philosophical focus on the experience of music by listeners. It is a quest towards understanding what must happen inside the practice room so that this music can happen in performance, since we claim that it is not guaranteed music is happening just because a contextual protocol is being followed.

By musical performance we mean live music happening, music being performed by musicians. Further considerations will be made towards understanding more precisely the conditions that enable music in performance, and how the different notions appearing in the literature to refer to performance, such as *interpretation*, *instance*, *rendering*, or *reproduction*, are tied in work-performance dichotomies we wish to discourage both in musical practice and philosophical thought. Our focus on what happens inside the practice room, when musicians are studying a score for performance, is precisely to question analytical, architectural, and overall text-centered perspectives that enforce such dichotomies and consequently lead, in our perspective, to a compromised practice of *Newer Music*.

Writing a thesis aiming at bridging a gap between philosophy and a specific musical practice must necessarily start by introducing both parties and make plans on how to build that bridge. Our particular concern in the first part of this thesis will be, thus, attending to the ontological misconceptions of musical

works we believe to be not only deafening philosophical thought about Western art written music, but also having a harmful impact within musical practice. In the first chapter, we will present the specific traits of *Newer Music* and provide some historical context on its practice, regarding the relation between musicians and scores, and the performative event. We intend to highlight the ontological assumptions which we believe are undermining its practice. The second chapter will be dedicated to review and present a critique on some of the more general theories taken by the recent philosophical literature on music, focusing particularly on the ongoing ontological discussion about *musical works*. A review of the specific philosophical literature on musical performance will also be presented and its shortage underlined.

After discussing the limitations of most ontological perspectives on works of Western art written music, as well as their harmful impact on musical performance, we will propose in the second part of the thesis a first draft of an ontology of musical works that can promote a more fruitful practice not only within the specificity of *Newer Music* but also in a broader sense. In the third chapter, such a preliminary ontology of the musical work as performance will be developed, starting by asserting the concept of music as a sonorous activity and defining further the specific traits of musical works within this tradition. With this groundwork established, we shall then enter the practice room, presenting and describing the process of turning scores into music. This fourth chapter was developed during a four-month practical research carried out at the University of Maryland (USA), throughout which I prepared for performance three selected *Newer Music* compositions for solo flute, taking notes on how one can achieve the musicality that seems concealed in such scores.

With all the information we gathered revising the literature on the philosophy of musical performance, exploring tentative ontologies of the musical work, and glancing at what happens inside the practice room, we have the conditions for expanding the ideas that music can only be found in the gaps left by notation, and that anticipation is the drive that enables music to happen in performance. Such will be the focus of the third and final part of this thesis. In the fifth chapter, we will look further into the ontological claims made previously and explore how

musicians can fill such gaps left by musical texts. We will also dedicate some attention to questions that will arise, related to the analogical-digital dichotomy, to evaluating performance, and to silence. Encompassing the previous findings, in the sixth chapter we will finally advance a philosophical model on musical performance that can contribute to a better practice within the Western art tradition and have a positive impact on *Newer Music*.

Our final thoughts will ponder on the profits and insufficiencies of our method. We will acknowledge and summarize the understanding of *anticipation* as the motor of music within the proposed model, and explore the possibility of such an understanding being ample enough to encompass different music, beyond the restricted context of Western art written music. It is our prospect to encourage our readers, whether musicians or listeners, to be more attentive to music's inherent performativity and the differences such performativity necessarily implies. If nothing else, our utmost hope is that the following chapters can provide a useful point of reference for further philosophical thinking about music.

Part I: *Newer Music* and Philosophy

1. *Newer Music* in Practice

Having said that we are concerned only with Western art written music, leaving jazz, popular, and other music out of consideration, it is clear that we fit *Newer Music* within this written tradition. We have the purpose, nevertheless, of highlighting the musical practice that comes out of the written score, more than such written instructions, despite these compositions being determinative when defining *Newer Music* as standing outside of the canonical-tonal repertoire. The fact that the musical work in the Western tradition is anchored to the composition makes it and the musician-score relationship unavoidable when thinking about this specific musical practice.

Although a chronological boundary is sometimes put forward to discriminate this non-canonical music – for instance, Paul Griffiths calls it *Modern Music and After* and frames it in between the Modernist impulse of the early 1900 and the closing of the twentieth century – it seems to us that what differentiates *Newer Music* from other music is not necessarily pin-pointed to a chronological model. Another thing to write about this music is that it is pretty much a niche within the already niche-like character of Western art music. Griffiths states it in this way:

> We live in unusual times. The subject matter of this book remains virtually unknown to a very large proportion even of people for whom the experience of Western classical music is a regular necessity, let alone the vast majority of others. Composers – still heirs to a nineteenth-century ideal of music's universality, despite the chastening of recent decades – find themselves writing only for specialized ensembles, specialized festivals, specialized audiences.[2]

It might seem, then, that writing a philosophical thesis on such a specific kind of music is of general irrelevance. Our perspective, however, is that the very specificity of *Newer Music* brings new and important insights into philosophical discussions about music in general. The relevance of a thesis in the philosophy of music that listens to and questions *Newer Music* is also related to the importance of having a diversified philosophical discussion. Thinking about music

[2] Paul Griffiths, *Modern Music and After* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 410.

that stands outside of the philosophical musical-canon[3] encourages such diversity, and the particular concern with *Newer Music*, as we will see, brings philosophy closer to the questions opened by musical compositions, from the early twentieth century on, that ruptured with the canonical sounds of tonalism[4].

[3] What we are calling "philosophical musical-canon" is composed of the main musical references that are presented in the philosophical literature about music. As Lydia Goehr pointed out in 1992, these references are centered around music composed by Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827), and extend back into the classical compositions of Mozart, Haydn or even back to Bachs', and further into Romanticism, with Schubert, Mendelssohn, Schumann, Chopin, Brahms, and Mahler. Although many other composers fit into the playlist of English-speaking philosophical discussion, the vast majority focus not only on Western art written music but particularly in music composed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Criticism and exceptions to this tendency are the emergent philosophies of pop, rock, film and jazz music. See Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania, eds., *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

[4] By "tonalism" we are referring to music in which melody and harmony are arranged towards a referential note (the tonic) within a specific tonality. Tonal music has also a stable sense of beat and regular metric. Most music we listen to in our daily lives (in the radio, television, or advertisements, for instance) is tonal music. For more about tonality see Brian Hyer, "Tonality," ed. Deane Root, Grove Music Online, n.d., https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.28102.

1.1. *Newer Music* in Theory

Defining in theory a musical genre that is still developing is an ungrateful and perhaps unattainable task. Not only we do not have the necessary impartiality that historical detachment can give us regarding the music from the past, as we cannot also anticipate where it is going, how it will change, and how much change will have to happen for it to become a different kind of music. The concept of *Newer Music* we will propose in the following must, thus, be an open one, bearing the fragility, and hopefully some strength, that such openness encompasses. It is foremost an operative concept, motivated by the questions this music presents to performers who wish to make it happen. As we will see later on, defending our philosophical model, in theory music is always *in practice*. And so, the music that impelled this investigation will be more clearly defined for our readers if they listen to it.

We would like to start shaping the notion of *Newer Music* with a very particular musical reference: Charles Ives' (1874-1954) *The Unanswered Question*. It is without a doubt a problematic piece to try and pinpoint the birth date, even if just symbolic, of *Newer Music*: the first version of *The Unanswered Question* was composed by Ives in 1908; he revised it from 1930 to 1935 and this second version was premiered in 1946, while the first version was played for the first time only in 1984. But even though it can be a challenging start, I refer to this piece so I can borrow Leonard Bernstein's insightful claims about it in his Norton Lectures[5], titled precisely the same.

Ives' *The Unanswered Question* is a short piece for Chamber Orchestra, written for three groups of musicians playing together, each of them presenting different musical ideas. The preface to the score illustrates this triparty structure, showing the different musical ideas that the strings, the solo trumpet, and the flute (or wind) quartet express in different ways:

> The strings play ppp throughout with no change in tempo. They are to represent "The Silence of the Druids – Who Know, See and Hear

[5] Leonard Bernstein, *The Unanswered Question: Six Talks at Harvard* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1976).

> Nothing". The trumpet intones "The Perennial Question of Existence", and states it in the same tone of voice each time. But the hunt for "The Invisible Answer" undertaken by the flutes and other human beings, becomes gradually more active, faster and louder through an animando to a con fuoco. […] After they disappear, "The Question" is asked for the last time, and "The Silences" are heard beyond in "Undisturbed Solitude".[6]

Bernstein suggests that with this piece Ives is not only asking timeless metaphysical questions, but also a very specific musical question emerging at the beginning of the twentieth century: "Whither music?"[7]. And Ives composes and combines three different ways of making music that illustrate somewhat the paths that musical compositions from the past hundred years discovered, questioning about the future of music what can only be answered by music itself. The strings, playing tonal chords throughout, would represent the conservative defenders of tonalism, silenced to a ppp but, nevertheless, ever-present; the hunt for answers by the flute (or wind) quartet, answering 6 times differently and more apart from both the strings and the trumpet, would represent the many different ways that twentieth century written music diverged from the canonical forms. While the perennial question remains unanswered in this appropriation from Bernstein's lectures, the clear distinction between the canonical and tonal music and the diversity and controversy of disruptive answers foreseen by Ives is the first and more important step towards defining *Newer Music.*

The modernist impulse in Western art music, at the start of the twentieth century, gave a lot of different answers when departing from the tonal, traditional and canonical forms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Perhaps the most well-known and discussed is the 1920s' twelve-tone serialism, associated with the Second Viennese School and the names of composers Arnold Schönberg (1875-1951), Alban Berg (1885-1935) and Anton Webern (1883-1945). But many others contributed to the diversity of written music breaking down the diatonic system of harmony and its rhythmic, timbrical, and formal traditions. Some examples, also from the first half of the century, are the futurist

[6] Charles E. Ives, *The Unanswered Question* (New York: Southern Music Publishing, 1953), 2.
[7] Bernstein, *The Unanswered Question: Six Talks at Harvard*, 5.

experiences with noise[8] led by the Italian Luigi Russolo (1885-1947) between the 1910s and the 1930s, Igor Stravinski's (1882-1971) rhythmic burst out with *Le Sacre du Printemps* (1913), Edgard Varèse (1883-1965) integrating different, non-canonical, sounds in his compositions, and Béla Bartók (1881-1945) exploring and incorporating diversity from indigenous and folk music. Later, Pierre Schaeffer's (1910-1995) development of *musique concrete* in the 1940s, a compositional practice that consists on arranging and manipulating recorded sound, contributed also to the diversity of non-canonical written music in the twentieth century, as John Cage's (1912-1992) indeterminacy and sound explorations, electronic and other music composed by Karlheinz Stockhausen (1928-2007) and Milton Babbitt (1916-2011), or as the complexity and virtuosity of Luciano Berio's (1925-2003), Elliot Carter's (1908-2012), and Brian Ferneyhough's (b. 1943) compositions, the postserialism of Pierre Boulez (1925-2016), the minimalism of La Monte Young (b. 1935), Steve Reich (b. 1936) and Philip Glass (b. 1937), or as the textural explorations of György Ligeti (1923-2006), Iannis Xenakis (1922-2001) and Krzysztof Penderecki (1933-2020).

What all of these and many other twentieth century diverse and divergent approaches to composing music share is the clear separation from the tonal and canonical forms, rejecting not only the diatonic system, but also in many cases the traditional sense of beat, the traditional sounds made by traditional instruments, and even the stage display. It is this diverging music, that is questioning today, still, the canonical structures and forms of tonalism, we are calling *Newer Music*. It diverges precisely from those canonical structures and forms, in many different ways. The other music from which *Newer Music* diverges, played by the strings in Ives' piece and less willing to give up on tonal and canonical forms, never halted being composed, although it received perhaps less attention, overshadowed by *New Music* especially in the first half of the century. Benjamin Britten's (1913-1976) compositions are an example, as well as Samuel Barber's (1910-1981) or Arvo Pärt's (b. 1935), and hence my resistance to a chronological model when defining *Newer Music*.

[8] Luigi Russolo, *L'Arte Dei Rumori* (Milano: Edizioni Futuriste di "Poesia," 1916).

The specific traits of *Newer Music* are, then, closely related to composition practices that stood and stand against the tonal models of harmony, form, rhythm, timbre, dynamics, and other specific musical material that defined most of the Western art written music from the classical and romantic eras. Moreover, these composition practices emerged thoroughly and heterogeneously in the first half of the twentieth century and continued to develop further after World War II, including the advent of electronic music, into the twenty-first century. The best way to present *Newer Music*, we have held, even if we are trying to define it theoretically, is promoting its listening. A short playlist, with some examples of *Newer Music,* can illustrate more clearly its specific traits, and also its diversity, and is, thus, presented in Appendix 1. In such a list, you will find compositions by Schönberg, Messiaen, Cage, Stockhausen, Nono, Ligeti, Ferneyhough, and others, as well as selected recordings.

Each example on this list is disruptive of the tonal canon in different ways. Even though we can trace back to the famous first chord of Ricard Wagner's (1813-1883) *Tristan und Isolde* (1859) as a first questioning of tonalism, and later Romantic chromaticism as exploratory deviations from tonality, it is not until the Modernist whim in the first decades of the twentieth century that such disruption was markedly declared in the agenda of Western art music. It is not by chance that this music was called "new", and remained so until Theodor W. Adorno delated its aging[9]. There was a significant novelty in written music from the 1900s that diverged from the traditional sonorities.

Although we could agree with Adorno in his critique of an aged "new" music by mid-century, it remains true that most written music in the Western art tradition from the last century stands against the conventional models of old tonalism. This music kept reinventing itself and exploring new sonorities throughout the second half of the twentieth century, growing in diversity and maintaining a distinct character from the canonical repertoire. At the same time, the music of classical and romantic composers was continuously played and listened to[10]. A few

[9] Theodor W. Adorno, "Das Altern Der Neuen Musik," *Gesammelte Schriften* 14 (1955): 143–67.
[10] Having the chance to examine the catalogue of released LPs from the Deutsche Grammophon recording company, we are forced to see the discrepancy between releases of canonical and

examples, of compositions from this canonical repertoire, are Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's (1756-1791) *Symphony No. 41 in C Major, K. 551* (1788), Ludwig van Beethoven's (1770-1827) *Symphony No. 5 in C minor, op. 67* (1808), Franz Liszt's (1811-1886) symphonic poem *Ce qu'on entend sur la montagne* (1849), and Gustav Mahler's (1860-1911) *Symphony No. 4 in G Major* (1900).

Many more well-known musical pieces could be referred to as counter-examples, for this canonical music written in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries constitutes the majority of Western art music available for us to listen nowadays whether in live performances or in recordings. "Classical music", Alex Ross writes, "is stereotyped as an art of the dead, a repertory that begins with Bach and terminates with Mahler and Puccini. People are sometimes surprised to learn that composers are still writing at all"[11]. To this, we should add that the lack of *Newer Music* in concert halls, in radio and television broadcastings, or in recordings is most certainly not only a matter of prejudice. Complex historical, sociological, economic, and educational developments contributed to this reality only now starting to change. An important one was the rise of popular musical genres such as jazz, musical theatre, or film music, in the first half of the twentieth century, and later R&B, rock and roll, and many others that developed and were amplified by new technological possibilities. Most of this Popular Music remained closely tied to tonal models of harmony and form, in a way perpetuating the canonical paradigm that *Newer Music*, in its turn, has been deconstructing. But Popular Music and its industry have been perhaps better equipped to find their way into the stage than *Newer Music*. In fact, popular music created its own stages, audiences, festivals, and merchandising, while *Newer Music* hardly made it to the ears of most music lovers.

The U.S. American composer Milton Babbitt (1916-2011) wrote about this "societal isolation" of *Newer Music*, in a famously titled paper published in 1958 when he was music faculty at the Princeton University. Arguing in favor of *Newer*

Newer Music. From the 2359 issued albums from 1940 to 1966, less than 20 are dedicated to the Western art music that was being written at the time. See https://www.discogs.com/label/7703-Deutsche-Grammophon.

[11] Alex Ross, *The Rest Is Noise: Listening to the Twentieth Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), xii.

Music in a somewhat twisted way, “Who cares if you listen?” presents the many troubles that must be beared by the composer of such specific music:

> This composer expends an enormous amount of time – and, usually, considerable money – on the creation of a commodity which has little, no, or negative commodity value. He is, in essence, a “vanity” composer. The general public is largely unaware of and uninterested in his music. The majority of performers shun it and resent it. Consequently, the music is little performed, and then primarily at poorly attended concerts before an audience consisting in the main of fellow professionals. At best, the music would appear to be for, of, and by specialists.[12]

Babbitt uncovers in these few sentences some of the topics that will be addressed in the next sections, although we will shift the perspective from composition into musical practice, noticing that, in the same way as composers, musicians who dedicate to this music can be considered “vanity” performers. Despite this aimed shift, we will start by focusing on notation and scores, and present some of the challenges that musicians face when working with these *Newer Music* texts, as well as the relationship established between them. The score’s regulative character over performance will be underlined and the implications in performance practices will be considered after.

[12] Milton Babbitt, “Who Cares If You Listen?” *High Fidelity*, 1958, 38.

1.2. Tied by the Score

To understand how scores came to be regulative of twenty-first-century performance practices, and to portray a clear context for thinking about the philosophical questions posed by *Newer Music*, we will present in this section some important developments that happened in the history of musical notation, and identify moments of change that were crucial for defining today's Western art musical practice. These developments, as we will see at the end of this first chapter, have also some ontological implications regarding the musical work, being closely related to the distinction between *work* and *performance* that will also be addressed in the next chapter.

Musical notation was not always as precise and unequivocal as it can be nowadays, regarding pitch, rhythm, dynamics, articulation, tempo, instrumentation, timbre, and other features that compositions might comprise. It was not until the eleventh century that the current 5-line staff became standard, evolving from the 1-line F staff, which in its turn had evolved from the first neumatic notations developed around the 8th century[13]. It was the renowned monk from Guido d'Arezzo, who created the system of discrete notes we know today, substituting the gesture-like notation of neumes. As for rhythm, a very simple mensural notation began to settle durations for each sound around the thirteenth century, within the polyphonic explorations of the School of Notre Dame, and at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the systematic arrangement of note values we know today was proposed in the *Ars Nova* treatise attributed to Philippe de Vitry[14].

What started and was once a way of notating music that already existed, and served as a mnemonic device for that same music to happen more or less in the same way in different times and places, soon became a device for creating written music from scratch. The idea of music as science, which prevailed in medieval writings, was not unrelated to these developments in notation, as well

[13] Thomas Forrest Kelly, *Capturing Music: The Story of Notation* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015).
[14] Thomas F. Kelly, *The Practice of Medieval Music: Studies in Chant and Performance* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).

as to the correlated complexification of polyphonic constructions made possible by the arithmetic notation of rhythm. It was within this practice of written polyphony that, according to J. P. Burkholder, D. J. Grout, and C. V Palisca, the four distinguishing pillars of Western art music emerged: "(1) counterpoint, the combination of multiple independent lines; (2) harmony, the regulation of simultaneous sounds; (3) the centrality of notation; and (4) the idea of composition as distinct from performance"[15].

Although "composition" and "performance" could be thought separately in the late Middle Ages, the composer was rarely detached from the manuscript score, leading players or singers through the interpretation of it, and/or participating in the performance. The Renaissance marked the beginning of a more explicit separation between composer and performers[16]. At the same time, the growing appreciation for the arts and humanities and the available leisure time of a growing merchant class, particularly in Italy, gave rise to a brand-new way for written music to happen out of the religious rites, in a recreational mode both in social and domestic contexts. A new market space was then open for written music exposing the fragilities of notation in the absence of the composer.

An exceptionally significant circumstance in the history of the score happened also during the Italian Renaissance, contributing to the standardization of notation and to a much wider distribution of written music: printing[17]. With printed scores traveling to the hands of more and more *dilettanti* and professional musicians, some extra indications, such as which instruments could be used to play a certain composition, started to be inked. Nevertheless, musical practice assumed and thrived, particularly during the Baroque period, despite the absence of many essential features of the music in the score. Improvised ornamentation, cadenzas, and figured-bass resolving, for instance, were vital for an authentic

[15] J. Peter Burkholder, Donald Jay Grout, and Claude V. Palisca, *A History of Western Music*, 9th ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), 85.
[16] Many composers throughout the Baroque, Classical, and Romantic eras still performed their compositions, but scores became evermore available for other performers to play, sing, or conduct.
[17] Ulrich Han's *Missale Romanum*, dated 12 October 1476 and printed in Rome, is usually considered the first example of printed music although other early attempts are known. See Donald W. Krummel, "Printing and Publishing Music," in *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians* (Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1980).

presentation of the music notated and were often a difficult matter for amateur musicians. So much so, that a new kind of edition of scores with written-out ornamentation and the like appeared in the market for these *dilettanti*, accentuating a split between professional and non-professional music-making.

Throughout the eighteenth century improvements in transportation lead to a more uniform printing of music scores for European consumption. By mid-century, composers were already writing more copiously how they wanted their compositions to sound and improvisational practices began declining. Indications on expression, metronomic time, articulation, ornamentation, and dynamics were now part of the score, and as precision increased in writing, pliability decreased in performance.

The rising centrality of notation in nineteenth-century musical practice correlates with the aggrandizement of the composers' social status as authors of the great art of music. It is not by chance that Lydia Goehr marks the 1800s as the grand opening of the imaginary museum of musical works and inauguration of the "regulative work-concept"[18]. Even if we might disagree with some of her bold claims, it is difficult to escape the fact that by that time the score became regulative and an identifier of the musical work. Contributing to this were not only the developments of an ever more precise notation of the music but also the emerging musicological studies that considered the score to be their object of analysis.

It was also by this time that the idea of *musical interpretation* started to take hold, meaning the performative activity by the musician who reads the score. The generalization of this notion, predominantly in Romance languages, relates to the growing importance of the musical text and to the fact that it needs to be both decoded and explained. Later, in the first half of the twentieth century, this romantic idea of *musical interpretation* was exchanged for the more modern notion of *reproduction*, paired with a longing for a machine capable of realizing

[18] Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*, Clarendon (Oxford, 1992).

the composers' intentions without distorting them, as well as with a resonance of the by then proliferating recording and music playing device.

As we will see, both these perspectives are already sitting on top of some ontological assumptions that identify the *musical work* as something other than the performance. The notion of *musical interpretation* suggests that the musician is interpreting not the score but the music itself, compromising in this way the distinction between the score and the music. To think of performance as *reproducing* the score effectively, in its turn, confirms the text as the complete and finished musical work and suggests music as "sounded writing". In this "paradigm of reproduction", as Nicholas Cook calls it, "performance is seen as reproducing the work, or the structures embodied in the work, or the conditions of its early performances, or the intentions of its composer"[19].

José Bowen sums up the musicological confusion concerning musical works and scores as an almost inevitable consequence of historical developments in notation and composition:

> For the last three hundred years, composers have increasingly tried to exercise more control over the variability of performances by being more specific in everything from pitch content and instrumentation to dynamics and even the physical experience of playing. With this growing emphasis on the immutable notated text, it was only natural that musicologists study scores and not performances[20].

The fact that the score is permanent and the performance (at least until the possibility of fixing it in a recording) is volatile also encouraged this text-centered approach when thinking about Western art music, be it through the lens of musicology, history, philosophy or even when it comes to evaluating performance itself. In the third chapter, we will develop and propose an ontological perspective on musical works that embraces such volatility, creating the conditions to investigate musical performance outside the biased look focusing only on the stability of musical texts. Nicholas Kenyon suggests that this treatment of scores

[19] Nicholas Cook, *Beyond the Score: Music as Performance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3.
[20] José A. Bowen, "The History of Remembered Innovation: Tradition and Its Role in the Relationship between Musical Works and Their Performances," *The Journal of Musicology* 11, no. 2 (1993): 140.

as a synecdoche of music emerged with musicology in the nineteenth century and its need for establishing *authoritative texts*. He claims that "for generations musicologists behaved as if scores were the only real thing about music"[21]. Richard Taruskin, a critic of this text-centered attitude regarding thinking about music, underlines that the confusion between "music as tones-in-motion" and "music as notes-on-page", even when the concern is musical performance, "may be simply because we are, on the whole, textual critics by trade, not performers"[22], a fact that haunts not only musicology but also the history and the philosophy of music.

This privilege of texts over the transitivity of orality is inescapable, being one of the fundamental traits of Western civilization. After Plato's caveat against letters, poignantly put into words in *Phaedrus*[23], "the epoch of logocentrism"[24], as criticized by Jacques Derrida, made us believe that the written signifier is more than technical and representative, that it has a constitutive meaning, that it is *the thing itself*. Controlling, amongst other things, "*the history of (the only) metaphysics*, which has, in spite of all differences, not only from Plato to Hegel (even including Leibniz) but also, beyond these apparent limits, from the pre-Socratics to Heidegger, always assigned the origin of truth in general to the logos"[25], logocentrism "relates to centrism itself", as pointed out by Gayatri

[21] Nicholas Kenyon, "Performance Today," in *The Cambridge History of Musical Performance*, ed. Colin Lawson and Robin Stowell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 10.
[22] Richard Taruskin, "The Limits of Authenticity: A Contribution," in *Text and Act: Essays on Music and Performance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 70.
[23] The myth of the creation of writing by the Egyptian old god Theuth, the Egyptian Hermes, told by Socrates to Phaedrus, places king Thamus replying to the proud inventor of letters: "O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learner's souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company having the show of wisdom without the reality." *in* Plato, *Phaedrus*, n.d., 274e-275a.
[24] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, ed. The John Hopkins University Press (Baltimore and London, 1997), 285.
[25] Derrida, 3.

Spivak, “the human desire to posit a ‘central’ presence at beginning and end”[26]. “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”[27], as all Westerners know.

In the same way, written music was fated to be deified. The assumption of the score as being the musical work itself grew steadily into the twentieth century accompanying the increase in detailed markings as well as the change in composing techniques. This change, prominently signaled by Schönberg’s serialism in the 1920s but, as we’ve seen, not restricted to it, diverted also many thinkers, scholars, critics, performers, and others devotees of Western art music into the very grammar of composing, assuming the grammar as the music, especially when thinking about *Newer Music*. Take, for instance, perhaps one of the most famous books on new music of the first half of the twentieth century: *Philosophie der Neuen Musik*, by Theodor W. Adorno, published in 1949[28]. In this book, the topic throughout is musical composition, particularly Stravinsky’s and Schönberg’s methods of composition, the references to performance being scarce, and subsidiary.

Changes in the notation of twentieth-century compositions also directed attention to the score, mostly in its extension and plastic character. These were instigated by the search for new sounds from traditional instruments, explored by composers since the beginning of the century. Moreover, also and perhaps mostly, through the influence of electronic music, notation expanded after mid-century and its vocabulary was enlarged with an unwieldy number of new symbols and graphisms. Richard Rastall calls this state of affairs “notational anarchy, in which each composer shall devise and introduce those symbols that seem most satisfactory for the work in hand”[29]. Although a few dictionaries appeared in the 1970s, indexing and systematizing the most common new

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[26] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translator’s Preface,” in *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), lxviii.
[27] St. John, “The Gospel According to St. John,” in *The King James Version of the Holy Bible*, ed. Dan Cogliano, 2001, 611.
[28] Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophie Der Neuen Musik* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1949).
[29] Richard Rastall, *The Notation of Western Music: An Introduction* (London, Melbourneand Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1983), 262.

symbols in use by composers, as well as their verbal explanation, it became common for each score to be prefaced with specific instructions for performers.

These developments contributed to the extremely marked centrality of notation in *Newer Music*, evincing also the two very distinct actions of composing and performing and leading to the invisible performer paradigm that shadows its practice. A note should be added to regard that although we are considering electronic music, which emerged in the mid-twentieth century and influenced later musical practices, as part of the *Newer Music* composed in the last hundred years, the performative and philosophical questions that concern us in this thesis are focused on how musicians make music from the written score. We believe the perspective that will be presented in the last chapters can apply to any case of singing, playing, or conducting music that takes any musical text as the departure point, and, as such, it cannot answer the specific questions posed by electronic music. Further philosophical investigations will also be relevant to better understand the performative and musical questions of mixed-media compositions, that comprise a score for one or several musicians to play, sing, and/or conduct, and an electronic part to which musicians must accommodate to[30]. In the same way, the particular relation between musician and score in jazz music, as in other different traditions of written music, is outside the scope of this thesis but of interest for philosophical inquiry.

Though this very brief summary of the history of the score might help clarify how the notation of music came to be regulative and identifying of the *musical work* in the Western art music tradition, to fully understand the extent of the ontological assumptions behind the practice of *Newer Music* we must give some attention to the musicians interacting with those regulative texts. In the next section, we will, thus, look into how musical practices developed in relation with the growing specificity of written music and also to some important technological and educational historical changes.

[30] A pioneering example of a mixed-media composition is Bruno Maderna's *Musica su due dimensioni*, for flute and magnetic tape, written in 1952 and revised in 1958.

1.3. The Invisible Performer Paradigm

Investigating musical performance is a challenging field of research. Undoubtedly, much more challenging than those in which the musical text is the investigated object. This is obvious, for it is not until the very late nineteenth century, and only gradually afterward, that we have a similar kind of fixed item in some way identifiable with a performance of music. Before the possibility of recording, the sources available to investigate music and performance were silent (except within fieldwork) and, therefore, we have access today only to the mediating writings about it scattered in different musical literature[31]. In any case, and since we are concerned with the musician's act of addressing the score, it is not inapt to formulate some assumptions about musical performance relating to the developments in the musical text reviewed in the last section, towards a clear vision of how the invisible performer paradigm weighs in the practice of *Newer Music* in the twenty-first century.

As we have seen, the first neumatic notations developed as a mnemonic device for music already known through oral transmission. They were "gestural", in the sense that the neumes represented graphically the movements of the melodic lines to be sung, and they had a tight connection to the written word. As such, these first musical texts were not as authoritative as the later referential and discriminative ones, and so we can imagine a very loose relationship between the monks singing and the notated music, and perhaps a more constricted one with the written word. Moreover, the relationship between musical texts and musical performance was not the same as the one we now enjoy for a long time. As Forrest Kelly notes, most books of music from medieval times "were not thought of as books to perform from – like a modern musician's sheet music – but as repositories, as recordings"[32]. The same was found by the Portuguese researcher João Pedro d'Alvarenga, investigating fourteenth to nineteenth

[31] For an extensive and gathered look into the history of musical performance see Colin Lawson and Robin Stowell, eds., *The Cambridge History of Musical Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
[32] Kelly, *Capturing Music: The Story of Notation*, 79.

century collections of keyboard music scores at the Portuguese National Library. He wrote that

> The pre-ordering by composers, the fact that the paper does not, in any case, show signs of frequent handling and the numerous incorrect lapsus calami denouncing the lack of practical use in keyboard performance reveal to us the essentially repository function of these collections […].[33]

So, even after Guido d'Arezzo's invention of the prescriptive 5-line staff system, which made sight-reading of music possible and implemented a much more strict authority on the literate musician, and even after Philippe de Vitry's precise rhythmic notation was part of the music score, performance practices of Western art music were not as closely tied to the composer's text as they later became.

Enrico Fubini identified the theoretical *discovery* of harmony as a specific turning point in the dynamics of musical practice:

> The *discovery* of harmony by theorists, as well as its progressive affirmation in the field of musical practice, are aspects of a more vast and profound modification that takes place in the way of practicing and conceiving music: the musical work, the relationships between the musical work and the public, the tasks of composer and performer, and the respective cultural and social functions of both.[34]

This evermore clear separation between composer and performer was amplified, as we have seen, by printing[35]. As musical texts became autonomous objects, mostly through the dissemination of published editions during the second

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[33] Translated by myself from João Pedro D'Alvarenga, "A Música Também é Escrita," in *Tesouros Da Biblioteca Nacional*, ed. Maria Valentina Sul Mendes (Lisboa: Inapa, 1992), 269–70. "A preordenação por compositores, o facto de o papel não apresentar, em qualquer caso, indícios de manuseamento frequente, e os numerosos *lapsos calami* incorrectos a denunciar falta de uso prático na execução ao teclado revelam-nos a função essencialmente repositória destas colecções […]".

[34] Translated by myself from the Spanish edition by Carlos Pérez de Aranda: "El descubrimiento de la armonía por parte de los teóricos, así como la progresiva afirmación de la misma en el terreno de la práctica musical, son aspectos de una modificación más vasta y profunda que se opera en la manera de practicar y concebir la música, a saber: la obra musical, las relaciones entre ésta y el público, las tareas tanto del compositor como del intérprete y las respectivas funciones culturales y sociales de ambos." in Enrico Fubini, La Estética Musical Desde La Antigüedad Hasta El Siglo XX (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005), 140.

[35] Such separation is even more marked when the musician addresses a dead composer's score, but that was not common practice until the revival of ancient music and the erection of the canonical repertoire in the nineteenth century.

half of the eighteenth century, their authority increased over the musicians who should decode them according to the common practices of the day, as thought of by composers. This was soon to become problematic as common practices were not only different within distinct geographical sites scores were traveling to, but also unstable, even in the same place. Many treatises on musical performance were published during this time to guide the practice and the interpretation of musical scores. These treatises are a great source of information on eighteenth-century performance, as they give us clues on how improvised ornamentation and other features of musical practice should happen. At the same time, they show the growing need for control of the musical text over the performance of music even before the later thickening of information written in the score.

The end of the eighteenth century saw the rise of an institution that would transform the practice of Western art music: the conservatory. Different from the older religiously oriented music schools, conservatories were secular institutions that trained students to be professional musicians in several distinct areas of musical activity[36]. At the same time, conservatories responded to the increasing technical skills demanded by the new romantic compositions, above all in instrumental music, and promoted the raising of those demands to an even higher level, by focusing students on the development of technical expertise.

Related to this escalation of technical difficulty in the music was the increment of indications left by the composer in the text. The musician had in the nineteenth century many more requirements to comply with when addressing the score, and also many more technical worries. In addition, *musical interpreters*, as translators of the great written music, were then responsible for a faithful rendition of the composer's musical work explicit in the score, and, as such, their

[36] Before the end of the eighteenth century, and as soon as the sixteenth, there were several charitable organizations in Italy that found sustainability through music education, and that preceded the nineteenth century model of the conservatory. For a more extensive look into the teaching of musical practice see Natasha Loges and Colin Lawson, "The Teaching of Performance," in *The Cambridge History of Musical Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 135–68.

relationship with the musical text was changing into a more subservient one, where fidelity to the letter was paramount.

Despite these developments, the *musical interpreter* of the nineteenth century was still able to add personal impetus concerning some nuances of tempo and articulation, a freedom that was put into question by twentieth-century composition. The modernist rejection of romantic values, including the notion of *musical interpreter* altogether, was soon to take the lead, with respect to the *Newer Music* composed, elevating the "fidelity to the text" requisite to the extreme. As Corey Jamason sustains, "Those performers who were actually engaged in the performance of new music were told not to 'interpret' a work, but rather, to simply 'play what is written', leading the performer of new music in the early twentieth century ever closer to a complete suppression of their individuality"[37].

The desire for a "transparent" or "invisible" performer, who would be as if not present between the composer's work and its listeners grew steadily in the first half of the twentieth century. Technological developments, leading to the rise of electronic music in the 1950s, were also taking place, and so, the possibility of making music without the performer, longed by composers, had an important impact in establishing the invisible performer paradigm that operates still in present-day musical practice. An excerpt of a small article that appeared in 1936 in *The Musical Times* helps clarify the spirit of the epoch regarding performers:

> Now it cannot be denied that this state of affairs is very unsatisfactory. What we want to get at through music is the mind of the composer, and fallible mediums which come between us and him must be regarded as necessary evils until some new invention or development renders them obsolete[38].

This perspective on the performer as, at the same time, insufficient and excessive when performing from the score – a perspective that we can find in many writings of composers in the first half of the twentieth century complaining

[37] Corey Jamason, "The Performer and the Composer," in *The Cambridge History of Musical Performance*, ed. Colin Lawson and Robin Stowell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 131.
[38] Patric Stevenson, "Exit the Performer?," *The Musical Times* 77 (1936): 797–98.

about the fact that performers would sing, play or conduct their compositions without complying rigorously with their instructions and, to worsen things even more, they would add their excessively expressive ways of doing it – also encouraged the use of a more explicit notation by composers. Leonard Stein wrote in 1964 about the particular influence of Schönberg and Webern's compositions in this thickening of information in scores: "the tendency towards greater explicitness increased tremendously under the impact of Schoenberg's careful and detailed markings in both atonal and twelve-tone works, and under Webern's close scrutiny of the smallest musical particle"[39].

The invisible performer paradigm was also amplified during the first half of the twentieth century, by one of the most impactful technical innovations in the history of music that thrived and populated Europe's living rooms. The record, or phonograph, player caused a tremendous transformation not only in the way people listen to music but also, and for our purposes more importantly, in the way musicians do it. This happened on several levels. The most obvious is that musicians could now hear themselves play or sing without the "distraction" of playing or singing, that is, passively, as audiences did. In its turn, this meant a greater attentiveness to the details of their own performances and, if it was the case, to the performances of other musicians involved. Even under the bad technological conditions that Theodor W. Adorno was complaining about in the late 1920s[40] and early 1930s[41], regarding the quality of recordings and the reproductive apparatus, musicians did hear some details in played back recordings that they couldn't hear while playing. Concerning the difference between hearing while performing and hearing passively, Robert Philip notes that "Musicians who first heard their own recordings in the early years of the twentieth century were often taken aback by what they heard, suddenly being made aware

[39] Leonard Stein, "The Performer's Point of View," in *Perspectives on Notation and Performance*, ed. Benjamin Boretz and Edward T. Cone (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1964), 43.
[40] Theodor W. Adorno, "The Curves of the Needle," in *Essays on Music*, ed. Richard Leppert (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 271–76.
[41] Theodor W. Adorno, "The Form of the Phonograph Record," in *Essays on Music*, ed. Richard Leppert (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002).

of inaccuracies and mannerisms they had not suspected"[42]. These mannerisms and inaccuracies, as Philip also notes, were soon enough corrected by musicians aspiring to excellence in their performances, and an improvement in technical expertise happened during the first half of the twentieth century.

Recording was also very different from performing live. In the studio, musicians didn't usually have an audience to perform to, and the possibility of doing several takes and choosing the best one was also distinct from the single-shot opportunity of the concert hall. Furthermore, the available option of hearing a recorded performance several times made the small imperfections and deviations from the score, which were before disregarded in live performance, gain significance as something to be carefully avoided. Tape technology, developed by mid-century, took note-perfect recorded performances even further with the possibility of editing after recording.

The significant increase in technical skills throughout twentieth-century musicianship meant that musicians made absolute compliance with the score a priority not only on recordings but also in concerts. In the same way, expectations of listeners accustomed to sterilized studio performances were raised in the concert hall. As Philip notes, "the influence of the recording experience has had a much wider effect, encouraging shifts of technique and style at every level of music-making"[43], the most evident change throughout the century being the "tidying up" of performance[44].

Another important consequence of recording technology, as more recordings were available and distributed, was the uniformization of performance practices. The diverse ways of playing in diverse parts of the world that one can hear in early recordings devolved into a more global common practice in which, Philip notes, "The process of change has slowed down"[45]. By mid-century, different styles of playing were less evident and performance practices were stagnating into neat conformity with the score and an absence of individual

[42] Robert Philip, *Performing Music in the Age of Recording* (Bolton: Yale University Press, 2004), 25.
[43] Philip, 62.
[44] Philip, 232.
[45] Philip, 239.

expression. Bruce Haynes called this a *Strait Style*[46] (as in *straitjacket*) and described it as "a form of Period style characterized by emotional detachment and a lack of expressiveness"[47]. Furthermore "strait players", although excelling in technical skill, neglect some important elements in the performance experience, like "reaching out to the audience", and are guided by the warped notion that "it is acceptable or even desirable to perform in a 'no one at home' predictable way"[48]. We might compare Hayne's *Strait Style* to what Thomas Carson Mark called the "instantiating sequence of sounds" as prescribed by the score, to which he opposed the "performance" as going beyond that mere instantiation[49].

This reality in musical performance practices was, as we have noted, slowly being constructed by the changes happening both in notation and composition, but became more pronounced with twentieth-century developments. As soon as 1942, Frederick Dorian was remarking the loss of a subjective way of performing music:

> Objectivity no longer connotes one of two ways in performance; it now becomes the only kind of interpretation that makes sense. Moreover, the final step must be taken and the whole matter of 'interpretation' thrown overboard. The idea of interpreting music is rejected per se, since interpretation reveals the personality of the performer rather than that of the composer[50].

It is also relevant of note in Dorian's writing that by this time, and particularly regarding *Newer Music*, scores were seen as representing the composer's personality or intentions, which were the important things to listen to, and which could be only heard if musicians managed not to do much damage adding their personal sense into performances.

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[46] Haynes follows Richard Taruskin who presented the notion of "straight player" in Richard Taruskin, "Text and Act," in *Text and Act: Essays on Music and Performance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 353–58.
[47] Bruce Haynes, *The End of Early Music: A Period Performer's History of Music for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 15.
[48] Haynes, 63.
[49] Thomas Carson Mark, "Philosophy of Piano Playing: Reflections on the Concept of Performance," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 41, no. 3 (1981): 301.
[50] Frederick Dorian, *The History of Music in Performance: The Art of Musical Interpretation from the Renaissance to Our Day* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1942), 324.

Contributing to the establishment of the invisible performer paradigm was the already mentioned erection of the canon and its relation with the formal education of music. Since the nineteenth century founding of conservatories, and also of musicological studies, a canonical repertoire of baroque, classical and romantic music established itself in musical practice. As such, and differently from earlier periods, musicians from the twentieth century onwards have been mostly occupied with playing the music of older times. For the most part, musical training and education have been sustained throughout the last two centuries by the same canon of musical compositions. The same happens with recordings and concert venues' agendas. And so, the criticism towards the inexpressive way of playing of modern musicians is mostly directed to the way they are playing old music, although one can perceive the generalized scope of these unified *Strait* practices.

Concerning specifically the way to play *Newer Music* compositions, it is frequently stated that there is less or no margin for musicians to add their individual perspective on the musical work since the score already determines precisely every action they should carry out and every resultant sound they should make. But even in more indeterminate scores of *Newer Music*, such as, to use a paradigmatic and controversial example, John Cage's *4'33''* (1952), it is the generalized Strait performance practice that imposes nothing more and nothing less than perfect compliance with the score, and in this case the absence of the individual perspectives of musicians in the sounding of the musical work[51]. In fact, this *Strait Style* was even institutionally established in the 1960s by the *Stillkommission* at the *Akademia für Musik und darstellende Kunst Vienna*.

[51] Cage's *4'33''* might seem a terrible example to complain about the absence of individual input in *Newer Music* performances. Which input can musicians make to a composition that instructs them to be silent? It is, nevertheless, worthy to acknowledge that Cage's indeterminacy in this piece is not only about not producing sounds. It is also about its length: in the *First Tacet Edition* of the score, in 1960, Cage added a note describing the first performance and suggesting that "the work may be performed by any instrumentalist or combination of instrumentalists and last any length of time". See John Cage, *4'33''* (New York: Henmar Press Inc., 1960). The fact that not many performers are willing to compromise Cage's precise instructions in the title of the piece and perform it without a chronometer, in favor of their own musical decisions regarding its length, is an indication of the "transparent" practices when performing *Newer Music*.

Robert Hill writes about this twentieth-century necessity of overcoming the excessively romantic practices:

> As the twentieth century grew older and the late-romantic era receded farther into the past, the latter period came to be seen as a time of interpretative debauchery. What had started out as a polemic against certain kinds of perceived exaggeration in performance behavior developed into a myth of the degeneration of noble classicism into cheap vulgarity, bearing with it a moral imperative to "cleanse" the performance practice of "classicist" works in order to restore to them a purity of which they had allegedly been deprived by late-romantic distortions.[52]

Although this critique of nineteenth-century practices was particularly directed to the ways musicians performed written music from the classical period, its influence had a broader impact in the overall formal musical education led by conservatories in the second half of the twentieth century and is still, according to Haynes, "the principal performing protocol presently taught in conservatories all over the world"[53].

As such, and even though *Newer Music* compositions are barely present in conservatories and music schools' curriculae, the context for this music to happen is one of a strict practice, focused on conveying every minute indication the composer notated in the score. Professional musicians in the Western art tradition of written music are trained to be unnoticed, as plain and invisible means for instantiating the composer's works of art. Consequently, if a particular performance of a *Newer Music* composition is not well received by the audience, the blame is usually not credited to the performers but to the composer, or to the composition taken as the work itself. The invisible performer paradigm is, thus, a model in which performers withdraw from the responsibility of making music happen, assigning it fully to the instructions in the score.

Lydia Goehr writes about this "ideal of invisibility" in performances of Western art music, relating it to their fundamental human character as opposed

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[52] Robert Hill, "Overcoming Romanticism: On the Modernization of 20th Century Performance Practice," in *Music and Performance during the Weimar Republic*, ed. B. R. Gilliam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 46.
[53] Haynes, *The End of Early Music: A Period Performer's History of Music for the Twenty-First Century*, 49.

to the “perfection” of machines: “[…] from the recognition of a performance’s necessary imperfection emerges a demand […] that the best performance be one that most successfully negates its own presence”[54]. Furthermore, she adds that this paradigm comprises two demands: “Performers and audiences should separate from the total performance event the essential ‘aural image’ of the work”[55]; and, since “[…] what is actually heard in the concrete soundings of the works is far less valuable than the transcendent meaning of the works the sounding are supposed to convey”, “performers should attempt, therefore, to create the illusion that the work is being conveyed immediately to the audience by undermining their own presence as necessarily flawed mediators”[56].

In the next section, we will look further into this split between *work* and *performance* that lies beneath the paradigm of an invisible performer regulated by the score, and expose the ontological assumptions sustaining the practice of *Newer Music*. We will start by attending more closely to the specific questions within this practice, acknowledging the consequences that such assumptions have in the performance of *Newer Music*.

[54] Lydia Goehr, *The Quest for Voice: On Music, Politics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 142.
[55] Goehr, 143.
[56] Goehr, 143.

1.4. Ontological Assumptions in Practice

Ontological assumptions about the musical work, that is, preconceptions on what kind of entity the musical work is, might not always be wittingly present in Western art musical practice. Musicians in this tradition are most likely to be concerned with the practical, technical, and musical intricacies of playing, singing or conducting from a score than with philosophical questions on what it means for a musical work to be. As Stephen Davies notes, "Composers and performers typically do not think about what they are producing as universal or abstract particulars, or as classes, types or kinds. Since they can make music without philosophizing about it, there is no reason why they should"[57]. Nevertheless, even if not explicit, there is necessarily an ontological position, regarding works of music, taken by musicians embedded in a musical practice that is, at least since the nineteenth century, sustained by the notion of musical work. This positioning, I claim, impacts musical practice and the performance of musical works from within and gives musicians a good enough reason to address philosophical questions concerning their music-making. Ontological questions are even more relevant regarding *Newer Music*, not only because it poses new and different questions from the ones presented by canonical music, but also because, as we've seen, it is enclosed by a problematic paradigm of a constrained practice.

Emerging within and encouraging this constrained practice, one might think that *Newer Music* would thrive through it. And yet, it seems in the twenty-first century that we can barely acknowledge the existence of written music from the last hundred years. A great number of reasons exist for the sad reality of *Newer Music*[58]. It has, for instance, to compete with the beloved canonical repertoire that fills concert halls and radio broadcastings, the recording industry, the sheet music publishing market, and also, as we have noted, the music schools' *curriculae*. With a musical training largely centered on classical and romantic music scores,

[57] Stephen Davies, *Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 44.
[58] Milton Babbitt didn't think the niche-within-a-niche-like character of *Newer Music* was a problem. In fact, he claimed that this condition was not only "inevitable" but also "potentially advantageous for the composer and his music". See Babbitt, "Who Cares If You Listen?" 38.

it is of no wonder that many musicians today still agree with the famous violinist Jascha Heifetz's opinion regarding *Newer Music*. In 1961 he said that "he occasionally performed works by contemporary composers for two reasons: first, to discourage the composers from writing any more; second, to remind himself of how much he appreciated Beethoven"[59]. Leonard B. Meyer stated, in what could have been an answer to Heifetz, that "people seldom like what they do not understand. Quite the opposite [...] [they] generally detest and reject what seems incomprehensible. Witness the hostility which contemporary music so often excites in audiences accustomed to the syntax and structure of tonal music"[60]. And so, if the training of professional musicians is focused on such different music as the canonical one, it is almost inevitable they will not understand the *Newer Music* and will refrain from it, and the same applies to listeners.

It could be said that, so it seems, audiences don't want to hear this music and most musicians don't want to perform it. *Newer Music* appears to be, as Babbitt puts it in the excerpt already quoted, "for, of, and by specialists"[61]. But even in that specialized ivory tower, the performance practices that sustain *Newer Music* are anchored both in the canonical repertoire of baroque, classical and romantic music, and in the *Strait Style* encouraged by twentieth-century developments. The U.S American composer Charles Wuorinen, writing about *Newer Music*, stated in 1964 that musicians were trained "in a tradition of no relevance to its performance requirements"[62]. Gunter Schuller complained about the same shortfall in American performance practices and added that immaculate mechanical presentations complying perfectly with the score are not sufficient when it comes to *Newer Music*:

> […] too many performers, regardless of their technical competence, are totally unaware of the new problems that have been brought to the fore by recent compositional developments. This is even true – in fact

[59] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*, 251.
[60] Leonard B. Meyer, *Explaining Music: Essays and Explorations* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1973), 16.
[61] Babbitt, "Who Cares If You Listen?" 38.
[62] Charles Wuorinen, "Notes on the Performance of Contemporary Music," in *Perspectives on Notation and Performance*, ed. Benjamin Boretz and Edward T. Cone (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1964), 51.

> perhaps most often true – of our technically best equipped professionals, who may have sufficient instrumental skill to play an advanced contemporary work immaculately from a mechanical point of view, but who often lack any rapport with the new concepts that may have inspired it[63].

Besides underlining the technical demands of most *Newer Music* compositions, Schuller highlights also the necessity of going beyond that technicality, writing that the "link between the mechanical details of a composition and that which emerges between the lines, so to speak, in actual performance, is very rarely experienced in contemporary music"[64].

Less than a decade before Schuller, in 1956, Theodor W. Adorno was taking notes of the same state of affairs in European performances of *Newer Music*:

> [...] senselessness in the presentation of new music is almost universal, and this contributes to public resistance. It is primarily a result of the lack of rehearsal time. With conductors in particular, there is a disastrous shift of attention. Rehearsals revolve around the musicians staying together, not around the music hanging together, whereas the former should simply be the precondition for the latter. People suppose that, if it 'comes off', it must be right, even if the most abominable gibberish comes out[65].

As in Schuller's statement, Adorno stresses in this quote the fact that music must be something beyond mere compliance with the score. Although "staying together" when playing, singing, or conducting is a precondition for music, it is not sufficient. Furthermore, the German philosopher points out an important question within *Newer Music* practices that also relates to its scarcity in public venues: rehearsal time. The fact that *Newer Music* compositions are in general thicker than canonical ones, in the sense they encompass more information for musicians to address, as also the fact that this information is diverse and non-related to the tonal forms that sustain musical training, contributes to a necessary increase in rehearsal time when compared to the canonical repertoire.

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[63] Gunter Schuller, "American Performance and New Music," in *Perspectives on Notation and Performance*, ed. Benjamin Boretz (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1964), 2.
[64] Schuller, 4.
[65] Theodor W. Adorno, *Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction: Notes, a Draft and Two Schemata*, ed. Henri Lonitz (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 122.

One consequence of this is economical. In principle, for us to listen to some *Newer Music*, a lot more time and effort must be put in by musicians than when it comes to rehearsing a piece from the well-known canonical repertoire. *Newer Music* is, thus, exceptionally expensive even when few musicians are required for it to happen. An extreme example is referenced by Alastair Williams on the rehearsing of Brian Ferneyhough's Second String Quartet (1980) by the Arditti Quartet. In an interview in 1999, the violinist Irvine Arditti recalls: "We worked on that not bar by bar, but beat by beat, and I think in those days, in 1980, we spent about sixty hours learning the piece. It was some twelve minutes long"[66].

It is not surprising, then, that *Newer Music* doesn't make it so easy to the stage. Even when it does, as Paul Griffiths notes, it is usually under the scope of the *première*[67], after which it resumes to eventual private hearings in recordings. The invisible performer paradigm in *Newer Music* extends, in this way, to an actual absence from most of the live happening. When compared with the canonical compositions of canonical composers, performances of *Newer Music* are scarcely repeated in concert programming, and this bears the consequence of unexperienced performance practices for most of the music written in the last century.

