Rural (In)Securities: Resettlement, Control and "Development" in Angola (1960s–1970s)*

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ABSTRACT

Nach dem Ausbruch organisierter anti-kolonialer Gewalt während der frühen sechziger Jahre suchten portugiesische imperiale und koloniale Akteure nach politisch-militärischen Strategien, die Sicherheit, rudimentäre Sozialfürsorge und Entwicklung kombinierten. Diese spezifische Kombination war ein Wesensmerkmal des Spätkolonialismus. Neben Strategien zur Bevölkerungskontrolle, „psychologischen Aktivitäten" oder einer Sozialgesetzgebung entwickelte sich ländliche Entwicklungspolitik zu einem zentralen Instrument der spätkolonialen Sicherheitspolitik. Ausgehend von der Analyse zweier zentraler Dokumente, die ländliche Entwicklungspolitik propagierten, zeigt der Artikel, wie ländliche Regionen zu einem wesentlichen Austragungsort von militärisch-politischen Sicherheitsstrategien wurden, die viele Elemente ländlicher Entwicklungspolitik enthielten

Introduction

The "wind of change" blew differently in the Portuguese colonies, since 1951 called "overseas provinces", after a Constitutional Revision. This legal, "semantic decolonization" did not entail a meaningful transformation of the authoritarian political nature of empire, marked by an exclusionary and discriminatory politics of difference, despite the widespread rhetoric of sociocultural "assimilation" and political "integration". The "lusotropicalist" ideology, which proclaimed a unique, benevolent and adaptive form of colonization, prevailed, including in diplomatic exchanges and in the ways in which the

Portuguese interacted with international fora such as the United Nations. Portrayed as a "multiracial, pluricontinental nation", not as an empire, Portugal refused the transformative energies of global decolonization, aimed to counteract internationalist dynamics of supervision and persistently dismissed dialogue and negotiation with anticolonial movements. On the contrary, a dynamic of reinforced colonization was predominant since the 1950s, but essentially from the 1960s. A combination of policies gained momentum: intense demographic, ethnic (white) colonization, sponsored by the state; social and economic developmentalism, with several state-coordinated developmental plans since 1953 and the opening up of the colonial economies; enhanced social control and military intervention, after a series of violent events in the north of Angola and in its capital, Loanda, in 1961 that marked the beginning of the colonial wars.[1]

The Portuguese authorities were very concerned with the outburst of organized anti-colonial violent initiatives during the early 1960s in three Portuguese "overseas provinces" – first in Angola, then also in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique –, and believed that it was necessary to generate a series of multifaceted strategic political-military responses.[2] For instance, in the north of Angola, according to the metropolitan and the colonial elites, there was an imperative need to pacify an area of significant economic importance and to deal with the approximately half-million refugees caused by the 1961 events.[3] Numerous crucial, political and legal modifications were advanced immediately after, some merely *de jure*, others also *de facto*, with varying consequences across the vast colonial empire. The suppression of the *indigenato* system (1961) – the longstanding dual juridical regime that governed the colonies; the promulgation of a new Rural Labour Code (1962) – which at last prohibited all the legally sanctioned modalities of forced labour, according to international norms; the creation of the *Junta Provincial do Povoamento* (Provincial Settlement Board, or JPP) – which aimed to promote ethnic colonization and transform the politics and the economics of rural contexts; and the creation of *regedorias* – local administrative bodies envisaged to "respect the tradition and the habits of populations," as could be read in the Decree that established them, and to create a

1   M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto, A Modernizing Empire? Politics, Culture and Economy in Portuguese Late Colonialism, in: M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto (eds.), The Ends of European Colonial Empires, Basingstoke 2015, pp. 51-80. For the "wind of change" context see L. J. Butler and S. Stockwell (eds.), The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization, Basingstoke 2013. For the global contexts of decolonization see, for instance, M. Frey, R.W. Pruessen and T.T. Yong (eds.), The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization, Armonk, NY, 2003; M. Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires, Oxford 2008; M. Thomas, B. Moore and L. Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918–1975, London 2008.

2   G. Bender, Angola under the Portuguese: the Myth and the Reality, Berkeley 1978; Bandeira Jerónimo and Costa Pinto, A Modernizing Empire?; D. Ramada Curto, B. Pinto da Cruz and T. Furtado, Políticas Coloniais em Tempo de Revoltas – Angola circa 1961, Porto 2016.

3   A. Keese, Dos abusos às revoltas? Trabalho forçado, reformas portuguesas, política 'tradicional' e religião na Baixa de Cassange e no distrito do Congo (Angola), 1957-1961, in: Africana Studia 7 (2004), pp. 247-76; D. Ramada Curto and B. Cruz, Terrores e saberes coloniais: notas acerca dos incidentes na Baixa de Cassange, in: M. Bandeira Jerónimo (ed.), O Império Colonial em Questão, Lisbon 2012, pp. 3-35.

new platform for political engagement and control of African rural communities – were some of the most relevant.[4] In the next decade, as a consequence of a constellation of international, metropolitan and colonial pressures and dynamics, novel policies of security, welfare and development emerged, designed by a new generation of military men, human and social scientists, and politicians. Frequently interdependent, they markedly shaped the late colonial period, in a context characterized by the ongoing global political decolonization. Political and military goals were connected to socio-economic rationales. Improvements in security and rationalization, population control, developmentalism and welfarism coalesced in many ways, entailing the simultaneous *securitization* of late colonial development and the *developmentalization* of late colonial security. A "repressive developmentalism" formed as a consequence of the intersections of these two processes, although the genealogies of these intersections can be traced further back.[5] There were some commonalties with other European colonial empires facing similar challenges. Despite their distinct chronologies, idioms and repertoires of repressive developmentalism were shared between them. With some important distinctions, all were characterized by consequential entanglements between novel coercive repertoires of rule, projects of social engineering and "modernizing" programmes.[6]

These entanglements became particularly clear, for instance, in 1967, with the formation of a General Council for Counter-Subversion (GCCS), in which high-ranking Portuguese officials of the colonial and military administrations gathered to debate new *strategic* rationales of counter-subversion.[7] Its first meeting, in January 1968, defined the most important areas of (interrelated) concern: security; civil administration; the regrouping of rural populations, to foster "social promotion" and ensure their "defence"; population control; settlement; propaganda and counter-propaganda; and "psychological orienta-

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4   The *regedorias* aimed at assembling an average of "2000 to 3000 souls" in 133 "new settlements", in order to impede the "dispersal" of "native" communities, in an articulation of developmental rationales and security imperatives. Only eighty-three were actually formed by early 1964. See Joaquim Carrusca de Castro, "Relatório dos trabalhos de reordenamento rural e da organização comunitária – distrito de Uíge, 1964", Portuguese Diplomatic Archives, Arquivo Histórico Diplomático (henceforth AHD), AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0413/06592. For the entire legislative package see Providências legislativas ministeriais tomadas em Angola de 20 a 28 de Outubro de 1961, Lisbon 1961. For the regedorias see Decree no. 43.896. Decree organising Local Administrative Bodies known as Regedorias, Lisbon 1961.
5   M. Bandeira Jerónimo, "A Battle in the Field of Human Relations": The Official Minds of Repressive Development in Portuguese Angola, in: M. Thomas and G. Curlessn (eds.), Decolonization and Conflict: Colonial Comparisons and Legacies, London 2017, pp. 115-136; M. Bandeira Jerónimo, Ordering Resistance: The Late Colonial State in the Portuguese Empire (1940–1975), in: Political Power and Social Theory, forthcoming, 2017.
6   M. Bandeira Jerónimo, Repressive Developmentalisms: Idioms, Repertoires, Trajectories in Late Colonialism, in: M. Thomas and A. Thompson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire, Oxford, forthcoming, 2017; F. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, Philadelphia 2013; M. Feichtinger, "A Great Reformatory": Social Planning and Strategic Resettlement in Late Colonial Kenya and Algeria, 1952–63, in: Journal of Contemporary History 52 (2017) 1, pp. 45-72. See also M. Frey, Control, Legitimacy, and the Securing of Interests: European Development Policy in South-East Asia from the Late Colonial Period to the Early 1960s, in: Contemporary European History 12 (2003) 4, pp. 395-412.
7   For general approaches of counter-subversion in the Portuguese late colonial period, see J.P. Cann, Portuguese Counterinsurgency Campaigning in Africa 1961-1974; PhD thesis, University of London, 1996 and W.A. van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola, Pretoria 2011.