Apart from this performative inexperience, the fact that *Newer Music* requires an extended amount of rehearsal to overcome the extraordinary technical demands of most compositions has, moreover, an impact on musical practice that contributes to the invisible performer paradigm and its short-minded focus on compliance with the score. In chapter four, we will address in more depth this question related to the necessary repetition that comprises such a great amount of rehearsal time. For now, let us look into what the philosopher and pianist Thomas Carson Mark writes about the motor habits that are formed when practicing music:

> […] through practice one acquires a set of extremely specialized motor habits. But this makes it possible that one's fingers may hit the right notes

[66] Alastair Williams, "Ageing of the New: The Museum of Musical Modernism," in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Music*, ed. Nicholas Cook and Anthony Pople (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 510.
[67] Griffiths, *Modern Music and After*, 409.

> through habit alone, completely mechanically, just as one can utter the words of a well-known nursery rhyme, with no attention to the sense of what one is doing. In such a case, on the view taken here, one has ceased to perform the music[68].

Mark is writing about the practice of written music in general (although he focuses on piano music), but if it is true that these extremely specialized motor habits musicians develop can disrupt musical performance, the case in *Newer Music* is much more troublesome than in any canonical music. With an extended rehearsal time required when compared to older music, *Newer Music* is, then, more prone to be played mechanically, in a *Strait Style*, as Haynes suggested.

Beyond the voluminous challenges in reading most of *Newer Music* compositions, and the colossal amount of necessary repetition for each fine motion to be assured, this literal style of performing happens also, one might suspect, because musicians are trained within a tradition that, as we've seen, values the literary quality of music and holds on to an ontological perspective of fixated musical works. In such a tradition, the aim of the performance is first and foremost to comply perfectly with the score. This is what Stan Godlovitch asserts in his thorough study of performance practice within Western art music, describing musical performance as "governed by powerful historical conventions of training and expertise"[69]. Stating this inescapable reality for musicians, he adds that "these conventions are established and internally regulated by performance communities, the structure and organization of which are determined by long-standing inherited norms"[70]. Daniel Leech-Wilkinson also emphasizes this fact:

> There are strong traditions in the performing of particular scores, it is assumed that these represent the composer's intentions which are believed to be of overriding importance, and thus there is a strong moral imperative not to perform scores non-traditionally. Small adjustments to norms are sought after by young players seeking to be noticed, but anything obvious is counterproductive: performers who dared to offer a radically different view would be slapped down by performance police

[68] Mark, "Philosophy of Piano Playing: Reflections on the Concept of Performance," 315.
[69] Stan Godlovitch, *Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 4.
[70] Godlovitch, *Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study*.

> (teachers, critics, bloggers) and spurned by potential employers (agents, conductors, ensembles, venue managers, record and radio producers).[71]

Musicians in the twenty-first century, thus, cannot dodge these inherited norms closely tied to the nineteenth and twentieth-century aims of perfect compliance with the score and supervised by the performance communities they were brought up in.

These norms and aims, one should say, are not a problem in themselves, and surely the composer's great amount of work in noting precisely everything that ends up in the score is not to be disregarded, but they can lead musicians, particularly in *Newer Music* thicker compositions, to disregard what is not written in the score but, as we'll argue in chapter three, is still part of the performance and the work.

The ontological assumption on musical works behind this practice, in which strict conformity with the text exhausts the performer's task, is that the work of music is something fixed and finished, perhaps an abstract object and, in any case, distinct from the performance. As such, the musician would need only to reproduce faithfully what was explicitly written by the composer in order to have instantiated the musical work in performance. The distinction between *work* and *performance* is, thus, at the core of this ontological misconception and, we claim, contributes to a defective practice of *Newer Music*. Furthermore, in strict relation with the aforementioned developments that led both to the identification of the musical work with the musical score and the *Strait* Style of performance, this defective practice can be said to contribute to the absence of *Newer Music* in the twenty-first-century listeners and musicians' choices.

To say this is, of course, not to deny that there are other complex psychological, sociological, political, and economic motives involved in the scarcity of *Newer Music* being performed. Nevertheless, we would like to focus on the specificity of musical practice from a philosophical point of view in order to understand how musicians and listeners today can have a more fulfilling

[71] Daniel Leech-Wilkinson, "Compositions, Scores, Performances, Meanings," *Music Theory Online* 18, no. 1 (2012): 3.3.

experience of the written music of their time. We shall claim, then, that the flawed practice of *Newer Music* is being sustained by an ontological misconception of the musical work, undermining it from the very beginning, since the first reading of the score by the musician.

Before proceeding to the next chapter, where we will review some important misconceptions about the musical work that also haunt the philosophical literature and philosophical thought about music, it is of necessity to underline that our claims about a defective practice of *Newer Music* do not intend to disregard the exceptional work carried out by musicians and institutions who dedicate themselves to performing and promoting it. It is due to them that, despite the ubiquity of canonical music from the past in our daily affairs, we can choose to listen, mostly through recordings, to the exciting and provocative sounding of *Newer Music*. Our aim with this critique is focused on developing a philosophical approach to music able to accommodate the specific questions of musical performance, and that can have a positive impact on *Newer Music* practices.

2. Philosophical [mis]Conceptions on the Musical Work

"Philosophy of music is the study of fundamental questions about the nature and value of music and our experience of it"[72]. It is a discipline that has received a dedicated focus in the last decades, many studies being published in books and journals concerning the definition of music, ontology, the emotions and expression related to the experience of it, questions about understanding, and the topics on its value and evaluation. Most of these inquiries, as Kania points out, have focused "exclusively on Western musical traditions"[73], puzzled by the fact that, contrary to works of non-performative arts, works of Western art music have a fixed written composition and multiple instances in performances. The repeatable character of Western art *musical works* is, thus, one of the most probed issues in the philosophy of music, particularly within the Anglo-Saxon literature and specifically regarding the ontological questions about works of music that emerge from this repeatability feature.

Even though many distinct perspectives were put forward by recent discussions on the ontology of music, some of which we will address in the second section of this chapter, the ontological misconception distinguishing *work* and *performance* we identified as problematic in the practice of *Newer Music* seems to be at the core of most philosophical thought about the Western art music tradition. Moreover, although some studies on musical performance have been published in the last thirty years, which will be the focus of the last section in this first part, the philosophy of music has centered the attention on the musical text, despite the performances, and taking the musical work for granted from the moment the composition is finished by the composer.

In the following section, we will address and criticize this assumption taken by most philosophical literature on music, claiming the discipline has been

[72] Andrew Kania, "The Philosophy of Music," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/music/.
[73] Kania.

deafened by dedicated attention to the composition, understood as the work itself, and by a theoretical disregard of the event-like character of performances. We will present some selected perspectives, neglectful of the performative character of music, outside the scope of ontological thought, after which we will direct a closer look into the more relevant theories currently discussing the ontology of the musical work. We will conclude the chapter and this introductory part of the thesis with a review of the philosophical literature on musical performance, highlighting its shortfall in answering the fundamental question of "How does one make music happen in performance?".

2.1. The Musical Work as Taken for Granted

In the first chapter, we mentioned Adorno's *Philosophie der Neuen Musik*[74] as an example of a philosophy of music exclusively concerned with questions that relate to the composition, the score, and the musical work as a fixed and determined entity confined to the musical text. The fact that most philosophical literature about music does not have its focus on the intricacies of musical practice should be easily understood as a consequence of most philosophers not being musicians, but listeners. Since musical practice is usually confined to the isolated practice rooms, what leads philosophical thought on music is, for the most, the experience of listening to it in performances or recordings. It might, then, seem unfair to accuse the philosophy of music of being deafened by the ontological misconception that splits the *musical work* from its *performances*. But even though the listening experience is fundamental in the literature, the last seems to be focused on what is common between performances or recordings of the same composition and ignorant of the differences.

Writing about the relationship between musical works and "authentic" performances, Stephen Davies illustrates this perspective:

> [...] the work determines or exemplifies the properties which its instances must display in order that they be instances of it: ontologically speaking, it is the nature of the work which determines those properties of its instances by virtue of which they are its instances. However, the epistemic process goes in reverse. We come to know the work from its instances, stripping away from its performances those of their properties which are artistically irrelevant, and then stripping away those artistically relevant properties which are properties of the performance but not properties of the work, and thereby exposing the work and its properties[75].

Moreover, he states later that "we do not classify performances as of the same work merely in terms of their similarity. Instead, it is because various performances are regulated by reference to its score that they qualify as of the

[74] Adorno, *Philosophie Der Neuen Musik*.
[75] Stephen Davies, "The Ontology of Musical Works and the Authenticity of Their Performances," *Noûs* 25, no. 1 (1991): 28–29.

given piece. The shared class membership of the performances is apparent only when they are identified in terms of the work they are of"[76].

This inevitable bond to the score Davies underlines as fundamental in performance was also stressed by Peter Kivy, who pinned musical notation as the crucial point promoting the work-performance dichotomy. In his *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music*, he wrote that "ever since there has been musical notation in Western music there has been a distinction between the performance and the thing being performed"[77]. We will return both to Davies' and Kivy's accounts of the *musical work* in the next section. For now, this is sufficient for us to investigate how the philosophical focus on the score is undermining thought about Western art music and making no contribution to a more careful practice, particularly in respect to *Newer Music*.

Before advancing with some examples, within the philosophical literature, that take the *musical work* for granted disregarding the differences between performances of the same composition, we will briefly explain why it is of absolute relevance not to assume the work of Western art written music as granted in performances that comply more or less (depending on the philosophical perspective) with the score. As will become clear with the ontological proposal of "works of music as music" we will present in the second part of this thesis, we don't intend to disregard the vital relation between scores and *musical works* within the Western art tradition. But if we grant this vital relation the status of *sufficient condition,* we might end up missing music altogether and be satisfied with its mechanical reproduction. We do not mean this in the sense put forward by Adorno, who criticized the phonograph record for being "not good for much more than reproducing and storing a music deprived of its best dimension"[78], but in a sense related to the Strait Style presented in the last chapter, and specifically relevant in regards to the practice of *Newer Music*.

To take the work as granted is, then, to assume that no matter what musicians do in performances, music is happening as long as some degree of

[76] Davies, *Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration*, 95.
[77] Peter Kivy, *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 204.
[78] Adorno, "The Form of the Phonograph Record," 278.

compliance with the score is attained. I believe this to be a poor and careless account of Western art music in general, with particular implications, I repeat myself, regarding the practice of *Newer Music*. The most evidently superficial account is posed by Roger Scruton's critique of what he calls "modern music" and essentially fits our definition of *Newer Music*. In *Music as an Art*, Scruton states that "real music" must be aligned with the tonal forms, and that "modern music" is incapable of "delivering anything comparable to what was given to us by the great tradition of tonal melody and harmony"[79]. Scruton points critically to Pierre Boulez' musical activity as composer, accusing him of manipulating the French subsidy with the creation of the *Institut de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique* (IRCAM), in 1970, and the founding of one of the more relevant ensembles playing and recording *Newer Music* for the last fifty years, the *Ensemble Intercontemporain*, all of which, according to Scruton, responsible for despotically instigating "a false conception of music"[80].

Scruton insists also on the fact that *Newer Music* has failed to create an audience, implying further the defiance of "tonalism" as responsible for "the growing gap between serious music and the audience on which it depends"[81]. In *Music as an Art*, *f*our developments of twentieth-century musical composition practices are pointed out as opposing the canonical practices of the past, in which Scruton believed the future of music to be grounded: 1) the attack on tonality made by Adorno; 2) the invention of serialism in the 1920s by Schönberg; 3) the replacement of tones by sounds started by Varèse and Schaeffer in the 1930s and 1940s; and 4) total or integral serialism that emerged after the war with Boulez, Stockhausen, and Nono.

Within this summarized presentation of Scruton's last book, the centrality of composition practices in his considerations over Western art music is easy to spot. As it was for a long time and only more recently is starting to change in the History of Music, this philosophical focus on the composers' works is a symptom of a non-sentient philosophy that ignores the essential event-like and

[79] Roger Scruton, *Music as an Art* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2018), 102.
[80] Scruton, 177.
[81] Scruton, 220.

performative character of music as something we make happen and listen to. Such is the case in "True Authority: Schoenberg, Janáček and Us", a chapter in Scruton's previous book about music[82], in which he presents the music of Leoš Janáček (1854-1928) as "sounding right", the music of Schönberg as "being right" in accordance with a system he discredits, and our aesthetic experience as bearing true authority when discarding the music that *is* right and keeping the music that *sounds right*. But although the philosopher emphasizes the sentient character of the experience of music, his critique is directed towards the fact that *Newer Music* "came fully armed in theory", and only in that sense could be "right", despite the fact it won't pass the scrutiny of our authoritative tonality-rooted aesthetic experiences.

Beyond the tonal "elements of musical order", such as "repetition", "the rhythmical figure", "the pure intervals of fifth and fourth", "strophic melodies", and "dance rhythms"[83], it is the fact that Janáček's compositions are, for Scruton, "vindications of human life", and "able to communicate a moral vision"[84], while Schönberg's contrastingly express "despair and emptiness"[85], that leads him to conclude that the "avant-garde music" is not "real music". Failing essentially in communicating with an audience is again pointed out by Scruton as a reason to discredit *Newer Music*. He writes that "it is still questionable whether the avant-garde can obtain a real audience; too often those present in the concert hall seem like a pseudo-audience, if not an audience of pseuds"[86]. The dogma Scruton is accusing of sustaining *Newer Music* is "rooted in the theory of music rather than in the sound of music, and is addressed to the task of justifying avant-garde music in the way that Mark Twain jokingly justified the music of Wagner, by arguing that it is better than it sounds"[87].

Scruton criticizes not the dogma, but its rooting in a theory that did not emerge, like tonality, "from an empirical understanding of the way things

[82] Roger Scruton, *Understanding Music: Philosophy and Interpretation* (London and New York: Continuum, 2009).
[83] Scruton, 176.
[84] Scruton, 177.
[85] Scruton, 177.
[86] Scruton, 180–81.
[87] Scruton, 181.

sound"[88]. But, at the same time he defends this empirical and sonorous understanding as highly relevant for the authority of the aesthetic experience, he also advances his arguments in favor of tonal music through an analysis of Janáček's composition, making no single reference to performance or the performances (or recordings) he attended to get to listen to the way Janáček's work sounded. One can, thus, assume the possibility that Scruton's access to the performance of Janáček's composition was a success, the musicians fully immersed in the music being made, the seats were comfortable, the acoustics of the room impeccable; while his access to the performance of Schönberg's composition was a disastrous event, the musicians careless of making any effort beyond playing the instructions in the score, "the seats are ok" but Janáček's were better, and the acoustics wouldn't let you hear the *pianissimo*. Extreme illustrations *ad absurdum* apart, it is possible that what Scruton identified as "despair and emptiness" in Schönberg's music, and "vindications of human life" in Janáček's, is not something located in the composition, as he identifies presenting several measures of the Czech composer's score, but in performance, in the ways musicians play, sing or conduct that and other scores each time anew.

The reasons for believing that most philosophies of music are deafened by a text-centered approach to music relate with this disregarding the differences that the sound of the same score makes, and the different ways in which the same music can happen. Moreover, for the most part, they disregard any evaluative question concerning performance, assuming musicians won't fail to present the work in any circumstance that complies with the score. It is in this sense that Scruton is taking the musical work for granted, his arguments against *Newer Music* being insufficient to convince us.

A second example of a text-centered approach in the philosophy of music is Jenefer Robinson's study on emotions. In "The Expression of Emotion in Instrumental Music"[89], Robinson focuses on musical analysis when searching for

[88] Scruton, 169.
[89] Jenefer Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).

the appropriate emotional interpretation of Johannes Brahms' (1833-1897) *Intermezzo, Op. 117 No. 2* (1892). A sample of her analytical exercise is the brief harmonic description she presents from the climax to the end of the composition:

> In the development section there are continuous modulations, and in the coda Brahms keeps the harmony ambiguous until the very end. The climax of the piece comes in bar 69. We have been listening to a low B (which can be read as a Cb) sounding all through measures 67 and 68 in the bass while in the upper voice in bar 68 there is a descent from A to G# to F#, leading us to expect an E (Fb). But at bar 69 unnervingly the bass line moves up to C which grounds a dominant 7th chord on F (the dominant of B flat), re-establishing the B flat minor harmony in a jarring, unexpected way. In the ensuing coda, as the A and B themes intertwine, the harmony is ambiguous between B flat minor and major before finally resolving unambiguously into B flat minor at the very end.[90]

Another is the thematic analysis she pairs with a printing of the final bars of the piece:

> In the final fourteen bars, marked *più adagio*, the somewhat calmer B theme returns, interwoven with the passionate questing A theme. The major interpretative question, as I see it, concerns the conclusion and the way in which the two themes and the two modes of major and minor are ultimately reconciled. The A theme throughout has been associated with the minor key, chromaticism, and yearning. The B theme is more robust and calmer, because it is introduced on the downbeat and in the major key. In the coda just as there is ambiguity between major and minor, so there is interplay between the A and B themes. The last ten bars are given over to the A theme but in a much steadier rhythm than hitherto, the rhythm of the B theme. Harmonically, the final chord is unambiguous: D flat major, the key of the B theme, has been banished by B flat minor, the key of the A theme.[91]

I believe these excerpts of Robinson's philosophical writing to be of little significance to the philosophy of music. Even though she developed, in the same book, an important theory exploring the emotional experience of literature, music,

[90] Robinson, 339–40.
[91] Robinson, 342–43.

and the arts, the fact that musical analysis is, at some level, sustaining that theory, is a symptom of the text-centered approach beneath her philosophy of music.

The consequence of considering musical analysis the fundamental tool for interpreting the score is an elitist perspective about music in general, and Western art music in particular, negating that it is possible to understand music without the understanding of the score. But more than that, it is a very narrow perspective on what Western art music is, as it would be the analysis of a poem focusing on its grammar. This is what the musicologist and music historian Richard Taruskin, a critic of the text-center approach in musicology and philosophy, recently wrote defending the need to "put the emphasis back on music as a performance rather than a text – which of course means music as a practice rather than a thing"[92]. He criticized Nick Zangwill's formalist perspective in *Music and Aesthetics* [93] saying that

> To identify the aesthetic properties of music as "consist[ing] simply and solely of tones and their artistic combinations" seems to me tantamount to asserting that writing has grammar before it has subject matter and so when we discuss a poem or a novel we should talk only about grammar. Rather than pure I would call that approach limited. In a bad mood I'd call it impoverished.[94]

Zangwill's standpoint is somewhat like Scruton's, focusing much more on formalist musical analysis, and against the approach of emotional theories[95], such as Robinson's. But what Scruton's defense of tonalism, Zangwill's formalism, and Robinson's analytical response to what she considers the "major interpretative question" in Brahm's *Intermezzo, Op. 117 No. 2* have in common, is their understanding of music as a fixed *thing*, stable as the composition, and

[92] Richard Taruskin, "Essence or Context," in *Of Essence and Context: Between Music and Philosophy*, ed. Rūta Stanevičiūtė, Nick Zangwill, and Rima Povilionienė (Springer International Publishing, 2019), 22.
[93] Nick Zangwill, *Music and Aesthetic Reality: Formalism and the Limits of Description* (New York: Routledge, 2015).
[94] Taruskin, "Essence or Context," 13–14.
[95] Nick Zangwill, "Against Emotion: Hanslick Was Right About Music," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44, no. 1 (2004): 29–43.

not everchanging within musical practice and performance. Even in structuralist[96] perspectives on musical performance, such as music theorist and composer Wallence Berry's rejection of what he calls "merely intuitive or mimetic"[97] doing both in performance and in musical training, the spotlight is on decoding the score, the key to it being musical analysis:

> If the performer does anything beyond mere execution, the doing must […] result from informed discretion and deliberate control. Analysis tempers the purely subjective impulse, resolves unavoidable dilemmas, and offers means by which the teacher can articulate ideas persuasively and rationally.

Besides Taruskin's defense of music as a *practice* instead of a *thing*, and within the philosophical literature, one of the early voices against *structuralist* perspectives was Jerold Levinson's. *Music in the Moment*[98] is a book dedicated to the experience of listening to music and focuses on its moment-to-moment character. It presents an alternative to analytical approaches, such as Kivy's architectonicism[99], and promotes the idea of a "basic musical understanding". In the fifth chapter, we will address Levinson's *concatenationist* and *ultra-concatenationist* perspectives again, defended further by him in a more recent essay about the appreciation of music:

> […] it is not so much a matter of *thinking* articulately about the music as it passes, or *contemplating* it in its architectural aspect, as it is a matter of *reacting* to and *interacting* with the musical stream, perceptually and somatically, on a non-analytical, pre-reflective level. [100]

Three decades ago, Levinson had already written on this, in a still relevant paper about musical literacy, presenting what it means to understand music:

> A musically literate individual in the sense under consideration – that is, listening literacy – need never have digested a formal definition of

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[96] For more on structuralism and musical analysis see Joseph Dubiel, "Analysis," in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, ed. Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 525–34.
[97] Wallance Berry, *Musical Structure and Performance* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 2.
[98] Jerrold Levinson, *Music in the Moment* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997).
[99] Peter Kivy, *Music Alone: Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990).
[100] Jerrold Levinson, "Concatenationism, Architectonicism, and the Appreciation of Music," in *Musical Concerns: Essays in Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 32.

> concerto or fugue, need never have grasped the least fundamental of harmonic theory, need not know how many octaves and fractions thereof each orchestral instrument spans, need not be able to thick off the characteristics of Baroque style. He need only have an implicit grasp of these things – in his bones and ears, so to speak. His literacy ultimately resides in a set of experientially induced, context-sensitive dispositions to respond appropriately to musical events in specific settings, and not in items of recoverable information in a mental dictionary of musical matters.[101]

Pulling the listener's experience of music into a more sentient and bodily level results, thus, according to Levinson, in "basic musical understanding", in the sense that the experience of listening is the base condition for understanding. To illustrate this point we could think of a reader of the musical literature, who read all that was ever written about, for instance, the Brahm's *Intermezzo, Op. 117 No. 2*. This reader learned how to read music so he could read its score, and developed analytical skills in order to understand the score further harmonically, thematically, rhythmically. This reader knew so much about Brahm's composition that he could copy it by heart. But, unfortunately, this reader never had a chance to listen to it in a live performance or even in a recording. In Levinson's and Taruskin's perspectives, you might have all the knowledge this poor reader of music had, but you cannot have access to an understanding of music without the fundamental sonorous experience of it.

But despite these defenses of the sensuous properties of music regarding the listeners' experience, against analytical, structuralist, and text-centered approaches, when it comes to the experience of performers, philosophical studies fall short on supporting a non-text-centered one. This is even more evident in the ontology of music, which we will revise more deeply in the next section, laying the groundwork for developing, in the third chapter, an ontological perspective on works of music that focus not on the score's stability, but on the variable traits of performance. We will present, in the following, some selected perspectives on the specific case of musical ontology, and highlight the ways in

[101] Jerrold Levinson, "Musical Literacy," *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* 24, no. 1 (1990): 24–25.

which they take the work for granted when ignoring the differences between performances from the same score and refusing to consider them as ontological constituents of Western art written music.

2.2. Ontology

Musical ontology, as Kania points out in "The Philosophy of Music"[102], has focused recently on what he calls the "fundamentalist debate", regarding the metaphysical nature of Western art musical works, and "higher-level ontological issues", concerned mostly with the authenticity of musical performance in this tradition. In this section, we will concentrate on the fundamental questions about works of music, revising some of the more recent and discussed theories trying to explain the repeatable character of musical works, and exposing their fragilities concerning the aesthetic qualities in musical performance. Our attention will be led by the fundamentalist literature, addressing also authenticity-related studies, as well as skeptical perspectives towards the ontology of music.

Within the philosophical inquiries on the nature of the musical work, Platonism is currently the dominant perspective, asserting that works of music are abstract entities. According to Kania, the popularity of Platonism is related to the fact that it "respects more of our pre-theoretic intuitions about musical works than any of the other theories"[103], the discussion fluctuating between those who defend that works of music are *eternal*, and thus cannot be created, and those who defend that "musical works come to exist in time as a result of human action"[104]. The "pre-theoretic intuitions" underlined by Kania seem to appeal to the independence between *work* and *performance* as more of an easy way to explain the repeatable character of musical works in performance. To understand them as *abstract* entities, leaves out of ontological consideration any *concrete* appearance that can be repeated or reproduced, such as scores, performances, and recordings, granting, this way, stability of the work's identity conditions.

Such is Kivy's perspective presented in his *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music*[105], making a clear break between "The Work"[106] "And the Performance

[102] Kania, "The Philosophy of Music."
[103] Kania.
[104] Kania.
[105] Peter Kivy, *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
[106] Peter Kivy, "The Work," in *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 202–23.

Thereof"[107]. The philosopher subscribes to the type-token theories, comparing musical works to numbers in the sense they are "real, existing thing[s]", but not "physical thing[s]"[108]. The work of music is, thus for Kivy, "not locatable in space and time: indeed, it is 'timeless'"[109], and as such, it cannot be created or destroyed. Furthermore, the philosopher claims that "not being a physical object but a spaceless, timeless entity, it is clear that it cannot causally interact with our world of space and time"[110]. Tokens, on the other hand, are physical instances that relate to a type and are "obviously locatable in space and time"[111]. Musical performance is, hence, the way we can have causal access to the abstract entity the work of music is.

The consequence of this type-token perspective is that for specific performances to be instances of a musical work they must satisfy some conditions which connect them to that eternal, non-changing entity. Since tokens inevitably differ from one another, a fundamental link between any token and the type must be attained in order for the first to be considered instances of the second. Kivy's answer to this problem underlines the authority of the score:

> […] the range and degree of difference among performances are under the strict control of the score. For, although there are ways in which performances can, and are supposed to, differ from one another, they must all be in compliance with the score, or fail to *be* performances of the work – fail to be tokens of that type. A 'performance' with 'too many' mistakes or wrong notes, or a performance in which the player willfully departs from the score in impermissible ways, is *no* performance *of that work*, whatever else it may be.[112]

This bond between performance and score comprises, as Kivy notes, the necessary differences of the performative event. Although "the performer is under contract to play *what* the composer has written"[113], this contract "also enjoins the

[107] Peter Kivy, "And the Performance Thereof," in *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 224–50.
[108] Kivy, "The Work," 211.
[109] Kivy, 211.
[110] Kivy, 211.
[111] Kivy, 213.
[112] Kivy, 213.
[113] Kivy, "And the Performance Thereof," 239.

performer to exercise his or her artistry as to the manner in which what the composer has written is played"[114].

But even though Kivy acknowledges this essential performative heterogeneousness in Western art music tradition, noticing the diversity in tones, phrasing, emphasis, and other particular nuances performers make, the elementary condition for performances to be instances of a work does not go past the compliance-with-the-score criteria. The difficulty in accepting such a criterion is tied to the trouble of defining how many "wrong notes" and "mistakes" are "too many" for a performance not to be considered an instance of the work. Moreover, if one accepts the compliance conditions, it becomes difficult to explain why should more strict perspectives, requiring perfect-compliance with the score, be rejected. The arguments presented by Nelson Goodman, in his influential *Languages of Art*[115], align with such strictness, and can be considered absurd precisely because of that:

> The innocent-seeming principle that performances differing by just one note are instances of the same work risks the consequence – in view of the transitivity of identity – that all performances whatsoever are of the same work. If we allow the least deviation, all assurance of work-preservation and score-preservation is lost; for by a series of one-note errors of omission, addition, and modification, we can go all the way from Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* to *Three Blind Mice*.[116]

Furthermore, Goodman comes to an even more absurd conclusion about musical performance that seems to neglect any aesthetic qualities when instantiating particular works:

> Since complete compliance with the score is the only requirement for a genuine instance of a work, the most miserable performance without actual mistakes does count as such an instance, while the most brilliant performance with a single wrong note does not.[117]

This is, of course, one of the main reasons for criticism of austere perspectives like Goodman's, and even for skepticism towards the ontology of musical works

[114] Kivy, 239.
[115] Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art*, 1968.
[116] Goodman, 186–87.
[117] Goodman, 186.

in general, as we will see and discuss later in this section. The fact that a "miserable", that is, an aesthetically careless performance, could be heard as instantiating the musical work, should be sufficient for us to disregard any philosophy that does not answer to the *musical* in music.

Goodman takes the musical work for granted in the sense that, even if his is a Nominalist view of it, asserting that, ontologically speaking, works of music are the class of their compliant performances, he considers them independently of any miserable performances. If every performance of a particular score # is miserable, # is still being instantiated, and we are having an access to the musical work, absent of, or extremely poor on, aesthetic qualities. That is also the case in Kivy's Platonism, even though he further elaborates on compliance questions to include performance practices, particularly regarding the Historically Authentic Performance movements[118]. Since the work is considered an entity apart from performance, the search for historical authenticity remains closely tied on to what defines the work independently of performance practices, the text-centered approach being amplified from the confined score to the historical and musicological literature. As such, musical performance is understood as a *medium* instead of an *agent* of the musical work, and musicians in this tradition are mere puppets that comply and confine themselves to literary instructions.

This negation of musical practice as fundamental in shaping musical works is equally present in Julian Dodd's outlook into musical ontology. In *Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology*[119], a defense of Platonism regarding musical works is put forward. Dodd's "simple view" aligns, as Kivy's, with the type-token theories, acknowledging the musical work as a "*norm*-type" and any "sound-sequence-event" under that norm as a token. Tokens of a specific work of music include, therefore, in Dodd's perspective, not only performances but also "sound-

[118] The Historically Authentic Performance movement (HAP), as the Historically Informed Performance movement (HIP) and other differently named performance movements strongly tied to musicological and historical research, emerged in the 1960s with a strong concern about how musical practices of early music, written before the canonical repertoire of Classicism and Romanticism, were taking place in the second half of the twentieth century. These movements were responsible for a great development in musical practices of Medieval written music and later expanded into the practice of Baroque and Classical compositions. See Harry Haskell, "Early Music," in *Grove Music Online* (Oxford Music Online, 2001), https://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/.
[119] Julian Dodd, *Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

sequence-events brought about in ways other than by the actions of sentient beings"[120], including playings of recordings and other machine-like reproductions of the normative sound sequence. Furthermore, Dodd presents a defense of sonicism, claiming that the normativity of musical works comprises only the acoustic properties defined in the score, and not its means of production, such as which instruments are used to play them, or the historical context in which the composition took place:

> […] whether a sound-event counts as a properly formed token of *W* is determined purely by its acoustic qualitative appearance. Nothing else matters. The properties comprising the set ∑ of properties normative within any work *W* are wholly acoustic in character: properties such as *being in 4/4 time, ending with a C minor chord*, and so on.[121]

But even though the philosopher stresses the acoustic character of the works' properties, by defining them as "abstract, fixed, unchanging, and eternally existent entities"[122] he is necessarily restraining those "sonorous" properties to the ones dictated by the composition and expressed in the score. What identifies the work of music are the stable properties defined by the text, excluding any differences that might come about in tokens and contribute to distinguishing them.

This centrality of composition and notation in Dodd's ontological perspective on musical works is clear in the following excerpt:

> A work of music *W* and a work of music *W** are numerically identical if and only if *W* and *W** are acoustically indistinguishable: just in case, that is, they have exactly the same acoustic properties normative within them.[123]

Being "acoustically indistinguishable" is, in Dodd's sense, reduced to the works' identity conditions, found by the composer and expressed in the composition. He makes the point of disregarding the aesthetic properties of tokens, that can (and do) differ from event to event, despite the fact that "the condition that a sound-event must meet to be a properly formed token of a work may, in fact, be quite

[120] Dodd, 2.
[121] Dodd, 201.
[122] Dodd, 36.
[123] Dodd, 202.

permissive and, as a result, allow a good deal of room for the performer to stamp her performance with her own interpretation"[124].

The problem here is the same as in Kivy's ontological outlook into musical works: how big or how small is the "good deal of room" we can allow for the performer's interpretation of the score, that is, a token of the work, to happen? Whether we grant +∞ or -∞ cubic meters of room to performers, their mediation, tokening the musical work, remains distanced from any aesthetic condition and trammeled to the text. The work of music in Platonism is taken for granted because it is independent of any aesthetic condition, rejecting in that way its artistic quality. Moreover, we can question Dodd's "acoustic indistinguishability" criteria by noticing how this sonorous condition he assigns to musical works is, in fact, narrowed down to the mere structural organization of frequencies (notes) and durations (rhythm). Although his sonicism contemplates also, to some extent, the timbral elements of the works' identity, it is inattentive to any other acoustic and aesthetic properties of tokens as ontological constituents.

A further statement made by Dodd, and further expressing this insensitiveness towards music as a performative art, disregards musical practice, and particularly the guild-like communities in which the practice of Western art music takes place, by questioning Stan Godlovitch's sociological arguments regarding the instrumental individuation traits of musical works:

> Godlovitch, it seems to me, makes a convincing case for his sociological account of the values held dear by musical communities. But we need to be clear that such a descriptive account of how music-making communities come to the opinions that they do on matters of instrumentation can in no way support a philosophical thesis concerning the individuation of works of music. That the practice of musicians embodies a commitment to instrumentalism does not entail that this doctrine is correct. To make good this latter thesis, we need to come up with sound philosophical arguments, not a sociology of belief. Merely reporting the beliefs embedded in musical practice does not help us decide whether these beliefs are true.[125]

[124] Dodd, 33.
[125] Dodd, 222.

Dodd's critique of Godlovitch's viewpoint on musical performance[126], a study we will address in the next section, makes it clear that an ontology of music need not and should not be concerned with how music happens in practice, within the musical communities in which it thrives, remaining, thus, detached from its sensuous experience, and accepting, in extreme, technological reproductions of scores[127], written to be played by sentient beings, as instantiating works of written music. Even if we concede that technological reproductions of scores can be musical, technology being an ever-surprising wonder, the normative and identity conditions of the platonic musical work exclude, from the start, any sonorous reality, be it accomplished by performers or by machines.

The philosopher underlines the allowance of Platonist accounts accepting and encouraging the necessary differences in performances, but puts away any possibility of considering their ontological relevance:

> A performance of a piece of music is, most certainly, the result of a two-way relation between performer and the work. A performer does not merely seek to obey the composer's instructions; she necessarily brings something of herself to the piece. Crucially, however, the Platonist can allow for all of this. As we have just noted, the tempo of a performance, the dynamics with which a piece is played, the timbre of its instrumentation, and even aspects of its rhythmic pattern, are usually not precisely determined by the work itself.[128]

He further claims "there is no good reason for supposing musical works to depend for their existence upon performances, playings, or other 'embodiments'"[129], admitting, in a way, that his whole theory could be about never heard musical works, found by composers and registered in scores, and eternally still and silent.

The a-historicity of such perspectives is undeniably problematic in the ontology of works of art in general and of musical (and other performable) works

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[126] Godlovitch, *Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study*.
[127] By "technological reproductions of scores" we are referring to MIDI-like soundings that reproduce every single indication in the musical text, as music notation softwares can do, being, thus, in perfect compliance with the score regarding what text-centered ontological approaches considered that to be, but neglect the performative quality of music written to be played, sung, or conducted. We are, in this sense, not referring either to recordings of live or studio performances nor to electronic music.
[128] Dodd, *Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology*, 141.
[129] Dodd, 142.

in particular. Defending a historically aware ontology of art, Guy Rohrbaugh writes precisely that "this picture of works of art as historical individuals is at odds with certain tendencies in aesthetics to tie the very identity of a work of art to its form"[130], like Dodd's "simple view" and Kivy's "architectonicism". Rohrbaugh criticizes type-token theories about art because they miss the modal and temporal flexibility character of artworks, which he considers fundamental. Besides suggesting that "a general framework which allows for the possibility of change in all artworks is the more powerful one"[131], he highlights the particular relevance of having an aesthetically-driven ontology of repeatable works of art.

The dogmatic views of type-theories cannot accommodate the changing properties of repeatable artworks, and are insensible to the "occurrences" or "embodiments of a work", that according to Rohrbaugh are the "things on which it ontological depends for its continued existence"[132]. The fact that Platonists consider the work of music to be a disembodied entity can be a symptom of the non-collaborative relation between philosophy and music, which can lead both to a feeble philosophy of music, and, as I claimed in the previous chapter, a feeble practice of music. However, R. A. Sharpe advised us to be careful when questioning Platonism and this asymmetrical relation between "the concept of music as articulated by philosophers and the practice of musicians"[133]. Even before Kivy's or Dodd's twenty-first century perspectives, he was writing about the common ideal of a Platonic musical work both in philosophy and in musical practice, and how disregarding that ideal could challenge the practice of written music:

> If the concept of a work of music thus embodies Platonism we may well feel ambivalent about challenging the analysis which embodies it. Although we may feel it fails to accord with other aspects of musical practice and with the way we discuss music, we may feel that the purpose of such a concept is to incorporate an ideal. Undermine it and

[130] Guy Rohrbaugh, "Artworks as Historical Individuals," *European Journal of Philosophy* 11, no. 2 (2003): 178.
[131] Rohrbaugh, 188.
[132] Rohrbaugh, 198.
[133] R. A. Sharpe, "Musical Platonism and Performance: Some Ontological Strains," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 35, no. 1 (1995): 42.

> you may undermine a pillar of the institutions and practices of music-making.[134]

The dominant conventions of training, expertise, and fidelity to the letter sustaining Western art music tradition are, thus, contributing to this common ideal of a flawless musical work that thwarts the ontology of music and constrains musical practice. Both philosophers and musicians, the seconds most prominently when dedicated to *Newer Music*, focus on the stable identity conditions of musical works even if acknowledging the means of performance as ontological participants. Such is the case of Levinson's perspective, which objects against sound-structuralist standpoints, and suggests a more complex understanding regarding works of music.

Levinson proposes that an adequate account of musical works should satisfy some other requirements beyond the mere sound-structure of Kivy and Dodd's "simple Platonism". He suggests, therefore, that *creatability*, *individuation*, and *performance means* must be considered, and depicts the musical work as an "S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-*t*"[135]. This means that works of music are created by composers (X), at a specific time (*t*), their sound and performance means structures (S/PM) being determined both by the compositional activity and the "conventions of notational interpretation assumed to be operative at the time of composition"[136]. But although he considers that "musical works must be such that specific means of performance or sound production are integral to them"[137], Levinson still pins the way to perform the sound structures determined by composers to the creative compositional activity.

The composer is thus considered, in Levinson's account, the creator of musical works, as opposed to more rigid type-token theories that believe the type to be eternal, not creatable. The *creatability* requirement states that "musical works must be such that they do *not* exist prior to the composer's compositional activity, but are *brought into* existence by that activity"[138]. In this way, and even

[134] Sharpe, 42.
[135] Jerrold Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is," in *Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 79.
[136] Levinson, 74.
[137] Levinson, 78.
[138] Levinson, 68.

though the philosopher underlines the importance of performance means when considering works of written music, the creativity of the performers' activity does not participate in those works' existence. Levinson's consideration of performance in his ontology of musical works is, hence, merely apparent, and a more careful look into his words makes it clear:

> To regard performing means as essential to musical works is to maintain that the sound structure of a work cannot be divorced from the instruments and voices through which that structure is fixed, and regarded as the work itself. The strongest reason why it cannot be so divorced is that the aesthetic content of a musical work is determined not only by its sound structure, and not only by its musico-historical context, but also in part by the actual means of production chosen for making that structure audible.[139]

While the philosopher highlights the fact that the aesthetic content of a musical work is determined by more than its sound structure and historical context, by mentioning the *chosen* means of production he is putting aside any performative means that are not determined by the composer in the score.

Ontological misconceptions in musical Platonism are closely tied to this obsession with the score and the very distinction between work and the performative event. Even though Levinson's view is more sensitive to performance than others, he still differentiates the work from its correct performances (instances), which need to be closely tied to the musical text: "An *instance* of a musical work W is a sound event that conforms *completely* to the sound/performance means structure of W and which exhibits the required connection to the indicative activity wherein W's composer A creates W"[140]. In this view, any performance that does not comply with the sound and performance means structure, and does not exhibit the required connection to the composition, is not considered an instance of the work.

Even in later reconsiderations of his perspective, favoring a unitary view of the musical work "as an indicated *performed-sound* structure" instead of the

[139] Levinson, 75–76.
[140] Levinson, 86.

dual "indicated *sound/performing-means* structure"[141], Levinson is taking the musical work for granted from the moment the composition is created by the composer. Furthermore, we can assume that Levinson takes for granted not only musical works, as abstract entities created by composers, but also their correct performances, since he considers intended compliance with the conjoint sound and performance means structure to be a sufficient condition for an instance of the work to happen. Goodman's "miserable performance" could, thus, fit in Levinson's account of correct performances of musical works, leading us to believe, in my perspective erroneously, that we can have access to musical works by listening to technical or pre-determined performances, which bring to the performative event nothing beyond what is stipulated by the composer and outside the historical context of the time of composition.

The a-historicity of Platonic accounts of the musical work is, then, the major obstacle towards a philosophy of music aware of the aesthetic properties of its subject. But as we will see in the following, this a-historicity undermines not only Platonic perspectives as also any consideration that distinguishes *work* and *performance*. This happens because it is the novelty of and in performance that actualizes and creates the work of music each time anew, granting it a historical character. If the *work* is considered apart from *performance*, the fundamental historicity of artworks is not being taken into account, and consequently, philosophical studies about music are neither helpful to better understand it nor valuable to its practice.

Criticism towards this un-aesthetic thinking about music is plainly put by Saam Trivedi. He writes that

> Just as philosophizing about science must be based on actual scientific practice, aesthetic theorizing about the arts must conform to, and be grounded in, artistic practice if it is to give us any insights about the arts; or else it must give us sufficient reasons to revise artistic practice […][142]

[141] Jerrold Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is, Again," in *Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 261.
[142] Saam Trivedi, "Against Musical Works as Eternal Types," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42, no. 1 (2002): 75.

If we recognize, as sustained in the first chapter of this thesis, that Western art musical practice, and particularly the practice of *Newer Music*, is a hostage of the text-centered approach to musical works, it becomes inevitable for a fruitful philosophical study about music to be not only aware of performance, but also and necessarily to go beyond the deafening work-performance dichotomy.

Stephen Davies' discussions about the authenticity of musical performances are an example of a philosophy that, despite attentive to the problems posed by the practice of written music, excludes the aesthetic relevance of the performative event from ontological considerations by maintaining a distinction between the *work* and its *authentic performances*. Even though he underlines that "there is an important connection between any theory of the ontology of musical works and a specification of the characteristics which must be exhibited in an authentic performance of a musical work"[143], the fact that he considers *work* and *performance* to be separate entities compromises his own ontological account. Moreover, the conditions he specifies and believes to be "jointly sufficient" for performances to be of a specific work are silent with regards to any aesthetic qualities to be met in the performative event:

> I have argued that three conditions must be met if a performance is of a given work: (1) there must be (a suitable degree of) matching between the performance and the work; (2) the performers must intend to follow (most of) the instructions specifying the work in question (though they need know neither what work that is nor who composed it); (3) there must be a robust causal chain from the performance to the work's creation, so that the matching achieved is systematically responsive to the composer's work-determinative decisions.[144]

It is clear that, for Davies, a performance is *of* a work only if meeting the latter's constitutive properties or features, which are determined by the instructions firmed in the composition. Notwithstanding he allows deviations from the score, being much more aware of the inevitable differences between performances of the same composition than, for instance, Goodman's perfect compliance requisites, those deviations and differences in musical practice which

[143] Davies, "The Ontology of Musical Works and the Authenticity of Their Performances," 21.
[144] Davies, *Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration*, 182.

grant us epistemic access to the musical work are not pondered over the fundamental connection with the musical text.

It is precisely this difficulty in addressing the performativity beyond the constraints of the score that Davies disclosures when considering the performers' musical understanding. In 2011, he identified four conditions to be met by performers if they are to understand the musical work: (1) "must understand the work-identifying instructions"[145]; (2) "must know what is unmentioned because it is assumed by the composer as knowledge he shares in common with the musicians who are to perform his work"[146]; (3) "has to know notational rules"[147]; and (4) "needs to know how the performance practice affects the reading of the notation"[148]. By referring to "what is unmentioned" in the score, assumed as common knowledge, and to performance practices affecting the reading of the notation, Davies is at the same time highlighting the importance of going beyond the musical text, towards an understanding of the work by performers, but also making no commitment to philosophically explore such practice. Furthermore, he contradicts himself when writing that the conditions for a performance to be of a specific work need not include the knowledge of what work that is nor who composed it and later assumes the shared knowledge between composer and musicians to be of necessity if performers are to understand the work.

This struggle to verbally explain music is accentuated by Davies, quoting a well-known musicologist, Joseph Kerman, who wrote in 1981 that

> […] a musical community does not maintain its life or continuity by means of books and book-learning. It is transmitted at private lessons not so much by words as by body language, and not so much by precept as by example […] The arcane sign-gesture-and-grunt system by which professionals communicate about interpretation and rehearsals is even less reducible to words or writing. It is not that there is any lack of thought about performance on the part of musicians in the central tradition, then.

[145] Stephen Davies, "Musical Understandings," in *Musical Understandings: And Other Essays on the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 106.
[146] Davies, 106.
[147] Davies, 107.
[148] Davies, 107.

> There is a great deal, but it is not thought of a kind that is readily articulated in words.[149]

The same awareness was presented by Kivy in his thoughts about the purely musical experience:

> […] anyone who takes lessons on an instrument or attends a master class knows full well that although talking of course takes place and verbal descriptions of music are offered by the teacher, very frequently words fail and the teacher finds it easier and far more effective to show rather than tell the nature of a particular passage and how it should be rendered by singing, or playing, or gesturing: in other words by description perhaps, but in a non-verbal way.[150]

The fact that this purely musical thought cannot be readily put into words is most certainly the reason for what we might call a deviation in philosophical studies about music, focusing on subsidiary aspects of Western art music-making which, despite significant in its practice, evade the fundamental question of how musicians create music from the score in performance.

In 1998, Lydia Goehr emphasized that "many theorists have asserted that music has no meaningful existence other than through its sounding out in performance, yet the role of performance, and even more so that of performers, remains surprisingly undertheorized"[151]. More than two decades later, and despite the growing musicological interest in performance practices shown by the emergence of many dedicated journals and research centers, the philosophical questions on the specificity of Western art musical performance remain largely unaddressed, even when performance is contemplated in "higher-level" issues regarding the ontology of musical works. When it comes to considering the differences that performances from the same score comprise, the philosophy of music seems to go no further than acknowledging their inevitability. It is not, one can assume, that philosophers don't listen to music. They most certainly do. But it seems that those differences between one and another performance of the

[149] Joseph Kerman, "The State of Academic Music Criticism," in *On Criticizing Music: Five Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. Kingsley Blake Price (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), 196.
[150] Peter Kivy, *Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 104–5.
[151] Goehr, *The Quest for Voice: On Music, Politics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 134–35.

same composition are deliberately left out of philosophical consideration, more fragrantly when discussing the ontology of musical works, being reduced to matters of taste in a spectrum from good to bad.

This evasion towards addressing the *musical* in performance is even manifest in Carson Mark's study on the nature of artistic performance. The pianist and philosopher, although aware of the intricacies of musical performance and critic of what he calls "mindless playing", states the following:

> […] the differences between two instances might be so great that we no longer say they were mere differences of interpretation, we might say instead that one of the instances did not count as an instance at all. I believe this does occasionally happen, but I do not think there is any way to draw the line precisely. The question is one of taste and judgement, on which people disagree.[152]

What seems odd in this statement is that the question of what, in Mark's terms, counts as an instance of the musical work is left to be answered by the disagreeing judgments of as many people who care to give them, meaning that as long as there is someone to whom compliance with the sound sequence expressed in the composition is enough to instantiate the work, such as Goodman or Dodd, the musical work is happening in performance. As such, even the "mindless playing" that Mark criticizes, an example being "when a pianist attends just to the correctness of the notes or the technical difficulties of the notes while ignoring other aspects of the music, such as the emotional or expressive content"[153], could be said to instantiate the work of music.

Such unconformity between the philosopher's perspective about what makes music happen in performance, thoughtfully developed and considered in his study, which underlines the importance of mapping the emotions and expressions as movement, as well as the intentional action of playing (or singing, or conduction) to an audience, and his non-commitment to drawing a line separating performances that instantiate the work from performances that do not is, we believe, linked to the same ontological misconceptions we have been

[152] Thomas Carson Mark, *Motion, Emotion, and Love: The Nature of Artistic Performance* (Chicago: Gia Publications, 2012), 11.
[153] Mark, 98.

revising. It is the same platonic view disconnecting *work* and *performance* that undermines Mark's fine philosophical considerations and inhibits him from firmly drawing that line. His even more elaborate division between *work*, *instance*, *performance*, and *interpretation*, dismantles the musical work (and the works of any performing art) into a fixed, soundless object, to which three subsidiary entities must accommodate. In this way, he proposes that the *work of performing art* "is a musical composition, a dance or a play. It is not a physical object, and therefore cannot be directly perceived"[154]; an *instance* is "a series of sounds, or a series of movements, or movements together with speeches, that meet the requirements of the work performed"[155]; a *performance* is "a series of intentional actions that produces an instance of a work of performing art"[156]; and *interpretations* are "the ways in which instances can differ one from another while remaining instances of the same work"[157].

Mark's proposal towards an understanding of how does music come into being in performance is, otherwise, quite sensitive to the role of performers. Being an experienced pianist, he advises

> […] the performer must examine the work in a direct and personal way, using the feelings and emotions he discovers in himself as a means of perceiving the work. In the course of learning a work of music, I produce sounds with particular qualities, which I appraise as attentively as I can. Is that sound beautiful or harsh, loud or soft? What is its emotional quality? The emotional quality of a sound depends partly on what went before and what follows after.[158]

Furthermore, he highlights two fundamental tasks the performer has to fulfill: "1) to produce an instance of the work and 2) to develop an interpretation, that is, to decide exactly how he wants the work to go, and to verify that the instance he produces does realize his intended interpretation"[159]. This conjoint intentional action, necessarily addressed to an audience, is according to Mark the main

[154] Mark, 204.
[155] Mark, 204.
[156] Mark, 204.
[157] Mark, 204.
[158] Mark, 135.
[159] Mark, 18.

ingredient for a successful performance: “In performance, the vital intention is the one that actually generates the movement, moment to moment, and *that* intention, which amounts to a decision what exactly to do, is formed together with the execution of the movement.”[160]

In the third part of this thesis, we will put forward a philosophical perspective about musical performance that comes close to Mark’s intentional claims, shunning, nevertheless, from his fragmented outlook into works of music, as well as from the ontological reification it comprises. It is this very reification, as well as the refraining from considering the sonorous and aesthetic properties as ontological constituents of musical works in the viewpoints we revised, that led some criticism to appear towards the ontological question altogether. We will look, in the following, into a few skeptic perspectives that emerged as a response to the growing debate around the ontology of Western art music and its focus on the fixed, inaudible, musical work.

One of the most sonorous positions is Aaron Ridley’s, who wrote in 2003 that

> […] a serious philosophical engagement with music is orthogonal to, and may well in fact be impeded by, the pursuit of ontological issues, and, in particular, that any attempt to specify the conditions of a work’s identity must, from the perspective of musical aesthetics, be absolutely worthless.[161]

He followed this skepticism towards musical ontology further in his book *The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations*[162], sustaining that it cannot “assist in the perspicuous framing of evaluative questions”[163] that emerge when we listen to particular performances. The problem with ontologies of music, he states, is that they are mostly concerned with questions of identity between work and performance, centered on the later “matching” the former’s content, and failing even to rise the more relevant aesthetic question of whether a performance is

[160] Mark, 229.
[161] Aaron Ridley, “Against Musical Ontology,” *Journal of Philosophy* 100, no. 4 (2003): 203.
[162] Aaron Ridley, *The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004).
[163] Ridley, 118.

worth listening to. Furthermore, he underlines that "evaluative questions [about musical performance] get skewed if one insists on doing one's ontology first"[164].

Ridley's arguments rely on the fact that we experience works of music by experiencing or giving performances of them, "a process of discovery", he underlines, "that may well have no determinate end"[165], our primary concern being aesthetic or evaluative ("whether a given rendition is any good"[166]). Since the ontological perspectives he criticizes are focused on finding the conditions that identify the work and must be met by different performances, those conditions not only fail to be specific to any particular performance but remain also stagnated in a virtual space with no aesthetic consequences. The philosopher claims that regarding musical performance "evaluative [or aesthetic] questions are what matter and are what comes first, and […] ontological speculation is, at bottom, nothing more than irrelevant philosophizing"[167].

Although Ridley's criticism aligns with the one we have been addressing towards ontologies of music that appear to ignore the aesthetic and sonorous qualities, as well as the differences in musical performances, his discarding of the whole ontological issue seems not only excessive, as also unchallenging. In other words, Ridley chooses the easy way out of the problem he so attentively signaled, denying the possibility for thinking differently about musical works. Our perspective leads us to think that the reason for this difficulty in Ridley's struggle with ontology is that he is still pinned, as are the ontologies he castoffs, to the work-performance dichotomy. Additionally, we might argue that his position against musical ontology is, in this way, entailed in the same ontological misconceptions he criticizes. This becomes clear when he writes the following:

> I have nowhere, in effect or otherwise, claimed or assumed that works are identical too (some? all?) faithful performances of them, and nor can I see why anyone would want to. All I have argued is that performances can show us things about works; and that requires nothing more than the thought that (some) performances are interpretations *of* works – not, I

[164] Ridley, 127.
[165] Ridley, 120.
[166] Ridley, 113.
[167] Ridley, 129.