tion." The planned resettlement of "native" populations was one of the most important topics of interest, reviving early efforts made in 1961 and building on the possibilities opened up by Decree no. 3484 of 25 April 1964, that enshrined rural resettlement as a central element in the ongoing process of formulating a counter-subversion strategy in Angola. According to the decree, the new policy aimed at using community development repertoires for socio-economic development of autochthonous rural communities, inducing their cooperation on the way. Their participation in a market economy and the provision of welfare were two other related intents. But this policy was also a political and securitarian instrument, aiming at gradual political integration, active social control, and focused on security, which was defined holistically. The *regedorias* were the spatial units in which these main purposes could be experimented with. Despite the identified risks (e.g. the disruption of "traditional" ways and customs), in just three years, from 1965 to 1967, the money spent in rural resettlement went from 5000 *contos* to 19591 *contos*.[8] In 1964, Silvino Silvério Marques, the Governor-General of Angola, had already established rural resettlement as an administrative priority.[9]

The centrality of rural resettlement and "population concentration" in the discernible strong nexus between civil administration, security, population control and socioeconomic development was further reinforced by the outcomes of a "secret" symposium on counter-subversion that was organized by the GCCS to assess past experiences and discuss future possibilities. Senior officials from the military, the administration, the police and the specialized security and intelligence services gathered from November 1968 until March 1969 to discuss the most appropriate avenues to solidify these seemingly fruitful interconnections. How to connect development and counter-insurgency more effectively was the collective challenge, characterized by the embracing the variegated idioms and repertoires of developmentalism that increasingly circulated during and after World War II. Reinforcing the strategy delineated at the GCCS, the symposium enabled the systematic cross-fertilization of ideas and programmes of population regrouping and control, social welfare and "social promotion," psychological "action" or "mentalization," rural resettlement and community development were recurrently promoted and their instrumental use stimulated. The entanglements between schemes of coercive societal control, on the one hand, and plans of development, on the other, were, revealingly, at the core of the symposium.[10]

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8   "Memorial dos principais assuntos tratados no Conselho Geral de Contra-Subversão", secret, Contra Subversão em Angola 1968-01-01/1972-01-01, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/56; Services of Centralization and Coordination of Information of Angola (SCCIA), Uíge Section, "Relatório dos trabalhos de reordenamento rural e organização comunitária, empreendidos no distrito de Uíge a partir de Junho de 1962", AHD/1/MU-GM/GNP01-RNP/S0413/UI06546; Alfredo J. de Passos Guerra, "Reordenamento rural. Promoção Económico-Social das Populações Rurais de Angola", IV Colóquio Nacional do Trabalho da Organização Corporativa e da Segurança Social (Loanda: JPPA, 1966), citations from pp. 2, 8, 9, AHU-IPAD-08418; C. Rebocho Vaz, Acção Governativa, Loanda 1971, pp. 97-107.

9   S. Silvério Marques, O reordenamento rural integrado nas preocupações globais da administração, Loanda 1964.

10   Bandeira Jerónimo, "A Battle in the Field of Human Relations". For developmentalism, see, for instance, M. Frey, S.

Focusing on two fundamental documents and respective discussions that encapsulated the variegated ways in which securitarian and developmental rationales intersected in the early 1970s – the *Norms of Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping* and the *General Instruction of Counter-Subversion in Angola* –, this text builds on these previous developments, aiming to show how they evolved across time and became pivotal in the late colonial politics and policies, especially in rural areas, which became privileged loci of the overall spatialization of the developmental-securitarian nexus. The dynamics of everyday life in those areas was transformed, their economic value tentatively enhanced.[11] First, this text addresses the ways in which the decades-long experience of regular articulation between security and development arguments and demands in the formulation of a counter-subversion strategy was used to elaborate a renewed normative framework, namely in relation to political and socio-economic intervention in African rural communities. Second, it illuminates how this normative framework was central to the definition of a general policy of counter-subversion (and respective instructions), characterized by an attempt to merge civil and military modalities of social and psychological intervention. Third, it engages with the conditions in which these modalities of social change and control were enacted, focusing on some of their consequences. Economic disparities, labour relations and the "land problem" in rural contexts are mobilized in order to illustrate such conditions and consequences, revealing the circumstances in which the debates about the twin subjects of security and development occurred, and the related practices evolved. The central place occupied by rural development in these debates and practices, on how it was imagined and promoted, will be analysed throughout the paper.

On "systems" of control

On 3 April 1972, a meeting of the Angolan Provincial Council of Counter-Subversion (PCCSA) approved a new set of *Norms of Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping* (hereafter *Norms*).[12] After years of exchange of ideas and arguments about the benefits and shortcomings of counter-insurgency strategies in the colony, connected to the variegated contributions to the "secret" symposium on counter-subversion, a novel normative framework was crystallized.[13] The symposium had concluded that a fundamental distinction needed to be made between population regrouping and rural resettlement. The first was essentially seen as a "process of population protection and control" in contexts

Kunkel, and C.R. Unger (eds.), International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990, Basingstoke 2014 and J.M. Hodge, G. Hodl and M. Kopf (eds.), Developing Africa, Manchester 2014.

11   Much needs to be done to assess the diversity of local impacts of these transformative processes. As noted before, some of the schemes of rural intervention were essentially aspirations, not actual realities.

12   Normas de Reordenamento Rural e de Reagrupamento de Populações, Reserved, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0163/01091 (hereafter Normas...).

13   For the major purposes, see "Plenary meeting of the Executive Council of Counter-Subversion," 21 August 1968, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Sugestões das Comissões. 1968–1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01234.

of "direct pressure" from guerrilla action. Therefore, it should be a "transitory" solution. It should focus on areas of "violent subversion," of "emergency," in which prompt action was required, with no room for planning. Moreover, population regrouping should turn into rural resettlement, as soon as possible. The second was considered a process of "social, political and economic development of rural populations," mostly appropriate to relatively peaceful areas. It entailed planning and the use of the techniques of community development. Of course, this neat distinction had plenty of grey areas. Population regrouping could be instrumental in areas in which "subversion" was identified as a mere possibility. Regrouping enabled preventive "mentalization" of the populations against the opponent efforts of "infiltration and indoctrination." It also facilitated the promotion of self-defence in villages.[14]

The *Norms* prolonged these tendencies, trying to systematize ideas and experiences. The almost simultaneous formulation of *Norms concerning district militias and self-defence of rural populations*, added to the reinforcement of the intersections between securitarian and developmental rationales in Portuguese late colonialism. The *Norms* that should govern population regrouping and rural resettlement identified three major interrelated topics of intervention: the formulation of "systems of development," the restructuring of rural landscapes and the relocation and reorganization of population nuclei. There were three fundamental "systems" of developmental practices, which should be enacted according to particular local constraints and, an aspect of crucial importance, according to "security" considerations. These "systems" were the means to induce rapid social transformation by accelerating "the rhythm of evolution of rural communities."

The first one, community development, the guidelines for which were provided by the United Nations, was identified as *the* tool to provide an "integral," "harmonious" and "gradual" development of rural communities, in territories in which the population was "still in a scarcely developed state." Its ability to "avoid social disruptions" that could be "extremely serious" was underscored. The UN's "development decade" acquired multiple meanings, and was appropriated in a variety of ways.[15] The second was "rural extension," which was seen as an "educational, informal and flexible system" that aimed to instruct rural communities in "agriculture and domestic sciences." A pilot project in the Bié district was regarded as successful and was expanded. The main purpose was to modify individual and collective attitudes in rural contexts, transforming the rural men and women into agents with "responsibilities", not mere objects of developmental intervention. This was seen as "integral," "material and non-material" development. It was "informal" because the classrooms were the actual estates and the houses of rural communities. It was flexible because it was meant to be as adaptable to local circumstances and individual and family particularities as possible. The family unit should be the focus of all efforts of "mentalization," taking into account the putative "immediate," non-elaborate nature

14 "Conclusões finais," 22 March 1969, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Conclusões finais. Encerramento. 1968-1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01235.

15 Normas, p. 3-5. See also Marc Frey's text in this volume.

of rural individuals in underdeveloped contexts. The fruitful convergence between science, politics and rural dynamics was the ultimate goal of "rural extension." Productivity should be measured beyond strict economic terms. Credit to agricultural endeavours should be as important as socio-psychological interference. The creation, in 1971, of *Brigades for rural promotion and development* materialised these multifaceted purposes: the facilitation of the acceptance by African rural communities of novel socio-technical behaviours that could enhance productivity and development at large, but also social control. As the decree that established the expansion of the programme of "rural extension" argued, "economic welfare" and the "gradual extinction of tensions" were "the most effective barriers to the infiltration of negative ideas." The *Norms* replicated these viewpoints. One fundamental obstacle emerged: the system was seen as "impractical" in "restless environments," marked by latent and manifest conflicts. And many areas of the overseas territories were certainly good examples of that. Finally, the third system was "closed supervision," which the document classified as "total supervision." With a "rigorous and paternalist" ethos and requiring considerable financial investment and qualified human resources, this solution aimed to identify those willing to cooperate, rewarding them with technical and financial assistance. It was seen as appropriate to small agricultural areas and populations.[16]

With variations, all these systems were crucial to the coeval policies of rural resettlement and population regrouping. The announced multiple purposes of rural resettlement – the articulation between social and economic development, between new socio-cultural "habits" and novel and more efficient "labour methods" to enhance economic productivity – required the close participation, and "adhesion," of local communities. Only with their acquiescence would the desired "convergent evolution" of coexisting "cultural groups" ("natives" and white colonists) become a reality. These goals required population concentration, not dispersion: welfare provision would be facilitated, social control easier to exert. On the administrative side, a considerable bureaucracy was set in place, including a "technical commission" which comprised delegates from several departments of the colonial administration, from the educational and health services to labour and commercial. Delegates from the police and security services were also members of the commission, as were those from the Department of Studies and Coordination of Counter-Subversion (DSCCS). The attainment of the purposes of rural resettlement entailed the regular collaboration and support of military units. The definition of any plan of rural resettlement should take "aspects of security and counter-subversion" into consideration, especially in level one and two "zones of subversion" (areas of guerrilla and areas surrounding guerrilla, respectively). The commander in charge and the DSCCS should be listened to before any decision. The abovementioned systems and rural resettlement

16   Normas, pp. 6-7, 9. For "rural extension," see Missão de Extensão Rural de Angola, Alguns elementos acerca da Missão de Extensão Rural de Angola, Nova Lisboa 1973, pp. 1-3, and Bender, Angola under the Portuguese, pp. 186-187. For the brigades, see Decree no. 17482, 2 February 1971, and Junta Provincial do Povoamento de Angola, Brigadas de promoção e desenvolvimento rural, Loanda 1971.

were equally vital to the rolling "counter-insurgency" schemes. Their enhancement was a major goal that should be pursued vigorously on many fronts: they were critical to the combined strategy of assuring security and development.[17]

The same happened with population regrouping, which was deemed to be predominantly rural. This intervention was a "solution of opportunity and emergency" that responded to "economic and securitarian necessities." The economic rationale was connected to the purpose of finding the appropriate "population density" for the fostering of rapid economic transformation and "accelerated growth." The developmental technique of "closed supervision" was the preferred instrument in such circumstances, despite being onerous and constituting a "paternalistic system." Given the widespread conflicts in the so-called overseas provinces, the securitarian reasoning was clearly predominant. Development in "unsafe areas" was a critical problem. Population regrouping or resettlement enabled "self-defence" and tentatively insulated the population from the "subversive process." It also facilitated social and economic development, which was crucial to impede subversion. This population intervention, which had precise instructions regarding its spatial arrangements, went from minor dislocations to massive forced removal from areas of "violent subversion," following, at least on paper, ethnic criteria and taking into account "traditional authority." Production, self-defence, surveillance and "recuperation" (or rehabilitation) were the main goals. "Tactical resettlements" were ultimate examples of such combined purposes. "Recuperated" and "captured" populations, defined according to the degree of willingness to cooperate in the resettlement process and to the degree of "compromise" with the "enemy," were to be identified and appropriately dealt with. The populations that were "compromised" should either be submitted to "special measures of vigilance" and an "intensive action of recuperation" or relocated to "Recuperation Centres," in which an "intense and well-guided psychological action" should be carried out. The centre in São Nicolau, in the south of Angola, was just one example. In both cases, a constant collaboration between military and civil forces was prescribed, involving "work groups" modelled on the mobile teams of community development. Developmental models and techniques of social intervention should be replicated by the military.[18]

"House and village files" (*ficha de casa e de aldeia*) should be meticulously filled in, one by one. They were crucial to the "control" of rural populations. The information on these – about personal data but also on religion, existing social services, "general conditions of nutrition," communications and, of course, security aspects – should be duplicated and channelled throughout the administrative chain, civic and military. The need for up-to-date information prompted the use of a pencil. This *individualization* of the information-gathering process constituted a significant change from proposals considered years before. In one of the documents that contributed to the "secret" symposium on counter-subversion, focused on population control in "native" resettlements, argued that it was

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17 Normas, 14-15, 18, 28.
18 Normas, 30-31, 33-36; Provincial Council of Counter-Subversion, meeting of 13 May 1970, Secret, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/S056/UI13505.

more practical and effective to keep "family files." These would be permanently available to any member of the local commission of resettlement. A copy should be placed on the main door of each house. Side by side with proper travel documents, registering all movements by each individual, and with an "information network" formed by resettled individuals recruited by the political police, this family card would facilitate population control. Any incongruence between the data on the family card and the observed reality in occasional inspections would have serious consequences: for instance, the missing individual would be considered a "collaborator with the enemy." His capture would be ordered. "Recuperation" ensued.[19]

Within the administrative and military circles, discussions about the most appropriate forms of controlling African rural communities, within or outside settlements, were recurrent. For instance, the transformation of the nature and scope of the instruments to gather information about them that occurred with the major changes after 1961 was criticized by many in those circles. The suppression of the *indigenato*, in that year, brought important modifications, although more in theory than in practice. One was the end of "transit permits" that restricted unchecked population mobility. Another, perhaps more significant, was the substitution of the *caderneta indígena* ("native card") by a standardized "identity card," extended to all citizens irrespective of race or the so-called degree of cultural advancement. The abandonment of a longstanding legal discrimination between "Europeans" and "natives", formally supressed by the 1961 law, transformed the nature of the information collected by the colonial state. In a sense, it made it less useful to those in charge, especially in what related to African subjects, and even more so in relation to rural areas, in which the administrative presence was notably scarce. For some authorities, the option for the identity card caused the mitigation of the colonial state's ability to obtain detailed individual socio-economic information, which was more present in the "native card". Therefore, the authorities' knowledge about the populations to be controlled diminished. To cope with this situation, new solutions were advanced, such as residency certificates or a more elaborate system of information and intelligence-gathering, based on novel, and more sophisticated governmental information services.[20] The escalation of conflicts and the intensification of subversion urged the devising of effective investigative instruments. But population regrouping also generated negative effects in itself, starting from its involuntary, frequently forced, nature and ending with the coexistence of distinct ethnic groups or with the failure in deploying the promised provision of social betterments.[21]

19   Normas..., pp. 38-39; Carlos Alexandre de Morais, "Controle das populações nos reagrupamentos," Simpòisio da Contra-Subversão. Comunicações para Estudo. 1968–1969, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01236.