> surmise, a proposition likely to provoke a storm of protest, and certainly not one that involves or presupposes (or should prompt) the slightest flicker of ontological reflection.[168]

To think of performances as interpretations *of* works might not cause a storm of protest but, as we have been arguing, it contributes to the misguided ontology of inaudible musical works and, consequently, to a withdrawal from the philosophical questions on what makes music happen in performance. Moreover, this misguided dichotomy between work and interpretation surely encourages some ontological questioning if one is aimed at considering works of music not as abstract entities, apart from the world of perception, but as concrete happenings.

Kania's response to Ridley supports our defense of musical ontology, even though he doesn't seem to commit to an understanding of works of music as concrete entities. He writes that "much of what Ridley says *does* imply some substantive ontological presuppositions, and certainly prompts ontological reflection in those predisposed to such reflection"[169]. But Ridley's presuppositions perpetuate the difficulties in developing an ontology of artworks that accommodates their changing character, particularly with regards to the so-called repeatable or multiple ones, such as works of music, theatre, dance or literature, which are tied to what David Davies, in its turn, terms "the problem of variability". This means that such an ontology, based on the assumption that musical works are distinct from musical performances, must "explain the range of acceptable variation in artistically relevant properties"[170] for an instance to be considerer of a specific work.

The same difficulties are put forward in Amie L. Thomasson's revision and critique of the ontology of art. Regarding multiple artworks, she states that "it seems we at least need a different view of the ontological status of repeatable works of art, such as works of music and literature. Since they are not easily

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[168] Ridley, 125.
[169] Andrew Kania, "Piece for the End of Time: In Defense of Musical Ontology," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48, no. 1 (2008): 70.
[170] David Davies, "Locating the Performable Musical Work in Practice: A Non-Platonist Interpretation of the 'Classical Paradigm,'" in *Virtual Works Actual Things: Essays in Music Ontology*, ed. Paulo de Assis (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2018), 50.

identifiable with individual physical objects, these have often been considered abstract entities"[171]. Besides putting into question attempts to finding a unified ontological status shared by all artworks, sustaining that "What is the ontology of the work of art?" is an "ill-formed and unanswerable"[172] question, she highlights that "even if we divide it into a number of more specific, answerable questions […], answering these properly may require reaching outside the bounds of traditional philosophical category bifurcation (such as the real and ideal, the material and the mental), and broadening our category system altogether"[173].

Works of music ought then to be considered in a broader way, unoppressed by traditional modes of thinking about the unchanging artwork if one is to make their ontology not only truthful to their changing aesthetic qualities but also valuable to their practice and evaluation. Thomasson stresses that "it shouldn't be a surprise that those working against the background of traditional category systems have not found suitable ways of classifying works of music, literature and the like"[174]. We believe this to be true regarding the ontological perspectives we have been revising, including Ridley's skepticism and rejection of musical ontology. His interrogation of "How, exactly, is a convincing ontological backdrop supposed to lens perspicuity to evaluative questions?"[175] can never be answered if one remains a hostage of the work-performance dichotomy.

Another critic of traditional musical ontology, with a particular focus on the fundamentalist debate, is Christopher Bartel. In 2011 he argued that

> […] the current debate over musical ontology has been developed under the assumption that *musical works* should be at the center of our evaluative practices, and […] an interest in the aesthetics of music would be better served by a view that places *musical performance* at the center of our concerns instead.[176]

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[171] Amie Thomasson, "Debates about the Ontology of Art: What Are We Doing Here?," *Philosophy Compass* 1 (2006): 246.
[172] Thomasson, 253.
[173] Thomasson, 253.
[174] Thomasson, 253–54.
[175] Ridley, *The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations*, 117.
[176] Christopher Bartel, "Music Without Metaphysics?," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 51, no. 4 (2011): 386.

Although he seems, still, to be pinned to the work-performance distinction, his criticism towards the lack of consideration of musical practice in philosophical thought should be regarded, as well as is his recommendation for fruitfully investigating the fundamental ontological questions posed by musical works. “If the fundamentalist debate is relevant to the evaluation of musical performance”, he states, “this needs to be argued for, and the burden of proof rests on the defender of the fundamentalist debate”[177]. In a later experimental study focused on the role of intuitions in the ontology of music, Bartel pursued this criticism further by putting the platonic argument of the intuitiveness to distinguish between work and performance into question:

> One source of our intuitions is our understanding of musical practice. But musical practice is messy. When we seek to describe it, we must adjudicate between conflicting practices; and at the point where we must adjudicate some conflict, the intuitions that we draw from cannot be those that are reflective of our understanding of musical practice. If musical practice is inconsistent, then our intuitions should be as well.[178]

From this, we can grasp the importance of an ontology of music aware of the many times conflicting differences that musical practice and performance necessarily bring to the musical event, an inquiry that has been recently addressed within the field of artistic research[179]. The focus of one such recent publications is precisely a critique of philosophical perspectives about works of music, particularly within the analytic tradition, for being inconsiderate of artistic practices:

> The fundamental questions of the diverse music ontologies assume the existence of identifiable and stabilized musical works (be it *abstracta* or *concreta*), of uncorrupted subjects capable of immaculately

[177] Bartel, 388.
[178] Christopher Bartel, “The Ontology of Musical Works and the Role of Intuitions: An Experimental Study,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 26 (2018): 364, https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12247.
[179] Artistic practice as research is a field that has been gaining academic attention for the last two decades. At least since 2005, the Orpheus Instituut, in Ghent, Belgium, is invested in promoting such research, with a particular focus in music. In 2010, the Society for Artistic Research, in Amsterdam, Netherlands, was created and has also, since then, been promoting international conferences, publications, and providing a searchable repository for artistic research. More recently, in 2017, the platform IMPAR, in Aveiro, Portugal, has dynamized meetings, publications, and artistic creation under the same expanding field of investigating the arts, and music in particular.

> apprehending them, and of a transparent link between a work's written codification and its sonic manifestation in performance. They do not take into account the energetic, intensive conditions and processes of their coming into being, nor the intricacies of their transmission throughout time and history.[180]

Furthermore, Paulo de Assis sustains the same claims we did in the first chapter about the impact that ontological conceptions have on musical practice and performance:

> The way one defines what counts as a work established profound constraints on what is considered "acceptable" and "unacceptable", as "possible" and "impossible", what is allowed and what is forbidden, thus providing the musical market with precise instruments of survey and control. Therefore, ontological judgements, which are a priori judgements, do have empirical consequences – at least in the empirical works of music performance.[181]

Within the philosophy of music, Caterina Moruzzi's Musical Stage Theory (MST) is a recent ontological proposal challenging the notion of musical works as taken by traditional philosophical thought. She promotes a work-as-performance perspective, stating that the musical work exists only in performance, being connected by a repeatability-relation to other performances. The components of this privileged relation between performances are a causal connection with the act of composition, the performer's intentions to play that performance, and a sufficient degree of similarity. Regarding similarity, this sufficient degree "requires that all suitable R-related performances share at least certain aspects of a sonic (harmonic, rhythmic, and melodic) profile"[182], but the philosopher makes it clear that any details remain negotiable, "since their specification is not an exclusive burden of MST"[183].

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[180] Paulo de Assis, "Virtual Works - Actual Things," in *Virtual Works Actual Things: Essays in Music Ontology*, ed. Paulo de Assis (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2018), 24.
[181] Paulo de Assis, ed., *Virtual Works Actual Things: Essays in Music Ontology* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2018), 17.
[182] Caterina Moruzzi, "Every Performance Is a Stage: Musical Stage Theory as a Novel Account for the Ontology of Musical Works," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 76, no. 3 (2018): 244.
[183] Moruzzi, 344.

As put by Moruzzi, “Musical Stage Theory accounts for the commonsensical commitment to the idea that we should be able to have direct epistemological grasp of musical works”[184], answering both to the skepticism regarding musical ontology, and to the questions of repeatability that sustain type-token theories. In the same way, we will be proposing a work-as-performance ontological perspective, although considering more thoroughly the details left out by Musical Stage Theory, regarding the similarities between performances from the same score and highlighting also their differences. For us to contribute towards a musical practice that is not inhibited by traditional immaculate and sterile ideas of what a musical work is, such a fundamentally different of looking into it is necessary; one that is compatible with the novelty brought each time by performance in the event of music. Before attempting that endeavor in the next chapter, we will finally address the more recent philosophical literature specific of musical performance and revise its merits and limitations so that we can, in the third and final part of this thesis, develop a philosophical approach contributing to better musical practice, and particularly to a better way of performing *Newer Music*.

[184] Moruzzi, 342.

2.3. Philosophies of Musical Performance

Philosophical studies on musical performance are a somewhat new topic within the also recent specific dedication of philosophers to the subject of music. We could say that it was not until the publication of Eduard Hanslick's *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*[185], in 1854, that a more focused attention on the singularity of music started to grow, although it is parlous to propose a definitive turning point in these types of issue, with such a light overlook into the questions that are always involved in the complex process of change. Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, it was notorious the increasing number of published books and articles about music, and this reality grew exponentially during the twentieth century. Stephen Davies, however, narrows this growing interest in the philosophy of music to the last fifty years, underlining the work of Kivy in the 1970s as a motivator of subsequent debate, and highlighting the fact that it was not until the 1990s that a broader consideration of questions related to technology, recording, popular music, improvisation, and performance took place[186].

Despite this recent broadening of philosophical interest, the bibliographic corpus dedicated to the performance of music is still today quite sparse, with few studies committed to a thorough investigation, and most of them being short commentaries or approaches to the subject. This might be because musical performance is, without a doubt, an intricate subject to explore, even more, if the explorer must do it from the listeners perspective, without the practical knowledge that performers have, which, as we've seen, seems to be so difficult to put into words. Theodor W. Adorno's *Zu einer Theorie der musikalischen Reproduktion: Aufzeichnungen, ein Entwurf und zwei Schemata*[187] is an example of a failed

[185] Eduard Hanslick, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (Leipzig: Rudolf Weigel, 1854).
[186] Stephen Davies, "Music," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[187] Theodor W. Adorno, *Zu Einer Theorie Der Musikalischen Reproduktion: Aufzeichnungen, Ein Entwurf Und Zwei Schemata*, ed. Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001).

twentieth-century attempt of a Theory of Musical Performance, published posthumously as a series of notes and drafts of what would be such a theory[188].

In this section, we will review the more recent literature on musical performance, which, as we have earlier pointed out, is mostly considered in the philosophy of music within the so-called "higher-level ontological issues". This implies that, in philosophical thought, musical performance comes typically after the fundamental ontological questions about the musical work are settled, and it must accommodate to those settlements, whichever they are. Kania suggests that within these higher-level questions "the issue of 'authentic performance' […] is perhaps the most discussed ontological issue, of interest to philosophers, musicologists, musicians, and audiences alike"[189]. It is easy to relate this interest, that became more palpable by the end of the twentieth century, with the emergence of the practice-based musicological studies on the performance of early music, commonly called Historically Informed Performance (HIP) movements, which from the 1960s on have been discussing and putting into practice what they defend to be the authentic way of playing and singing written music from the past[190]. Much of this musicological debate started to be around the instruments used and the performance practices musicians should employ when reading old scores, but it expanded further into philosophical discussions, gaining more significance after the publication of Kivy's book, *Authenticities: Philosophical Reflections on Musical Performance*[191], in 1995.

Although the specific questions that opened the authenticity debate are of no relevance to the performance of *Newer Music*, since the instruments and practices are synchronous with the compositions, or at least do not present as great disruptions as playing Bach on the piano might be considered to present, we will look in this section to a few perspectives on the subject that can,

[188] For a brief outlook into Adorno's proposals towards a Philosophy of Musical Performance see Margarida Neves, "Deux Airs for Flute Solo: A Musical Reading of Fernando Lopes-Graça through Theodor W. Adorno's Philosophy of Music," *ÍMPAR - Online Journal for Artistic Research* 3, no. 1 (2019): 24–36.
[189] Kania, "The Philosophy of Music."
[190] For a more comprehensive look into such field research on early music, developed by musicians and academics during the twentieth century, see Haskell, "Early Music."
[191] Peter Kivy, *Authenticities: Philosophical Reflections on Musical Performance* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995).

nevertheless, be noteworthy when searching for a philosophical contribution towards a theory of musical performance. We will focus, after, on several proposals made by philosophers in the last decades around the particular questions that the performance of Western art music prompts. It is important to note that most, if not all, of these studies, stand on the same dichotomic perspective that we have been criticizing, opposing *work* and *performance*. Different terminology, such as *interpretation*, *instance*, or *rendering* is also used to refer to what is, or is part of, the performative event as we understand it.

The first significant acknowledgment about authenticity in musical performance is that there can be different ways in which a performance is authentic. In the above-mentioned book, Kivy suggests the relevance of considering at least four different types of authenticity, three of them closely tied to the score, and one regarding the performer. The first is "authenticity as intention", meaning that the performance should be faithful to the intentions expressed by the composer in the score; the second is "authenticity as sound", requiring a faithfulness to the sound of the performance during the composer's lifetime; the third is "authenticity as practice", with a faithfulness to the performance practice of the composer's lifetime as requisite; and the fourth is the "performer's authenticity" or the "other's authenticity", presenting an "autonomous, sincere, self-originating, original, an expression of the performer rather than of someone the performer is aping"[192].

Kivy stresses the impossibility of attaining all of these authenticities at once. He, furthermore, supports there can be a plurality of "authentic" practices, and that "there is no a priori road to the best performance"[193]. Nevertheless, Kivy seems to defend what he calls "reasons of the ear" as better advocates of authenticity than those proposed by the HIP movements, even though he states from the beginning to be merely trying to establish "the groundwork for future dialogue, among musicians and philosophers together"[194], forewarning that "of

[192] Kivy, 6.
[193] Kivy, xiii.
[194] Kivy, xiii.

conclusions, then, there will be none, if by 'conclusions' we mean a systematic philosophy of musical performance, authentic or otherwise"[195].

Even if no conclusions arise from Kivy's study, the "reasons of the ear" he fearlessly evokes against historic authenticity, seem, for us, to open the philosophical discussion to include performers and the decisions they must make so that music can happen in performance. The "reasons of the ear" are first and foremost the reasons of the performers' ears, and the "other's authenticity" is, in our perspective, the only authenticity that can respond to those reasons. Being "authentic" in performance should primarily mean that music, and not merely a reproduction of a determined sequence of sounds, is happening. But this brings to the table the questions related to compliance between *performance* and *work*, impossible to evade if one is tangled in such dichotomy.

This is the standpoint of David Davies' reflections on the subject. Similarly to Kivy, he distinguishes between three types of historic authenticity in musical performance: 1. "authenticity defined in terms of the composer's intentions"; 2. "authenticity defined in terms of the sound of the work"; and 3. "authenticity defined in terms of performance means". Even if not considering the "performer's authenticity", proposed by Kivy, to play any part if the performance is to be historically authentic, Davies acknowledges its possibility and "aesthetic payoff", remaining nevertheless skeptic towards the value of such performance in contributing to our understanding of the *work* in question:

> While authenticity in musical performance is usually a matter of being true to the work, authenticity can also be construed in terms of the performer's performing the work in a way that is *true to herself*. The kinds of constraints placed upon performers by the demand that they be true to the work might be thought to militate against "personal" authenticity in performance, and thereby to threaten a central value in our appreciation of performances of performable works.[196]

The demands and requirements posed by the *work*, that should be met by a performance aiming to be true to that work, Davies also notes, depend "upon

[195] Kivy, xiii.
[196] David Davies, *Philosophy of Performing Arts* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 74.

what we take the work itself to be"[197]. Since Davies account of the performable work states that it is "the action of prescribing certain things for correct performance"[198], meaning in the case of musical works that it is the action of the composer creating the composition, it is not surprising that the "performer's authenticity" is left out of his considerations when searching for a way to be true to the work. But perhaps Davies exclusion of "personal" authenticity in performance, if our understanding of the work as listeners is to remain the least corrupted, is a bit to easily put forward. A collaboration between the performer and the composition is, after all, implicit in the actions taken by composers who, we can assume, wish their compositional practice to have an aesthetic outcome in performance.

The same, in our perspective, insufficient requirements for authenticity in performance are Levinson's *instrumentalist* claims regarding early music. He states that

> A performance matching the *sound* of an ideal contemporary (and thus, presumably, authentic) is not authentic unless this match is brought about through the offices of the *same performance means or instrumental forces* as were prescribed in the original score (or other composition-fixing vehicle of a composer's determinations). And one reason this is so is that if this is not done, crucial aesthetic properties of the musical work are defeated […].[199]

Although we could agree that some aesthetic properties of the musical work might be defeated by changing the instrumentation and the performance means prescribed in the composition, this being the single point Levinson is trying to make in his short essay about authenticity and performance means, we cannot assume that this is all there is with regards to the aesthetic properties of the musical work. As Paul Thom points out,

> Doing what is required by the work's determinative prescriptions does not mean doing nothing else. In particular, it does not exclude the

[197] Davies, 73.
[198] Davies, 43.
[199] Jerrold Levinson, "Authentic Performance and Performance Means," in *Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 394–95.

> practice of performative interpretation whereby performers bring to their realization of the work their own individual ways of executing what the work prescribes, or their own ways of supplementing what the work prescribes, without coming into conflict with the work's requirements.[200]

Most of the questions around the authenticity debate never make it to this point, presumably because centered in the performance of older music, mostly written with a less discriminative notation, and for instruments that are no longer standardly used. This ambiguity and a-synchrony between composition and practice is, however, not the case in *Newer Music*. If we are, then, to ascertain anything from discussions about authenticity that can be of relevance towards a philosophical approach on the performance of this *Newer Music*, we must focus on the acknowledged importance of the individual ways in which performers bring works anew in each performative event, be this called "performer's authenticity", "personal authenticity", or simply, as we will see further on, "musicianship".

Let us now revise some of the more relevant and recent philosophical investigations on musical performance, starting by the already mentioned *Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study*, published in 1998 by Stan Godlovitch. In this study, the philosopher proposes "an idealized model of the complete performance which comprises a complex network of relations linking together musicians, musical activities, works, listeners, and performance communities"[201]. As we have seen, Godlovitch is thinking about musical performance within the Western art tradition, the same that concern us in this thesis and that we briefly presented in the first chapter. He is, thus, aiming to explain which components and interactive features are of necessity for a "fully successful and exemplary performance"[202] of written music, underlining the ritual settings associated with this practice, as well as the regulatory powers and hierarchical structure of the performance practice community in this tradition.

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[200] Paul Thom, "Authentic Performance Practice," in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, ed. Andrew Kania and Theodore Gracyk (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 93.
[201] Godlovitch, *Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study*, 1.
[202] Godlovitch, 12.

In the same way we have been alerting against philosophical approaches that focus on the musical work as an abstract entity, Godlovitch starts by denouncing such work-centered perspectives for considering music a disembodied circumstance, silenced by the text in the sense that the performative event is considered to be subsidiary:

> Performance can become inadvertently minimized in focused approaches by assigning to it a merely subservient role or neglecting its influence altogether. Work-centered accounts may treat performance purely functionally as merely one means to reveal the work in sound, thus reducing it to a kind of messenger mediating between composer and listener. More formal accounts of works may portray performances as simply token instances of the work type while underestimating the significant fact that works massively underdetermine their performances. Listener-based accounts may leave the impression that the immediate cause of the experienced sound is incidental both to its expressive qualities and to a full musical appreciation of it. Such accounts often treat musical sound as a purely disembodied phenomenon, a private sensuous array for the auditor – however informed the listener about the context of creation of the work. We may open up such tightly framed perspectives by reminding ourselves of the near platitude that music is a performing art, an attribution which is surely central to musical tradition.[203]

Even if it is platitudinous to acknowledge music as a performing art, this centrality of performance in Western art music, as we have argued in the first chapter, has been corrupted in the last century, favoring text-centered approaches not only in the literary disciplines of History, Musicology, and Philosophy, but also in the effective musical practices and performances. “Modern performers”, Taruskin wrote in 1995, “seem to regard their performances as texts rather than acts, and to prepare for them with the same goal as present-day textual editors: to clear away accretions”[204].

The regulatory force of the musical text over performance practices cannot, thus, be ignored. In this respect, although Godlovitch writes about what

[203] Godlovitch, 3.
[204] Richard Taruskin, “Text and Act,” in *Text and Act: Essays on Music and Performance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 71.

he calls the “constraint-model”, pondering both the external constraints imposed by the work, such as pitch, rhythm, and instrumentation and the performer’s internal or interpretative constraints, of which he merely acknowledges the existence, his proposed model of musical performance, as we will see, takes for granted the fundamental musicianship performers must necessarily exercise if they are to go beyond those work-constraints, not considering that those very constraints imposed by a text-centered tradition onto performers can and do have a pronounced impact on performance practices. This is the unwieldy cost of musical literacy, developed from the first notations of music and responsible for the great tradition and artistry of Western art music that, otherwise, would not exist. “We seem to have paid a heavy price indeed”, as Taruskin points out, “for the literacy that sets Western musical culture so much apart and makes its past available in the first place, if the text must be so venerated”[205].

Godlovitch’s model does not, however, openly venerate the musical text. He is particularly concerned with the performative event as an intentionally filled ritual, complying to a few critical constituents, and is focused on the performer-listener relation, devaluing the traditional performer-composer relation that seems to regulate text-centered approaches. The critical constituents of performance proposed by the philosopher are divided into *sound sequence*, a “temporally-bounded ordered set of sounds which fall under a physical-acoustical description involving a transmission medium, sound waves, and wave qualities like frequency and amplitude”[206], and *musical agency*, meaning that “musical performances are activities brought about by human agents with certain abilities and with certain intentions about their activities and beneficiaries”[207].

The *sound sequence* constituent of a performance is, then, that which is repeatable in different performances from the same score. It is because this *sound sequence* is fairly similar from one performance to another that we can identify these different performances as being of the same composition, or, in work-performance dichotomic perspectives, of the same work. As for *musical*

[205] Taruskin, 72.
[206] Godlovitch, *Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study*, 13–14.
[207] Godlovitch, 15.

agency, and since for Godlovitch complying with the "physical-acoustical description" in the score is manifestly insufficient for a successful performance, the philosopher determines that four aspects are of relevance: *causation*, *intention*, *skill*, and *intended audiences*. Each of these aspects, which we will look into in the following, refines the proposed model to exclude mechanical renderings of the sound sequence by machines, bad-intended, feeble, or unskilled realizations, and presentations that fail to be other-directed. It is within these aspects that the essential diversity of musical performance, a fundamental feature in the ontology we will be developing later, can be taken into account.

Causation means that a performance must be the result of an action undertook by one or more agents. In Godlovitch's proposal, the agent that causes a performance of written music must be a human being. For a sound-making device to be considered the cause of a musical performance, it must meet the condition of programming its own rendition, a requirement that is, at least for now, impossible to attain with regards to written music. But even if future developments grant this possibility, *causation* remains the place of individuation, in the sense that different agents will necessarily present different performances from the same score, and that even the same agent cannot present the same performance in different occasions. The even-like character of performance is closely tied to the actions taken at each time and causing it to happen. This is why the philosopher states that "performance points both to its origin and purpose"[208].

By *intention*, Godlovitch is referring to the necessity that performances be deliberate actions, not "involuntary like sneezes, nor accidental or inadvertent"[209]. This means that performers must go beyond the preparatory stages of musical practice, which involve the thin plans of conforming to the sound sequence, if they are to present something musically interesting. Even though the planning of performance can range from "microscopic details" to "rough-hewn notions of the overall effect"[210], they "must have some notion about the desired outcome, some

[208] Godlovitch, 15.
[209] Godlovitch, 16.
[210] Godlovitch, 17.

relatively determinate conception of their intended sound"[211]. Performance intentions are, thus, personal and individualized, meeting the performers' creation and achievement standards. But many external regulations or constraints are also implicit in these standards, as Godlovitch promptly notes, flowing "from the performer's regard for the listener, the work being performed and its performance traditions, the performer's immediate performance community, and the formal rituals and institutions of performance like the recital, concert tour, conservatory juries and so on"[212].

Skill relates closely both to the *causational* and *intentional* aspects of *musical agency* in performance. It is the "consistently reliable ability to cause sound to match one's intentions"[213]. The requirement for *skill* in performance grants that musicians can predict, even if not infallibly, the likelihood of their success in fulfilling their intentions. "If players chronically lacked confidence in their power to realize on call a musical plan in sound", Godlovitch points out, "few would perform"[214]. This might be another reason for the lack of sympathy from musicians towards complex, detailed, and technically demanding *Newer Music* compositions, since they require greater and different skills from performers trained within the canonical repertoire.

The last aspect the philosopher identifies as necessary in *musical agency* and constituent of his model of musical performance is that of an *intended audience*. Performances must be "other-directed", "as purposive activities, their *telos* is to be experienced by those for whom the performer prepares them"[215]. Performer-centered activities, such as rehearsals, recreational practice, or exploratory sight-reading cannot, thus, be confused with performances, since they lack this fundamental relational element. Moreover, Godlovitch accentuates later the importance of this relation between performers and audience, writing that the model he proposes "implies that whereas performers have no categorical obligation to the composers of the works they deploy (for example, to do exactly

[211] Godlovitch, 17.
[212] Godlovitch, 18.
[213] Godlovitch, 18.
[214] Godlovitch, 18.
[215] Godlovitch, 28.

as the composer bids in score), they have certain categorical obligations to their listeners"[216].

These four aspects of *musical agency*, together with the *sound sequence* explicit in the musical text, are, then, the primary constituents of Godlovitch's model of an exemplary performance within Western art music. But for a performance to be considered such in this tradition, as the philosopher's extended knowledge about the subject leads him to conclude, a few other general structural conditions must be met. He advances these conditions as related to performance integrity, discriminating between primary and secondary integrity factors. Further on, and within his dichotomic perspective of works as separate entities from performances, Godlovitch examines the tense relations that emerge between the two in Western art musical practice.

Performance integrity is linked to several types of continuity that grant performances "their characteristically formal, ritualized, and ceremonial quality"[217]. As such, the primary integrity factors acknowledged by Godlovitch include *work continuity*, meaning that there should be a complete presentation of what is determined in the score as being the work, *temporal continuity*, indicating a necessity of an unbroken presentation of what is prescribed by the composition, and *personnel continuity*, stipulating that it must be presented by the same performer or group of performers throughout. Secondary integrity factors are the *listener continuity*, requiring that a performance be presented to the same audience throughout, *sensory continuity*, entailing that it must be aurally available in its entirety to, at least, one listener from that audience, and *interpretive continuity*, meaning that it "must exhibit appropriate interpretative consistency"[218].

The "dominance relations" between musical works and performances Godlovitch specifies are tangled in this highly ritualized practice of music, in which so many conditions must be met by musicians and audiences so that the event can be considered successful. He finds that the subordination perspective on musical performances, which enables such dominance relations, over-values the

[216] Godlovitch, 50.
[217] Godlovitch, 35.
[218] Godlovitch, 38.

work as an autonomous and fixed entity and "underplays the fact that notated works massively underdetermine whatever emerges in performance"[219]. It is this underdetermination that creates several tensions in performances, in which musicians assume two conflicting obligations: to present the work accurately, and, at the same time, in a creative, interesting, and novel way. But since the conventional standard for accurately presenting a notated musical work within Western art music's performance communities is fidelity to the score, "the prime virtue being note-perfect execution"[220], a compulsive concern with this fidelity can (and does) emerge in musical practice, detracting musicians from musicality. "This is reflected", Godlovitch notes, "in complaints about awesome technical playing which comes off as mechanical"[221].

The same conflict between performer and work was identified by Goehr in perspectives that stress "the vehicular and structured Apollonian ideal of a performance *qua* performance-of-a-work"[222]. She calls this "the perfect performance of music", "bound up with the solemn, sacred, serious, and sublime aesthetic of the concert hall and with the *Werktreue* ideal central to the development of music as a fine art"[223]. In such practice, performers are strained trying to settle the tension between the polarized notions of "a *free* interpretation and of an *unfree* rendition in full compliance with the composer's commands"[224]. As Godlovitch, Goehr suggests that for a performance to be "the open, social, and spontaneous Dionysian ideal of musicianship"[225] it must have an aesthetic reaching, an emphasis on progression, accentuating the actions involved in its full context, and "asserting its uniqueness as a transfiguring, ephemeral event that [is] fully socially, audibly, and visibly situated"[226].

Goehr's aim is not, however, to propose a theory of musical performance. She is merely addressing the conflicting ideals of performance perfection that

[219] Godlovitch, 82.
[220] Godlovitch, 84.
[221] Godlovitch, 85.
[222] Goehr, *The Quest for Voice: On Music, Politics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 134.
[223] Goehr, 140.
[224] Goehr, 146.
[225] Goehr, 134.
[226] Goehr, 164.

dwell in Western art musical practices. Godlovitch's intention is, in this sense, more ambitious. But although he strikingly identifies the regulative influence of text-centered practices as adverse to music-making, stating that "performance instances extend beyond passively, accurately and obediently matching sounds to notated works"[227], and although he insists that "a performance is an exceptional instance of a work only if it involves actively making creatively novel instances"[228], the model he proposes not only does not break the ontological assumption that works are distinct from performances but advances also very little with regards to how that active and intentional creativity can be accounted as musical. In this way, and despite Godlovitch's outstanding efforts to enhance musical performance within philosophical discussions about music, his purpose falls short in determining what musicians must specifically do, beyond the vague notions of creativity and novelty, to transform the inert musical text into live music.

The same shortage is evident in Thom's considerations on *The Musician as Interpreter*[229]. As Godlovitch and Goehr, he emphasizes the fact that the work both explicitly and implicitly prescribes and proscribes certain actions to those who aim to interpret it, leaving, however, a range of actions neither prescribed nor proscribed. It is within this last range of actions that musicians can and must exercise creativity:

> Any interpretation has an object – that of which it is an interpretation. The interpretation is made by an interpreter. What is made must in some way exceed the object; because of this, interpretation involves creativity. The interpretation cannot simply reproduce the object, but it does represent the object, and because of this fact, interpretation requires fidelity to the object.[230]

Additionally, he sustains that genuine interpretation can be attained between the extremes of an "overdone fidelity, in the form of mere repetition or literal transcription"[231], and "mere willful departures from the object"[232].

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[227] Godlovitch, *Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study*, 89.
[228] Godlovitch, 89.
[229] Paul Thom, *The Musician As Interpreter* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).
[230] Thom, 72–73.
[231] Thom, 76.
[232] Thom, 76.

Thom's focus on interpretation is, however, compromised by his notion of the work as a "relatively abstract entity"[233]. The object that interpretation must be faithful to is, then, not the score, but the work itself. As such, musicians as interpreters and creative agents are kept hostage of the finished and already fixed musical work, their creativity being nothing more than a secondary and subsidiary element to the "real" creation of composers. "Performers", Thom notes, "are caught up in a dialectic that invites them to display themselves as creative artists while calling on them to respect the work they claim to be realizing"[234]. Furthermore, and even if we ignore this ontologically conditioned creativity, Thom's study does no go beyond the plain statements recognizing that a balance between such creativity and the prescriptions and proscriptions of the work must be met in performance, failing, as Godlovitch, to clearly answer the specific questions related to turning the score into music.

A different route towards the discovering of musicianship is taken by Jane O'Dea. In *Virtue or Virtuosity?: Explorations in the Ethics of Musical Performance*[235], she focuses on the ethical questions faced by performers when interpreting scores, applying the Aristotelian model of ethics to musical performance. To some extent, her concerns align with Godlovitch's, in the same way denouncing purely mechanical renderings of what is specified in scores. O'Dea criticizes the many institutions in music education of Western tradition for being "almost totally oriented toward technical instruction", and endorsing "little time to further understanding and resolution of the ethical challenges musical performance presents"[236]. Her focus is on the responsibility of musicians in developing a sonorous understanding of musical works, that is, an "aural understanding" or, she also calls it, an "understanding simpliciter", which consists in "a non-propositional mode of understanding that involves tracing or following aurally the patterns, processes and relationships of musical compositions"[237].

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[233] Thom, 90.
[234] Thom, 90.
[235] Jane O'Dea, *Virtue or Virtuosity? Explorations in the Ethics of Musical Performance* (London: Greenwood Press, 2000).
[236] O'Dea, xi.
[237] O'Dea, 11.

Regarding the relationship between the musician and the musical text, O'Dea argues that

> It is the performer's task to go beyond what is only schematically presented in the score. And taking into account what scores of their very nature cannot accommodate – the singular and unique properties of sound sensation – it is her task to particularize what is only generally indicated there. It is her responsibility to exercise imagination and judgement and to select, from among the permissible soundings, one that effectively promotes aural understanding.[238]

In the same way, she suggests that performance traditions that direct musicians in the interpretation of scores "can encourage us to employ only generalized types of sounding"[239], being, therefore, like musical notation and technical skill, insufficient in promoting "aural understanding". What does it mean, then, to go beyond the graphic representation of music in the score, the directrices of performance traditions, and technical skill?

The philosopher develops an answer to this question that centers on the *integrity* of musicians, meaning that a specific kind of authenticity is required in performance:

> Authenticity is usually associated with sincerity. The essential characteristics of sincerity – truthfulness and honesty – are retained in the more complex notion of authenticity. But instead of holding beliefs, attitudes or values "sincerely", authenticity speaks of holding ones that are "truly your own". It implies that your beliefs, values, actions are in some important sense "personally owned" and that they are an expression of your true and honest self.[240]

It is this authenticity or integrity, similar, if not the same, as the "performer's authenticity" we signaled at the beginning of this section, that O'Dea finds of "vital importance in the training of young musicians"[241], and lacking in traditional formal training of Western art music. Only through this integrity can musicians explore and discover each work's commendable features and promote an "aural understanding" of it.

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[238] O'Dea, 14.
[239] O'Dea, 15.
[240] O'Dea, 94.
[241] O'Dea, 105.

O'Dea's proposal is of relevance not only because it insists on the importance of an individuality in performance that goes beyond the instructions, skills, and shared traditions, but also because it underlines aural and non-propositional understanding as the aim of any musical performance. Even though she only briefly describes how this mode of understanding can take place, it is manifest that for music to happen in performance musicians must attain first their own individual understanding of each work.

The last philosophical study on musical performance we will consider in this revision was already mentioned and criticized in the previous section, on the ontology of music. We argued that Mark, in his investigation about the nature of artistic performance, portrays the musical work as a soundless object by determining that *instances*, *performances*, and *interpretations* are separate and subsidiary entities. But, as we have also pointed out, Mark's deliberations on musical performance seem to be particularly attentive to what musicians must do in order to make music happen. Beyond the mentioned mapping of emotions as movement, and the necessary intentional actions governing those particular movements, made moment to moment by musicians in an audience directed manner, Mark points to some important aspects when preparing for performance.

Perhaps the most significant thing musicians must keep in mind in their practice is that "the *concept* of performance includes a relation with an audience"[242]. As such, the many hours they dedicate to individual and solitary training cannot obliviate them of that primordial and fundamental aim, which is to address the music to the ones who want to listen to it. In its turn, addressing the audience requires that musicians make some contribution of their own, for even if Mark considers the musical work to be an abstract entity, that "cannot be perceived by the bodily senses"[243], his deliberations about performance reject the idea that performers are submissive agents:

> If the performer thinks of himself merely as an interpreter who conveys the work of someone else without making any artistic contribution of his own, or if he thinks of himself as being subservient to the composer […],

[242] Mark, *Motion, Emotion, and Love: The Nature of Artistic Performance*, 171.
[243] Mark, 6.

> he may easily come to think that the artistic content of the performance comes exclusively from the composer […].[244]

A different manner in which performers make no artistic contribution of their own, and at the same time do not address the audience, is through mindless playing, singing, or conducting. As an experienced pianist within the Western art tradition, Mark highlights the fact that some common ways of practicing encourage this mindlessness. For instance, "an approach that relies on technical exercises or numerous repetitions of scales and arpeggios can easily become a mindless routine"[245], and here we can grasp the parallel with O'Dea's critique of most institutional formal training of music. "The more a person plays or practices without full attention", Mark continues, "the more mindlessness itself becomes a habit and the more difficulty the person encounters when trying to be absolutely attentive"[246].

Attentiveness is, thus, a performance skill that musicians must practice even when no audience is present. Mark points out that "failure to practice the skills needed in performance creates a gap between practicing and performing: the two become different activities"[247]. But this gap is perhaps inevitable, since the very concept of performance comprises, according to the philosopher, a relationship with an audience. Practicing and performing are necessarily distinct in this sense. However, and even if the presence of an audience can be practiced only through repeated performances for different audiences, it shouldn't be outlandish to assume that music can happen in the practice or rehearsal room, even without such presence. The attentiveness and addressing that must be present in the performance, are and need to be experimented and experienced first in the practice room. Otherwise, it would mean that musicianship in performance was left to the heat of the moment, unattended in preparatory practice, and, as such, not an exercise of decision but of chance, improvisation, or a specific kind of performative expertise.

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[244] Mark, 161.
[245] Mark, 97.
[246] Mark, 97.
[247] Mark, 108.

Plausibly, this has already been the reality in Western art music of previous times, and perhaps it is somewhat in this way that any other music happens to be. But in most recent Western art musical traditions, and accordingly with the philosophical discussions we have been revising, which highlight the necessity of developing a creative understanding of musical works in practice, it shouldn't be the case that such musicianship would be left in its entirety to be met in the performative event in front of an audience. Moreover, we believe that in the particular case of *Newer Music* the development of a musical understanding is far more constrained by the individuality of each composition, in the sense that there are no unifying traits or styles to perform them. If we can find similarities within compositions of the Baroque, Classical, and Romantic eras, the same cannot be said about the diversity that composes *Newer Music*. In this way, to leave musicality to be met by chance in the performance of these divergent compositions would be to condemn those performances to failure.

In the second part of this thesis, we will address three examples of *Newer Music* compositions, presenting and describing the process of preparing them for performance, which includes, amongst many other things, actively searching for musicality and making music even without an audience. Before we present that practical research, carried out over a period of four months, we will propose in the third chapter an ontological perspective of the musical work as performance that we find crucial for a successful practice of *Newer Music*.

Part II: Ontology in Practice

3. Works of Music as Music: Towards Developing a Sentient Ontology

In order to develop a sentient perspective on musical works, one that is aware of the sonorous or audible quality of music and considers the performative event as the core element in music-making, we need, as Thomasson noted, to reach outside the traditional philosophical category systems. An abandonment of the idea of works of music as permanent entities is the first necessary step towards such sentient outlook. If works of music *are* music, then they *are not* when music is not happening, that is, when we are not listening to the sonorous phenomenon we call music. One of the consequences of this perspective is that composers cannot be considered the authors of musical works, even though each of their compositions is a necessary condition for each specific musical work to happen, intermittently, in performances. This is a problematic thing to state, however. Besides being counter-intuitive within the ways we speak about written musical works in the Western art tradition, it also neglects the composer's input created in the composition and hearable in the performance. Composers are, undoubtedly, the authors of the condition of possibility of specific musical works, but cannot be considered the authors of musical works understood as performative events. Besides being inevitably intermittent entities, existing discontinuously only when created by musicians in performance, the nature of musical works is, thus, also one of transitivity. We can never grasp the musical or any performative work in its entirety at once. At least not as in a painting, for instance, when it appears in its wholesomeness in front of our eyes.[248]

In this chapter, we will cultivate some considerations towards an ontology of the musical work as performance, as happening or phenomenon, aided by

[248] We could develop this idea further, and argue that even in the visual, and "a-temporal" arts, as opposed to the temporality in the performative arts, poetry, and literature, the aesthetic experience is doomed to happen in the transitivity of the moments we spend contemplating the object. In front of a painting, we can direct our eyes towards different areas of the composition, analyze details, come closer and further from the picture, and this time we spend with the work of art is the only way we can experience it. In music, this temporality of the aesthetic experience stands bluntly out, and we are led by it through the continuous flow of sounds and silences.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's critique of the dichotomic split between *subject* and *object*, and the ontological reorientation of artistic practices recently proposed by Alessandro Bertinetto. Even though the expression "sentient ontology" can be traditionally considered an oxymoron, we believe the apparent contradiction can add value to the search for a theoretical ground to understand what musical works are. We will start by motivating the notion of works of music as music, addressing some stark definitions of what music is considered to be. We will then ponder on the *stable* and *variable* constituents of a musical work and how they accommodate to such an understanding, reflecting also on the inadequacy and false necessity of establishing a priori identity conditions to be met in performance. Finally, we will dedicate the last section to present a tentative model of the musical work *as* performance, emphasizing what is, nevertheless, still missing in such a perspective.

3.1. Conceptualizing Music

To sustain that works of music are music, and not compositions or idealized non-sonorous entities, I would like to make reference to the plain acknowledgement made by Kania on the idea of "organized sound" as the starting point for any definition of music[249]. In the expanding field of philosophy of music, defining the entity on which the discipline leans has been a present concern and, as such, a few attempts to define music appeared in the last decades, even if other attempts to do it existed at least since Socrates. Although it is not our purpose here to make a thorough revision of the literature regarding the definition of music, we will look into a few recent examples that substantiate its evident and strong connection with sound and with listening.

In the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Levinson states that the efforts to define music usually fall under three perspectives. Music can be described as a "sound-involving activity distinguished by certain cultural or sociological traits", as "sound-involving items, activities and practices that have evolved, historically and reflexively, from certain earlier such items, activities and practices", or "from the producer's point of view, by appeal to distinctive aims or purposes on the part of makers of sound"[250]. In each of these perspectives, it is evident the fundamental presence of sound but also its insufficiency as it is, having to be assembled with something else, whether cultural traits, historical developments, or intents of producers. Levinson's own earlier definition also underlines the significance of the sounding character of music adding to it the requirement of a specific purpose: "Music = df sounds temporally organized by a person for the purpose of enriching or intensifying experience through active engagement (e.g., listening, dancing, performing) with the sounds regarded primarily, or in significant measure, as sounds"[251].

[249] Kania, "The Philosophy of Music."
[250] Jerrold Levinson, "Music, Aesthetics Of," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Routledge, 1998).
[251] Jerrold Levinson, *Music, Art & Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 273.

More recently, Andy Hamilton proposed that instead of determining necessary and sufficient conditions for sounds to be considered music we should look for "salient features", which can be elucidated by jointly contemplating three directions of characterization: "acoustic, aesthetic and acousmatic"[252]. Hamilton accommodates the notion that music is a somewhat vague phenomenon which includes sounds, an aesthetic attitude in the production of those sounds, and an acousmatic experience of detachment between the sounds and the circumstances of their production as prominent features. Similarly, although with a more strict definition, and determining specific necessary conditions, Kania proposed that music is "(1) any event intentionally produced or organized (2) to be heard, and (3) *either* (a) to have some basic musical feature, such as pitch or rhythm, *or* (b) to be listened to for such features"[253].

Highlighting the importance of distinguishing between non-musical and musical sounds when trying to define music, Stephen Davies wrote about this motivation to incorporate "musical features", as Kania does, in definitions of music:

> Trying to define music in terms of the elements of music and the structural features that arise from their combination is perhaps the approach most likely to occur to musicologists and philosophers. The goal is to attempt to isolate specifically musical elements and structural relationships between them that together separate music from all other kinds of sounds.[254]

This determination of specific musical elements or structural relations is also attempted by Vítor Guerreiro, who defines music as "the art of tonal sound" and proposes a broad understanding of "tonal" as "encompassing all organization of sounds into relations of tones"[255].

The fact that music is a sonorous entity seems inescapable in any definition of music, and one might think that this elementary claim should be

[252] Andy Hamilton, *Aesthetics and Music* (London and New York: Continuum, 2007), 46.
[253] Andrew Kania, "Definition," in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, ed. Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (New York: Routledge, 2011), 12.
[254] Stephen Davies, "On Defining Music," *The Monist* 95, no. 4 (2012): 544.
[255] Vítor Guerreiro, *The Art of Tonal Sound: Music as a Social Kind and Natural Kind Activity* (Porto: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, 2019), 7.

sufficient for us to accommodate the certainty that works of music are sounding entities, for how can a work of *x* be different in its defining elements from *x*'s defining elements? But as we have seen, when we think about musical works immersed in the literary tradition of Western art music, the text tends to become the defining quality and the sounding becomes ontologically subsidiary. The countless possibilities of different performances of the same composition are the main reason for their avoidance in most ontological accounts of the musical work. It is a Leibnizian identity condition requiring the ontological essence of musical works to be separated from the multiplicity manifested in varying performances from the same score. In such accounts, as we acknowledged, works of music stand as having only the common properties that different performances share, and further ontological discussion focuses on which common properties to consider as constituents of musical works.

It seems, thus, that the intuitive will to consider music as a sounding entity is not accordant with the ontological discussion over musical works in the Western art tradition. Even the Nominalist perspectives, which consider the work of music to be a collection of concrete performances, fail to accommodate the differences in them that do not perfectly comply with the score, as Kania exemplifies:

> Though many of our claims about musical works may be paraphrasable into claims about sets of possible performances, some seem to make intractable reference to works. For instance, most performances of *The Rite of Spring* – even including the possible ones – include several wrong notes. Thus, it is difficult to imagine how the paraphrase schema will avoid the nonsensical conclusion that *The Rite of Spring* contains several wrong notes. The solution to this problem seems unavailable to the nominalist.[256]

This disaccord is flagrantly linked to the regulative authority conceded to the musical text. It is such authority that leads Kania to consider nonsensical *The Rite of Spring* containing wrong notes. But, as we will see, if we are truly seeking for an understanding of musical works as performance, we must go beyond

[256] Kania, "The Philosophy of Music."

considering them as a bi-product of compositions, and welcome wrong notes into such an understanding.

Even if the common properties performances of the same composition share are regarded not as inaudible structures, but as ones which can be heard, allowing us to identify by ear a particular musical work, it is inevitable that we hear them in and through the differences that comprise the performative event. Moreover, it is necessarily and only in those differences that music can happen, even though it is not guaranteed that it will. To separate *work* and *performance*, considering the first as the definitive entity regardless of what happens in the second, is to neglect thinking about how music is made in performance[257] and avoid confronting the possibility that even if every protocol is followed, and every identity condition complied to, music can still fail to happen in the scheduled event.

Any account of the musical work that misses the differences entrenched, so to speak, in between the written symbols, misses the novelty that music always comprises. The Japanese composer Toru Takemitsu (1930-1996) wrote about this necessary diversity in performance, engrained in the insufficiencies of musical notation:

> One might add that music's real essence is protected by the ambiguities of writing. Grasped in the moment of performance, pitch, rhythm, even loudness are relative. The notation of the score is a boundless symbol of the will toward precision, but is not a recording of the results. The conductor's role as a medium, and this may seem contradictory, is to grasp precisely that ambiguity and to express the desire for constant

[257] Similar arguments have been made in the field of literary studies in relation to reading and interpretation of texts since the 1970s. Reading is seen as a performative event that produces the meaning of the text. See Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). This notion has been extended by feminist criticism, stating that gender is a performative construction. See Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory," *Theatre Journal* 40, no. 4 (1988): 519–31. Another author with relevant insights on the performativity of reading is Johanna Drucker, whose work has been focusing on demonstrating the performative nature of meaning (written texts and typographic structures are seen as constraints and provocations for reading. Her notion of "non-representational approach" suggests that no symbolic code can represent a preexisting entity. As such, the musical work (like the literary work) is presented (not re-presented through its symbolic notation) and it must be performed in order to exist as perceived event. See Johanna Drucker, "Performative Materiality and Theoretical Approaches to Interface," *Digital Humanities Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (2013).

> variety. That is, in a thousand performances he must reveal a thousand different expressions. It is this that gives music that special quality in which a single composition can be repeatedly performed.[258]

It is, thus, only in performance that the musical work can excel through the event's novelty. And it is only by acknowledging the differences, absent in the rigidity of the notation, that we can surpass the rift disconnecting musical ontology from the concrete works of music happening within musical practice.

Our proposal of a sentient ontology of the musical work aims at bridging this gap between philosophy and the practice of written music, encouraging further discussion on how music is created by performers within the innumerable different ways the same score can be presented. This perspective of *works of music as music* is aligned with the work-as-performance perspectives and shares some of their consequences, which we will be addressing in the final section of this chapter. Opposing the most common and previously revised perspectives on the ontology of music, we propose, then, that the musical work encompasses not only those common properties which are present in every performance from the same score, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the differences between each of those performances. In the next section, we will investigate both the common and the diverse properties of musical works, which emerge holistically in the performative event, focusing more briefly on the former, of which so much has been said, and more comprehensively on the later.

[258] Toru Takemitsu, "The Landscape of the Score," in *Confronting Silence: Selected Writings* (Berkeley: Fallen Leaf Press, 1995), 46.

3.2. The Matter of a Musical Work

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the ontology of the musical work within the Western art tradition is strongly held over establishing its identity conditions, pinning them to the finished composition. Whether it is a Platonist perspective that assumes the work as an abstract entity, or a Nominalist one that considers the work to be the class of its compliant performances, the authority of the score seems inevitable to any ontological discussion about written music. Assuming that the identity conditions of a musical work are nothing more than the instructions left by the composer in the score is, however, insufficient for accommodating to our understanding of works of music as music. Such identity conditions of written musical works are surely defined by the compositions, but hardly exhausted by them. Since there can be renderings or mechanical reproductions of such instructions failing to be music, even if perfect compliance is attained, this insufficiency is not only platitudinal but, if not considered in musical practice, it can also be misguiding both for musicians and listeners.

John Dyck points to the fact that "the perfect compliance condition" (PCC) is a necessary one on classical music performance, constituting "a ground for our evaluation of performance"[259]. He, furthermore, highlights the manifestation of such an ideal in classical music pedagogy, and grants that "PCC characterizes contemporary classical music performance"[260], relating to the highly ritualized and skill-oriented construct that Godlovitch identified in Western art music traditions. Within such a paradigm, if we do not assess performance, as listeners or as musicians, beyond the mere compliance with the identity conditions determined in the score, we might be led to think that compliance is all there is for music to happen. Even though we have also pointed out that some philosophers emphasize the need for something more than compliance if the performance is to be of value, the fact that no ontology further explores that

[259] John Dyck, "Perfect Compliance in Musical History and Musical Ontology," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 54, no. 1 (2014): 32.
[260] Dyck, 40.

something more is a sign of the disconnectedness that Trivedi identified in philosophical studies about the arts that are not grounded in artistic practice[261].

Establishing identity conditions tied to the score might, then, be unsuited when considering works of music as performance. Even if it is impossible to deny the score's heavy jurisdiction, those a priori conditions can be considered unnecessary within a practice that is itself already highly regulated, and propels forward closely tied to the letter which is its condition of possibility. In other words, if musical practice and performance in the Western art tradition of written music are already highly regulated by a perfect compliance standard, establishing a priori identity conditions of the musical work, to which the performance must comply, might simply be redundant. Although it is because of these conditions or determinations established by the composer in the score that we can recognize the same work in different performances, their insufficiency when it comes to making music happen cannot, furthermore, grant them the significance of identifying the musical work on their own.

In this sense, an ontology of the musical work as performance must accommodate both the inevitable connection to the score, but also how that connection is presented differently by musicians when performing.[262] The work of music as performance can, then, be understood as having two broad constituents or traits that emerge interconnected and correlatedly in the performative event. We will call these the *stable* and the *variable* traits of the musical work, and examine one and the other in the following. This split we are proposing should, however, not be regarded as a fall into the dichotomy we have been criticizing, which distinguishes between *work* and *performance*. Both the

[261] Trivedi, "Against Musical Works as Eternal Types."

[262] It would be rightful for someone in the audience of our ontological considerations to ask if listeners are cold-heartedly excluded from them, and, if so, are such considerations not weakened by such exclusion. We will have the chance to address this question in the last chapter, and underline how, at the limit, there is always at least one listener in written music being performed: the performer. Even if the way performers listen to the music they are performing might be different from the way listeners do, sitting or standing in the audience, this expectation of being heard is already embedded in the performative musical action. This means that, even if we are focused in this thesis and in our ontological explorations, on the performance of music, our concern is first and foremost with what is hearable, whether by the performers or by other listeners.

stable and the *variable* traits identified here as constituents of the musical work emerge within performance, as the work itself. Moreover, the *stable* traits influence the *variable* traits as much as the contrary is also true. The relevance of making such a distinction is, nevertheless, to underline the important relationship between musicians and scores in the practice of Western art music, enabling further investigation on how such relation can be accommodated in a sentient ontology of the musical work.

3.2.1. Stable Traits

The *stable traits* of the musical work, commonly addressed in ontologies of music as its identifying traits, are what we, in most cases, recognize straightaway as identical in different performances from the same score. They guarantee a strong relation anchoring the work to the composition, and allow us, in the same way as the causal connection that Moruzzi identifies in her Musical Stage Theory, to experience the same work existing intermittently in various performances. The stable traits of the musical work are what enables us to hear "the composer's voice" in the variability of performance. The strong causal link between the work as performance and the composition in Western art written music makes it clear that works of music, in this tradition, are a collaborative action, between composers and performers. Even if it is only in and through performance that musical works are created, such creation starts undoubtedly with the composer's hand. Besides this causal and important link to the act of composition, Moruzzi identifies, as we have seen, two other components within the repeatability-relation between performances that depart from the same musical text. The performer's intention to comply to that text, we have noted previously, is already entrenched in the paradigm of Western art musical practice. The other component identified by Moruzzi is the more problematic "sufficient degree of similarity"[263] between performances, and several reasons can be put forward explaining why this is so.

[263] Moruzzi, "Every Performance Is a Stage: Musical Stage Theory as a Novel Account for the Ontology of Musical Works," 344.

One of the problems in determining more precisely the sufficient degree of similarity between performances from the same score was already pointed out earlier. It necessarily relates to the questions of compliance debated in philosophical discussions on the ontology of Western art music, and, as such, diverges between more closed perspectives of perfect compliance with the score, like Goodman's or Dodd's, and more open ones. Davies's, for instance, thinks "a performance can be of a work although it contains wrong notes. Such a performance instances the work imperfectly, but instances it nonetheless"[264]. Levinson has a similar approach proposing a more fine distinction between "instance" and "performance", and having a closed perfect compliance perspective for the former, and a more open one for the later. Aligned with his view of the musical work, he sustains that "an instance of a musical work W is a sound event that conforms *completely* to the sound/performance means structure of W and which exhibits the required connection to the indicative activity wherein W's composer A creates W"[265]. "A performance of the musical work W", on the other hand, "is a sound event that is *intended* to instantiate W […] and which *succeeds to a reasonable degree*"[266].

As mentioned, it is the difficulty in precising this reasonable degree of deviation from the score and other performances that enables the "problem of variability" within ontological reflections about repeatable artworks. Besides the complications in determining how much is sufficient similarity between performances, another problem that arises is that there can be a high degree of similarity between two performances complying perfectly with the score, one of them being filled with musicality and the other being a completely mechanical rendering, that is, one of them presenting the work-as-performance, but not the other. An additional problematic example is that of indeterminate music, or of compositions that envision different performances, such as ones that instruct musicians to determine how they are going to arrange the formal structure of the

[264] Davies, *Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration*, 158.
[265] Jerrold Levinson, *Music, Art and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 86.
[266] Levinson, 86.

piece. All of the above encourage us to think that the similarity criterion is fallible in establishing a connection between performances from the same score and justifying the relation between such performances as works.

A different measure is sometimes put forward as a way to explain how much deviation from the score is too much deviation. The recognizability criteria provides that a certain degree of nonconformity from the score is allowed if the work can still be recognized by the audience[267]. But this measure is far too centered both on the well-known canonical repertoire and the experienced listeners, lacking consideration of first-time listeners as well as first performances of any music. It seems counterintuitive to think that works of music only happen after and not including first performances and listenings, and so, recognizability is also a fragile standard for us to determine the degree of *stability* that must be exercised in a performance from a specific score.

Aware of these unfruitful attempts to determine how much compliance with the musical text must performers exercise, and aware also of the insufficiency of full compliance in making music happen, we propose understanding the *stable traits* of musical works in a much looser manner. Since neither a rigorous compliance with such *stability* is guarantee of the work as performance, nor failure to comply meticulously assures the absence of it[268], and furthermore, since the *stable traits* of musical works can only come forward in performance through the *variability* of the event, it must be within this *variability* of performance that the music in the musical work emerges. The *stable traits* of works of music cannot, thus, be held responsible for the music to happen in performance, even though they are the condition of possibility of any written musical work, and even though

[267] See, for instance, Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is, Again."

[268] In a very elucidative article praising wrong notes in performance, Sudip Bose presents the case of pianist Vladimir Horowitz's "glaring mistakes" on the famous recital on Carnegie Hall on May 9, 1965. He compares the two recordings released, the first, issued in LP that same year, in which the errors were edited, and the second, the unedited CD version issued only in 2003. Bose writes "[…] once I compared this unexpurgated CD to the older, doctored version, I had no doubt that the recent release is the superior one". He suggests that even if perfection can astonish us, mistakes are more comforting, and that Horowitz's "finger slips humanized the performance". In *Sudip Bose, "In Praise of Flubs," The American Scholar, 2004.*

they have an impact on how easily or how hardly the performers make the music[269].

Moreover, since performance practices of written Western art music already carry the encumbrance of fidelity to the text, in a highly regulated tradition, it seems redundant and unnecessary to an ontology of musical works as performance to ascertain *a priori* conditions to be met by musicians regarding the *stable traits* of such musical works. We suggest, then, that these traits be considered simply a pivot, pinning the work, in its many eventual occurrences, to the composition. Further elaboration on how this link between performance and score is met can only be discussed within the *variability* of the musical event, since, we repeat ourselves, it is only through this *variability* that the *stable traits* of the musical work emerge. We will address, in the following, those *variable traits* that constitute also, and importantly, the musical work as performance, and within which music can emerge. The relation between score and performance will be pondered in this *variability*, aiming to understand how can musicians transform the rigidity of the letter into the pliability of music.

3.2.2. Variable Traits

The *variable traits* of the musical work are those which are usually, as we have seen, merely referred to in higher level ontological issues regarding musical performance. These are the artistically or aesthetic relevant properties that Ridley identified as absent in ontologies of music, without which the musical work does not come into being, and within which it can emerge each time anew. The common references to what musicians do in performance, beyond what is prescribed by the score, are usually vague or ambiguous. Robert Martin, for instance, writes that “the central objects of attention when performers speak of studying, interpreting, and performing musical works are the instructions they

[269] This difference between an “easy” and a “hard” score is not merely a matter of virtuosistic writing. A composition can have a tremendous number of notes and intricate rhythms to play or sing and still be “easy”, or at least comfortable, for a determinate instrument or voice. The opposite is also true, for the simplest of compositions can be made music by the musician with tremendous difficulties attached. A clear difference can be sensed by performers between composers who write with or without the knowledge of the instrument.

must bring to life"[270]. Another example is Lawrence Kramer stating that "the score is a mode of writing, an inscription. Like all inscriptions, it is 'literal' […]. But like all inscriptions, too, it remains inert until and unless its reproduction exceeds the strictly literal"[271]. And yet another, by José A. Bowen stating that "a composer can establish a *particular* musical work by defining specific restrictions (most often pitch and relative durations) but the nuances – everything that is not absolutely specified by the score – are still varied by the performer"[272].

All these claims share the vagueness that "bring to life", "exceed the strictly literal", and "varying nuances" carry when trying to put that into practice. The same vagueness is present in Schuller's already mentioned appeal to a link "between the mechanical details of a composition and that which emerges between the lines"[273] in musical performance of contemporary music, as in Davies noting that

> […] there is a gap between performance and the features that constitute the work the performance is of. […] Provided the performer is in control of the sounds she produces, it is she who decides how to bridge this gap. Where the composer's instructions are indefinite, she must choose what is to be sounded or how it is to be done.[274]

Levinson's account of a "performative interpretation" (PI), as opposed to a "critical interpretation", is another example. He states that a performative interpretation is "a considered way of playing a piece of music, involving highly specific determinations of all the defining features of the piece as given by the score and its associated conventions of reading"[275]. Furthermore, he adds that "a PI, though it need not be backed by a critical analysis or justification, must at least represent a set of choices to play a certain way, with some awareness of, if not

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[270] Robert L. Martin, "Musical Works in the World of Performers and Listeners," in *The Interpretation of Music*, ed. Michael Krausz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 125.
[271] Lawrence Kramer, *Interpreting Music* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), 263.
[272] Bowen, "The History of Remembered Innovation: Tradition and Its Role in the Relationship between Musical Works and Their Performances," 148.
[273] Schuller, "American Performance and New Music," 4.
[274] Stephen Davies, "The Multiple Interpretability of Musical Works," in *Is There a Single Right Interpretation?*, ed. Michael Krausz (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 238.
[275] Jerrold Levinson, *The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 63.

active experimentation with, the alternatives available, and not merely a set of realizations of the sonic properties constitutive of the work"[276].

Despite being true, these and other acknowledgements we reviewed within the ontological literature shed no light on what makes music happen in performance, besides the fact that it is not merely a matter of realizing the score's instructions, and moreover have no bearing in most ontologies of music. Within the philosophical studies on musical performance, also discussed in the previous chapter, the same resistance is palpable in the underexplored ideas of personal authenticity, creativity, and integrity. As we have seen, determining what musicians must do to create music from the inert musical text is difficult to put into words. Even performance manuals struggle when trying to grasp such pragmatic matters, as Stewart Gordon notes writing that "the ability to turn in a successful performance stubbornly resists codification"[277].

Recent research in musicology is perhaps more concerned about and aware of the intricacies and the diversity of musical performance than the philosophy of music in general. Cook, for instance, makes a grand defense of *music as performance* in his book *Beyond the Score*. About the specificity of musical performance, he writes that

> musicians do not execute the score as a series of instructions, in a way a computer plays a MIDI file. In performance every one of these parameters [notes, durations, dynamics, timbres, tempo, …] is given a specific nuanced value, and the crucial point is that these values are negotiated between performers.[278]

Nevertheless, his book attempts primarily to underline the particular status of music as a performative activity, putting traditional text-centered musicology into question. Although exploring and analyzing thoroughly the "nuanced values" in particular performances, as well as focusing on the performative body of such particular performances, *Beyond the Score* is not aimed to answer the more

[276] Levinson, 74.
[277] Stewart Gordon, *Mastering the Art of Performance: A Primer for Musicians* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 7.
[278] Cook, *Beyond the Score: Music as Performance*, 235.

general philosophical inquiry of how one factually goes beyond the score to make music.

Within philosophical investigations, what appears to be an insufficiency of words when writing or speaking about the fundamental traits of music that must be met in performance for the musical work to be instantiated, leading some not to adventure beyond the veil of the ineffable, might just be a case of insufficiency of thought on the subject matter, or at least a forgetfulness of the material, craft-like character of music. And it is not surprising that most philosophers, not being musicians, should concentrate their philosophical thinking about music on the listener's perspective and experience, embedded in our listening culture, and distracted from the minutiae of the professionalized performance and from the relationship between musician and score from which music, and each particular musical work, might emerge. In this sense, however, they take music for granted, just as musicians do if they fail to consider what needs to be done in performance beyond complying to the text. It is precisely this dangerous and barren path for musical practice, particularly the practice of *Newer Music*, we are trying to deviate from, towards a performative approach to written musical works.

The problem with considering *variability* in an ontology of the musical work is that there are indefinitely many ways of differently making the same work happen in performance. This is probably the reason for the philosophical attention on what is common among performances from the same score, even if philosophers, as listeners, acknowledge the differences. To take the indefinite many ways the same work can happen differently in performance and accommodate them as ontological constituents might seem not only an impossible task, but at the same time counterintuitive for traditional ontology. But since the musical work as performance does not come into being without the *variable* artistically and aesthetically relevant properties of the event, even though they are different each time and in each performance, those properties are necessary features of the work. It is not merely the *possibility* of different and in-principle indefinitely numerous properties that is part of the musical work. It is the difference itself that is a necessary feature.

Aiming to incorporate such *difference* and *variability* as constituents of the musical work, I propose taking a step back and contemplating the possibility of shifting the focus from the *quality* of those differences to their *quantity* or *intensity*. In other words, instead of concentrating on *how* musicians fill, in different ways, the gap between composition and music in performance, I propose considering *how much* they fill that gap. In this sense, for music to happen it is not so much a matter of *how* the *stable traits* of the musical work are nuanced in performance, but *if,* and *how much* and consistently they are nuanced throughout the performance. This means that the musical work cannot happen, and therefore we cannot listen to it, if *variety* isn't linking the *stability* signified in the score. The extreme case of absence of such variety would be a MIDI playing, as exemplified by Cook, in which only the digital information in the composition is being presented, unnuanced and in such a way it could be continually repeated with no differences.

More than managing the conflict between *fidelity* and *creativity*, *stability* and *variety*, musicians must, then, work towards letting the *stable traits* of the work emerge within the essential *variability* that brings the dead letter of the composition to the everchanging life of the musical event. The Polish pianist Krystian Zimerman spoke about this when commenting on working with the conductor Leonard Bernstein:

> He is perhaps the person who has been most successful in integrating his life into his music. Everything he experiences is immediately reflected in the evening's concert. I was able to play Brahm's Second Piano Concerto in B flat Major with him seven times during a European tour. It was amazing. Each concert was different. The experiences, the little things that influence our lives could immediately be found in the music. Here I rate the honesty of his message highest of all. He is a person who makes music with total honesty. And as a result of this honesty I have the feeling that each work, whether a symphony by Haydn or Mahler, sounds as if it has just been written.[279]

[279] Humphrey Burton, *Teachers and Teaching: An Autobiographic Essay by Leonard Bernstein* (USA: UNITEL, 1988).

In the third and final part of this thesis, we will explore and develop this idea of a constant variability as requisite for the musical work to be created anew each time in performance. Looking ahead, we would like to suggest that the *variable traits* of any written musical work are hinted at by the spaces between what is notated in the score, and that it is the filling of those *blanks*, moment to moment, by the performers, that can make music happen. The "honesty" Zimerman speaks about, and the integration of one's life into one's music in performance is, then, this constant presence of the musician's input, bridging the gap between the score and the music that is being created in the moment.

How this bridge is built and created in performance by musicians is precisely what we are trying to find. To arrive at some fruitful conclusions, however, we must first craft the ontological groundwork of music *as* performance. A *sentient* ontology of music, that is. One that is an alternative to the rigidity and sterility of text-centered perspectives that overshadow not only the philosophy of music but also musical practice, and acknowledges the historical and eventive character of musical works. In the next section we will explore this apparent oxymoron of a *sentient* ontology aided by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's onto-phenomenology of the *sensible-sentient*, in which the body is the original intentionality, the place where any phenomenon, in its appearing, can encounter a first dynamic, active, and motor expression. Alessandro Bertinetto's more recent defense of an ontological (trans)formability of musical works will also assist our considerations. This will lead us to contemplate some consequences on our theoretical and practical understanding of musical works, and account for the positive impact it may have on musical practice. Before going inside the practice room, in the next chapter, unveiling the path taken by musicians when preparing for performance, and examining the reliability of our theoretical proposal while addressing some particular questions regarding *Newer Music*, we will reflect on the weaknesses that our *sentient* perspective of musical works still faces, and understand what is still not answered by this first ontological draft.

3.3. The Flesh of Music

Attempting to describe the musical work as performance, and understanding it as the performative event it is, does not go against our "pre-theoretic intuitions", as Kania suggested. If our intuitions are truly pre-theoretic, works of music necessarily are entities that we listen to, play, sing, or conduct, and not something we conceptualize after the written compositions. Such non-sentient conceptualization is what Merleau-Ponty's onto-phenomenology questions in other ontologies that are unaware of the "brute or savage being" that stands against the "sedimented-ontic being"[280]. In *The Visible and the Invisible*, the French philosopher advises us to redefine *subject* and *object* so that we are able to pose the ontological problem existing in the relation between them.

> If it is true that as soon as philosophy declares itself to be reflection or coincidence it prejudges what it will find, then once again it must recommence everything, reject the instruments reflection and intuition had provided themselves, and install itself in a locus where they have not yet been distinguished, in experiences that have not yet been "worked over", that offer us all at once, pell-mell, both "subject" and "object", both existence and essence, and hence give philosophy resources to redefine them.[281]

Merleau-Ponty is rethinking the *being* from a phenomenological perspective, through the body both as sensible and sentient. "It is the body and it alone", he writes, "that can bring us to the things themselves, which are themselves not flat beings but beings of depth, inaccessible to a subject that would survey them from above […]"[282]. It is through the body that we experience "the melody of life", as called by Ponty, in his posthumously published notes on the concept of *nature*, and explained by Luís A. Umbelino: "[…] to be-in-the-world as a body is not just to be localized in a measurable point in space, but to be

[280] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 220.
[281] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 130.
[282] Merleau-Ponty, 136.

active, to be in connection to a space of involvement, that is to say, to have a familiar link to a *milieu* of belonging […]"[283].

Even if in the posthumous *The Visible and the Invisible* the French philosopher is considering *beingness* in general, we can frame his thoughts into our specific concerns about the musical work as performance, and its necessary openness to the difference that performance, as action in connection to a space of involvement, always comprises. Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor wrote that "the phenomenological tradition and Merleau-Ponty in particular discover subjects to be an opening onto, and an engagement with, their surroundings"[284]. This ontological openness to what is brought to being in the performative event is fundamental if we are to understand what musical works are within the relations we establish with them, as Evans and Lawlor point out:

> All attempts, therefore, to isolate and examine subjects initially apart from this engagement, however useful otherwise, are a distortion, a crucial misunderstanding, of these subjects. Similarly, to sever objects from their relationship to subjects, to consider them as fully determinate entities, is to ignore that they are present to us as reflecting our hold upon them (their "immanence") as well as their inexhaustibility in relation to our perception and thoughts about them (their "transcendence").[285]

To think of musical works as abstract objects is, then, to deny their musical quality. It is an absurd and misguided way of initiating philosophical considerations about music, and bears negative consequences, as we have been claiming, particularly to the practice of *Newer Music*. The *flesh* of music, to freely use Ponty's notion[286], happens only in the facticity of the performative event, within the intertwining between the stability of minute and memorized motor gestures, and the variability of the performative here-and-now. It is such bodily

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[283] Luís António Umbelino, "The Melody of Life. Merleau-Ponty, Reader of Jacob von Uexküll," *Investigaciones Fenomenológicas: Anuario de La Sociedad Española de Fenomenología, Razón y Vida* 4, no. I (2013): 352.
[284] Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor, "The Value of Flesh: Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy and the Modernism/Postmodernism Debate," in *Chiasms*, ed. Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), 3.
[285] Evans and Lawlor, 3.
[286] "The flesh is in this sense an "element" of Being. Not a fact or a sum of facts, and yet adherent to *location* and to the *now*. Much more: the inauguration of the *where* and the *when*, the possibility and exigency for the fact; in a word: facticity, what makes the fact be a fact." in Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 139–40.

facticity of music that encourages us to use Ponty's expression, since we are concerned precisely with how music comes to be, through the body, in performance. Aligned with Moruzzi's Musical Stage Theory, we propose, then, that musical works exist only when performed, as happenings or events to which we have access. This grants them a particular ontological status of intermittence, meaning that each musical work begins with performance and ceases to exist when the performance is over. A consequence of such a perspective is that the same musical work can exist in different places at the same time, performed in different ways by different musicians. It can exist every week, every other day. Or it can exist only once, in its premiere, never to happen again.

Our way of speaking about musical works in the Western art tradition, however, can give us the impression they are permanent and static entities. This happens mostly because the majority of us talk about works of music as created by composers, disregarding the fact that we can only have access to them in and through performances. Different scenarios are laid in other musical traditions. In pop music, for instance, the opposite is true, and credit is given to performers, songwriters and producers being commonly disregarded in favor of the aesthetic experience of music and performance. Perhaps this happens because in pop music there is a looser relationship between the musical text and what can be conveyed in performance. But even in performer-centered traditions, and even when defending an account that focuses on the *variability* inherent to music as performance, the ontology of musical works cannot escape the *stability* rooting each particular work to the composition. It is such *stability* that bequests us to speak of musical works the way we do, ignoring its insufficiency in grasping the everchanging character of musical works. It is also such *stability* that leads us to talk about specific works of music, as if they were there, when we are not listening to them.

The composition, directing towards the *stable traits* of a specific musical work, is indisputably the first condition for it to exist in performance, linking all the possible future performances from a particular score to the same starting point. Composers create, thus, this condition of possibility for as many musical works as the compositions they write down on paper. But only performers, who study

and prepare themselves to play, sing, or conduct what is written in those scores can make musical works happen, *creating* them in performance. Even if different compositions, and different composers, could be considered more dexterous than others, easing or aggravating the performers' work, it is always and only in performance, through the musicians' actions, that the musical work is created and authored.

Perhaps the notion of "creation", when thinking about musical works, could be probed here. When we write that musical works are created by musicians on stage, subtracting composers from the picture, we are acknowledging that, within our understanding of the musical work as performance, there is no musical work if the composition is never performed. On the other hand, there is a chance the musical work might be, even if it was never composed. Such is the case, at least in part, for instance, of the majorly improvised album *Giant Steps* by John Coltrane, each song being created while being recorded. In this example, however, it might be considered that the composition is being created at the same time it is being performed, while in Western art written tradition composing and performing music have become two markedly distinct activities. Undoubtedly, both composing and performing music are creative activities, but the first is not creating the musical work as performance unless it is simultaneous with the second.

If this is true, what sense is then, however, for someone analyzing a score to say, for instance, that there is a mistake in a specific measure?[287] Or even for a listener to say "I detest the third movement of that symphony", if in neither case, analyzing or affirming, the music is being heard? The answer to this can be found in Saint Augustine's considerations about time, in book eleven of the *Confessions*, which will also help us in the last chapter, and is rooted both in *memory* and *expectation*. It is the memory of the third movement of that symphony, as well as the memory of other different compositions heard and analyzed, that can lead us to make considerations about music, and about

[287] An example is the already cited D'Alvarenga, writing about the *lapsus calami* in eighteenth century collections of scores for keyboard music that can be found in the Portuguese National Library, in D'Alvarenga, "A Música Também é Escrita."

specific works of music, even if we are not listening to them at the moment. At the same time, there is an expectation, perhaps rooted itself in the memories we have about music, that can lead us to believe a specific note in a composition is mistaken, or that any other performance of the third movement of that symphony we detest will be as detestable as the ones we have heard.

To consider works of music as events, in the sense they only exist in the present event of performance, is also to inevitably accommodate their historicity as essential. Musical works are changing entities, and even if the *stability* that comes from their condition of possibility rests on paper and in the memories of those who have heard them, and even if musicians endorse in the common practice of the day, *variability* is always a requisite. Such *variability* between, for instance, today's and tomorrow's performances of the same composition by the same performers might not be plainly evident to the unaccustomed listener, but it gains a greater status when we compare recordings of the same piece several decades apart. An early recording of Mozart's Jupiter Symphony, in 1913 by the Victor Concert Orchestra conducted by Walter B. Rogers, is manifestly different from a 1953 recording by the Orchestre du Théatre des Champs-Elysées, conducted by Hermann Scherchen, and both these are strikingly distinct from the 2013 recording by the Orchestre des Champs Elysées on period instruments, conducted by Philippe Herreweghe[288]. Even if the ontological *variability* of musical works is not noticed by audiences grounded on perfect compliance evaluation requisites, it must be present for music to be happening. It is because of this constant and necessary *variability* that we are attracted to live performances, or to new recordings of old pieces. It is only within *variability* that the same work can be reinvented and created anew in the present, even if it remains the same in the sense of the memory and the expectation we maintain of it.

Along with the traits of *stability* and *variability* that emerge in the performative event, the musical work as performance is tied also to the ritualistic

[288] We will ignore in this example both the particularities of recordings, when compared to live performances, as also the technological developments that immensely improved the quality of recorded sound throughout the twentieth century.

traditions of Western art music identified by Godlovitch. In such a tradition, performances happen at a designated time, in a designated space, announced to an audience that is informed of the program being performed. The protocol of arriving in the concert venue, quieting with the lights, applauding when musicians enter the stage, listening in silence, and applauding again at the end of each work is rarely disrupted. The structural conditions Godlovitch pointed out as essential in musical performance, regarding *work*, *temporal*, *personnel*, *listener*, *sensory*, and *interpretative* integrity are linked to this ritualized protocol.

But such integrity conditions granting the work's continuity can, nevertheless, be put into question when thinking of the musical work as performance. Although what Godlovitch identifies as *work continuity*, meaning the full presentation of what is indicated in the score, and *temporal continuity*, meaning an unbroken presentation, is expected, as envisaged by the *stable traits* connecting the work to the composition, the other four integrity conditions can be discarded and the work still be presented in performance. These conditions are enforced by tradition and protocol but do not carry any ontological consignment, as Alessandro Bertinetto suggests in his thoughts reorienting musical ontology towards the paradigmatic artistic practice of improvisation. He claims that the ontological identity of musical works depends on, and co-varies with, musical and aesthetic practices and contexts. "Since practices change", he writes, "the identity of musical works is dynamic (in flux)"[289]. If musical works are everchanging entities, historical and open to novelty, any rigidity of tradition is mere circumstance and never essential to what a particular work of music has been, is, or will be.

The ritualized protocol of Western art musical performance is, furthermore, a promoter of the idea that, provided it is followed, the works announced on the program will be experienced by the listeners. As such, and since the protocol is seldom disturbed, the happening of those announced musical works is hardly ever questioned. Ridley, in his quest against musical ontology, highlighted this case: "When was the last time you came away from a performance of a piece of

[289] Alessandro Bertinetto, "Improvisation and Ontology of Art," *Rivista Di Estetica* 73 (2020): 15.

music – live or recorded – seriously wondering whether the performance had been of *it*? My guess is, never."[290] He then took this certainty as a way of justifying the irrelevance of ontological discussions about music, but it is precisely that certainty that we are questioning, not granting the protocol the status of sufficient condition for music to happen. We are, thus, proposing that it is at least plausible that we come away from a performance wondering if we listened to music, since even if perfect compliance with the score and a strict following of the protocol did happen, it is not granted that the necessary condition for the work to be created in that performance were attained. It is precisely this necessary condition for music to be that we are searching for, even if we have not yet gathered the practical details to discuss it in this chapter.

Developing a sentient ontology of musical works as performance implies, thus, being aware of both the anchoring in the composition and the performative procedures within Western art musical tradition, not letting, however, such awareness to be taken as the whole, or even the fundamental. In the previous section, we argued that music happens only within *variability*, which is neither present in the rigidity of the score nor the stiffness of the performative protocol. A sentient ontology must recognize this *variability* as essential, and the performer's continued input throughout the performance as the way to achieve such constant *variability*, creating the musical work in the present. The impact of such a perspective might change the way we listen to music, hopefully making us more aware of the novelty in each musical work and less focused on compliance requisites. As important, and of much more relevance for our purposes in this thesis, a sentient ontology of the musical work as performance might have a positive and significant impact on musical practice, and particularly in the practice of *Newer Music*. If musicians consider the musical work to be what they create in performance, their relationship with the score in the practice room becomes one of discovery, instead of decoding, and their actions become driven by themselves and that discovery, instead of being mere re-actions to the instructions on paper.

[290] Ridley, *The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations*, 113.

Bertinetto highlights this "transformative dynamic 'structure'"[291], which typifies musical improvisation, as exemplary for all artistic practice and most blatantly for music, due to the performative nature of its reality. He writes that "only as performed, musical works are empirically and concretely real as music that is perceived and experienced"[292], rejecting both "the view of musical works as metaphysically fixed entities with invariant identities"[293] and "the repeatability of the musical work without transformation of identity"[294]. It is the same perspective that Merleau- Ponty reinforces in *L'Oeil et L'Esprit*, writing about this historical and constantly change-driven ontology of every artwork. He writes that

> As for the history of works of art, in any case, if they are great, the sense we give to them later on has issued from them. It is the work itself that has opened the perspective from which it appears in another light. It transforms *itself* and *becomes* what follows; the interminable interpretations to which it is *legitimately* susceptible change it only into itself.[295]

In the same way, the identity and ontological nature of musical works rely on this dynamic character. The musical work is always a *becoming*, a transformation in itself in and through performance. A sentient ontology of musical works is, thus, defined by the awareness of an active character in music, contrary to the passivity of the sedimented object stagnant in the once-and-for-all idea expressed in the score or in logged traditional practices.

To know a musical work, that is, to understand it, is to admit the changeability of its performativity. It is only through this audible, everchanging flesh that we can access an understanding of what a musical work is. Such an understanding or "know-of" the work, however, is not the type of knowledge we can later express and convey with words. It is sentient, a living knowledge of the music in the moment we listen to it. The musical work does not have an a priori meaning, fixed by the composer in the score and explained or translated by

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[291] Bertinetto, "Improvisation and Ontology of Art," 14.
[292] Bertinetto, 14.
[293] Bertinetto, 14.
[294] Bertinetto, 14.
[295] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," in *The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting*, ed. Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 139.

musicians in performance. Its meaning is performatively created, in a similar way as described by Merleau-Ponty, writing about language and its resemblances with music, both "sustaining a sense by virtue of [their] own arrangement"[296]:

> […] in a sense, to understand a phrase is nothing else than to fully welcome it in its sonorous being, or, as we put it so well, to *hear what it says* (*l'entendre*). The meaning is not on the phrase like the butter on the bread, like a second layer of "psychic reality" spread over the sound: it is the totality of what is said, the integral of all the differentiations of the verbal chain; it is given with the words for those who have ears to hear.[297]

However, even if we uphold an ontological perspective grounded on *variability*, on the improvisational character of artistic practice, a crucial point is still missing. The quest we proposed for this thesis – to find how to make music happen departing from the score – cannot be resolved simply by saying that *difference* and *variability*, are constituents of musical works. Something else must be presented in performance for music to be, otherwise, any sonorous gibberish would fit into our sentient ontology of musical works and that is not the case we wish to promote. Acknowledging *variability* as a fundamental constituent of musical works is, nevertheless, the sufficient ground we need, for now, to enter the practice room and gather some practical knowledge investigating the process of learning musical scores. Such hands-on approach will further help us understand how musicians bridge the gap between the score and the music, towards developing a theoretical model on musical performance in the final part of this thesis.

[296] Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 153.
[297] Merleau-Ponty, 155.

4. Inside the Practice Room: Making Music from Scratches

In this chapter, we will depict the process that musicians go through when preparing for performance. As with the rest of this thesis, we are focused on written music within the Western art tradition, meaning that the score is the point of departure for such a journey. The practice that precedes the performative event of this music, and that is usually inaccessible to audiences, can take many forms, depending on the program being prepared, the number of musicians involved, or the logistics and technical demands of particular scores. In the following, we will dedicate our attention to the specific case of preparing for a solo performance, even though we can acknowledge that group performances necessarily convey different and more complex dynamics of interest to this topic. We are aiming at putting into words the embodied process that happens inside the practice room, the materiality of music being made, so that we can question and develop our inductive ontological proposal. I will present thus, singularly, the way I prepared for a short solo performance as a flute player, aware that different musicians might pursue different strategies and have different methodologies. The project that enabled this hands-on research inside the practice room took place between September 15th, 2019, and January 15th, 2020, at the University of Maryland, and culminated with a solo flute recital I presented at The Clarice Smith Performing Arts Center.

For this four-month research, I selected three *Newer Music* compositions for flute solo, written by different composers and exemplifying, even if in a limited way, the diverse character of such music. The practice sessions happened daily in the facilities of the University of Maryland's School of Music. They had an average duration of two hours with some rest days in between. After each session, I took notes on the challenges faced, as well as on the ways I discovered to surpass them. Such notes can be found on Appendix 2. I also video-recorded several exercise-performances, of each one of the pieces, inside the practice room. These recordings will be referenced in the following footnotes. In the next

sections, after briefly presenting each composer and each composition, we will lean on those collected materials to illustrate the process of creating live music from the very first moment the musician addresses the score, through the mandatory repetition involved in developing and maintaining the specific technical skills each score prescribes, and in going beyond those skills.

Even though learning any piece of written music for performance is a continuous and organic process that cannot be fully captured by formal and analytical divisions such as the one we are proposing in this chapter, my experience in the practice room allowed me to understand that, in any case, three stages are inevitably present if one wants to go from the inert score to the live event of music. Most of the time, the boundaries between addressing the score and repeating the movements required to play, sing or conduct it, or between such repetition and going beyond it, are not clear-cut. Furthermore, each score promotes a unique way for this three-stage process to occur.

Presenting the practical research I carried out with three *Newer Music* compositions by Toru Takemitsu, Jorge Peixinho, and Milton Babbitt, will not only make it clear that different scores invite different approaches when preparing for a performance, in the same way different books by different authors evidently invite different readings, but also that reproducing the instructions left by the composer, even if perfectly complying with the score, is not a sufficient condition for music to happen. It is, thus, essential to go beyond such plain conformity in the practice room and promote the musicianship we are trying to understand in this philosophical investigation. The findings contemplated in the last section of this chapter, as we will have the chance to see, will hint us towards the development of such a philosophical model on musical performance, which shall be the focus of the third and final part of this thesis.

4.1. Takemitsu, Peixinho, and Babbitt

Choosing the compositions to prepare for performance is the first step towards the aimed goal of presenting music to an audience. For this particular research, deciding which scores to select from the vast list of compositions for solo flute was narrowed by the time available to practice them. Three compositions were, thus, selected for a circa thirty minutes long recital. As mentioned, this selection was made from the *Newer Music* repertoire available for flute solo, presenting some of the diversity of this music with compositions by a Portuguese, a U.S. American, and a Japanese composer. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly situate each of these composers and the selected compositions.

4.1.1. *Itinerant* [1989][298]

Toru Takemitsu (1930-1996) was a Japanese composer that became well known in the West for combining Oriental and Western sonorities, both by integrating traditional Japanese instruments into standardized Western ensembles and by exploring and pushing Western instruments to produce non-conventional sounds in their traditional practices. He was, thus, influenced by his Oriental heritage, but also by European and American composers, such as Claude Debussy (1862-1918), Edgard Varèse (1883-1965), Olivier Messiaen (1908-1992), and John Cage (1912-1992). Takemitsu was also a writer, with a few books published on music and the music of his time.

Itinerant[299] was composed to mourn the death of the Japanese-American sculptor Isamu Noguchi (1904-1988), a friend of Takemitsu. It was premiered by Paula Robinson, at the Isamu Noguchi Museum in New York, in 1989, and the score was published in the same year. The piece is around six minutes long. It is fragmented into several short phrases that are separated from each other by

[298] A list of video-recordings of exercise-performances of *Itinerant*, carried out during the practice sessions, is available at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL47ZmuA2FhNXv2NxD7XDD0NJ8_C5GFBC_. The video-recording of the final presentation of *Itinerant* is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Ss_yqCOOtQ&t=1s.

[299] Toru Takemitsu, *Itinerant* (Tokyo: Schott, 1989).

silences of different durations. The score has no time-signature, no measure bars, and is preceded by a set of instructions on how to decode non-standard symbols used by the composer, including different types of fermatas, quarter-tones, and alternative fingerings. Along with the musical text, several indications of such alternative fingerings are presented in order to produce different timbres, trills, and multiphonics.

Itinerant is an overall slow piece, the initial tempo proposed by the composer being the dotted quarter note *circa* thirty beats per minute, followed by the indication "flexible". The textual tempo mark is "Lento Misterioso", an impression facilitated by the constantly changing dynamics, which range from *ppp* to *fff*, and by the already mentioned silences in between phrases. An abrupt change in dynamics, from *f*, *sf* or *sff* to *p*, accompanied by the indication "much air pressure" is sometimes used to simulate the shakuhachi bamboo flute and expand the traditional sonority of the Western flute. This is a well-known and very much played flute piece, several recordings being available both in video and audio format.

4.1.2. *Glosa II* [1992][300]

Jorge Peixinho (1940-1995) was one of the most important Portuguese composers of the twentieth century. He studied and worked abroad with Nono, Stockhausen, and Boulez in the 1960s, learning and exploring the new avantgarde of post-serialism, and developing his own ways of composing and discovering sound. Peixinho was a big promoter of *Newer Music*, a pianist, a conductor, and the founder of the first contemporary music group in Portugal – Grupo de Música Contemporânea de Lisboa – in 1970.

Glosa II[301]*,* for flute solo, was composed in 1992 and dedicated to Carlos Franco[302], who premiered it in January 1995, in Coimbra. It is part of a four-piece

[300] A list of video-recordings of exercise-performances of *Glosa II*, carried out during the practice sessions, is available at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL47ZmuA2FhNUECMqLKGt_IxQaGPTWZE3A. The video-recording of the final presentation of *Glosa II* is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TORCCLhI_10&t=1s.

[301] Jorge Peixinho, *Glosa II (Manuscript)* (Lisboa: PMIC, 1992).

[302] Carlos Franco (1927-2011) was a Portuguese flute player and flute teacher, to whom several composers dedicated compositions. He was an active performer playing *Newer Music* in Grupo

series that explores the same melodic motif by a solo instrument: *Glosa I*, for piano; *Glosa III*, for violin; and *Glosa IV*, for cello. The manuscript of *Glosa II* was edited and made available in 2009, by the Portuguese Music Research and Information Center, and includes eight pages of a meticulously handwritten composition. But despite Peixinho's careful writing, many specific symbols used by the composer in this manuscript can only be understood and decoded through other of his compositions, since there is not an exclusive set of instructions for *Glosa II*.

There are two trial digital editions of the manuscript score, none of which includes such a needed set of instructions, and this lack led me to enroll in my own digital transcription of *Glosa II*, elaborating a list of performance instructions to preface the score. This list was made possible with specific research on Peixinho's composition and notation style, but also with the advice of Pedro Couto Soares, an experienced performer of *Newer Music*, and knowledgeable of Peixinho's work. *Glosa II* is almost twenty minutes long. The score has no time-signature, no measure bars, no tempo indications, but includes, nevertheless, a voluminous amount of information to comply with, particularly regarding dynamics, which change constantly and range from *pppp* to *fff*, and is overall very dense. It demands a great amount of energy and focus, with many great virtuosistic phrases, and a few passages requiring extended techniques, such as *flutterzunge*, playing harmonics, playing with an unfocused sound, and keyclicks. Not surprisingly, there are currently only two listed performances of this piece: the premiere in 1995; and the one I presented in 2020.

4.1.3. None but the lonely flute [1991][303]

Milton Babbitt (1916-2011) was an American composer and academic. He is particularly known for his work on electronic music, but also for his dedicated

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de Música Contemporânea de Lisboa, from 1980 to 2003, and several other chamber music groups, premiering many of such compositions.

[303] A list of video-recordings of exercise-performances of *None but the lonely flute*, carried out during the practice sessions, is available at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL47ZmuA2FhNWjefYsWAyQtIlr66bIhln3.
The video-recording of the final presentation of *None but the lonely flute* is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hr9nk-L0BnY.

attention to twelve-tone and serial music, both in his academic writings and in his complex compositions for conventional instruments. Babbitt believed that musical composition was analogous to scientific research, and that music should continue to develop through the work of the composer as a specialist, whether there were people interested in listening to such music or not. His compositions are usually indicted as difficult music by listeners and performers alike.

None but the lonely flute[304] was composed in December 1991 and dedicated to Dorothy Stone, who premiered it and recorded it for the first time in 1994. The score is twelve pages long, with a single, barely interrupted, line of sounds put together in a continuous set of very complex rhythmic figures, with abruptly and constantly changing dynamics. A pre-compositional structure, with some motivation on Tchaikovsky's song "None but the lonely heart", determines both the sequence of notes, the rhythms, and the changing and duration of each dynamic[305], meaning that every composed detail is part of a predetermined series. This piece belongs, thus, to the group of compositions within the integral or total serialism movement.

Although it takes only around seven minutes to play, *None but the lonely flute* is not frequently recorded or presented live. "The performer of *Lonely Flute*", Daphne Leong and Elizabeth McNutt assert, "faces virtuosistic demands in many arenas"[306], including abrupt changes in register and dynamics, difficult combinations of both elements, extremely fast motifs, and an overall fast tempo, which can lead flute players to pursue a different type of repertoire.

[304] Milton Babbitt, *None but the Lonely Flute* (New York: Edition Peters, 1991).
[305] For an extended analysis of Babbitt's compositional process see Daphne Leong and Elizabeth McNutt, "Virtuosity in Babbitt's Lonely Flute," *Music Theory Online* 11, no. 1 (2005).
[306] Leong and McNutt, 6.

4.2. Addressing the *Newer Music* Score

Addressing the *Newer Music* score is usually a more complex assignment than addressing a score of eighteenth- or nineteenth-century music. This happens, as we agreed in the first chapter, because the harmonic, melodic, rhythmic, and other mechanisms that sustain canonical music and formal music education are absent, subverted, and of no use in decoding such differently written music. An example is the consistently and thoroughly practiced scale and arpeggio exercises musicians include in their daily routines, usually ineffectual in helping read and produce the diverse organization of sounds that *Newer Music* scores prescribe.

The process of learning a written musical work for performance starts with the musicians learning the notes, the rhythms, the dynamics, the articulations, and any other instruction in the score. They must be able to produce the sounds and silences represented symbolically in the composition, and for this, they need to have some previous knowledge about musical notation and the instrument they handle[307]. In *Newer Music* compositions, addressing the score often means becoming previously acquainted with a series of prefaced instructions, which clarify the specific requests the composer could not accommodate within the traditional notation system. It also implies dedicated and careful attention when addressing each composition, since the common practice that secured the reading of canonical compositions is not sufficient in responding to the diversity of *Newer Music*. Furthermore, *Newer Music* scores are usually denser, that is, they have usually more detailed information to comply with. Given this complexity, the process of decoding and learning the score is necessarily slower and more time-consuming in most *Newer Music* compositions.

This first stage of addressing the score encompasses the activities that lead the musician from the first reading to a point in which what I will call *minimal*

[307] Our previous claim that canonical technical exercises of scales and arpeggios are of no use in decoding *Newer Music* scores is perhaps a bit excessive. The technical expertise acquired with such exercises is undoubtedly an advantage for musicians addressing these scores. However, while they are fundamental in easing the canonical repertoire for musicians, in *Newer Music* they are manifestly insufficient.

control is attained. Personal annotations are an important part of this stage, helping clarify the notated instructions and adding the performer's individual decisions, regarding bowings, fingerings, breathing, and/or other relevant actions for the performance. By the end of this stage, *minimal* practical knowledge about the score is obtained, and it is possible to structure and organize the subsequent and required practice. It is this sufficient practical knowledge of the score that I am calling *minimal control*. It can be different for different pieces and different musicians but presupposes an ability to play, sing, or conduct from the score, even if with some technical flops, hesitations, and doubts. It should be reiterated that attaining a *minimal control* over any score, and particularly over *Newer Music* scores, is not disconnected from the following steps of refining the learned movements through repetition. Nevertheless, and even though there are things about scores that musicians can or will only learn in later stages of musical practice, the fundamental part of this process happens in the beginning, along with the first readings.

In the practical research I carried out while preparing for the solo flute performance – notwithstanding the fact that I started the practice sessions with an equally complete sight-reading of each piece – further addressing the scores of Peixinho's, Takemitsu's, and Babbitt's compositions took on different routes for each one of them. To have *minimal control* over the full score, I had to make different investments according to the level of skill required, and the amount of information to be processed. Takemitsu's *Itinerant* was the easiest of the three, being the shortest score and the slowest piece. Peixinho's *Glosa II* and Babbitt's *None but the lonely flute* were much more challenging in getting such *minimal control*.

Sight-reading Takemitsu's composition was almost effortless. The difficulties posed by the score were related only to the different fingerings for trills, hollow notes, and multiphonics, but were soon resolved and automatized. The flexibility expected for the tempo, as well as the *accelerando* and *ritardando* indications, helped to make the rhythm more intuitive, less strict, and easier to read. Attaining a *minimal control* over the score and signaling the few technically

demanding passages was, thus, uncomplicated, less than three practice sessions being sufficient.

The case of Peixinho's score presented a different scenario. Being a manuscript, with no instructions on how to play several ambiguous indications throughout the score, with no tempo markings, and with such an extended length, achieving *minimal control* was not as straightforward as with Takemitsu's *Itinerant*. After the first sight-reading, I started searching for and signaling structural divisions in the composition, so that I could work with shorter sections and attain a *minimal control* on each one before accomplishing such control on the full twenty-minute piece. At the same time I was addressing each of the nine sections I ended up finding in the composition, I became involved both in the transcription of the manuscript and the research that led me to create the needed set of instructions.

While I cannot say that *minimal control* was conquered before the performance instructions were ready and applied to my playing, since such control implies knowing how to decode the full score, by the time I had both instructions and the transcription put together I was already comfortable playing much of the score's prescriptions, having the more difficult parts marked for further practice. The transition from playing by the manuscript to playing by the digital transcript was worthy of note. The visual unfamiliarity with the transcribed score seemed to bring novelty and difference to the very same indications and a resumption, or re-start of the process of addressing the score took place. I copied the structural division and the notes taken on the manuscript and after some practice with each section, and with the full piece, I reached a stage of *minimal control* over the full transcription of Peixinho's *Glosa II*[308].

Of the three pieces, Babbitt's *None but the lonely flute* was unquestionably the most difficult score to address. This was mainly because of the precise and complex rhythm to decode all through the twelve pages, but it was also related

[308] Although this edition/transcription of Peixinho's manuscript took place at the same time I was preparing for performance, I am not including it as part of the process inside the practice room. In my perspective, it is a pre-musical action, much in the way as the creation of the manuscript by the composer was.

to the disparate sequence of notes, constantly and abruptly changing from one register to another, as well as the similarly abruptly changing dynamics. Needless to say, sight-reading this composition from beginning to end was not only disastrous but also of little help in giving a first impression of the piece. After such first reading, however, I was certain of at least one thing: preparing this short piece would mean spending many lonely hours inside the practice room.

That certainty turned out to be just right. It took me around fifty-five hours to prepare this seven minute piece for performance, and more than half of that time was dedicated to accomplishing *minimal control* over the full score. This labored process involved dedicated attention page by page since the composition has few resting points to structure smaller sections for practicing, with many markings to aid in decoding and be able to play the rhythm as written. Further on, I started annotating the breathings I was going to do and using those smaller phrases as sections for dedicated practice. This division also helped me to include practicing the dynamics from an early stage.

After this brief description, it might be evident that a lot of repetition was necessary to attain a *minimal control* of Babbitt's score. The previously mentioned continuity and organicity in the process of learning how to play, sing, or conduct a musical work allows for such imbrication between the formalized steps we are following in this chapter. Depending on the score, the overlap can be more prominent, as happened with Babbitt's composition, or less accentuated, as happened with Takemitsu's composition. However, even if a lot of repetition happens to get *minimal control* over the score, a lot more repetition is necessary to surpass it. It is by enduring in such repetition that technical struggles can be overcome and further decisions on how to play, sing, or conduct the written instructions can be made. In the next section, we will devote attention to that second stage towards making music happen and understand the dynamics involved in the process. It will also become clear how the third stage of going beyond repetition starts to develop within such repetition.

4.3. Repetition, Repetition, Repetition, Repetition, Repetition

We should start by asking why is repetition so important in the process of learning how to play, sing, or conduct a work of Western art music. If musicians in this tradition are trained for and acquire such high-level skills, as we remember from the first chapter, why do they still need so much repetition when preparing for a performance? An even more ingenuous question could ask why are so many hours of practicing and rehearsals necessary for this music to happen if everything is already written in detail in the score and musicians only have to read it. At this point, this second question should already be senseless, given that we have established not everything is written even in the most detailed score, and perfectly reproducing those instructions is plainly insufficient for music to happen. Addressing the first question, however, can help clarify the attributes of Western art music's necessary skill-set, as well as the marked distinction between *Newer Music* and canonical music at the practical level.

The reason for such needed repetition in the practice of Western art music is related to the fact that the set of skills required to perform it is first and foremost motor, that is, associated with the physiological matter of movement. More precisely, it is a set of fine motor skills that enables musicians to produce and coordinate the very specific, rigorous, and meticulous movements that generate the sounds instructed by each score. As with any other motor activity, continuity in practice is necessary if one wants to maintain muscular performance. That said, it is not wrong to assume that a lot of motor control is already established before any professional musician addresses a new score. One does not become a professional musician in the Western art tradition, as Godlovitch pointed out, if such practical knowledge of the way to handle the instrument and the body is absent. However, not only is that control accomplished itself through a lot of repetition, but it is a generic control that cannot possibly comprise all the different combinations and sequences of movements that different scores demand.

Repetition is, thus, indispensable in the practice of written music. It is merely the amount of repetition that can vary depending both on the demands of the

score, the skill level of the musicians, and the adequacy of such skill level to the score's demands. A musician can be, for instance, very skilled and experienced in performing written music from the classical period, but the adequacy of such skills and practical knowledge to address a score by any avant-garde composer is very reduced. I believe the opposite scenario to have the same outcome, although it is not as common that an avant-garde performer doesn't have any classical-music skills. Since formal music education is centered in the practice of canonical repertoire, technical exercises, such as scales and arpeggios, being focused on mastering the movements and sonorities which are the foundation of that music, even if professional musicians want to dedicate their attention to *Newer Music* they will necessarily do it under the legacy of tonal music. This also means, on the other hand, that musicians who frequently play, sing, or conduct *Newer Music* perforce develop and expand the technical and musical skills demanded by its scores. Nonetheless, the diversity of *Newer Music* hinders the construction of an a priori technical program to partake the practice routines of musicians and sustain a specific formal training for such music[309].

The technical intricacies of *Newer Music*, which I encountered differently in Takemitsu's, Peixinho's, and Babbitt's scores, can only be overcome through repetition. Included in such intricacies are the coordination between fingers, tongue, and breathing, embouchure flexibility for changing register and dynamics, speed, control over the intensity and direction of the air column, and mastering of extended techniques. While different instrumentalists will necessarily deal with different intricacies, as also singers and conductors, the most relevant aspect to take into account regarding this second stage of preparing for a performance is, I believe, common to all musicians in the Western art tradition. Overcoming the technical challenges presented by specific scores is never a straightforward

[309] This topic on the formal education of *Newer Music* is, of course, much more complex than the few questions I am raising here about technique development. In the first chapter, we addressed some of those questions, related to the unsuitability of the technical difficulties of *Newer Music* to primary levels of training, but also to the strong heritage that conservatories built during the nineteenth century, focused on tonal music. Discussion is also open on the dispensability of technical exercises in formal musical education, particularly addressing the relation between technical training and injuries. See, for instance, Brenda Wristen, "Technical Exercises: Use Them or Lose Them?," *Faculty Publications: School of Music* 2, no. 3 (1999): 1–18.

process. In the following, I will address such an absence of a direct way towards technical control, presenting and discussing some examples from the practical research I carried out. It will also become clear how mastering the technicalities through repetition is not disconnected from the aimed musicality, and how such musicality starts to develop within the process of repeating.

Perhaps the plainest sign that this is a slow-moving process is that a difficult phrase or motive can be repeated until it comes-off right in one practice session, and in the next session it can be as if starting from scratch, that is, as if reading and playing, singing, or conducting that phrase or motive for the first time. This forward-backward dynamic can happen multiple times throughout the process of preparing for a performance, even if a consistent and regular practice is maintained. It can remain suspended for a few sessions, and the need to revise a specific excerpt emerge again. Such was the case with many passages when practicing Babbitt's *None but the lonely flute*. On October 6, for instance, I did two practice sessions with this score, consolidating the last pages on the first one, and returning to them after. As we can read from the notes I took, "it turned out that nothing was consolidated and it seemed I was reading for the first time what I had practiced in the morning"[310]. The same happened on November 7, after many previous sessions dedicated to repeating it: "I played Babbitt's piece once and it was an authentic disaster"[311]. A similar set back happened before with Takemitsu's *Itinerant*. Listening to a recording I made on October 22, I wrote that "several passages that were already controlled were not anymore"[312] in that recording.

Dealing with this back and forward progress towards attaining technical control can be frustrating. The required repetitions can also enhance physical and psychological overtiredness, and even physical injuries, if the practice is not properly articulated with periods of rest. The wearisomeness of playing the same thing over and over again can, furthermore, promote an unfocused practice in which musicians are merely mechanically reproducing the necessary

[310] Appendix 2, October 6, 2019.
[311] Appendix 2, November 7, 2019.
[312] Appendix 2, October 22, 2019.

movements, trying to develop the indispensable dexterity for producing the sounds prescribed by the score. We might recall the “mindless playing” Mark advised us against, in the first part of this thesis, and confront such recall with the notes I took after several unfocused practice sessions.

As the process of repeating continues to develop and the pieces become more familiar, different challenges might emerge, including new technical difficulties, the necessity to revise breathings, rectifications of misread instructions, and the detail in the timing and continuity between events or phrases Examples of these new challenges when practicing Takemitsu’s, Peixinho’s, and Babbitt’s scores can be read in the notes I took and can happen even after a long journey of repetition has taken place. As late as December 6, for instance, and regarding Babbitt’s score, which I started practicing on September 15, “I changed a breathing placement on the first page that makes a high B easier to play and, by avoiding the following breathing, makes the end of the section more fluid”[313]. But perhaps the most significant challenge emerging within this second stage of preparing for a performance is starting to play each piece through, from beginning to end.

Playing a piece through after practicing it repeatedly in fragments, and having worked more meticulously the difficult parts, appears as a challenge for several reasons. First of all, we can admit that whenever a dedication to detail takes place, the sense of the whole is temporarily lost. In this way, the necessary repetition of particular motives towards technical control, sometimes as short as a single beat, and sometimes as many as hundreds of times, runs against grasping the whole. In scores like Peixinho’s *Glosa II* and Babbitt’s *None but the lonely flute*, which are extremely long and technically difficult, the sense of the whole is delayed until much later in the process of practicing them. But even in shorter and easier pieces, such as Takemitsu’s *Itinerant*, repeating the full piece, from beginning to end, is a necessary step towards understanding it as a unity. On October 3, I wrote about this initial stage of searching for the unity of *Itinerant* after listening to a recording of myself playing it: “In today’s practice session I

[313] Appendix 2, December 6, 2019.

recorded Takemitsu's composition. It is still very slow and broken. Watching the video, it is clear that I still don't know what is going on or what comes next when I am playing"[314].