20   José Henriques de Carvalho, "Reagrupamento de populações e Promoção Social," 25 September 1968; Fernando Lisboa Botelho, "Controle de populações"; both in Contra Subversão em Angola, 1968-01-01/1972-01-01, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/56.

21   Carlos Morais, "Controle das populações nos reagrupamentos," 20 September 1968, Contra Subversão em Angola, 1968-01-01/1972-01-01, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/56.

The *Norms* reflected these longstanding debates, and were acutely debated in a meeting of the PCCSA and its DSCCS on 3 April 1972. The past shortcomings were addressed, including the fact that the necessary dialogue that could make military-civil collaboration possible, and fruitful, was far from accomplished. The production of knowledge, "as perfect as possible," of the "tendencies" and "habits" of the targeted populations was ever more essential in this regard. Surveillance and control depended on it. In relation to military-civil collaboration, the debates were more intense. Their separate "technical languages" had led to conflicts, a lack of "adequate planning" and related "hesitations." The *Norms* aimed to clarify positions, decision-making processes, and hierarchies. Those in charge of the military zones into which Angola was divided had to be consulted on issues related to rural resettlement and population regrouping. The same happened regarding the related projects of rural development. Developmental strategies in rural areas were gazed upon through securitarian and counter-insurgency lenses, which should define the "priorities" of socio-economic intervention.[22]

On "modern" instructions…

On the same day, in the same meeting, a pivotal, confidential document, the *General Instruction of Counter-Subversion in Angola,* was the subject of debate. The goal was to ensure the "close coordination and convergence" between the actions being taken by the armed forces, by civil authorities and services, and also by private entities (e.g. enterprises) to "re-establish peace." The topic of communications deserves special mention, as the economic and security reasons for the development of communication lines rarely coincided. Again, the military-civil collaboration and the precedence of security rationales were at the core of the debate. If coordination and convergence were goals, decentralisation was also a purpose. The idea was to set guidelines that could then enable a more localized decision-making process. The variety of political, economic, social and population circumstances and, of course, the distinct dynamics of conflict, required strategic flexibility. To seize, immediately, the "opportunity" to prevent or control insurrection, or to induce rapid socio-economic change (that could be central to the former), was crucial. Counter-subversion plans should focus on interrelated goals: "social promotion" (mainly education and sanitary assistance), economic development (agriculture and livestock farming), communications and self-defence of rural localities and populations (as defined by the respective *Norms concerning district militias and self-defence of rural populations*, approved in the same moment in time).

But the decisions on how to meet these goals, although guided by norms and rules, should be reached at local level. For such decisions to be as informed as possible, em-

22   After this consultation process, the Technical Commission could send the annual plan to another commission, the Technical Commission of Economic Planning and Integration, in which, anyway, the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in Angola was a pivotal member. Actas da Sessão do Conselho Provincial de Contra-Sub-versão (3 de Abril 1972) (hereafter Actas da Sessão...), 82 pages, Secret, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0048/01088.

phasis was placed, again, on the production of knowledge about the "social and political organization" of rural communities. "Family organization" was particularly important: forms of lineage and kinship, succession (customary law and practices), marriage rules, rites of passage and generational conflicts should be identified and systematized, and taken into consideration in the devising of local strategies of political control and socio-economic intervention. One of these strategies was the creation of "Rural Youth Centres," which was also debated in relation to the *General Instruction*. The idea was praised because it could serve as a way to socially frame youngsters (from 9 up to 22 years of age), making them immune to "the action of subversion," and promote their interest in "agrarian activities." The case of Rovuma, in Mozambique, in which the instrumental use of Rural Youth Centres paid off, and should be extended to Angola. But the idea was also feared. There were some examples that revealed the potential subversive nature these groups could take. The Provincial Secretary of Education offered his own personal, and negative, experience in Venezuela.[23]

The question of population control, a fundamental aspect of the *Norms of Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping*, was also central in the *General Instruction*.

First, in relation to the usefulness, but also the problems, of the methods of Residency Certificates and Identity Cards. The circulation of individuals and groups was considered a crucial problem, creating additional difficulties in the much-needed population control efforts, due to political and military, but also economic reasons. In April 1968, a decree determined the extension of Residency Certificates to all Angola, not only the cities, as the 1964 legislation defined. An important contribution on the need to expand the scope of the existing legislation, and to turn population control into a more effective policy instrument was a confidential memorandum made by the Services for the Centralization and Coordination of Intelligence of Angola (SCCIA) in November 1967. The close articulation between population concentration and the control of its mobility was at the core of the memorandum's fundamental rationale, which ended up being crucial to the 1968 legislation, and resonates in the *General Instruction*.[24] But such articulation was hard to achieve. In the mid-1970s, in a meeting of the Council of Counter-Subversion, concerns were raised regarding the fact that the mandatory nature of the certificates was still to be legally confirmed. Pressure over the higher-authorities to urgently enforce the 1968 decree was in order, otherwise the identification and control of mobile populations would be ineffective, entailing dangerous consequences.[25]

The actual control of the mobility of individuals and groups was difficult for many other reasons. For instance, the movement of people for labour reasons was a recurrent economic problem. The "instability" of manpower had effects on the productivity of partic-

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23   With variations, these centres were already being tested in Angola, in Cela, Pambangala, Catofe e Tongo. Actas da Sessão (April 3, 1972)

24   Decree no. 3819, of 4 April 1968, in: Boletim Geral de Angola, 1st Series, 81, 4 April 1968, pp. 597-604; SCCIA, Memorandum on "Population control," confidential, 22 November 1967, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0362/04514.

25   Provincial Council of Counter-Subversion, meeting of 13 May 1970, Secret, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/S056/UI13505.

ular economic sectors in essentially rural and agricultural societies. The need to manage labour pools was a longstanding and crucial demand. But such administration required cautious methods. On one hand, the control of labour movements was fundamental to economic planning and to the reinforcement of population control. On the other, labour was a traditional cause of local and international criticism. The entire process should be one "without any appearance of coercion" over the African workers. Of course, these movements could also have politico-military consequences, as they could be channels for the circulation of "subversive" agents and agendas. In this respect, the expected use of polaroid machines was seen as a game-changer.[26]

The control of "native" labour mobility was crucial for other reason. The "instability" of labour, connected to multiple migratory flows, raised serious difficulties for the ongoing efforts of "psychological action." Of the estimated 531,153 salaried private employees, around 173,200 spent less than one year in their workplace. Circa 50,000 of these migrant workers were in their workplace less than six months. As noted above, this created significant economic and political problems. Labour "stabilization," which was systematically debated in international, interimperial and colonial meetings and organizations, became a priority in Portuguese developmental and security circles. Social, politico-military and economic reasons coalesced in making it a recurrent concern of numerous administrative policies. But mobility could also be used in a positive way. Afonso Mendes, one of the most important experts on colonial labour issues in the Portuguese bureaucracy and Director of the Institute of Labour, Social Security and Social Welfare of Angola (ITPASA) from 1962 to 1970, saw "native" labour mobility as a perfect laboratory for "psychological" intervention. In a reserved document produced for the Council for the Orientation of Psychological Action (*Conselho de Orientação da Acção Psicológica*), created in 1968, Mendes saw these mobile masses as "excellent carriers" of the Portuguese "doctrine and cause" or of "the subversive ideology and techniques." It all depended on the intervention of the authorities. With the exception of "military and educational concentrations," these mobile masses of workers provided "opportunities" for a systematic psychological intervention. They were young (18 to 30 years old, mostly), curious and eager for "new ideas and knowledge," and they circulated, therefore being able to disseminate the message. They would surely welcome any kind of "entertainment." The "poverty" and "lack of comfort" of the villages for workers certainly eased the process. Mendes offered some suggestions, some already taking place.

The ITPASA could collaborate in the efforts to guide these mobile masses to a proper psychological direction, as the existing and planned roadhouses (*estalagens*) could be places in which the radio *Voz de Angola* was exclusively transmitted, disseminating the authorities' propaganda, or in which the workers would find "simple literature," with "a

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26   Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972). For the labour problem, including international aspects, see M. Bandeira Jerónimo and J.P. Monteiro, O império do trabalho. Portugal, as dinâmicas do internacionalismo e os mundos coloniais, in: M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto (eds.), Portugal e o fim do Colonialismo, Lisboa 2014, pp. 15-54; J.P. Monteiro, A internacionalização das políticas laborais 'indígenas' no império colonial português (1944–1962), PhD thesis, University of Lisbon, 2017.

predominance of photographic images and intentional drawings" aiming at "doctrinaire education." The replication of *clubes* (social centres) for the migrant rural workers, already existing in some medium-size companies, should be promoted. The ITPASA also had four of these institutions. The "possibilities of propaganda and psychological action" in such premises were great: "selected" films and documentaries as elements of a "circuit of political propaganda" carried out by protagonists prepared for the "engagement with rural manpower," carefully instructed in "techniques and tactics of contact." "Political mentalization" was crucial: it would enhance political control of mobile rural workers and facilitate the territorial and sociological dissemination of the counter-subversion message. The development of "corporative sports," the realization of Labour Institute holiday camps (already working in Lobito and on the verge of starting in Loanda and Nova Lisboa) and the progress of the two periodicals being published by the Institute – *Trabalho* and *Jornal do Trabalhador* (*Labour* and *The Worker's Journal*, respectively), which had a print run of 3,000 and 10,000 – were another three instruments intended to achieve such purposes of "mentalization" and control. The combination of the "dangerousness of subversion" and the need to properly deal with rural manpower, which had been so far treated with a "neglect hard to understand" and which now needed to be submitted to "attempts at immunization," demanded innovative strategies.[27]

Second, and more important regarding rural areas, the utility of the *ficha de casa e de aldeia* was also addressed in the *General Instruction*. The "complete efficacy" of population control was based on the accuracy of such files, which, as we have noted above, became gradually *individualized*. All information, and changes to original information, should be provided by the head of the family, by the "traditional authority" or by the administrative authority with local jurisdiction. The local "native" militias should also be involved in the process. Since the promulgation of a decree on the subject in 1967, the idea was to foster the emergence of "militias of the *regedorias*," extending to rural communities those same principles and repertoires of civil defence being enacted in urban areas. In 1972, the legal responsibility for population control within the villages lay with the head of each family. The supervision and control of population and associated modifications in number and profile were legally attributed to the Angolan Public Security Police, the Directorate-General of Security (the political police) and to the Organização Provincial de Voluntários de Defesa Civil de Angola (OPVDCA), the Provincial Organization of Volunteers of Civil Defence, a voluntary militia-type force created in 1961 after the violent tumults in Angola.[28]

The *General Instruction* also included important direct references to "Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping" and to "Social Promotion" as major developmental tools and also as crucial counter-subversion techniques. In the first case, the contents of the

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27   Afonso Mendes, "Contra-subversão/Acção Psicológica," Reserved, 10 April 1969, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/ 0440/00383. For the importance of labour "stabilization", see the magnum opus by F. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society. The Labor Question in French and British Africa, Cambridge, UK, 1996.

28   Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972); "Conclusões finais," 22 March 1969, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Conclusões finais. Encerramento. 1968-1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01235.

Norms were synthetized and reiterated in the document. In relation to "Social Promotion," the fundamental ideas exposed at the 1970 Congress on Settlement and Social Promotion (October, 4-9) were reaffirmed: the socio-economic progress of African communities, especially in rural settings, was a "precondition of national survival" (meaning imperial resilience), as was argued in the conclusions of the meeting. Pacification depended on it. Social control would be easier. One of the ideologues of the spread of the "modern" doctrinal aspects of counter-insurgency in Portugal, Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, contributed to the illumination of the fruitful interdependence between social development, (re)settlement and counter-subversion. In the *General Instruction*, the "pressing urgency" to strengthen such interdependence was understood and highlighted. It was admitted that the "state of underdevelopment of many regions and populations of Angola" was one of the catalysts of "subversion." To those in charge of devising and debating the counter-insurgency strategy, the need for policies of "accelerated development" that could foster social promotion and minimize subversion was obvious. Concerns with social disruption, potentially caused by rapid social change, were voiced, but the widespread rhetoric of holistic integration – not merely social and economic, but also political and cultural – was praised. Again, the military-civil collaboration was crucial.[29] The military should be fundamental players in the enhancement of developed agricultural and livestock farming policies via the transfer of knowledge, using "the most developed agricultural workers, willing to cooperate and with local influence," and through direct intervention in the market. The list of their potential contribution was immense: from the participation in the diffusion of more advanced agricultural techniques and the acquisition and distribution of seeds to the promotion of afforestation or the distribution of tractors and breeding of animals (especially rabbits, sheep, pigs and chickens). The direct consumption of agricultural produce of local communities was also important, for many reasons. One of the most important was the expectation that it would bring dynamism to local markets. The presence of armed forces constituted a significant increase in the demand for agricultural products that could contribute to stimulating local economies. The consumption of local produce was also a measure that aimed at reducing the cost of the war effort, in transportation, for instance (at the time, a third of the Portuguese state Budget was being spent in defence). It was also seen as "one of the most effective ways" of bonding with local populations. Another important role was a securitarian one: the military should "support the evacuation of tradable products," guaranteeing their "necessary protection." In a context of widespread conflict, characterized by a particular modality of war, commercial security was absolutely essential. "Health and Assistance" was another area in which the crucial role of the military was advocated. The existence of areas in which the civil services were absent was just one of the reasons

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29 Actas da Sesão (6 April 1972); Congresso de povoamento e promoção social, Luanda, 4 a 9 de Outubro de 1970, Luanda 1970; H. de Araújo Oliveira, Povoamento e promoção social armas fundamentais contra a subversão, in: Congresso de povoamento e promoção social, Luanda, 4 a 9 de Outubro de 1970, pp. 311-321. See also his Guerra revolucionária, Lisboa 1960.

why many civil and military authorities did this. The medical staff of the armed forces had to realize that part of their responsibilities was related to local populations. Likewise, the military health and sanitary facilities – hospitals, wards or first-aid posts – should be open to all. The provision of drugs to local populations was an element of "Social Action." The civil-military cooperation in "local improvements" and the establishment of a central role of the Armed Forces in such efforts also merited attention. Its impact on the "indoctrination of populations" about the need "to improve their conditions of existence" was highlighted. As was declared at the meeting, local improvements were one of the demonstrations of social promotion. Military participation was more than the mere provision of materials or technical advice.[30]

… and "inconvenient procedures".