Another reason why playing a piece through can be a challenge relates to the technical difficulties it presents. This was obvious in Babbitt's *None but the lonely flute* and Peixinho's *Glosa II* and is intertwined with the necessity of practicing them in fragments. But more than that, it is extremely demanding to constantly keep the focus on what is being played and, at the same time, on what will be played immediately after. On October 8, I wrote about Babbitt's piece that "it is completely different to play an isolated event or to play it following the previous one"[315]. Further on, on November 1, I noted that "it is difficult to keep the focus throughout the full piece, especially when an inexplicable mistake (one that never occurred) happens. In those moments, I am astonished, trying to understand what happened, and even if I can carry on without stopping, my focus is stuck on that inexplicable mistake"[316]. Before that, on October 5, I wrote again about Takemitsu's piece that "it is important to play repeatedly from beginning to end to understand how to prepare each new event when playing what comes before, with the tiredness and eventual discomforts (in embouchure, in breathing, regarding saliva in the mouth, etc.)"[317]. What these annotations share is the idea that to play a specific piece as a whole, a continuous flow of events must occur. If such continuous flow is interrupted by doubt, a hesitation, or a mistake, the music ceases to happen. I noted this listening to a recording I did of Peixinho's piece on October 31: "In the recording, the moments where I hesitate are noticeable and the music disappears!"[318]. Two days before I had already annotated about the same piece that "it is necessary to anticipate reading what comes next so it won't come as a surprise. That is, it is necessary to know the score and the music very well in order not to be surprised. Perhaps the most

[314] Appendix 2, October 3, 2019.
[315] Appendix 2, October 8, 2019.
[316] Appendix 2, November 1, 2019.
[317] Appendix 2, October 5, 2019.
[318] Appendix 2, October 31, 2019.

important thing is precisely that, anticipating the listening of what comes next, at the same time I am playing"[319] [320].

Repetition of the full piece is, thus, essential to understand and be able to prepare transitions from each moment to the next. Recording the full piece can be a valuable tool at this stage since, as we remember from the first chapter, the awareness that musicians have of the sounds they are producing can be different from what is actually heard by an audience. On October 24, I annotated precisely that, writing about Peixinho's piece: "It is very different to listen to the recording and to listen when I am playing"[321]. Moreover, listening to the recordings I made not only signaled moments of imprecision, hesitation, and with no direction, as it also helped me understand better the potential musicality in specific phrases or motives, allowing me to create a conscious trajectory for playing each of the pieces.

From the preceding paragraphs, we can already understand the importance of memorization when preparing for performance. Even if musicians are reading from the score, they must already know from memory what will follow if a continuous flow of events is to be met. This previously attained memory is as much auditory, as it is mechanical (or muscular) and cognitive. Exceptions to this necessity would, of course, include highly skilled sight-readers, that can read scores for the first time and play, sing, or conduct them with such continuity, and extremely easy scores, demanding very little skill from musicians. But we can suspect that exceptions such as these are tied to the canonical repertoire, given that *Newer Music* scores are usually not as immediate to grasp. This means that the auditory, mechanical, and cognitive memory I am claiming to be necessary for a continuous flow of events in performance is already, in a way, present within the tonal forms of canonical scores, making it easier to maintain continuity even if sight-reading them. One of the problems of *Newer Music*, which we signaled

[319] Appendix 2, October 29, 2019.
[320] This is interesting as it seems to happen in the reading of writing: reading also depends on this ability to anticipate what comes next. The focus on sequences of letters and words moves forward through this anticipation.
[321] Appendix 2, October 24, 2019.

previously, is precisely the fact that its scores demand a greater amount of practice time when compared to canonical ones.

An example of the necessary memorization when preparing *Newer Music* for performance is clear in the annotations I took on Babbitt's piece, after almost one month of daily practicing it: "Everything is still very slow because, each time I play, I am still reading the rhythm, the notes, the dynamics, the articulation, and trying to feel the adulterated and contorted beat. The motives I have memorized I can already play faster (although not at 72 bpm) and I think it sounds much better"[322]. To be clear, by this time I couldn't play the piece without having the score in front of me. When I wrote "the motives I have memorized" I was referring to the mechanical or muscular memory needed to produce the specific motions required by such motives, even when reading. In any case, such memory of what comes next is necessary in the early stages of practicing towards the determined speed, as in the example given, as well as in later stages towards making sense of the whole piece. It is at this point that an imbrication between the second and the third stages of preparing for performance starts to happen. Even if musicians won't take the further step onto knowing the piece by heart, without the score, they must go beyond the plain repetition, letting the stability of the score go and welcoming the inevitable differences within which music can happen in performance. As we will see, the paradox of going beyond repetition is that to reach such next stage more repetition is necessary.

Before addressing that final step in the next section and revealing the important findings that actual memorization and practicing the pieces by heart led to, I would like to point to a few more annotations taken during this second stage of preparing for the performance, some of which tied to the readings I was doing at the time, and that were also fundamental in developing the philosophical approach to musical performance we will present in the final part of this thesis. The first one is about an idea proposed by the already mentioned pianist and philosopher Thomas Carson Mark in an article we also referred to in the first part of this thesis. In this article, Mark develops a comparison between musical

[322] Appendix 2, October 7, 2019.

performance and speech-acts claiming that in both cases there is an important difference between merely quoting the text and quoting it with assertion. He writes that "although one can simultaneously quote and assert, identity of the words [in the case of speech] neither assures nor rules out identity of assertion"[323]. The same goes for musical performance, since complying with the instructions on the score is merely quoting it, and not necessarily asserting it. For someone to assert what is written in a specific text, a recognizable intention to do it must be present:

> For assertion, the relevant intention has to do with you recognizing my statement as purporting to be true: to assert is to utter words with the intention of their being accorded by others some authority as a claim about how things are, and this is the crucial point, whatever other effects I may incidentally wish my assertion to have. Similarly in music, the performer intends that the sounds he produces will be taken as having cogency, as articulating how things musically are.[324]

As with speech-acts, the intention to assert is always tied to meaning. If one knows how to read and pronounce a foreign language but does not understand the meaning of what is written, one is not asserting even if perfectly quoting it. Regarding this, Mark also points out that

> […] there can be things which are hard to assert not because they are hard to pronounce but because they are hard to *understand*. Some sentences may just be hard to grasp, and not because they are poor sentences; if one does not succeed in unravelling some meaning in them one is effectively prevented from asserting them.[325]

On October 2, I practiced Takemitsu's score with this in mind and made note that I "felt a difference when trying to assert, but it is hard to understand why this happens"[326]. At that time, I was still at an early stage of practicing that score and had not yet fully understood the music I was trying to play. But the parallel between asserting speech and asserting music made an impact on the further practice I engaged in, relating also to the fact that to assert, a detachment from

[323] Mark, "Philosophy of Piano Playing: Reflections on the Concept of Performance," 310.
[324] Mark, 312.
[325] Mark, 321–22.
[326] Appendix 2, October 2, 2019.

the text is necessary. This appears to be the case because for assertion to happen what one is quoting must already consider what will be presented after, as a meaningful whole. It is in this sense Mark writes that "written words *are* parasitic on spoken words […] just as musical notation is parasitic on music as played"[327], and it is also in this sense that memorization plays such a crucial role in making music happen.

We learned from the previous chapter that for the performative event of music to take place what is written in the score is insufficient. There is a necessary variety in music that cannot be captured by the stability of the text[328], and it is such variety that demands a detachment from the text. What is not written is at least as significant as what is. This was another finding that emerged in the second stage of the practical research I carried out. On November 5, I wrote that

> […] the most important thing for making music departing from the musical text is that which is not written; the space between the notes; the fluency that the digit cannot apprehend. It is very difficult to think like that in practice; detach what is written from what is not written and make what is not written more evident. But it seems to me that it can make all the difference between a mechanical and senseless (going nowhere) reading and a directed reading, from one note to the other, or to silence. The difficulty is in maintaining this *modus operandi* when there are so many technical worries.[329]

This issue has to do with the difference of medium: writing is always notation, that is, an abstract system of differences that defines the parameters and constraints for performance but the actuality of sound cannot be captured by notation. "What is not written" can be understood as what is implicit as consequence of what is made explicit in the written instructions, but it also suggests that which cannot be written because that is the full acoustic range of sound events that must necessarily exceed the notation. The notation is a constraint for performance but it cannot write the performed sound, only prescribe a set of relations among

[327] Mark, "Philosophy of Piano Playing: Reflections on the Concept of Performance," 303.
[328] In Margarida Teixeira Neves, "Música Contrafeita: A Partitura Como Autenticidade Falsa," *Biblos* 5 (2019): 35–49, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14195/0870-4112_3-5_2., I wrote about this counterfeiting of music in the score, and the event-like character of music, briefly exploring its relation with the flagrant divorce between *Newer Music* and the audience.
[329] Appendix 2, November 5, 2019.

elements (that is, a disciplining of the body in its efforts to master the skills for sounding the instrument). But the ways in which the particular assemblage of score, instrument and the musician's body remains unwritable. The "space between notes" is the space for performance – the unique linking up of sounds instantiated by each embodiment of notes as played and heard music.

We hinted at this when discussing the *variable traits* of the musical work, and will have the chance to explore further this idea of music in the spaces between the notes in the following chapter. For now, it is important to note that the technicalities of playing can act against the awareness of such blank spaces and the fluency that filling them will bring, particularly when motor habits need to be developed through prolonged repetition. As we can realize by reading through the notes I took, the inevitability of continued repetition can be overwhelming and govern most of the practice if musicians are not attentive to the need of surpassing score compliance towards music.

The final matter I would like to point out, and which emerged within the process of repeating the pieces I worked on inside the practice room, relates to this goal of detaching the playing (or singing, or conducting) from the score, an accomplishment that will be expanded by memorization in the final stage of preparing for performance. I am referring to integrating into the flow of events, without compromising the continuity that music demands, any deviation from the score, or from what was previously practiced, that might happen when playing, singing, or conducting a particular piece from beginning to end. I have already pointed out earlier to some annotations that address these failures to comply with the musical text and to reproduce the technical measures taken by performers regarding, for instance, breathing, embouchure, and management of endurance. The ability to maintain continuity of events and fluency, so that music won't stop happening, when unexpected flops occur was also already mentioned as a needing to be taken effort. Since performing requires "absolute and complete concentration on the music", as Mark underlines, "and achieving this concentration despite nervousness, distractions, and all the other obstacles, is

very difficult"[330], practicing for performance must include not only the aim for perfection that sustains the practice of Western art music but also and as importantly the imperfections that might arise in the moment and jeopardize such concentration.

Such was my concern with Takemitsu's, Peixinho's, and Babbitt's scores after I have practiced them enough to be comfortable with the technical demands. I repeatedly played each piece from beginning to end both to practice the technical intricacies of complying to the text and my annotations on it, and the ways to better deal with eventual mistakes. At the same time, I was practicing the indispensable physical and mental endurance to maintain complete concentration throughout each piece. On November 8, I took note of this relevant achievement with *Itinerant*: "I practiced Takemitsu's piece and I am successfully playing it naturally, integrating the few mistakes and imprecisions in the piece's flow"[331]. It was not, however, until I started to practice playing the pieces from memory that I started to develop a new perspective on how music can happen differently, and away from the score. Such a new perspective aligns with the ontological proposal on musical works we addressed in the previous chapter, particularly regarding the *variable traits* of such works. As we will see in the next section, memorization was also an important step towards developing an understanding of music as an analogical event, which will be the focus of the following chapter, as well as towards outlining, on the final chapter of this thesis, the central idea of anticipation as the motor of music.

[330] Mark, "Philosophy of Piano Playing: Reflections on the Concept of Performance," 316.
[331] Appendix 2, November 8, 2019.

4.4. Beyond Repetition

On November 17, I started memorizing Takemitsu's *Itinerant*, more as an experiment than with any specific aim of performing it without the score. I took notes on starting such an experiment, writing that "it is extremely easy to fall under the automatic and not to play assertively when I am reading"[332]. I was trying to understand if that departure from the score would make a difference in the way I was playing and soon enough found out that it did. The next day I wrote that "it is difficult to remember all the details in the score, but everything becomes more natural. Even technical difficulties become easier, and assertion and confidence are related to that; there is no way of escaping playing assertively when playing by heart"[333]. The next step was trying to understand why playing from memory makes such a difference.

Before addressing such findings and recognizing how the repetition that enables memorization can paradoxically help musicians go beyond the second stage of preparing for a performance, we will look into several other annotations I took during this process. These will hopefully clarify how attachment to the musical text can hinder musicality from emerging within practice, and help us understand how music can happen even when performing reading from the score. The excerpts presented refer only to Takemitsu's and Babbitt's pieces, since I didn't commit myself to learning Peixinho's extremely long score by heart. Takemitsu's *Itinerant* took me six practice sessions to memorize (between November 17 and November 23). Babbitt's *None but the lonely flute* required fourteen practice sessions to memorize (between November 23 and December 11) and the process was a much more challenging one.

Let us, then, go back to the previous quote in which I signaled that playing was more natural when I wasn't reading by the score. On November 27, after having fully memorized Takemitsu's score, I compared a recording playing by heart and a previous recording playing by the score before having learned it by memory, and again remarked the more natural flow of events in the former: "I

[332] Appendix 2, November 17, 2019.
[333] Appendix 2, November 18, 2019.

recorded Takemitsu's piece playing by heart and only with two mistakes and a few technical imprecisions. It sounds much more fluid than in the recording I did with the score"[334]. This fluidity might have to do with the impact that memorizing had on transitions and silences in the music. I noticed this from the very first session practicing memorizing Takemitsu's score: "When something is played by heart the transitions from one note to another become more important, as well as the silences"[335]. It seemed that such attention to what is in between the digits in the score made a difference towards the natural flow of music.

Memorization enabled this attentiveness to details that were not in the text, aiding also, perhaps consequently, to produce the sounds actually instructed by the score more easily and fluently. After having fully memorized Takemitsu's piece, I noted on November 23 precisely this easiness when playing:

> […] it is so much better to play by heart. It is impressive the difference I feel between playing by heart and playing by the score. To memorize it is necessary to give attention to different details, which don't appear as important or even relevant when I am reading. The technical difficulties I had in a few passages vanished with memorization only.[336]

It was surprising for me to find out the impact that playing by memory had on technically difficult passages that I had already practiced repeatedly, in many different ways, and were still not sounding fluid. The same happened with moments I haven't fully grasped the musical sense of, that is, in which I was not understanding the music and couldn't, therefore, assert it. This was particularly evident with Babbitt's score right from the beginning, and I gave a tentative answer to why such easiness happened when making music from memory:

> […] I started memorizing Babbitt's piece and also acknowledged some differences. I memorized the first and second pages and was able to make sense of some moments in the piece that were not so good before. Perhaps the easiness in being musical, which emerges when I play by heart, has to do with keeping away from the score, or perhaps it has to do with the fact that more focus on the actions is necessary.[337]

[334] Appendix 2, November 27, 2019.
[335] Appendix 2, November 17, 2019.
[336] Appendix 2, November 23, 2019.
[337] Appendix 2, November 23, 2019.

The fact that, when playing from memory, the focus is remarkably on the actions being taken to produce the sounds instructed by the score, which include also what is not prescribed, might be a reason for such easiness in understanding and asserting the music, instead of merely quoting the notes and rests of the composition. It is as if there is a struggle between checking the body movements against the score, on the one hand, or having the sounds entirely somatised through the embodied memory of the score. Score events have been internalized as the memory of the many micro-gestures required to sound emission. Through memorization musical writing becomes an embodied choreography. Withdrawing from the score can, thus, prompt, and invites, filling the spaces that notation cannot capture.

Steve Schick, a US American percussionist whose motivation is focused on contemporary music, wrote about the link between these actions taken by musicians and the liveness of musical works. He was also thinking about memorization, and the nonconformities with the score that can be implied in playing, singing or conducting from memory:

> One might immediately see the possible flaw in playing from memory if deviation from the text is the result. However, the friction between these forces – one exerted by the score and a contrary one by the body – provide a long term source of heat and energy that allows for the longevity of a piece.[338]

We can admit that such friction between score and body is inevitably present in Western art music, whether being it performed by heart or not. But Schick underlines that memorizing promotes an input from musicians that is essential to the event of music:

> […] I firmly believe in the advantages of playing solo music from memory. Memorized music more closely approaches the sense of ritual that I find fascinating in performance; it relocates the information found in the score to the living and mutable musculature of the human performer, and it provides a sense of immediate experience in concert.[339]

[338] Steve Schick, "A Percussionist's Search for Models," *Contemporary Music Review2* 21, no. 1 (2AD): 10.
[339] Schick, 10.

It seems that the essential quality of music cannot manifest itself if the performing body is not fully present. If the musculature of the human performer is not there beyond the composition, we are listening to bloodless music, just as in a bloodless MIDI file playing[340]. Schick also writes about this need to go beyond the score, particularly regarding what we are calling *Newer Music*:

> If one takes the attitude that representing a composer's score is the ultimate responsibility, then performers feel that their own personality should not intervene between the score and the audience. Unfortunately, this often invites the kind of bloodless, almost anonymous performances that have so characterized the performance of recent contemporary music.[341]

Anonymity in performance is less likely to happen if the bodily investment of knowing the piece by heart was made. Memorization invites such creative action that gives a particular performance its signed verve. I noticed this need to create an understanding of what is happening musically when trying to learn the music by heart. It happened as if I was not able to memorize it unless I understood it. On November 30, I wrote about Babbitt's piece that "memorizing has been important in resolving moments that are apparently under control when reading but stop making sense without the score, or at least is more evident that they make no sense. Playing by heart demands a search for musicality"[342]. It is this search that can be absent in the previous practicing for bloodless performances of any music.

We can question further onto what is there in playing, singing, or conducting by heart that promotes such musicality. It is inevitable that we do it if we want to understand the process of making music from the scratches on the score.

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[340] The question of whether a MIDI playing can be considered music is certainly much more challenging than what we can approach in a thesis focused on musical performance. Moreover, such a subject opens a full field of questions regarding technological developments, how different music can "survive" even in such desolate spaces as the ones occupied by MIDI files, and to the fundamental question of *what is music?* There seems to be a void in the philosophical literature on such matters. The exception might be Gordon Graham's thoughts on electro-sonic music, in which he values the diversity that comes from participation in active music-making, against the fixity of electro-sonic sounds; see Gordon Graham, "Music and Electro-Sonic Art," in *Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning and Work*, ed. Kathleen Stock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 209–25.

[341] Schick, "A Percussionist's Search for Models," 11.

[342] Appendix 2, November 20, 2019.

Memorization seems to promote a continuity and a sense of direction that if broken, as happens when hesitations occur or in mechanical renderings whether by performers or machines, music collapses, even if to return briefly after. I took a note on this problematic of what makes music happen on November 29, in the midst of learning Babbitt's piece by heart:

> It is difficult to understand what makes a difference between making music and merely making sounds. For sure it has to do with directing each sound towards the next. It is a kind of avoidance of stagnation. In this sense, it has to do also with anticipating what is going to be played next. There is an excess in the presence of music that demands continuity. As in speech, the sense of what we read has to be already present so that the reading concurs with what the text encloses. To make music from Babbitt's score, then, such continuity is necessary, and for continuity to happen it is necessary to direct what I am playing towards rest or closure moments. But even in those moments, there is music. What is it, then?[343]

We will have the chance of pondering about those silences in rest or closure moments in the final section of the next chapter. For now, let us explore the idea that "there is an excess in the presence of music that demands continuity". It is this excess in the event of music, for musicians and audiences alike, that captures our bodies and attentions when we experience it. The continuity that this presentified excess demands is like the act of drawing a line with a continuous gesture propelling itself forward[344]. It is an "avoidance of stagnation" in the sense that there is a directed purpose in the gesture that leaves its print on the line that is drawn. The more we are undecided about where the line is going, the more fragmented will the result be. So in music, this directed purpose when performing seems fundamental for us to experience music's continuity. In its turn, it is only within this continuity that we can experience musical works as a whole.

There is a relation between this need for continuity and the necessity of performing the spaces left unnoted by the musical texts. An attempt to explain what to do in practice for such continuity to emerge is dated from November 30:

[343] Appendix 2, November 29, 2019.
[344] We will develop this idea of an excess in music in the final chapter, when exploring further the comparison between musical works and the act of drawing a straight line.

“[…] to attain the continuity that makes music happen (to fill the spaces between the notes) an anticipation of what will happen next is necessary”[345]. The idea that some kind of anticipation is needed for music to happen had already been presented in previous annotations I took from practice. It is as if anticipating what follows was the needed excess for music to be in the present. We will explore such topics further in the final chapter of this thesis, arguing for a philosophical approach to musical performance that can contribute to the actual practice of music.

A final word, before heading on to the third part of this investigation, should be addressed to the differences that going beyond repeating the score inevitably invites. Whether making music by heart or by the text, the result will always be a unique event, played, sung, or conducted differently each time. I found out that if those differences are part of the musical work, I should invite them into the practice room and practice making music with them, instead of trying to flawlessly repeat the same text. In the final stages of my practice, I continuously dedicated myself to playing through the pieces I was preparing and started to notice slight differences that happened each time I played the full piece. I also noticed that a few flaws, and even wrong notes, could be accommodated in such differences, without having to interrupt the continuous flow of events that seems essential for music to happen. On December 27, I annotated that: “I played the full program twice at the end of the session and it came off alright both times, even with some mistakes, different in the first and the second run-throughs”[346]. The day after, I noticed such differences again: “Each time I play, something different happens and those differences don’t disturb the happening of music”[347].

By this time, I was already playing by the score again. I always felt too insecure to play by heart in front of an audience, and at the beginning of December, I returned to my safe place behind the music stand. Nevertheless, taking notes on the impact that memorizing had on my playing was an ear-opening process, and I believe such impact can be heard even when while

[345] Appendix 2, November 30, 2019.
[346] Appendix 2, December 27, 2019.
[347] Appendix 2, December 28, 2019.

reading. It has to do with propelling the music forward, inviting the inevitable differences into the full gesture of music, than with complying with the rigidity and cleanness of the text. It has to do with filling in the blanks left by musical notation, knowing each time it can and should be played in a different way. In the next chapter, we will be focused on addressing such questions related to the gap left open by the score and also on the musical work understood as performance. We will further explore the ontological claims we made in this second part, and accommodate the findings of this fourth chapter into a philosophical understanding of how we can make music happen.

Part III: How Much Music?

5. Mind the Music in the Gap

In the third chapter, we proposed an understanding of the musical work as performance that helped us in the practice room focusing more on the variability of the event than on the stability of the score. We also addressed the difficulty of gathering a theoretical ground to accommodate the innumerable many ways such variability can manifest, and suggested shifting the perspective from the quality of the differences within which music happens to their quantity or intensity. Instead of thinking about *how* to fill the gaps left open by notation, we will, then, investigate in this chapter a few ideas related to *how much* can and should those gaps be filled. We will start by justifying more thoroughly why perfect compliance with the score is insufficient for making music happen. Further, we will develop the idea that written music, and the musical work, can only happen if every unnoted space in the score is filled with some information by the performer. Finally, we will bring about some considerations on silence and how it can integrate our notion of the musical work as a dense performative entity.

It is fundamental that we survey in this chapter the loose ends left by our ontological proposal about musical works in the Western art tradition. If we want to contribute to a philosophy of music more aware of the performative character of its subject, we must examine and consider more thoroughly the variability we claimed essential for the creation of the musical work in performance. Moreover, such consideration will foster an understanding of music as performed aligned with the ways we experience it as listeners, notwithstanding many differences can be spotted in the ways music is listened to by performer-listeners (musicians) or by listener-listeners (auditors). Even though we are concerned in this thesis only with the process of preparing for a performance, trying to fathom how should musicians proceed so that music can happen in front of an audience, it is categorical that such preceding practice relates to its purpose. That said, we will succinctly address Levinson's perspective on how we listen to music, appropriating his thoughts into our philosophical study over musical practice.

5.1. Why is Perfect Compliance with the Score Insufficient?

Throughout this thesis, we have been pointing to the insufficiency of the musical text, referring to composers and performers, such as Takemitsu and Schick, who underline the importance of appending performances with more than what is strictly written in scores. Even though musical compositions represent the music which they are the condition of possibility of, and even though they also demand to be played, sung, or conducted, the transitivity and event-like character of music cannot be encapsulated within the rigidity of the symbols. This rigidity, which Adorno called the "mensural element" (*das mensurale*) in his unfinished theory of a dialectical musical reproduction, "does not reach the music's level"[348]. It is a sterile picture of music that needs to be surpassed if music is to happen. And it is precisely in that sense Adorno writes that "the perfect realization of the mensural would be meaningless on its own"[349].

According to Adorno, for music to happen a dialectic movement must occur between the objectivity of the score and the subjectivity of musicians, towards the gesture we can only find in the event of performance. It is only through such movement beyond the mere repetition of the score that the musical work can emerge in and only in the present: "The immanent gestus of music is always that of the present […] and this is why even the most ancient musical symbols apply to the *now*, not the *then* […]"[350]. Moreover, Adorno underlines the existence of a "fundamental tension between notation and music", which, aligned with our ontological proposal focused on variability, reveals "the assumption of the work's static content as their core to be an illusion"[351]. The same is put forward by Pirkko Moisala *et al.*, reflecting on Deleuzian and Guattarian findings. They write that "we engage musics as acts that establish and emerge from sets of relationships in the places and times in which they are occurring"[352].

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[348] Adorno, *Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction: Notes, a Draft and Two Schemata*, 93.
[349] Adorno, 93.
[350] Adorno, 188.
[351] Adorno, 194–95.
[352] Pirkko Moisala et al., "Noticing Musical Becomings: Deleuzian and Guattarian Approaches to Ethnographic Studies of Musicking," *Current Musicology* 98, no. Fall (2014): 72.

Complying with the score in a repetitive manner, disconnected from the volatility of the event, means that the difference of the present moment is missing and the inherent variability of music absent. In his investigations on *Difference and Repetition*, Gilles Deleuze writes precisely about this absence of being that sustains repetition:

> *It* (language) repeats because *it* (the words) is not real, because there is no definition other than nominal. *It* (nature) repeats because *it* (matter) has no interiority, because it is *partes extra partes*. *It* (the unconscious) repeats because *it* (the Ego) represses, because *it* (the Id) has no memory, no recognition and no consciousness of itself – ultimately because it has no instinct, instinct being the subjective concomitant of the species as concept. In short, things repeat always by virtue of what they are not and do not have. We repeat because we do not hear. As Kierkegaard said, it is the repetition of the deaf, or rather for the deaf: deafness of words, deafness of nature, deafness of the unconscious.[353]

In the same way, we found out in our practice that for music to happen we must go beyond repetition. The musical work can only be heard if musicians surpass the repetitiveness of complying to the score and embrace the differences that will fill the emptiness between the digits. The identity of the musical work can only be found in such variability, as Pirkko Moisala and her colleagues apprehend from Deleuze, who "equates being with becoming by stating that identities only emerge from repetition *as* difference"[354].

This is of course not to say that fidelity to the musical text one is playing, singing, or conducting is a disregardable element in the practice of written music. It is only through such commitment to the score that we can listen to and recognize specific musical works. But not only can this fidelity be disturbed in the performative event, as we will have the chance to discuss further on, as it is insufficient, according to Adorno, in bringing such musical works into existence if not complemented with the performers' input:

> "Fidelity to the notation is only one – admittedly indispensable – element here, the barrier to a violation of the work's historical laws of

[353] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 271.
[354] Moisala et al., "Noticing Musical Becomings: Deleuzian and Guattarian Approaches to Ethnographic Studies of Musicking," 71.

> interpretation, but this fidelity alone is not enough. On its own it can neither provide insight into the state of the work, and thus its truth, nor can it satisfy itself if held onto in isolation: mere fidelity of reading […] leads to a state of rigor mortar in which the ray of vision that enables the act of reading is itself ultimately extinguished."[355]

Such insight into the state, and truth, of the musical work in its historicity cannot be reached by complying with the fixed rigidity of the text alone. It is the very act of reading, we can apprehend from Adorno's writing, that is in itself compromised if it halts at the literal. Musical notation, in its inescapable insufficiency, demands an effort from musicians to fill the temporal and historical dimensions left empty in the score.

As we remember from the previous chapters, technological reproductions of scores intended to be played by musicians, as well as mechanical performances by musicians who fail to exceed the immediate literalness of musical notation, are missing the vital element in analog music-making. It is only in the friction between the contradictory forces of the score and the musician's body, as Schick pointed out, that the heat and energy of a musical work are revealed. If such a dynamic is absent, the result is either a lifeless reproduction of the instructions or egress from the conditions of possibility of the musical work in question. In the first scenario, even if perfect compliance with the score is attained, music, and therefore the musical work, is not happening. In the second, if the musician's body deliberately departs from the instructions in the score to take its own road, there can be music, but the happening of that specific musical work might be compromised.

To clarify the distinction between these two contrary forces, and also understand further on how we can instead favor thinking of an alliance between them in the practice of Western art music, we will consider briefly in the following both the analogical input that musicians must bring to performance and the digital insufficiency of scores and technological or mechanical renderings. This will assist us towards developing in the next section what we hinted at in the third chapter, regarding the necessity of filling the blank spaces or gaps between the

[355] Adorno, *Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction: Notes, a Draft and Two Schemata*, 197.

symbols in scores. A practical example of an excerpt of Peixinho's *Glosa II*, both reproduced by a MIDI player and recorded by myself, will hopefully contribute also to such clarification, as well as to justify why perfect compliance with the score is not sufficient for making music happen.

5.1.1. Analog *vs* Digital

In the already mentioned book *Languages of Art*[356], Nelson Goodman developed a theory of notation within which he considered the differences between analog and digital systems of representation. Favoring a more well-defined distinction, he proposed that analog representation is "dense" or "continuous", while digital representation is "differentiated" or "discrete"[357]. It is in this sense that we can counter the digital representation of music in scores, each written note being a digit informing on frequency, duration, and intensity, and the analog-sounding of the musical work in performance. An additional distinction should be put forward since the score is manifestly a representation of the music, but the sounding that can be produced by musicians when performing a specific score is the object itself, the work of music, and not a representation of it in the same sense that musical notation is.

Regarding this opposition, a parallel, or at least a diagonal, could be traced with languages that use an alphabet in their writings, in which, as Marshall McLuhan pointed out in his well-known reflections about the different media that amplify human communication, "semantically meaningless letters are used to correspond to semantically meaningless sounds"[358]. Even though musical semantics is a particular field of investigation[359], necessarily different from the semantics of language, a specific note in a score, as a specific letter in a book, can be considered musically senseless if secluded from the other notes.

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[356] Goodman, *Languages of Art*.
[357] Goodman, 160.
[358] Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (Berkeley: Ginko Press, 2013), 147.
[359] For an understanding of musical meaning as metaphorical, see Bernstein's third lecture in Bernstein, *The Unanswered Question: Six Talks at Harvard*. A more recent and thorough study on the subject can be found in Ole Kühl, *Musical Semantics* (Bern: European Academic Publishers, 2008).

Moreover, this digital discretion or differentiation that represents visually what was once continuously sonorous is considered by McLuhan as "both crude and ruthless"[360], diminishing "the role of the other senses of sound and taste in any literate culture"[361], and making "such a sharp division in experience"[362] as to give to its users "an eye for an ear"[363].

At this point, we might recall the critique made earlier towards theoretical investigations on music, and particularly the one towards philosophical studies, that focus on the visual elements given by the static and discrete symbols in the score and neglect the richness and density of the continuous sonorous event[364]. The same critique applies to a practice that, even if decoding and rendering the differentiated sounds in the musical text, does not contemplate and fulfill the moments between the digits. An extreme example of such a rendering is, then, a MIDI file, playing solely the literal information available in the score. Let us now consider some audio instances that can clarify this distinction between digital and analog, beyond the theoretical ground we have been establishing.

In #isthismusic?[365], we can listen to a MIDI file reproducing an excerpt of the digital information in the score of Peixinho's *Glosa II*. In #definitelymusic[366], the same excerpt is presented played, and recorded by myself. This excerpt is the introductory section of the piece, and the correspondent text that was its

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[360] McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, 147.
[361] McLuhan, 148.
[362] McLuhan, 147.
[363] McLuhan, 147.
[364] Despite our critique of the text-centered philosophical thought on music, we are not neglectful of the importance and worth of musical writing. As with language, and even if, as Plato anticipated, writing might have promoted a forgetfulness in the learners' souls, musical notation allowed the development of music in a way that would not be possible otherwise. It is because of writing, both of music and language, that we can be, today, discussing not only such forgetfulness but also how we can still remember that which cannot be written.
[365] We are inclined to answer that this sonorous sample, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-ECnohyd-M&ab_channel=MargaridaNeves, is not music, but remain open for further questioning, perhaps in the comment section of the video. Since we cannot accommodate in this thesis all the philosophical queries that focus on the experience of listeners, or the social and psychological aspects of listening to music, and many other facets which could make a decisive difference when answering to the question posed by this sample, we are limited to say that, it seems to us, if this MIDI file was to reproduce the full score of *Glosa II*, composed by Jorge Peixinho, such reproduction would not be a presentation of the musical work.
[366] This sonorous sample is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QKCaxAThbjA&ab_channel=MargaridaNeves.

condition of possibility is presented both in the videos accompanying the sonorous samples and in Figure 1. Needless to say, we cannot listen to Figure 1. At the utmost, we can listen internally to the music that is represented there, if we know how to read music and can create an internal performative event of such excerpt. In any case, we would not be listening to Figure 1. Stated the obvious, the differences we can perceive between the two sonorous samples relate to the fact that not only in the first one the notes are played as separate entities, while in the second we can sense a continuity leading one note to the next and internally organizing each musical phrase, but also in the second sample a few deviations from the text can be heard.

Being a digital system, the fact that a MIDI player will produce the designated or programmed sounds as isolated and unconnected events is evident. This is notorious in #isthismusic? if we attend to the grouped notes in the musical text, particularly the ones with semiquavers. By comparing the same groups of semiquavers, in #definitelymusic we can listen to the continuity or direction that leads from the first note of each group to the first note after them. This happens because I played these groups of notes with a small *rubato*, taking



Figure 1 - Excerpt from Peixinho's Glosa II

more time in the beginning and making an *accelerando* towards the end. Such flexibility and deviance from the strict notated rhythm is an example of the nuances that Kivy, Bowen, and Cook were referring to when writing about the fundamental adding that musicians must convey in performances. As we have agreed, these nuances from the same score can take as many forms as the different occasions and musicians performing them, as can also go beyond fluctuations in tempo, such as timbre, dynamics, or articulation. For music to happen, varying in performance the digital information provided by the score is

inevitable. Ontologically speaking, however, the ways in which such digital information is embodied and varied in the analog performance can be considered irrelevant.

Contrasting #isthismusic? with #definitelymusic leads us to think the fundamental feature of music is veiled in between the digits, inaccessible to a MIDI player. Nevertheless, and even though we can listen to the unconnected semiquavers in the first audio file, some segments of this excerpt, and particularly the faster ones with demisemiquavers, can give us the impression of an analog directed playing. When more digital information is available for each instant in time, it is for us more difficult to distinguish the digits. This is the same kind of perception we have with any digital picture with a high resolution. Even if such a picture is still an image composed of pixels, our understanding of it will be as a whole. Pictures 1 and 2, below, present us that contrast between a figure with less digital information and one with more, respectively.



Picture 1

Picture 2

Both Pictures 1 and 2 are composed of differentiated units of information. It is challenging, however, for the naked eye to spot in the second those more than evident units in the first because they are smaller. Consequently, the whole in Picture 2 is composed of sufficient information for our perception to capture it as an analog image. In the same way, if a MIDI file holds sufficient information, we

can listen to it and have a similar sense as when listening to a live performance or an analog recording. In such a case, however, the matter is perhaps more complex, involving different psychological, sociological, philosophical, and other questions, larger than the specific one we are considering in this thesis. It relates to the act of listening to music, and the different ways that experience can happen also with different listeners. The next section in this chapter will consider one philosophical study dedicated to such experience – Levinson's concatenationism and ultra-concatenationism. We will avail Levinson's proposal, appropriating and accommodating it in our quest to understand how music can happen in performance, and focusing on the perspective of musicians over the process of making music, before an audience has the chance of listening to it.

To conclude this reflection contrasting the analog and the digital in music an important addendum should be put forward since the recorded excerpt in #definitelymusic is a digital recording, being, in a way, similar to the second high-resolution digital picture. The analog version would be in a live event of me (or another flutist) playing it, or a recording by an analog device like the tape recorder. But even if a digital recording converts and codifies the analog performance into discrete units it can capture much more than just the digital information in the score reproduced by a MIDI player. The major difference between the presented pictures and the presented audios is that while pixelized Mario served its purpose as it was, the enhanced Mario being an afterthought on digital development, the information in the score enabling the MIDI playing in #isthismusic? was from the beginning insufficient in fulfilling its purpose. The fact that compositions, as Peixinho's *Glosa II*, were written by composers to be performed by musicians implies such insufficiency. The same does not happen when composers work directly with digital writing. Electronic music resembles Mario in the sense that the codified digits enabling it to be played are sufficient in serving their purpose. Needless to say, technological development in electronic music is as sophisticated as the one in digital visual arts, the composer having absolute control over the raw material of music, manipulating it in the process of composing, and losing it only in the event of its reproduction. When writing for musicians to play, however, composers are losing such control in the very act of

composing, at the same time crafting the condition of possibility for a specific musical work to be created, and resigning the creation of music as performance with the action of writing.

The disparity between the analogical and the digital is, perhaps, the major quarrel that musicians, practicing a score for performance, must endeavor within the written music tradition. It is a contradiction between the difference of novelty and the sameness of repetition, that must be resolved on stage. It is a search for what is similar, or analogous, but not exactly the same as what is written. Musical notation cannot escape being a digital medium, a system of discrete information that will only fill its purpose if decoded and analogically re-produced, each time in a different way whether in performance or being recorded in a studio with no audience. Perfect compliance with the score is then, on its own, plainly insufficient for music to happen because it negates this analog necessity of written music. It goes no further than the differentiated information in the score, neglecting the spaces the act of composing left to be filled. As mentioned, in the next section we will expand the already hinted idea that music happens when musicians fill such gaps. Further, we will develop some considerations on musical understanding, and how it can play a role in preparing for performance, aiming to create the conditions for determining the circumstances in which a work of music can be said to have happened.

5.2. Filling Gaps Towards Music

Saying that written music can only happen when musicians fill the historical and temporal gaps between the notated information left by the composer, or that the varying properties of the musical work are hinted by the spaces between such information, is perhaps saying little more than the vague and ambiguous musicological claims we previously condemned. Nonetheless, by stating that the musical work will only come into being in performance if every unnoted space in the score is filled with some information by musicians, we are making a point regarding a necessary disposition of performers when playing, singing, or conducting. If music is to be heard, an investment must be made by musicians beyond complying with the digits, and beyond making nuances within those digits. It is a matter of fulfilling the performative event with musical information at every single moment, in a continuous and directed flow.

In his autobiographic essay on "Teachers and Teaching"[367] music, Leonard Bernstein comments on this significant need of filling the gaps between beats when conducting an ensemble, calling this gap the "inner beats":

> It is what is between the beats, because a beat is no good, once you have given it they have already played it. It's too late. Everything is in the preparation for that beat. And so between one beat and the next you prepare beats, it's the inner beats that are important.[368]

He is talking specifically about the role of conductors in promoting togetherness between a group of people making the same music at the same time. But we can amplify this idea to the role of musicians in general, with or without a conductor, and the way of making music in general, even if the traditional sense of "beat" that Bernstein is referring to is absent. It is in the preparation of what comes next that music is made moment after moment, in and in-between the notated digits.

Sergiu Celibidache, another conductor and music theorist, talks about the same questions but in a different and more elaborated manner:

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[367] Burton, *Teachers and Teaching: An Autobiographic Essay by Leonard Bernstein*.
[368] Burton.

> It is quite common that one thinks one knows what music is. But let's say you take the fourth bar of a piece: In order to reach the fifth bar, you have to appropriate it all and make a unity from it, because your mind is only able to perceive one unity at a time. It's the only way. Then you can leap onwards. You leap from one to the next. You have to appropriate it. And in order to appropriate it, you have to be there, right? Otherwise it won't work. It's the only way to comprehend the complexity. But there is more concealed in the fourth bar. Or is the third bar no longer there? Isn't the fourth bar the organic, logical consequence of the third bar? And the third of the second? In the fourth is the third, the second… Not potentially, but actually! It is a product… that doesn't fall from the sky. It emerges from within you in combination with the sound. It is complicated… Bar four is not solitary; it contains bar three, two and one. What else does it contain? All that follows from it. It is the mother of what follows. Thus, bar four is neither here nor there. In order to appropriate it, I have to be there. But if I am at the start and the end simultaneously, I am not there. Thus, I am not there because I am there. That is the point where logic fails. This is where your Cartesianism defeats itself.[369]

We can sense the conflict in Celibidache's words, which himself recognizes as part of music as a creative act that "knows no memory, no science, and no cognizance"[370], since "these things are always bound up with the past"[371] and any creative act "accepts no conditions outside of itself"[372]. Trying to explain with more clarity the example given, the Romanian conductor adds:

> Your mind detaches itself from the fourth bar. If it gets stuck there, there's no room for the fifth. You appropriate it to vacate yourself. And you vacate yourself in order to comprehend the fifth in the same creative way. And thus you leap forward. […] In music, the present is a perpetual genesis.[373]

It seems, thus, that music is created in this constant inconstancy, in which both *what was* and *what will be* are united in the gesture that leaps forward, connecting whichever is digitally presented on paper to musicians.

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[369] Sergiu Celibidache, "Sergiu Celibidache on His Philosophy of Music," n.d., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SthKs40ClCY&ab_channel=1Furtwangler.
[370] Celibidache.
[371] Celibidache.
[372] Celibidache.
[373] Celibidache.

Another visual example might help us further explore this idea of filling the gaps in musical notation, even if such comparison is necessarily constrained by the complex differences between visual and aural perceptions. Let us, then, compare the musical score with those numbered dot-to-dot drawing exercises we might have had the chance to enjoy in childhood, an example being Picture 3. Assuming each dot as a digit, the same way we do with each note in the score, it is easy to understand that the resulting image after filling the gaps between the dots will be quite different from the dots themselves if left un-linked. The great difference is not so much the fact that the represented apple is incomplete in its contour since we can still perceive it is an apple even without connecting the dots, but that the action of completing it is absent. If we were to handle a pen and merely draw dots on top of the existing dots, as when musicians or technological devices merely reproduce the written notes in scores, the result would be likewise incomplete. In both cases, it is the game that is missing.

Picture 3



Picture 4

We might further compare Picture 3 with a score from the tonal repertoire, within which an understanding of the represented music can be obvious even if there is no information connecting the digits. In such cases, as in Picture 3, it is us, as listeners or as viewers, who complete the missing information and perceive the sounds as music or the dots as an apple. This is why we can still appreciate "on-hold music"[374] when Bach's or Mozart's compositions, for instance, are played by a midi-device. What is missing in such playing is fulfilled by our knowledge of the context and idiom of tonal music. With *Newer Music*, however, and for several reasons already discussed, an input from listeners, and also from musicians, is much less straightforward. To continue fostering the analogy with the numbered dot-to-dot images, a *Newer Music*'s score could be compared to

[374] This notion was suggested to me by Professor Jerrold Levinson referring to the musical selections we hear when we are put on hold on the telephone.

Picture 4, in which no comprehensible form can be as easily discovered before the action of drawing a line and completing the exercise.

As with scores, these numbered dot-to-dot games prescribe a temporal organization for the actions they embolden, ensuring a predetermined trajectory for the players, who should comply with such structured trajectory if the result is to be the one proposed. But of course, we can draw the figures in Pictures 3 and 4 going backward, starting in the last number and building our way into the first, having an identical outcome, and the same will not happen when playing, singing, or conducting the majority, if not all, of music scores. The outcome of music, in itself, is also different from the visual and permanent result of dot-to-dot drawings. Music is a process, an action happening from moment-to-moment until it ends leaving no final object to contemplate. It is only in the process of making it or listening to it that an aesthetic experience can happen[375]. As such, it is in the action of connecting the digits, the *to* in the moment-to-moment idea of a continuous flow of events, that music can emerge, be experienced, and understood as music.

In the notes taken by Adorno for what would be his theory of musical performance, the philosopher points to these questions when referring to the gestural, or mimetic, element, underlining also important differences between the visual, the verbal, and the musical:

> The dignity of the musical text lies in its non-intentionality. It signifies the ideal of sound, not its meaning. Compared to the visual phenomenon, which 'is', and the verbal text, which 'signifies', the musical text constitutes a third element. – To be derived as a memorial trace of the ephemeral sound, not as a fixing of its lasting meaning. – The 'expression' of music is not an intention, but rather mimic-imitative. A 'pathetic' moment does not signify pathos etc., but rather comports itself pathetically.[376]

[375] In the last section of this chapter, we will make reference to silences framing the end of musical works. It could be said that in such silences, a contemplation of the full work is attained in a recalling of the preceding musical experience as a whole. In any case, the final object disintegrates as our memory of it fades into the applause.
[376] Adorno, *Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction: Notes, a Draft and Two Schemata*, 4.

Adorno further writes about the mimetic root of all music, affirming that "interpreting music is not referred to without reason as music-*making*"[377].

The musicologist and musician Christopher Small coined the term "musicking" to express the importance of focusing on this act of making music, instead of the idealized and passive notion of music as a thing. "Musicking" is, thus, the "present participle, or gerund, of the verb *to music*"[378], and Small's claims go hand in hand with our criticism of the Platonist perspectives:

> Music is not a thing at all but an activity, something that people do. The apparent thing "music" is a figment, an abstraction of the action, whose reality vanishes as soon as we examine it at all closely. This habit of thinking in abstractions, of taking from an action what appears to be its essence and of giving that essence a name, is probably as old as language; it is useful in the conceptualizing of our world but it has its dangers. It is very easy to come to think of the abstraction as more real than the reality it represents, to think, for example, of those abstractions which we call love, hate, good and evil as having an existence apart from the acts of loving, hating, or performing good and evil deeds and even to think of them as being in some way more real than the acts themselves, a kind of universal or ideal lying behind and suffusing the actions. This is the trap of reification, and it has been a besetting fault of Western thinking ever since Plato, who was one of its earliest perpetrators.[379]

Small was concerned with promoting a framework for understanding all musicking, first and foremost, as a human activity, "from performer and audience at a symphony concert to drunken ol' pals singing bawdy or sentimental songs in rustic harmony"[380]. Written music we make and listen to in concert halls is certainly more prone to an intellectualization and reification than the non-written singing of ol' pals, precisely because there is an object (the score) representing it. And, as we have already suggested, this can have a negative impact on performance practices of such music, one that we cannot find in most informal

[377] Adorno, 4.
[378] Christopher Small, *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1998), 9.
[379] Small, 2.
[380] Small, 212.

contexts, in which music is acted and experienced *in the moment*, apart from any previous or posthumous objectification and regardless of the drinking involved.

It is this awareness of music as *presence* that Levinson explored and propped up in his book titled precisely *Music in the Moment*[381]. Even if he is concerned exclusively with the experience of listeners, investigating the ways we understand music as it unfolds, we can admit many of his claims to be true also regarding the performative actions that create such unfolding. Not only because, as Smalls advises us, "we must never forget that the player is always the principal listener"[382], but also because from the experience of listeners we might be able to trace back the act of music in performance. Before addressing, in the next section, the specific questions related to the happening of the written musical work, we will, then, investigate Levinson's proposals and accommodate them to our purposes regarding what must musicians be athirst for when performing from the score.

5.2.1. Levinson's Concatenationism for Performers

In *Music in the Moment*, the U.S. American philosopher brought to the fore the discussion on how we listen to and appreciate music. His concatenationist proposal stood against the structuralist way of thinking about music, also known as architectonicism, that many theoreticians and music commentators adopted, focusing particularly on "large-scale structural relationships, or spatialized representations of a musical composition's shape"[383]. Levinson developed his ideas after Edmund Gurney's thoughts in the well-known *The Power of Sound*[384]:

> What is crucial, according to Gurney, is involvement in the musical progression from point to point, the local movement from note to note and phrase to phrase. The essential form of music is located there, he would claim, and not in architectonic vistas beyond the scope of aural experience.[385]

[381] Levinson, *Music in the Moment*.
[382] Small, *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening*, 221.
[383] Levinson, *Music in the Moment*, ix.
[384] Edmund Gurney, *The Power of Sound* (London: Smith, Elder, 1880).
[385] Levinson, *Music in the Moment*, 2–3.

For us to appreciate music, it is, then, according to Gurney and Levinson a matter of accompanying its progression, the continuous flow of events, from one note, motive, phrase, or melody to the next, from moment to moment. “It is in the musical progression from point to point that a piece lives”, he writes, “and the quality of that progression is the principle criterion of its worth as music”[386].

As such, Levinson is granting the event of music in performance a great significance, even though, as we have attested previously, he considers the musical work to be an abstract entity. For the philosopher, however, “the core experience of a piece of music is decidedly not of how it is as a whole, or even of how it is in large portions, since one never has the whole, or large portions of the whole, except in abstract contemplation”[387]. This abstract, intellectual contemplation cannot, according to Levinson, provide the listener the fundamental experience of music, “the musical substance of a composition, part by part, into his or her ‘inner ear’”[388]. Even if such contemplation can contribute an additional sense to the experience of music, Levinson believes it is meaningless on its own, without previous internalizing “the fundamental, dynamically progressive form of a piece of music”[389].

Despite this strict anti-structuralist position, the philosopher points also to the worth of such architectonic knowledge about a musical composition for musicians who engage in performing it:

> Since concatenationism is fundamentally a view about the understanding of music by listeners, in denying that spatial images of global form are necessary for such understanding is not meant to deny that such images are of value to conductors and performers in their attempts to arrive at optimal ways to perform or structure pieces for legitimately present-focused listeners. A spatial grasp of large-scale form may quite plausibly enable a conductor, say, to make the right decisions about how a piece should be played, or shaped at each moment, so that its concatenational

[386] Levinson, 11.
[387] Levinson, 159–60.
[388] Levinson, 157.
[389] Levinson, 157.

> substance, as it were – which any successful piece of music must possess – is conveyed to a listener most effectively.[390]

Even though we can understand that listening to music and making it happen are two inherently distinct activities, as much as they intertwine with each other, in the sense that music makers are also listeners in the event of music, and listeners are also accountable for the happening of such event[391], we can sense that the way we experience music, as musicians or as listeners, is a shared experience of moment-to-moment engagement in the continuous flow of sonorous events, which can be pre-determined by a score, or improvised and created on-stage "from scratch". As such, we are inclined to admit, against Levinson, that if an architectural or structural contemplation can be of use to musicians, in making the right decisions on how the piece should be shaped, it can also be of use to attentive listeners, engaged in the experience of listening.

It is this common bodily experience of music that leads us to believe that what Levinson writes about the appreciation of music as listeners can be understood more amply, encompassing also the very nature of making music happen. We are trying to amplify his perspective, or perhaps merely noticing its fittingness, towards meeting the experience of musicians: concatenationism for performers. Before such focus, however, let us briefly explain Levinson's point, advancing, as a prelude to the next paragraph, that it assumes appreciating music to be a matter of understanding it in a way he calls *basic* musical understanding.

Concatenation, the Cambridge Dictionary asserts, is "a series of events, ideas, or things that are connected". When Levinson poses the question of "How do we listen to music?", his concatenationist perspective leads him to answer that

[390] Levinson, 172.

[391] We believe the way musicians listen to music is transformed in the process of becoming musicians. As such, the experience of listening to music can be fundamentally different between someone that never took action in making music happen, and an experienced musician. Despite being noticed in the philosophical and musicological literature, this difference has not been investigated in much depth either by philosophers and musicologists.

it is by "following music"[392]. In this more recent article, elucidating and re-defending his former claims, he wrote that to appreciate music

> […] it is not so much a matter of *thinking* articulately about the music as it passes, or *contemplating* it in its architectural aspect, as it is a matter of *reacting* to and *interacting* with the musical stream, perceptually and somatically, on a non-analytical, pre-reflective level".[393]

Though perspicuous and reflective of an attentiveness as a listener, Levinson's look into the appreciation and understanding of music by listeners in *Music in the Moment* is walled by the distinction between teleological and anti-teleological music, the latter being described as "a series of unrelated sonic events, a found object, or militantly nondevelopmental"[394]. Examples of anti-teleological music were reiterated by the philosopher in a more recent interview by Bastien Gallet[395], namely compositions by John Cage, Karlheinz Stockhausen, and Morton Feldman, encouraging us to approximate it from the notion of *Newer Music* but, nevertheless, leaving room for questioning if such compositions categorically present those features.

The depiction of teleological music, "from Bach to Schoenberg"[396], is also fitting to the distinction between the tonal canonical music and *Newer Music*, being the first "guided for the most part by ideals or norms of continuation, progression, development, evolution, and directionality"[397], while the second "does not present the aspect of a directed process of some sort"[398]. The kind of comprehension elicited by such anti-teleological music was, thus, categorized by Levinson as almost the opposite of concatenationism, himself suggesting that his theory could not answer to the way we listen to music in general, and merely to the "mainstream of Western instrumental music"[399].

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[392] Jerrold Levinson, "Concatenationism, Architectonism, and the Appreciation of Music," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 238 (2006): 505–14.
[393] Levinson, 32.
[394] Levinson, *Music in the Moment*, 34.
[395] This interview is part of the online Magazine promoted by the Ensemble Intercontemporain and can be found at https://www.ensembleintercontemporain.com/fr/category/entretiens/. The quoted excerpts were translated by myself.
[396] Levinson, *Music in the Moment*, 34.
[397] Levinson, 34.
[398] Levinson, 34.
[399] Levinson, 34.

However, and after *listening* to Anton Webern's third *pièce pour orchestra, op. 6*[400], and exemplifying how can the experience of hearing anti-teleological music be, after all, the same as teleological music, moment-to-moment, Levinson reassures the ample spectrum of his concatenationist perspective. We can read the full description of this experiment of listening to an atonal piece with the same frame of mind as when listening to a tonal one in the earlier mentioned interview. Even if Levinson specifies that anti-teleological music claims rather an "ultra-concatenationist listening", a "listening that would be more intimately focused on the fleetingness of the moment than the listening demanded by teleological music of the standard type"[401], the focus remains the same: understanding and appreciating music happens on the moment-to-moment experience, on the following of the continuous flow of events.

We believe this *simplicity* in explaining how can we, as listeners, understand and appreciate music is the great strength of Levinson's concatenationism, even if his distinction between teleological and anti-teleological music could be questioned. Not only because it can comprehend the way we experience music in general, that is, any type of music we are engaged in listening to, from drunken ol' pals singing to symphony concerts, but also because it acknowledges that the experience of music is fundamental in human nature, in the sense that it is *simply* there, as a base, before any concept or alphabetization. Such experience of music, or "musicking", as Small names it, is, thus, available to "all normally endowed human beings"; they "are born with the gift of musicking, no less than they are born with the gift of speaking and understanding speech"[402]. Understanding music is simply a matter of following it, in the moment and moment-to-moment, "*reacting* and *interacting* with the musical stream"[403], before and beyond any analytical or reflective pretense.

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[400] Levinson mentioned to me that he had listened to recordings of Webern's piece conducted by Karajan, Boulez, Sinopoli, and Dohnanyi, his favorite one being, perhaps, "chacun a sa manière".
[401] Bastien Gallet, "Grand Entretien Avec Jerrold Levinson, Philosophie," *Ensemble Intercontemporain*, December 2015.
[402] Small, *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening*, 207.
[403] Levinson, *Music in the Moment*, 32.

Re-acting and *inter-acting* are the key words leading us towards amplifying Levinson's concatenationism as to encompass the experience of performers whose *actions* produce the musical stream. Following that lead, if *basic understanding* is the sufficient condition for the experience of music as listeners, it might be the case that the same is true for the experience of music as music-makers. We will further address this question in the following paragraph, investigating how can a *basic understanding* of music be sufficient for musicians to play, sing, or conduct an advanced, complex piece of written music. We will start by succinctly go through Levinson's claims on *basic musical understanding*, and discuss whether they could fit the ampler perspective we are looking for.

5.2.2. Levinson's Basic Understanding for Performers

In *Music in the Moment*, the philosopher wrote that a *musical understanding* "centrally involves neither aural grasp of a large span of music as a whole, nor intellectual grasp of large-scale connections between parts"[404]. It is rather "a matter of apprehending individual bits of music and immediate progressions from bit to bit"[405], this being the fundamental, or basic, condition for an understanding of the experience of music. He states that other kinds of legitimate musical understanding, such as "grasping the representational content of program music, registering the social or political significance some music may manage to process, or recognizing principles governing a piece of music as revealed by some analytic procedure"[406], are likely both generally impossible and, even if attainable, "they would be unrewarding, abstract determinations with no experiential impact"[407]. Those other kinds of legitimate understanding of music, however, cannot be so lightly discarded when thinking about how to make music happen in performance; not because they are of necessity, or have any ontological implications, but because they are inevitable. Moreover, we can question the way we understand music to be rewarding. At odds with Levinson,

[404] Levinson, 13.
[405] Levinson, 13.
[406] Levinson, 35.
[407] Levinson, 35.

we can further admit this is also true within the experience of listeners, having, thus, at least potentially, an experiential impact on the ways they understand the music. In any case, however, we believe it is possible to understand music, in the sense of having an impactful aesthetic experience of it, if we listen apprehending its progression from moment-to-moment.

Erkki Huovinen notes in his considerations about understanding music that the distinction between "perceptual understanding" (*Ästhetisches Verstehen*), such as Levinson's *basic understanding*, and "epistemic understanding" (*Erkennendes Verstehen*), such as Kivy's architechtonicism, is, perhaps, merely conceptual. He states, further, that "musicians are often experts in understanding music perceptually: they may have highly developed abilities to grasp even complex sound constructions as musically meaningful"[408]. This meets the idea of an intertwined understanding of music by musicians, construed inside the practice room. When musicians are preparing for a performance, the perceptual and epistemic understanding of the music is growing as a whole. In that sense, and even if the musical quality of a piece, as an aesthetic experience, owes nothing to the epistemic knowledge anyone, musician or listener, might have over it, we should at least acknowledge that the *basic understanding* we are trying to uphold from Levinson's proposal into our investigation emerges in a complex dynamic of practical and theoretical *know-how* and *know-that*, this being particularly true within the Western art written-music tradition.

We have repeatedly sustained throughout this thesis that music is eventual, an experienced process, rather than a fixed object. Thus, our principal concern investigating how musicians make music happen is towards the *basic understanding* of the experience of music, and not to the secondary and subsidiary understandings that relate to some extent or another with such experience. Different approaches and further investigation on the understanding of music by musicians can, of course, be made. As Huovinen opportunely asserted, our beliefs about what it means to understand music will depend "on

[408] Erkki Huovinen, "Understanding Music," in *Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, ed. Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (New York: Routledge, 2011), 125.

our answers to the question of what music is: are we trying to understand music as a human expression, as an artifact, as an experience, as a social activity, or perhaps as a cognitive process?"[409]. Without discarding the relevance of these questions, we will propose that the *basic*, *perceptual* musical understanding is sufficient for musicians to make music happen in performance. We sustain our claims with Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht's consideration on musical understanding, in his well-known book *Musik Verstehen*[410]. As pointed by Huovinen, "in Eggbrecht' conception, epistemic understanding is based on and will always refer to prior, non-conceptual, aesthetic understanding"[411]. He adds, further, that "this is because the reality (*Dasein*) of music lies in its aesthetic complexity"[412]. How can this reality or *Dasein* of music, then, be searched and found by musicians trying to create music in performance?

To answer this question, we will start with the premise that no musician is making music happen in performance if not knowing it. The *basic understanding* of music is also this fundamental knowledge of, or connection to, the event of music. This might come intuitively to experienced musicians, but being able to actively promote such understanding is extremely relevant both to music education in any of its forms, and to musical practice in general[413]. Consequently, the audiences that share the experience of music with musicians will also benefit from such capacity, and for the reasons presented in the previous chapters, this might be particularly relevant for the audiences of *Newer Music*.

Aligned with Levinson's proposals, we suggest that musicians understand and make music happen when they actively connect the discrete sounds, from point to point, progressing in, or better said, promoting the progress and

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[409] Erkki Huovinen, 132.
[410] Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, *Musik Verstehen* (Munich: Piper, 1999).
[411] Erkki Huovinen, "Understanding Music," 128.
[412] Erkki Huovinen, 128.
[413] Current discussion has questioned the traditional transfer of mechanistic and structural knowledge in music education. Schyff *et al*. write that "until recently the taken-for-granted superiority and autonomous status of the Classical canon went largely unquestioned in Western culture and the locus of musical expressivity and meaning was thought to be found in, or to be 'possessed' by the formal structural relationships of the 'music itself'", in Dylan van der Schyff, Andrea Schiavio, and David J. Elliott, "Critical Ontology for an Enactive Music Pedagogy," *Action, Criticism & Theory for Music Education* 15, no. 5 (2016): 84.

continuity of the specific music they are playing, singing, or conducting, moment-to-moment. In this sense, while Levinson's concatenationism suggests that we listen to and understand music by *following* it, we can speculate that performers make and understand music by *leading* it. It is, then, not only a matter of connecting the digits, but a continuous renovation of the action of connecting the digits is also of necessity if music is to happen. The *basic understanding* of the musical progression from point to point, in which "a piece lives", is, then, the continuous and simultaneous act of creating and leading such progression, being also the sufficient condition for making music happen in performance.

Such considerations have an implication on the ontology of the musical work we rehearsed in the third chapter and might answer the ungrateful question of determining how much deviation from the score in Western art written music is allowed in performance for a specific musical work to happen. We will ponder such matters in the next section, explaining how the musical work is fundamentally dependent on this continuity alone, on the *density* of the performance, beyond or before the questions of score compliance. Clinging on those questions are the ones related to the evaluation of performance. We will lean on that afterward, not only because it is of relevance for sustaining our ontological claims, but also because it is relevant for musicians and the discussion on musical practice.

5.3. The Work of Music Only Happens When Every Space is Filled: Further Ontological Implications

The particular case of Western art written music when considering the ontology of the musical work marks as unavoidable the question of how much can musicians deviate from the score in performance if the specific work of music codified by that score is to happen. We criticized earlier a few answers given by several ontological accounts, whether by being too strict or too vague regarding score compliance, but we have delayed our own answer to fit this chapter in the hope of clarifying the importance of minding the music in the gaps left by musical notation. The insufficiency of score compliance alone in making music happen, as we have discussed in the previous section, is because it does not grant such needed information in-between the digits. In the next paragraph we will propose the *analogic moment-to-moment density* as the ontological condition for any written musical work to happen in performance, discussing the implications of such understanding on the question of score compliance, and further regarding the practice and the experience of music. We will then be in the condition to make a few considerations on the evaluation of performance within the Western art music tradition.

Let us preface the discussion ahead with Small's daring claims regarding the relationship between the written musical composition and the performative event:

> There is nothing in the rule book that tells us that the score is a sacred text that must not be altered in any way or that it must be performed in a way that approximates as nearly as possible to the way it was performed in the composer's time. Or if such a rule does exist, it was invented in the twentieth century by composers and musicologists as part of the contest for control of the musical texture, which we have seen has been a feature of the Western concert tradition since the seventeenth century at least.[414]

[414] Small, *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening*, 217.

Beyond his critique of the text-centered and institutionalized performance practices, Small adds a few more considerations on the role of performers within the Western tradition, discarding further the score's authority over the enjoyability of performance. He writes that:

> Performance is for performers and for listeners, not for composers and certainly not for their works and not for musicologists either. The performer's obligation, in other words, is not to the composer (who is quite likely dead anyway and can make no protest) or to the work but to his own enjoyment and to that of his or her listeners, if there be any. The performer has the right to make any changes he or she feels like making in the work and to interpret the written or printed score anyway he or she chooses.[415]

Such affirmation stands bluntly against the majority of considerations about performance practices of Western written music. Except for the emerging field of artistic research, in which traditional ontological perspectives centered on the composition are being questioned[416], most theoreticians will not advance on questions related to performers making changes to the score. It might be simply because if we agree with Small, we are opening up to the possibility of having, for instance, and to take a canonical example, Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony*, performed by an orchestra interpreting the score attending to the rhythm only. This orchestra might have had several different reasons to do so, according to Small in their own right. Moreover, and even if we believe that what composers think about the performances of their compositions is ontologically irrelevant, Beethoven is not minding what people have been doing with his scores for a long time. Would we say that, in this scenario, Beethoven's *Fifth* happened? And what to say about non-canonical interpretations of scores written by composers that are still alive? Can we admit the same openness to the will of performers? Can I take Ferneyough's score of *Unity Capsule*[417], for solo flute, decide that I am going

[415] Small, 217.
[416] Examples are investigations and artistic practices pursued by the already mentioned Orpheus Institute. For a discussion on how "experimentation", instead of "interpretation", can be a fundamental part of the musician's work when making music from the score, see Paulo de Assis, *Logic of Experimentation: Rethinking Musical Performance through Artistic Research* (Leuven: Orpheus Institute Series, 2018).
[417] Brian Ferneyhough, *Unity Capsule* (London: Edition Peters, 1975).

to interpret every notated symbol as a rest, play it that way (awkwardly similar to Cage's *4'33''*, except longer), and say that I have performed *Unity Capsule*? And if I can, should I do it?

We are motivated to answer "Yes" to almost all of these questions. We even got excited to experience Beethoven's *Fifth* the way we imagined, naked to the rhythm. We might be a bit more reluctant, however, to accept this kind of post-modernist approach to the playing of Ferneyhough's scores, and particularly the absurd scenario of having around fifteen minutes of silence and call it *Unity Capsule*, but if we acknowledge that both these imagined scenarios are highly unlikely, we can think about the ontology of the musical work in a much more down-to-earth perspective, away from abstractions. In that way, we can easily understand how experiencing the many times heard Beethoven's *Fifth* in such a different way from the canonical practices spikes our curiosity while experiencing fifteen minutes of silence as Ferneyhough's *Unity Capsule* sounds quite unappealing when compared with experiencing it within the traditional performance practices, that is, complying to the conventions for reading and playing musical notation. Furthermore, and as we will have the chance to discuss in the next section, silence is perhaps the most difficult thing musicians have to manage on stage. That is why Cage's *4'33''* is such a difficult piece to perform having a musical impact, beyond or before the thoughts that pass by the listeners' minds. Imagine, then, how difficult would it be for the flutist to be actively musical during the fifteen-minutes-of-silence-version of *Unity Capsule*.

I find this fiction nearly impossible to happen, perhaps because as a flute player I would not engage in such a quest for a silent *Unity Capsule*, and I don't believe many flute players would be willing to do so, the same way I don't believe any orchestra will anytime soon play only the rhythm in Beethoven's *Fifth*. Many tethers to the canonical performance practices in Western art music must still be untied, and much philosophical discussion will follow before the concrete happening of these and other ultramodern musical performances can question the ontological perspective on musical works we have been arguing for. Nevertheless, I believe the fundamental *analogic moment-to-moment density*, which we will look into in the following paragraph, to be fitting and relevant in any

musical performance, ultramodern or not. The rhythm-only performance of Beethoven's score could only be said to have presented the specific work *Fifth Symphony* if this *analogic moment-to-moment density* was maintained throughout the performance, and the same is true for any musical event within or without the Western art tradition.

5.3.1. Analogic Moment-to-Moment Density

To better explain what we mean when we write *analogic moment-to-moment density* let us recall what was suggested in the third chapter when considering the *variable traits* and the differences encompassed by the musical work. I proposed "taking a step back and contemplating the possibility of shifting the focus from the *quality* of those differences to their *quantity* or *intensity*". It is only by stepping back that we can accommodate the notion of the musical work as performance, incorporating the differences that performances inevitably present, without being distracted by questions of taste and circumstance. This performative moment-to-moment density the score can only silently present as an appeal to musicians who can read it is the fundamental condition for written music to happen. It is a matter of having continuous sonorous information being presented, creating a thick flow of sonorous events with a sense of continuity and forward propelling, before and independently of the variation different performers and different performances can present.

It is such thickness and constant density of information that gives rise to music and the musical work, beyond the encoded digits. More important than score compliance is, thus, this *analogic moment-to-moment density*, a gesture, much like Adorno's mimetic element, which must be pursued by musicians preparing for performance and actively presented in performance if the musical work is to happen. As such, we can say that a specific work of music happened in a specific performance only if this actively produced continuity and density is not disrupted from beginning to end. Even if deviations from the score occur in performance, the integrity of the musical work will not be compromised as long as this *analogic moment-to-moment density* is constantly renovated throughout.

In the abstract, this means that a performance of whichever score loudly failing to comply with it can still be said to present the specific encoded work if moment-to-moment density is not interrupted. In the concrete Western tradition of written music, however, it is highly unlikely that if such deviations from the score happen, they won't disturb the constant drive of performers formally educated to comply minutely with the indications left by composers.

Allowing extensive deviations from the score into our viewpoint of musical works does not mean we disregard or neglect the composer's work. As we have repeatedly said, the composition is the condition of possibility for a specific musical work to happen in performance. Nevertheless, we are more concerned with the performative implications on the aesthetic experience of music, and with how can musicians promote such experience even if deviations from the score occur. In this way, we are entrusting musicians to comply with the composition, avoiding any regulative measure regarding such compliance in the performative event. The *analogic moment-to-moment density*, however, is the *sine qua non* without which music ceases to happen. If this *density* is not presented throughout the performance, even if it is a perfectly complying with the score performance, the work of music will not happen.

The requisite of maintaining a continuous *analogic moment-to-moment density* in and throughout the performance might be considered excessive, perhaps in a similar way the perfect compliance requisite is excessive. If, for instance, a great performance of Stockhausen's *Gruppen*, full of verve and information throughout, happens to have the briefest moment in which continuity of information is broken, by a single musician in one of the three orchestras playing it, we cannot admit it into our conception of what that specific musical work is. This is, thus, a topic needing further discussion regarding also what is perceived by the audiences[418]. It might be the case that in such a performance the broken continuity of a single musician's playing is not sufficient to disrupt the continuity being presented by the conductors and the orchestras involved. If we

[418] Sergiu Celibidache talks about these questions, within his experience as a conductor, in the already cited interview available at Celibidache, "Sergiu Celibidache on His Philosophy of Music.", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SthKs40ClCY&ab_channel=1Furtwangler.

choose a composition for a single musician as an example, however, it is clear that a disruption in the needed *analogic moment-to-moment density* will compromise the happening of music and, consequently, of the musical work[419].

While we are concerned to a certain degree in this thesis with the ontology of the musical work in Western art written music, particularly because of the impact ontological assumptions have on *Newer Music*'s performance practices, we are aiming the investigation towards finding how it is that musicians produce the continuity we claim fundamental if music is to happen. Such will be the purpose of the sixth and final chapter. For now, let us dedicate some thought to the evaluation of musical performance in the following paragraph, and conclude this wondering on minding the music in the gap with a consideration about silence, in the next section, and how can the absence of sound be filled with information by musicians.

5.3.2. Evaluating Musical Performance

Evaluating musical performance is always tied to opinion. It is as much a social matter as it is an aesthetic one. Considering such a question, Levinson writes that "performances of music are *legitimately* evaluated from a number of different perspectives, and thus, as a result, there is little use for the notion of a good performance *simpliciter* of a given piece of music"[420]. There is a "perspective relativity" regarding the evaluation of musical performances which hampers our quest for such a *simpliciter*. Moreover, if we assume, as Small does, that all musicking is equally worthy as a social event, evaluating performance becomes either a far more complex of an issue or an irrelevant one altogether:

> […] if all musicking is serious, then no way of musicking is intrinsically better than any other; all are to be judged, if they are to be judged at all, on their success in articulating […] the concepts of relationships of those who are taking part. We may not like those concepts of relationships, and we are surely entitled to say so if we wish, but we should understand

[419] We mentioned this fact in the previous chapter, quoting the notes taken inside the practice room on *Glosa II*, by Jorge Peixinho, on October 31: "In the recording, the moments where I hesitate are noticeable and the music disappears!", in Appendix 2, October 31, 2019.
[420] Levinson, *Music, Art and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics*, 376.

> that our opinions are as much social as they are purely aesthetic – if anything can be judged to be purely aesthetic. That is to say, we are passing an opinion not merely on a musical style but on the whole set of ideal relationships that are being articulated by the musical performance.[421]

We are considering, however, the evaluation of musical performance within the quest towards a presentation of the written musical work by musicians, in the sense they must assess their efforts throughout the process of preparing for performance. As such, some judgments must be made by performers behind the scenes, inside the practice room, and consequent decisions taken if the musical work is to be presented on-stage. It is, thus, a concern with evaluating musical performance in a prefatory way, even if the actual on-stage performance can be assessed in the same manner.

Both Levinson and Small suggest answers to the question "How do I know if a musical performance is a good one?". But while Levinson is concerned with the evaluation of performance within the work-performance dichotomy, suggesting that beyond attempting to produce the work's sound and instrumental structure as determined by the composer, a performance must be faithful to the work's expressive content, Small attends to the general question of musical quality, proposing that the best performance is that which comprehensively, subtly and clearly empowers all the participants to "explore, affirm, and celebrate the concepts of ideal relationship of those taking part"[422]. In both cases, the problem seems to be defining what does "good" mean, and how can one evaluate "goodness".

Our purpose being, in this investigation, to determine how can musicians produce the written musical work in performance, and having rejected both the appeal to comply with the score and to a predetermined and fixed expressive content in the composition, we are leaning towards Small's proposals of exploring, affirming, and celebrating the social act of musicking, empowering all the participants. In our perspective, evaluating musical performance cannot be

[421] Small, *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening*, 213.
[422] Small, 215.

detached from the claims we made earlier about the fundamental need of an *analogic moment-to-moment density* promoted by musicians and experienced by all the participants in the occasion because it is such a continuous flow of events, moment-to-moment, that engages both performers and listeners in the same action of musicking, as Small would write. The evaluation of performance in the Western art written music tradition must attend, beyond or before matters of opinion, to this fundamental musical quality.

Alexander Lerch and his colleagues present both the importance and the current state of affairs regarding music education on this topic:

> Performance assessment is a critical and ubiquitous aspect of music pedagogy: students rely on regular feedback from teachers to learn and improve skills, recitals are used to monitor progress, and selection into ensembles is managed through competitive auditions. The performance parameters on which these assessments are based are not only subjective but also ill-defined, leading to large differences in subjective opinion among music educators.[423]

They add that "in spite of several attempts across varied performance parameters using different methods, the important features for assessing music performances remain unclear"[424], and this is one of the reasons why it is paramount to promote philosophical investigations such as the one we are engaging in this thesis. Philosophy can help us go beyond the "false experience", as Celibidache calls it, of directness when assessing musical performance. Defending the slow time of some of his conducting, and criticizing the critics for not transcending the physicality of the musical text, he states the following:

> The more complex something is, the more time it requires. So if someone says that my pieces are slow, he is merely proving that he is deaf to music. He is hearing the physical material, the direct frequencies. But I can also hear the fourth octave, called the astral sound. In Ravel or Debussy it's possible too. I reduce the highs and the lows, but not everyone has the ear for it. Critics find it too slow. They reduce the physical time, but have neither perceived the same thing, nor have they

[423] Alexander Lerch et al., "An Interdisciplinary Review of Music Performance Analysis," *Transactions of the International Society for Music Information Retrieval* 3, no. 1 (2020): 231.
[424] Lerch et al., 233.

> had the possibility of reducing what they have heard. It is a question of musicality. The poor critic can't do it. He is a victim of a false experience.[425]

Celibidache is proposing that whenever we listen to music hold back by the memory, the science, or the knowledge of what we think it should be, we cannot access the transcendental, beyond the subjectivity of finding it beautiful or otherwise. He then continues, criticizing also conservatoire professors:

> Which critic ever hears anything more than the direct sound? He has yet to be born. One could guide the critics to this new perspective, but who will do it? Not the professor of conducting at the conservatoire. It's a disgrace! Why? Is it to ruin young people? To evoke embittered reactions because there are no others?[426]

Music should be, thus, always a novelty, different from the direct sound that emerges when we play the same structure and content written in the score. Hence, to assess and compare different performances from the same musical text, we should attend primarily to such novelty, instead of focusing on the stability that our memories and traditional biases on what a specific work should sound like prompt us to.

Musicians preparing for the performance of a musical work in this tradition must, hence, assess their playing, singing, or conducting with such novelty in mind. The actual performance can be evaluated, then, in one of two ways: either as presenting the specific musical work intended, if *analogic moment-to-moment density* is constant throughout, or not, if such *density* is interrupted. In the second scenario, whenever this *density* of information fails to be presented, music is not happening. This does not mean, however, that the whole performance is to be discarded as musically insignificant. Music can happen intermittently in any performance intending to present a specific musical work, even if in that case the work is not presented. We are, thus, making a point about the evaluation of musical performance in the Western art tradition primarily concerned with the presentation of written works of music, and not with if they are either "good" or "bad". Those further questions that might be asked about the quality of different

[425] Celibidache, "Sergiu Celibidache on His Philosophy of Music."
[426] Celibidache.

performances presenting the same work are left out of consideration here because the answers to them can only be based on preference and opinion, not being germane to the ontology of the musical work. Moreover, we can equally appreciate the goodness of different performances, without preferring one or the other. Levinson's statement on several performances of Brahms symphonies is an example of this. He writes that "Boult's Brahms symphonies are good, so are Solti's, so are Walter's, so are Karajan's, and so are Kleiber's, each in different ways"[427]. For the American philosopher, this is not so much a matter of indifference as it is of acknowledging that musical works can happen differently. However, as we have seen, Levinson seems to ontologically disregard these differences. On the contrary, we believe that music, and consequently the ontology of the musical work, is rooted in such differences[428]. The musician preparing for performance should care, thus, for such differences, practicing the many ways in which an *analogic moment-to-moment density* can happen. Such repetition of the different is what will bring the focus towards the fundamental directiveness filling the gaps left by the score.

[427] Levinson, *Music, Art & Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics*, 387.

[428] We should note that Levinson is, in his remark, comparing recordings of the Brahms' symphonies and not live performances. As we have noted in the first part of this thesis, recording technology might have led us to forget the transitivity and inevitable differences essential to music, even if we can acknowledge that listening to the same recording can be each time a renewed experience. Such questions, however, are beyond the amplitude of our research since they concern the experience of listening to music and not of performing it.

5.4. What About Silence?

We have mentioned silence on several occasions throughout this thesis, from the one which is present in the concert ritual of Western art music, to the one used as a compositional device in Takemitsu's *Itinerant*. In this section, we will pursue a more thorough consideration about this silence in compositions, focusing on finding how can the notated rests, requesting the musicians not to produce any sound, can still be filled with the information needed for a continuous flow of musical events in performance. We will attempt to explain the importance of these silences, as well as the ones framing the compositions, that is, immediately before and immediately after the notated instructions, in the creation of music by performers.

The reason for this reflection has to do not only with the obvious question posed above, on how can silence fit the ontological configuration we have been defending for musical works but also with a curiosity that was triggered in me many years ago, not long after I started learning the flute, by a saying of those you can hear in the realm of music schools, never knowing who said it first. It was precisely about the importance of silence in musicality and could be formulated in a way such as this: "More than by the sounds, you can tell a good musician by the silences". This is perhaps a counterintuitive saying, especially in the context of Western art music formal education, oriented towards the development of sonorous technical skills and, moreover, concerned with the production of the best tone one can get out of an instrument, voice, or ensemble. It can even be considered paradoxical, in the sense that it goes against most definitions of music, which leave no room for silence when reflecting on what delimits the musical from the non-musical.

But even if silence is absent in the definitions of music we revised in the third chapter, it is not an ignored topic on the philosophy of music. The growing popularity of long silences as compositional devices in *Newer Music*, highlighted

by Jennifer Judkins[429], is likely the reason for the corresponding development of philosophical and musicological interest. The moto for most investigations, however, or at least the unavoidable issue, is the famed composition *4'33''* by John Cage, aligned with his writings on the subject. "The material of music", he wrote, "is sound and silence"[430]. According to William Brooks, Cage believed the structure of music to be, first and foremost, rhythmic, silence being the condition that enables it[431]. Douglas Kahn, also reflecting on Cagean silence and quoting Cage's words on a 1948 lecture given at the Black Mount College, explains how the composer found this structure to be fundamental in music:

> He figured that structure was determined by duration, which sound and silence shared, and in turn determine being from non-being: "Music is a continuity of sound. In order that it may be distinguishable from non-being, it must have structure." Pitch, loudness, and timbre, although they could be heard in musical sound, were not intrinsic to the being or non-being of music because they did not require duration, whereas "silence cannot be heard in terms of pitch or harmony: It is heard in terms of time length."[432]

What is striking in Cage's reflections is that silence *is heard*. It was this finding that led him later to compose *4'33''*, in which the musician is instructed to produce no sounds, affirming "there is no such thing as silence"[433], and believing, thus, that music can be everywhere, in the ongoing continuity of the sounding world.

4'33'' is an ode to such belief, a sharing of Cage's sensibility to the ever-present sounds in our daily lives, and has led, since it's composition and first performance in 1952, to extensive discussion on what is music, and whether such a work can be considered music or merely a performance piece about music with

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[429] Jennifer Judkins, "Silence, Sound, Noise, and Music," in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, ed. Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 14–23.
[430] John Cage, *Silence: Lectures and Writings* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 62.
[431] William Brooks, "Pragmatics of Silence," in *Silence, Music, Silent Music*, ed. Nicky Losseff (London: Routledge, 2007), 97–126.
[432] Douglas Kahn, "John Cage: Silence and Silencing," *The Musical Quarterly* 81, no. 4 (1997): 574.
[433] Cage, *Silence: Lectures and Writings*, 51.

no musical content[434]. Our perspective on this, as suggested earlier, is that *4'33''* is as much a musical work as any other performance by the score that maintains a constant *analog moment-to-moment density* of information throughout, even if it is tremendously difficult to attain such density producing no intentional sounds. If a performance from the score maintains such density through silence, and we believe it is possible to do so, *4'33''* will have happened. We are, thus, pondering on silence maintaining our focus on what musicians must do in performance for music to happen, regardless of further debate on what is heard or not by the audiences in the concert room. Notwithstanding the philosophical relevance of such a debate, the aim of this thesis is centered on the actions of musicians in the Western art written music tradition towards the creation of music in performance. As such, what interests us is how the intentional absence of sound can be filled with information by performers, and how to attain and maintain the *analogic moment-to-moment density*, crucial for music to happen, through silence, that is, through the opposite of what musicians have been practicing to do since they started learning music.

Percussionist and scholar, Jennifer Judkins writes precisely about this. Although "the characterization of musical silence is one of the most crucial musical decisions made during a performance"[435], it is also greatly neglected inside the practice room. She writes that "it is as if musicians feel that what would fill the silence cannot be present until the performance, and therefore there is no sense in rehearsing it"[436]. This is particularly true for longer and framing silences, as she also points out. At the same time, Judkins is aware of the musical relevance and impact such silences can have on the performative event: "In truly great performances, where ultimate technical and artistic control has been reached, the energy presented on stage during silences can electrify the hall. These moments are rare."[437] What she does not infer from this, but we are

[434] Stephen Davies, for instance, does not admit Cage's *4'33''* into his definition of music as "organized sound" (see Stephen Davies, "John Cage's 4'33'': Is It Music?," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 75, no. 4 (1997): 448–62.).
[435] Jennifer Judkins, "The Aesthetics of Silence in Live Musical Performance," *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* 31, no. 3 (1997): 40.
[436] Judkins, 41.
[437] Judkins, 42.

motivated to do, is that the rarity of such electrifying silent moments in musical performance is a consequence of musicians failing to practicing them.

Our point is that, if silence is as much part of the music as sound is, it should also be practiced. The senseless feeling in rehearsing silences Judkins refers to is only justified within the ontological misconceptions about the musical work that we criticized. If we accept that works of music are performative events that live through the differences performances inevitably entail, it is clear that even the sounds produced by musicians cannot be present until the performance. In each performance, as well as in each practice session or rehearsal, both sounds and silences are always presented anew. But, of course, it is technically much more demanding to produce any sound than to produce no sound at all. The technical practice of the sounding parts of the work is, thus, unavoidable and in many cases very time-consuming. Artistically speaking, however, and as we have been claiming, something more, namely the *analogic moment-to-moment density* which also demands practice, is necessary throughout, from the silence preceding the first sound produced by musicians, to the silence preceding the first applause in the audience.

Failing to rehearse silences can, thus, be considered a symptom of an ontologically compromised musical practice. In other words, a practice that fails at the core of its own being, as if empty on the inside, as a sterile analysis of the phenomenon, missing the phenomenon itself. Before addressing how musicians can *inform* the silences in their practice, let us consider Judkins' thoughts on the different types of musical silences, aiming at understanding what unifies them when it comes to being produced in the continuous flow of musical events. Upfront, we would like to subscribe to the clear distinction she presents between *intrinsic* and *framing* musical silences. As we will see, Judkins also distinguishes between *measured* and *unmeasured* silences, the first being mostly the ones *intrinsic* to the pulse of music, and the second those in which we can sense no pulse or beat, as framing silences can be, but also as, for instance, the long silences used as a compositional tool in *Newer Music*. She dedicates most attention to these longer, *unmeasured* silences, as well as to *framing* silences,

having considered them “more interesting philosophically”[438]. Even if we can question this judgment on what is more or what is less of a philosophically interesting topic, we believe Judkins’ considerations on silence, all the more being herself an experienced musician, can help us understand better the phenomenon of silence in music and ultimately lead us to confirm our thesis that *anticipation* is what propels music forward in performance.

The important distinction between *measured* and *unmeasured* silences is paramount to our concerns, for if the first might be considered easy to perform the same is not true for the second. *Measured* silences “are short, notated, pulsed moments felt as part of the ongoing musical line”[439], while *unmeasured* silences are longer and include “framing silences (before and after the work, and between movements), grand pauses, and other longer internal silences (fermatas, caesuras)”[440]. Judkins writes that these silences, in which a beat or pulse is absent, are technically more challenging for musicians, or “present considerable technical problems because of the exposed attacks and releases”[441]. However, we believe there is more difficulty in producing these *unmeasured* silences than the mere technical “edge-shaping” challenge. As we will see, it is, most of all, a question of timing.

Intrinsic silences can, thus, be *measured* or *unmeasured*. Longer intrinsic silences are usually *unmeasured* and, as Judkins points out, “often by virtue of their long duration, have difficulty maintaining a directional status at all”[442]. This acknowledgment can lead us to draw them closer to the *framing* silence she identifies before, after, and in-between movements of the same musical work. Further, we can question if these edging silences can, instead, be considered as part of the work and, in that sense, also *intrinsic*. We are disposed to believe this is the case, even if we have to dismantle a few ritualistic conventions of Western art music, examining the boundaries of the written musical work. As such, a few

[438] Judkins, “Silence, Sound, Noise, and Music,” 20.
[439] Judkins, 20.
[440] Judkins, 20.
[441] Judkins, 20.
[442] Judkins, “The Aesthetics of Silence in Live Musical Performance,” 48.

words should be dedicated to the question of when does a specific musical work begin and end within our ontological standpoint.

Judkins writes about these ritualistic settlements, which are also addressed by philosophers investigating Western art music, namely Godlovitch, concerned, amongst other things, with the ontology of the musical work. She sustains that "we have certain conventions in Western music that enable us to tell when a musical work begins and ends, and what sounds are most likely musical sounds that are part of the work (the sounds of the trumpets), and what sounds are probably not part of the work (the cough of the woman in front of you)"[443]. Even if she carefully phrases this deliberation with the words "most likely", and "probably", it reiterates the text-centered ontological perspective about musical works, which excludes any coughing and other sounds that are not pre-registered in the score. If we are, however, to include the differences the performative event inevitably encompasses as part of the musical work, we must accept as well the different sounds that different audiences carefully or carelessly produce in each event, taken as a whole, as part of that work, safeguarding that the fundamental *analogic moment-to-moment density* produced by musicians is not disrupted by such sounds. Cage's *4'33''* is such an iconic musical work because it enlightens us precisely about the listeners' presence in music, encouraging an ampler perspective on what music really is.

But let us return to the foregoing question. It is avowed, and perhaps commonsensical, that musical works start with the first sounds produced by musicians and end when the last sounds produced by musicians are extinguished. Judkins excludes, in the same way, the *framing* silences before and after such edges from the ontological core of musical works calling them respectively "preperformance" and "postperformance" silences[444]. We would like to criticize this perspective and include such pre and post performance silences as part of the musical work as a whole, likewise other longer silences and silences between movements are included. They should, thus, be considered not as pre-

[443] Judkins, "Silence, Sound, Noise, and Music," 14.
[444] Judkins, "The Aesthetics of Silence in Live Musical Performance."

or post- performance, but as intrinsic to the performance, requiring as much care and attention in musical practice as any other sound or silence that is part of the work. We are, then, considering the frame as part of the picture in the musical work, so to speak. And we will have the chance of making further considerations on this. For now, we will attend two more of Judkin's thoughts on those framing silences.

She writes that "unlike preperformance silences which are full of expectation and empty of content, postperformance silences are rather empty of expectation and yet full of reflective content"[445]. Further, Judkins associates expectation with anticipation regarding preperformance silences, and quotes the Polish musicologist Zofia Lissa:

> The front edge of the musical frame, like most beginnings, holds the strongest anticipation. These preperformance silences are those moments when, in a traditional concert setting, the applause has died down, the baton is raised, and instruments are poised. Zofia Lissa has called this time "the condition of tense expectancy of a group of human beings mentally prepared to live collectively through an artistic experience".[446]

If, however, we admit that both pre and postperformance silences are part of the musical work, we must conclude that neither the first is empty of content, nor the second can be filled so soon with reflective substance. We suggest that the "condition of tense expectancy" Lissa identifies is the very content of those silences anticipating the first sounds in performances, and we would like to broaden such perspective to suggest that silences after the last sounds in a performance, before the applause starts, are also filled with such a "tense expectancy". It is perhaps *the condition of tense expectancy of a group of human beings who lived collectively through the artistic experience that now comes to an end*. As such, it is not a precocious reflective response that entails the final part of a musical work, but an expectation for the individual and collective reply that will follow the artistic experience.

[445] Judkins, 46.
[446] Judkins, 45.

As for the musicians' part, we will suggest in the next chapter that anticipating what comes next is what fills both sounds and silences with the required information creating a dense line of events. Every silence in music is filled with the expectation of the sounds and silences that will follow. It is such expectation that musicians must keep throughout sound or silence, anticipating at every moment what will come next. The final silence in each specific performance is, thus, filled with the expectation of a response from the audience, both by musicians and listeners. It can be a somewhat diffuse boundary between the musical and the non-musical. If we think about concert settings that stand outside the Western art music tradition, such as, for instance, the ones in pop music, the response from the audience can even break, and usually does, into the work of music itself. It might be, thus, difficult to delimit the boundaries of the musical work, particularly at the end. The beginning is perhaps clearer, at least within the Western concert tradition, in the silence starting immediately after the first gesture of musicians, anticipating the first sound.

Regardless of being able to precisely define the boundaries of the musical work, it is perhaps more important to remember once again the performative character of its ontological status, re-underlining that the different ways those boundaries happen in different performances fit within the work's *variable traits*. The first silence, before the first sound, of the same musical work, can be longer or shorter, anticipating a different character in each performance, it can also be very similar between different performances, especially if the same musicians are playing, but the occasion is always a new one. This is also a lesson we can take from Cage's *4'33"*. The occasion changes the same music. In each performance, the musical work is actualized, presented, created anew by musicians and audiences.

A final word should be addressed, still, to the longer unmeasured silences that sometimes appear between sections of measured sounds, and that we have found more difficult to produce in performance. We suggested that musically producing these silences was mostly a matter of timing. The difficulty in producing them is, then, in the fact that such timing is unmeasured. The musician has to create those timings, each occasion demanding a precise transition from sound

to a silence that starts being filled with the expectation of a response by the audience, back again to the expectation of what comes next, and finally to sound again. These silences must be filled both with tension and release from the previous sounds and with a preparation anticipating what will sound next.

When practicing for the performance of Takemitsu's *Itinerant*, I registered a few notes on such silences which lead to the considerations I am making now. On September 29, for instance, I wrote "Takemitsu's score is almost fully practiced. The major difficulty is to give continuity between the several motives separated by rests."[447]. It might be useful to recall how these rests, or pauses, in Takemitsu's score are unmeasured, appearing sometimes with different fermatas, as shown in Picture 5 below, within the overall indication of a *flexible* slow tempo. The difficulty in giving and maintaining continuity in such silent transitions is related to the fact that in rests, the length is the only thing musicians can control. Furthermore, performing with the right timing and managing silence on stage is a matter requiring extreme sensibility and experience. Throughout my practice of Takemitsu's score I also took notes on this specific timing, and the ways it could happen differently each time I played:

> Today I played the full program once and dedicated the remaining of the session to Takemitsu's piece. The timing of the silences between motives is hard to figure out and each time I play, it seems that it can be different. If I am immersed in the music and, in each silence, preparing what comes next, anticipating, it comes more naturally, but sometimes, especially if what comes next is technically difficult, it is hard to prepare without creating tension. (Appendix 2, December 22, 2019)

Practicing these silences is, thus, a matter of practicing the different timings they can have on different occasions, maintaining continuity in the flow of events, and not letting the fear of failing what comes next interfere with such continuity. In the case of Cage's *4'33''*, the same thing can be practiced by the musicians, if they feel the predetermined number of silent beats[448] to make for the specified length with a sense of direction, in each beat anticipating the following. As we will see, filling the gaps left by musical notation, be them silences or the spaces

[447] Appendix 2, September 29, 2019.
[448] Cage's *4'33''* is, thus, composed by measured silences.

between one note and the next, is a matter of active intentionality, of promoting an *analogic moment-to-moment density*. In the next chapter, we will develop the idea that beyond causing the sounds and silences that make music, musicians must anticipate what will follow so the gaps can be filled with such intention.



Picture 5 – From Takemitsu's Itinerant performance instructions

6. Anticipation as the Motor of Music: a Practice-Based Philosophical Approach

We have finally arrived at the place to present our proposal of a philosophical model for making music in performance. Again, we reiterate that we are considering musical performance within the Western art tradition of written music and particularly concerned with *Newer Music*. The considerations we will be making are, thus, tied to the contours of this specific context we presented in the first chapter. However, throughout the investigation, we have had reasons to believe that assuming anticipation as the motor of music can be thought of as a broader perspective on how the event of music happens in general, regardless of genre, context, or the existence of a score. It might be of interest to further explore such perspective and the several kinds of music and traditions it could be fitting, beyond the one we are dedicating our attention towards.

In the next sections, we will address first the etymology of *anticipation*, linking it to the deliberations made in the previous chapter. We will then dedicate, again, some attention to the experience of listeners and how it can inform our knowledge about the experience of musical performers. The third section in this chapter will explore further the analogy between music and the act of drawing, this time focusing on how anticipating the continuity of the drawing gesture informs what is drawn and how that experience relates to the act of music. At last, in the final section, we will present the philosophical model for making music in performance, developed through this practice-based research, and find how anticipation can produce the continuity we claim fundamental if music is to happen.

6.1. Etymology

Looking into the etymology of the word *anticipation* can aid us to encounter several viewpoints, which might help us, in their turn, when trying to understand the action of *anticipating* as a relevant feature in music-making. The *Online Etymology Dictionary*[449] states that the general meaning of *anticipation* as the "act of being before another in doing something"[450] dates from the 1550s while meaning the "action of looking forward to"[451] dates from the year 1809. It is a "noun of action from past-participle stem of *anticipare*"[452], from Latin *anticipatio*, and this is the first important thing to notice when relating it with the action of music-making. It is the conjunction of *ante* + *capio*. According to the *Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages*, *anti* is the Proto-Italic root of *ante*, meaning "before, in front of"[453], the Proto-Indo-European root being *ant*, meaning "in front", "front side, face", "before, near, facing", over "against, face to face", and "toward, along"[454]. In its turn, *capio* or *capere* means *to take*, with derivatives such as *captare* ("to try to touch, grasp at"), *captivus* ("taken prisoner"), *anticipare* ("to occupy beforehand"), *capesso* ("to grasp, seize"), *accipere* ("to take, receive"), *percipere* ("to perceive, acquire, earn"), and *praecipere* ("to seize beforehand, to give notice, advise")[455], its Proto-Indo-European root being *kap* ("to seize, grasp")[456].

Besides having an action-oriented root, in the same way our ontological perspective understands music as the act of performing, other noteworthy meanings relate to the way we are motivating our quest towards understanding how musicians should fill the gaps left by musical notation. To grasp, capture, or perceive beforehand when performing is filling each present moment in music

[449] Douglas Harper, "Online Etymology Dictionary," n.d., https://www.etymonline.com/.
[450] Douglas Harper, "Anticipation," Online Etymology Dictionary, n.d.
[451] Harper.
[452] Harper.
[453] Michiel de Vaan, "Ante," in *Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the Other Italic Languages* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 45.
[454] Vaan, 45.
[455] Michiel de Vaan, "Capio," in *Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the Other Italic Languages* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 89.
[456] Vaan, 90.

with the fundamental sense of direction or continuity, as if an excess of what is to come was propelling what is presented, towards, and along with it. The fundamental continuity of music is produced by musicians whenever they fulfill each moment with this know-where-to, this directiveness. A *basic musical understanding* of what will come next at each moment is, thus, essential if anticipation is driving performing musicians.[457]

The idea of *anticipation* as trying to touch beforehand or seizing in advance is also quite fitting to the practice of music in a broader sense – What are rehearsals if not an anticipation of performance? – but at the same time, at a microscopic level, so to speak, the enthusiasm in music-making is in this crafting, granting access to a privileged position of experiencing each moment in music before any audience member.[458] It is a *will* of accessing music, and each moment in music, before it is presented, creating it by trying to take it. In Western art written-music, this *will*, or *drive*, is distinctly present from the moment musicians decide they will perform a particular composition, even before they acquire the score, and it should remain present until the performance is finished.

In *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, the change of Latin from *capere* to *cipare* (*ante*+*cipare*)[459] is precisely related to the word *abigeat*, "to drive"[460], from *agere*, "to set in motion, drive, lead, conduct,

[457] At this point, it might be asked the relation between the *anticipation* I am claiming fundamental for music to happen and the practice of free musical improvisation, in which there is no score or predetermined script to attain a previous understanding of or to grasp what is to come. Such a matter is surely beyond the horizon of a thesis focused on the particular case of Western written music. Nevertheless, we are inclined to believe that even in free improvisation a pre-perception of what will come immediately after must be presented at each moment by musicians, who are at the same and in real-time creating the direction that propels what is heard now towards what is heard next. It is undoubtedly an extremely specialized practice in which an exquisite knowledge of the instrument is paramount, but most of all a great knowledge of what music is and can be. The possibility that *anticipation* is what drives the music, even if no one but the musician knows at each moment where to, leads us to a curious point of conversion between free musical improvisation and most works of *Newer Music*, in which the scenario is quite similar.

[458] In the next section, we will ponder on *anticipation* and the experience of listeners and develop further this idea of a *décalage* between the otherwise quite similar practices of making music and listening to music.

[459] Ernest Klein, "Anticipate," in *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 40.

[460] Ernest Klein, "Abigeat," in *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 2.

govern, to do, act"[461]. The suffix *-ion*, in *anticipation*, advocates also for an action-oriented meaning, and the same happens in the Latin languages. The prefix *ante-*, beyond its French and Latin root meaning "before, in front of"[462], is cognate with several words in Old Indian, Tocharian, Armenian, Greek, Old Norse, Old Saxon, Old English, Old High German, Middle High German, German, and Hittite, meaning "opposite, opposed to, over against"[463]. Meaning "to catch, seize, take hold of, take, receive, hold, contain"[464], *capere* relates also to Old English and Gothic words meaning "to have"[465].

The idea of *anticipation* as the opposite of *seizing*, or *taking hold of*, might seem, in a way, counterintuitive when thinking about musical performance. In a particular manner in *Newer Music*'s performance practices, *taking hold of* the many technical requisites, as we have seen, is fundamental for the continuous flow of musical events, as is a *basic musical understanding*. How are we, then, proposing the opposite of such necessary control and knowledge – *anticipation* as the opposite of *capere* – to be the vital element for making *Newer Music* in performance? The answer to this question is perhaps related to the very transient nature of music. To grasp, or capture an understanding of music might be strongly linked to the experience of *anticipation*, in the sense of knowing or doing beforehand, fulfilling itself with what is to come and, at the same time, denying a fixed perception of each moment, being in this way an *anti- caption* throughout. This perspective aligns with our ontological focus on the *variable traits* of the musical work, as also with our understanding of music as performance.

Saint Augustine wrote about this transitivity of time exemplifying precisely with reciting a psalm, that is, performing it:

> The mind performs three functions, those of expectation, attention, and memory. The future, which it expects, passes through the present to which it attends, into the past, which it remembers. […] Suppose that I

[461] Ernest Klein, "Agent," in *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 18.
[462] Ernest Klein, "Ante-," in *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 38–39.
[463] Klein.
[464] Ernest Klein, "Captive," in *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1971), 112–13.
[465] Klein.

> am going to recite a psalm that I know. Before I begin, my faculty of expectation is engaged by the whole of it. But once I have begun, as much of the psalm as I have removed from the province of expectation and relegated to the past now engages my memory, and the scope of the action which I am performing is divided between the two faculties of memory and expectation, the one looking back to what I have already recited, the other looking forward to the part which I have still to recite. But my faculty of attention is present all the while, and through it passes what was the future in the process of becoming the past. As the process continues, the province of memory is extended in proportion as that of expectation is reduced, until the whole of my expectation is absorbed. This happens when I finish my recitation and it has all passed into the province of memory.[466]

Anticipation as the motor of music can be understood in the same way as Augustine's expectation. It is such expectative for what is to come that fills the present moment and transforms it at the same time in what was and what will be. But as we have seen, in the hyper-specialized context of Western art written music, and particularly working with the extremely detailed scores of *Newer Music*, anticipation of what comes next cannot be disconnected from the practiced memory over the full musical text and necessary actions to make it sound. According to Liliann Manning and her colleagues, "St. Augustine was very likely the first philosopher to put forward the idea that past and future could be seen as equivalent entities that exist, as long as they are present in our consciousness"[467]. The notion of a "memory of the future"[468], coined by D. H. Ingvar, explains how this simultaneity happens in the brain:

> Evidence is summarized that the frontal/prefrontal cortex handles the temporal organization of behavior and cognition, and that the same structures house the action programs or plans for future behavior and cognition. As these programs can be retained and recalled, they might be termed "memories of the future".[469]

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[466] St. Augustine, *Confessions* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), 277–78.
[467] Liliann Manning, Daniel Cassel, and Jean-Christophe Cassel, "St. Augustine's Reflections on Memory and Time and the Current Concept of Subjective Time in Mental Time Travel," *Behavioral Sciences* 3 (2013): 239.
[468] D. H. Ingvar, "'Memory of the Future': An Essay on the Temporal Organization of Conscious Awareness," *Hum. Neurobiol.* 4 (1985): 127–36.
[469] Ingvar, 127.

Anticipating music is, thus, *acting* at each moment not only the sounds and silences we listen to but inducting them with whichever comes ahead. It is grasping, understanding, or perceiving music beforehand, setting it in motion. It is only in such present memory of what is to come that musicians can create the continuity of music, its fundamental ongoing character also experienced by listeners. In the next section, we will see how *anticipation* plays an important role in such experience and appreciation of music by listeners, and how the same is true about the experience of music by the musicians making it. The more knowledgeable the listeners, we advance, the more their experiences of *anticipation* in music become synchronized with the privileged listening perspectives of musicians performing.

6.2. Expecting Listeners

We have been repeatedly underlining the focus of this thesis in the practice of music by musicians, disregarding almost completely the experience of listeners and their role in the event of music. Some exceptions have been the considerations we made on the sounds produced by audiences as part of the musical work, and the appropriation of Levinson's concatenationist perspective on the way we listen to music to our purposes investigating musical-practice. In this section, we will shortly address again an investigation on the experience of music by listeners, this time focusing on the psychology of expectation and its relation with anticipation. But before such considerations, a word should be directed towards the importance of having a musical practice, comprising all the preparatory steps before performances, embedded in the performers' expectation for listeners. Music can happen without any listener except the solo musician who is creating it. But even in this intimate experience of music, when the musician is alone in the practice room, learning music by making it, takes place an exteriorization. The musician's body performs the music and receives it back at the same time, addressed to itself. Expecting listeners props up this need of exteriorization that music comprises, its affirmative character. At the same time, this affirmative character and the performative continuous flow of musical events is what engages listeners in the experience of music, at each moment expecting the next.