All these projects of intense social, economic and political intervention entailed debates about their unintended and undesirable consequences. Given past records and present circumstances, it was no surprise that the *General Instruction* had one Annex focusing on the principles and means to ensure the "Protection of populations in relation to inconvenient procedures." As noted above regarding questions of labour mobility, social antagonisms and "contradictions" were seen as the cause for subversion. It was mandatory to minimize the exploitation of local communities by "elements more evolved and with few scruples." According to the Head of the DSCCS, Carlos Bessa, the fact that exploitation was directed towards "coloured" populations had an additional consequence: it created the "appearance of being manifestations of racial discrimination," particularly dangerous given Portuguese imperial rhetoric and propaganda efforts to prove its exceptional multiracialism. The repression of these two interrelated phenomena should be a priority, and the "structure of counter-subversion" should have an important say in the process. The rules of the overseas public service should be strictly followed. Similarly, "commercial speculations" should be closely monitored. The provincial Secretary of the Economy, who raised the question, could not be clearer: he was not talking about inflation caused by market prices, he was targeting the "absence of scruples" in the economic relations with "less developed populations." Given the "large scale" prevalence of behaviours such as the adulteration of weights and measures or the sale on credit at high rates of interest, not to mention the imposition of low prices when buying and high prices on selling the exact same product, a more "intimate" collaboration between the armed forces and the Inspectorate of Economic Activities was suggested, especially in the countryside. The widespread "commercial speculations," and other issues such as contraband, would be

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30   The study of the entanglements between late colonial economic and securitarian dimensions is yet to be done. Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972).

better tackled with such collaboration. Their "extremely serious effects in the effort of counter-subversion" thus recommended.[31]

Already in the final conclusions of the 1968–1969 "secret" symposium, it was argued that it was important to consider, and avoid, the "suffocation" of the local producers and businessmen given the unequal conditions for the exercise of economic activities. "Discrimination" regarding the rules that related to the existence of "rural markets," in which the African producers were compelled to participate, was another example that was "susceptible to be explored by subversion." The difference in the level of salaries between the African and the European labourers, the disparity between the salaries of urban and rural African workers (the latter earned six times less than the former, despite representing three quarters of Angola's active manpower), the "repressive intervention" of the authorities over the "native" workers and the "irregularities" of the employers against them added to the vast catalogue of economic conditions that favoured social unrest, and "subversive" options. The problem of labour and the regime under which "native" labour was recruited, distributed and used was a longstanding cause of colonial dissension and unrest, as well as a recurrent topic of international criticism. The reformist efforts enacted at the beginning of the 1960s, such as the Rural Labour Code of 1962, for example, failed to deliver. Unequal salaries, paternalism, ethnic differentiation and discrimination continued.[32]

Another source of recurrent "inconvenient procedures," side by side with labour and fiscal exaction and the variegated forms of "commercial speculation," was the "land problem" ("*problema de terras*"). The "land problem" was one of the most important problems at the time.[33] Accordingly, the issue was naturally debated in several meetings of the council, deserving as well special place in the *General Instruction*. The existing 1961 legislation, and the (geo)political, military, economic and socio-cultural pressing circumstances, enhanced a manifest contradiction, or at least two purposes that were hard to balance. On one hand, the legislation aimed to facilitate the fixation of colonists coming from the metropole. An attractive policy of land concession distribution was essential to sustain one of the fundamental policies of late colonialism, on many levels: ethnic colonization.[34] The latter was simultaneously a developmental instrument and a securitarian tool. It was also an important element in the ongoing diplomatic strategy:

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31   Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972).
32   "Conclusões finais," 22 March 1969, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Conclusões finais. Encerramento. 1968–1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01235; Afonso Mendes, "Aspectos relevantes da Contra-Subversão," Secret, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Sugestões das Comissões. 1968–1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01234. For the historical significance of labour question, see M. Bandeira Jerónimo, The "Civilizing Mission" of Portuguese Colonialism (c. 1870–1930), Basingstoke 2015; M. Bandeira Jerónimo and J. P. Monteiro, Internationalism and the Labours of the Portuguese Colonial Empire (1945–1974), in: Portuguese Studies 29 (2013) 2, pp. 142-163.
33   Much needs to be done regarding this topic, in itself and in relation to the developmental and securitarian policies that characterized late colonialism.
34   G.J. Bender, Planned Rural Settlement in Angola, 1900–1968, in: F.W. Heimer (ed.), Social Change in Angola, Munich 1973, pp. 235–279; C. Castelo, Passagens para África: o povoamento de Angola e Moçambique com naturais da metrópole (1920–1974), Porto 2007.

demography was crucial to sustain the rhetoric of a multiracial and pluri-continental nation and also to make solutions of political disengagement harder to formulate. On the other hand, the legislation was proclaimed as sufficient to impede the "disrespect of the rights of the natives" by Europeans, guaranteeing some forms of protection. This was particular relevant given the widespread criticism that the authoritarian regime was facing at many levels. The need to explicitly minimize, at least *de jure*, "inconvenient procedures" towards local "native" populations regarding land concession was obvious. It was imperative to promote a "fair distribution" and "determine the terrains attributed to autochthonous populations," as Manuel dos Santos Moreira, the Head of the DSCCS noted in June 1972. The "social, economic and political consequences" of "inconvenient procedures" and "abundant illegalities" – the recurrent disrespect for the existing legislation, and the related scarcity of means, or of will, to enforce it – caused numerous and profound problems to the counter-subversion strategies being enacted. This view was shared by a few. The Provincial Secretary of Rural Development (*Fomento Rural*) termed it one the "most distressing problems" of administration.[35]

As noted above regarding the negative effect of "commercial speculations," the final conclusions of the symposium already stated that the "serious problem of land" characterized "extensive areas." Two measures were seen as imperative to minimize that state of affairs. First, the application, "with rigour and opportunity," of the existing legislation. Second, the promotion of "more evolved cultural practices" in rural communities, causing their "gradual fixation" in a given area and also the increase of productivity. Also important, it was mandatory to "prohibit the concession of lands" that were left by autochthonous populations after their enforced regrouping. Until then, it had not been.[36] In 1972, the situation continued to cause major apprehensions among authorities. The rural nature of Angolan society and the near-absolute dependency of "traditional populations" on land utilisation were two of the reasons for this. Despite the 1961 suppression of the *Indigenato*, existing legislation still differentiated between "native" and Europeans in relation to land uses and property prerogatives. The old indigenous "reserves," which prevailed before 1961, aimed at securing a spatial unit for the autochthones to reside and explore the respective land, but failed. The "covetous and uncontrolled occupation" prevailed. The Decree on the Occupation and Concession of Land in the Overseas Provinces of September 1961 envisioned the correction of such practice. Land was divided into three types. The so-called "terrains of 2nd class" could only be occupied by the populations organized around and neighbouring the *regedorias*, in harmony with local tradition. They were forms of collective property, not individual.[37]

35   Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972); Actas da Sessão do Conselho Provincial de Contra-Subversão (12 de Junho 1972), 50 pages, Secret, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0048/01090.

36   "Conclusões finais," 22 March 1969, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Conclusões finais. Encerramento. 1968-1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01235.

37   Decree no. 43894, 6 September 1961; L. Polanah, Resistência e adesão a mudança, in: Reordenamento 25 (1972), pp. 7-16, cit. p. 9.