It was this *anticipation* by listeners that David Huron, a researcher in the fields of music cognition and systematic musicology, investigated in *Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation*[470]. He was trying to understand expectation in music, investigating the listeners' experience regarding tonality, time or beat, predictability, surprise, tension, recognition, and other relevant features. He ended up, however, developing a general theory of expectation, of an ampler interest for cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. Applied to the experience of listening to music, the ITPRA theory,

[470] David Huron, *Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

acronym for the response systems or emotional consequences of expectation (imagination, tension, prediction, reaction, appraisal), leads Huron to conclude that the aesthetic experience of music is enhanced through familiarity:

> Veridical familiarity helps listeners "learn" to enjoy musical works they may otherwise find peculiar or unsatisfying. The best advice for those who dislike modern music or non-Western music is that they "give the music a chance" through repeated listening.[471]

It is not surprising that audiences disliking what Huron calls "modern music" is a topic of interest in his investigation. As we have seen, the listeners' disinterestedness in *Newer Music* is an old subject. He remarkably underlines that the fundamental and defining trait of this music is in the way it corrupts an immediate chance for the listeners to have "a strong expectation that a particular event will occur"[472], the *feeling of anticipation*. Our definition of *Newer Music* is quite fitting with the fundamental unorthodoxy against canonical expectations that Huron identifies in musical modernism:

> To be sure, the twentieth century saw a significant increase in the proportion and variety of dissonant sonorities. However, I think the emphasis on dissonance as a defining character of musical modernism detracts from a more fundamental characteristic. The essence of unorthodoxy is to be found in the psychology of expectation.[473]

Huron is linking the appreciation of music with previous knowledge or understanding of what will come next. The familiarity he advises for listeners to be able to enjoy particular modern or non-Western musical works is but a mechanism to enhance the anticipation he claims fundamental in the aesthetic experience of music, repeated listening being undoubtedly the best way to know and understand a particular musical work. We have, however, sustained that the *variability* each musical work comprises is of utmost relevance for aesthetic appreciation, since it is within such *variability* that works of music are actualized in performance. This actualizing character of musical works implies that we can never have absolute knowledge of a particular musical piece if we understand

[471] Huron, 241.
[472] Huron, 409.
[473] Huron, 332.

“absolute knowledge” as a definitive grasp of the music. We can recognize this is true whenever we discover new connections and relations within the musical material of the same musical work. Even after repeated listening or performing, sometimes over years or decades, new and different extents of the same work are always potentially enabled by its *variable traits*. Moreover, the same listener will inevitably bring “new ears” for subsequent performances, informed by both musical and non-musical experiences in between. This is why the same recording of a particular performance can still promote the discovery of novelty in a musical work.

Besides enhancing the listeners’ expectation and anticipation of music, familiarity with the *stable traits* of musical works, achieved through repeated listening, might also facilitate the appreciation of their *variable traits*. If we listen repeatedly and attentively to the same musical work in different performances, such *variability* will become self-evident, and we might even look forward to experiencing it. On the other hand, if listeners are focused solely on what is familiar, attentive exclusively to what they can anticipate and recognize, a significant part of the aesthetic experience of the musical work as performance will be lost. It seems, thus, that the problem with Huron’s claims about the necessary anticipation for listeners to be able to appreciate musical works clings on the same ontological misconceptions we have accused of impairing the practice of *Newer Music*. It is a fixation with the illusory *stability* that composes works of music, and a neglect of the *variability* that makes them happen.

The author of *Sweet Anticipation* shrouds the solution to this problem in the way he explains how the crucial expectation in the aesthetic experience of listeners is denied them by modern music, and how some listeners have managed, nevertheless, to overcome the unfamiliarity of such music, not through repeated listening and consequent memorization but by expecting the unexpected:

> By looking in detail at the musical organization we will be able to see how the psychology of expectation accounts for the betrayal felt by many listeners of the time, and why the music continues to confound many present-day listeners. At the same time, the psychology of expectation

> will help us understand how some listeners have adapted to the contrarian aesthetic, and have internalized the same contrarian principle as a basis for auditory expectation. Experienced listeners can come to expect the unexpected.[474]

An important thing to notice in this excerpt, from a chapter Huron dedicates precisely to "Expecting the Unexpected", is the classification of listeners. By underlining the capacity of experienced listeners to expect the unexpected, being in that way able to appreciate *Newer* and other unfamiliar music, he is observing that some listeners, perhaps many present-day listeners, are not experienced, in the sense they have not internalized and adapted to contrarian aesthetics that break through the tonal canon. This concurs with Babbitt's perspective on *Newer Music* being "for, of, and by specialists". Huron's *experienced listener* can be perhaps compared to Levinson's *jaded listener*, or even to the *practiced listener*, both of which he distinguishes from the *first-time listener* and the *one-time listener*.

Being able to expect the unexpected can be thought of as paradoxical. If, however, we think there is an aesthetic appreciation to be made of the unexpected in music, in the same way as, for instance, when we are watching a horror movie expecting to be surprised by horrific sounds and images, such thought can be easily deconstructed. The surprise of spectators in horror movies is a part of the aesthetic experience of that cinematic-genre just as much as the unexpected can be expected as part of *Newer Music*. The comparison is, perhaps, a bit tragic, but it assists us in dismantling the apparent paradox of Huron's perspective. He reserves, then, this sagacious way of adapting to the *contrarian aesthetic* of modern music and internalizing its contradiction to the *experienced listener*, the *specialist*. As such, for Huron only the *specialist* can have a rewarding aesthetic experience of this music, and this is particularly true in premieres.

To the *un-experienced listener*, Huron proposes, we have quoted, they "give the music a chance". But we can rightfully question, as listeners, why give this music a chance if experiencing it is aesthetically unrewarding. Why should

[474] Huron, 333.

un-*experienced listeners* expose themselves repeatedly to Ferneyhough's tenebrous *La Terre est un Homme*[475], for instance, trying to grasp an understanding and nurture an appreciation for it, if they can listen instead to such a great variety of different music much more appealing to them? The answers to this question can be diverse, as can the cultural context and musical knowledge from which different *un-experienced listeners* depart towards being able to appreciate *Newer Music*. It seems to us that Huron's proposal is extremely significant, even if utmostly uninviting as taken in the somewhat-absurd scenario of learning to take fruition in *Newer Music* by repeatedly listening to *La Terre est un Homme*. The advice of repeated listening, if understood in the broader sense of listening repeatedly to a varied repertoire of *Newer Music*, is undoubtedly a good one for anyone interested and curious on how can this different and

[475] In Appendix 1 a recent recording of this piece by the BBC Symphony Orchestra, conducted by Martyn Brabbins, is listed. In the liner notes of the album, released in March 2018, Paul Griffiths writes the following about it: "The monolithic *La Terre est un Homme*, with its 4-foot-tall score and written for an orchestra of eighty-eight, each of whom at times becomes a soloist in their own individual stave, caused a scandal at its 1979 premiere and has scarcely been heard since". Another recording of the same composition exists, from a live concert by the same orchestra and conductor on February 26, 2011, at The Barbican, in London. Music journalist and critic Tim Rutherford-Johnson wrote about this performance of Ferneyhough's piece, integrated in a full day Total Immersion in Ferneyhough's music. The full post can be read in Rutherford-Johnson's blog, but we would like to quote here the excerpt about *La Terre* to picture how can such complex music be appreciated from the first listening and beyond any intellectual complexity. The piece had not been performed since 1979 and a great deal of expectation was created around the event: "And *La terre est un homme*? As if to make a mockery of both my slow assimilation approach to Ferneyhough's music, and the view that compositional complexity is inversely proportional to emotional effect, this was a quite staggering kick in the guts. I have no idea how the performance measured up to those two from 1979 but frankly it didn't matter – most of us were left speechless. The organizers and participants in this Total Immersion day had done their best to cut through the huff and bluster that surrounds Ferneyhough and his music, but they struggled. In the end it came down to this one piece. And one particular moment. You see, there is a dark secret to *La terre*: a hushed string chord of incredible luminosity that suddenly leaps out of the pages of phenomenally dense writing. As a moment of recontextualization I know nothing else quite like it; it was so unlike anything I had been prepared to expect that I was almost knocked out of my seat. You had to be there. In the end, nothing spoke so eloquently or gripped so powerfully as Ferneyhough's music itself." Tim Rutherford-Johnson, "Total Immersion? Brian Ferneyhough," The Rambler, 2011, https://johnsonsrambler.wordpress.com/2011/02/28/total-immersion-brian-ferneyhough/. A curious thing to find in the comments to this post is a great example of the "huff and bluster" surrounding Ferneyhough's music. It is worthy to notice how the perspective of this commentator (signed Skim) clashes with the one we have just read: "Personally I dislike his pretentious unfounded alien-styled inhumane chaotic pseudo-random material, which exists only for its own sake and creates sensory responses that are not of the composer's intention, but just happen to occur. Make no mistake: Ferneyhough is no real composer, and the fact that this has never been accordingly stated or criticized shows the times in which we live: Feed the people any rubbish, with just a hint of added intellectual superiority and they'll believe it and worship your 'message'. …Ferneyhough… the charlatan king of pretentious wishful implication."

diversified music have an aesthetic call. But since the unexpected is what we need to learn to expect and anticipate to appreciate *Newer Music*, shouldn't we infer, then, that the more we listen to a single musical work, memorizing it and coming to expect its course, the less are we learning to appreciate it?

Such unintuitive contradictions are, perhaps, mere rhetoric trying to disassemble the distinction between the way we listen to different types of music and between the first and the following listenings of the same musical work. Even if there are psychological and cognitive discriminations to be made when investigating the diverse experiences of music-listeners, we believe a philosophical common ground accommodating such diversity exists. Focused on the performative character and the *variable traits* of musical works, we are disposed to suggest that the mechanism through which Huron explains how one can appreciate disruptive music, expecting the unexpected, is more deeply rooted in the way we experience music in general. Naturally, we are not sustaining that expecting the expected is not a relevant component of the aesthetic experience of music. It undoubtedly is. But at the same time, the expectation for the unknown – the *variable* – within the known – the *stable* – seems to be what motivates us towards music. And this is true not only regarding live music, as also recordings of music, which we re-play to experience the same music anew, in different spaces, private and public, with different technological means, with different states of mind, noticing different things or the same things in different ways.

It might be the case, then, that music is in its essence disruptive, perhaps as all art, and the canonization of tonal music is but a disruption of such disruptive character, through a repeated carving of the *stable traits* of musical works into our ears, and a subsidiary forgetfulness of their inherent *variability*. *Newer Music* can teach us to appreciate this *variability* back, and aesthetically experience any music, be it for the first or the thousand time, and being us experienced or un-experienced listeners, because it refuses to reproduce the canonical forms and sounds we so easily memorize and anticipate. As such, we are put in a state of anticipating difference, the *newer* in music, a refusal to remain the same, changing moment-to-moment. This should be the optimal state to appreciate any

music, but, of course, the predispositions of listeners might bring complexity to such a question which certainly deserves an ampler study.

Our purpose in addressing the experience of listeners, even if briefly, in a thesis centered on the experience of musicians, is both to assure we are caring of such an experience as part of musical practice as a whole, and to learn about the common ground between listening and making music, which can inform us, in its turn, on how musical performance takes place. The reflections we made over Huron's proposals will aid us next when surveying the dynamics in music-making and how anticipation is the propelling force keeping both musicians and listeners engaged in the experience of music. The major difference, we have noted, is that while listeners are following the music being performed, musicians are leading the music through performance. Even if experienced listeners are engaged in the performative event of a particular musical work they very well know, able, thus, to anticipate the *stable* progression of sounds and silences the composition encompasses and musicians are producing, there is always an asynchrony with the performative anticipation being crafted. This *décalage*, can be minimal and, we suspect, the smaller it is the more impactful the aesthetic experience of the music for listeners.

It is probably in this sense that *experienced listeners* have an advantage, especially when it comes to *Newer Music*. For if in tonality grounded music a minimal *décalage* is easy to maintain between the practice of musicians and the listening of listeners at least in the sense of beat[476], hence our pulsing bodies quite effortlessly "understand" it for us, in *Newer Music*, the absence of such stability, comfortably easy to anticipate, makes it much more challenging for us listeners to blend our experience with the practice of musicians performing. The act of performing is unquestionably granted some front-row attention this way, that is, it becomes a protagonist over the communal sense of beat and well-known harmonic progressions. This is why we believe it of such importance for the practice of *Newer Music* to have a philosophical understanding of how music

[476] This issue is surely more complex than what I am exposing here. Even if there is a stable sense of beat in the music, other features (musical, historical, and even psychological) can disrupt and question the experience of listeners.

comes to performance. If musicians performing *Newer Music* are not engaging their practice in the most fundamental performative moment-to-moment drive of music, ensuring listeners there is a sense in the sounds and silences they are producing, and inviting them to *trust* their lead and closely follow such peculiar path contemplating this music, music is not happening. Ultimately, the leap into trusting must be made by each listener. If one remains tied to a tonal conception of what music is, it is less likely such entrusting leap towards musicians performing *Newer Music* will happen.

The shared aesthetic experience of music is, thus, a complex phenomenon that can be thought of from various perspectives. It is in the sense these different perspectives share the same contour that we can also learn about musical performance through what we know about the experience of listening to music. While we have deconstructed Huron's proposal on the necessity of listeners to be able to anticipate music so they can appreciate it, asserting instead that expecting the unexpected is the most fundamental disposition in their experience of music, we believe the contrary to be true when performing *Newer Music*. In chapter four, we dedicated a section precisely to the importance of repetition in the practice of *Newer Music*. Musicians must not only know the technical intricacies they will perform ahead, but also the musical sense they have found through previous repetitious practice. Such practice grants an exceptional knowledge of the work's *stable traits*, leading to memorizing them. For musicians, thus, the unexpected corresponds always to the *variable traits* of the musical work they are performing. It is, however, the stable knowledge that enables musicians to grant continuity in the music, ensuring a directed flow of the sounds and silences prescribed by the score.

But at the same time, musicians practicing through repetition should also be aware of the variability such repetition always comprises. Music happens only when a performative assurance of the *stable traits* of the musical work is open and integrating of its *variable traits*, adjusting in real-time, moment-to-moment. In other words, the knowledge musicians have of the score allows them to anticipate each bit of music, fulfilling each moment with that very knowledge. The knowledge they have of the performative variability of the work, which they

acquire by experiencing it in repeated practice, allows musicians, on the other hand, to lead the music integrating such novelty. More than recognizing and being able to anticipate the music, the experience of listeners is kept alive by this performative ability to be able to present the future in advance, urging us to keep following the music closely.

The *expecting listeners* are, thus, *expecting* this convergence of the known and the unknown in musical performance, this performative confidence by musicians leading the music, which is not shaken by and embraces the uncertainty of the event. Such performative action was identified by neuropsychologist Alexander R. Luria as the basis of any human voluntary movement. He suggested that the initial component of any voluntary motor task stands on a *model of the future need* which "is *constant* or *invariant*, and […] demands an equally *constant*, *invariant* result"[477]. To this, he adds that

> […] it would be a mistake to imagine that the invariant motor task creates an equally constant and invariant programme for the fulfilment of the required action. It is a most important fact that the *invariant motor task is fulfilled not by a constant, fixed set, but by a varying set of movements which, however, lead to a constant, invariant effect*.[478]

Understanding the musical work as a performative voluntary action, with the *stability* of the score as a *model of the future need*, and the performance itself as the *constant*, *invariant effect* of presenting the work codified in the model, brings together our ontological standpoint regarding musical works and Luria's reflections on human movement and action. In the same way, we proposed that such requested *stability* is fulfilled by the *variety* in each performance, a variety which "is not accidental, but *essential*, in *principle*, for the normal course of an active movement and for its successful accomplishment"[479].

Luria explained how this *variety* in the performance of an action happens through a system of *afferent syntheses*, a "constant inspection system, continually analysing the feedback signals and comparing them with the original

[477] Alexander R. Luria, *The Working Brain: An Introduction to Neuropsychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 248.
[478] Luria, 248.
[479] Luria, 249.

plan"[480]. Furthermore, the neuropsychologist stated this *afferent synthesis* is "an absolutely essential component, of the voluntary movement, and without it the performance of the required task is extremely unlikely to succeed"[481]. In the end, even though the *stability* of the plan maintains a regulatory force, for a successful performance of such plan to happen, the greatest accountability is on the way *variation* is integrated into the continuity of the event:

> […] in the performance of a voluntary movement or action, although the motor task preserves its regulatory role, the highest responsibility is transferred *from efferent to afferent impulses*. In other words this responsibility is transferred to those *afferent syntheses* which provide information on the position of the moving limb in space and on the state of the muscular system which take into consideration the difference between the future requirements and the position of the moving organ in the present […][482]

Successful performative actions are, thus, the ones which emerge in this dynamic of reinventing the plan moment-to-moment, assessing and adjusting each bit of music to anticipate and prepare the following required motor task. It is such continuous success in re-inventing the work that listeners expect in music and musicians must ensure.

In the next section, we will return to an analogy with the visual, comparing the act of music with the already mentioned act of drawing. Our focus will be on the basic action of drawing a straight (even if not geometrically) line in a single gesture. We could equally focus on the gesture alone, as analogous with the performance of the musical work as a whole, but let us keep the visual aid towards understanding how anticipation is the motor of music. At the same time, this analogy with a visual outcome also comprises the use of instruments, or the body as an instrument, the same way musical works do, strengthening the comparison also in matters of instrumental technique.

[480] Luria, 250.
[481] Luria, 250.
[482] Luria, 249.

6.3. Beforehand: making music as drawing a line[483]



[483] This visual preface to the following section, in which we will discuss the similarities between the performative musical work and the act of drawing a continuous straight line, was taken from a blog post, by Belarussian ink artist Eugenia Hauss, in Eugenia Hauss, "10 Exercises for Confident Lines and Accurate Hatching," The Virtual Instructor, 2018, https://thevirtualinstructor.com/blog/10-exercises-for-confident-lines-and-accurate-hatching. It is intended that a comparison is made between each of the lines presented and different performances of the same composition. The variety from one performance or action to another is, thus, represented in the different motion techniques used (elbow, wrist, and fingers), different starting and ending points, different width ink liners used (0.1, 0.3, and 0.4 mm), and different tools used (pen, and brush pen) in the lines drawn above. A sharp distinction is traced with the digital line above this footnote.

We had planned this section so there would be a place in this thesis to consider the work of music as a unitary gesture, even if a complex one, so that we could visualize with the simplest of drawings the propelling forward motion we claim fundamental in musical performance. We soon found out, however, that many intricacies exist in such simple act, from the instrument and ink used, to the surface on which the action takes place, the technique performed by the arm and hand, the knowledge of the instruments, and many other subtleties we can spot in the fifteen lines drawn in the preface. Curiously, the author of these lines introduces the article with the comparison between the technical exercises she will propose for practicing drawing a “confident line”, and the scales musicians regularly practice.

But while these technical intricacies are of interest to drawing aficionados, we are focusing our concerns on what is transversal to any act of drawing a confident straight line. We could make the comparison more elaborate if instead of a simple straight line we wrote about more complex drawings, or if we compared the musical work in its assertiveness with the calligraphic experience we have whenever using a tool we know, in a surface we know, writing on something we are certain about. Let us, nevertheless, hold with the uncomplicated version, which any reader can experiment, regardless of their drawing skills. What we are proposing is that anyone reading this thesis, and willing to experiment with the act of drawing a straight line, can have a sense of the performative experience of a musical work. We aim at bringing all readers closer to the experience of making music, even those who have not nurtured and cultivated music but from the listener’s perspective.

Let us, then, experiment with this action of drawing a straight line, finding first a surface to draw on, such as paper, and a tool, such as a pen or a pencil. Notice how the body adjusts itself and its surroundings to prepare the performative act, how the hand holds the tool, and how a *model of the future need* is being crafted from the moment we decided to act. Notice, moreover, the many pre-conditions that must be met before drawing any line, regarding the surface itself, the ink in the pen or the sharpness of the pencil, or the adequacy between the surface and the tool. As simple as these pre-conditions may be, arranging

them can be compared to what musicians do preparing for a performance, even if practicing fifty hours alone in a room is far more complex and demanding than sharpening a pencil.

After such arrangement and planning, the act of drawing a line as the ones prefacing this section is quite straightforward. We can start it in different ways, the tip of the tool touching the surface before the gesture of drawing the line takes place, or leading that gesture to accommodate the beginning of the line midway. The same *variability* will happen regarding the end of the line, as well as its length, the speed of the gesture, the pressure applied with the tool on paper throughout the gesture, and many other variances that can occur, such as a grain in the surface we are drawing on misleading the straightness of the line, or a distraction compromising the performative gesture. As in the performative action that musical works are, the concretization of the intended straight line will be different each time we do it, and sometimes it will fail. We wish to focus our attention, however, on what is there, in this simple performative gesture, enabling the successful materialization of any straight, confident line on a surface, regardless of contextual variations.

Drawing a straight line requires us to produce a continuous motion of the tool in use. It can be a small movement, with just the fingers, or it can engage the whole body if we are drawing on a large-scale surface. In any case, we are focused on this single continuous gesture, comparing it to the necessary continuity in the performative action when presenting musical works. We are thus excluding from this comparison a stop-motion-like drawing of a line, in which there is no continuous single gesture but a sequence of smaller gestures. Our attention is centered on the single gesture that draws the line from point A to point B, in the same way performances present musical works from the first to the last sound or silence established by composers in the score. For us to produce such a continuous gesture drawing a line we must anticipate it, not only as a whole when preparing for the actions needed, but at each moment creating the next. It is because we renewedly anticipate the continuity of the line that the directed gesture goes on.

As the sounds and silences we listen to in musical works, the line we see being drawn is always behind the gesture creating it. It is a consequence of such gesture, presented to our perception at the same time the continuity of the action is prepared. This preparation or anticipation of each following visual tinge is, thus, synchronous with the outcome at each moment. If we cease to anticipate the continuity of the action before arriving at point B, the straight line we were drawing will be disrupted and the aimed sole gesture will be severed, even if the tip of the pen does not part from the paper. Therefore, we can assume that this anticipation of what comes next is the propelling force leading the whole single gesture of drawing a straight line from beginning to end. It is such force that imprints directiveness and assertiveness in the line being drawn. The *density* we claimed fundamental for the work of music to happen in performance is the same needed for the drawing of a straight line in a single gesture, and it is achieved in the same way, through anticipating at each moment the next one.

As in the act of drawing a straight line, the act of playing, singing, or conducting from the score must be constantly directed forward. This density, or performative thickness, requires that each sound or silence be loaded with planning and an active seeking of the following sound or silence. An excess is, in that way, created at each moment, demanding continuity and asserting a successful performance of the intended action. We have mentioned such excess in the fourth chapter while examining the notes we took inside the practice room (Appendix 2) and exploring the need of going beyond repetition when preparing for performance. It should not be taken, however, as something undue or uncalled-for. It is excess only in the sense that it surpasses the *stability* premeditated in the *model of the future need*, be it the drawing of a straight line or the work of music. An indispensable excess, that is, within our ontological claims on musical works as performance, granting them their fundamental *variability*.

The differences between performances of the same compositions, like the ones between drawings of a straight line, will be, in this sense, shaped by the way, from the many ways possible, musicians or drawers decide to anticipate each moment. In the case of music, such decisions are partially made inside the

practice room, preparing for the performance, but, as we have seen, must always be actualized, moment-to-moment, in the performative event, through a renewed process of *afferent syntheses* assessing the outcomes in real-time and simultaneously discovering the continuity in the performative action. These real-time decisions, synchronous with the sounds or silences being heard, or with the verge of the line being drawn, ply such sonorous or visual material with a propelling force that grants unity to the performative gesture as a whole.

It is only within this anticipation of the following that the gaps between the notated instructions are filled and music emerges. In the previous chapter, we explored this idea focused on the silence musicians must produce whenever there is a rest in the composition. We underlined also the importance of silence in music, and how crucial it is that musicians practice it. In this comparison between works of music and the action of drawing a straight line, a further correspondence can be made to help us visualize the filling of silences with the anticipation of the following sounds. For this, let us look again into the preface and examine the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth lines, in which the inked information is presented with gaps. We will ignore the third example since it presents not one continuous line with a gap, but two distinct lines, drawn with two distinct movements of the fingers. The dashed lines below, however, were drawn by the same continuous gesture propelled forward. To such continuous gesture, as we can envisage and experiment ourselves by drawing a dashed straight line, a fluctuation happened in the pressure applied in the drawing tool, parting it from the paper and creating an absence within the line. In the same way that the continuity of the full gesture was not disrupted by such parting, silences in music should not mean a halt in the anticipation of the following. It is precisely such anticipation that will fill the silences with directiveness instead of leaving them contentless.

When we draw a dashed line with a continuous gesture, the spaces left empty between the traced ink are part of such continuity. We can sense it imprinted throughout by this gesture in the resulting line and we know that, even though there are gaps in the visual trace, the motion we performed was a continuous one, propelling forward at each moment whether the tool was inking

the paper or not. Performing silences in music is no different than this, and just as anticipation is present through the continuous gesture of drawing a dashed line, so in musical works, it must be present through the sounds and silences that compose them. The need for forwardness in music, demands this anticipation from performers singing, playing, or conducting. We believe this to be true in all music-making, be it from the score, by heart, or improvised. This thesis, however, is focused on performing *Newer Music*, an extremely specialized practice of written compositions, as we have seen, troubling us for its unpopularity among listeners and musicians outside the specialist's realm.

It is clear now that the specific contours of *Newer Music*, in its aversion to the canonical sonorities, are challenging when it comes to anticipating what follows. This is true not only for listeners but also, and in a particular way, for musicians, who must expect the unexpected in performance, its inherent *variability*, within a demanding technical control conquered through repeated practice of what is *stable* and expected. Approaching the final section, we are in conditions for returning to our particular concerns on the performance of *Newer Music*. The model advanced in the following will, thus, be embedded in the specific contours that surround this music, from its tradition and historical context to its technical demands. Our purpose is to condense all the findings we arrived at throughout this thesis, and bring important philosophical awareness to musicians wishing to engage in a successful practice of *Newer Music*.

6.4. A Practice-Based Philosophical Model for Music-Making in Performance

Searching for a practice-based philosophical model for better performances of *Newer Music* has proved to prompt relevant questions about music as a whole. When we revised and underlined the shortcomings of philosophical studies on musical performance in chapter two, we were aiming not only at such a model but also at its comprehensiveness of the very specific intricacies in the practice of *Newer Music*. At the same time, we are confident the philosophical considerations we have made so far in this thesis, as well as the model we are about to present, can have a positive impact on such practice. In the same way as Godlovitch, we will describe an idealized model for a successful presentation of a musical work in performance, identifying and characterizing its constituents. We will derive from his proposal for being the most far-reaching and proximate to our concerns with *Newer Music*, but we will have the chance to incorporate also the insights given by different studies already mentioned, and our own insights discovered throughout this investigation.

Departing, thus, from Godlovitch's model to create our own should start with presenting it once again, but this time in a more concise and recapitulative manner. Picture 6, below, gives a visual impression of his proposal, and we can see that the philosopher suggests a dualistic model of which components and interactive features are of necessity for a *fully successful and exemplary performance of a musical work*. Musical performance is thus constituted by the *sound sequence*, imprinted in the score, plus the diversity that performers bring with *musical agency*. This *agency*, in its turn, involves a compound relation between *causation*, *skill*, *intention*, and *intended audience*. Both *sound-sequence* and this interrelation within *musical agency* are, however, under the sovereignty of six general structural conditions of integrity, if, in Godlovitch's terms, the musical work in question is to be successfully performed. We can intuit the *primary integrity factors* are more closely related to the *sound sequence*, while the *secondary integrity factors* are focused almost exclusively on the listening experience of audiences.



Picture 6 – Godlovitch's model for the performance of musical works

Our proposal is a simpler one. We identify *musical agency* alone with the musical work in performance and retain only three of the four elements Godlovitch finds interacting with each other in such element. It will become clear that we are not ignoring the important considerations made by Godlovitch, although we admit having a different perspective on questions related to the experience of listeners. We will find, as such, many of his conditions embedded in our own model, even if we do not consider them to be structural. In other words, it seems to us that what is essential in the performative experience of musical works, the core of such experience is much less constrained by integrity factors and much more a result of a constant driving force, from *causation* to *intention* through *skill*. This is a rather contrasting proposal with Godlovitch's, conceding musicians, the agents of music, the ones who actually make music happen, all the structural responsibility of musical works as performance. It is through the actions of musicians that those integrity factors are manifested, not as a constraint, but as a consequence, a subsidiary result of the historical context in which musical performances happen. The fundamental element in any musical performance, to which some might call *authenticity*, others *musicianship*, and others *artistry*, is, thus, not a conformity with external constraints but the action itself. This is why our proposed model, figured in Picture 7, might seem so bare when compared to Godlovitch's. And this is also why it excludes considerations about listeners.

Picture 7- Practice-based model for musical works in performance

Focusing on the action of music, in the same way in the previous section we focused on the action of drawing a straight line, does not mean, however, we have less to say than Godlovitch did in his study, even if our thesis has led to the conclusions we are now approaching about what is essential in the action of music, while Godlovitch's philosophical study on musical performance took an interest in different questions, resulting in different answers. And while we are preserving his terminology, we are also thinking and writing about it from a different ontological perspective. As such, we will portray in the following, describing, characterizing, and amplifying Godlovitch's considerations both on *musical agency*, and each of the three elements interacting within it when music is happening, that is, *causation*, *skill*, and *intention*. We will do so with *Newer Music* in mind, bearing all the constraints that emerge through this specialized practice, and putting our model to the test of fitting such an intricate circumstance as the one of making this music from the score in performance. Once this depiction is accomplished, it will become clearer how fundamental *anticipation* is in this triadic relation that composes the action of music.

By *musical agency* we mean, then, the performance itself. The musical work, in case a continued, uninterrupted, gesture is propelling the sounds and silences forward, intentively, from beginning to end of the causational relation of performers with the score. It is what might be called *authenticity* in music, what differentiates between music and other sounds that can be produced by different agents, and different actions, with different intentions. It is that which encompasses the actualization of the musical work, each time anew, in its inherent diversity and historicity. It is "the open, social, and spontaneous

Dionysian ideal of musicianship"[484] Goehr wrote about, "asserting its uniqueness as a transfiguring, ephemeral event"[485]. It is the action of making music sound, in a similar way focusing on the act of music as Small's *musicking* promoting the idea of music as an activity, instead of as a fixed object, but excluding the listener from the picture. Surely, we are not, once again, ignoring the important relationship between musicians and audiences, and the fact that music has also, and importantly, a social component to it. But if the presence of an audience was an essential feature in music-making it would not be possible to make music alone, in the practice room, for instance, for oneself. That is simply not the case, as any musician can assure us, even if the thrill of on-stage performances, and the connection established with different audiences, might enhance such experience.

This is why we are focusing on this behind-the-stage-scene, the exclusive realm of music-makers, trying to understand what must happen *before* music so that the performative agency is a musical one. Aligned with our ontological perspective on musical works, our philosophical model for *musical agency* is twofold. It would be unexpected if it was otherwise since we are claiming that *musical agency* is the performance itself, in the same way we claimed the musical work is the performance itself. But while our proposed ontological perspective focused on distinguishing between the *stability* and the *variability* in musical works, the model we are presenting now is set to find the dynamics, or the mechanism, of music, within the relationship between *causation* and *intention*, mediated by *skill*. As such, even if there is recognizable *stability* in *causation*, and an obvious *variability* in *intention*, in this proposed model we are contemplating the action of music, and how musical works in the specific context of Western art music come to be in performance, through the action of musicians.

Causation is, thus, a key element in *musical agency*, encompassing all the conditions of possibility for the musical work to happen at a specific time and place. Differently from Godlovitch, we are allocating that which he considers

[484] Goehr, *The Quest for Voice: On Music, Politics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 134.
[485] Goehr, 164.

repeatable in different performances from the same score in *causation*, instead of granting the musical text a dedicated place. “The physical-acoustical description” in the composition is the first condition of possibility, *causing* the musical work, but is hardly a secluded one, disconnected from the context in which the practice of music happens, or from the instruments at use. This is why even if we can recognize some *stability* in *causation* since the score will remain the same through time, such *stability* will inevitably be actualized by the historical changes in musical practice. These changes comprise not only aesthetical metamorphosis in the expressive sensibilities of musicians, but also technological developments in musical instruments, as well as musicological findings, the *HIP* movement being an example, and the development of technique by performers.

We will focus next precisely on *skill*, the medium between *causation* and *intention* in *musical agency*. But in advance, we can sense the overlapping, and how *skill*, or technique, is also a condition of possibility for musical works to happen in performance. In the same way, *skill* correlates with *intention*, as we will see. This is why the model we are proposing cannot go without a place for *skill*, even if, to some, it might seem unfair doing so while denying such dedicated focus to the composition, and consequently ripping the authoritarian connection between the musical work as we know it since the nineteenth century and composers. Our emphasis on *skill*, rather than the musical text, is an appeal for noticing the craft-like nature of musicianship. Nonetheless, we are not defining this element in *musical agency* merely in the sense of *technique*, that is, regarding only the knowledge of the instrument and its use, even if this *technique* is fundamental in many musical practices, including in *Newer Music*. The artistry in music, however, is beyond, or perhaps before, *technique*, and not knowing if *skill* is more, or less, than *technique* does not mean we cannot weave some considerations on it. The fact that *skill* can sometimes be a matter of dealing with the lack of *technique* for reproducing the instructions designated by the score is a hint towards the following thoughts.

Skill is perhaps the most important element in this model of musical performance, even if, in the same way as *causation*, it is not an isolated constituent of *musical agency*, disconnected from its causes and contexts and

the important deliberation of *intention*. The inner-look into what happens inside the practice room, which may be the major contribution of this thesis towards future and diversified philosophical investigations on music, was precisely what led us to uphold now such significance to *skill*, in such a way that *technique* becomes a secondary matter. Describing the process of making music from scratches, in the fourth chapter, allowed us to base our philosophical model on the practice of music, towards the happening of musical works in performance. The relevant findings on the notes taken inside the practice room assured us that beyond an exquisite *technique*, musicians must be able to incorporate in real-time the inevitable differences in the performative event. In the same way that the different relationships established between musicians performing and audiences can change enormously the aesthetic experience of musical works, which ontologically embrace such enormous difference, unplanned deviances from exquisite *technique*, as from perfectly complying with the score, are also a performative possibility within this ample and practice-based ontological outlook. While it is impressive that some musicians can maintain a very high and demanding technical control over the instrument, the voice, or conducting, *skill* is beyond *technique* in the sense it comprises the ability to incorporate the eventual failure in *technique* when performing, maintaining the continuous flow of events, undisturbed by such technical failure in any given moment and constantly focused on what will follow in the next one, from start to finish.

Skill is also, in a sense, before *technique*, allowing imperfection in musicianship, and granting that even if some technical requirements are not met in performance, music can still happen. But at the same time, defining *skill* as the ability to maintain music regardless of technicalities, might lead some to wonder into a plausible abstract scenario in which a musical work can happen even if no technical requirements are met by the performance, and even if a complete deviation from the score is presented to our ears. However, in the same way as *causation*, *skill* is not an isolated element in this model of musical performance. It is part of the event of *musical agency*, the way between cause and effect, intertwined both with *causational* conditions of possibility and the *intentional* continuity we will look into in the following. Defining *intention* will clarify how such

an abstract scenario is a weak argument against our considerations on *skill*. It will also, and finally clarify how *anticipation* is the propelling force that maintains music in the act of performance.

Intention is, then, the place of individuation, encompassing the voluntary actions of musicians performing, towards the desired, planned, and prepared outcome. It is through *skill* that *intention* is manifested. And in the same way that *skill* is personal and individualized, each musician developing it in their own manner, so *intention* is a particular matter. It is pertinent to ask, then, how do musicians perform together, in a chamber group, choir, or orchestra, if each one of them has an *individualized* planned outcome. The answer to this goes beyond the acknowledgment that such groups of musicians build their individual plans within the common rehearsal towards a collective goal. In each musician's personal *intention* making music, there is an internal regulation, acquired through practice in a specific context, which brings a convergence of these individualized desired outcomes. We are claiming, thus, that the external regulations Godlovitch identified in *intention*, in his model for musical performance, are, on the contrary, internal. It is only because these regulations of common practice have been internalized by musicians that they can perform together, with the common purpose of making a specific musical work happen.

Intention is also where the general structural conditions Godlovitch identified in musical performance have a place in our practice-based model. Instead of considering these primary and secondary conditions as external to *musical agency*, however, we propose they are intrinsic to the *intention* of making a musical work happen in performance. As such, work, temporal, and personnel continuity are all encompassed by the desired outcome within a specific musical context, leading the *intentional* actions of musicians. Regarding listener, sensory, and interpretative continuity, Godlovitch's secondary integrity factors, we refrain from considering them relevant when modeling *musical agency* because we believe they are a consequence, not a condition, of those actions. The reason for this is because, in this thesis, we are investigating music that was written to be performed by musicians, who grant such secondary integrity to performance even without an audience.

We have said that a continuous *analogic moment-to-moment density* of information, outlined by the *stable traits* notated in the score, is necessary for the musical work to happen. This accommodates the inevitability of the work emerging in many different ways, without constraining those differences to pre-dictated modes of playing, singing, or conducting, and consequently allowing for the musical work to be actualized by the changes in musical practice internalized by musicians in different times and places. Such continuous *density* is accomplished when the plan established by *causation* is concretized through the necessary *skill* for maintaining a constantly renewed *anticipation* of what will follow. For the musical work to happen, *intention* must be filled with this *know-how*, this non-propositional understanding of the following actions, assessed and re-arranged in real-time moment-to-moment.

Transforming the inert musical text into live music, in the innumerable different ways it can happen throughout the history of a musical work, materializes, thus, whenever musicians perform the sounds or silences instructed by the score, infusing them with a directiveness towards what follows, according to plan, but also adjusting to whichever happens that fails to meet the plan. It is such consistency that brings music to life, maintaining listeners attentive to this continuously progressing flow of sonorous events, following it moment-to-moment. This necessary *anticipation*, propelling the music forward, is well known by conductors, who must lead-together a group of musicians. In fact, the conductors' role in music is nothing but anticipating it, unifying with their gestures a synchronized performance, and a common direction. The only way a conductor's performance can have a direct outcome in the music being performed is by gesturally anticipating the timings, intensities, and characters that will follow. But even if conductors could be considered the archetype of musicians, the same *anticipation* of what comes next is necessary when musicians are playing or singing together without a conductor, and in the same way, they exchange gestural cues anticipating togetherness. As for solo musicians, even though they do not need to align their performative *intention* with others, *anticipation* is what maintains a constant directiveness, and can also be sensed in their unaccompanied gestures.

Anticipation is, thus, the motor within the mechanism of *musical agency*. It is what animates *intention* to fulfill itself, as we have seen, through *skill*. In written music, this *anticipation* is encouraged by *causation*, leading musicians to plan and *skillfully* shape an *intention* preparing for performance. Maintaining such constantly actualizing driving force in performance is easier, or at least comes more naturally, to the musicians playing by heart, as we have also noted inside the practice room. But we believe noticing and noting such particularity happened only because of our practical focus on *Newer Music*. The fact that no easy-to-anticipate tonal ground is established in the written music we chose to investigate, leaves the bareness of the construct of *Newer Music* compositions at sight if something else beyond such construct is missing in the performance. Our point addressing this music was precisely such absence of *something else* in many *Newer Music* performances, beyond, or perhaps in-between, the digits in the score, while in canonical music the continuous flow of events seems to come naturally to the practice of musicians and the ears of audiences.

The significant change in performance experienced inside the practice room beyond repetition and after memorizing highlighted how fundamental it is to know where to direct each sound or silence being produced for musicality to emerge. It is a before-hand knowledge, an *anticipation* of the music to come, creating the music in each moment. Memorizing empowered this ability to *anticipate* the serialist scribbles of Babbitt's *None but the lonely flute*, for instance, adding consistency and directiveness to the performance, even when latter playing from the score. The un-naturality of *Newer Music*, when compared to the tonal repertoire, led us, then, to find this propelling force in *musical agency*, within the realm of *intention*, while it seemed unnoticed by philosophical investigations focused on canonical music. But even if we have departed from this specific music, acknowledging and addressing its specific questions, we believe our proposed model for musical performance is ample enough to embrace all written music, at least. We suggest this because the same relationship between score or script and musicians is established, even if within different contexts and practices.

Our purpose in this thesis, however, was arriving at a model that could help us understand how to make the performance of *Newer Music* more appealing both to musicians and audiences. In a sense, we were simply looking for music, and how it can happen when performing from the complicated scores outside the tonal canon. Finding *anticipation* as the crucial element in musicianship has led us to important conclusions but, not less important, it has prompted new and different questions about music and about how different philosophical standpoints can impact the way musical practice happens. The strength of our model, and its fittingness to encompass the historical character of musical works in their changing way of being, is due to its ground in musical practice, even if this focus on the way towards music might have diverged us from other important philosophical questions and answers. The reasoning we arrived at throughout this thesis, and further thoughts on its limitations and extents, will be presented in the following final thoughts.

Final Thoughts

Arriving at the final thoughts of this thesis is a bittersweet dwelling. On one hand, we believe something of value was laid in the six chapters aimed at finding how do musicians create music from the score in the Western art tradition. We even believe a few considerations made can be useful for further thinking about music in different contexts, beyond the restricted field of written compositions. On the other hand, we also acknowledge the limitations of our method, and the barrenness that an excessively analytic overlook can lead us to. Nevertheless, we attempted to accommodate also different and broader perspectives to enrich our findings on musical performance, further on than the specialized analytical bibliography which founds much of our investigation.

The greatest criticism we made on such specialized philosophical references concerned with the particularities of the musical work and musical performance in the Western art tradition was their biases on the dichotomy between work and performance. Biases, we also noticed, that exist not only within the philosophy of music but also across musicology and the history of music, and which overflow into musical practice, corrupting the performative nature of music with an excessive focus on the musical text. Such dichotomy is perhaps due to a similar kind of analytical excess in specialized philosophical knowledge about music we might find the core of this thesis to be. But while we are now alerting to the dangers of analyzing too much, and most of all in the wrong direction, acknowledging the pros and cons of such method, counting the dead and hopeful for what was lighted, we also believe that if we acknowledge music from an analytical perspective, we can find truths about it which outstrip such analyses.

The same is true for musical practice and we can go no further in this final thought without recognizing that being able to criticize the extremely specialized knowledge acquired through more than twenty years practicing the flute and studying music, in fine schools with very fine teachers, with the best canonical gear available, from repertoire to technique development exercises, is nothing but a privilege. But at the same time, it was such privileged knowledge that led

us to conclude that for music to happen, and even if it is a fundamental key to access *Newer Music*, knowledge is not sufficient. Musicians still have to insert the key in the lock, and performatively unlock it. Our motivation throughout this study was understanding the mechanics of such core performative process in which music is created.

Our look into the musical work as performance, however, is not a breakthrough in the literature on music. Recent musicological studies and artistic research have been actively criticizing and reconfiguring text-centered perspectives, and the same is true regarding several aesthetic investigations on music which we also had the chance to refer to. But when it comes to the philosophy of music, and its specialized way of studying the subject, the discussion is strongly rooted on the work-performance dichotomy we are questioning. The worth of our ontological proposal on musical works is most of all the fact that it is not only grounded in practice but it has practice as its purpose. In other words, understanding the musical work as performance is, in our perspective, paramount for musicians in the Western tradition before entering the practice room to study a score and prepare for performance. This focus on musical practice and performance is, perhaps, the major contribution of our thesis, since it brings forth copious and consistent considerations from the musician's perspective that are still scarce in philosophical investigations about music. We were, thus, able to find in the fourth chapter, inside the practice room, a confirmation for our ontological understanding of musical works as performance, sustained by the inevitable variability that emerged from and beyond repeating the score.

Our concernment with *Newer Music* is, on one side, a matter of aesthetic and artistic keenness, both as listener and performer. On the other side, it is a matter of practical curiosity, not only as a musician in the Western art tradition, trying to make music from the scratches in scores of the past hundred years or so, but also as a philosopher and flute teacher, searching for the answers that explain how it happens, music, that is. *Newer Music* is also a statement in itself. Music is always in the present, constantly renewing. In that sense, the oldest score being performed can be considered *Newer Music*. But when we focus on

defining this music as contrarian to the canonical aesthetic in Western tradition, we are encouraging the new questions that this specific music, because of its specific traits and contexts, can open for philosophical discussion.

Even if we are engaged in an inside out perspective of music, we believe this thesis to be of value also for listeners curious about the performative musical experience and its particular significance in the listening experience of written music outside the canonical procedures in the Western tradition. Nonetheless, our fundamental believe is that this music can “speak for itself”. Beyond matters of taste, intellectuality, emotions, morality, or analytic considerations about the scores instructing performers, *Newer Music* can prompt an aesthetic experience for the listeners which, at its core, is the same as any other music. Our thesis is, thus, also an apology of *Newer Music*, against any doubts that might still exist of whether some of its compositions can be turned into music or not. It is, however, the musician’s job to make it happen, to lead from the score the way towards each musical work. If musicians playing, singing, or conducting from *Newer Music* scores can do it, there is no need for program notes, or prefatory talks, instructing the listeners on how to listen to this music, so that they can at least understand it. It would be pretentious of us to indoctrinate listeners on what to hear, listening to this music, since they have their own ears. We are inclined to think that the best listeners, if any competition should be held, are the ones listening with the least amount of prejudice and not trying to understand the musical work outside of what the musicians are presenting.

Yet, understanding the musical work beyond what is presented in performance, or at least understanding some things about it, is inevitable for musicians going through the process of learning a particular score. They already arrive prejudiced and knowing at the beginning of such process, loaded with undoubtedly useful points of reference, whether historical, technical, aesthetical, and others, that are at the same time the conditions of possibility for musical works in the Western art tradition. But “simply put”, as Herbie Hancock proclaimed at the turn of the century, and ourselves quoting him in the epigraph

to this thesis, “knowledge corresponds to the past”[486], it will not in itself become a force to guide what is to be presented. “Wisdom”, by contrast, “is the future”, “it is philosophy”, it “captivates people’s hearts, and has the power to open a new age”. “Creating the time” [487], Hancock adds.

Naturally, Hancock’s words can be questioned. We can admit that wisdom is not the future, as he claims, but the present. Since the future might not exist except when we are wise enough to present it, reinventing the memory of the past. This would be a great timing to remember Augustine’s considerations about time, reciting a psalm. We choose to refer to the saint while writing on the etymology of the word *anticipation* because of the *expectancy* he claimed to be present (or presented) at each moment. We were claiming that this *anticipation* or *expectancy* might be understood as the propelling force in music. But at the same time, Augustine writes that the memory of the past is also composing the present, at each moment. And the present is undoubtedly the present, as it is, at each moment. In that sense, the philosopher’s thoughts would adjust more fittingly in the fourth chapter, inside the practice room, where we found precisely that such memory of the past is fundamental for creating the future, music, that is, in performance. The way Augustine recites the psalm is a dynamic process in which the present is put into motion by a “memory of the future”. It is an expectative memory of the music learned, that specific psalm, or in our practical research, those three specific scores of *Newer Music*. It is by remembering what comes next, as I play each score, that I can direct what I am playing towards what I *intend* to play, fulfilling music in the present with such *anticipation*.

But to find the model for *musical agency* we proposed on the sixth chapter took us first to acknowledge the crucial importance of what is not written in scores for music to happen. This was not only a further defense and clarification of our ontological proposal, informed by the annotations inside the practice room, but also a quest for understanding how it is that musicians mind the gaps left in scores when making music. Both the confrontation between analogical and digital

[486] Herbie Hancock, “Wisdom,” in *Future 2 Future* (Columbia Records, 2001).
[487] Hancock.

and the appropriation we made of Levinson's concatenationism were valuable in finding there is a necessary density or assertiveness in musical performance, which must be presented moment-to-moment by the musicians throughout. Such undisrupted density is the *sine qua non* condition for the musical work. In other words, for the work of music to be presented by musicians in performance, there can be no interruption in the flow of events from the very first moment that precedes the first sound until the final moment, after the framing silence is finished.

This might seem a rather high-standard perspective on musical works, idealistic after all, and even naïve. To say that a single moment, in an otherwise faultlessly presentation of Beethoven's *Fifth*, in which the density in the flow of events dropped to zero compromises the happening of the work, sounds as excessive as Goodman's perfect compliance requisite. But while Goodman was focused on the score, we are attentive to the continuously sounding flow of events, despite de score. In that single moment in which there is no density in the continuous flow of events, music is not happening. As such, how can the musical work *be* if it is not music from beginning to end? This question prods other questions regarding precisely the case of musical works composed by several movements, as happens to be with Beethoven's *Fifth*. Are the silences between movements part of the work? Are they musical silences or just technical ones, to adjust the performative character and anything else necessary before the next movement? Our answer is that they can either be part of the work or not, depending on what musicians do with them. If musicians do not maintain a continuity in the flow of events from the last note of the previous movement to the first note of the forthcoming movement – and we wrote about this performativity directing silence in the last section of the fifth chapter – music is not happening between movements, meaning that those silences are not part of the work. But a different performance might include those silences between movements in the happening of the same work, creating it in a different way.

Amongst the consequences of such a perspective, in which a single disruption of the unfolding integrity of the musical work as music is sufficient for it not to be presented after all, is that there is a possibility that several, if not many,

compositions were never transformed into musical works in performance, despite the protocols arranged for such. We might have been talking and writing about musical works that never existed, as the ones composing Goehr's *Imaginary Museum*. Such was one of our claims at the start of this investigation regarding *Newer Music*. Perhaps excessively, and with a limited experience as listeners of this music, we argued that one of the reasons for the somewhat general distaste for *Newer Music* was that musicians were doing something wrong, ineffectively, carelessly, or feebly when performing, and certainly when preparing for performance too. We acknowledge now that such claims were addressed first and foremost to our own musical practice. This thesis ends up being a case study, limited to the single experience of a musician trying to make music happen from the score. However narrow, we believe an important contribution is made here to the philosophy of music, if nothing else, for granting focus on the perspective of performers, and on the different questions that arise when we think of music from such a perspective.

Researching on this topic and writing this thesis made the greatest impact in my practice as a musician. It made me think of the process of making music happen, trying to understand it and put it into words. Consequently, it had an impact also in my practice as a flute teacher. It transformed the way I play and the way I practice from a score, and made me relate to music in a much more intimate, or personal, way. Such individuality was then easier to share with my students, as was encouraging them to search for their own distinctiveness when playing, in their individual practice. One of the most important moments in this study was finding difference, amongst and beyond repetition, since musicians in the Western art tradition are historically trained to look for the same, unchanging, musical work. Without such burden of tradition, it was easier to question how far could we go with those differences, departing from the sameness in the musical text. Even if we left loose ends on determining precisely where the edge stands between not going far enough and going too far in the search for music, our quest has led us to conclude at least that the perfect compliance requisite was out of the question. That was a second load of traditional burden we were happy to relieve.

Practicing without such constraints was immensely more productive and effective. In any case, something fundamental was still missing to fill the negative space of musical notation, that which the text cannot accommodate except as a contoured absence. Performativity, that is. Music being made. The question of what must musicians do to fulfil such absence was still unanswered. As was the one asking about the content that performers imprint in musical works. The model we proposed on the sixth chapter, elucidated us towards finding that in order to make music happen from the score musicians must at each present moment imprint a performative transition from what is sounding now to what will be sounding next. It is their “memory of the future”, being actualized moment-to-moment, that enables this propelling force in the threshold between memory and expectancy. Musicians must skillfully maintain a constant directiveness, going forward, an intentional anticipation rememorizing the stability in the score being read or known by heart.

Throughout this thesis, we made several comparisons between the sounding and the visual, intending to find some common ground in such different senses that could help us *see* music more clearly, and, above all, enlighten us on how to make it happen. Although we remained focused through our practice on *Newer Music*, and untangling the specific questions its scores foster, we believe that the constant directiveness, or the intentional anticipation we are claiming fundamental for this music to happen in performance, is an essential trait of all music. Even if the contours of preparing for performance can be extremely different in different music-making, for music to be happening such directiveness is essential. This finding, on its own, opens the discussion for the fittingness of our model to other music being made, within different contexts and protocols, with different relationships established between musicians and scores, or even in non-literary traditions or practices. Could we consider that *musical agency*, the essential action of creating music, is put into motion barely by a *skillful intention* of *causing* music to happen? It sounds redundant, and, perhaps, as missing the point. The essential action of music, might be said in other words, is a sonorous imprint of the intention of what will be heard next in what is being

heard now. An excess of causation, presented by the “memory of the future” each performer has.

Saying that it is an *imprint*, is not with the intention of going against our own ontological perspective of musical works as dynamic, un-fixable entities. It is merely a figure of speech, a further way of comparing the audible and the visible. What is important to notice in our claim is that for music to happen musicians must know where the music is going. Such certainty, an *anticipation* of what will sound next, nevertheless aware that many subtleties cannot be predicted, is what brings out musicality in performance. It might seem that musical improvisation is excluded from our model, for how could there be a “memory of the future” when the future is being improvised by the musicians? It is contradictious to say that, for music to happen, musicians improvising must know ahead what they will improvise. But this is precisely what we are saying. Even if the subject of musical improvisation urges its dedicated research, having as *Newer Music* its specific context, history, and practices, we believe our claims about what makes music happen to be fitting for the case of improvising it. The “memory of the future” in musical improvisation is construed in different ways, with much less *stability* and much more *variability*. It is a practiced memory for the new, a certainty on the way towards music, even if such certainty is being created anew at each moment, and no prefatory overlook on what will come out of the improvisation can, thus, be anticipated.

But however immensely different, *Newer* and improvised music must share, at least, the musical. If we were looking for how to make music happen in the context of the first, our findings, if true, must be fitting to, and serve any musical practice, including the ones using no musical text. We believe, thus, that improvising music is also a matter of *anticipating*, *imprinting* what is being played with what will follow immediately after, continuously renewing even if with no predetermined plan ahead of the next moment. The *essential* in music, manifested across any music within any musical practice, is this anticipatory nature, whether playing from the score in the concert hall, singing a psalm by heart, or improvising with friends. It is the same anticipatory nature we can find

and feel in our bodies when dancing, or in the gesture of drawing a line we proposed in the sixth chapter.