The 1961 legal framework aimed at moralizing the situation, minimizing the possibilities of arbitrary and systematic land expropriation and population eviction, but failed. The problem was that there were significant administrative and socio-political obstacles to such legal prescriptions. For instance, Francisco de Vasconcelos Guimarães, a land survey engineer of the Studies Office of the Provincial Secretariat from Rural Development in Angola (*Gabinete de Estudos da Secretaria Provincial de Fomento Rural*) noted that the government service responsible for demarcating the second-class tracts failed to incorporate anthropological, sociological or ecological knowledge about local agricultural dynamics. For autochthonous communities, the occupation of land entailed multiple meanings and social uses of land. It meant the territorial definition of a community, its political security, the delimitation of a unit for agriculture and cattle raising, and also hunter-gatherer economic activities. The *scale* and the requirements needed for such ends were distinct from the ones associated with European interests. At the Geographical and Land Survey Services, no such expertise, crucial to a proper planning and to a balanced policy, existed. Moreover, as Guimarães noted, the Portuguese colonists were "refractory in accepting the rights of the indigenous population to occupy land." Legal restrictions collided with their motivations, interests and also racialized worldviews. Their expectations were obvious, fostered by the positive economic conjuncture: overturn the prerogative that attributed a particular type of land to Africans and facilitate a privileged access to land, that which was available or that occupied by local populations. As a consequence, claims to concessions multiplied, arguments and demands for expropriation escalated, "coercion" and forced resettlement reigned, and conflicts abounded.[38]

Throughout Angola this reality was creating abundant disruptive circumstances. The pressure for granting land concessions to colonists for them to develop the culture of cotton, as in Malanje (Malanje District), or cattle farming, as in Quibala (South Cuanza District) or Benguela (Benguela District), was facing social and legal obstacles. First, some of such requests were backed by previous rights, some of a clearly dubious nature, as was noted in a meeting of the council. But the lands had not been developed before, and were then occupied by the "natives." The Governor general, Camilo Rebocho Vaz, synthetized the "historical process." Since the late nineteenth-century, the main goal had been to attribute land in order to prove actual occupation. For decades "nobody occupied or exploited it." The great landowners did not invest in their exploitation and the autochthonous population occupied them, in some cases pleasing the owners, as a "good source of manpower" became available. The rising prices of coffee and cattle, among other products, changed that state of affairs. Since the 1950s an interest in benefitting

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38   Francisco de Vasconcelos Guimarães contributed with a paper to the Council on Counter-Subversion in 1969, entitled "Aspectos do 'Regulamento de ocupação e concessão de terrenos nas províncias ultramarinas' com interesse para a contra-subversão." See International Documentation and Communication Centre (IDOC), Angola: Secret Government Documents on Counter-Subversion, edited and translated by C. Reuver-Cohen and W. Jerman, Rome 1974, pp. 72-74, cit. p. 74; Polanah, Resistência e adesão a mudança, p. 13 (social uses of land); Bender, Angola under the Portuguese, p. 182, n70.

from the overall economic and developmental impetus emerged: "everybody" wanted lands and, as a consequence, "conflicts" arose.[39]

This was the problem in Quibala, for instance, or in Nova Lisboa (District of Huambo): colonists with property deeds over abandoned or unexploited farms and terrains that were massively occupied by autochthones for a while. The attempts to solve the disputes abounded, but were unfruitful. Second, the pressure for land concessions, surely related to the state-funded policy of massive ethnic colonization and to the overall developmental projects associated with a "modernizing" empire, turned some "2nd class" terrains into coveted properties. In many areas, demand exceeded supply. To square the circle was not easy, but was imperative. An immediate "strong action" by the central administration and local services was mandatory. The ongoing "extremely violent attempt" carried out by some "evolved farmers" to expel "native" farmers from their properties, and "seizing those enclaves," seriously endangered the social, economic and political aims of the counter-subversion strategy: an equally "violent and exemplary" response was needed. The need to solve the situation had another motivation. The Secretary considered that the actions of occupation of European properties by the autochthones appeared to be governed by a particular "supervision," a suggestion that it was part of a wider political strategy, not merely a result of an "instinct of self-defence." As a consequence, if those properties were not "conveniently armed and protected", similar problems were to be expected. Anyway, the "tendency" for complications was "total." Throughout Angola, any decision regarding the dilemmatic circumstances – to favour the colonists' demands for more land and to support their occupation of their previously abandoned legal properties or to ensure a non-discriminatory policy of land concession and to protect rights resulting from actual land use – was as urgent as it was probably unsuccessful.[40]

Not even the scientific *apport*, purportedly less politicised or less motivated by particular local interests, brought by the *Missão de Inquéritos Agrícolas de Angola* – MIAA (Angolan Board of Agricultural Census and Surveys) – the institution created in 1962 to gather and analyse information on agricultural "traditional" and market-oriented practices in reaction to the activities of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation in Africa and the worldwide agricultural census of 1960 – was seen as useful to solve the problem.[41] Their assessments frequently collided with the delicate local political and strategic (im)balance of interests. They were frequently critical of aggressive Portuguese agrarian colonization.

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39 The reference is to the principle of "effective occupation" connected to the aftermath of the Berlin Conference (1884–1885). Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972).

40 Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972). For the "modernizing" impetus see Bandeira Jerónimo and Costa Pinto, A Modernizing Empire?.

41 The decree that determined the realization of agricultural surveys in all overseas provinces, excluding Macau, was from 1959. In accordance with the FAO guidelines, the goals were to elaborate inventories of the factors that determined agro-economic production, assess the spatial dynamics of such activities and also provide statistical information of those realities, in order to enable the planning of agrarian development. For one example of an important MIAA survey that explores the entanglements between social, educational and agricultural dynamics see F.W. Heimer, Educação e sociedade nas áreas rurais de Angola: Resultados de um inquérito, Vol.1, Apresentação do inquérito/estatísticas descritivas, Loanda 1972.

From an ecological and sociocultural standpoint, it was disruptive of "traditional" agrarian communities and respective economic practices. The related resettlement policies, which frequently redistributed the finest and more fecund lands into Portuguese (or European) hands reinforced the negative appraisal. One example was the testimony of the agronomist Francisco Sá Pereira (Deputy Director of the MIAA), given to the Council on Counter-Subversion in 1968. No one could "doubt" the security rationale behind the European land occupation. But that option had costs, including from a securitarian point of view: the underdevelopment of "traditional agriculture". From the "white" settlement in Cela (South Cuanza District), one of the most well-known and important *colonatos*, to the pasture lands in Mucope (Cunene Province), the most productive lands were taken from the hands of Africans and given to European agrarian interests. The number and the *scale* of African lands was being minimised "without any technical compensation." The living conditions and communal existence – social and cultural, not only economic – of African herders and farmers was deteriorating greatly and resettlement was no definitive solution. For Sá Pereira, those communities interpreted circumstances as a "regression." And "each regression" entailed "a new potential stratum of subversion in the traditional milieu." As expected, his views and, more generally, the MIAA's "technical" emphasis were criticized within the administration, namely at the "structure of counter-subversion."[42]

The tensions between security through demography or security through autochthonous development continued to echo four years later. For some, the motto "development and settlement in the service of strategy" was restricted to white populations. It was "the most eloquent assertion of our will to remain".[43] But consensus about the balance between security through demography or security through autochthonous development did not exist. In the Uíge district, the Provincial Settlement Board and the District Governor were in disagreement on what to do regarding the need to create "reserved areas" for the "natives." In Huambo, the MIAA's suggestions that further areas should be allocated to them were met with surprise: there was no "sufficient land" for the existing population. As a consequence, the process of demarcation of "2nd class" terrains was cancelled. In Angola, the Geographical and Land Survey Services, understaffed and underprepared, were facing about 40,000 processes related to these issues. Their resolution was urgent, given their potential negative consequences. But, as the Provincial Secretary of Rural Development stated, these services were "completely obsolete." The capacity of the colonial administration to deal with the "terrible problems," namely the conflicts between the "evolved" and the "traditional," was notably inadequate. On one hand, the European communities were becoming increasingly distressed with the fact that the government was not providing "all the land they wanted," as happened in the "entire Nova Lisboa."