Studying and practicing *Newer Music* as proved useful to find, or at least to question, more general things about music. We believe such findings, as well as the questions opened, can be valuable for anyone interested in musical practice. Even if our narrowed focus on musical practice and performance has left out of this thesis major subjects regarding the experience of listeners, or questions relating to technology, its contribution for enlarging further philosophical discussion is tangible, as is its will for a continued collaboration between the different ways in which both philosophy and music can happen.

Appendix

Appendix 1 – Playlist

Pierrot Lunaire, op. 21 (1912) – Arnold Schönberg

- Chicago Symphony Orchestra Production – February 2012
- Cristian Macelaru – conductor; Kiera Duffy – soprano; Pierre-Laurent Aimard – piano; Mathieu Dufour – flute, piccolo; J. Lawrie Bloom – clarinet, bass clarinet; Robert Chen – violin, viola; John Sharp - cello

5 Stücke für Orchester, op. 10 (1913) – Anton Webern

- Cité de la musique – Paris – September 2018
- Matthias Pintscher – conductor; Ensemble Intercontemporain

Variationen für Orchester, op. 31 (1928) – Arnold Schönberg

- Swiss Festival – 1974
- Sergiu Celibidache – conductor; Swiss Festival Orchestra

Amériques (1927) – Edgard Varèse

- Royal Albert Hall – The Proms - August 2019
- Simon Rattle – conductor; London Symphony Orchestra

Quatour pour la fin du temps (1941) – Olivier Messian

- Elma Arts Center – Israel – March 2017
- Israeli Chamber Project: Daniel Bard – violin; Tibi Cziger – clarinet; Michal Korman – cello; Yael Kareth - Piano

Music of Changes (1951) – John Cage

- Recording by hat[now]ART – 2001
- David Tudor - piano

Studie II (1954) – Karlheinz Stockhausen

- Commisioned by the Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk – Cologne
- Electronic music

Gruppen (1957) – Karlheinz Stockhausen

- Cité de la musique – Paris – January 2016
- Matthias Pintscher – conductor; Paul Fitzsimon – conductor; Bruno Mantovani – conductor; Orchestre du Conservatoire de Paris; Ensemble Intercontemporain

Threnody to the Victims of Hiroshima (1960) – Krzystof Penderecki

- Helsinki Music Centre – March 2015
- Krzysztof Urbański – conductor; Finnish Radio Symphony Orchestra

Intolleranza 1960 (1961) – Luigi Nono

- Staatsoper Stuttgart – March 1993
- Bernhard Kontarsky – conductor; Chor der Staatsoper Stuttgart; Staatsorchester Stuttgart

Sequenzas (1958-2002) – Luciano Berio

- Box set by Naxos – May 2006
- Several performers

Lux Aeterna (1966) – György Ligeti

- Rencontres musicales de Vézelay – August 2015
- Mathieu Romano – conductor; Ensemble Aedes

Quadrivium (1969) – Bruno Maderna

- Recording by Naxos – August 2013
- Arturo Tamayo – conductor; Frankfurt Radio Symphonie Orchestra

As Quatro Estações (1972) – Jorge Peixinho

- Grupo de Música Contemporânea de Lisboa – 1980
- Carlos Franco – conductor; António Reis Gomes – trumpet; Luísa Vasconcelos – cello; Clotilde Rosa – harp; Jorge Peixinho – piano

Einstein on the Beach (1975) – Philip Glass

- Theatre du Chatelet – Paris – July 2014
- Michael Riesman – conductor; Philip Glass Ensemble

Music for 18 Musicians (1976) – Steve Reich

- Festsaal Fürstenhaus – Hochschule für Musik Franz Liszt Weimer – October 2016
- Martijn Dendievel – director; New Music Ensemble Weimer

Pléïades (1978) – Iánnis Xenákis

- PASIC – Indianapolis – 2010
- So Percussion; Meehan/Perkins Duo

La Terre est un Homme (1979) – Brian Ferneyhough

- NMC Recordings - March 2018
- Martyn Brabbins – conductor; BBC Symphony Orchestra

Répons (1985) – Pierre Boulez

- Philharmonie de Paris – June 2015
- Matthias Pintscher – conductor; Ensemble Intercontemporain

Nostalghia (1987) – Toru Takemitsu

- Kleiner Saal Tonhalle Zurich
- Muhai Tang – conductor; Zurich Chamber Orchestra

Septet, But Equal (1992) – Milton Babbitt

- Recording by Musical Observations – February 2003
- Paul Zukofsy – conductor; Composers Ensemble

String Quartets (1963-2010) – Brian Ferneyhough

- Recording by æon – 2014
- Arditti String Quartet

Appendix 2 – Notes Inside the Practice Room

September 15, 2019
I started practicing Babbitt today. I did a first reading of the whole score and it seems inscrutable. I'm dealing with it page by page and practiced the first and the second in today's session. The most difficult part is the rhythm. Babbitt wrote the piece with a time signature and measure breaks but seems to want to escape from a regular beat. Tuplets are constant and appear rarely in the beginning of beats and mostly in mysterious places, in the middle of measures. To this, he added the abrupt and also constant changes in dynamics and dramatic changes of register. I am marking in the score the beginning of each beat, working slowly, and trying to internalize the rhythmic gestures. I tried working a bit with the metronome, but for now (until my fingers know the notes) it is of no use. It seems important, together with rhythm, to automize the dynamics since the beginning, even if it is necessary to perfect them later. I have also added breathing marks to the score, where it appears to make sense, and worked each fragment between breathings. Some of those fragments start to sound like something with intention, even though much slower than it should be. Hearing a recording unraveled something on the first page when I played it immediately after. Perhaps it was the reduced concern with rhythmic rigor. It seems important to practice the rhythm rigorously (within the possible attending to Babbitt's writing [I am not a machine!]) and internalize and memorize after my own musical interpretation of the written rhythm. An interpretation that makes sense in my way of playing and within the limits of my technical skill.

September 16, 2019
Today I practiced unwillingly the third page of Babbitt's score. It was, anyway, a good practicing session. In the same way as the first two pages, the rhythmic torment continues. I realized it makes more sense, and playing is easier if I do not maintain the measure structure of beats and adequate them to the rhythmic gestures. Abrupt changes in register and dynamics remain constant. It is difficult to stay alert to everything, especially regarding dynamics, in this first stage of practicing. It is also very difficult to internalize and memorize the gestures and phrases; the first page, however, has started to become more natural to listen and that is reflected in the way I play it. NOTE: measure 33 is marked as ¾ but is in fact a 4/4.

September 17, 2019 [Rest]

September 18, 2019
Today I practiced the fourth page of Babbitt's score. It is much more difficult than any of the previous three. Or maybe I felt it that way because I was not focused. Anyway, I decided to practice with the pulse mark on the eight-note instead of the quarter-note, as I have been doing until now. Most of the rhythmic complexities were more easily resolved like this, although other complexities emerge. I will have to re-practice the first three pages in this way to consolidate a pulse that is more or less stable throughout this first reading I am doing. I didn't practice yesterday and what was starting to consolidate in the first page disappeared. The second and third pages also regressed.

September 19, 2019
Today I revised the first three pages from Babbitt's score and everything is still difficult. The first page is the more solid one. I need to practice phrase by phrase but it is difficult, in these first readings, to understand where do certain phrases start and end. Some are

more evident. Others not so much and it is possible to find different breaks and different interesting ways of organizing the gestures and the breathings.

September 20, 2019
Today's practice session was dedicated to detail work in the first and second pages of Babbitt's score. The different gestures start to take shape but it is still difficult to have access to the music, mainly because of the technical demands. It seems important to practice since now pursuing the final tempo (72 bpm). Some gestures or motives, even if difficult to play in a faster tempo, make less sense or no sense at all when played slow. Each phrase and each motive must be practiced from the beginning pursuing the final tempo. It is not productive to practice the entire piece in a slow tempo and only after practicing the speed. The tempo transforms the character of the music and gives it a different sense.
I also practiced the first page of Takemitsu's score. It is much more natural, intuitive, and easy than Babbitt's. It is important to search who is the person the piece is dedicated to. As well as, regarding Babbitt, to look for the song "None but the lonely heart".

September 21, 2019
"None but the lonely heart" is a sad song by Tchaikovsky (Frank Sinatra does a very nice version). The lyrics are about being distant from a loved one, "alone and parted from joy and gladness". The song is tonal and square like, I don't know how Babbitt's score relates to it. Perhaps I can find that later on. Today I practiced the first three pages of Babbitt and they are starting to sound like something, but still at a slow tempo (52 bpm, more or less).

September 22, 2019
Today's practice session was productive. The first four pages of Babbitt's score are going well (with one or two hitches) and I am starting to memorize and understand better what is musically going on in each phrase. Maybe it is not so important to have a millimetric rhythmic rigor. It is immensely difficult to be rhythmically rigorous because the composition is filled with non-conventional metric variations. It is not possible to feel and internalize some strange things such as a ¾ measure in which two beats appear in between a dotted eight-note and a sixteenth-note, and must be divided by eleven notes… It seems more reasonable to me to look for an approximate rhythm and make it sound musical. The tempo defined by Babbitt (72 bpm) seems also too fast for the number of notes to play in some motives.

September 23, 2019
In today's practice session I worked on the fifth page of Babbitt's score. The first reading is already done but there are still dynamics and abrupt changes in dynamics that are not assimilated. These abrupt changes are very difficult. They are not intuitive and seem unnatural. How to make them more natural? I realized today there is a tempo change in the fourth page that goes on into the fifth page. The quarter-note is faster (90 bpm). On the fifth page, it goes back to 72 bpm. The fact that the score is so loaded with information promotes that some important things go by unnoticed. On the fifth page, there is a repetition of a gesture that appears on the third page from the high B to the high G and an octave lower afterward. This is the first repeated motive that I recognize. This morning I read an author (Wallance Berry) who writes about and defends the importance of analysis for an enlightened performance. I strongly disagree and believe that analysis will not help performers understand anything that cannot be understood within the practice.

I advanced a bit more on Takemitsu's score. Although it is technically much easier than Babbitt's, the right timing between gestures is not immediate, as also the duration of the different fermatas. The direction of gestures and the construction and dissolution of tension is also not immediate.

September 24, 2019
Today I practiced the sixth page of Babbitt's score. It makes no sense and I cannot find it. It is very difficult to play the rhythm with precision, and even more on the final tempo. The initial beat (72 bpm) is the same as Varèse's *Density 21.5*, perhaps it is a reference to that. It seems also that on the fourth page there is a reference to the initial motive of that piece, but with a different rhythm. The existing recordings of Babbitt's *None but the lonely flute* are all extremely slow. Even if it seems impossible to play in the indicated speed, it seems to me that the piece is not as great played so slow. It is very different that way.

September 25, 2019
Today's practice session was dedicated to the sixth and seventh pages of Babbitt's score. I felt more tranquil with the fact that I can play it slower, as everyone does. It is very important to practice phrase by phrase and assimilate very well each one. It is impossible to memorize the mechanical gestures, the rhythm, the dynamics, and the registers if it is not through this fragmented repetition. I need to make copies of the pages so I can play the piece without having to turn the pages.

September 26, 2019
The seventh and eighth pages of Babbitt's score were the focus of today's session. The eight-page is not so difficult. It has a section of slurred *pianos* and *pianissimos* that is easy because it is always on the high register. I have already copied and taped the pages together and it is an intimidating score-length. It will be necessary to use three or four music stands. I feel pain in my jaw. Perhaps it is not from playing but because of anxiety. I feel more in shape after these last days practice session. It is very different to play without stopping. There are some passages in the eight pages of Babbitt's sore I practiced that are still not assimilated.
I advanced a bit more on Takemitsu's score. Multiphonics are not immediate to play and it is difficult to play continuously when changing from a note to a multiphonic.

September 27, 2019
Today's practice session was a good one. I didn't go further on Babbitt's score but I tried to consolidate what I have already practiced. Although I didn't advance much on such consolidation, I feel more comfortable and in shape with the flute.
I advanced a bit more with Takemitsu's score and did the first reading of Peixinho's manuscript. It is difficult to read and to play not knowing the tempo and how to address some symbols he uses. Since it is a very long piece, I signaled what seemed to be the end of sections for organizing further practicing.

September 28, 2019
Today's session didn't include Babbitt's score. I practiced Takemitsu's and revised the rhythm. I was playing it more or less intuitively and it seems important to clearly understand rhythmically what is happening, even though there is an initial marking requiring a *flexible* tempo. I practiced the first two sections of Peixinho's manuscript, annotating breathings and fingerings for the harmonics. The rhythm is marked

imprecisely, without a time signature. It seems to be a composition made of free gestures, like a baroque *fantasia*.

September 29, 2019
Today I practice the ninth page of Babbitt's score. I couldn't assimilate it, and the eighth page is also insecure. I felt very uncomfortable playing. I have pain in my jaw and no flexibility. It is very difficult to play Babbitt's score with no flexibility and a tense embouchure. The difficult rhythms continue and it is still difficult to read, play, understand, memorize. Everything is difficult! I cannot even imagine how it will be possible to play this full piece, even if slower than the indicated tempo. Besides the technical difficulties (speed, flexibility, dynamics, registers) there is also the difficulties of giving it a musical sense. In the first pages, such sense seems to be somewhat present, but in the last pages, it is still impossible to recognize anything that could relate to music. Takemitsu's score is almost fully practiced. The major difficulty is to give continuity between the several motives separated by rests.
I also addressed and annotated the third and fourth sections of Peixinho's score. Earlier today, I started working on the transcription and found that the bracketed motives should be played with a different character, slower, as if in a parallel state to the rest of the piece. There are quite a few difficult passages with harmonics that should be played *piano* and *pianissimo*.

September 30, 2019
Today's practice session included the tenth page of Babbitt's score plus the revision of the previous ones. It seems that the piece is becoming more difficult and senseless in each session. The tenth page has irregular time-signatures and many irregular rhythms. Everything is difficult on the tenth page. I don't know anymore if I should practice with the pulse in the quarter-note or the eighth-note, or without even thinking about the beat. What a nightmare! Everything else seems easy when compared to Babbitt, even if it's not.
I haven't looked anything yet about Isamu Noguchi, to whom Takemitsu's piece is dedicated. I also need to look for the sounds that the Japanese bamboo flutes make so that I can understand if it makes sense trying to reproduce such sound in this piece. I am almost sure it will.

October 1, 2019
Today I finished addressing the score of Babbitt's *None but the lonely flute*! I practiced pages eleven and twelve. I couldn't play the whole piece without stopping because I only had two music stands. In the morning, I was taking notes on one article Babbitt wrote in the 1950s ("Who cares if you listen?" [In the book I was reading in the library someone had written next to this title "I do"!]). Babbitt writes about the importance of five parameters in contemporary music which, together and within their complexity, establish the sense of a piece: pitch-class, register, dynamic, duration, and timbre. Each "atomic" event is located in a music space with these five dimensions. None of these parameters can be corrupted in performance. Otherwise, the work won't make sense as a whole. However, none of the recordings I know complies one-hundred percent to these elements. Not even those who were certainly approved by Babbitt (such as Dorothy Stone's or Rachel Rudith's). Now that the most difficult part of addressing the score is completed, it is necessary to repeat, repeat, repeat, repeat, repeat, repeat, repeat… until it is automatized and hoping that new musical senses can emerge from this continued repetition.

Takemitsu's score is almost ready. I'm already repeating the most technically difficult motives, but some of those, especially the ones with alternative fingerings are not fluid still. I was reading about Isamu Noguchi, the American-Japanese sculptor to whom the piece is dedicated, and found out there is a museum in New York dedicated to his work. It would be nice to play this piece there.
I revised the first four sections of Peixinho's manuscript. It is starting to flow more naturally but the musical sense is not immediately evident.

October 2, 2019
This morning I read an article by Thomas Carson Mark that made some difference in my flute practice. Mark writes that for a performance to be authentic it must be an assertion, that is, it is necessary to affirm the text (quoting it), understanding it, and with an intention to affirm it. In today's practice session I started with some embouchure work. I have been turning the flute too much inwards and consequently loosing sound projection and flexibility. I worked after on Takemitsu's score and felt a difference when trying to assert, but it is hard to understand why this happens. I also worked on the less confident motives and the fluidity between motives and phrases. It seems to me that the next step is starting to play the piece from beginning to end as many times as I possibly can. I should also record it and listen to the recordings, and internalize it as a whole.
As for Babbitt's, it is still difficult. A lot of endurance and relaxation to keep up with the technical demands, especially regarding the changes in registers. I started working from the end to the beginning, that is, first the last event, then the one before the last, and so on. Many sections, mostly from the middle to the end of the score, are still insecure.

October 3, 2019
In today's practice session I recorded Takemitsu's composition. It is still very slow and broken. Watching the video, it is clear that I still don't know what is going on or what comes next when I am playing. My posture is also not great: my head is too much down and forward. In general, there is a verve missing in my performance.
Practicing Babbitt's score, I focused on the end of the piece, adding events going backward. It is working well practicing like this, but it is difficult to maintain attentiveness during practice.
I played through the first four sections of Peixinho's manuscript and practiced the fifth section. This is a very time-consuming piece! But not as much as Babbitt's!

October 4, 2019 [Rest]

October 5, 2019
The final part of Babbitt's composition is already sounding like something of interest. The most important thing now is practicing focus on each of the events that happen, from one breathing to another. Corporal expression follows such focus and works on its own. It is not necessary to fake it.
Some passages in Takemitsu's piece need still to be technically revised, but it is important to play repeatedly from beginning to end to understand how to prepare each new event when playing what comes before, with the tiredness and eventual discomforts (in embouchure, in breathing, regarding saliva in the mouth, etc.). In each new event, it is necessary to restart technical control.

October 6, 2019
Today I engaged in three short practice sessions. In the first one, I practiced a few more events in Babbitt's score and the last three pages were well consolidated, although still

in a slow tempo. In the third session, I returned to Babbit's score and it turned out that nothing was consolidated and it seemed I was reading for the first time what I had practiced in the morning. It is deeply frustrating! I didn't feel so good playing today. The low notes were not comfortable and sounding terrible.
I practiced and recorded Takemitsu's *Itinerant*. It is sounding very uninteresting… The last two pages are much worse than the first two because I dedicated much more attention today to the first part of the piece.

October 7, 2019
It is more important to work on the continuity and fluidity of motives and events in Takemitsu's *Itinerant* than it is focusing on being rigorous with the rhythm. I recorded it two times and feel that I am still playing it to slow. Listening to the recordings it seems that it would work better and sound more fluid if I played it a bit faster.
I continued practicing Babbitt, adding events going backward. In measure 118 there is a G with a key-click impossible to do because it is slurred to the previous F#. I am doing the key click by with the low C and C# keys. Everything is still very slow because, each time I play, I am still reading the rhythm, the notes, the dynamics, the articulation, and trying to feel the adulterated and contorted beat. The motives I have memorized I can already play faster (although not at 72 bpm) and I think it sounds much better. Comparing the work I am doing with the recordings I know, it seems that I am doing a much more rigorous job with rhythm and articulation. This is a very laborious piece and perhaps the biggest difficulty is that fact. A lot of time, work, and repetitions are necessary to assimilate what is written. After so many repetitions just to address the score, however, the technicalities start to become easier.

October 8, 2019
In today's practice session I dedicated the first hour to Babbitt's score. The strange events that emerged in the first readings start to gain some sense, and even the schizophrenic dynamics are now not that difficult or incomprehensible. The last four pages are already practiced with more detail, however, it is extremely difficult to play the four pages in a row without any mistake or hesitation. It is completely different to play an isolated event or to play it following the previous one. While playing it is necessary to be able to anticipate what comes next and prepare each moment, especially technically challenging motives, abrupt changes in register, dynamics, also articulation, timbre…
Although technically less challenging, Takemitsu's *Itinerant* is full of these changes that are necessary to prepare while playing. Many of them start to become naturally prepared with the repetition of the full piece. Nevertheless, active attention is necessary so that those moments can occur in the best way possible while maintaining control. This active attention will also allow a fast regaining of control in case it is lost for some internal or external reasons.

October 9, 2019
Today I felt that an improvement in the endurance of my ability to focus took place. I spent more than one hour practicing the last half of Babbitt's score and I attained good results. I will have to revise everything in the following sessions. Two hours of daily practice is not sufficient, but consistency helps a lot so that those two hours can be productive. I think it would be better to be able to study in the mornings, with a clear and rested head, but unfortunately, it has to be at the end of the day. It is going well, anyway. Babbitt's piece will take more time to be ready, still. I have certainly practiced it around twenty hours already, and it is still far from being ready to play from beginning to end what is written. After that, it is still essential to practice the details.

I revised the five sections of Peixinho's score and worked on the sixth. It is going well, as is the transcription. Only three more sections to go.

October 10, 2019 [Rest]

October 11, 2019
I dedicated today's practice session to revising the last half of Babbitt's score. I did a very slow recording. Slow is the only way I can play for now. I think the tempo is not even at 50 bpm. I should, nevertheless, start playing it from beginning to end more times, so that the transitions from one event to the other start to become more natural. Some events already sound like music, but that does not happen when there are hesitations.

October 12, 2019
Today's practice session started early and it was very productive. I added one page to the revision of Babbitt's score. I spent around one hour on the revision of that sixth page and played everything (from there to the end) three times. It is quite demanding to maintain focus and anticipate what comes next, as well as maintaining the necessary flexibility for the abrupt changes in register and dynamics.
I also played Takemitsu's piece from beginning to end with a few stops and revisions in between. The first phrase is very long and difficult to play in one breathing. It is important to breathe well and not to start very slow.
I worked on Peixinho's manuscript, playing once through the first six sections and practicing the seventh. It is becoming clear when the main motive, which is glossed, appears. This is not immediate to spot on the score but it is somewhat evident when playing.

October 13, 2019
Today it was one more practice session dedicated majorly to Babbitt's score. I worked on the fifth page, but it was not completely assimilated. I played everything (from the fifth page to the end) a few times and there are still hesitations and stops occurring, as well as imprecisions, especially in the dynamics. I already worked the final part of the faster section (90 bpm). I don't know what to write more. There are no great novelties in this reading and assimilating practice. It is always the same. Perhaps the most relevant thing is that I notice that when I play in a row everything that is already practiced, that which I have repeated more times (not only the isolated events but also the transitions) happens more naturally, that is, it is not a surprise for me anymore, I am not reading without knowing what is going on, I can already anticipate and prepare what comes next.
I spent the last half hour practicing the eighth section of Peixinho's manuscript. There is a phrase with trills that is quite difficult to grasp.

October 14, 2019
Today's practice session went pretty well. *None but the lonely flute* is almost prepared from start to finish. I practiced the fourth page and played from there to the end. I kept up pretty well with focus and anticipating what happens at each moment. It is difficult still to manage the changes in register and dynamics, especially with high notes *piano* or *pianissimo*. It is also very difficult to differentiate the nuances in dynamics, between *p* and *mp*, or *mp*-*mf*, or *f*-*ff*. I can already play a bit faster and feel the music flow much more comfortably (except for the more difficult passages, still very uncomfortable).
I practiced the final section of Peixinho's manuscript and the transcript is almost ready. It is a very long section and it is not clear how I should play the very end.

October 15, 2019
Today I recorded Babbit's piece from beginning to end, slow, very slow… and with some mistakes. It happened also with many flaws in the articulation of high notes, whether *p* or *f*. I will have to work on flexibility, and mostly on playing the high notes *piano*. In general, from what the recording captured, many musical ideas are already passing over. I practiced the first and the second page with a tempo of 72 bpm. The first page is relatively simple. On the second page, there is a passage impossible to play at that speed… it will have to be much slower there. [I remember the words of my flute teacher at the University of Aveiro, Jorge Salgado Correia, about the listener's needing also more time to listen to every note in such technically difficult passages. If this is true, and I have no interest in believing it is not, there is no problem in adapting the speed of such difficult passages.]
Before the practice session, I took notes on a book by Takemitsu. There was a short text about Isamu Noguchi and his work. Takemitsu saw in the sculptor a voyager and in his work the fragments or the unfinished aspects of the great travel of those who don't let themselves become stagnant. It became clearer the purpose of such a fragmented piece as *Itinerant*, as well as the motives that appear to be unfinished. The final event is the one I still cannot understand.
I played Peixinho's piece throughout once. It is not yet comfortable to play one section after the other. Many passages are not ready still, and I am not certain of how what I am playing should sound. It is still a novelty to listen to what I am playing.

October 16, 2019
I recorded Babbitt's piece again today. From the 9 minutes and 13 seconds of yesterday, I progressed to 8 minutes and 34 seconds. I will have to practice again page by page to increase the speed, but I was not very patient to do such work today. It was good to play it several times from the beginning to the end. Listening to the recording I noticed that the articulation and the sound in the high notes are not clean. Both have a lot of air noise and it would be good to clean it up and have magnificent and brilliant high notes.
I started practicing Peixinho's transcript score today. I have signaled already some corrections to errors in the transcription. It is strange to play by the transcribed score after having practiced by the manuscript. Some things seem different…

October 17, 2019
In today's practice session I worked on another page of Babbitt's score, close to the stipulated tempo. There are quite a few passages impossible to play with 72 bpm. Besides speed, I worked on cleaning the high notes, and articulation details on the first three pages. I feel already a little tired of this piece, but am afraid that if I stop practicing continuously, I will forget all the work I have done. I will practice it a bit more tomorrow and during the weekend I will dedicate only to Peixinho's score. When playing the three first pages of *None but the lonely flute* at the speed indicated by the composer (even if with some slowing down here and there) I felt a different energy and immersed in what I was playing. Perhaps the focus that the piece demands for its performance promotes the engagement in each detail that seems to be extremely important to make music happen. When I play without focusing on what I am doing it doesn't have the same sense.
Addressing the transcript score of Peixinho's *Glosa II* is going further. Much of the work was already done, but I have still to copy the annotations and breathing marks for the whole piece. I am practicing section by section, as I did with the manuscript, and adding the annotations as I go.
Takemitsu's piece is ready for the first performances!

October 18, 2019
Today I starred the worst practice session in the history of humanity. I couldn't work anything at all, was extremely unfocused, and ended it after one hour because there was no point in continuing the torment. Even so, I recorded the first pages of Babbitt's piece two times, trying to play faster. They are not great. I also recorded Takemitsu's piece and it was horrible, full of mistakes and wrong notes. Listening to the recording, however, and surprisingly, revealed it to be not as bad as I thought. I think I need a break in my practice sessions.

October 19, 2019
Today's practice session consisted solely of confronting the transcript score of Peixinho's *Glosa II* with the manuscript. It seems better to adopt the model in which accidentals refer only to the notes they precede and include that in the instructions, even if Peixinho uses a different one. I also have doubts regarding slurred notes with accidentals.

October 20, 2019
I practiced today the first four sections of Peixinho's score. It is difficult to understand for now which tempo works best. It seems that different sections will work best with different tempos, but no indication is given. The second section, for instance, includes phrases that seem to work better slower and others that seem to work better faster. I am starting to have some doubts about the breathing marks I added in the manuscript.

October 21, 2019
In today's practice session I practiced and recorded Takemitsu's piece. It is definitely too slow. I think it will work best a little faster and more fluid.
In the second hour, I practiced *Glosa II*. I spent a lot of time in the fifth section and, by listening to the recording I did, it is still not very interesting. It was difficult to decide on the breathings and the structuring of the musical ideas. It doesn't seem to exist, for now, a lot of sense in what is written. The end of this section includes a motive in harmonics from the high A to the hiper-high D that is not possible to play. On top of that, it should be played *pp*.

October 22, 2019
Today's practice session was shorter. I started with Takemitsu's piece and recorded it a bit faster than yesterday, but much more unfocused. Listening to the recording it seems that there is no intention in what I am playing. Several passages that were already controlled were not anymore. For instance, multiphonics are not good, nor high notes in general. The final gesture is still also not convincing.
I practiced also the sixth of Peixinho's score and recorded it. This section has a lot of fast gestures, ascending and descending, which "die" in long notes. A few phrases are easier to identify and give sense to, but the major part is still strange. I was very unfocused in today's practice session.

October 23, 2019
Today's session was more comfortable than the last one. I was more focused and able to practice sections seven and eight of Peixinho's score. They are both difficult and strange, with many broken gestures. Listening to the recordings I can notice that some phrases, that I am still separating too much, will work better with a faster tempo and less fragmented. Only section nine is missing for the transcribed score of Peixinho to be fully addressed.

October 24, 2019
I did a good practice session today. I was a bit unfocused in the beginning but was able to work well. The last section of Peixinho's score was not well internalized. The recording I made was very slow and without certainties. I also recorded the first three sections of *Glosa II* in a row. Some phrases and moments already sound good. It is very different to listen to the recording and to listen when I am playing.
I also played both Takemitsu's piece and Babbitt's from beginning to end. Babbitt's piece is not yet forgotten, even after six days without playing it.

October 25, 2019
In today's practice session I recorded the fourth and fifth sections of Peixinho's score, and after that, I recorded the first five sections in a row. It is still very fragmented. There is no continuity between many gestures and perhaps there should be. It is a very, very long piece. I haven't realized that it was so long. It seems to have between 15 and 20 minutes. It will be difficult to make it interesting for listeners.
I also recorded Takemitsu's piece and it took almost five minutes. I confronted the instruction in the preface to the score and, turns out, it should be around 6 minutes long. That means it can be much slower than I was thinking. Anyway, and since in the beginning there's the indication "flexible", regarding tempo, I should understand how I feel good playing it and how does it make sense for me to play it.

This next weekend I am having a pause in the practice sessions.

October 26, 2019 [Rest]
October 27, 2019 [Rest]

October 28, 2019
Today's practice session went pretty well. I mostly practiced Peixinho's *Glosa II*. I recorded sections 1 to 7 and, although it sounds a bit boring, it already sounds like something decent that one could call an approximation to music. Some passages already sound really well, and, it turns out, it is not as difficult as it seemed in the beginning. It will have to be played a bit faster so that some repeated gestures (ascending and descending scales) won't be as boring. Further on, I will also have to revise the breathings.
I revised Babbitt's full piece and it is still slow. It is impossible to maintain the 72 bpm, but I still have to practice the second half faster.

October 29, 2019
Today I practiced section eight from Peixinho's score. I also revised the previous sections and encountered some problems. It is difficult to play everything in a row and keep the focus on what comes next. It is necessary to anticipate reading what comes next so it won't come as a surprise. That is, it is necessary to know the score and the music very well in order not to be surprised. Perhaps the most important thing is precisely that, anticipating the listening of what comes next, at the same time I am playing.
I recorded Babbitt's full piece two times in a row. In the first recording, I tried playing faster and it was very clumsy, but it is much more interesting to listen to.
At the end of the practice session, I played Takemitsu's piece once and it sounded pretty good.

October 30, 2019

I did today a shorter and unfocused practice session. I practiced Peixinho's section nine, with doubts about the final part, and revised the full piece. From the beginning to the middle it is sounding good. I believe that to attain that in the second half I will have to repeat, repeat, repeat many times. The same goes for Babbitt's piece. I played it today from the beginning to the end two times, with many mistakes. I was very unfocused. It was not a very productive practice session.

October 31, 2019
Today's practice session was a bit longer. I recorded Peixinho's full piece and it sounds incredible! It lasts around 17 minutes and some passages with many notes are still not ready, but the piece results pretty well. In the recording, the moments where I hesitate are noticeable and the music disappears!
I also recorded Babbitt's piece, and after that, I played it again two more times. Surprisingly, it is not as put together as Peixinho's. There are many moments or events that sound like they don't have a direction, that is, they seem to go nowhere. Although I am playing the notes, the rhythm [more or less], and the dynamics [more or less] right, some events are not convincing and sound uninteresting.

November 1, 2019
Today I played Babbitt's piece from beginning to end three times. New problems emerged and I revised those hesitations. It is difficult to keep the focus throughout the full piece, especially when an inexplicable mistake (one that had never occurred) happens. In those moments, I am astonished, trying to understand what happened, and even if can carry on without stopping, my focus is stuck on that inexplicable mistake.
I also practiced the fast and more difficult passages in Peixinho's piece and played it once from beginning to end. I feel less comfortable playing the final sections (from 6 to 9). I will have to focus more on those and leave the first 5 sections, which are more comfortable, for later.
I played Takemitsu's piece once and it was acceptable, although a few imprecisions, mistakes, and failures happened.

November 2, 2019 [Rest]

November 3, 2019
I dedicated today's practice session to sections 6 and 7 of Peixinho's score. I marked new breathing and practiced repeatedly and continuously. Section 7 is very difficult. It is very fragmented and it has several fast motives that are not very interesting.

November 4, 2019
Today I revised once more Babbitt's piece. I practiced the first three pages with detail. I was, however, a bit unfocused and with a terrible sound in the low notes… I revised a few breathings that were not working well and that helped to resolve some problems regarding the musical sense. It is frustrating that I am not able to play the piece in the tempo determined by the composer.
I practiced section 8 of Peixinho's score and revised sections 6 and 7. This is a difficult piece to practice in full because it is really long. It is laborious to play it from beginning to end. I need one entire hour to play it only three times. It is really important to record the pieces to understand how it is sounding, from the listeners' perspective. While I am playing, I need to be more focused, or totally focused, in the music, otherwise, I believe it doesn't sound like music.

November 5, 2019
I am performing Takemitsu's piece on November 20th. I also scheduled my final performance, in which I will be playing Takemitsu's, Peixinho's, and Babbitt's pieces. It will be on January 10, 2020, at 5 pm, in Leah M. Smith Hall. I have still a terrible sound on the low notes and have a lot of pain on my back. Today I only recorded Takemitsu's *Itinerant* and revised the passages that did not go well.
Before today's practice session, while writing about the ontology of the musical work, I developed the idea that the most important thing for making music departing from the musical text is that which is not written; the space between the notes; the fluency that the digit cannot apprehend. It is very difficult to think like that in practice; detach what is written from what is not written and make what is not written more evident. But it seems to me that it can make all the difference between a mechanical and senseless (going nowhere) reading and a directed reading, from one note to the other, or to silence. The difficulty is in maintaining this *modus operandi* when there are so many technical worries.

November 6, 2019
Today's practice session went better. I worked on section 9 of Peixinho's score. I am still trying to find out how to play the final event.
I also played Takemitsu's piece and changed my posture accordingly to what I have learned in a Timani workshop. It helped better the sound, breathing, and flexibility.

November 7, 2019
Today's practice session was longer. I recorded Peixinho's full piece two times, and it sounded a bit too slow. There are still many hesitations in many similar passages which I still don't distinguish very well. It is also difficult to maintain a comfortable embouchure from beginning to end.
I played Babbitt's piece once and it was an authentic disaster.
I also played and recorded Takemitsu's piece, but haven't seen the video yet.

November 8, 2019
I have pain in my back and my right shoulder. Today's practice session was painful. Even so, I practiced almost two hours. I practiced Takemitsu's piece and I am successfully playing it naturally, integrating the few mistakes and imprecisions in the piece's flow.
I also practiced Babbitt's piece until the end of the faster section. It felt good working on the details again.

November 9, 2019 [Rest]
November 10, 2019 [Rest]

November 11, 2019
Today I practice Babbitt's piece until the middle. I can play it a bit faster but not at the determined speed. It is impossible!! After finishing this revision, I will start playing the piece exclusively from beginning to end, so that I can practice fluidity, endurance, and expression, which don't work as well with a fragmented practice.
I didn't practice Peixinho's piece today but have already an answer for the final part.
I played Takemitsu's piece once and it is sounding ok for the performance on the 20th.

November 12, 2019
Today's practice session was canceled because I was not feeling good and decided it was better to stop playing.

November 13, 2019
I spent today's practice session repeating Takemitsu's *Itinerant*. I already feel anxious about the performance on the 20th. I did three recordings and all of them sound acceptable. I was having pain on my jaw, and my lips had a reaction to the cold, so I couldn't play the high notes very focused. In the last recording, I tried to be more expressive with my body and my face and I think it can help to maintain the focus on what I am playing.

November 14, 2019
Today's practice session went well but was not very motivating. I am tired of playing the same things over and over… and I am also unfocused. I cannot be present and engaged when playing, in an analogical way, according to James Stern, whom I interviewed today. I am playing mechanically, or digitally.
I practiced Peixinho's piece a bit. I played Takemitsu's *Itinerant*. And I practiced Babbitt's piece a bit. It is frustrating to return to Babbitt's because there is always something that is not ok again.

November 15, 2019 [Rest]
November 16, 2019 [Rest]

November 17, 2019
Today's session was not very long. I practiced Takemitsu's piece and started to memorize it. I think it can make a difference to know the piece by heart, even if I end up playing it by the score. It is extremely easy to fall under the automatic and not to play assertively when I am reading. I will try to memorize the full piece and understand if it really makes a difference. With Peixinho's and Babbitt's pieces it will be much harder, if not impossible. When something is played by heart the transitions from one note to another become more important, as well as the silences.

November 18, 2019
Today I practiced Takemitsu's piece a lot. I memorized a bit more and confirm it makes a huge difference! It is difficult to remember all the details in the score, but everything becomes more natural. Even technical difficulties become easier, and assertion and confidence are related to that; there is no way of escaping playing assertively when playing by heart. I recorded the piece two times and they are both very good! I shouldn't be afraid. Even with small mistakes, it sounds convincing.

November 19, 2019
Today I practiced Takemitsu's piece. I included in the practice what I have learned today in a book by Thomas Carson Mark (*Motion, Emotion, and Love*): it is necessary to be present at each moment in the motion or movements I am doing so that my playing is not mindless. There is enough time to play each note and I cannot ever feel that I am playing too fast. In Takemitsu's piece, this helped particularly in two passages that were a bit insecure still. I found that "holding" a specific note in those passages helps to clarify what is heard and that the fingers know the movement. However, it is necessary to be able to be present with the music and the movements when the audience is in front of me. I have everything ready for tomorrow. I am excited to finally play for an audience.

November 20, 2019
The performance of Takemitsu's *Itinerant* went reasonably well. The most difficult things to control are the breathings and air management. Several things did not go well and I

didn't feel comfortable playing the multiphonics and the silences. In the recording, it is difficult to understand many of the mistakes because of the low quality of the video and audio. In general, it was a good performance, and I was able to maintain the posture, but I was not very satisfied.

November 21, 2019
Today's practice session was shorter. I was much more relaxed and the low notes were sounding amazing. I practiced Babbitt's piece very slowly, without worrying about the speed. I still have almost two months until the final performance in January, and since I am already so tired of practicing the same things in the same way, I dare myself from now on to try to memorize the three pieces I am researching. I want to understand if that memorization work does really make a difference, as it seems to me that it does, and why. Playing Babbitt's piece slower helped the details to come out much more clearly, but some sections don't work as well.

November 22, 2019 [Rest]

November 23, 2019
In the first hour of today's session, I practiced only Takemitsu's piece and memorized it in full. It is still not perfect but it is so much better to play by heart. It is impressive the difference I feel between playing by heart and playing by the score. To memorize it is necessary to give attention to different details, which don't appear as important or even relevant when I am reading. The technical difficulties I had in a few passages vanished with memorization only!
In the second hour, I started memorizing Babbitt's piece and also acknowledged some differences. I memorized the first and the second pages and was able to make sense of some moments in the piece that were not so good before. Perhaps the easiness in being musical, which emerges when I play by heart, has to do with keeping away from the score, or perhaps it has to do with the fact that more focus on the actions is necessary. I am excited to memorize all the rest, even if I know that I will not play by heart in the final performance (that seems impossible!).

November 24, 2019 [Rest]

November 25, 2019
I only practiced 30 minutes today, very unfocused. I couldn't play Takemitsu's piece by heart completely, but I memorized a bit more of Babbitt's score.

November 26, 2019
Today's practice session went very well. I worked mostly on Babbitt's piece. I memorized a bit more but it is very difficult and takes a lot of time to know every indication in the score. I recorded the first pages and it is sounding pretty well and fluid, although it could be a bit faster. I think it is better to maintain continuity in the flow of music than accomplishing the metronomic tempo indicated by the composer. This implies giving a bit more time to prepare the following phrases.

November 27, 2019
Today I practiced in the morning and felt more focused. I recorded Takemitsu's piece playing by heart and only with two mistakes and a few technical imprecisions. It sounds much more fluid than in the recording I did with the score.
I memorized an extra half page from Babbitt's score.

November 28, 2019
I did a longer practice session today, around two and a half hours. I recorded Takemitsu's piece by heart and memorized a bit more of Babbitt's score. I recorded the memorized pages of Babbitt's piece playing by the score. It sounds a bit aggressive and uncontrolled, but it might be because of the recorder and the proximity of the microphone. I cannot notice any differences between this recording and the last one I did before having memorized it.

November 29, 2019
In today's practice session I memorized a bit more of Babbitt's score and am already halfway through. It is difficult to understand what makes a difference between making music and merely making sounds. For sure it has to do with directing each sound towards the next. It is a kind of avoidance of stagnation. In this sense, it has to do also with anticipating what is going to be played next. There is an excess in the presence of music that demands continuity. As in speech, the sense of what we read has to be already present so that the reading concurs with what the text encloses. To make music from Babbitt's score, then, such continuity is necessary, and for continuity to happen it is necessary to direct what I am playing towards rest or closure moments. But even in those moments, there is music. What is it, then?

November 30, 2019
A bit more of Babbitt's score, today. Memorizing has been important in resolving moments that are apparently under control when reading but stop making sense without the score, or at least is more evident that they make no sense. Playing by heart demands a search for musicality. I have been thinking that the moments of closure in the piece end the music and that, as such, breaks in the continuity can exist inside the same musical work. I have also been thinking that to attain the continuity that makes music happen (to fill the spaces between the notes) an anticipation of what will happen next is necessary.

December 1, 2019 [Rest]
December 2, 2019 [Rest]

December 3, 2019
Today's practice session was painful. Two days without playing makes a lot of difference in flexibility. Besides that, the focus was also an absent entity. By the end of the day, I am already very tired and it is hard to practice with energy and focus.
I practiced Babbitt's score and memorized only two more phrases. I feel there is no point in practicing like this, but sometimes a practice session can start badly and improve afterward. It is good when that happens. It is also a way of practicing the muscles and precise movements which are necessary, but it is a torment.
I tried practicing Peixinho's piece but it was impossible to make sense of what I was doing. I will have to dedicate a lot of time to revise this piece and feel more comfortable playing. This is a very difficult piece to "maintain alive". Some passages seem to be "musically weak" and those are the most difficult to play with a sense. Perhaps it is a matter of finding a direction in what is written, but in many phrases don't seem to have that, and without failing to comply with the score is very difficult to create a musical sense.

December 4, 2019

Today I had a more focused practice session. I memorized almost a full page of Babbitt's score, and there are only three more to go, and the few lines in the last page. I recorded it one time reading from the score and it doesn't seem to be very convincing… I don't know if it is because I didn't play it convincingly, or because I am not listening with the attention I should be listening to. I am really tired of this piece.
I feel my left hand weird. It is tense and sometimes the little finger and the ring finger get stuck. It never happened while I am playing but it is scary to think it might be some serious injury.
In the recording I did of Babbitt's piece, I notice that after, or even during, the fastest section I am slowing down and playing in a much slower tempo.
I also practiced Peixinho's score today. It is important not to let the more difficult passages to go by in the practice, and make decisions in the motives that are impossible to play as written.

December 5, 2019 [Rest]

December 6, 2019
I practiced Babbitt's score today. I memorized a bit more and played a few times with the score. After memorizing it is much easier to play with the score, although flexibility is still difficult. I changed a breathing placement on the first page that makes a high B easier to play and, by avoiding the following breathing, makes the end of the section more fluid.
I also practiced Peixinho's score with a new version of the transcript (I corrected a few wrong things). I need to start practicing this piece from beginning to end soon.

December 7, 2019
In today's practice session I worked on Peixinho's score, particularly sections 7 and 8. What I practiced a few weeks ago is already forgotten.
I also practiced Babbitt's piece and memorized a bit more. I recorded reading by the score and it was difficult to maintain a comfortable embouchure throughout. I am failing many high notes because I am not supporting the speed of the air column. I feel I could play everything a little faster. As soon as I finish memorizing the piece I will start playing only from beginning to end, forgetting the excess of the score and trying to give it a sense that makes sense for me.

December 8, 2019 [Rest]

December 9, 2019
Today I memorized a bit more of Babbitt's score. Only the two final pages are missing. Playing what is already memorized I notice there are a few passages in which I am still hesitant, which means that music is not happening and that I will have to mark and revise them with attention.
I practiced the last section of Peixinho's score and recorded the full piece. It lasted 19 minutes. Many parts are still insecure but it sounds well in general. These 19 minutes leave me more at ease for the final performance. It will not be as short as I thought it would be.

December 10, 2019 [Unnoted]
December 11, 2019 [Unnoted]
December 12, 2019 [Rest]

December 13 2019

This week I finished memorizing Babbitt's score! Today I recorded the full piece by the score and it is 7 minutes and 35 seconds long. Some breathings are cutting the flow of music.

December 14, 2019 [Rest]

December 15, 2019 [Unnoted]
December 16, 2019 [Unnoted]
December 17, 2019 [Unnoted]

December 18 2019
In the last days, I started practicing the full program for the final performance from beginning to end. Today I played everything twice and it is going well. In *Glosa II*, I feel I get tenser and tenser and need to make a reset several times to adjust posture, embouchure, the flute… In this piece, there are many opportunities for such reset because there are many moments of rest. In Babbitt's piece, it is more difficult because those moments are very few and of short length. I have been, however, able to maintain focus and the flow of music, even when I slip here and there. It will be very different to play for an attentive audience… I have no way of preparing for such a moment because I am already desensitized by the video recordings.

December 19, 2019
Today I played the full program again twice. I did a little experiment with the first section of Peixinho's piece, trying to play each note separated from the next, and then trying to anticipate what comes next. The difference in what we listen to is enormous, even if in some passages I cannot understand such difference (when there are scales it is difficult not to think in the total movement). It is not about playing what is next before getting there, but about anticipating the arrival of each moment by preparing it in the previous one. This changes the way I play each note.

December 20, 2019
In today's practice session I tried to play each piece on the program with anticipation in mind. It is not easy. I believe this happens because I didn't have this in mind in the practice I have carried out until now. I worked on a few specific passages in each piece in which I feel technically stuck and am not able to think ahead towards what comes next.

December 21, 2019 [Rest]

December 22, 2019
Today I played the full program once and dedicated the remaining of the session to Takemitsu's piece. The timing of the silences between motives is hard to figure out and each time I play, it seems that it can be different. If I am immersed in the music and, in each silence, preparing what comes next, anticipating, it comes more naturally, but sometimes, especially if what comes next is technically difficult, it is hard to prepare without creating tension.

December 23, 2019
In today's practice session I played the full program once in the beginning and once in the end. In between, I practiced Peixinho's piece a few times trying to anticipate what comes next. I am still not fully aware of that, and I am sure it has to do with the fact that I didn't memorize this piece. I feel saturated with practicing and overwhelmed when

thinking about having to memorize such a long score. I will have to play it many times from beginning to end to feel more confident playing it in front of an audience.

December 24, 2019 [Rest]
December 25, 2019 [Rest]

December 26, 2019
Today I played the full program for the performance three times. It is very important to practice without stopping when something goes wrong. I have been trying to get back in focus when that happens and not letting any mistake shaken my attention to what comes next. At the end of the session, I revised a few things in Babbitt's piece that were starting to come off badly.

December 27, 2019
In today's session, I started by practicing Babbitt's piece, trying to anticipate what follows at each moment. I feel it is much easier to do that in this piece than in Peixinho's or Takemitsu's because it is a continuous flow of events. I also already know the piece very well, after so many hours practicing it, and that helps to prepare what comes next while playing what I am playing in each moment. I played the full program twice at the end of the session and it came off alright both times, even if with some mistakes, different in the first and the second run-throughs.

December 28, 2019
Today's practice session was mostly dedicated to playing Peixinho's piece from beginning to end. I played it three times, and once more as part of the full program. I still feel a bit hesitant when an inaccuracy happens, but it is becoming more and more natural incorporating those small mistakes into the performance and not letting them disturb the continuous flow of events. Takemitsu's and Babbitt's pieces are also more fluid, and I feel I can anticipate what comes next even if I fail here and there. Each time I play, something different happens and those differences don't disturb the happening of music.

December 29, 2019 [Rest]

December 30, 2019
I did a short practice session today. I only played the full program twice. I felt more focused the second time I played it, and I was able to correct a few things that didn't go as well the first time. I am feeling comfortable when I play and, if I maintain the focus, I can anticipate everything that will follow (except the external factors that can always create some discomfort, such as the amount of saliva in the mouth or some scratching in the throat). In the next practice sessions, and until the performance on the 10th of January, I will dedicate the time to play the program throughout several times, so I can practice dealing with unpredictable things happening when I am playing. It will also help me practice maintaining focus and experiencing the transitions between each piece.

December 31, 2019 [Rest]

January 1, 2020
I started the new year with a satisfying practice session. It was not very long but I felt good playing the full program twice. I also revised a few passages in each piece that are already prepared but I feel could be more secure.

January 2 2020
Today I played the full program four times. It was very tiring but good things happened each time. I am feeling comfortable but am also already pretty tired of playing this program.

January 3, 2020
In today's practice session I only played the program once. I was not focused and several things went wrong. I am starting to feel anxious about the recital. This not so good practice session amplified my insecurities to play this *Newer Music* for an audience. I will need to make an extra effort during this final week, so I can deal with the wearisome of playing the same program over and over again.

January 4, 2020
I started today's session by practicing each score, and each difficult passage, individually, with attention to detail. It was a good practice session and helped me feel more secure for the recital next Friday. I played the full program only once at the end of the session, imagining the scenario in Leah M. Smith hall. It is a small venue, and I am curious to rehearse there next Thursday and get to know the acoustics.

January 5, 2020
Today's practice session started with some warm-up exercises. I have been doing them inconsistently but will add them to this last week's routine. I played the full program twice, imagining the audience. When I am playing, I am fully focused on the pieces and am able to anticipate at each moment the following. I hope I am still able to do this with an audience in front of me. There is no reason why I shouldn't, but I cannot control the anxiety I feel, mostly because I am afraid not to be able to gain back control if I fail. This is precisely what I have been practicing, and everything is going smoothly. The only need for worries is because of the on-stage anxiety, that can mess focus, breathing, sound, etc.

January 6, 2020
After warming-up, I played the full program three times. I revised a few things that went wrong the first time, and the second and third times were more focused. Imagining the audience, as the recital date approaches, is becoming easier and more nerve-wracking. Despite that, I feel I am in control of what I am doing and am enjoying playing this music. Even if I am tired of playing the same pieces over and over again, I am fully focused on what I am doing when I am playing, and I know exactly where what I am playing at the moment is going.

January 7, 2020
I did a long warm-up in today's practice session and included the revision of a few passages from each piece that are more difficult in the first part of the session. After that, I played the complete program two times. Everything went great and I feel very well prepared for the recital.

January 8, 2020
Today's practice session was similar to yesterday. I did a long warm-up and practiced the specific passages in each piece which I feel more difficult to play. I played the complete program three times today. I will do the same thing tomorrow in Leah M. Smith Hall.

January 9, 2020
Leah M. Smith Hall has amazing acoustics! The low notes sound easy and fill the whole room. It is very comfortable to play there. I warmed up and did the same revision of difficult passages I did yesterday. Then I played the complete program three times and felt good each time. I felt a bit more anxious than inside the practice room.

January 10, 2020
The recital went very well! A few hours before, I warmed up and revise the more difficult passages. Then I played the complete program twice, resting in between.

I was feeling very anxious at the beginning of the recital. The first page of Peixinho's piece was a bit trembled but such anxiety, but after a while, and throughout the piece, I fully emerged in what I was playing. The almost 20 minutes this first piece lasts passed by without me even noticing it. The rest of the recital was very comfortable for me. I was not anxious at all and it gave me immense pleasure to play Takemitsu's piece. It was also an amazing experience to play Babbitt's piece to an attentive audience. I felt fully focused on what I was doing throughout the recital. In the end, I played an extra, much easier, piece. The overall experience of recital and previous practice was very rewarding. I learned a lot preparing these three pieces to be played in front of an audience and actually playing them. It is now more evident for me that for this *Newer Music* to happen in performance the preparatory work has to keep in focus that flowing of events still needs to happen, even if the direction of each moment towards the next is not as plain as in canonical music. The performer's work is, thus, much more substantial in *Newer Music*, not only because of the technical difficulties but also because the continuous movement of flowing events that creates music is not as obvious. After the recital, the audience commented and questioned me about the pieces I had played. They enjoyed the program, but most people suggested they would prefer to listen to canonical music. I believe that *Newer Music*, clearly, has still a long way to go in order to reach the popularity of the canon. Perhaps it never will, and maybe, as Babbitt would put it, it is doomed to remain "for, of, and by specialists". In any case, it should happen, the best way it can possibly happen.

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