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42   For Pereira's perspective, see Bender, Angola under the Portuguese, pp. 183-184. For Cela, see, for instance, C. Castelo, Reproducing Portuguese Rural Villages in Africa: Agricultural Science, Ideology and Empire, in: Journal of Southern African Studies 42 (2016) 2, pp. 267-281.

43   J. Pequito Rebello, Fomento e povoamento estratégico. Solução do problema de Angola, Lisboa 1966, p. 14.

On the other, an aspect considered to be increasingly relevant to the whole problem, the "natives" were starting to be interested in individual property, not communal. If it persisted, this tendency would aggravate the pressure on the governmental services, already with thousands of legal processes to solve.[44]

A novel legal framework was needed, and was being debated in Lisbon by a commission led by José Fernandes Nunes Barata, the Inspector of Overseas Economy and one of the most important experts on population politics, development and agriculture.[45] Given the circumstances, Nunes Barata was invited to participate on the council and explain the legal state of affairs. The social, economic and political disruptions the existing law was failing to solve were too important to be overlooked. The entire counter-subversion strategy was in peril. In his lengthy exposé, Nunes Barata argued that the forthcoming legislation was based in the "intransigent" defence of "native" populations. The protected access to and safeguard of the existing occupation of 2nd class tracts were considered an instrument of the desired social promotion. The rationales of "native" social promotion, economic development, and population ordering and control should prevail.[46] As an article in the Loanda-based periodical *Reordenamento* (Resettlement) stated, the existing law was "ineffective and inefficient," especially relating to the provision of legal instruments capable of guaranteeing the "good observance of its precepts." The current "socio-economic constraints" required novel legal tools, which enabled more operational political interventions. Local "peace and progress" depended on it.[47]

However, for Santos Moreira, the most pressing question was not legal: all district governors and presidents of the district councils of counter-subversion were asked to press administrative authorities to "prevent" any kind of transaction of "2nd class" terrains, owned or just occupied by natives, that were in-between European properties. The existence of 40,000 legal processes could also be the result of a good strategy, according to Rebocho Vaz: keep things as they were and avoid more concessions and the more than probable backlashes. In a sense, the preservation of the status quo was preferable to great transformations with predictable results: further disarray. The commander-in-chief of the Military Region of Angola, Francisco da Costa Gomes, concurred. The situation was already troubling: the impact of the "land problem" on the dynamics between subversion and counter-subversion was enormous. "Native populations" could "already be manipulated by the enemy" and, at the same time, it was also possible that "abuses or attempts of abuse" were being systematically carried out by "business interests" in a search for additional land. As the Governor general summed up, the "problem was so complicated

44   Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972).
45   J. Fernandes Nunes Barata, Estudos sobre a economia do ultramar, Lisboa 1963; idem, Para uma política de população, Lisboa 1964.
46   The new legal framework was promulgated on 1 August 1973. Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972).
47   Reordenamento was published by the Settlement Provincial Board of Angola, the public institution in charge of the policies of (re)settlement. J. R. Ferreira Amador, Lei de terras para o Ultramar, in: Reordenamento 30 (1973), pp. 23-24.

and severe" that it was doubtful that it would be possible to "put the house in order in the next fifty years." Three years later, the empire was over.[48]

Conclusion

Both the *Norms of Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping* and the *General Instruction of Counter-Subversion* crystallized the debates that were held and the policies that were enacted, with different rhythms and impacts, in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique from the onset of the intensification of the colonial conflicts.[49] They both highlighted the centrality of rural development as a key instrument in the definition of the late colonial policies. That centrality was a result of socioeconomic considerations. But it was also an outcome of political calculations, securitarian rationales and military expediencies. Control, security and violence constrained the administrative imagination of rural policies. Notwithstanding natural divergences, namely between more "technical" and more political and military standpoints, a significant consensus prevailed within the colonial bureaucracy and respective armed forces. The embracement of developmental languages and repertoires – from social welfare and community development to rural extension and rural development – and the experimental combination between diverse forms of engineering of social change, including of spatial and social landscape, and a variegated catalogue of coercive repertoires of administration gained momentum, and thrived until the end of the empire.[50]

The debates and the policies that marked such an experimental combination occurred in a challenging context characterized by critical international pressures (from indictments in international organizations to cold war interferences[51]), metropolitan transformations (for instance the so-called *primavera Marcelista*, a period of relative political liberalization and economic modernization after Salazar's removal from power[52]) and colonial disturbances (namely the continuation of violent conflicts). In these circumstances, thinking about how to control the "native" population, secure the economy, administer social and cultural difference (the *politics of difference*), contain de-tribalization and deal with the perils of urbanization, stabilize labour pools, provide social welfare, find or create

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48   Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972).

49   For Mozambique, see J. Borges Coelho, Protected Villages and Communal Villages in the Mozambican Province of Tete (1968–1982), PhD thesis, University of Bradford, 1993 and A. Neves de Souto, Caetano e o ocaso do "Império". Administração e guerra colonial em Moçambique durante o Marcelismo (1968–1974), Porto 2007.

50   M. Bandeira Jerónimo, Managing Inequalities: Welfare Colonialism in the Portuguese Empire since the 1940s, in: F. Bethencourt (ed.), Inequality in the Portuguese-Speaking World. Global and Historical Perspectives, Eastbourne, forthcoming, 2017.

51   M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto, International Dimensions of Portuguese Late Colonialism and Decolonization, Special Issue of Portuguese Studies 29 (2013) 2.

52   Marcello Caetano replaced Salazar in 1968. During the first two years, prospects of change – or „evolution in continuity", as Caetano himself termed it – in the authoritarian regime emerged. In relation to colonial issues, no political solution to the military conflicts was offered. The official rhetoric advocated a gradual autonomy of the overseas provinces. Continuity without evolution prevailed.

the African *homo economicus* and foster productivity, induce new worldviews and ethos, counteract "subversive" agendas, (forcefully) resettle and reorganize rural communities and landscapes, minimize the number or impact of the causes of dissension and dissidence, respect international agreements, or balance the interests and initiatives of white and African communities was seen as entailing a systemic, holistic exercise. All these dimensions were closely related, and interdependent. Domain-specific experts debated contentiously, knowledge was produced, circulated and selectively appropriated. Legislation was redefined – for instance, the 1971 Constitutional Revision finally acknowledged "subversion" as a reality and a major problem to be dealt with systemically and systematically, legitimizing states of emergency and violent practices, recognizing the need to explore the interdependence of these dimensions. The related intersections became crucial to colonial policy-making, as well as to internal and external political legitimation.

All these dynamics were clear on the exchanges that characterized the formulation and institutionalization of a counter-subversion strategy, from the early responses to the 1961 events in northern Angola to the "systems" of control of the *Norms* and the comprehensive guidelines of the *General Instruction*. Security rationales and policies embraced developmentalism and welfarism, and the other way around. In a context of a failed, and actually undesired, strictly political transformation and "modernization," starting with the refusal to negotiate increasing self-determination, let alone imperial disengagement, with anticolonial movements, repressive developmentalism reigned. The co-constitution of the *securitization* of development and the *developmentalization* of security in the late colonial period thrived. The rural contexts, polities and economies, were privileged laboratories of these dynamics, and need to be more properly analysed.